Intelligence Bulletin ~ Jan 1944

8/9/2019 Intelligence Bulletin ~ Jan 1944

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VOL.n NO.5 JANUARY 1944INTELLIGENCEBULLETIN

TQ BE PUBLISHEDELLIGENCE DIVISION


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VOL. I I , NO. 5MID 461Intelligence BulletinMILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISIONWar Department

Washington 25, D. C.January 1944NOTICE

The Intelligence Bulletin is designed primarily for the use ofjunior officers and enlisted men. I t is a vehicle for disseminatingto them the latest information received from Military Intelligencesources. In order to insure the widest possible use of this bulletin,its contents are not highly classified; however, it is for the exclusive use of military personnel. Reproduction within the militaryservice is permitted provided that (1) the source is stated, (2) theclassification is maintained, and (3) one copy of the publicationin which the material is reproduced is sent to the DisseminationUnit, Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington 25, D. C.

It is recommended that the contents of this bulletin be utilizedwhenever practicable as a basis for informal talks and discussionswith troops.Readers are invited to comment on the use that they are makingof the Intelligence Bulletin and to forward suggestions for futureissues. Such correspondence may be addressed directly to theDissemination Unit, Military Intelligence Division, War Department, W ashington 25, D. C. Requests for additional copies shouldbe forwarded through channels for approval.

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TABLE OF CONTENTSP AR T O N E : GERMANY

PageSECTION I . H ow THE GERMAN ARMY USES SMOKE IN COMBAT \

1. Introduction. 12. Smoke Screens 3a. In the Defense 3b. In the Attack 8

3. Ground Attacks Employing Area Smoke 12a. Definition 12b. Preparations _i 12C; Maintaining the Area Smoke Screen 14d. How Units Are Coordinated 15e. The Attack . 16f. Aids to Maintaining Direction "; 17g. Follow-up of Attack 18h. Note on Area Screens Used with Water

Obstacles 19I I . H ow INFANTRY BATTALIONS DEVELOP FOR THE AT

TACK 201. Introduction 202 . First Stage 203 . S e c o n d S t a g e _. 23I I I . C A M O U F L A G E A G A I N S T G R O U N D O B S E R V E R S 251 . G e n e r a l ____ 252 . U s e of N a t u r a l C o n c e a l m e n t 263 . U s e of A r t i f i c i a l C a m o u f l a g e 27

a . Employing Natural Material 27b . Employing Artificial Material 28

4 . Precautions Regarding Noise 31Section IV. NE W HEAVY TAN K: TH E Pz. Kw. 5 (PAN TH ER) 33

V. B R I T I S H C O M M E N T S O N G E R M A N U S E O F T A N K S 38V I . G E R M A N C O M B A T T A C T I C S I N T O W N S A N D C I T I E S 41

1. Introduction 412. In the Attack .__. 423 . In the Defense _ _ - _ - 44

VII. GERMAN STAKE MINE__ _ 47

I I


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I I IABLE OF CONTENTSP A K T T W O : J A P A N Page

Section I . E N E M Y B A Y O N E T T E C H N I Q U E 5 31. In t r od uc t io n 532. The Japa nese Regu la t ions 53a. Guard Position 53b . Basic Thrust 55c. Other Types of Thrusts 56 d. Close Combat 58

IT. S M A L L - U N I T T A C T I C S U S E D B Y J A P A N E S E A T N I G H T 641. In t roduc t ion 64 2. The M anu al 64a. Preparations 64 b . Reconnaissance 65 c. The Approach 66d. Demolitions 69e. Assault 70 f. Reorganization ^ 72I I I . C O M M E N T S B Y O B S E K V E R S O N F I G H T I N G I N B U R M A 7 31. In t ro duc t ion 732. En em y Reac t ion dur ing Co m bat 733. N otes on Ene m y Tac t ics 754. N otes on Co m bat Pre para t ions 76I V . " T H R E E J E E R S F O R T H E S O U V E N I R S A P " 8 01. General 802. Specific Ca ses 81a. Private (signal com pan y) 81b . 2nd Lieutenant (AA artil lery) 81c. Private (engineer com pany ) 82


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IV TABLE OF CONTENTSPART THREE: UNITED NATIONS

PageSECTION I. THE INFANTRY LIEUTENANT AND H I S PLATOON 83

1. Introduction 832. The Article 83

a. General 83b . Officer Qualifications 84c. Basic Training 85d. Administration 87e. Psychology 88f. Getting Ready and on the Way 89g. Arrival and Preparation for Action 90h. In Action 91

II . NOT ES ON PATROLLING IN JUNGLES OP BURMA 941. Introduction 942. Preparations 943. Comments on Tactics 97

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONSFigures 1-9. Sketches Illustrating German Tactical Use of Smoke 2-11Figures 10-11. Development of German Infantry Battalion for the

Attack 22Figures 12-15. Some German Camouflage Measures 29-31Figure 16. New German Heavy Tank, the Pz. Kw. 5 (Panther) 34Figure 17. German Attack Tactics in Towns and Cities 43Figure 18. German Stake Mine (antipersonnel) 47Figure 19. Methods of Laying the German Stake Mine 49Figures 20-26. Sketches Illustrating Japanese Bayonet Technique 54-63Figures 27-29. Sketches Illustrating Japanese Small-unit Tactics- - 67-71.


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P A R T O N E : GERMANYSection I. H O W THE GER MAN A R M YUSES SMOKE IN COMBAT

1. INTRODUCTIONUp to a certain point, the Germans use smoke incombat much as we do. They believe th at smokeshould be supplementary to other weapons, rather thana weapon in itself. Incidentally, the German Armymakes more extensive use of smoke candles than doesthe U. S. Army. Although German doctrine coveringthe effect of weather, wind, and terrain on smokescreens is almost identical with our own, the enemytheory of ground attack under cover of area smoke,

discussed in paragraph 3 of this section, differs fromU. S. methods.It should be noted that as yet the Germans have notused white phosphorus smoke, which not only is ahighly effective screening agent, but one which causescasualties, as well. Also, it must be remembered that


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I NT E L L I GE NCE BUL L E T I Nif gas warfare should b reak out, the enemy may usescreening smoke to mask barrages of poison gas.The purpose of such a procedure would be to force our

LE6EN0Direction of wind""'f. ifX Smoke grenade

German outpost line

Opposing outpost line

Figure 1.troops to put on gas masks whenever smoke is usedagainst them.


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HOW THE GERMAN ARMY USES SMOKE IN COMBATThis section is based entirely on German Army documents, winch the U. S. Army Chemical W arfare Serv

ice has translated and recommended for publication.12. SMOKE SCREENSa. In the De fens e

The following examples of German tactical use ofsmoke are representative.OPPOSING OBSERVATION

Figure 2.(1) The advance guard in figure 1 must find outwhether the group of houses in the upper right is

1 For supplementary notes on German use of smoke, see Intelligence Bulle-tin, Vol. I, No. 5, pp. 15-20; Vol. I, No. 7, pp. 58-60; and Vol. II, No. 2, p. 31;also Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 24, pp. 8-11, and No. 38, pp. 14-20.


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I NT E L L I GE NCE BUL L E T I Noccupied by United Nations soldiers. If it drawsfire from these houses and from the grove of saplingsat the upper left, smoke candles are ignited, and theadvance guard re tu rn s to the woods under cover ofthe smoke.(2) In figure 2 a German heavy machine gun platoon is under fire of United Nations artillery. With

Figure 3.the wind coming from the l:30-o'clock direction, theGerman platoon sets down a line of smoke candles,which permits movement to a new position on the hillat the right. I t will be noted that smoke is used tocover only that part of the terrain which offers no


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5OW THE GERMAN ARMY USES SMOKE IN COMBATconcealment. The candles are of course placed with dueregard for the direction of the wind.

(3) In figure 3 strong, well-spaced United Nationsdefenses have stopped the German attack at theentrance to a village. To prepare for fur ther maneuvering later on, the Germans dig in under cover of

Figure 4.smoke, taking advantage of all cover offered by theterrain.(4) A German bicycle scout squad returning fromreconnaissance suddenly receives flanking fire from thewoods shown at the top of figure 4. The squad takescover in a ditch, and ignites smoke candles. The

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6 I NT E L L I GE NCE BUL L E T I Nsmoke allows the Germans to proceed under coverbehind the hill at the left. B eh in d th is hill they areout of the field of fire.

Figure 5.(5) I n figure 5 a Ge rm an re tr og ra d e movement is

ta ki ng place un de r cover of smoke. The withdrawalwas begun as soon as the first screen was set up.Sh ort ly aft erw ard , the second screen was set up, togive the German unit time to reach the cover affordedby the woods shown at the bottom of figure 5.P lu n g in g fire from m ach ine gu ns on the flank is alsocovering the movement.


