INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONSFALL, 2005

DR. CHRISTINE G. SPRINGER

702.497.1216 CGGS@AOL.COM

WEDNESDAY NIGHTS – FDH 215

UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA LAS VEGAS

POLITICAL ASPECTS

STRUCTURED TO ESTABLISH OPPORTUNITIES FOR GOVT UNITS REPRESENTING DIFFERENT INTERESTS TO STAKE OUT POSITION AND EXERCISE INFLUENCE

POLITICAL ASPECTS POLITICAL, FISCAL AND

ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS OF SYSTEM LINKED

ROLES, BEHAVIOR AND INTERCONNECTIONS OF MULTIPLE ACTORS– THE PRESIDENCY– CONGRESS– FEDERAL COURTS– NATIONAL BUREAUCRACY– PIGS– NON-GOVERNMENTAL THINK TANKS– SPECIAL DISTRICTS

GOVERNMENTAL DIVERSITYROBERT REISCHAUER FORMAL STRUCTURE DOES MAKE A DIFFERENCE

– SIX BASIC TYPES OF SUBNATIONAL GOVT IMPORTANT CHARACTERISTICS OF DIVERSITY

– NONE ROUND EVERYWHERE– NUMBERS, OVERLAPPING, DIFFERENCE IN SCALE– SERVICE AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITIES DIFFER AMONG

AND BETWEEN STATES– RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF TYPE DIFFERS– SCOPE AND ACTIVITY– INSTRUMENTS USED TO RAISE REVENUE

IMPLICATIONS– WHO TO COUNT ON?– LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ABILITY TO DELIVER?– DEAL WITH WHO DELIVERS THE SERVICE?– PROVIDING OR FINANCIALLY SUPPORTING SERVICE?– DEAL ONLY WITH THE STATES?

THE PROBLEM WITH PROJECT GRANTS

THE INCOMES STRATEGY – DEALING WITH CITIZENS REINFORCES TENDENCY TOWARD CENTRALIZATION

SHEER NUMBERS MAKE DIFFICULT TO ADMINISTER

FAIR ALLOCATION TO LOCAL GOVTS GIVEN LARGE NUMBERS– ELIGIBILITY BASED UPON DATA

INTERJURISDICITION FISCAL DISPARITIES– EQUALIZATION THROUGH PER CAPITA

GOVERNMENTS AS INTEREST GROUPS

MIRRORING CONSTITUENCY OF CONGRESS

APPEALING FOR SUBNATIONAL GOVTS NOT INTERESTED IN POLICY SUBSTANCE? SPATIAL, FUNCTIONAL AND CONSTITUENT

INTEREST GENERAL GOVT AND PUBLIC INTEREST

GROUPS– COALITIONS– HOUSING VS. CHILD CARE/WELFARE– WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY W/O STRINGS

LOBBYING FOR THE GOOD OLE DAYS

NGA AND NLC FROM CHICAGO TO CAPITOL HILL– SHOWCASE OF IDEAS AT WORK?

NCSL IN DENVER– FROM HELPING MEMBERS TO LOBBYING

WASHINGTON (+1975)– CONFERENCE OF MAYORS IN WDC SINCE 1932

STATE BUDGET OFFICERS/ICCMA LOBBYING THE STATES OFFICE OF FEDERALISM? PRIDE AND POLITICAL TURF

ADVANCING STATE INTERESTS1997

INCREASING STATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS AND POLITICS

STATES’ INITIATIVE USING EXPERTISE– UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT– FAMILY SUPPORT ACT– SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT

CONGRESSIONAL CONDITIONS ON GRANTS FEDERAL JUDICIARY

– CHALLENGES BY ATTY GENERALS• MOTOR VOTER ACT AND EPA REGS• NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND

– CHALLENGES BY INDIVIDUALS• DRUG FREE SCHOOL ZONES ACT

– SUPREME COURT APPTS IMPORTANT

PREEMPTION CONGRESS TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER

STATE LAW WHEN STATES DON’T ACT OR TO

REGULATE 1988- SUPREME CT = NO PROTECTION 1970’S – ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 1991- SUPREME CT = MISSOURI AGE-

DISCRIMINATION LAW STANDS 1992 – FAIR CREDIT REPORTING 1993 – CELLULAR RATES INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNET?

THE IMPORTANCE OF COALITIONS

TWO OR MORE INDIVIDUALS EACH REPRESENTING OTHERS AGREE TO PROMOTE AND SUPPORT BENEFIT PROGRAM

BENEFICIARIES: EMPLOYEES, BUSINESS, ONE-THIRD OF AMERICAN FAMILIES

BARRIERS TO ACCESS: TERRITORIALITY AND FRAGMENTATION

HOW DO COLITIONS HELP US TO UNDERSTAND POLICY DEVELOPMENT INTERGOVERNMENTALLY?

