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1
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION
PROCEDURE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS
FINAL REPORT
1 May 2020
Members of the Committee:
Professor Hélène Ruiz Fabri (French): Co-Chair
Professor Shotaro Hamamoto (Japanese): Co-Chair
Professor Philippe Sands QC (British): Co-Chair
Dr Arman Sarvarian (British): Co-Rapporteur
Dr Filippo Fontanelli (Italian): Co-Rapporteur
Professor Geir Ulfstein (Norwegian) Professor Laurence Boisson de Chazournes (French)
Alternate: Professor Alain Pellet Professor Hervé Ascensio (French)
Alternate: Professor David Ruzié Professor Matthew Happold (British) Dr James Devaney (British) Dr Antonios Tzanakopoulos (British) Professor Andrea Gattini (Italian) Professor Serena Forlati (Italian) Professor Lorenzo Gradoni (Chair’s nomination - Italian) Ms Louise Reilly (Irish)
Alternate: Dr Anna Marie Brennan Professor Yuval Shany (Israeli)
Alternate: Dr Gilad Noam Professor Manuel Almeida de Ribeiro (Portuguese)
Alternate: Dr Francisco Pereira Coutinho Dr Francisco Pascual-Vives (Spanish) Professor Alfred Soons (Dutch) Professor Chiara Giorgetti (American) Professor Jeffrey Dunoff (American) Professor Andreas Zimmerman (German) Professor Stephan Schill (German) Professor Christian Tams (German) Judge Rüdiger Wolfrum (Chair’s nomination - German) Professor Gabrielle Marceau (Canadian)
Alternate: Dr Noemi Gal-Or (until 2018) JudgeYuji Iwasawa (Japanese)
Alternate: Professor Hironobu Sakai Professor Mariko Kawano (Japanese)
Alternate: Professor Dai Tamada Dr Hrachya Simonyan (Belarussian) Ms Loretta Malintoppi (Singaporean)
Alternate: Ms Davinia Aziz (until 15 March 2019); Mr Alvin Yap (from 15 March 2019) Professor Gonzalo Villalta Puig (Hong Kong) Mr Shashank Kumar (Indian) Mr Atip Latipulhayat (Indonesian) Mr Arshad Ghaffar (Pakistani) Dr Christopher Ward (Australian) Professor Enrique Hernández Sierra (Swiss) Professor Makane Mbengue (Headquarters - Senegalese) Dr Illy Ousseni (Headquarters - Burkinabe) Mr Justice Ronnie Boodoosingh (Caribbean)
Alternate: Mr Calvin Hamilton Professor Paula Almeida (Brazilian)
Alternate: Professor Luana Pedrosa de Figueiredo Cruz
Professor Aziz Tuffi Saliba (Brazilian) Alternate: Professor Carlos Henrique Haddad
Professor Diego Fernández Arroyo (Argentine) Professor James Graham (Mexican) †Dr Oluwabunmi Lar (Nigerian)(until 22 January 2020) Professor Davorin Lapaš (Croatian) Dr Joanna Gomula (Polish)
Alternate: Dr Aleksandra Mężykowska Ms Etleva Haka (Albanian) Mr Stratis Georgilas (Hellenic)
Alternate: Dr Constantinos Salonidis Professor Milenko Kreća (Serbian)
Alternate: Professor Rodoljub Etinski Dr Marina Trunk-Fedorova (Russian) Professor Stephan Wittich (Austrian) Mr Philipp Janig (Austrian) Ms Alexia Solomou (Cypriot)
Alternate: Ms Maria Louca
2
I. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 4
II. Case Management .............................................................................................................. 6
A. Case Management Conference ...................................................................................... 6
B. Summary Dismissal ....................................................................................................... 7
C. Suspension of Proceedings ............................................................................................ 8
D. Default............................................................................................................................ 9
E. Composition of the Panel ............................................................................................. 10
1. Arbitrators ................................................................................................................ 11
2. Chambers of the ICJ and ITLOS ............................................................................. 13
3. Appointment of judges ad hoc ................................................................................. 14
4. Nationality of judges in cases of joinder or interventions ....................................... 14
F. Emergency interim measures in inter-State arbitration ............................................... 16
G. Participation of Third Parties ....................................................................................... 16
1. Joinder of Parties...................................................................................................... 17
2. Alternative methods of participation for State and non-State actors ....................... 18
3. Time-limits ............................................................................................................... 21
4. Access to Pleadings.................................................................................................. 22
5. Transparency of proceedings ................................................................................... 23
H. Joinder of Proceedings ................................................................................................. 24
1. Joinder of Bilateral Proceedings .............................................................................. 24
2. Joinder of Multilateral Proceedings ......................................................................... 25
I. Counter-claims ............................................................................................................. 26
J. Costs Orders ................................................................................................................. 28
K. Written Phase of Pleadings .......................................................................................... 28
1. Time-limits ............................................................................................................... 28
2. Length of Written Pleadings .................................................................................... 30
3. Simultaneous Filing ................................................................................................. 30
4. Number of Pleadings................................................................................................ 30
5. Closure ..................................................................................................................... 31
6. Late Filing of Documents ........................................................................................ 31
7. Data Security ............................................................................................................ 32
L. Oral Phase of Pleadings ............................................................................................... 32
1. Scheduling................................................................................................................ 33
2. Duration and Utility ................................................................................................. 33
3
3. Virtual Hearings ....................................................................................................... 34
M. External Professional Activities of Judges .............................................................. 36
III. Objections to Jurisdiction or Admissibility ..................................................................... 37
A. Objections to Jurisdiction or Admissibility in WTO Panel Proceedings ..................... 37
B. Bifurcation ................................................................................................................... 38
IV. Evidence ........................................................................................................................... 41
A. Documentary Evidence ................................................................................................ 41
1. Requests for Evidence.............................................................................................. 41
2. Confidentiality ......................................................................................................... 42
3. Provenance ............................................................................................................... 44
4. Refusals to Produce Evidence .................................................................................. 46
B. Testimonial Evidence................................................................................................... 47
1. Witnesses of Fact ..................................................................................................... 48
2. Expert Witnesses and Assessors .............................................................................. 49
3. Examination of Witnesses........................................................................................ 51
C. Site Visits ..................................................................................................................... 52
V. Concluding Remarks ........................................................................................................ 52
VI. Annex ............................................................................................................................... 52
4
I. Introduction
This is the Final Report submitted by the Committee on the Procedure of International Courts
and Tribunals (‘the Committee’) to the 79th Biennial Conference of the International Law
Association (ILA). The mandate of the Committee is twofold: 1) to identify and analyse
procedural issues arising in the practice of inter-State international courts and tribunals; and 2)
to formulate proposals for procedural reform for the consideration of those courts and tribunals.
Three broad areas of procedure were selected for consideration: 1) case management; 2)
objections to jurisdiction or admissibility; and 3) evidence. Four fora were selected: 1) the
International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’ or ‘the Court’); 2) the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea (‘ITLOS’ or ‘the Tribunal’); 3) inter-State arbitration, particularly under the auspices
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (‘PCA’); and 4) World Trade Organization (‘WTO’)
panel proceedings (collectively, the ‘adjudicators’1).