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HOW THE GERMAN ARMY USES SMOKE IN COMBAT(6) In figure 6 German tanks are withdrawing whilescreened by their own smoke. The flank vehicles are

screened by smoke from an artille ry batte ry. I t willbe noted that this situation calls for quick realizationby the artillery observation post of the tanks' predica-

Figure 6.ment, and for a knowledge of how to use wind directionto achieve the proper secondary screen.(7) Antitank Defense.In at least one instance during the North African campaign, a German tank unitmade simple but effective use of smoke. P a r t of aUnited Nations armored division was brought up tohelp stem a German advance. I t succeeded in ambush


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8 INTELLIGE NCE BULLE TINing a column of German tanks. Some damage wasinflicted and the Germans withdrew , laying down asmoke screen. The commander of the United Nationsforce waited for the smoke to lift, thinking that it couldnot last long. But it persisted, and, since the terraindid not permit by-passing the screen, he gave ordersfor his tanks to proceed through it. As soon as theUnited Nations tanks were silhouetted on the other side,the Germans fired on them with everything they had,and inflicted a great deal of damage before retreating.The Germans have also tried some interesting experiments to make tanks vulnerable. Their glasssmoke grenades seem to be designed specifically forantitank use, but might also be used against pillboxes.The Germans believe that by breaking smoke grenadesover air-intake openings, it is sometimes possible toforce a crew to evacuate its tank, or at least to havegreat trouble in handling it. Also, the Germans haveexperimented with the trick of tying smoke grenadesprobably with time fuzesto each end of a 6- or 7-footrope and throwing it across the barrel of the tank'sgun.b. In the Attack

The following examples of German tactical use ofsmoke in the attack are representative:(1) There is a barricade of wire obstacles in frontof the United Nations machine-gun nest in figure 7.Under cover of smoke, the Germans cut gaps in thewire. (If there is any likelihood of prolonged activ


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9OW THE GERMAN ARMY USES SMOKE IN COMBATity in dense smoke, the Germans put on gas masks.)By means of a few smoke candles, the screen is extended toward the machine-gun positions, since thedirection of the wind perm its this . Both flanks ofthe nest are attacked under the light screen. Also, a

S M O K E T R O O P S

Figure 7.few smoke grenades are thrown in front of, and into,the nest.For a large-scale attack on a United Nations line,the Germans are likely to follow a similar procedure.First, they may cover our centers of resistance with aheavy smoke blanket; then the attacking forces may tryto envelop the positions from both flanks and reducethem from the rear.


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10 INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN(2) Against Pillboxes -The German technique ofassaults against pillboxes is similar to that used against

machine-gun positions [described in (1) above],'withsome interesting modifications. Usually the assault ispreceded by concentrated artillery fire.

Figure 8.One purpose of this is to make craters in which anadvancing combat engineer detachment can take cover.When the assault detachment reaches wire obstaclessurrounding the pillbox, a Very signal calls for allavailable artillery fire to be placed on the pillbox.Smoke screens are laid down by grenades or candles.Men with wire cutters or Bangalore torpedoes opengaps through the wire. Very signals call for artillery


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11OW THE GERMAN ARMY USES SMOKE IN COMBATfire against the pillbox to cease, and a flame-throwingdetachment advances through the gaps in the wireand tries to get within 5 or 6 yards of the pillbox.These men are covered by machine-gun fire. As soon-as their fuel is almost exhausted, they shout a warn\ing, and men with pole charges advance to the embrasures of the pillbox and detonate the charges insideit. If the pillbox still holds out, smoke candles maybe thrown inside it to make the air unbreathable, oran attempt may be made to blow in the roof with aheavy charge.(3) In figure 8 a German attack is stopped by firefrom a heavy machine gun on the left flank. Smoke

$

Figure 9.


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1 2 INTELLIGENCE BULLETINis used to blind the machine gun, and the attackcontinues.

(4) D uring a German tank attack, a United Nations observation post and (suspected) antitank weapons (see fig. 9) are blinded by smoke from aircraftand artillery.3. GROUND ATTACKS EMPLOYING AREA SMOKEa. Definition

The term "area smoke," as denned by a Germanmanual, means the use of smoke to achieve, over anextensive area, an effect much like that of thick natural fog. The Germans regard this as an importantasset in an attack against forces prepared for defensealong a stabilized front, in a field defensive position,or behind a water obstacle.Area smoke creates a zone in which, and into which,observation and observed fire are either difficult orimpossible, except at close range. I t therefore favorsclose combat, with infantry playing an importantpart . The Germans regard surprise as especially useful in an attack under area smoke; this prevents theopposition from rearranging its defensive strategyso as to safeguard against penetration of its lines.b. Preparations

Before the main attack, the Germans occupy suitable positions of readiness. Reconnaissance is performed and thorough preparations are made, beforethe area smoke is laid down. The attacking units


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1 4 INTELLIGENCE BULLETINThe attacking units come to the positions of readinessin open formation.

F ir s t light in the morning is regarded as the mostfavorable time for the attack to begin. The approachof the attacking units may be preceded by a fairlylong area smoke bombardment on the hostile forwardpositions. Smoke- and high-explosive projectiles arefired together until the attacking German infantryapproaches the area which is being smoke-screened.If possible, the hostile rear observation posts areblinded at this time.c. M ainta in ing the Area Smoke Screen

The area smoke is laid down in zones 225 to 350yards wide, across the axis of attack. It s rate ofadvance is governed by the difficulties that the Germans estimate they will encounter in the respectivecombat areas, and by the nature of the terrain;normally, the ra te of advance averages about 225yards in a 15-minute period. The Germans stipulatethat once this screen has been set in motion, it mustfollow the timetable prepared in advance.German units carry the attack forward under fullcover of the smoke. At this stage, forw ard visibilityis kept to hand-grenade range.A head-on wind gives the attack the best smoke protection, the Germans believe. Also, a lateral windhas certain advantages, because it carries the smokeacross sectors which are not being attackeda usefuldeception. The Germans say that a wind blowing in


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HOW THE GERMAN ARMY USES SMOKE IN COMBAT 15the direction of United Nations forces is unsuitable,since it prevents use of the screen for close combat.The Germans believe in extending a screen over theflanks of the combat area, as a ruse. During an attack the screen is supplemented by the smoke equipment of individual attacking unitsthat is, by smokegrenades and candles and by smoke shells from infantryguns. The Germans try to supply their units generouslywith these items, especially with the smoke candles.d. How Units Are Coordinated

The division commander assigns objectives to theinfantry commander, and also assigns missions to theartillery. Antiaircraft defense is provided while unitsare assembling. The area screen is laid down bysmoke units and artillery, working together under thesole command of the artillery commander. This areascreen is laid on the basis of a time schedule and acoverage outlined by the division commander.The infantry regimental commander gives the battalions details regarding their attack and the objectives of the breakthrough. He puts under thecommand of the battalions such materiel as may benecessary to the fulfillment of their missions; thisincludes antitank guns, infantry guns, and aids tomaintaining direction. Forces assigned to attackdefensive works are augmented by combat engineerunits with their special equipment, individual armoredvehicles, and weapons for engaging pillboxes. The bat


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1 6 INTELLIGENCE BULLETINtalion commander goes forw ard with the troops engaged in the breakthrough.

Radio apparatus is considered necessary, even forlateral communication, during the course of fightingin the smoke-covered area. Additional signal unitsare attached, to provide the necessary communicationunder these difficult circumstances.Reconnaissance aircraft are employed to report theeffectiveness of the screen, and to reconnoiter the terrain beyond it. Dive-bombing attacks are carried outagainst hostile bat tery positions, assembly areas, andmoving columns of hostile reserves.After the breakthrough, the regimental commanderreorganizes those forces which have become scattered.e. The Attack

The infantry are the first to enter the combat area.The Germans are likely to dispatch assault detachments against individual and especially formidabledefensive positions on the near edge of the combatarea; the purpose of this, of course, is to make penetration easier.German assault troops are thrown in at points wherethe terrain and the character of defensive obstaclesoffer conditions most favorable for a thrust . Duringthe battle these assault troops must rely on their ownresources. The German theory is that such unitsshould be strong enough to fight their way across thecombat area, and reach the far edge still strong enough


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17OW THE GERMAN ARMY USES SMOKE IN COMBATto continue active fighting. I t is a German principlethat these assault units should advance simultaneously,no matter how great the variety of tasks that each unitmust perform.When the infantry is nearing the far edge of thehostile defenses, under cover of the smoke, the artillerybegins its mission of providing the necessary fire coverfor the spearhead of the attack, as it comes out of thesmoke and within the view of United Nations forces.German artillery forward observers, with field telephone apparatus, accompany the forward elements ofthe attacking infantry, and communicate with theartillery liaison officers at battalion headquarters . During the advance through the smoke, the observerssignal to field artillery observation personnel at prearranged times, to indicate which objectives have beenattained. Vertical light signals, such as Very lights,are used for this purpose.f. Aids to M ain ta in ing Direction

The Germans consider it necessary for attackingunits to be properly oriented at all times, so that therewill be no confusion when vision is sharply reduced.The following devices are employed in maintainingdirection:(1) The magnetic compass.(2) A radio beam sent out by a transmitter, withseveral receivers picking it up. The transm itte r isset up at the line of departure, and lays a beam about65 feet wide through the smoke, in the direction of the


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1 8 INTELLIGENCE BULLETINobjective. The men operating the receivers can tellat any time whether they are in the radio beam orhave deviated to a flank. A special unit of the signalservice, moving with the leading elements of theattacking forces, operates this equipment.(3) "D irection shells," which scatter red, yellow, orblue powder, are issued to the infantry gun companies.Before the attack these rounds are so fired as to markthe path of attack with colored patches every 55 yards(approximately).(4) Marking lines, each about 350 yards long, attached to rockets.(5) The gyro-compass.(6) Direction tapes in different colors mark theroutes that staffs or units have taken through thesmoke. These tapes facilitate courier traffic, themaintenance of contact, and the forward movement ofunits advancing later on. Numerals on the tapes tellmen fighting within the screen how far they havepenetrated from the line of departure.g. Follow-up of Attack

When the attacking units reach the far edge of thescreen, they reorganize so that an immediate attackcan be launched against important objectives, whichusually lie beyond the screened area . While the infantry is reorganizing, antitank guns provide protection. Also, tank units which have been held in readiness are brought through the newly captured area toattack hostile artillery positions and any hostile re


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1 9OW THE GERMAN ARMY USES SMOKE IN COMBATserves which may have been brought up . German reserves exploit the breakthrough so that maximumstrength can be applied against United Nations forceson the far side of the smoke screen.h. Note on Area Screens Used with Water Obstacles

It is a German principle that, when hostile forcesare defending themselves behind a water obstacle, anarea screen is useful only if there is little or no current or if the stream is a narrow one. The first waveto be ferried over consists only of assault troops whoare to engage the fieldworks on the opposite bank.The timetable for the area screen takes into accountthe requirement that units ferried across a streammust have time to assemble on the opposite bank before any thrust against extensive hostile defenses isattempted.