IMPACT OF U.S. VS. LOPEZ TURNING POINT FOR FEDERALISM

– SUPREME CT AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE– CONGRESS EVOLVES RE: INTREPRETATION– PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS CHECK IN ON

FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMES ONCE EXCLUSIVELY REGULATED BY STATES

EXCEEDING CONGRESS’ AUTHORITY UNDER COMMERCE ACT

CONSTITUTIONAL MINUTE OR MOMENT? CONSERVATIVE JUSTICES LOOKING TO

LIMITS OF POWER TO REGULATE INTERSTATE COMMERCE

FEDERAL GOVT IN STATE POLITICS

ALTERING – WAY KEY ACTORS FUNCTION– DISTRIBUTION OF INFLUENCE AMONG THEM– WHO IS AN ACTOR

STATE AGENCY ALLIES– RECEIVING GRANTS AND ENHANCING ROLE

IN STATE SYSTEM

WITHHOLDING FUNDS OR NEGOTIATING

FISCAL ASPECTS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL

RELATIONS TYING GOVERNMENTS TOGETHER OBLIGATIONS OPPORTUNITIES DEPENDENCIES FEDERAL DOLLARS

– $363 BILLION TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVTS IN 2002– 56% THROUGH HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES– 42% FOR MEDICAID– ALASKA = $3,500 PER CAPITA– NEW YORK = $2,000 PER CAPITA– NEVADA = $800 PER CAPITA

SIGNIFICANT FEATURES

STATE GOVT SPENDS MORE ON FINANCING GOVT– 1/4 FROM OTHER LEVELS

LOCAL GOVT SPENDS MORE ON SERVICES– 1/3 FROM OTHER LEVELS

CYCLES OF FEDERAL SPENDING

RAISING THE REVENUE SHIFT OVER TIME TO

USER, GENERAL SALES, UTILITY, LIQUOR

FEDERAL 11.8% P.I.– 70% INCOME TAXES

STATE 10% NV P.I.– 50% GENERAL SALES

AND EXCISE TAXES– 33% INCOME TAXES

LOCAL– 75% PROPERTY TAXES– 15% SALES TAXES– 33% INTERGOVT

TAXES AS REVENUE GENERAL PROPERTY

TAX– WORST TAX?

SALES– 83%

LICENSES– 13%

INCOME CORPORATE

– 25%

OTHER– STATE LOTTERIES 3%– 12%

STATE AND LOCAL SPENDING IMPACTS FROM

INFLATION STATE

– PUBLIC WELFARE– EDUCATION– HEALTH – HIGHWAYS

LOCAL– EDUCATION– HEALTH– HIWAYS

INTERGOVERNMENTAL GRANTS CATEGORICAL = STIMULATING

SPENDING IN FUNCTIONAL AREAS AND LOWER PRICES FOR GRANTEES

FORMULA GRANTS = DOLLARS TO GOVERNMENTS

FIXED AMOUNT = FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSES (EDUCATION, HIWAYS)

PROJECT=PLANS AND COMPETITION

FEDERAL GRANTS IN AID

PROVIDING SERVICE THAT NATIONAL INTEREST REQUIRES W/O PRE-EMPTION

EXPENDITURE W/O RESPONSIBILITY? NOT INCREASING STATE EXPENDITURES

IN TARGET AREAS SECURING UNITY W/O SACRIFICING

COHESIVENESS REFINING FEDERALISM NOT

UNDERMINING IT

WHY CATEGORICAL GRANTS?

ECONOMIC AND FISCAL CONSIDERATIONS– SPILLOVERS AND EXTERNALITIES– HIGHWAYS, WASTEWATER PLANTS

POLITICAL FACTORS– INTEREST GROUPS AND DISTRUST– CONGRESSIONAL INFLUENCE

SOCIAL PLURALISM– INCREMENTAL STEPS VS. FISCAL CHANGE

10TH AMENDMENT

POWERS NOT DELEGATED TO THE U.S. BY CONSTITUTION NOR PROHIBITED BY IT TO THE STATES ARE RESERVED TO THE STATES OR TO THE PEOPLE.

ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT SOUTH CAROLINA VS. BAKER - 1988

– NO TAX IMMUNITY UNDER THE 10TH AMENDMENT? GARCIA VS. SAN ANTONIO METROTRANSIT AUTH –

1985– NO PROTECTION FROM FEDERAL REGULATION

LESSONS:– POLITICAL ADMIN RELATIONSHIP NOT

CONSTITUTIONAL– FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT STATUTORY

GONZALEZ VS. RAICH – JUNE 6, 2005– TRANFORMING THE NONCOMMERCIAL

POSSESSION OF HOMEGROWN MARIJUANA INTO INTERSTATE COMMERCE (6 TO 3)

IMPACT OF U.S. VS. LOPEZ TURNING POINT FOR FEDERALISM

– SUPREME CT AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE– CONGRESS EVOLVES RE: INTREPRETATION– PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS CHECK IN ON

FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMES ONCE EXCLUSIVELY REGULATED BY STATES

EXCEEDING CONGRESS’ AUTHORITY UNDER COMMERCE ACT

CONSTITUTIONAL MINUTE OR MOMENT? CONSERVATIVE JUSTICES LOOKING TO

LIMITS OF POWER TO REGULATE INTERSTATE COMMERCE

FEDERALISM AND FED BUDGET REDUCTIONS

ECONOMIC FEDERALISM REAGAN’S NEW FEDERALISM USING FEDERALISM PRINCIPLES TO

AFFECT DEFICIT– BUDGET CUTTING THROUGH MANDATES

• PRODUCE A GOOD – CLEAN AIR• PRODUCE SPECIFIED WAY – DRINKING WATER• REGULATE FIRMS OR CONSUMERS – HANDGUN

WAITING

– INTERGOVT GRANTS – REFORM OR BUDGET CUTS?

