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Inter-Firm Comparability of GRI Sustainability Reporting
- A study of seven European Companies
in the Chemical Sector
BACHELOR’S DEGREE PROJECT
THESIS WITHIN: BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
NUMBER OF CREDITS: 15 HP
AUTHOR: Alexander Thoresson, Mikael Pehrsson & Yao Tang
JÖNKÖPING December 2020
2
Bachelor Thesis in Business Administration
Title: Inter-Firm Comparability of GRI Sustainability Reporting
Authors: Alexander Thoresson, Mikael Pehrsson & Yao Tang
Tutor: MaxMikael Wilde Björling
2020-12-15
Key terms: Sustainability reporting, GRI, Inter-firm comparability, GRI Standards
Abstract
Background: The perceived importance of sustainability has left its mark on organizations. The
demand for sustainability reports is growing. The question whether these sustainability reports
provide an authentic, or alternatively, an embellished picture of how sustainable a company is,
seems interesting. There is no clear definition of what good or bad sustainability would be, and as
such, one could argue that companies are considered to be sustainable, or not, depending on other
companies in the same industry. The importance of whether sustainability reports are inter-firm
comparable rises in compliance with the importance of sustainability itself. This paper attempts to
further investigate the inter-firm comparability aspect by using the latest standards from the GRI,
namely the GRI Standards that launched in 2016.
Purpose: Comparability seems to be a natural way of determining whether a company is
sustainable or not. The quality of the sustainability reports therefore diminishes, if the inter-firm
comparability between them, is lacking. Hence, the thesis has the purpose of determining whether
sustainability reports are inter-firm comparable.
Method: This study utilized the GRI database in order to filter and select a population of
companies. Seven companies in the European chemical sector were chosen, and a content analysis,
where the different firms' responses to 34 selected indicators were analysed and interpreted using
the scope of the Stakeholder theory, the Functionalist perspective & the Critical perspective.
Conclusion: The inter-firm comparability of the seven companies' sustainability reports, who all
used the GRI Standards, was found to be insufficient. This paper adds to previous research which
3
also found inter-firm comparability between sustainability reports conducted according to earlier
versions of the GRI framework to be inadequate. The main issues observed were results of
differences in how the indicators were answered, sometimes quantitatively,
sometimes qualitatively, as well as the amount of superfluous information provided.
4
Table of Contents
1. Background ........................................................................................................... 5
1.1 GRI Background and History ................................................................................................ 6
2. Problem Discussion .............................................................................................. 8
3. Purpose and Research Question ......................................................................... 9
4. Frame of Reference ............................................................................................10
4.1 Stakeholder Theory ............................................................................................................. 10
4.1.1 Stakeholder ................................................................................................................... 10
4.1.2 Stakeholder Theory ....................................................................................................... 11
4.2 Functionalist perspective ..................................................................................................... 12
4.3 Critical perspective .............................................................................................................. 13
5. Method ................................................................................................................14
5.1 Selection of Companies ....................................................................................................... 14
5.2 Selection of Indicators ......................................................................................................... 16
6. Result and Analysis ............................................................................................18
6.1 Economic Indicators ........................................................................................................... 19
6.2 Environmental Indicators .................................................................................................... 21
6.3 Social Indicators ................................................................................................................. 22
6.4 Concluding Analysis ........................................................................................................... 24
7. Conclusions ........................................................................................................27
8. Discussion ............................................................................................................28
References ...............................................................................................................31
Appendix .................................................................................................................38
Appendix 1 ................................................................................................................................ 38
Appendix 2 ................................................................................................................................ 42
Appendix 3 ................................................................................................................................ 48
5
1. Background
What constitutes good or bad sustainability? This is difficult to define and one could argue that it
depends on circumstances and interpretation. As such, a reasonable way of determining whether
something is good or bad - when there is no clear definition of what exactly that would entail - is
to compare it with other similar entities. This does not mean that the
phenomenon actually is comparable, or that the way in which it is compared is adequate. The latter
is what this paper sets out to investigate.
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) related questions, i.e., questions with an economic,
environmental or social nature are becoming increasingly important, and have as a result
developed into an important criterion for global investors and the capital market (Singhal & Dev,
2016). Providing the public with a sustainability report has become part of the general
business practice of many companies. An increasing number of customers and stakeholders expect
to witness the company’s achievements and advancements in sustainability. The value of non-
financial information for stakeholders therefore seems to be recognized to a greater extent by
companies (KPMG, 2017). There is a growing awareness that we, as consumers and people in
general, need to work hard for sustainable development. Accordingly, it is critical to develop a
solid and comprehensive reporting strategy. One of the approaches for sustainability reporting with
growing popularity, in the recent years, is the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines
(Isaksson & Steimle, 2009). “The GRI Sustainability Reporting Standards help organizations
increase their transparency and communicate both their positive and negative impact on
sustainable development” (GRI Standards, n.d.). With a better understanding, and implementation
of the GRI Standards into the general business mindset, companies could have the possibility to
enhance their strategic decisions, reduce certain risks, identify new business opportunities, and
strengthen their relationships with stakeholders. The Global Reporting Initiative Sustainability
Reporting Guidelines are periodically reviewed to provide the best and most up-to-date guidance
for effective sustainability reporting (Singhal & Dev, 2016).
6
1.1 GRI Background and History
GRI was established in Boston in 1997, and it is based on non-profit organizations CERES
and Theellus Institute. The first edition of the GRI Guidelines G1 was published in 2000
and provided the first global framework for sustainability reporting. In 2001, it became an
independent non-profit organization. In 2002, the headquarters moved to Amsterdam, Netherlands,
and the G2 guidelines were issued in that year. Subsequently, as more and more organizations
adopt and demand, the GRI guidelines have been further expanded and improved. The G3
guidelines were released in 2006 and the G4 guidelines released in 2013. In 2016, GRI changed
from providing guidance to formulating the world's first sustainability reporting standard—GRI
Standard. The Standards continue to be updated and revised, including new Topic Standards on
Tax 2019 and Waste 2020 (GRI, n.d.). The purpose of GRI is to create and establish the first
accountability mechanism to ensure that companies comply with the principles of responsible
environmental behavior, and then expand to social, economic, and governance issues.
GRI’s goal is a sustainable future, which can be achieved through transparent and open dialogue.
This is a future in which reporting on impacts is a common practice by all organizations around
the world. As a provider of the world’s most widely used sustainability disclosure standards, the
GRI standard is a catalyst for that change (GRI, n.d.). Most of GRI's funding comes from business
services/events, corporate business, and membership, and 40% of the funding comes from
government and foundation program grants (GRI, n.d.).