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Section II H O W INFANTR Y BATTALIONSDEVELOP FOR THE ATTACK

T. INTRODUCTIONThe German theory of entrance into offensive combat is fairly usual, in that two distinct stages areinvolved. These are called Entfaltung and Entwick-

lung, which may best be translated into U. S. terminology as "development" and "deployment." Thefirst stage is evidently designed to permit more rapiddeployment at the proper time, and to enable goodcontrol to be main tained until as late a moment aspossible. Briefly, the first stage {Entfaltung) beginswith the approach march, when the battalion changesfrom a route-march formation to one made up of several columns. The second stage (Entwicklung) coverswhat, in U. S. practice, is the deployment of platoonsand squads. The following paragraphs outline thetactics involved in each stage, as they are taught toGerman infantry noncoms.2. FIRST STAGE

Normally, the development of a regiment is by battalions (see fig. 10). If necessary, distances betweenbattalions are increased.When a high state of preparedness is necessary, thebattalion itself may "shake out" into companies.20


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HO W GERMAN INFA NT RY BATTALIONS DEVELOP 2 1Companies proceed in the direction given them, employing the normal marching formation and, at thesame time, making use of whatever cover and concealment are available. Commanders take into account the additional strain of marching across country.Company transport remains with companies as longas possible, until the companies themselves mustdeploy.The Germans believe that it is often advisable tohave only one company forward, with the mainstrength of the battalion kept directly under the battalion commander as long as possible, ready to beemployed in the direction most advantageous for anattack.Support weapons are used to cover the developmentand the subsequent advance. These weapons are interspersed in the line of march, either between thecompanies or behind the battalion. If any alterationof intervals is caused by ground conditions or hostilefire, the original intervals are resumed at the earliestopportunity.

When the development takes place, the leading elements of the battalion may be ordered to seize tactically important terrain.German training points out that deployment atnight, and in woods, calls for stronger protection forward, for preparatorymarking of routes.shorter than by day.

Inreconnaissance,tervals betweenandunitsfor theare5(33795 43 vol. 2, No. 5 4


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22 I NT E L L I GE NCE BUL L E T I N

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RST

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HOW GERMAN INFANTRY BATTATIONS DEVELOP 2 3The battalion commander's orders cover:a. Information regarding hostile and German un its ;b. German intentions;c. Reconnaissance;d. Ins tructions for forward companies (includingseizure of dominating terrain) ;e. Instructions for weapons supporting the advance ;f. Instructions for the companies comprising themain body (including reconnaissance on flanks andprotection of flanks, if necessary) ;g. Rendezvous of company transport and battalionvehicles;h. Battalion headqu arte rs; intercommunications.At the time of the development, the battalion commander moves with the forward elements from one

prominent terrain feature to another. He generallysends special reconnaissance patrols ahead, or reconnoiters the hostile position himself from a commanding ter ra in feature . Commanders of support weaponsaccompany him, reconnoitering for firing positions.3. SECOND STAGE

As soon as any German company comes withinrange of observed hostile artillery fire, it dispersesin depth (see fig. 11). The Germans consider thatan advance in file is often desirable, inasmuch as itrepresents only a small target and one which iseasily controlled; they recognize, however, that it ishighly vulnerable to enfilade fire.


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2 4 INTELLIGENCE BULLETINIf ground conditions and hostile fire make deployment necessary, the platoons may be dispersed in

depth into squads. The Germans find that thissplitting-up permits the ground to be exploited forcover during the advance, and that it hinders theeffectiveness of hostile observation and fire. Reservesand support weapons also adopt open formations.They remain sufficiently far behind the forward elements to avoid coming under fire directed at theseelements.If the rifle companies are deployed, their elementsnormally move forward in narrow columns or singlefiles, with irregu lar intervals, and make use of allavailable cover. The forward elements are not deployed as skirmishers until they are required to engage in a fire fight.


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Section III. CAMOUFLAGE AGAINSTGROUND OBSERVERS1. GENERAL

German camouflage is excellent, experienced U. S.fighting men agree. The enemy's natu ral ap titudefor painstaking craftsmanship seems to serve him ingood stead when camouflage is to be undertaken . Nomatter whether the German is making use of naturalor artificial camouflage, his work is resourceful andthorough. He is aware that in camouflage, it 's thesmall touches that countdetails that an impatientsoldier, or a lazy one, might regard as unimportant.

The German Army does not consider camouflage anend in itself, but a vitally important preliminary tosuccessful action. As the Germans frankly put it,"Camouflage enables us to achieve surp rise ." Theytry to use their own weapons and equipment for theutmost effect, while simultaneously preventing the hostile force from making exact calculations and employingits own resources to advantage."When time is short," the Germans say, "it is better to camouflage a few objects well than to camouflage everything badly. If a camouflage plan is linkedwith deception, such as the use of dummy materiel,it will be all the more effective. However, it must beremembered that a single blunder can ruin the success

25


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2 6 INTELLIGENCE BULLETINof an entire plan. Noise and light discipline are partand parcel of an over-all camouflage layout, and it isevery soldier's responsibility to help maintain thegeneral scheme to perfection. The careless man endangers the lives of all his comrades."2. USE OF NATURAL CONCEALMENT

German use of natural concealment is comparable to'our own. However, a few outstanding German principles may be noted.Since natural concealment can be put to use quickly,it is considered preferable to artificial camouflage.The importance of darkness, mist, and shadows, and ofthe " tex tu re " of natu ral growth, is stressed. (It is acamouflage axiom that a "smooth-textured" surface,which reflects light, make a dangerous background; onthe other hand, such "rough" surfaces as thickets,tall crops, and high grass absorb light and seem darkerthan they are, when viewed from a distance. Of primary importance in confusing the air observer, texture can also be used to deceive the ground observer.)The German Army emphasizes that darkness affordsthe best concealment of all, and stipulates that it beutilized extensively for the assembly and movementof troops, tran spor tat ion of supplies, and work onpositions. The importance of maintaining a totalblackout is stressed.The Germans believe in continuing normal daytimecamouflage measures throughout the night, in caseUnited Nations forces should try to break the darkness


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GERMAN Y CAMOUFLAGE AG AINST GROUND OBSERVERS 2 7by means of flares or any other light-producing device.German soldiersespecially the men of the HermannGoering Divisionhave been taught to freeze in theirtracks the moment their surroundings are unexpectedlyilluminated.German soldiers are taught that bad visibility, suchas mist creates, affords much the same concealment asdarkness, but are warned that mist often clears awayso rapidly that it is dangerous for them not to be readywith some other type of concealment.3. USE OF ARTIFICIAL CAMOUFLAGEa. Employing Natural Material

The German Army makes liberal use of naturalcamouflage mater ial. Often the outline of an objectis broken, and its betraying shadow is changed, by theuse of branches; this is a favorite way of disguisingtanks and vehicles at the ha lt.Grass, moss, and low bushes are frequently transplanted for use as camouflage. Turf is lifted in neatrectangular sections. Recognizing that cut grass,branches, and so on soon lose their original color, theGermans renew this type of garnish continually. Theyare aware that branches cut from trees last longer thanthose cut from shrubs, and that they will keep theiroriginal color even better if they are stuck into theground or are wrapped in wet rags or moss.

On stabilized fronts the Germans often plant grass,grain, flowers, shrubs, and even trees, to completecamouflage schemes.