At its first meeting, the Committee chose to publish its working documents in the interests of
transparency but to apply the ‘Chatham House Rule’ to its deliberations and to keep
confidential the summary records of its meetings in order to encourage free debate. In line with
its Mandate, the Committee decided to concentrate on the ICJ and the ITLOS before shifting
its focus to inter-State arbitration and WTO panel proceedings by comparatively examining
common issues while sequentially tailoring proposals to each institution.
Following three meetings held in 2017 and 2018, the Committee adopted its Interim Report
without prejudice to individual views on particular issues and comprising provisional proposals
for procedural reform for the consideration of the ICJ and the ITLOS.2 The Interim Report was
debated with the participating membership of the ILA at the 78th Biennial Conference held in
Sydney in August 2018. In three meetings held in 2019 and 2020, the Committee reviewed its
Interim Report and considered ideas for procedural reform in inter-State arbitration and WTO
panel proceedings. The Committee then adopted at second reading this Final Report together
with a Resolution and duly submitted them on 1 September 2020 to the Headquarters of the
ILA.
For convenience, the conclusions and proposals of the Committee contained in the Resolution
are arranged by jurisdiction. This Report seeks to provide analytical underpinning to the
Resolution and is structured for succinctness and coherence in accordance with the three
aforementioned fields of inquiry. These are subdivided into specific topics, arranged in a
loosely chronological manner according to the sequence of contentious procedure and
containing brief descriptions of problems identified and the solutions proposed. For
background, analysis and citation underpinning these proposals, readers are referred to the
documents published on the Committee webpage.
1 This term is used for shorthand only. Members of WTO panels are not judges but their mandate is akin to that
of adjudicators more broadly. 2 The following members actively participated in the deliberations: Professor Laurence Boisson de Chazournes,
Professor Alain Pellet, Professor Hervé Ascensio, Professor Matthew Happold, Dr James Devaney, Professor
Andrea Gattini, Professor Serena Forlati, Professor Lorenzo Gradoni, Dr Francisco Pascual-Vives, Professor
Alfred Soons, Professor Chiara Giorgetti, Professor Jeffrey Dunoff, Professor Gabrielle Marceau, Professor
Christian Tams, Professor Mariko Kawano, Ms Loretta Malintoppi, Ms Davinia Aziz, Mr Shashank Kumar, Dr
Christopher Ward, Dr Enrique Hernández Sierra, Professor Makane Mbengue, Dr Illy Ousseni, Professor Paula
Almeida, Professor Davorin Lapaš, Dr Joanna Gomula, Mr Stratis Georgilas, Dr Marina Trunk-Fedorova, Dr
Stephan Wittich, Ms Alexia Solomou, Ms Maria Louca, Dr Noemi Gal-Or, Professor David Ruzié, Professor
Stephan Schill, Professor Yuval Shany, Professor Manuel de Almeida Ribeiro, Professor Pereira Coutinho, Ms
Louise Reilly, Professor Gilad Noam, Ms Etleva Haka, Professor Milenko Kreća, Mr Alvin Yap.
5
The proposals put forward in the Resolution and this Report concerning procedural reform for
the ICJ, ITLOS and WTO panels are aimed at their rules of procedure, practice directions,
resolutions, judicial practice and administrative practice. No recommendations are made with
respect to their statutes, in accordance with the Committee’s mandate, the rationale of which
was to examine ideas for reform that institutions can achieve themselves, in contrast to statutory
reform for which the political will of the States members of the respective organisations or
parties to the respective conventions would be required. In light of the paralysis of the WTO
Appellate Body – which ceased on 10 December 2019 to have a quorate division – amidst
wider uncertainty about the scope for systemic reform at the WTO, the Committee decided in
2019 to confine the scope of its inquiry into the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to the
procedure and working methods of panels. As the Institut de Droit International had taken up
the issue of provisional measures,3 the Committee decided in 2017 to omit this topic in order
to avoid duplication.
Two features of inter-State arbitration distinguish it from the standing courts: 1) the power of
parties to create the statute of arbitral tribunals, namely, arbitration agreements; and 2) the
existence of the UNCITRAL-inspired PCA Arbitration Rules 2012 (‘PCA Rules’) as a template
for the potential use, as modified, of arbitral tribunals. The resulting flexibility prompted the
Committee to craft recommendations addressed to three audiences, namely: 1) the PCA
Administrative Council when undertaking its next review of the PCA Rules and attendant
documents; 2) parties to an arbitration when negotiating their arbitration agreement and
consulting the tribunals; and 3) arbitral tribunals when issuing the rules of procedure,
procedural orders and otherwise conducting the arbitration. The Committee considers that this
approach has enabled a more nuanced set of ideas while remaining true to the pragmatic spirit
of the mandate.
During the course of this project, the Committee regularly conveyed the substance of its
ongoing work, including its Interim Report, to the ICJ, ITLOS, PCA and WTO by the good
offices of each respective Registrar, Secretary-General or Director-General. Whilst the
Committee received replies expressing interest and appreciation, no remarks were received in
response to its request for comments on the substance of the work. The Committee thus
developed its proposals without the benefit of formal remarks from the respective institutions,
though individual members informally consulted with individual judges, arbitrators and
administrative staff. The Committee has examined ideas for procedural reform in holistic
terms. Proposals should thus be viewed not individually but rather as part of a ‘package’; in
many cases, the Committee has linked multiple suggestions to one another.
This Report proposes procedural reforms or best practices that, in the view of the Committee,
are practicable and useful. Three overarching policy considerations drive these measures: 1)
enhancing the ‘sound administration of justice’ (la bonne administration de la justice) as the
integrity of the proceedings; 2) promoting procedural economy, as the time-efficiency of
contentious procedures both for the institutions and for the parties; and 3) furthering cost-
effectiveness in order to increase, and appear to increase, the value of the services provided by
the institutions for the money invested in them by States.4 While drawing valid and useful
comparisons between the Court, the Tribunal, arbitral tribunals and WTO panels, the
Committee has also acknowledged their respective institutional realities: certain approaches
may well apply across them, others may not. The Committee has continuously been mindful
3 Institut de droit international, Third Commission (Rapporteur: Lord Collins of Mapesbury), Provisional
Measures, Final Resolution (Hyderabad, 2017), Report (Hyderabad, 2017). 4 The latter two aspects are less prominent in the discussion of inter-State arbitration, due to the parties’ liberty to
set the pace, costs, and procedure, and the lack of an over-arching concern about the adjudicator’s docket.
6
of the fact that parties may jointly propose modifications to the rules at the outset of
proceedings before permanent jurisdictions 5 and are expected to cooperate with arbitral
tribunals and WTO panels to set the working procedures in each dispute. This margin for
flexibility ensures that parties’ voices shape in practice the procedure applied, and that the
Committee’s recommendations could be relevant in specific instances, without need or
aspiration of universal endorsement or codification.
Whereas the disruption to international adjudication and arbitration arising from the COVID-
19 pandemic has prompted interesting reactions from international courts and tribunals and
parties, the Committee has not examined these events separately but rather as part of its broader
inquiry. Hearings and case management conferences by remote videolink, for example, were
an extant technique prior to the pandemic, even if the disruption has resulted in greater recourse
to it and given rise to new techniques and problems. Procedural techniques applied during the
pandemic are thus integrated into the Report, as opposed to a separate study. This exercise
appears at a time of considerable challenge to the legitimacy of institutions across public life.