• FROM GENERAL REVENUE SHARING TO GRANT PAYMENTS TO INDIVIDUALS

LOCAL GOVTS’ RESPONSE

BALANCED BUDGET CONSTRAINTS

AFFECTS ON REDISTRIBUTION

RESTRICTING BENEFITS

SHIFT TO STATE ADMINISTERED BLOCK GRANT PROGRAMS?

LVCC AND NEVADA TAX PAYERS ASSOCIATION

RECOMMENDATIONS MEANS-TEST ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS OR FEE

SCHEDULE FOR NON-DISADVANTAGED PRIORITIZE EXPENDITURES PROGRAM OR PERFORMANCE-BASED BUDGETS OUTCOME BASED PERFORMANCE INDICATORS SUMMARY OF GRANTS IN EVERY BUDGET

PREPARATION RETIREMENT BENEFITS SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECT

TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NO VACATION TIME AND SICK LEAVE BUY BACKS PRIORITY SCHEDULING FOR TECH ENHANCEMENTS

AND TRAINING FOR REVENUE GENERATING DEPTS

CALIFORNIA ADOPTION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

WHAT ARE THE PROBLEMS WITH THIS PROGRAM?

HOW BIG IS EACH OF THESE PROGRAMS IS THIS PROGRAM REALLY SO OUT OF

CONTROL AS IT APPEARS? WHAT SHOULD THE STATE WANT TO

HOLD THE COUNTIES ACCOUNTABLE FOR?

WHAT IS ACCOUNTABILITY? COST MINIMIZATION? ADHERING TO FUNDER DIRECTIVES? DEFINING AND ENFORCING

STANDARDS? OFFICIALS ARE HELD ANSWERABLE

FOR GENERAL NOTIONS OF DEMOCRACY, MORALITY AND SPECIFIC LEGAL MANDATES

WHAT ABOUT INTER-COUNTY CONSISTENCY

WHAT ABOUT INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION SAVING THE 15%?

CONCLUSIONS REGARDING EFFECTS OF FEDERAL

BUDGETARY CUTS

UNFUNDED MANDATES FEDERAL GRANTS TO LOCAL

GOVTS APPEALS TO FEDERALISTS SHIFTING FROM OPEN ENDED

MATCH GRANTS TO BLOCK FIED GRANTS

ELIMINATING ENTITLEMENTS

QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED RE: PROJECT SELF SUFFICIENCY

WHAT’S THE CONFLICT?

HOW TO RESOLVE? WHAT CHANGE IS

BEING MADE? WHAT MOTIVATED

THE CHANGE? WHAT PRINCIPALS

ARE IN THE CONFLICT?

DOES THERE HAVE TO BE A CONFLICT BETWEEN FEDERAL AND LOCAL INTERESTS?

WHAT ARE INTERGOVT ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITIES?

TWO OR MORE LEVELS OF GOVT CONVERTING A NATL POLICY TO SPECIFIC

STATE AND LOCAL OBJECTIVES NATL

– WHICH AGENCIES? WHAT REGULATION? HOW MUCH AID? WHAT PLANS? COORDINATION?