The GRI system is modeled after generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which provide
ways to simplify and unify conflicting accounting methodologies (Stenzel, 2010). Sustainability
is conceptually helpful even though it lacks specificity. In past decades, many people thought of
sustainability primarily in environmental terms, but today the focus has shifted to
the Triple Bottom Line, which looks at economy, environment, and social equity (Stenzel, 2010).
GRI Standards is one of the specific guidelines for sustainability, but the Triple Bottom Line
provides a base point for sustainable development. GRI standards have become a global touchstone
for measuring, observing, and reflecting on the sustainable work of enterprises. Likewise, GRI
standards placed Triple Bottom Line reporting in a format that promotes accuracy, comparability,
and impact. According to the GRI standards guideline, GRI standards help organizations to
7
manage and enhance the quality and transparency of sustainability reports while
providing a reasonable and efficient framework.
Along with the global sustainable development prosperity, the emergence of GRI standards has
not only helped many companies and organizations standardize their own sustainable development
strategies. They have also been widely acknowledged and utilized as a measurement tool to be
used on such topics as triple bottom line, corporate social responsibility (CSR), stakeholder theory,
etc. The GRI reporting framework is the most utilized set of standards employed by companies in
the world and is often a key tool when overcoming problems of social or environmental nature
(GRI Standards, n.d.).
The GRI Standards create a common language for organizations and stakeholders, with which the
economic, environmental, and social impacts of organizations can be
communicated and understood. The Standards are designed to enhance the global comparability
and quality of information on these impacts, thereby enabling greater transparency and
accountability of organizations (GRI, 2020). Organizations can use GRI standards to prepare
sustainability reports, or they can use selected standards to report information for specific
purposes. The information made available through sustainability reporting allows internal and
external stakeholders to form opinions and to make informed decisions about an organization’s
contribution to the goal of sustainable development (GRI, 2020). GRI standards can meet the needs
of multiple stakeholders and help organizations understand and disclose their impact. In addition
to reporting companies, these standards are also of concern to other groups such as investors,
policymakers, markets, citizens, and society.
GRI Standard reports need to be submitted and verified either through the GRI Standards Report
Registration System or the Registration form. All reports that claim to meet the GRI
Standard requirements need to be submitted and verified either by a representative of the reporting
organization or by a 3rd party authorized by the reporting organization. GRI do not check the
accuracy or content of the reports and its claim (GRI, n.d.). To become a certified representative,
a provider/organization can send the application form to GRI with their draft version of
software/tool that can be used to collect and manage data. When GRI has received the application,
the provider/organization will receive a Memorandum of
8
Understanding form from GRI that informs about the fee, timelines, process, subject of
certification and other conditions. Then GRI will assess the accuracy to ensure that is accurate use
of the GRI Standards. After certain suggested changes are implemented, GRI will provide a
permission letter to the applicant that authorized the use of GRI content, and a certification. The
certification is valid for one year. Afterwards, the provider/organization can extend it by following
the same process (GRI, n.d.). So far there are 21 certified organizations valid by GRI (GRI, n.d.).
2. Problem Discussion
The rise in sustainability-reporting does not automatically mean that the reports fulfil their
intended purpose. The validity and use of the sustainability reports is dependent upon the
information disclosed being of adequate quality and honesty. The increase in the amount of
sustainability reports does not necessarily mean that the quality of the reports increases (Hąbek &
Wolniak, 2015). The definition of the relationship between the sustainability concept and
accounting also seems to be lacking (Özsözgün Çalişkan, 2014). Of the different aspects which
can be used to discuss the quality of sustainability reports, this paper focuses on inter-firm
comparability. The information disclosed in sustainability reports might be of lower value if the
possibility of comparison between similar companies is lacking. Ambiguous comparability of
reports can make it rather problematic for the reader to get an understanding of how a company
compares to other companies (Isaksson & Steimle, 2009). Therefore, the usefulness of a report
might be hindered if the reader cannot put the information into perspective. Since comparability is
one of GRI´s main principles one would expect that reports which are produced using the
GRI framework would be comparable. However, according to previous research that does not
seem to be the case. Earlier studies conducted in regard to inter-firm comparability of
sustainability reports using the GRI framework have found the inter-firm comparability lacking
(Boiral & Henri, 2017; Cardoni et al., 2019; Parsa et al., 2018; Sherman & DiGuilio, 2010).
This paper is an attempt to further investigate the inter-firm comparability aspect by using the
latest standards from the GRI, namely the GRI Standards that launched in 2016. Many previous
studies are based upon earlier standards from the GRI (Boiral 2013; Boiral & Henri, 2017; Parsa
et al., 2018; Sherman & DiGuilio, 2010). In order to avoid possible discrepancies and
9
inconsistencies with regard to potentially specific sustainability issues for different
sectors, this paper will deal only with one sector, specifically the chemical sector. In companies
from a polluting sector the disclosure of environmental reporting has a tendency to be relatively
high, most likely due to considerable stakeholder pressure (Gamerschlag et al., 2010). This has the
potential to create a better and richer information groundwork for the paper. The scope of
the paper is also limited to the European region. Due to operating in a common political and
economic environment the setting and conditions for companies in the European region should be
similar (Sacer, 2015). Ceteris Paribus, or all else being equal, is desirable when
comparing, and narrowing the scope down to the European region will increase the possibility of
attaining this. This, in turn, has the potential to better promote comparability. To elucidate the
findings of this paper the results will be analyzed through the lens of the Stakeholder
theory, functionalist perspective and critical perspective. The Stakeholder theory is used to give
insight into why companies choose to voluntarily provide information that might otherwise be
regarded as sensitive. The functionalist and critical perspective provide two different ways of
interpreting the data that is being analyzed in the content analysis. Descriptions of these
aspects are provided in the frame of reference section of the paper.
3. Purpose and Research Question
This paper has the purpose of determining whether sustainability reports are inter-firm
comparable. Comparability seems to be a natural way - as there are no clear definitions of what
good or bad sustainability would be - of determining whether a company is sustainable or
not. The quality of the sustainability reports therefore diminishes, if the inter-firm comparability
between them, is lacking. This will be done by examining the sustainability reports from seven
different companies. The reports have been conducted according to the GRI Standards. The
seven companies make up the population of available companies who share a set of criteria used
when narrowing the scope of the paper. How these seven companies have been selected is
explained in detail in the method section of the paper. The results will be analyzed from the
perspective of the stakeholder theory, functionalist perspective and critical perspective.
10
Is the information from the sustainability reports, which have been produced according to GRI
Standards, comparable?