In this evolving environment, practices that were once acceptable have become less so even
while expectations have risen as to the performance of the institutions. To respond with
conviction, institutions, including international courts and tribunals, need to adapt by
demanding more of themselves in terms of both effective performance and ethical rigour.
Whereas enhanced procedural efficacy and strengthened ethical standards are not necessarily
a decisive factor in the decision-making process of States to participate in international dispute-
settlement, they are by no means peripheral: continuous efforts to achieve effective and
efficient proceedings would promote confidence amongst States in the professionalism and
fairness of international adjudicators. 6
II. Case Management
Case management entails handling a diverse range of procedural matters that affect the general
progress of proceedings from beginning to end. The two key principles that feature most
prominently are: 1) procedural economy; and 2) procedural integrity (‘the sound administration
of justice’7). Though at times these two principles complement one another, at others they
conflict, thus requiring prioritisation or balancing between them. In proposing the following
reforms or suggestions, the Committee has considered not only the importance of prescribed
rules that provide clarity but also the need for discretion to exercise judgement in response to
different procedural incidents. Thus, the proposals focus not only on texts but also on other
means of achieving procedural improvements, notably judicial practice.
A. Case Management Conference
The Committee proposes the standardisation of timings for the existing practice of holding at
least two case management conferences on procedural matters under the direction of the
President (of ICJ and ITLOS),8 the tribunal’s chairperson (interstate arbitration) or the WTO
panel.9 Such conferences should be informal, using remote communication technology as
appropriate, for speed and convenience. For ICJ and ITLOS, the Committee recommends that
5 ICJ Rules, Art 101; ITLOS Rules, Art 48. 6 For statistical purposes, the period of review is the judicial year 1997-1998 to 2016-2017 with a cut-off date of
1 September 2017. The cut-off date for qualitative analysis of cases is 1 January 2020. 7 For instance, see how this formula appears in the ICJ’s Practice Directions. 8 ICJ Rules, Arts 31, 54(1); ITLOS Rules, Art 45. 9 In WTO panel proceedings, it is standard practice to have one Organization meeting with the parties. The
Committee’s proposal is limited to the standardisation of timing, to the extent possible, of such practice. At the
end of the Organization meeting the panel adopts its working procedures, which can include special working
procedures on confidential information, on the use of experts, on the rights of third-parties, and on other process
and logistical matters.
7
the first conference be held within one month of the initiation of proceedings and that another
conference be held within one month of the closure of the written phase, initial deliberations
having taken place beforehand to enable the president to consult. This would not preclude
additional conferences at earlier stages to address procedural matters such as joinder of
proceedings or the exercise of fact-finding powers. This reform could be codified by
amendment to Article 31 of the ICJ Rules and Article 45 of the ITLOS Rules. For arbitration
tribunals, a conference for the adoption of a timetable and procedural rules should be held
within a month of signature of the terms of appointment of the tribunal. The DSU provides that
WTO panels should issue a timetable as soon as praticable and whenever possible within a
week from composition.10
In line with the proposed reforms below, the first conference could deal with a range of
procedural matters, as applicable to the particular forum, such as: 1) fixing of time-limits and
page or word limits for written pleadings; 2) need for a jurisdiction and admissibility phase; 3)
summary dismissal of application; 4) joinder of proceedings and/or parties; and/or 5) planning
of the process of evidence production. The second conference could determine: 1) adoption of
a list of issues, an agreed statement of facts, dates and speaking-times for the hearings; 2)
applications to intervene and requests for copies of pleadings; 3) requests to produce new
evidence; 4) organisation of the examination of witnesses and experts at the hearings; or 5) the
exercise of autonomous fact-finding powers (i.e. – appointment of experts, inquiries, site
visits). Additional conferences may be necessary to address promptly procedural issues before
the second conference, particularly evidentiary matters.
B. Summary Dismissal
Whereas Article 40(1) of the ICJ Statute vests parties with the right to file applications for
summary dismissal, there is no right for applications to be admitted to the General List. After
an application is entered onto the List, the Court may summarily dismiss it for manifest want
of jurisdiction; this procedure has no textual basis in either the Statute or the Rules but has been
invoked since the Nuclear Tests Cases.11 A notable example of where the exercise of this power
was both applied and withheld were The Legality of the Use of Force Cases.12 The vagueness
of the modalities for summary dismissal inhibits predictability.
The Committee proposes that a new Article 38(5)bis be considered for inclusion in the ICJ
Rules to codify removal from the List of a manifestly unmeritorious application or the summary
dismissal of particular claims contained in an application for manifest lack of jurisdiction.13
The new provision could specify that the application or particular claims must be manifestly
lacking in jurisdiction at the point of application14 with a time-limit for requests to dismiss; the
parties would submit brief comments at the first case management conference. The ITLOS
10 DSU Art 12(3). 11 Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) (Australia v. France)(Provisional Measures)(Order of 22 June 1973)
[1973] ICJ Rep. 99, 100 (para 6); 135, 136-137 (para 7), 141-142 (paras 32-34). 12 Legality of the Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Spain) (Provisional Measure), Order of 2 June 1999, [1999] ICJ
Rep. 761, at 768-783 (paras 19-33); Legality of the Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of
America)(Provisional Measure), Order of 2 June 1999, [1999] ICJ Rep. 916, at 923-925 (paras 19-33). 13 E.g. – Armed Activities in the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Burundi) (Order of
30 January 2001) [2001] ICJ Rep. 3, at 4. 14 E.g. – Case Concerning Legality of the Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. United Kingdom) (Preliminary
Objections)(Judgment), [2004] ICJ Rep. 1307, at 1322 (para 34). See also, however, Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia)(Preliminary
Objections)(Judgment) [2008] ICJ Rep. 412, at 437-444 (paras 78-91); ‘Document entitled ‘Application for
revision of the Judgment of 26 February 2007 in the case concerning the Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia)’, ICJ Press Release No.
2017/12 (09 March 2017).
8
position differs in that Article 294(1) of the UNCLOS provides for summary dismissal of
abusive and/or ill-founded applications by an Article 287 body, on application or proprio motu.
Article 96 of the ITLOS Rules specifies the procedure for the exercise of this power, providing
for a time-limit of two months for proprio motu exercise (paragraph 3) and case-by-case fixing
of deadlines by order for applications (paragraph 2), a time-limit of sixty days for written
observations (paragraph 5) in addition to oral proceedings (paragraph 6).
However, inter-State arbitral tribunals (including those constituted under Annex VII
UNCLOS) and WTO panels have no specific instrument to dismiss applications summarily. It
is therefore important that the respondents’ objections be determined as quickly as possible
after the composition of the panel, as recommended below for preliminary procedural rulings.
C. Suspension of Proceedings
Parties before the ICJ, ITLOS and WTO panels may discontinue the proceedings at any point
up to the date of the promulgation of the decision or report on the merits, either by parties’
agreement or upon application in the absence of objection.15 Discontinuance of a case by
settlement is an important function, as it can promote the satisfactory settlement of the dispute
to which the contentious case contributes. In arbitration, tribunals can issue awards by consent
that codify or hint to the parties’ agreement to end the dispute.