STATE AND LOCAL– COALITIONS AND DRAFTING PLANS– STAFFING– CORRDINATION– PROGRAM BENEFICIARIES

ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM

INTERGOVERNMENTAL REGULATION MANDATING

– UMRA – 1995– COMPLEX POLITICAL FORCES– STATE MANDATES ON LOCAL GOV’TS

NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW 1993

REPUBLICAN CONTRACT WITH AMERICA 1995

INTERGOVERNMENTAL REGULATION

DIRECT ORDERS– THREAT OF CRIMINAL OR

CIVIL PENALTIES

CROSSCUTTING– APPLY TO ALL FEDERAL

ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

CROSSOVER– THREATEN TERMINATION OF

AID UNLESS REQUIREMENTS MET

PARTIAL PREEMPTION– FEDERAL STANDARDS BUT

STATE ADMINISTRATION

DIRECT ORDERS EEOC 1972 MARINE

PRORTECTION RESEARCH & SANCTUARIES ACT 1977

OSHA– EXEMPT AS

EMPLOYERS FLSA 1974

– NLC VS USERY 1976• CAN’T THREATEN

INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE

CROSSCUTTING REQUIREMENTS

HORIZONTAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 1964 OMB 1980

– 39 SOCIO-ECON.– 23 FISCAL-ADMIN– ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION– NONDISCRIMINATION

CROSSOVER SANCTIONS

TIED TO GRANTS-IN-AID

VERTICAL– SINGLE FUNCTION,

DEPT OR PROGRAM HIGHWAY

BEAUTIFICATION ACT 1965

EMERGENCY HIGHWY ENERGY CONSERVATION ACT 1974

PARTIAL PRE-EMPTION USING SUPREMACY

CLAUSE AND COMMERCE POWER

WATER QUALITY ACT 1965– FED. GOVT CAN ASSUME

JURISDICTION CLEAN AIR

AMENDMENTS 1970– ESTABLISHING EMISSION-

CONTROL REQUIREMENTS– SIPS AND HWY

CONSTRUCTION– FUND TERMINATION AS IN

CROSSOVER

THE ROLE OF FEDERAL MANDATES 1995

200 SEPARATE MANDATES 170 DIFFERENT LAWS 3,500 COURT DECISIONS NATL ISSUES TODAY: ANY

PROBLEM THAT IS VISIBLE ACIR RECOMMENDATIONS

– REPEAL BASED ON LACK OF NATL IMPORTANCE (FLSA, FMLA, OSHA)

– SHARED COSTS (CWA, ADA)– REVISE FOR FLEXIBILITY

(SDWA, CLEAN AIR, SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT

POLITICS OF UNFUNDED MANDATES

PAUL POSNER

FROM MANDATES IN 1970’S + 1980’S TO REFORM IN 1990’S

REPUBLIANS AS RELUCTANT MANDATORS

DELAYED STATE AND LOCAL REACTION

SERVING POLITICAL FUNCTIONS

INTERGOVERNMENTAL ROOTS– PRECEDED BY STATE

ACTION GROWING INTERDEPENDENCE

COOPERATIVE MANDATING?

NOT JUST HOW BUT WHETHER?

HELPING LEGITIMIZE THE FEDERAL PRESENCE

MODIFICATIONS INFLUENCE OVER

DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION AS A PROTECTOR

THE OTHER MANDATE WARHOSANSKY

FLORIDA 1980’S– 5O A YEAR– $1 BILLION– RELIEF FROM VOTERS

(17 STATES) UMRA 1995

– CBO ESTIMATES AND HURDLES FOR $50 MILLION+

FEDERAL AND STATE START-UP MONEY ONLY– IT JUST ROLLS

DOWNHILL

NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW - 1993

ACIR GOES OUT OF BUSINESS

$226.1 BILLION IN GRANTS

DUPLICATION AND OVERLAP

INCREASED MANDATES

CONSOLIDATION NEEDED

OPPORTUNITY FOR CHANGE

NPR GOALS FOR CHANGE

REDUCE CATEGORICAL GRANTS

REDUCE UNFUNDED MANDATES

OUTCOMES AND INCENTIVES

INTERGOVT AND INTERDEPT COLLABORATION

NPR RECOMMENDATIONS

IMPROVE GRANT ADMINISTRATION

CUT RED TAPE AND ELIMINATE ROADBLACKS

SIMPLIFY COST REIMBURSEMENT PROCEDURES

ELIMINATE NEEDLESS PAPERWORK

SIMPLFY COMPLIANCE REINVENT ACIR PROMOTE

INTERGOVERNMENTAL COLLABORATION

CONTRACT WITH AMERICA OR REDISCOVERING GOVERNMENT

DIIULIO AND KETTL

DISTRUST IN GOVT THEN AND NOW 3,000 MILES WIDE AND 2 MILES DEEP

– NATL ROLE– HOW TO BALANCE THE FEDERAL

BUDGET– WHAT DOES LESS GOVT REALLY

MEAN– MEDICAID AS AN EXAMPLE

• 694 PAGES OF RULES DO DEVOLUTIONISTS WANT TO KILL OR

CURE INVOLVEMENT IN HEALTH, CRIME, WELFARE, ENVIRONMENTAL MGT, TRANSPORTATION?