4. Frame of Reference
4.1 Stakeholder Theory
4.1.1 Stakeholder
The term stakeholder seems to have originated sometime during the beginning of the 1960’s. The
name was meant as an allusion to stockholder, with the intention of elucidating that there were
other individuals or groups with an interest in how decisions in public corporations were made,
not just the share/stockholders (Goodpaster, 2015).
The stakeholder mindset was adopted relatively early in Scandinavia, with
Eric Rhenman, Professor of Business Administration, as its originator. Along with Professor
Emeritus Bengt Stymne he presented a book, titled “Företagsledning i en Föränderlig Värld”, or
“Corporate Management in a Changing World”. The two professors phrased their interpretation of
the term as follows: “Stakeholders in an organization are the individuals and groups who are
depending on the firm in order to achieve their goals and on whom the firm is depending for its
existence” (Carroll & Nasi, 1997). The creator of the Stakeholder theory, as it is used today, Robert
Edward Freeman, has defined stakeholders as “any group or individual who can affect or is
affected by the achievement of the firm’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984, p.49). We can derive from
these articles that even if the precise wording may differ, every definition boils down to that a
company’s stakeholders are made up of the people and groups who have interests tied to the
company’s operations and the manner in which the company conducts its business.
Some examples of stakeholders, other than shareholders, can according to Professor Emeritus
Kenneth Goodpaster be, “employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, competitors,
governments, and communities.” (Goodpaster, 2015, p.54). Stakeholders can be made up of
everything from individuals to societies, even nature can be considered a stakeholder (Mitchell,
Agle & Wood, 1997).
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4.1.2 Stakeholder Theory
The Stakeholder theory was first developed by Igor Ansoff in 1965. The theory was intended to
better explain how the organization's relations with its stakeholders’ matter, as well as how the
various interests of the stakeholders needed to be considered and assessed. Robert Freeman
later, 1983, continued working on the theory and his contributions are still being used (Roberts,
1992). The theory encourages companies to develop strong, positive connections with the various
stakeholders that it has. By conducting its operations in a way that the stakeholders approve of,
such as providing reports designed to give an insight into the company, or taking the environment
into consideration when producing products, for instance, the organization's stakeholders will view
it in a better light and be more willing to affiliate with it (Fernando & Lawrence, 2014).
A key idea in Stakeholder theory is that the company is best off when an
organization’s stakeholders, by their own accord, come together and collaborate to make it better
for all parties involved. Therefore, a premise for the Stakeholder theory is that the purpose of the
company should be aligned with the interest of the company’s stakeholders as it is through the
joint interest of the company and its stakeholders that it will thrive best (Freeman, Wicks, &
Parmar, 2004).
Stakeholder theory is often divided into two approaches: the ethical or moral branch, and the
positive or managerial branch. The two approaches differ in the way that they view how
the organization’s different stakeholders should influence the managerial decisions. According to
the ethical branch all stakeholders, regardless of size or monetary influence, should be regarded as
equally important, and the organization should be operated so that all stakeholders benefit. The
managerial branch considers stakeholders increasingly important as the amount that they
contribute to the company increases (Guthrie, Petty & Ricceri, 2006).
Accountability is an important term in Stakeholder theory and that the organization is held
accountable towards its stakeholders is as important as that the organization takes stakeholder
rights and desires into consideration when making managerial decisions (Fernando & Lawrence,
2014). Accountability stems from responsibility but differs in that responsibility is a much more
comprehensive term which encompasses several different definitions. Richard Mulgan (1997,
12
p.27) explains accountability as follows: “Accountability refers to one aspect, the calling to
account and acceptance of oversight, of one type of responsibility to someone else.” One party
being held accountable by another is typically a symptom or sign of an unequal relationship
dynamic as the accountable party must endeavor to gain the other party’s approval (Mulgan,
1997). The Stakeholder theory has a few key ideas: Companies should try to keep their
stakeholders’ rights, interests, and opinions in mind, it is when stakeholders’ readily come together
with the company and each other that everyone is best off, and the organization should be
accountable towards its stakeholders.
Stakeholder interest for the environmental and social values of companies is progressively
growing, and companies, in accordance with the Stakeholder theory, are diverting resources, to
match this change and thus keep their stakeholders satisfied (Closs, Speier & Meacham, 2010). A
result of the growing importance of environmental and social questions have been that stakeholders
want a reliable way to determine whether they should be satisfied with the different companies,
the stakeholders typically want information of environmental and social nature to be divulged
through reports (Logsdon & Lewellyn, 2000).
Companies want to illustrate how well they are responding to their stakeholders’ needs and by
voluntarily providing potentially sensitive information through public reports, they are
acknowledging that their stakeholders deserve insight into, at least some parts of the company’s
engagements. These organizations get a better public image. Additionally, by sharing sensitive
information and thus illustrating their compliance with their stakeholders’ opinions, the
organizations are better off (Fernando & Lawrence, 2014).
4.2 Functionalist perspective
The functionalist perspective presupposes that organizations have a systemic character aimed at
order and coherence (Morgan, 1980). Information regarding performance measurement of
organizations is in this positivist perspective considered objective (Dillard, 2014; Morgan, 1980).
Sustainability performance can therefore, implicitly, be objectively measured and comparable.
This assumes that the reporting itself is comprehensive and transparent.
13
The GRI framework with its orientation towards structure, order and standardisation (Brown et al.,
2009; Moneva et al., 2019) and its extensive adoption amongst CSR-reporting (Mori
Junior & Best, 2017; de Villiers & Sharma, 2017; KPMG, 2017; Michalczuk & Konarzewska,
2020) provides a bit of strength to those that use the functionalist perspective in regard
to sustainability measurement. The GRI framework can potentially, on the issue of sustainability
performance and measurability, broadly be considered to be the most rigorous and robust source
of material (KPMG 2017; Morhardt et al., 2002). Sustainability performance disclosed in reports
produced using the GRI framework should, in accordance with the functionalist perspective,
therefore be measurable and comparable. If any complications would arise regarding the
comparability and ranking of sustainability performance the problem would be an inadequacy
of standardization, according to the functionalist view. If the GRI framework is employed
extensively and methodically such issues are assumed to be inconsequential. The perspective,
therefore, does not question the assumptions regarding measurability and comparability (Boiral &
Henri, 2017).
4.3 Critical perspective
A main point of critical theory is “…questioning established social orders, dominating practices,
ideologies, discourses and institutions” (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000, p.1). In stark contrast with the
functionalist perspective, the critical perspective is anti-positivist and set forth that organizations
are molded by power relations along with the control of beliefs and norms which underlie
management praxis (Dillard, 2014). Therefore, one could describe the functionalist and the critical
perspective as being opposites of each other.