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2 8 INTELLIGENCE BULLETINb. Employing Artificial M ate ria l

Artificial material is used only if natural materialis insufficient, unsuitable, or not available at all. Tarpaulins, hemp or wire netting , clothing, old rags,paper, sheet iron, wire, cord, timber, sawdust, chips,shavings, ashes, and paint are among the many kindsof artificial material that the Germans use.As a rule, units contrive their own artificial camouflage schemes.Camouflage suits and jackets, with or withouthoods, are often worn by patro ls and observers. Helmets are camouflaged with netting and garnish.Small objects are often camouflaged with garnishedcanvas, and large objects with garnished netting. TheGermans employ the familiar IT. S. principle of thinning the garnish gradually from the center outward,so that the camouflage will merge with the surroundings.To hide bridges, exposed stretches of roads, andtactically important areas, the Germans sometimeserect screens (see fig. 12) . This measure is a precaution against observed fire. Such screens usuallyare constructed of leafy branches placed verticallyand supported by wire stretched between trees orposts; they may be supplemented by garnished netting.Sometimes the German Army issues "camouflageum bre lla s." These consist of a light metal frame andreversible netting, green on one side and buff on theother, so th at local surround ings can readily be


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GERM ANY C AMO UFLAG E AGAINST GROUND OBSERVERS 2 9

Figure 12 .matched. Garnish is added. The umbrellas, whichare easy to put up and take down, are used to camouflage heavy weapons, observation posts, and so on (seefig. 13).

Figure 13.Dummy hillocks are constructed, sometimes overfoxholes, by means of wooden or wire frames covered

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30 INTELLIGENCE BULLETINUncamouflaged frame

Camouflaged frameFigure 14.

with materials of suitable texture and color (see fig.14).When the Germans use paint in camouflaging weapons, vehicles, and other metal equipment, they deliberately employ a color which is darker than thesurroundings. Also, they add sand to roughen a flatsurface and thus prevent reflection of light. TheGermans may either remove the windshields of vehicles altogether, or smear them with g rit ty oil orpaint, leaving only a narrow slit for vision.


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GERMA NY CAMOUFLAGE AGAINST GROUND OBSERVERS 3 1

Figure 15.

White horses are sprayed with a solution of about10 percent perm angana te of potash (see fig. 15). Toobtain a darker color, the Germans strengthen thesolution. The coloring is renewed every 8 to 10weeks.4. PRECAUTIONS REGARDING NOISE

The Germans are aware of the importance of silenceas part of a camouflage scheme when a hostile forceis in the vicinity. Accordingly, they take precautionsto eliminate or lessen sounds which might indicatetheir presence.Orders are given in a subdued tone, or are written.Hard ground is avoided as much as possible, and fulluse is made of soft ground.


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3 2 INTELLIGENCE BULLETINThe equipment of the individual soldier is sowrapped and fastened as to prevent clinking or

scraping noises.For short distances the wheels of horse-drawn vehicles are wrapped in rags or sim ilar material, andhorses' hooves are padded. Since horses which havea tendency to neigh are a liability, their mouths aretied. If they are standing still, they are given feedbags; this has a quieting effect.Vehicles are loaded in such a way that the clatterof equipment is impossible, even on bad roads or whenthe vehicles are moving across country. Horns aredisconnected, so that they will not be sounded byaccident.W hen conditions perm it, vehicles take advantage ofthe sound of artillery fire or friendly aircraft overhead and move while the sound of their motors isdrowned out by the louder noises.To prevent United Nations forces from locatingGerman gun positions by sound ranging, the Germanstry to carry out their fire ranging by means of rovingbatteries and by means of roving guns brought upexpressly for this purpose. If such a system cannotbe employed, fire is restricted to close bursts or salvos.The Germans also use dummy batteries (equipped toimitate the sound of fire) to make sound ranging byUnited Nations forces more difficult.


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Section IV . NEW H E A V Y TANK:THE Pz. Kw. 5 (PANTHER)When the Pz. Kw. 6 (Tiger) became standard, thePz. Kw. 5 (Pan th er) was still in an experimental stage.

Now that the Pan ther has joined the German tank seriesas a standard model, a general description of this newest"land battleship" can be made available to U. S. military personnel. Much of the data presented here comesfrom Russian sources, inasmuch as the Pz. Kw. 5 hasthus far been used only on the Eastern Front.The Panth er (see fig. 16) is a fast, heavy, well-armored vehicle. It mounts a long 75-mm gun.Weighing 45 tons, the new tank appears to be of atype intermediate between the 22-ton Pz. Kw. 4 andthe 56-ton Pz. Kw. 6.1 The Panther has a speed ofabout 31 miles pe r hour. I t corresponds roughly toour General Sherman, which the Germans have alwaysgreatly admired.

1With certain alterations the Pz. Kw. 6 may weigh as much as 62 tons.For an illustrated discussion of the Pz. Kw. 6, see Intelligence Bulletin,Vol. I, No. 10, pp. 19-23.

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Figure 16.New German Heavy Tank, the Pz. Kw. 5 (Panther)


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GERMANY NE W HEAVY TAN K 35The following table of information regarding thePz. Kw. 5 will be of interest:

Weight 45 tons.Width 11 ft 8 in (same as the Pz . Kw . 6).Length 22 ft 8 in (1/2 ft longer than the Pz. Kw. 6).Clearance 1 ft 8 in (3.9 in more than the Pz. Kw. 6) .Motor gasoline, 640 hp, in rear of tank (the gas tanksare on each side of the motor).Cooling system water.Ignition magneto.C a t e r p i l l a rsection drive sprockets at front rear idlers; 8 doublerubber-tired bogie wheels, 33.5 in in diameter, on either side; torsion suspension system ; hydraulic shock absorbers inside tank;metal caterpillar tread 25.6 in wide.

Armor front of turret and cannon shield, 3.94 in ;upper front plate, 3.45 in, 57 angle ofslope; lower front plate, 2.95 in, 53 anglef slope.Armament 75-mm gun, long barrel; one 7.92-mm machine gun (MG 42).Ammunition- 75 rounds (A P and H E ) .M a x i m u mspeed ,. approx 31 mph.Range approx 105 mi.Crew 5.I t is believed that the 75-mm gun is the Kw. K.2 Thistank gun is a straight-bore weapon with a muzzle brake,and has an over-all length of 18 feet 2 inches.

'' KampfwagenJcanonetank gun.


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3 6 INTELLIGENCE BULLETINAlthough equipped with the same motor as theTiger, the Panther has lighter armor and armament.

For this reason it is capable of h igher speed andgreater maneuverability. The Pa nth er is also provided with additional armor plate, 4- to 6-mm thick,(not shown in fig. 16) along the side, just above thesuspension wheels and the sloping side armor plate.When a flexible tube with a float is attached to theair intake, the Panther has no difficulty in fordingfairly deep stream s. There is a special fitting in thetop of the tank for attaching this tube.Like the Pz. Kw. 6's, the Pz. Kw. 5's are organizedinto separate tank battalions. During the summer of1943, the Germans used m any of these new tanks onthe Russian front.Although the Russians have found the Pz. Kw. 5 moremaneuverable than the Pz. Kw. 6, they are convincedthat the new tank is more easily knocked out. Firefrom all types of rifles and machine guns directedagainst the peep holes, periscopes, and the base of theturret and gun shield will blind or jam the parts,

the Russians say. H igh explosives and armor-piercing shells of 54-mm (2.12 inches) caliber, or higher,are effective against the tu rret at ranges of 875 yardsor less. Large-caliber artil le ry and self-propelled cannon can put the Panther out of action at ordinarydistances for effective fire. The vertical and slopingplates can be pene trated by armor-piercing shells of45-mm (1.78 inches) caliber, or higher. Incendiaryarmor-piercing shells are said to be especially effec


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3 7ERMANYNEW HEAVY TANKtive, not only against the gasoline tanks, but againstthe ammunition, which is located just to the rear ofthe driver.The additional armor plate above the suspensionwheels is provided to reduce the penetration of hollow-charge shells. According to the Russians, it isineffective; antitank grenades, antitank mines, andMolotov cocktails are reported to be effective againstthe weak top and bottom plates and the cooling andventilating openings on top of the tank, just above themotor.However, it should definitely be stated that thePz. Kw. 5 is a formidable weapona distinct asset ofthe German Army.

563795 43 vol. 2, No. 5


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Section V . BRITISH COMMENTS ONGERMAN USE OF TANKSIn the Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. I , No. 11, pp.53-54, there appeared a translation of a Fifth PanzerArmy order signed by Lt. Gen. Gustav von Vaerst,listing " te n commandm ents" for the employment oftanks. This month the Intelligence Bulletin againpublishes a translation of these "com mandm ents," andadds approp riate comments by GHQ, Middle EastForces, based on a report by an experienced armored

force officer.First, the German order:1. The tank is a decisive combat weapon. Therefore, itsemployment should be limited to the "main effort" in suitableterrain.2. The tank is not an individual fighting weapon. Thesmallest tank unit is the platoon, and, for more importantmissions, the company.3. The tank is not an infan try support weapon. I t breaksinto, and through, the opposition's line, and the infantry followsit closely.4. The tank can take and clear terrain, but it cannot hold it.The latter is the mission of the infantry, supported by infantryheavy weapons, antitank guns, and artillery.