To facilitate settlement negotiations, the Committee suggest that the ICJ and the ITLOS
consider amendments to Articles 88 of the ICJ Rules and 105 of the ITLOS Rules to create a
procedure for time-limited suspension, which may be renewed by joint agreement16 – along the
lines of the procedure established in Article 12.12 of the WTO DSU.17 Arbitral tribunals could
also propose to include such procedure in their rules of procedure.18 To further this approach,
courts, tribunals and panels could also consider the following measures: 1) exhorting the
parties, upon the closure of the written phase, to consider resuming or starting settlement
negotiations prior to the scheduling of the oral hearings; or 2) the adoption of an optional
‘conciliation procedure’ whereby the parties could enter into confidential negotiations upon the
closure of the written phase to explore settlement, while the proceedings are suspended. As
parties may wish to keep secret the fact that they are negotiating, the suspension order could
also be confidential. These procedures would promote case settlement while facilitating the
management of dockets; whilst extensions of the time-limit for written observation or
postponement of oral hearings can create time for settlement negotiation, suspension orders
achieve the same effect without disrupting the efficient management of work for adjudicators
and registry officials. Improved predictability in terms of time-management also benefits
parties to other pending cases by enabling them to take scheduling priority over suspended
15 ICJ Rules, Arts 88-89; ITLOS Rules, Arts 105-106; WTO DSU, Art 3(7). Under Art 12(12) of the DSU, the
Panel may suspend its work at any time at the request of the complaining party. 16 The practice is very common in investor-State arbitration, see for instance Mobil Investments Canada Inc. v.
Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/6, consent award of 4 February 2020. 17 No. 7 Sustainable Conservation and Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-East Pacific (Chile v.
European Community) (Order of 16 December 2009), at paras 9-14. In Legality of the Use of Force, to facilitate
negotiations the Court granted two twelve-month extensions to the time-limit for observations on the preliminary
objections, but ultimately proceeded to judgment. Under Art 12.12 of the WTO DSU: ‘[i]f the work of the panel
has been suspended for more than 12 months, the authority for establishment of the panel shall lapse. Note also
that under Art 11 of the DSU, Panels should consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them
adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution.’ 18 See Duzgit Integrity, Award on Reparation, at paras 16-19, referring to Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure.
9
cases while also facilitating greater flexibility in receiving sudden and urgent applications, such
as emergency provisional measures.19
D. Default
Following multiple high-profile inter-State arbitrations20 and two ITLOS provisional measures
proceedings,21 the problem of default or ‘non-participation’ has again become topical.22 The
central issue is to what extent the procedural rights of a non-appearing party shall be
safeguarded. There has been no case of non-appearance in WTO proceedings, not even when
the responding party had made forceful objections to the panel’s jurisdiction.23 To the extent
feasible, the recommendations below are in principle valid for WTO panel proceedings.24
Though Articles 53(2) ICJ Statute and 28 ITLOS Statute preclude default judgments, the term
‘well-founded’ does not (and, in practice, cannot) oblige the Court or the Tribunal to handle
the proceedings in the same way as a case in which all parties appear – least of all to determine
its jurisdiction conclusively (rather than prima facie) at the stage of provisional measures.25
Whereas parties are not obliged26 to exercise their procedural rights, the Court or the Tribunal
cannot do so in their stead.
The procedural approach adopted by the tribunals in the South China Sea and, especially, the
Arctic Sunrise cases were successful and managed to preserve the integrity and fairness of the
proceedings.27 One inevitable disadvantage was that the costs of hiring the experts, whose role
19 E.g. – LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America) (Provisional Measures)(Order of 3 March 1999),
[1999] ICJ Rep. 9, at 14 (paras 19-21). 20 PCA Case No. 2014-02 The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (The Netherlands v. Russia) (Award on Jurisdiction of
26 November 2014), at paras 9, 13, 19, 32; PCA Case No. 2013-19 South China Sea Arbitration (The Philippines
v. China)(Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 29 October 2015), at paras 37-41, 112-129; PCA Case No.
2012-04 Arbitration between Croatia and Slovenia (Croatia v. Slovenia)(Partial Award of 30 June 2016), at paras
37 et seq. 21 No. 22 The ‘Arctic Sunrise’ Case (Netherlands v. Russia) (Provisional Measures)(Order of 22 November 2013)
[2013] ITLOS Rep. 230, at 232 (paras 9 et seq.); The Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukraine v.
Russia)(Provisional Measures)(Order of 25 May 2019), para 8. See also Obligations concerning Negotiations
relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. Pakistan)
(Judgment of 5 October 2016), at 5-6 (paras 3, 8). 22 ICJ Statute, Art 53; ITLOS Statute, Art 28. 23 E.g., Russia - Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, WT/DS512/R/Add., Panel Report (Addendum). 24 In US – Shrimp (Ecuador), WT/DS335/R, Panel Report the responding party appeared before the panel but did
not contest any of the claiming party’s arguments. Nonetheless, the panel noted (at para VII.28): ‘we can only
rule in favour of Ecuador if we are satisfied that Ecuador has made a prima facie case.’ 25 No. 22 The ‘Arctic Sunrise’ Case (Netherlands v. Russia) (Provisional Measures)(Order of 22 November 2013)
[2013] ITLOS Rep. 230, Separate Opinion of Judges Wolfrum and Kelly, at 257-259. 26 Institut de Droit International, ‘Non-Appearance before the International Court of Justice’ (Resolution, 4th
Commission, 1991), Preamble. 27 The Arctic Sunrise tribunal gleaned Russia’s position from its notes verbales, chose Vienna as a neutral venue
of arbitration, granted a dilatory bifurcation request and scrutinised closely Netherlands’ pleadings. It also
appointed experts to examine the request for damages to make sure that the quantum of compensation be adequate.
In this case, the tribunal adjusted the default practice of granting to the parties equal times to exchange written
submission, balancing the non-appearing party’s right to submit documents and the appearing party’s interest not
to be unjustly burdened by the former’s inaction. Upon receipt of the Memorial, the non-appearing party would
have 15 days to indicate ‘whether it intend[ed] to submit a Counter-Memorial,’ see Procedural Order No. 2 of 17
March 2014, Art 2.1.2. The South China Sea tribunal used China’s position paper as a counter-memorial on
jurisdiction and, in the Rules of Procedure, introduced a specifically designed clause providing for the tribunal’s
power to question the appearing party on any questions that ‘have not been canvassed, or have been inadequately
canvassed, in the pleadings submitted.’ Subsequently, the tribunal appointed several experts, with respect to
several factual contentious matters, and autonomously obtained documentation relating to historical survey
records produced by the Royal Navy, France and the Japanese Imperial Navy. Interestingly, the tribunal based
10
was critical precisely because of the non-appearance, was borne by the appearing party.28
While the Philippines did not ask for a costs award, Russia and the Netherlands ultimately
reached a confidential settlement agreement, that included a payment of roughly half of the
amounts included in the compensation award and a recognition of the legal determinations
made in the award on liability.29 In any event, tribunals could include in the award an order to
pay costs, addressed to the absent party, which could be carried over in any subsequent
settlement negotiation.