In the view of the critical perspective this means that the information provided by organizations in
the form of, for example, sustainability reports essentially lacks the ability to be transparent
(Boiral & Henri 2017). Instead of truly catering to the stakeholders’ interest, the information
provided by the organizations has a tendency to gravitate towards echoing their own agendas
(Hahn & Lülfs, 2013; O’Dwyer, 2003; Owen et al., 2000). Also, there is the issue of the
sustainability reports being used as false fronts to hide the unsustainability of the business (Gray
2010; Hahn & Lülfs, 2013; Moneva et al., 2019). This implies that the possibility of comparability
14
is impaired as long as this managerial capture and greenwashing of the sustainability reporting
process occurs. Another possible problem, observed by Gray (2006b, 2010) and Milne & Gray
(2013), is the broad disassociation between the real connotation of sustainability and what
significance it should have for organizations and how sustainability accounting is conducted in
practice. The confines of organizations are simply too small to incorporate the entire
comprehensiveness of environmental and social sustainability (Boiral & Henri 2017). Because of
this one could say that the critical perspective contests the idea that sustainability reporting in its
current state is a meaningful endeavor (Gray 2006a, 2006b; Milne & Gray, 2013).
5. Method
This paper will use a content analysis approach in order to analyze the sustainability reports from
the companies that have been chosen. Content analysis can be described as a “…research method
that uses a set of procedures to make valid inferences from text. These inferences are about the
sender(s) of the message, the message itself, or the audience of the message.” (Weber, 1990, p.
10). Many previous studies with similar aspects to this one also use the content analysis approach
(Cardoni et al., 2019; Parsa et al., 2018; Boiral & Henri, 2017; Boiral, 2013; Hahn & Lülfs, 2013).
This potentially lends credence to the suitability of the content analysis approach for studies of this
kind. The content analysis will be conducted by inspecting the sustainability reports provided by
the companies that were selected and compiling their answer to each of the selected GRI indicators.
Analysis and conclusions will then be drawn from this. The approach for this paper is further
described in the sections below.
5.1 Selection of Companies
The purpose of this paper is to determine if different organizations’ sustainability reports are inter-
firm comparable with each other. Having as many common denominators as possible is preferred
when selecting a sample for which the question will be tested. The paper aims to compare apples
to apples, not oranges. Apples would in this case be defined as organizations that share a set of
criteria. The GRI database has a search function with filters which have been utilized when
narrowing possible organizations down. The seven selected organizations all share a set of
attributes that were chosen to make sure that the risk for incomparability, as a result of irrelevant
15
differences, would be as low as possible. The organizations selected for the paper are in the same
industry, of similar size and based in the same region. They are also using the same GRI reporting
standard, the selected reports are of the same year and they are all listed companies. Maybe most
importantly, their GRI-reports are all of the same adherence level and verified by either GRI or a
third party authorized to represent GRI. While these seven companies make up the population of
companies which share all these required criteria, the chemical sector can be considered a sample
of all the available industries.
Aside from choosing a polluting sector due to these sectors tendency to have relatively high
disclosure regarding environmental pollution, there was no preconceived notion that the chemical
industry would be particularly good, or bad, as a sample industry for which to test our research
question. Additionally, choosing a sector where the risk for environmental pollution is relatively
high makes it more interesting in a sustainability context. Also contributing to the choice of the
chemical sector is that a good set of organizations which shared the previous mentioned criteria
was found.
The companies are all listed which proposes the idea that they, at least in some way, rely on
stakeholders purchasing their stocks in order to raise necessary capital. In order to
attract stakeholders in today’s world, as mentioned prior in this paper, proof of compliance with
stakeholder wants is increasingly important. Therefore, the likelihood of listed companies to
provide, or withhold, certain information might be crucial in understanding if GRI-reports are
inter-firm comparable.
Size and region could have been any of the different available options in the database, as long
as all selected companies were the same in those regards. The size “Large” and the region
“Europe” was selected as sample criteria. Out of the available GRI reporting types the latest
available type was desired, as each new report type improves and eventually replaces its
predecessors. GRI Standards is the selected report type, and 2019 was chosen as report year.
A GRI-report can be conducted either in line with adherence level “Core”, or “Comprehensive”,
core being the simpler of the two options (Globalreporting.org, 2020). As a majority of reports
were conducted with adherence level core, and core being an approved level of contribution, it was
16
added to the sample criteria along with a green check mark indicating that the organization’s
reports details has been approved by either a GRI direct, or indirect representative.
The criteria used when selecting the seven organizations ended up as follows: Verified 2019-year
reports of reporting type GRI Standards. Conducted in accordance with the core adherence level
and provided by large, listed organizations from the European region. The organizations operate
in the chemical sector. Our selected companies are, in alphabetic order: Clariant AG, Evonik
Industries AG, Givaudan S.A., OCI N.V., Semperit Group AG, Synthomer PLC and
Wacker Chemie AG.
5.2 Selection of Indicators
The report type GRI Standards divide its questions, or indicators, into different groups: general,
economic, environmental, and social topics. The indicators listed in the general topic were deemed
unnecessary for the purpose of this paper as they were mostly concerned about - like the name
suggests - general disclosures such as name of the company and location of its headquarters. The
general topic, and its indicators are therefore not included in this paper.
Each main topic has several subtopics intended to further specify what each underlying
indicator addresses. GRI-reports are constructed in a manner so that they are applicable for every
organization regardless of the industry in which it operates, hence some indicators might be more
important than others, and vice versa. Organizations do not have to provide information about each
indicator and all questions might not be relevant for the chemical sector; relevant indicators need
to be identified.
If some indicators are left unanswered by all, or a majority of the selected companies, it is a likely
sign that it is due to them being irrelevant to that sector, and conversely the opposite is true - more
answers indicate a higher relevance.
The initial step when determining which indicators that best would provide an answer to the
research question, was to identify which of them were answered by a minority of the seven
organizations and mark them as discards. Following this, the indicators that were answered by all
the companies were tested for relevance, mainly by comparing them with each other, if two of
them were too similar, one of them would not be needed. None of the indicators answered by all
of the companies were taken out. After first selecting indicators with a clear majority - six or seven
17
answers from the companies - subtopics with indicators only answered by a minor majority -four
or five out of the seven companies - were selected. The selected indicators are listed in Table 1.
Table 1.