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SOME BRITISH COMMENTS ON GERMAN USE OF TANKS 3 95. The tank is not to be employed as artillery to fight theenemy from a single position for an extended period. Whilefighting, the tank is almost constantly in motion, halting brieflyto fire.6. The mission of the infantry is to neutralize hostile antitank weapons, and to follow the tank attack closely so as toexploit completely the force and morale effect of that attack.7. The mission of the artillery is to support the tank attackby fire, to destroy hostile artillery, and to follow closely therapidly advancing tank attack. The main task of the artillery

support is continuous flank protection.8. The task of the tank destroyers ("Ferdinands" or other self-propelled mounts equipped with high-velocity weapons) is tofollow the tank attack closely, and to get into the battlepromptly when tank fights tank.9. The mission of the combat engineers is to open gaps inminefieldsunder tank, infantry, and artillery protectionandthereby enable the tank attack to continue.10. At night, when tanks are blind and deaf, it is the missionof the infantry to protect them.And now the comments by GrHQ, British MiddleEast Forces:I t is considered that, with the exception of Nos. 2 and 3,these "commandments" are sound common sense, based on fundamental principles.Number 2 is interesting, however, since it reflects the opinionsof von Arnim, von Thoma, and Stumme (all now prisoners ofwar), who fought in Russia, where they acquired the habit ofusing their tanks in "penny packets." A platoon consists offive tanks, and a company consists of 17 Pz. Kw. 3's, 18 Pz. Kw.4's, or 8 Pz. Kw. 6's. Rommell would never have agreed to the

company being split, and would normally have preferred to usethe battalion, or even the regiment, as the unit of attack, justas we [the British] ourselves would.


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4 0 INTELLIGENCE BULLETINN um ber 3 is deb atable. A ga inst weak a ntit an k defense andno mines , th is metho d would be effective. How ever, the actionat Medenine, in the Mareth line area, and all action after thatshowed th a t we are as well equ ipped w ith a n tita nk guns as theG erm an s are . Because of th is, th e Germ ans will be compelledto rew rite the ir No. 3 "co m m an dm en t" and use their tanks muchas our Eighth Army has been doing recently.


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Section V I . GERMAN COMBAT TACTICSIN TOWNS AND CITIES1. INTRODUCTION

Now that United Nations forces are fighting energetically on the soil of continental Europe, it must beexpected th at we shall engage the enemy in- townsand cities with ever-increasing frequency. For thisreason, it is most important for us to understandGerman doctrine regarding combat in populatedplaces.

Often the size of a town is not the principal determining factor in a German commander's tacticalplan; instead, a town's geographic or economic importance may be his first consideration. A very smallvillage may be worth contesting fiercely if it commandsthe entrance to a mountain pass, for example, or if itpossesses resources essential to the German war effort.A much larger town, on the other hand, may have farless value, and by no means be worth the same expenditure of men and materiel.However, the Germans use the same basic tacticsfor towns and cities alike. These tactics are summarized in the following paragraphs, which are basedon a German Army document. 41


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4 2 INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN2. IN THE ATTACK

The Germans attem pt to outflank and encircle atown. If this move succeeds, they cut off the water,electricity, and gas supply. They find the most vulnerable spot in the area held by the hostile forces, andpenetrate it. After cu tting the hostile forces in two,the Germans then divide the opposition again andagain so that it no longer is able to maneuver freely.German doctrine main tains that paralle l attacks constitu te the most advantageous method if a number ofcolumns are available (see fig. 17a). Thrusts at anangle (see fig. 17b), and especially thrusts from opposite directions (see Hig. 17c and d ) , are avoided. TheGermans believe that such thrusts are likely to resultin friendly troops getting under each other's fire, andthat confusion is inevitable.The Germans group their units as attack columnsand mopping-up columns. Advance by limited sectorsis the rule . Commanders do not plan too far ahead.After taking a block, a commander reassembles hismen and issues further instructions.

It is a German axiom that "he who commands theheights also commands the dep th s." The Germansstrive for dominating positions, although in defensethey may site their machine guns in much lowerpositions.While an advance is being made in a street, a simultaneous advance is made along the roofs if the housesadjoin each other. In the streets an advance is made


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GERMAN COMBAT TACTICS IN TOWNS AND CITIES 4 3

mm

RIGHT

UNFAVORABLE

1 % , , m mtemm181S1

WRONG

I WRONGFigure 17.German Attack Tactics in Towns and Cities.


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4 4 INTELLIGENCE BULLETINby single files edging forward close to the houses oneach side. From front to rear , marksm en are detailedto observe danger points on the opposite side of thestreet; that is, a m an may be ordered to observe allroofs or all the windows on a given floor, and so on.Side alleys and en trances to side streets are blockedas rapidly as possible. After this, searching partiesare detailed to investigate all buildings in the block,and then close them. Entra nces to cellars and firstfloors are guarded unti l all houses in the block havebeen searched. All windows are closed and shuttered.The Germans attach importance to constant andeffective cooperation with art il le ry . Light guns (manhandled) advance along the street and combat nests ofresistance with direct fire. The Germans believe that,aside from air bombardment, only 150-mm to 210-mmpieces are effective in destroying the larger buildings.Tanks, they main tain , are not very successful inassaults on houses.When attacking a town, the Germans do not employmotor vehicles or horses. As much gear as possibleis sacrificed in favor of axes, crowbars, wire-cutters,saws, ropes and rope ladders, flashlights, preparedcharges, hand grenades, smoke candles and grenades,and maps and air photographs of the locality.3. IN THE DEFENSE

In organizing the defense of a town, the Germansprepare a reserve of drinking water, rations, ammunition, and medical supplies. Some of this is stored in


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GERMAN COMBAT TACTICS IN TOWNS AND CITIES 4 5various cellars, since the Germans are aware that theseare tactically useful places, from which the advanceof a hostile force can be hindered considerably.Searchlights are kept ready to illuminate the targetarea at night. P re par at ion is made for defense bysectors. Mines and booby trap s are kep t ready for use.So that the main line of resistance will not be discovered by the hostile forces, the Germans place itwithin the town proper and make it irregu lar. Onlyindividual centers of resistance are established in theoutskirts. These are used for flanking purposes. Im portant buildings are defended, not from their ownwalls, but from advance positions.The Germans try to maintain a strong mobilereserve.

Every attempt is made to trap hostile units in dead-end streets and to cut off, by sudden flanking movements, hostile units which advance too recklessly.Emergency barriers are kept ready in the entrancesto buildings. These barriers can be placed across thestreets on extremely short notice.Low machine-gun positions are prepared to coverall possible approach routes.Good telephone communication is maintained.Command posts remain constantly on guard againstsurprise attacks.The windows of all buildings are kept open at alltimes, so that the attackers will have difficulty in

detecting from which windows fire is being delivered.563795" 43 vol. 2, No. 5 7


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4 6 INTELLIGENCE BULLETINGerman soldiers are instructed not to fire from window sills, but from positions well within the rooms.Snipers continually move from room to room. Individual roof tiles are removed to provide loopholes.On rooftops, firing positions behind chimneys are considered desirable, provided that the chimneys arebelow the roof ridges.Important doors leading to the street are guarded,and doors which are not to be used are blocked.Holes are pierced through the walls of adjoininghouses to afford communication channels.The Germans regard the entire matter of defensemerely as a preliminary to surprise counterattacks.


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Section V I I . GERMAN STAKE MINEThe German concrete antipersonnel mine known asthe Stockmine (stake mine) is now standard. Thestake mine, which must not be confused with the

Italian picket mine, apparently represents a Germaneffort to economize on strategic materials; nevertheless it deserves to be treated with as much respectas any other an tipersonnel device. I t has. been reported that the stake mine may be fatal up to aradius of 66 ya rds.Shrapnel, tightly packed in conc rete, usedas aggregate, e.g. pieces ofmild steel ba r, ball ammun ition, etc.

Igniter - - Standard boreholemodified Z.Z.3S charge as detonator.

Tnp wiro Explosive charge Round plywood stake

Figure 18.German Stake Mine (antipersonnel).The mine consists of a doncrete casing, a high explosive cartridge, an igniter, and a detonator, and isused with a stake. The mine (see fig. 18) is about

47


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4 8 INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN6 inches high and about 2% inches in diameter, andweighs approximately 4y2 pounds; the stake (seefig. 18) is about l .foo t 4 inches long and 1% inchesin diam eter. The Germans assemble these parts in thefollowing manner:a. The stake is driven into the ground until itprojects about 5 inches.b. The cartr idge is placed inside the casing. Whenthe Germans use a smaller commercial cartridge, theywedge it into place with bits of wood.c. The igniter, together with a detonator, is screwedinto the top of the mine.d. The mine is placed on the stake.e. If necessary, the top and bottom of the mine aresealed with wax to keep out moisture.

The ways in which the Germans lay the stake minedepend on the terrain, especially on the type of soiland the vegetation. Figures 19a, 19b, and 19c illustrate methods of laying the mine with the GermanZ. Z. 42 ign iter. If a German Z. Z. 35 igniter is used,a pull at a rig ht angle to the ign iter will not fire it.For this reason, a stake with its top cut off at a 45degree angle is driven into the ground until it projectsabout l1/^ feet, and the mine is placed beside it; thetrip wire is led from the igniter over two nails whichhave been driven crosswise into the top of the stake,as shown in figure 19d. (This last precaution isdesigned to keep the wire from snagging.) Theenemy may also use two tr ip wires, at an angle of180 degrees to each other (see fig. 19e) ; both are at


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GERMAN STAKE MINE

- Up to 5 0 '

Up tp 5 0 '

Figure 19.Methods of Laying the German Stake Mine.