CIVIC EDUCATION ABOUT PUBLIC MGT– IMPLEMENTATION IS IMPORTANT

REDISCOVERING GOVERNMENT

DOCUMENTING WHAT GOVT DOES

ADMIN. SUCCESSES AND FAILURE

ANALYZE REASONS FOR VARIANCE IN PERFORMANCE AT EVERY LEVEL

HOW TO REPLICATE MGT EXCELLENCE

WHAT APPLIED STRATEGIES WORK BEST

DISSEMINATE WIDELY

WHERE TO FROM HERE? INTERDEPENDENCE GLOBALIZATION DESTRUCTIVE

PLURALISM NEW NATIONALISM FEDERALISM

CONTINUES ROLE OF

TECHNOLOGY NEW NATIONALISM CENTRALIZATION OR

DECENTRALIZATION

THE IDEA OF NATIONBEER

ONE NATION DEFINED AS HOW– COMMON BENEFIT– PARTNERSHIP IN

PERFECTION– ONE STEADY

PURPOSE– UNITED ACTION IN

EMERGENCIES– ADDRESSING

SECIONAL, ECONOMIC AND ETHNIC STRESSORS

HAMILTON– 50 STATES ENGAGED

IN NATION BUILDING

THE POWER OF STATESKELLER

MADISON– POWERS RESERVED

TO STATES IN ORDINARY COURSE OF AFFAIRS

STATE AND LOCAL OBLIGATIONS MET WITH FEDERAL STANDARDS WORK

INCREMENTAL CHANGE

THE SYSTEM PERSISTS

HEALTH POLICY AS AN EXAMPLE

ABSENCE OF NATIONAL ACTION DOES NOT PREVENT STATE ACTION

USE OF WAIVER AUTHORITY UNDER SOCIAL SECURITY ACT (43 STATES)

DIFFERENCES INCREASING UNDERMINING MEDICAID BLOCK GRANT

EVEN AS CREATING WELFARE BLOCK GRANT

HEALTHCARE REFORM TO LEAD THE WAY?

NEW NATIONALISM IN SOCIAL POLICY

JANSSON AND SMITH

1950’S – 1970’S – OPPRESSIVE FED. GOVT?

1980’S – 1990’S – DEVOLUTION COMMON STATE TAX? (1992) ONE NATION NEEDED TO ADDRESS

SOCIAL PROBLEMS FEDERAL POWER BUT GRANTING

WAIVERS

FEDERAL POWER BUT WITH THE GRANTING OF WAIVERS

WAIVERS TO BE GRANTED:– EXTENT FEDERAL TAX CODE USED

• EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT

– PROGRAM ADDRESSES SURVIVAL NEEDS– LIKELIHOOD STATES WILL DISCRIMINATE– PROBLEM REQUIRES LARGE RESOURCES– ECONOMIC COMPETITION BETWEEN STATES

INHIBITS SOCIAL OUTCOMES– LINKED TO GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS– LOCAL INPUTS AND PARTNERSHIPS NEEDED– SERVICE-INTENSIVE PROGRAMS

STRATEGIES FOR POLICY PRACTITIONERS

SEEK AND RETAIN CENTRAL RULES AND FUNDING

TARGET EXCESSIVE DEVOLUTION FOR CHANGE

BE PRINCIPLED OPPORTUNISTS

THE FUTURE OF REFORM

DEVOLUTION OR

CENTRALIZATION?

SYSTEM UNDER STRESSKETTL

EFFECTIVE RESPONSE STRATEGY:– PREPARE GOVT TO ASSIST CIVILIANS

IN CASE OF ATTACK– PROVIDE CONTINUITY OF GOVT– PROVIDE CONTINUITY OF MILITARY

OPERATIONS– BORDER AND COASTAL DEFENSE– NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE

HOMELAND SECURITY AND PUBLIC POLICY

HELPING EVERYONE UNDERSTAND

CIVIL RIGHTS VS. SECURITY

THINKING ABOUT RISK DIFFERENTLY

SHAPING AND RESTRAINING CHANGE IN AMERICA

THE SYSTEM BREAKS DOWN

SEPTEMBER 11– HIJACKED

AIRLINES– NEAR MISSES– LACK OF

INFORMATION SHARING AND COORDINATION

OCTOBER 29– ANTHRAX EVENTS

HOMELAND SECURITY AS COORDINATION

+ INTERGOVERNMENTAL + FEDERAL + REGIONAL + HEALTH + FIRST RESPONDERS

- WORLD TRADE CENTER - INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

- PRESIDENCY AND CONGRESS THE CHALLENGE: GETTING

BUREAUCRATIC AGENCIES TO WORK TOGETHER

COORDINATION IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY

CREATING DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY -$37.5 BILLION AND 160,000 EMPLOYEES– 22 AGENCIES– CONFLICTING MISSIONS– DIFFERENT CULTURES– PHYSICAL AND TECHNOLOGY BARRIERS

• THE TRILOGY PROJECT

– 88 DIFFERENT CONGR. COMMITTEES– ASYMMETRY AS THE ENEMY– WHAT DOES HOMELAND SECURITY REALLY

MEAN?

REORGANIZING HOMELAND SECURITY

NAPA – SUMMER 2003 CENTRALIZED DECISION MAKING WON’T WORK OPERATIONAL AUTHORITY IN THE FIELD LISTEN TO STAKEHOLDERS BUILD INTER-AGENCY TEAMS USE BUDGET TO BUILD CONSENSUS DO NOT LET CRISES DETER DAY-TO-DAY

ADMINISTRATION GOOD INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEM STREAM LINE PROCESSES CHOOSE ADMINISTRATORS BASED ON COMPETENCE DON’T FORCE UNIFORMITY CONTINUOUS EMPLOYEE COMMUNICATION

PUA 705 – NOVEMBER 3, 2005

INTERSTATE COMPACTS STATE AND LOCAL STRUGGLES

INTERSTATE COMPACTS

AGREEMENTS BETWEEN TWO OR MORE STATES THAT BIND THEM TO THE COMPACT PROVISIONS– CONTRACT LAW APPLIES– CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION– STATES BOUND EVEN IF CONFLICT WITH STATE LAW