Indicator Economic
201-1 Direct economic value generated and distribution 202-1 Ratios of standard entry level wage by gender compared to local minimum
wage
204-1 Proportion of spending on local suppliers
205-1 Operations assessed for risks related to corruption 205-2 Communication and training about anti-corruption policies and procedures
206-1 Legal actions for anti-competitive behavior, anti-trust, and monopoly
practices
Indicator Environmental
301-1 Materials used by weight or volume
302-1 Energy consumption within the organization 305-1 Direct (Scope 1) GHG emissions
305-2 Energy indirect (Scope 2) GHG emissions 305-3 Other indirect (Scope 3) GHG emissions
305-4 GHG emissions intensity 305-5 Reduction of GHG emissions
305-7 Nitrogen oxides (NOX), Sulfur oxides (SOX), and other significant air
emissions
306-2 Management of significant waste waste-related impacts 307-1 Non-compliance with environmental laws and regulations
308-1 New suppliers that were screened using environmental criteria
Indicator Social 401-1 New Employee hires and employee turnover
18
403-2 (2016
version)
Types of injury and rates of injury, occupational diseases, lost days, and
absenteeism, and number of work-related fatalities
403-2 (2018
version) Hazard identification, risk assessment, and incident investigation
404-1 Average hours of training per year per employee 404-3 Percentage of employees receiving regular performance and career development
reviews
405-1 Diversity of governance bodies and employees
406-1 Incidents of discrimination and corrective actions taken
407-1 Operations and suppliers in which the right to freedom of association and
collective bargaining may be at risk
408-1 Operations and suppliers at significant risk for incidents of child labor
409-1 Operations and suppliers at significant risk for incidents for forced or
compulsory labor 412-1 Operations that have been subject to human rights reviews or impact
assessments 413-1 Operations with local community engagement, impact assessments, and
development programs
414-1 New suppliers that were screened using social criteria
414-2 Negative social impacts in the supply chain and actions taken
416-1 Assessment of the health and safety impacts of product and services categories
417-1 Requirements for product and services information and labeling
419-1 Non-compliance with laws and regulations in the social and economic area
6. Result and Analysis
As to best maintain a clear and concise structure throughout the paper, the result and analysis
sections have been merged. The result and analysis presentation will not go through each indicator,
rather certain good or bad indicators and their respective answers that relate to comparability will
be selected and made into examples for the findings in general. Each selected indicator will be
discussed from its inter-firm comparability aspect and, where applicable, analyzed through the lens
of stakeholder theory, functionalist perspective, and critical perspective. At the end of the section
a concluding analysis will be presented.
19
The paper has found that the selected indicators have been answered in four different ways:
quantitively, qualitatively, non-answers and N/A. Quantitative answers, seem to be the most
comparable as the information provided gives little room for free, or alternative interpretation.
Quantitative answers are closed and specific in nature. If all companies would have answered the
indicators quantitively, the inter-comparability of the reports would dramatically increase.
Qualitative answers make up a large portion of the provided answers. As some of these indicators
refer to complicated matters, qualitative, or open and explanatory answers seem justified. The
qualitative answers take very different shapes and often it would appear that the length of the
provided answers could be substantially shortened and still provide a similar result. The
quantitative answers take the shape of numbers, graphs and tables.
The non-answers were an interesting phenomenon. One of the criteria used when selecting
indicators for this paper was the frequency by which the indicators in question were answered by
the selected companies. Some indicators show up in the organizations reports, but when analyzing
them it was found that they were answered by stating that they were not relevant for the
organizations, or that the organizations did not deem them to be important, i.e., not answering
them. In other cases, the information that is claimed to answer a particular indicator does not do
so. These non-answers may be purposely crafted with the intent of misleading the reader, or they
may be a result of misinterpretations of what information the indicator requires the reporting
organization to provide. No company had answered all the available indicators, yet some chose to
include indicators that they did not provide information for. They might include them to illustrate
that they have noticed said indicators, or at least not avoided answering them out of ignorance. It
is not completely clear. The N/A indicators are the indicators where an organization has not
provided an answer at all.
6.1 Economic Indicators
Indicator 202-1, “Ratios of standard entry level wage by gender compared to local minimum
wage”, provides an excellent example of non-answers from companies (see Appendix 1). None of
the companies actually answer the indicator. At the end of Clariant's disclosure they say
“Therefore, Clariant does not keep statistics of the salaries in relationship to minimum wages”.
20
Givaudan only directed the reader to their “Independent Assurance Statement”. Including an
indicator but not answering it directly does not promote inter-firm comparability since it
potentially adds confusion for the reader. By answering around the indicator and trying to portray
the situation in a different light by talking about how their wages are determined and equal pay
overall, the reader might get a positive impression of their disclosure. But in a strict sense the
companies mislead the reader from the actual indicator. In accordance with the critical perspective,
actions of this kind can, to some extent in this case, be interpreted as managerial capture and an
echoing of their own agenda (Hahn & Lülfs, 2013; O’Dwyer, 2003; Owen et al., 2000). Inter-firm
comparability is therefore impaired in a strict sense. However, it should be noted that the indicator
itself can be considered confusing as the phrasing of it might come across as odd. In that case the
functionalist perspective argues that more standardization would be needed (Boiral & Henri,
2017), for example a better or more clearly phrased indicator, in order for the companies to
extensively disclose it.
Indicator 204-1, “Proportion of spending on local suppliers”, is a prime example of where the
overall inter-firm comparability can be considered satisfactory (see Appendix 2). The indicator is
clearly defined, and most companies answer it straight to the point with minimal unnecessary
information that distracts the reader. A method of potentially improving the inter-firm
comparability even further for this kind of indicator would be to standardize the presentation of the
disclosure for all companies. For example, all companies would have to present the information in
a table or something similar. This further standardization would be in line with the functionalist
perspective (Boiral & Henri, 2017).
Indicator 205-1, “Operations assessed for risks related to corruption”, shows an excellent case of
superfluous information disclosure by a company (see Appendix 3). While, as an example,
Wacker Chemie AG has a clear table with the relevant information, Evonik Industries, on the other
hand, has a page of text and then a figure with unrelated information. As a result, the transparency
of the disclosure is questionable, and the reader might be misled. From a critical perspective
Evonik's approach is not ideal to promote inter-firm comparability as the potential for managerial
capture, greenwashing and embellishment of information can be argued to be high. Such actions
have the potential to alter the perception of the underlying situation and could be used to hide the
21
unsustainability of the business (Gray 2010; Hahn & Lülfs, 2013; Moneva et al., 2019). The
interesting thing here is that the indicator is rather clear-cut and alternative interpretations by the
companies as to how to disclose about it should be limited. Therefore, the option for
more standardization, as promoted by the functionalist perspective, is impaired.