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5 0 INTELLIGENCE BULLETINtached to the eye in the releasing mechanism of a Z. Z.35 igniter , and two guide stakes are used. The Germans s tipulate that tr ip wires not longer than 50feet be used, as a rule. If longer tr ip wires (up to65 feet) are used, they are supported at a height of 8to 10 inches above the ground by stakes carefullyaligned 15 feet a part . Also, the mine without thestake may be tied to trees or telephone poles (see fig.19c). "When this is done, the hole in the bottom ofthe mine is plugged to keep the cartridge in position.In loose sand, boggy ground, or snow, extra-longstakes are used. The Germans recommend tha t whitepaint be used as camouflage when there is snow on theground.

The G ermans say that stake mines should be laid andarmed only by highly skilled men working in pairs.One man holds the mine and the igniter while the otherarranges the tr ip wire. German soldiers are warnedthat the wire must never be stretched tight.The enemy is likely to lay stake mines in depth innarrow country paths, and in defiles and ravines.The mines may also be laid in staggered rows to formmine belts. F o r example, such a belt might consistof 150 mines laid in three rows, each about 3,200 feetlong, with the mines 65 feet apart.In neutralizing the stake mine, the Germans firstidentify the type of igniter . If it is a Z. Z. 42, oneman holds the safety pin firmly in position while asecond man cuts the tr ip w ire. If the pin of the Z. Z.42 has been partly withdrawn, the mine is destroyed


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GERMAN STAKE M INE 5 1on the spot. If the igniter is a Z. Z. 35, the safety pinor a nail is placed in the safety-pin hole. As anadded precaution, the pin may be secured with adhesive tape.To disarm the stake mine, the Germans unscrew theigniter, remove the charge and the detonator, and thenpack each of these three parts in separate boxes forfuture use.


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PART TWO: JAPANSection I. ENEMY BAYONET TECHNIQUE1. INTRODUCTION

Japanese training regulations dealing with the technique of using the bayonet are presen ted below. Although reports to date from theaters of operations showthat, as a rule, the individual Japanese soldier has notbeen very adept at bayonet fighting,1 all our intelligence sources indicate that the Japanese place considerable emphasis on bayonet training.2. THE JAPANESE REGULATIONSa. Guard Position

The regulations give the following specific instructions for this position:Face the opponent and look into his eyes. W ith the toes of

the right foot pointing to the right, take a half step with theleft foot, toes pointing toward the opponent; bend the kneesslightly and keep the body straight (see figure 20). At the sametime, throw the rifle with the right hand so that its weight leanstoward the left and drops forward. W ith the left hand held atrifle above the belt line, grasp the rifle just in front of the lowerband. W ith the right hand, palm to the left, grasp the small of1 See Intelligence Bulletin. Vol. II , No. 2, p. 64. 53


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54 INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Figure 20.Guard Position.the stock, keeping the protruding part between the forefingerand the middle finger. Hold the right fist against the side ofthe hip. Hold both arms in a na tural manner, slightly bent.Point the bayonet at the opponent's eyes.(1) While Moving Forward. Press lightly with the toes ofthe rear foot and advance forward with the front foot, following quickly with the rear foot.

(2) While Moving Backward.Execute in exactly the opposite manner from the forward.The advantages of these movements are that: (a) balancecan be maintained easily, with the soldier ready for instantmovement in any direction; (b) the knees are not strained;and (c) both feet are moved close to the ground, and the toesare always in contact with the ground.


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5 5APANESE BAYONET TECHNIQUEb. Basic Thrust

The basic thrust is a movement executed by driving thebayonet in a straight line to any opening in the body from acrossing position of the rifles, opponents facing each other (seefig. 21).

Figure 21.Position for Basic Thrust.The instructor gives the command of "Rear Left" from the

crossing position, and the thrust is executed by carrying outthe following instructions:Execute the thrust from the "On Guard" position by steppingfirmly with the right foot and then quickly advancing the left foot.At the same time, with both hands grasping the rifle firmly,raise the right hand to the lower front part of the rightbreast, raise the left hand forward and a little higher thanthe right, and bend the waist a trifle; during this movement,


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5 6 INTELLIGENCE BULLETINdrive the bayonet forcefully, with the left hand extended, ina straight line at the opening of the instructor's body. Whileboth legs move forward close to the ground, step with the leftfoot flat so that it will carry the weight of the body, andquickly move the right leg to the proper position. After executing the thrust, return swiftly to "On Guard."When the bayonet fighter executes his thrust, the instructorwill move his left hand slightly to the left from the crossingposition. He moves backward with the thrust and receives it onhis body. Then he returns immediately to "On Guard."

Successive basic thrusts are movements in which the thrust isexecuted several times in succession. In executing these movements, the instructor will give a command of "Rear Left" fromthe crossing position.Successive thrusts are executed swiftly. After each thrust,the bayonet fighter retreats , but recovers immediately. Evenif he believes that the distance and timing are not just right,the fighter must always try to thrus t with determination. Ifthe thrust cannot be executed immediately, he should not givehis opponent an advantage. The fighter should be alert fordistance and timing, and, at the opportune moment, he shouldthrust with determination.The instructor, in order to comply with the main points ofteaching the thrust, will move backward swiftly with eachthrust, according to the skillfulness of the thrust, and allowthe bayonet fighter to thrust his body. Then, as the bayonetfighter becomes more competent, the instructor should vary andlengthen the timing and distance so as to give the fighterpractice.c. Other Types of Thrusts

In executing movements of the bayonet, the different typesof thrusts are: side-step thrust, low body thrust, body-contactthrust, knock-off thrust, and parry thrust.


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5 7APANESE BAYONET TECHNIQUE(1) Execution of Side-step Thrust.To execute the side-stepthrust, place the bayonet on the right or left of the opponent'sbayonet. Lower the bayonet point by bending both knees and,at the same time, move to the right or left, step in quickly, anddrive the bayonet forcefully into the opponent's throat or upperbody. Guide the bayonet to the target through the upper pa rtof the opponent's left hand.Common errors: (a) the tendency to lower the bayonet pointtoo much; and (b) the tendency to withdraw the riflea movewhich gives the opponent an advantage.(2) Execution of Low Body Thrust.Execute this thrust in thesame manner as the side-step thrust, except that your target isthe lower part of the body and you guide the bayonet to thetarget through the lower part of the opponent's left hand.Common errors: (a) a scooping-up motion accompanying thethrust, preventing a straigh tforward penetration; (b) loss ofbalance, caused by too long a step or improper movement (rearfoot not following properly) : and (c) giving away your intentions before the thrust.(3) Body-contact Thrust.This movement, executed withgreat speed and power, unbalances the opponent through bodycontact. Without losing balance or advantage, the bayonetfighter, in executing this thrust, holds the rifle close to hisbody, with the bayonet point facing slightly to the right;presses his right foot firmly on the ground, and, with his ab

domen strained firmly, thrusts upward to the opponent's body.Common errors: (a) loss of balance and (b) slow recovery.(4) Knock-off Thrust.This is an offensive blow designed tocreate an opening by knocking the opponent's bayonet out ofthe way. The bayonet fighter makes a movement which is bothforward and lateral. He hits his opponent near the left fistto knock his bayonet to the right , left, or downward. When anopening is created, he executes his thrust.


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5 8 INTELLIGENCE BULLETINCommon errors: (a) too much strength put in the left hand,thereby making it difficult to execute a continuous thrust; and(b) failure in the lateral movement to move first the foot onthe shifting side.(5) Parry Thrust. This is an offensive blow, delivered whilein th e crossing position and designed to create an opening bypu shin g aw ay the o pp on ent's bay onet. I t is executed in thesame manner as the knock-off thrust.(6) Execution of Counterthrust to Parries. Counter the opponent's parries by parrying his bayonet to the right or left,

and create an opening for a counterthrust.(7 ) Execution of Counterattack. To coun ter an enemy executing a thrust, follow the direction given for the knock-offthrust, beat the opponent's bayonet out of the way, and executethe counterthrust .To counter an opponent who is trying to knock off or parry,follow the direction given for the side-step th ru st. Ju st at the

moment the opponent executes a thrust, evade it quickly andcounterthrust .d. Close Combat

The purpose of close combat training is to learn the mainpo in ts of close-in fighting, thereb y gai n in g self-confidence. Secu rin g the in itia tive by a ttac kin g sudd enly is the secret ofsuccess in th is phase of fighting.(1) Vulnerable Parts of the Body. When h itt in g the opponent w ith th e rifle, the most vu lne rab le p a rt s of the body areth e elbows, fists, feet, knees, face, h ead, solar plexu s, sides ofthe body, testicles, and shin.(2) Execution of Rifle Blows. Hit th e opponen t's head andface by swinging the rifle up and driving home the blow (seefig. 22a) or, by following the direction given for the body-contact


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60 INTELLIGENCE BULLETINWhen the opponent attempts to drive home a blow, advanceand block the opponent's rifle with the left arm ; at the sametime, counter with the right fist or rig ht knee (see fig. 22c).(3) Execution of Butt Stroke.To execute the butt strokefrom the guard position, step in with the right foot or step backwith the left foot, so that the body is sideways to the opponent;at the same time, draw in the left hand, extend the right hand,and drive the butt diagonally upward through an arc to the opponent's face or the side of his body (see fig. 23).

Figure 23.To counter the butt stroke, step in quickly to block the stroke,and, at the same time, h it the opponent with your fist or knee.(4) Execution of Right Punch.To deliver the right punch,release the rifle from the right hand; at the same time, step in


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6 2 INTELLIGENCE BULLETINthe same time, knee him or kick him in the groin or testicles(see fig. 25).