Whereas default cases remain relatively rare, they are typically high-profile and raise complex
procedural problems. The Committee proposes the following measures for default cases before
the ICJ and the ITLOS and in inter-State arbitration:
1) Acceleration of the proceedings through the disposing of equal allocations of time
for written pleadings and/or the omission of oral argument;
2) Acknowledgement of irregular communications from the defaulting party to the
panel on procedural matters30 in procedural orders and judgments while refusing to give
weight to views expressed therein by the defaulting party on procedural matters (e.g. –
on applications to intervene by third States) in light of the waiver by the defaulting party
of the exercise of its procedural rights;31
3) Proactive use of the fact-finding powers of the adjudicators, including through the
appointment of experts.32
These proposals could be adopted through judicial and arbitral practice rather than amendments
of rules, and would not preclude the typical procedure to resume in the event of the defaulting
party discontinuing the default.
E. Composition of the Panel
The composition of the adjudicatory panel is governed, primarily, by the statutes of the ICJ and
the ITLOS as well as the WTO DSU. In inter-State arbitration, the parties regulate the matter
in the arbitration agreement: one of the reasons for parties to choose arbitration is precisely the
ability to select arbitrators. Institutions play a role in the appointment of arbitral panels.33
much of the final awards on the evidence collected autonomously or through tribunal experts, see Award, paras
978-983 and 1084-1108. See also Duzgit Integrity, Award on reparation, paras 37 ff. 28 The Arctic Sunrise tribunal specified that Russia, besides compensation, would owe to the Netherlands its share
of the tribunal’s costs that the Netherlands had had to disburse, see Arctic Sunrise, Award on Compensation of 10
July 2017, para 128. 29 Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the Kingdom of the Netherlands on Scientific Cooperation in the
Russian Arctic Region and the Settlement of a Dispute, https://www.government.nl/documents/diplomatic-
statements/2019/05/17/joint-statement-of-the-russian-federation-and-the-kingdom-of-the-netherlands-on-
scientific-cooperation-in-the-russian-arctic-region-and-the-settlement-of-a-dispute (17 May 2019). See
https://www.uawire.org/russia-agrees-to-pay-green-peace-2-7-million-euros-to-settle-arctic-sunrise-case. 30 With the exclusion of ‘position papers’ and other published accounts of that party’s views on the merits. 31 ICJ Statute, Art 42(1); ICJ Rules, Arts 31, 40(1); ITLOS Rules, Arts 45, 52; South China Sea Arbitration, supra
note 20, at paras 13-14, 17, 42, 51, 97-104, 142; Arctic Sunrise Arbitration, supra note 20, at para 68. Should the
parties settle the case in circumstances in which one party is in default, this should be recorded as unilateral
discontinuance rather than by settlement – United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (Order of 12
May 1981) [1981] ICJ Rep. 45, 47. 32 Section IV (B-C), infra. 33 See the PCA submission to the UNCITRAL Working Group III, ‘Mechanism for selection and appointment of
presiding arbitrators or sole arbitrators’ (11 May 2020).
11
1. Arbitrators
For inter-State arbitration, the Committee recommend that parties expressly designate an
appointing authority in their arbitration agreements and that they name either the PCA
Secretary-General 34 or the ICJ President as appointing authority for their expertise. This
approach is preferable to the UNCITRAL model – which envisages the prior intervention of
the PCA Secretary-General as designating authority. By identifying in advance an appointing
authority the appointment process is shortened and reduces the risk of deadlock.
Moreover, a general rule should apply providing for the incompatibility between the role of
appointing authorities and the role of arbitrators. Such incompatibility would promote the
independence of the appointing authority and preclude all potential conflicts of interest arising
from the possibility of self-appointment, 35 which would materialise when appointing
authorities, also acting as arbitrators, are vested with the powers to decide challenges and to
replace arbitrators.36 Even when the appointing authority is not vested with the power to decide
upon challenges or to appoint replacement arbitrators, conflicts of interest could manifest from
service as arbitrator insofar as the appointing authority might be perceived to exercise the
appointing power in order to influence the composition of the panel to be favourable to his/her
point of view, or even to further his/her own professional interests by favouring the nominee
in the expectation of reciprocal treatment elsewhere.
This approach would also preclude the increasingly commonplace phenomenon of parties
appointing the appointing authority to the panel.37 Whereas the likelihood of PCA Secretaries-
General appointing themselves to a panel is remote,38 the Committee proposes that the PCA
amend Article 6(3) of the Arbitration Rules to prohibit an appointing authority from self-
appointment. Moreover, an appointing authority should decline all appointments to the
tribunal, even if requested by the parties, as the ability of the appointing authority to discharge
34 PCA Rules, Art 6(1); Annex (‘Model Arbitration Clause for Treaties and other Agreements’). 35 In two UNCLOS Annex VII proceedings, the ITLOS President and Vice-president, respectively, acted as
appointing authorities and appointed themselves as arbitrators for the panel – PCA Case No. 2015-28 ‘Enrica
Lexie’ Incident (Italy v. India), Request for the Prescription of Provisional Measures, Order (29 April 2016), para
14; PCA Case No. 2017-06 Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch
Strait (Ukraine v. Russia). In the Gulf of Piran Arbitration, the ICJ President appointed himself as an Arbitrator
– note 20, supra. 36 To avoid this problem, the rules applicable to the Enrica Lexie and Black Sea proceedings have a gap on
challenges. These rules indicate as appointing authority the President of ITLOS (in line with Article 3 of Annex
VII to UNCLOS, see Articles 5 and 6 of the Rules of Procedure of 19 January 2016 in the Enrica Lexie case and
Articles 5 and 6 of the Rules of Procedure of 18 May 2017 in the Coastal State Rights case). 37 A party-appointed arbitrator Judge Stephen Schwebel became, during the arbitration, President of the ICJ and,
accordingly, the appointing authority – PCA Case No. 1996-04, Sovereignty and Maritime Delimitation in the
Red Sea (Eritrea v. Yemen), Award on Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute (9 October 1998), para
4. In one case, the specific rules of arbitration ruled out the possibility that the appointing authority would be in
charge of replacing arbitrators – PCA Case No 2004-04 Guyana v. Suriname, Rules of Procedure (24 February
2004), Art 6: In Croatia v. Slovenia, Slovenia appointed Judge Ronny Abraham as a replacement arbitrator amidst
a crisis at a late stage of the proceedings, who as President of the ICJ was ex officio the appointing authority –
Arbitration Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Slovenia and the Government of the Republic
of Croatia, Stockholm, 4 November 2009, in force 29 November 2010, Art 6. 38 In the UNCITRAL investor-State dispute Yukos Universal Holding v. Russia, PCA Case No. AA 227, Interim
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 30 November 2009, para 8, the Claimants consulted the PCA Secretary-
General as designating authority and consented to him acting as appointing authority too. This practice raises a
different issue of veiled self-interest, insofar as it might encourage parties to favour or instigate the ‘conversion’
(from designating to appointing authority). On PCA ‘conversion’ see David Gaukrodger, ‘Appointing Authorities
and the Selection of Arbitrators in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: An Overview’ (March 2018) OECD,
https://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/ISDS-Appointing-Authorities-Arbitration-March-2018.pdf,
58. Conversion would be precluded if, as recommended by this Committee, the parties always included an
appointing authority in the applicable rules.