6.2 Environmental Indicators
Indicator 301-1 states that the reporting organization shall report the total weight of renewable and
non-renewable materials used. The indicator is an excellent example of the more comparable types
of indicators, as it is formulated in a way that warrants a quantitative answer. Most of the
selected companies answered the indicator with clear numbers. One company answered by stating
that the required information is confidential in nature, and as such they cannot disclose it. This
indicates that the company understands stakeholders wants and while said company appears to be
willing to comply with stakeholder demands - in this instance for more information - like the
stakeholder theory suggests (Fernando & Lawrence, 2014; Logsdon & Lewellyn, 2000), they
simply cannot do so because providing those numbers could harm the company. As our selected
sample companies have conducted their reports in adherence with the core level, and not the
comprehensive, answers like these are sometimes enough. Interestingly the other companies,
which all operate in the same industry, did not consider the weight of how much renewable and
non-renewable materials to be confidential and one could argue that it is probable that the company
who would make such a claim might not be confident that their stakeholders would approve of the
numbers, should they be provided with them. According to the critical perspective this seems like
a textbook altering of public, or stakeholder perception, i.e., greenwashing (Hahn & Lülfs, 2013;
O’Dwyer, 2003; Owen et al., 2000), of the company rather than altering and improving the
operations which it conducts. By stating that the required information is confidential, but still
including the indicator in the report, the company is likely trying to make it seem as if they have
nothing to hide – by hiding in plain sight.
Indicator 302-1 requires the reporting organization to report its energy consumption with regards
to renewable and non-renewable sources. This seems to be highly comparable but is made
unnecessarily complicated as the allowed formats for how the consumption is measured can be
provided in three different formats: joules, watt-hours or multiples. These different formats can be
22
converted and altered but as not everyone knows how, it diminishes comparability. A common
issue shared in the phrasing of many indicators is the lack of unity, or standardization. Again,
according to the functionalist perspective, the solution to these kinds of issue would be more
specific and extensive standardization (Boiral & Henri, 2017).
Indicator 308-1, The reporting organization is required to input the percentage of new suppliers
that were screened using environmental criteria. The indicator is mostly answered but some
answers illustrate a lack of effort, or at least information. One company writes that “all new
suppliers are screened”. The report then refers the reader to a section with a text which
is suspiciously reminiscent of an advertisement for the company, with sentences such as “we aim
to perform a sustainability evaluation of 90 percent of suppliers...” That seems good but it
does not really answer how many suppliers are currently screened with environmental criteria. All,
or a hundred percent are apparently screened, but the company does not state by what
criteria. Observing this, with the scope of the critical perspective, would make one question if this
is an altering of perception, i.e., greenwashing (Gray 2010; Hahn & Lülfs, 2013; Moneva et al.,
2019), rather than operations.
6.3 Social Indicators
Indicator 403-2 (2018 version), “Hazard identification, risk assessment, and incident
investigation”, focuses on descriptions of processes and policies related to work-related hazards,
risks and incidents. Viewing the issue from the critical perspective, the focus on just descriptions
makes it questionable if the indicator provides anything of value overall to the reporting. One could
argue that since the companies only have to state their various processes for handling work-related
hazards, risks and incidents, the possibility for embellishment of information has the potential to
be high. In some sense the information provided by the companies cannot be truly comparable
since they most likely use somewhat different processes and approaches. However, what can be
compared is their overall approach to the indicator and how serious they take it, which could be
the intention of the GRI in this case. But the issue of information trustworthiness then becomes
apparent. Indeed, as the embellishment of information has the potential to be high for an indicator
of this kind, one could possibly expect an exaggerated positive description done by the companies
which echoes their own agenda (Hahn & Lülfs, 2013; O’Dwyer, 2003; Owen et al., 2000) with
23
minimal focus on the not-so-good aspects. This can be deemed as a lack of transparency and
mislead the reader by providing a distorted overview of the situation. In the positivistic
functionalist perspective however, any information disclosed by the companies for this indicator
would be considered relevant as the perspective presupposes that such information would be
objective (Dillard, 2014; Morgan, 1980).
Indicator 404-1 requires the reporting organization to report the average hours of training that the
organization’s employees have undertaken by gender and employee category. It is a
straightforward question with the possibility for clear quantitative answers. Despite this, some of
the selected companies reported with regards to other factors, such as region of employment for
instance. Although these companies do not answer the indicator correctly, they still list 403-2 as
at least one of the indicators which the attached segment is supposed to answer, possibly due to
the company understanding that this topic might be important to stakeholders, and even if the
provided answer shares information that slightly deviates from what the indicator asked for, the
company might still believe that stakeholders may view any answer as better than none (Closs,
Speier & Meacham, 2010). The inter-firm comparability is non-existent if organizations do not
even provide answers with the necessary information. Issues such as this are prevalent throughout
the different topics and might be a result of the selected companies reporting in adherence with the
core, and not the comprehensive level. As the core adherence level is still approved by GRI, the
sample companies in this paper’s reports are still relevant however, maybe even more so.
Indicator 412-2, “Negative social impacts in the supply chain and actions taken”, asks for numbers
and percentages regarding negative social impacts in the supply chain and how the company deal
with such issues. Due to the straightforward nature of the indicator, one would expect equally
forthright answers from each company. However, that is not the case as only Clariant has what
could be considered a straightforward disclosure about the indicator. Evonik has a, more or less,
non-answer and only generally talk about human rights and compliance rules for business
partners. Synthomer PLC states that restructuring regarding their procurement function has
basically made their audit lacking and that they will make up for it in their next report.
Wacker Chemie AG answers the indicator but not in the same succinct way as Clariant, due to
having more general information about their assessments and audits. This kind of scattered type
24
of answers has the potential to impair inter-firm comparability. If every company disclosed the
same way as Clariant did in this case the potential for inter-firm comparability would be better.
Disclosures that only address the issue in general terms, such as Evonik in this case, with no proper
answer, leads back to the issue of trustworthiness and transparency as mentioned for indicator 403-
2. However, from an inter-firm comparability standpoint it is interesting to compare the answer of
Wacker Chemie AG and Clariant as their approaches to the indicator are so different. Here the
question is if the extra information provided by Wacker Chemie AG actually adds anything of
value to their disclosure of the indicator. From a strict inter-firm comparability standpoint, the
extra information could possibly be considered bloated and non-essential for the indicator and
therefore unnecessary. In the critical perspective it could, if one follows it stringently, even be
considered as an attempt to embellish information, i.e., a form of greenwashing or managerial
capture, that masks the potential unsustainability (Gray 2010; Hahn & Lülfs, 2013; Moneva et al.,
2019). The functional perspective, however, would consider all added information to be, if not
relevant, at least objective (Dillard, 2014; Morgan, 1980).