Figure 25.To counter such tactics, turn the body sideways, with the rightfoot forward, and counter with the butt stroke.(6) Execution of Short Thrust to the Throat. To execute thismovement, grasp the rifle near the muzzle with both handsthe


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6 3APANESE BAYONET TECHNIQUEright hand just above the belt line, and the left hand just abovethe rightand thrust at the opponent's throat (see fig. 26).

Figure 26.To counter this thrust, carry the rifle forward and upwardwith both hands, and counter with the butt stroke to the face orhead.


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Section II. SMALL-UNIT TACTICS USEDBY JAPANESE AT NIGHT1. INTRODUCTION

Tactics used by Japanese companies and smallerunits in nigh t attacks are described below. This information, based on enemy sources, appears to be afairly complete summary. An earlier discussion ofJapanese night operations appeared in IntelligenceBulletin, Vol. I, No. 3, pages 44-51.In the paraphrased Japanese manual which follows,particular attention should be paid to the enemy'sreconnaissance methods, his massing of forces (themain body) in the approach march and during theearly stages of the assault, and his reliance upon thebayonet in rushing hostile positions.2. THE MANUALa. Preparations

Upon receiving orders for a nigh t attack, company commanders acquaint their platoon leaders with the major points ofthe plan . Prepara tions are begun, with special emphasis placedon gaining a thorough knowledge of the terrain and on the disposition of hostile forces.64


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6 5MALL UNIT TACTICS USED BY JAPANESE AT NIGHTThe thoroughness of preparations will depend upon the situation. If there is an interval of several days between the formation of plans and the actual attack, successive patrols will be sentoutat least one of them during darkness.

b. ReconnaissanceKnowledge of the terrain and of hostile dispositions is normallygained by reconnaissance patrols, each of which consists of five orsix men (never more than ten). A reconnaissance by a smallpatrol led by lih officer is considered highly desirable before a

night attack.Forward lookout posts are then established for the purpose ofobserving new developments. If necessary, these are investigated, in turn , by additional officer-led patrols. The companycommander also makes forward observations, and his headquarterspersonnel maintains a continuous lookout.In reconnoitering. our patrols get as close as possible to thehostile positions, and try to induce the opposing forces to fire orto attack, so that they, will reveal their strength and their positions. If possible, our patrols fix the exact location of these positions by measuring their distance and direction from some easilyrecognized terrain feature.The reconnaissance also determines the type, strength, and location of obstacles to be met in the night attack. Outguards, flanking machine-gun positions, and illumination methods are noted.Nearby terrain is inspected. Subordinate leaders familiarizethemselves, under night conditions, with the hostile positions andthe terrain involved. If possible, the entire unit which is to takepart in the attack is given the opportunity to view, from a vantagepoint, the terrain over which the attack will move.Normally, soon after dusk on the night of the attack, a patrolgoes out to .lay out the. approach route, which, to the greatest possible extent, follows continuous terrain features in the desireddirection. Roads, railroads, telegraph lines, and ridge lines, or


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6 6 INTELLIGENCE BULLETINother topographical features are thus used to maintain directionat n ig ht . The app roach rout e is usu ally ma rke d w ith pieces ofwhite p ap er or cloth, or pe rson nel m ay be stationed as markers.Ropes may be stretched along the route, and distances paced off.c. The Approach

In the a pp ro ach m arc h, the com pany advances in a line ofcolum ns, bu t oth er fo rm atio ns are used freely to cope withspecial situation s. W ith in the co m pany , the squads move in avery close fo rm atio n, w ith t he m inim um distance between men.The m en m ay adv ance w ith a ha nd on the sho ulde r of the soldier in fron t. A lso, they may ad vance at a crouch ing walk.

W hen the com pany is attack ing indep end ently, patrols provide all-a rou nd p rote ctio n. Th ey u sua lly a re 30 to 50 yardsfrom the main force, depending on visibility and on the natureof the ter ra in. If th e com pany is ad va nc ing as p ar t of a battalion, patrols are sent out to assigned sectors to the front (seefig. 27). Th ey a re instru cte d to ru sh small groups of hostileforces, such as sen tries and ou tpos t pe rsonnel. Groups whichthe patrols cannot handle are dealt with by a small advanceforce, prev iou sly des ign ated for such emergencies. Meanwhile,the main body of the company continues its advance and takesno part in these preliminary actions.The company maintains liaison with battalion headquartersby means of runners, but it also takes individual responsibilityfor maintaining the direction of advance necessary to reach itsobjective, even if contact w ith the ba tta lio n is lost. To maintain proper contact and direction, the company uses connectingfiles between the adv ance gua rd an d the m ain body. Figure 28,an oth er ex am ple of a form atio n for th e approach m arch, illustrates the use of these connecting files.In addition to the various methods of maintaining directionwhich are outlined before the attack, compasses and stars areused for o rien tatio n. F la re s of different colors may be fired


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67MALL UNIT TACTICS USED BY JAPANESE AT NIGHTFORMA TION OF THE 2D COMPANY

THE FOLLOWING JAPANESE SYMBOLSAND ABBREVIATIONS ARE USED

PO Battalion CO Company Commander Platoon LeaderO NCO

O Soldierf Heavy Machine GunA Antitank Rifle

Figure 27.


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68 INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, Guides__


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6 9MALL UNIT TACTICS USED BY JAPANESE AT NIGHTthe attack, but are needed in defending captured positions.Sometimes these weapons are used to fire on hostile illuminating equipment. Ligh t machine guns are kept well to the rearof each squad. Autom atic guns (antitank rifles) are usually-left in the rear, since tanks are not likely to be encounteredat night. Pack horses for the automatic guns and for theheavy weapons usually remain with the ammunition platoon.The company reserve, usually a platoon, is kept in readinessto counter any enemy [United Nations] attempt to surroundour attacking forces, or else the reserve may execute a flankattack on the objective if the frontal assault by the main forcebogs down.The approach march ends at a previously selected point, andthe company pauses briefly to complete preparations for thefinal assault. This poin t is as close as possible to the hostileforcesusually about 300 yards on ordinary terra in. Here,final contact with forward patrols is made, final details regarding demolitions are decided upon, and final dispositionsfor the assault are carried out.Absolute secrecy and quiet are enforced prior to an attack.Commands are given by signal only. Lights are concealed,and are used only for signaling purposes. Camouflage is usedeven after dark, and precautions against hostile patrols orspies are redoubled. Personnel usually wear white cloths foridentification, and the countersigns are drilled into every man.d. Demolitions

Detailed plans for demolishing obstacles are worked out onthe basis of information obtained by reconnaissance andobservation.For ordinary demolitions, such as the task of cutting a gapin barbed wire, a few men from each platoon are designated.If sturdy obstructions, such as pillboxes, must be overcome, adetachment of engineers (about 15 men) will be assigned toperform the task, under the direction of the company com


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7 0 INTELLIGENCE BULLETINm and er. Th ese engin eers are dem olition ex perts, equipped withBangalore torpedoes and mines.Points where gaps in wire entanglements are to be cut usuallyare in areas easy to ap pro ac h , o r in areas difficult for the oppo sitio n to cover wi th fire. I n any case, th e selection of thesepo ints is dic tated chiefly by th e pl an s for the attack. Gaps forni gh t a ttack s are no rm ally at closer inte rva ls th an those for dayattacks.De m olitions are com pleted ju st before the assault. Prematuredem olitions, w hich m ig h t rev eal the atta ck pla ns and allow timefor rep air s, are av oid ed ; howev er, allowance is mad e in timeschedules for possible hostile interference.Dem olitions are executed as secretly as possible. Force isemployed only when time is too short or hostile interference toogre at. If necessary, pa tro ls are disp atched to pro tect demolitionteams or to capture the points selected for demolition.Th e tim e elemen t invo lved in execu ting dem olitions should benoted. M ak ing a gap in barbe d-w ire entanglem ents 6 yardsdeep req uires from 2 to 3 ho ur s w hen the wo rk is done byone man, and from iy2 to 2y2 hours when it is done by two men.e. Assault

F ro m the position w here the app roach m arch has ended, thecompany moves out in a body, as secretly as possible, to withinrushing distance of the opposing forcescrawling, if necessary.The company commander usually moves at the head of his unit,directing its full force and controlling his subordinates withpositiveness. T he rush is m ad e w ith gre at energ y, silently andw itho ut fire. T he objective is tak en by use of the bayonet.I f hostile forces are enc oun tered before the m ain objective isreached, they are dea lt w ith by a detach m ent from the mainbody. A detachm ent m ay also be used to neu tralize importantpillboxes o r oth er po in ts of resistan ce to th e attack (see fig. 29).