36 COMPACTS BETWEEN 1783-1920– BOUNDARY DISPUTES

MULTISTATE REGULATORY BODIES– 1921 NEW YORK-NEW JERSEY PORT AUTHORITY

MORE THAN 200– EMERGENCY MGT ASSISTANCE– INTERSTATE COMPACT ON INDUSTRIALIZED MODULAR

BUILDINGS– INTERSTATE INSURANCE RECEIVERSHIP COMPACT– LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE COMPACTS

• MANDATED BY CONGRESS

INTERSTATE COMPACTS

CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL– ARTICLE ONE – US. CONSTITUTION

• NO STATE, SHALL WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF CONGRESS ENTER INTO ANY AGREEMENT OR COMPACT WITH ANOTHER STATE

• VIRGINIA VS TENNESSEE (1893)– NOT ALL

» ONLY THOSE THAT AFFECT A POWER DELEGATED TO THE FEDERAL GOVT OR ALTER FEDERAL BALANCE OF POWER

» EDUCATION AS AN EXAMPLE

• EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED THRU RESOLUTION• CAN BE INVALIDATED

INTERSTATE COMPACTS

GENERAL PURPOSES– EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE– INTERSTATE AGRICULTURAL– PORT AUTHORITY– RIVER BASIN COMPACT– SUPERVISION OF PAROLEES AND PROBATIONERS– ECONOMIES OF SCALE

• WESTERN HIGHER EDUCATION COMPACT– COMPLY WITH FEDERAL LAW

• INTERSTATE LOW-LEEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE – PROMOTE REGIONAL INTERSTS

• SOUTHERN GROWTH POLICIES BOARD– SETTLE INTERSTATE DISPUTES

• BOUNDARY

INTERSTATE COMPACTS

TYPICAL TIMEFRAME: 5 – 9 YEARS COMMON CRITICISMS

– MEMBER STATE FOREIT INDIVIDUAL SOVEREIGNTY

– COMPACTS CAN BE EXCLUSIONARY– ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY MAY

NOT BE CLEARLY DEFINED

OHIO, KENTUCKY, INDIANA MEMBER OF EMAC 2002 –

HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE 3 STATES MUST RESPOND TO BIOLOGICAL

THREAT OF CONTAMINATION OF OHIO RIVER– KENTUCKY TO SEND EXPERTS

• COVERED BY WORKER’S COMP IN KENTUCKY– YES IN OHIO/NO IN KENTUCKY

• SUPREME COURT EXTENDS HOST STATE JURIS.• WHICH STAKEHOLDERS HAVE STANDING

– FEDERAL LAW USUALLY APPIES– WORKER INJURED MAY SEEK COMPENSATION

FROM EITHER OHIO OR KENTUCKY– BALANCING PRIVATE RIGHTS, RISK AND

STRENGTH’S OF AGENCY INTERESTS

INTERSTATE COMPACTS-OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

HEARING REQUIREMENTS– FORMAL OR INFORMAL

DECISION MAKERS– SEPARATION BETWEEN ALJ AND INVESTIGATORS?– ARE DECISIONMAKERS ACCOUNTABLE?– DELEGATION OF DECISIONMAKING

EXPARTE COMMUNICATION– LAWMAKERS CONVEY INTERPRETATION EX PARTE?– OVERRIDE DISQUALIFICATION OF DECISIONMAKER ON GROUNDS OF

NECESSITY?– IMPRTIALITY OF ALJs ASSURED?

HOW WILL DECISIONS BE MADE?– ORAL OR IN WRITING– FINAL ORDER OR RECEMMENDATION– WHICH JURISDICTION HAS FINAL SAY?– AGENCY BOUND BY ITS OWN PRECEDENT OR BY CONSTITUENT STATES– MEAN TO RESOLVE INCONSIDENT PRECEDENTS– WILL ALJ DECISION HAVE PRECENDENT OVER INCONSISTENCIES?

INTERSTATE COMPACT FOR ADULT OFFENDER

SUPERVISION OUTDATED AUTHORITY AND STRUCTURE STATES WITH LIMITED CONTROL 4.5 MILLION OFFENDERS 50 STATES ARE MEMBERS TWO OPTIONS

– TEXT AND TERMS NOT AMENDED– RESPONDING TO CHANGES W/O AMENDMENT

SPECIFICS– INDEPENDENT OPERATING AUTHORITY + STAFF– STATE POLICY MAKERS– MANDATORY FUNDING MECHANISM– COLLECTION OF STANDARDIZED INFORMATION– FACILITATING STATE AUTHORITY AND NATIONAL COOPERATION

• STATE COUNCILS DETERMINE OWN STRUCTURE• PARTICIPATE IN NATIONAL COMMISSION• LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL REPRESENTATIVES• STATES DETERMINE COMPACT ADMINISTRATOR• FORMULA DUES• RULES AND BYLAWS EFFECT STATES• EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