Indicator 413-1 requires the reporting organization to provide information about operations with
local community engagement, impact assessments, and development programs. A percentage for
this is asked for, with regards to eight different sub-questions. This is an instance where the
indicator is unnecessarily complicated. A complicated indicator might not be a comparability
issue per definition, but seven different companies could claim to have answered the indicator,
when in fact seven different sub-questions have been answered, making comparability non-
existent.
6.4 Concluding Analysis
An overarching theme that the paper identified is the uncertainty regarding how disclosures from
the companies should be judged from an inter-firm comparability standpoint when extra
information is provided. Even though a company has answered an indicator and you compare that
answer with that of another company the inter-firm comparability is not guaranteed. Indeed, as
stated above, extra information is something often provided by companies that are not strictly
needed to answer an indicator. If one should deem this information as conducive for inter-firm
comparability or not is the issue here. Sometimes this extra information could be considered
25
relevant in a sustainability report context. The skeptical nature of the critical perspective would
align itself more with the opinion that extra information, being relevant in a sustainability context
or not, is unnecessary and not conducive to inter-firm comparability. Since information from
companies has a propensity to incline towards echoing their own agenda (Hahn & Lülfs, 2013;
O’Dwyer, 2003; Owen et al., 2000) awareness of such an aspect is essential when considering
extra, or bloated, information. The issue of sustainability reports being used as false fronts to
camouflage or obscure actual unsustainability by the company (Gray 2010; Hahn & Lülfs, 2013;
Moneva et al., 2019), is also an inescapable factor not to be dismissed lightly when it comes to
extra information provided in the disclosures by the companies. Therefore, the omnipresent
concern regarding managerial capture and greenwashing stemming from the critical perspective is
a pervasive risk one simply cannot dismiss altogether when it comes to inter-firm comparability.
These aspects of the critical perspective, combined with the extra information often observed in
the disclosures by the companies in this paper as well as the lack of transparency shown by non-
answers, certainly gives some credit to the idea that sustainability reporting in its current state is
not a meaningful undertaking. Sustainability reporting not being a meaningful undertaking in its
current state is also something indicated by Gray (2006a, 2006b) and Milne & Gray (2013). From
the critical point of view the issues regarding transparency, managerial capture and greenwashing
will most likely persist as long as the same power relations continue to mold organizations in
relation to the beliefs and norms which dominate management praxis (Dillard, 2014). Unless these
beliefs, norms and power relations change inter-firm comparability, from a critical perspective
standpoint, will be flawed.
However, the functionalist perspective and its call for more standardization might alleviate some
of the issues observed through the critical perspective. More standardization might even increase
the overall transparency from the companies. After all, the GRI framework has been extensively
adopted when it comes to CSR-reporting (Mori Junior & Best, 2017; de Villiers & Sharma, 2017;
KPMG, 2017; Michalczuk & Konarzewska, 2020) and further standardization of the framework
can most likely be expected in the future. Something which was discerned during the content
analysis is that improvement of certain types of indicators is something that needs to be brought
about in future versions of the GRI Standards to further facilitate inter-firm comparability. These
improvements could potentially take the form of:
26
• A reformulation of indicators that previously seems to have given companies the
opportunity to embellish or greenwash information, in order to reduce potential
managerial capture.
• A reduction of indicators that have too many sub-questions that needs to be
answered. For the reader too many sub-questions might lead to confusion as the
discernment of what information answers what part of an indicator becomes more
demanding. This, in turn, has the possibility of negatively affecting inter-firm
comparability. If the sub-question is important it can be an indicator of its own.
Alternatively, an indicator with sub-indicators could have an established hierarchy,
where certain indicators are required, and others are more voluntary.
• A streamlining of how companies can disclose regarding the indicators. An
example would be specifying that a certain indicator must be presented in a table.
Such standardization might positively affect inter-firm comparability drastically.
Indeed, extra or bloated information might then further be reduced which consecutively
can decrease the potential risk of managerial capture and greenwashing.
Nonetheless, one must keep in mind that further standardization always has the possibility of
limiting the freedom that each company has regarding their sustainability reporting. This would
be especially true when it comes to forcing the company to disclose information regarding
an indicator in a certain way, even though that way has the potential to improve inter-firm
comparability. Since the GRI framework has the possibility of being called the most rigorous and
robust source of material when it comes to the issue of sustainability performance and
measurability (KPMG 2017; Morhardt et al., 2002), further standardization would then serve to
make it even more meticulous and substantial. If this standardization becomes too much of a
detriment to the freedom or autonomy of the reporting process for a company, the usage of the
GRI Standards might be negatively affected. This in turn can weaken the potential of inter-firm
comparability regarding GRI Standards on a grand scale.
Another view of the issue of extra information from the functionalist perspective, is that the extra
information is not actually an issue. As the perspective assumes that the information about
27
performance measurement is objective (Dillard, 2014; Morgan, 1980) and that organizations have
a systemic character aimed at order and coherence (Morgan, 1980) it must therefore have some
value. However, the question boils down to if this value has a positive effect on inter-firm
comparability. It can certainly be argued that the information improves the inter-firm
comparability from the standpoint that more information gives the possibility of greater context
for comparison between companies. But in the context of comparing companies from the
standpoint of GRI Standards and its indicators the situation is different. Indeed, the strict focus on
inter-firm comparability for this paper combined with the standpoint of GRI Standards and its
indicators, inevitably culminate in the result that more information beyond what is required inhibit
inter-firm comparability. Undoubtedly, at the root of comparability lies similarity, and if the excess
information is not similar, it is not comparable.
7. Conclusions
Overall, the inter-firm comparability was found to be lacking between the GRI sustainability
reports produced by the seven companies observed. Therefore, this paper aligns itself with
previous studies that also found inter-firm comparability lacking for sustainability reports
conducted according to the GRI framework (Boiral & Henri, 2017; Cardoni et al., 2019; Parsa et
al., 2018; Sherman & DiGuilio. 2010). Even though the companies in this paper use the newer
GRI Standards, the case for good or perfect inter-firm comparability is still an issue. However,
there were definitely elements that were comparable. These elements of good comparability most
often appeared when the indicator was succinct and conducive to disclosures that are quantitative
in nature.
Much like the paper done by Boiral & Henri (2017) this paper also gives credence to the
impossibility of measuring and comparing sustainability performance that is disclosed in GRI
reports, at least for the companies used in this paper. The number of qualitative disclosures that
included extra, or bloated, information is one of the main points found to impair inter-firm
comparability. Another considerable point that impedes inter-firm comparability is the alternative
ways that the companies go about regarding how they disclose. As mentioned in the analysis
section, more standardization - as implied by the functionalist perspective - could be one option to
28
remedy these issues. But that, as mentioned previously, comes with its own set of potential
complications. The conclusions of this paper also give support to the underpinnings of the critical
perspective in regard to managerial capture, lack of transparency and greenwashing when it comes
to sustainability reporting using the GRI framework.