12
his functions free of potential conflicts of interest would be endangered by personal service on
the panel. Should arbitrators become the appointing authority while serving on a tribunal (for
instance, after becoming President of the ICJ or the ITLOS), they should be allowed to continue
the proceedings only on condition that, for that set of proceedings, the powers normally vested
in the appointing authority are delegated to another subject (e.g., the ICJ or ITLOS vice-
presidents).
Parties normally constitute five-member tribunals in inter-State arbitration, 39 and the
Committee recommend that they appoint no more than one member each to the panel, to
promote its independence.40 Though three-member panels risk relying disproportionately on
the views of the presiding arbitrator,41 parties could opt to reduce costs through a three-member
panel.42 In this case, the Committee consider that parties should use joint appointment or the
‘list procedure’, rather than individual appointments, and recommend that Article 9(1) of the
PCA Rules be amended accordingly. This would promote the independence of the three-
member panel by rendering the arbitrators not beholden to any one party for their appointments.
The breach of the secrecy of deliberations43 in the Croatia v. Slovenia Arbitration raised the
issue of unauthorised ex parte contacts with adjudicators. When party-appointed arbitrators are
jointly entrusted with the appointment of the presiding arbitrator or the three remaining
members, parties often agree that they may confer with their respective party-appointed
arbitrators.44 This practice is vulnerable to abuse, as it offers an opportunity for parties to exert
pressure on the arbitrator appointed. In contrast, Article 18(1) of the WTO DSU prohibits ‘ex
parte communications with the panel or Appellate Body concerning matters under
consideration by the panel or Appellate Body.’ Even more rigorously, the Rules of Procedure
attached to the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement forbid communication of any kind between
arbitrators and parties in the absence of the other party and the other arbitrators.45
The Committee recommends that the PCA adopt a model arbitration clause forbidding
communication between any party and any arbitrator in the absence of the other parties and
arbitrators. This would enable party-appointed arbitrators to remain involved in the
appointment process of the other arbitrator(s) if the parties want so. However, full knowledge
of the other Party of the content of discussions with the party-appointed arbitrator would instil
mutual confidence in the integrity of the process of appointment.
As challenges are on the rise, the Committee consider disclosure of potential conflicts of
interest by potential arbitrators to be essential. While the PCA requests disclosure of
39 Five-member tribunals were appointed in nine out of the thirteen most recent inter-State cases – B Daly, E
Goriatcheva and H Meighen, A Guide to the PCA Arbitration Rules (OUP 2014), 44: South-China Sea; Ara
Libertad; Chagos; Croatia/Slovenia; Bangladesh v. India; Straits of Johor; Guyana v. Suriname; Barbados v.
Trinidad and Tobago; Enrica Lexie. There were seven arbitrators the Kishenganga arbitration. 40 PCA Rules, Art 9(1). 41 For the same reasons, even-numbered tribunals should be avoided. 42 E.g. – the Parties’ decision to derogate from the default rule of Article 3(a) of UNCLOS Annex VII and appoint
a three-member panel in Duzgit Integrity (Malta v. Sao Tomé and Principe), PCA Case No. 2014-07, Award of 5
September 2016, para 9. 43 A principle codified in the ICJ Statute, Art 54(3); ICJ Rules, Art 21(1); ITLOS Rules, Art 42(1). 44 Andreas F Lowenfeld, ‘The Party-Appointed Arbitrator in International Controversies: Some Reflections’
(1995) 30(1) Texas International Law Journal 59-70. IBA Guidelines on Party Representation in International
Arbitration, 5 May 2013: ‘8. It is not improper for a Party Representative to have Ex Parte Communications in
the following circumstances: … (b) A Party Representative may communicate with a prospective or appointed
Party-Nominated Arbitrator for the purpose of the selection of the Presiding Arbitrator.’ 45 Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America 2010, Annex 14-B
(‘Model Rules of Procedure for Dispute Settlement’), Arts 66-68. See also the European Union-Ukraine
Association Agreement, Annex XXIV, Rules 35-36.
13
professional commitments from individuals to gauge their availability and the scope for
‘double-hatting’,46 other appointing authorities, such as the ITLOS President, do not do the
same when appointing arbitrators to an Annex VII panel. To promote procedural integrity and
economy, the Committee recommend that parties include in arbitration agreements a statement
of impartiality and independence comparable to the PCA Model for individuals to provide
information concerning their professional engagements and workloads.
When challenges to arbitrators are brought, the Committee consider that the panel should not
be tasked with its resolution,47 as this endangers their perceived impartiality and complicates
the procedure in the case of multiple (several or joint) challenges. Instead, the Committee
recommend that challenges be referred to an external body: parties could include in arbitration
agreements a provision based upon Article 13 of the PCA Rules, empowering the appointing
authority, rather than the panel, to decide on challenges. The rule of incompatibility stated
above would make sure that challenges would not be decided by sitting arbitrators.
2. Chambers of the ICJ and ITLOS
Whilst there has been recurring debate concerning the desirability of ad hoc and standing
chambers,48 in practice they are infrequently used at the ICJ. Unlike ad hoc chambers, standing
chambers based upon subject-matter have hitherto failed to take root.49 Articles 26(2) of the
ICJ Statute50 and Section E of the ICJ Rules are silent on the composition of ad hoc chambers.
Parties generally prefer to have influence on the composition of the panel, as evinced by the
trend towards the greater use of arbitration in recent years (e.g. – per Annex VII of the
UNCLOS) in spite of the greater financial expense entailed.51 In the Special Agreement in the
Gulf of Maine Case,52 the Parties reserved for themselves the right to jointly nominate the
members of the ad hoc Chamber and to discontinue the case if the Chamber were not so
constituted; the Court accepted the Special Agreement and the Chamber was thus constituted.
The procedure for the selection of chamber panels is critical to parties’ perceptions of
impartiality.53 The Committee propose the adoption of a new Article 90bis to Section E of the
Rules whereby the Court would ‘determine, in consultation with the parties, the members who
46 Daly et al., supra note 39, 50-51, 237-238. 47 For example, Art 58 of the ICSID Convention provides for the remaining arbitrators to make a decision. In the
ongoing reform attempt, it is proposed that the remaining arbitrators should be allowed to ask the Chair of the
ICSID to make the decision. Rule 23(2), ICSID Arbitration Rules, Proposals for Amendment of ICSID Rules,
ICSID Working Paper #4, 2020, at https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/WP_4_Vol_1_En.pdf. 48 Calls for greater use of chambers were made in the Counsel Survey – Crawford and Keene, ‘Editorial’, 7(2)
Journal of International Dispute Settlement (2016), 225-230, at 226, 229. 49 ICJ Statute, Art 26(1); ITLOS Statute, Art 15. None of the three ITLOS standing chambers – whose composition
is exclusively determined by the Tribunal – have been used to date: 1) Chamber for Fisheries Disputes (9
members); 2) Chamber for Marine Environment Disputes (9 members); 3) Chamber for Maritime Delimitation
Disputes (11 members). The Chamber for Environmental Matters formed by the ICJ between 1993 and 2006 was
likewise never utilised. 50 Article 26(2) does, however, provide: ‘The number of judges to constitute such a chamber shall be determined
by the Court with the approval of the parties.’ 51 Recent arbitral tribunals have comprised Members of both the ICJ and ITLOS. 52 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Case (Canada v. United States of
America)(Merits)(Judgment) [1984] ICJ Rep. 246, at 252 (para 3); Special Agreement – Compromis, Arts I-III.