CONCERNS FROM THE FIELD

WHAT TRANSITION?– COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS AND

NATIONAL INTERSTATE COMMISSION PUT TOGETHER PROCESS

WHAT HAPPENS IF NOT A MEMBER OF ORIGINAL 35– GOVERNOR INVITED– OLD COMPACT STATES AND NEW

A NEW VIEW– EMPOWERING STATES TO MAINTAIN CONTROL

OVER AREAS THAT RIGHT ARE THEIRS AND PROMOTES FLEXIBLE RULE-MAKING

NEW COMPACT PROVISIONS

ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS CAN BE SPECIFIED

CENTRALIZED COMMISSION WITH STATE REPS

RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY AS LONGTERM SOLUTIONS

NATIONAL INTEGRATED INFORMATION SHARING SYSTEM

MANDATORY FUNDING MECHANISM TO SUPPORT ESSENTIAL OPERATIONS

INTERSTATE FIRE PROTECTION AND WATER RESOURCES COORDINATION

WHAT IS PURPOSE? WHO ARE THE PARTIES? HOW WILL DECISIONS BE MADE? HOW WILL COMMUNICATIONS BE

HANDLED? CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL? HOW WOULD YOU IMPROVE?

SYSTEM UNDER STRESSSTATE AND LOCAL

STRUGGLES ALL POLITICS AND DISASTERS ARE FIRST AND FOREMOST – LOCAL

EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION IS LIKE 911– 200 HUNDRED N.Y. UNITS RESPOND – ANTHRAX AND POSTAL WORKERS AND

PHYSICIANS

COMMON EVENTS PLAYING OUT IN UNCOMMON FASHION

DRAGON FIGHTERS RESPOND

ALARM GOES OFF AND LADDER 6 RESPONDS

SITUATION DIFFICULT TO ASSESS NO INFORMATION TRAINED TO SAVE PEOPLE TOWER COMES DOWN FINDING SIXTEEN PEOPLE AND A RADIO SAVING JOSEPHINE HARRIS JAY JONAS: JUST DOING THE SAME JOB AS

343 WHO DIED

GAPS IN THE SYSTEM

IS AN ALL-RISK STRATEGY BETTER?– STRONG BASIC CAPACITY AND DEPLOY REGARDLESS OF CAUSE

ARE MUTUAL AID AGREEMENTS KEY?– HOW COORDINATED?– SMALLER SACRIFICE RIGHT TO SEPARATE FUNDING?

UNDER-EQUIPPED, UNDER-TRAINED UNCOORDINATED

– DO FIREFIGHTERS TALK TO POLICE?– LACK OF INTER-OPERABILITY IN TEXAS– OCTOBER 2001 – ANTHRAX – PUBLIC HEALTH AND FIRST

RESPONDERS UNDERFUNDED

– COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 2003 POLITICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC

-STRUGGLING TO MAINTAIN AUTONOMY

COORDINATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

COORDINATION AS A STRUCTURAL PROBLEM REQUIRING ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN– TAYLOR:SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT: HOW WILL THE WORK BE DIVIDED?– GULICK:PURPOSE, PROCESS, CLIENTELE, PLACE

• NOT NEAT OR PERFECT– HOOD: COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED – TIGHTEN UP RULES AND

AUTHORITY COORDINATION AS A CONTINGENT PROBLEM

– SIMON: COORDINATION THROUGH DECISIONMAKING WORLD TRADE CENTER VS. ARLINGTON COUNTY’S RESPONSE TO

PENTAGON REQUIRING STRONG, FUNCTIONALLY ORGANIZED BUREAUCRACIES TO

SOLVE PLACE-BASED PROBLEMS IS DIFFICULT– STRUCTURAL AND NONSTRUCTURAL APPROACHES– SIMULATIONS

A QUESTION OF MONEY

FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL BUDGETARY ROLE MINIMUM PROTECTION REQUIRED WHERE TO FOCUS THE MONEY?

– BIGGEST THREAT?– TO ALL GOVTS?– RELY ON STATE AND LOCAL ASSESSMENTS?– HOW MUCH ON GOALS DEFINED BY FED. GOVT?– UNEVEN STATE RESPONSE?

CORE OF THE PROBLEM– SELF GOVT LIMITS FED CONTROL– DIFFICULT TO SET AND ENFORCE EMERGENCY STDS

HOW SHOULD STATE AND LOCAL FLEXIBILITY BE ENCOURAGED SO TO ENCOURAGE LABORATORIES OF DEMOCRACY AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE?

– CLEANER DIVISION BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE?– HOW TO ASSURE PROTECTION ACROSS BOUNDARIES?– FEDERAL GOVT DEFINES AND FINANCES WITH STATES IMPLEMENTING?

WHAT KIND OF GRANTS– NO STRINGS– BLOCK GRANTS– CATEGORICAL GRANTS

GOING BACK TO WHY FEDERALISM?