8. Discussion
The purpose of this paper is not to determine whether the selected companies can be deemed
sustainable based on the information provided in their sustainability reports, but rather to ascertain
whether the information in the reports is comparable between the firms. The paper does in no way
attempt to define what constitutes good or bad sustainability, but rather good or bad inter-
firm comparability between reports. In order for two or more answers to be comparable in the
context of sustainability reports, it would be rational to argue that the information provided should
attempt to give insight into the same area, in the same or a similar way. Additionally, comparability
would increase if the provided information requires a limited amount of time and expertise to
understand, and that the answers are formulated in a reasonably closed way so that it limits free
interpretation.
One of the three theories or scopes utilized when analyzing the secondary data is the functionalist
perspective which would argue that a lack of data is the main hindrance for comparability. A
shortage of unity in the way indicators were answered produces a result similar to that of a lack of
data and is as such one of the major issues for comparability with regards to the functionalist
perspective. As long as the GRI report types have indicators formulated in a way which warrants,
or even promotes, open and qualitative answers, comparability will suffer. The information that
the GRI reports are asking for, and the overall theme of sustainability is however, quite complex,
which could be the reason for why it seems that the reporting organizations have been given such
freedom in regard to how they are allowed to express their answers. Expanding on the overall
theme of sustainability, the seemingly broad disassociation between the real meaning of
sustainability and what it should imply for organizations and how sustainability accounting is done
in practice, as observed by (Gray 2006b, 2010) and Milne & Gray (2013), is an issue one should
keep in mind. The ramifications of such an issue would certainly be of relevance to policy makers
29
in the field of sustainability reporting, including the GRI. Also, the exhaustive nature of
environmental and social sustainability might simply be too comprehensive to be incorporated due
to the limited confines of organizations (Boiral & Henri, 2017). The potential significance of this
would be that perfect inter-firm comparability, on a grand scale, would be impossible to achieve.
Again, the implications of this are something the GRI, as well as policy makers related to
sustainability reporting in general, would be wise to observe and bear in mind when it comes to
future standards and policies.
Organizations’ source of motivation for sharing information which could potentially harm them,
seems not to stem from an altruistic sense of environmentalism and concern for society, but -
according to the stakeholder theory - rather as a result of an increased sense that stakeholder wants
and needs should be met (Fernando & Lawrence, 2014). Sustainability and overall corporate social
responsibility reporting happen to be what stakeholders are asking for now, in a decade it might
be something else. The source of motivation is not harmful for comparability per definition, it does
however give the skeptical nature of the critical perspective some merit. If the reason for the
increase in sustainability reporting is mainly due to organizations’ desire to comply with
stakeholder demands, the possibility that the focus of their sustainability reporting will lie on
altering stakeholder perception of the company, rather than conducting costly operational changes,
seems significant. Whereas if the motivation originated from within the company, the
trustworthiness of it would increase.
Keeping this in mind, a concrete suggestion for how to improve GRI reporting would be to limit
the reporting organizations freedom in regard to how they communicate their answer for
an indicator. One part of each indicator could be deemed as mandatory and if not answered in the
correct, standardized way, the answer does not get to be included in the report. If the reporting
organization wishes to provide information about why something is a certain way, that would be
voluntary. Not the other way around. The core adherence level could be less lenient as it seems to
allow companies excuses whilst still providing them with the positive light that sustainability
reporting is associated with. As companies want to keep their stakeholders happy, stricter
requirements should not discourage them from participating in sustainability reporting, it might
30
actually make them keener on performing well, as they need to pool more resources – which they
will want payoff for- into their reports.
Since the conclusions of this paper are limited to the chemical sector in the European region, a
potential future research avenue could be to observe other sectors as well, either in the European
region or outside. Such studies would add to the existing knowledge about GRI sustainability
reporting and inter-firm comparability. Which, in turn, could contribute to more generalized
conclusions being drawn regarding inter-firm comparability and the GRI framework. Studying
future versions of the GRI Standards, in order to find out if inter-firm comparability improves, is
also something of interest. A more grand undertaking would be to develop some kind of general
framework regarding inter-firm comparability and GRI Standards. Such a framework
could potentially be applied on a much larger scale to check inter-firm comparability in many
different sectors. Consequently, the possibility of creating such a framework relies on the
presumption that sustainability is measurable, and that topic, in itself, requires further research.
31
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Appendix
Appendix 1
201-1 Direct economic value generated and distributed
The reporting organization shall report the following information:
a. Direct economic value generated and distributed (EVG&D) on an accruals basis,
including the basic components for the organization’s global operations as listed
below. If data are presented on a cash basis, report the justification for this decision
in addition to reporting the following basic components:
i. Direct economic value generated: revenues;
ii. Economic value distributed: operating costs, employee wages and
benefits, payments to providers of capital, payments to government by
country, and community investments;
iii. Economic value retained: ‘direct economic value generated’ less
‘economic value distributed’.
b. Where significant, report EVG&D separately at country, regional, or market levels,
and the criteria used for defining significance.
39
Clariant
40
Evonik
industries
41
Givaudan
OCI
42
Semperit Group N/A
Synthomer plc N/A
Wacker Chemie
AG https://reports.wacker.com/2018/annual-report/financial-
statements/statement-of-financial-position.html
https://reports.wacker.com/2018/annual-report/notes/notes-to-the-
statement-of-income/01-revenue-from-contracts-with-customers.html
Appendix 2
204-1 Proportion of spending on local suppliers
The reporting organization shall report the following information:
a. Percentage of the procurement budget used for significant locations of operation
that is spent on suppliers local to that operation (such as percentage of products and
services purchased locally).
b. The organization’s geographical definition of ‘local’.
c. The definition used for ‘significant locations of operation’.
43
Clariant
44
Evonik
industries
Givaudan
OCI N/A
45
Semperit Group
46
47
Synthomer plc N/A
Wacker Chemie
AG
48
Appendix 3
205-1 Operations assessed for risks related to corruption
The reporting organization shall report the following information:
a. Total number and percentage of operations assessed for risks related to corruption.
b. Significant risks related to corruption identified through the risk assessment.
Clariant
Evonik
Industries
Givaudan N/A
49
OCI N/A
Semperit Group
Synthomer plc N/A
50
Wacker Chemie
AG