This was the first-ever use of an ad hoc chamber in the history of the Court. 53 Frontier Dispute (Benin v. Niger)(Order of 27 November 2002) [2002] ICJ Rep. 613, Declaration of Judge Oda,
at 615; Land, Island and Maritime Frontier (El Salvador v. Honduras, Nicaragua Intervening)(Application for
Revision)(Order of 27 November 2002) [2002] ICJ Rep. 618, Declaration of Judge Oda, at para 5.
14
are to constitute the chamber’.54 This approach tracks the existing approach in judicial practice,
as the Court is unlikely to depart from the expressed preferences of parties. Whereas the
Committee consider that a residual discretion ought to remain to overrule the parties (even if
unlikely to be exercised in practice) it notes that Article 15(2) of the ITLOS Statute requires
that a chamber be constituted with the ‘approval’ of the parties. Therefore, the Committee
cannot extend, for the ITLOS, the same recommendation made with respect to the ICJ.
3. Appointment of judges ad hoc
Currently, the identity of judges ad hoc to the Court or the Tribunal must be communicated ‘no
later than two months before the time-limit fixed for the Counter-Memorial.’55 This deadline
is not synchronised with the revised time-limit for the filing of preliminary objections of three
months after the filing of the Memorial at the Court and ninety days after the filing of the
Application at the Tribunal. The Committee thus proposes that the timing for notification of
the identity of judges ad hoc should be no earlier and no later than the time-limit for the filing
of the Memorial on jurisdiction/admissibility or the merits. This adjustment would also
synchronise it with the proposed time-limits for intervention.56
4. Nationality of judges in cases of joinder or interventions
The potential for multiple applicants or respondents before the ICJ and ITLOS, as well the right
of third parties before WTO panels, can generate problems concerning the adjudicators’
nationality.
Regarding the ICJ, the proposed amendment to Article 47 of the Rules on joinder of bilateral
proceedings57 carries important implications for the composition of the panel.58 Whereas the
Court has previously joined multiple States as Co-Applicants per Article 31(5) of the ICJ
Statute,59 it has never joined multiple States as Co-Respondents. Where joinder is ordered, the
joined parties must jointly select the judge ad hoc to sit on the panel; Article 37 of the ICJ
Rules does not address the scenario of multiple joined parties each having nationals as
Members of the Court.60
Neither Article 31(5) of the ICJ Statute nor Article 36 of the ICJ Rules addresses the problem
of an imbalance in the composition of the panel where joinder is not effected. Inequalities in
54 Two of the five contentious cases brought before the Tribunal to date have featured ad hoc chambers composed
of five judges – Case Conerning the Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-
Eastern Pacific Ocean (Chile v. European Union); Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary
between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire). 55 ICJ Rules, Art 35(1); ITLOS Rules, Art 19(1). 56 Section II(F)(2), infra. 57 Section II(F)(1), infra. 58 Contra Lockerbie, infra note 137, Joint Declaration of Judges Bedjaoui, Guillaume and Ranjeva (at 40-43, para
17). See also the rather vague conclusions of the Institut de Droit International, ‘Judicial and Arbitral Settlement
of International Disputes Involving More Than Two States’ (Resolution, Berlin, 1999), at paras 5-6. 59 E.g. – South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa) (Liberia v. South Africa) (Joinder of Cases and
Appointment of Judge ad hoc) (Order) [1961] ICJ Rep. 13. See also North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Denmark
v. Germany) (Germany v. Netherlands) (Order) [1968] ICJ Rep. 9. 60 The first case before the PCIJ saw four Applicants have nationals who were Members of the Court and who sat
on the panel – Case of the S.S. ‘Wimbledon’ (Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan v. Germany), PCIJ Series A,
No. 01, Judgment of 17 August 1923, at 15. This scenario had not been envisaged – PCIJ Rules of Court of 24
March 1922, PCIJ Series D, No. 01, Art 4; ‘Acts and Documents Concerning the Organisation of the Court:
Preparation of the Rules of Court’, PCIJ Series D, No. 2, 118-119, 455.
15
the composition of panels of parallel proceedings arose in the Legality of the Use of Force
Cases61 and Nuclear Disarmament Cases.62 This scenario has not yet arisen at the ITLOS.
A balanced panel is critical, notwithstanding the duty of independence of all judges. 63
Balancing could be obtained by 1) enlarging the panel by allowing for more judges ad hoc64;
or 2) shrinking the panel by requiring judges to withdraw.65 The problem is further complicated
by the right of Members of the Court and the Tribunal of the nationality of any of the parties
to sit on the panel.66
The Committee propose amendment to Articles 36 of the ICJ Rules and 20 of the ITLOS Rules
to prescribe mechanisms for balancing in cases both of joinder of parties and the hearing of
cases in common where the parties have multiple nationals as Members of the Court or
Tribunal. Where joinder is ordered, the Members concerned would determine amongst
themselves – potentially through the good offices of the President – which of them is to exercise
their right to self-recuse ‘for some special reason’.67 Where cases are heard in common, each
Member should sit on the panel in which the State of his or her nationality appears, but not on
the other panels. Through these prescribed rules, panels would be automatically balanced
without the need for a special decision during cases. This process would also avoid very large
panels resulting from the appointment of more judges ad hoc.68
In WTO proceedings, the parties can object to the nominations proposed by the Secretariat only
‘for compelling reasons’69 but their objections are invariably upheld.70 Under Article 8(4) of
the WTO DSU, the Secretariat maintains an indicative list of governmental and non-
governmental individuals, from which panelists may be appointed as appropriate.71 Individuals
that are not included in this list can also be appointed as panellists, and the Secretariat keeps
an undisclosed database with the information about previous or potential panelists, not on the
Indicative list. When called upon to appoint panelists, the Director-General of the WTO
61 Legality of the Use of Force, supra note 14, at 1314 (para 16). The Court rejected the request for joinder and
ruled that the judges ad hoc appointed by four of the Respondents (who had already sat on the panels in the
provisional measures phase) would not be permitted to sit on the preliminary objections phase without prejudice
to the merits phase; the Respondents still had a seeming advantage in that the seven panels included three Members
of the Court who were nationals of Respondents, as opposed to one judge ad hoc appointed by the Applicant. 62 Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear
Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom)(Judgment of 5 October 2016); Nuclear Disarmament
(Marshall Islands v. Pakistan), note 21, supra; Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the
Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. India)(Judgment of 5 October 2016).