1787 TO DATE CHECKS GROWTH IN TYRANNY ALLOWS UNITY WITHOUT

UNIFORMITY ENCOURAGES EXPERIMENTATION KEEPS GOVT CLOSER TO THE

PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

NATIONAL GOVT ONLY THOSE POWERS DELEGATED TO IT BY THE CONSTITUTION EXCEPT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

NATL GOVT SUPREME POWER TO WAGE WAR, REGULATED INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN

COMMERCE, TAX AND SPEND STATES HAVE THOSE NOT DELEGATED UNLESS DENIED AND SOME

CONCURRENT– TAX AND SPEND– LOCAL GOVTS– ELECTIONS– CREATING REPUBLICAN FORM OF GOVT

– NO TREATIES WITH FOREIGN GOVTS– NO COINING MONEY

– NO COMMERCE– WITH CONSENT TAX IMPORTS AND EXPORTS

– TAX FOREIGN SHIPS– KEEP TROOPS IN TIME OF PEACE

– COMPACTS– ENGAGE IN WAR UNLESS INVADED

NORMAL ORGANIZATION AND ABNORMAL EVENTS

INJECTING UNCERTAINTY USING CONVENTIONAL

ORGANIZATIONS TO RESPOND TO UNTHINKABLE

DEPENDING UPON FEDERALISM OVERCOMING FRAGMENTATION GREATER RISKS

Pua 705 – November 10, 2005

Political Costs of Managing RiskCivil Rights and Civil LibertiesThe Worst is Yet to ComeLessons from Wildfire Hazard

MitigationLessons from Seattle’s “Garbage

Mess”

POLITICAL COSTS OF MANAGING RISK

REDUCING ODDS NOT PREVENTING TERRORISM

BALANCING RISKS THROUGH REDUNDANCY?

TWO KINDS OF ERROR– FALSE POSITIVES– FALSE NEGATIVES– AA FLIGHT 63 AS AN

EXAMPLE– HOW TO FIND THE

RIGHT BALANCE?

THREE TENSIONS IN HOMELAND SECURITY

COLLECTING ENOUGH DATA TO MAKE GOOD DECISIONS– COLUMBIA SPACE

SHUTTLE RISK OF BACKSLIDING

– ACCEPTING SOME FALSE POSITIVES

CALIBRATING RISK– FEARING NEW RISKS

MORE THAN EXISTING ONES

– GAMBLING ON TERRORISM

HOW TO WARN?

FIVE COLOR DESIGNATION – MARCH 2002

FEB 2003 – TERROR WARNING FROM YELLOW TO ORANGE

BUYING PLASTIC HEETING AND DUCT TAPE FOR SAFE ROOM

2003 CRS STUDY FINDS SYSTEM TOO VAGUE

UK = SEVEN DIFFERENT LAYERS AUGUST 2003 BLACKOUT

– COMMUNICATING WHEN COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS ARE DISRUPTED

HOW TO FRAME HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY?

WHAT CAN OFFICIALS GUARANTEE?

SECURITY IS A PRODUCT OF POLITICAL TRADE-OFFS

HOMELAND SECURITY AS AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL PROBLEM

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP WHAT ROLE FOR

CITIZENS?

CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

HIJACKERS AS LEGAL RESIDENTS

PASSING THE PATRIOT ACT– BROAD NEW POWERS TO

INVESTIGATE AND DETAIN– HOW OPEN A SOCIETY?

BROADENING THE WAR AND PRISONER INTERROGATION

BALANCING SECURITY AND RIGHTS

THE WORST IS YET TO COME

WE NEED A FEDERAL GOVT– OPERATES FROM TOP DOWN SO

SYSTEM WORKS FROM BOTTOM UP– NIMBLE RESPONSE– ALL HAZARD APPROACH– TOP OFFICALS WITH SKILLS TO LEAD– FEDERAL BUDGETARY INCENTIVES– COMMUNICATION SYSTEM LINKING

LEADERS

THE WORST IS YET TO COME

WE NEED STATE AND LOCAL GOVTS THAT– CREATE UNIFIED COMMAND– ESTABLISH A SINGLE PUBLIC FACE

TO PROMOTE TRUST– PROVIDE COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

TYING DECISION MAKERS TOGETHER– PRACTICE PLANS– SPEND EFFECTIVELY

PATHOLOGIES OF FAILURE

LOOKING BACK NOT FORWARD REFORMING INSTEAD OF GOVERNING THINKING VERTICALLY NOT

HORIZONTALLY REGULATING NOT PERFORMING STAYING WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES NOT

TRUSTING THE INTERGOVERNMENT SYSTEM

LESSONS FROM 9 WILDFIRES

2003 HAZARD REDUCTION AND

COST CONTAINMENT– FIRE RESISTANT COMMUNITIES– STRATEGIC FUEL BREAK

SYSTEMS– REDUCE VEGETATIVE FUEL

LOADS AND RESTORE FORESTS

MITIGATION PARTNERSHIPS– CPLFA, FEMA, LANDFIRE INFO.

SYSTEM– ONE STOP WEB SITE

$870 MILLION PER YEAR THROUGH 2004