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71MALL UNIT TACTICS USED BY JAPANESE AT NIGHT'VllllllL. * Objective Simultaneous advance

by main body

Small detachmentto capture impor tant pi l lbox _

- ,f h

One unit to repulse ,enemy counter-at tack

A 1\

\\

^f. Barbed wi re

o ' ad 0

Attacking force

Figure 29.Although effective hostile fire may stop our advance momentarily, our forces determinedly try to continuecreeping orcrawling, and utilizing shadows. If our forces are near, theymay close with the bayonet immediately after receiving fire. Ifthey are too far away, they keep moving forward independentlyuntil close enough for the final rush.[Observer's comment: The Japanese are especially afraid of being caughtby fire while passing through the breeches in the wire. They probably areprepared either to cover this phase with smoke, or to send patrols ahead tocover the main body while trave rsin g the wire. If it appears necessary toreduce troublesome pillboxes, or to repel small counterattacks during thefinal assault, units are designated to take care of these tasks.In dealing with pillboxes, the Japs stress surprise and deception, andemploy varied and original ideas for the la tte r. Smoke, dummy soldiers,gun flashes, or sm all forces ope rating in the opposite direction from theattack are standard stra tagems. To overcome the defenders, assault fromthe rear is preferred.Under some circumstances, the Japanese may be expected to use only apart of the company to seize the objective, afterwards holding it with thewhole force. When opposition at the objective is small, and when there islikelihood of hostile fire from outside the defended position, it is not considered advantageous to expose the entire company unnecessarily. And


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7 2 INTELLIGENCE BULLETINwhere some te rra in featu re makes possible a surp rise attack and breakthrough by a smaller group, it is thought better to hold back the main force,whose movem ents might be hampered by this same terra in . In every casethe company commander leads the attacking force in person.]f. Reorganization

Once the objective has been gained, the company halts and reorganizes. Patro ls are dispatched immediately to pursue thehostile forces and reconnoiter their rear positions and the terrainto the rea r. Dispositions are made to repel counterattacks, andfire power is sited for close-range use. However, hand-to-handfighting is preferred wherever possible, and weapons are not loadedwithout orders from the company commander. Platoons automatically send out all-around security patro ls. If the ground isto be held permanently, they may change positions before daybreak to limit damage from hostile air and artillery attack.Any hostile forces remaining in the vicinity are mopped up.If necessary, the whole company is used for this task. Dispositions for defense and security measures are supervised by the company commander himself.


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Section III. COMMENTS BY OBSERVERSON FIGHTING IN BURMA

1. INTRODUCTIONThis section consists chiefly of comments by individual British officers on combat against the Japanesein the western Burm a area. Since these commentsare based on actual fighting experience in ruggedjungle terrain, they should prove helpful to U. S. officers and enlisted men who will participate in junglewarfare. However, it must be borne in mind that thecomments are not official British doctrine. The namesof the British officers are omitted.

2. ENEMY REACTION DURING COMBATThe following comments deal with various reactionsof the Japanese during combat:" Catch the J a p off guard and he is never ready tofight. W hen su rprised, he literally goes into a panic,screams, and runs. Commence firing, and wipe outthe enemy as soon as possible. However, once the

73


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7 4 INTELLIGENCE BULLETINJap makes a stand, lie is not a coward, but a courageousfighter.

' 'W e consider the J a p a very bad marksman, particular ly when he is moving. He is a better shot whenwell organized and sta tic . However, his positions andcamouflage are excellent.""The Jap hates the British artillery, and is literallyafraid of it. W e found that we could easily make himjiitery by fake attacks. Our troops would yell, stamptheir feet, fire everyth ing, lay a smoke screen, and, ingeneral, make all the noise possible. As a result, theJ a p would fire all arm s, thus giving away all hispositions."T he word 'h a lt ' should never be used. I t is un

necessary, and its use often gives the enemy time todecide on a quick plan of action. Our soldiers shouldnot be too trust ing at night, and should not take toomuch for granted . They must tre a t every man as anenemy until he has proved himself."In many instances, the Japs learned the names ofour units and used them frequently for 'pin-pointing'positions while patrolling at night. Anyone not ableto give the password at nigh t must be shot. The password should be changed every night."The Jap has difficulty in pronouncing the letter 'L,'so use passwords which have several L 's . Patrols going out for several days should be given the passwordfor each day until their return."


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7 5OMMENTS BY OBSERVERS ON FIGHTING IN BURMA3. NOTES ON ENEMY TACTICSThe following comments deal with various tacticsused by the Japanese:"The Japs seemed to prefer the 'circular tour'method of patrolling. W hether they were able togather much information by this method is doubtful."A s in all previous campaigns, the enemy has de-pended a great deal on infiltrations through our linesor movements around our flanks. If a flanking movement was started against him, he would reply by awider movement of his own. He has a passion forhigh ground and thick cover."We should protect our lines of communication byholding the high points which would be a menace ifheld by the enemy. All roads are essential because ofour extensive use of motor transport. ' '

U lThe Japs usually slept during the day and movedat night. During the day, while they were in de-fensive positions, they rarely attempted to fire on anyof our forces."The enemy forces often would throw lighted firecrackers 15 to 20 yards off to their side. Some of ourless experienced soldiers fell for this ruse at first, andfired in the direction of the exploding firecrackers.The Japs, having determined our positions, would thenfire on us from the flanks.''"Snipers are a par t of the Japanese defensivesystem. They attacked our forward troops as the


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7 6 INTELLIGENCE BULLETINla tter advanced ahead of large Brit ish forces. However, it is believed th at the snipers ' major mission isto collect inform ation. W e seldom heard of themfiring on an individual soldier. Snipers sometimestook up positions near road blocks along lines ofcommunication." About the only way to combat J a p snipers is touse stalker-snipers, who shoot the Japs as soon as theyare located. The stalker-snipers nearly always workin pairs , making full use of camouflage. W hile moving, they must be completely under cover. If trailsare unavailable, about the only way they can get aboutin the Burma jungle is along dry stream beds andgullies. The Brit ish are now tra ined to crawl (frequently on their stomachs) long distances if necessary . . . The stalker-sn ipers who move along thebanks of dry stream beds and gullies communicate byword of mouth. Along these avenues of travel thereare always places where the gullies and dry stream bedsconverge. Thus, the snipers can hold prearrangedmeetings under complete cover. W hen the snipers meet,they discuss the situation and make future plan s."4. NOTES ON COMBAT PREPARATIONS

A high-ranking British officer has outlined the following preparatory steps for combat against theJapanese:"a . Tra ining must be hard and realistic."b . Each man must be an expert with his weapon,and must be able to use every weapon.


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COMMENTS BY OBSERVERS ON FIGHTING IN BURMA 7 7"c. Every man must consider the jungle a friendlyplace, in which he can move, live, and fight with com

plete confidence.ad. Every man must know, and be able to take advantage of, the Ja p 's weaknesses. H e must realizethat Jap successes thus far have been largely due toour own errors and omissions rather than to any inherent superiority of the Jap soldier."e. Every man must achieve absolute physical fitnessnothing less will do in jungle warfa re. He mustbe able not only to march long distances, but to climbhills, overcome obstacles, and put up with gruelingconditions of heat and thirst."f. Every man (especially officers and noncoms)must be able to move freely and confidently about thejungle, to stalk and hide, and to use his weapon underall conditions and in all positions."g. Every man must be able to move as freely, andwith as much confidence, at night as during the day."h. Every man must have tenacity in defense, skilland boldness in the approach, and the willas wellas the skillto close with the Jap and kill him in theattack." i . The value of communications must be fullyrealized.

" j Cooperation between infantry and artillery mustbe fully and realistically practiced.' 'k. Field artillery regiments and mountain batteries must be trained in jungle methods."1 . Bad or indifferent leaders must be weeded out.


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7 8 INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN"m. Training must be carried out in real junglesand under conditions that are as realistic as possible.

Man must be pitted against man, squad against squad,and platoon against platoon. Slit trenches must always be dug; concealment must be practiced at alltimes; sleep must be disturbed frequently; and minorand major exercises must last four or more days."n. We must cease to be road-*bound and motor-transport minded."o . Greater use must be made of pack transportation. Local labor must be impressed as guides, porters, and interpreters." p . Half- trained replacements lacking jungle experience must not be sent to join units in the field."q. Greater use should be made of planes for dropping supplies and as ambulances."

"The only way you can defend a place in the Burmajungles is to attack. This should feature infiltrations not mass frontal attacks against strongly defended positions. Keep the Ja p s guessing. . . ."The theory that if you hold the high ground youwill win does not hold true in jungle warfare becausethe density of the lower jungle terrain obstructsobservation. You m ust combine holding the highground with holding the dry stream beds, gullies, andclefts in hills. Clefts in hills are the natura l linesof travel and are more easily traversed than low jungleterrain . W hen all the important par ts of the terrain


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7 9OMMENTS BY OBSERVERS ON FIGHTING IN BURMAcannot be held because of a lack of men, it is necessaryto use offensive patro ls ."

"The use of camouflage in fighting the Jap is mostimportant. Be sure that spoil from trenches is properly disposed of, that motor transport is well camouflaged during the day, and th at each individual isproperly camouflaged. . . ."Security precautions should be taken with regardto the natives. On several occasions we found ammunition and arms in baskets carried by coolies whohad passed through our lines en route to rice fields."Arrangements must be made for dealing withrefugees as well as with the natives. Neither shouldbe permitted to approach our positions at any time.Very often natives will have to be evacuated fromvillages that we wish to occupy. . . Officers andmen must be careful not to allow Jap spies to entercamp disguised as natives offering their services.Often an illiterate-looking native may understandEnglish very well, but not give you the slightest indication of the fact."We believe that the natives have done a lot ofsignaling at night by means of fires. They must havefires, of course, but we have noticed that sometimesthese have been very large and have burned wel

Documents

Intelligence Bulletin ~ Jan 1944