Nationals of two of the three Respondents (India and the United Kingdom) were Members of the Court; as the
proceedings were separate, the two judges sat on each of the three panels. The three Respondents opposed the
same prayers for relief and raised the same jurisdictional objections. There was thus an apparent inequality
between the Applicant and the Respondents; the Applications were dismissed in each case by a vote of 9-7. 63 ICJ Statute Art 2; ITLOS Statute Art 2(1). 64 Legality of the Use of Force Cases, supra note 14, Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Kreća, at 1439-1451 (paras
67-79), esp. 1446-1448 (paras 73-74). See, however, his distinction between ‘parties of the same interest’ and
joinder at 1440-1442 (para 69). 65 ICJ Statute, Art 24(3); ITLOS Statute, Art 8. 66 ICJ Statute, Art 31(1); ITLOS Statute, Art 17(1). 67 ICJ Statute, Art 24(1); ITLOS Statute, Art 8(2). 68 See also the use of the singular case ‘a judge’ – ibid. 69 DSU Art 8(6). 70 The EU made a proposal, then codified in a draft decision presented to the Dispute Settlement Body, to remove
the veto power of the parties, and operate instead a ‘single list’ system whereby the parties could provide a ranking
of the names proposed by the Secretariat. See Dispute Settlement Body - Special Session - Report by the
Chairman, Ambassador Coly Seck, 19 June 2019, at
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/TN/DS/31.pdf (‘Coly’s report’), para 2.127. 71 The indicative list is publicly available on the WTO website, with document code WT/DSB/44. The list is
periodically revised and updated.
16
frequently relies upon the knowledge and experience of the Secretariat in proposing
individuals. Normally, panelists cannot have the nationality of the disputing and third parties.
The ‘Endorsing Members’ that shared some best practices in 2017, led by Canada, proposed
that the right to exclude nationals of Members which are third parties should be waived (to
increase the pool of appointable individuals) and that first-timers could serve on a panel only
if the panel’s collective expertise is sufficient. They also reminded all Members that the
‘compelling reasons’ requirement should not be abused by Members simply seeking to turn
down a candidate for strategical reasons.72 The Committee seconds these proposals, which
remain subject to the Members’ discretion, to facilitate the appointment of qualified members
to panels without the obstacles of cross-vetoes and excessively stringent rules on nationality.
F. Emergency interim measures in inter-State arbitration
The Committee took interest in the issue of interim measures sought when an inter-State
tribunal is not yet constituted. Emergency arbitration is premised on the availability of an
institution pre-existing the tribunal that can be seised by the applicant, and is therefore
conceivable only when the parties use institutional arbitration. There is an obvious disparity
between UNCLOS Annex VII cases and other inter-State cases. In the first case, Article 290(5)
UNCLOS grants to the parties the possibility to request the interim measures from ITLOS,
while the composition of the Annex VII tribunal is pending.73 This possibility is tantamount to
resort to an emergency arbitrator.
The availability of emergency measures is equally desirable in other proceedings before the
PCA or other non-institutional tribunals. 74 The issue cannot form the object of a
recommendation to the tribunals or the parties drafting the arbitration agreement, because its
realisation depends on institutional arrangements. For a reform to happen, the emergency
system should be introduced as an option in the applicable rules of procedure (UNCITRAL or
PCA) and the parties should opt-in. Ideally, countries could mirror the functioning of Article
290 UNCLOS in their arbitration clauses of future treaties or a dedicated convention,
conferring on a designated body (for instance, a standing Chamber of the ICJ) the competence
to indicate provisional measures while the composition of an arbitral tribunal is pending. The
Committee recommends that parties consider this option in future drafting efforts, and invites
the PCA to explore the possibility of establishing a procedure capable of identifying an
emergency arbitrator to whom parties could resort.
G. Participation of Third Parties
Over the past thirty years, applications by third parties, whether States or other entities, to
participate in proceedings have become increasingly frequent. The regulation of such
applications varies according to the statutory rules of each inter-State court, tribunal or panel.
Whereas the rules of the inter-State courts are more restrictive, inter-State arbitration
theoretically allows for greater flexibility even though it has not traditionally featured third-
party participation. WTO panels have faced the most intensive use of third-party participation,
and there might be margin for further developments.
72 JOB/DSB/1/Add.7 of 10 July 2017, ‘Additional practices and procedures in the conduct of WTO disputes panel
composition.’ 73 See Enrica Lexie, the Ara Libertad, the Southern Bluefin Tuna, the MOX Plant and Land Reclamation cases. 74 In the ongoing ICSID Rules reform process, it is decided not to propose emergency arbitration mechanism on
the ground that ‘[t]he tight schedule required for emergency arbitration could raise due process issues in cases
involving States’. ICSID Secretariat, Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules – Working Paper, 2018, at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/amendments/Pages/Proposals/Working-Paper.aspx, p. 226. However, the
Committee does not find this observation entirely convincing given Article 290(5) UNCLOS.
17
1. Joinder of Parties
Before the ICJ, intervention entails the entry by a third State into pending proceedings without
becoming party to them.75 There are two forms of intervention: 1) interventions by application
on the basis of a ‘legal interest’ in the case;76 and 2) intervention by right of a party to a treaty.77
Whereas the first type of intervenor ‘does not acquire the rights, or become subject to the
obligations, which attach to the status of a party’,78 the latter kind of intervenor is bound by the
construction of the treaty given by the judgment.
Joinder of parties, as distinct from joinder of proceedings, arises when a State applies to join a
case as a new party. The ICJ has treated joinder applications as a form of Article 62 intervention
(‘intervention as party’).79 Intervention as party is subject to the consent of the (other) parties.80
In the Land and Maritime Dispute Case, Honduras made two applications to intervene, as party
and alternatively as non-party; the Court held that intervention as party requires both a
jurisdictional basis at point of application and an engaged ‘right’ whereas intervention as non-
party wants only a ‘legal interest’.81
The distinction between joinder of a new party and intervention is that the former is premised
upon rights or claims of the third State that are central to the proceedings,82 whereas the latter
enables the participation of third States whose legal interests are ancillary to them. 83 In
particular cases, a third State applying for joinder would be entitled to join the proceedings as
party, and the case could not be heard without its consent.84 In any event, joinder as party
should not be equated to intervention as non-party under Article 62. The approach of Honduras
in the Land and Maritime Dispute Case is understandable from the perspective of litigation
75 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) (Application by Honduras for Permission to
Intervene) (Judgment) [2011] ICJ Rep. 420, at 436 (para 46). 76 ICJ Statute Art 62; ICJ Rules Art 81; ITLOS Statute Art 31; ITLOS Rules Art 99. 77 ICJ Statute Art 63; ICJ Rules Art 82; ITLOS Statute Art 32; ITLOS Rules Art 100. 78 Land Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras)(Application by Nicaragua for
Permission to Intervene)(Judgment) [1990] ICJ Rep. 92, at 136 (para 102) cited in Nicaragua v. Colombia
(Application by Honduras for Permission to Intervene), supra note 75, at 432 (para 29). 79 In the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute Case, Nicaragua applied under Article 62 to intervene as a
party, citing the indispensable third-party principle in support. The Chamber granted the application to intervene
as non-party while rejecting the argument of Nicaragua that its legal interest formed part of the ‘very subject
matter of the decision’ – supra note 78, at 122 (para 73), 135 (para 99). 80 El Salvador v. Honduras (Application by Nicaragua for Permission to Intervene), supra note 78, at 134-135
(para 99); Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) (Application of Honduras for Permission
to Intervene) (Judgment) [2011] ICJ Rep. 420, at 432 (para 28). 81 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) (Application of Honduras for Permission to
Intervene) (Judgment) [2011] ICJ Rep. 420, at 430-438 (paras 20-48). See also the Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Donoghue (at 484-485, paras 34-38). See also Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia)
(Application of Costa Rica for Permission to Intervene) (Judgment) [2011] ICJ Rep. 348. 82 Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. France, United Kingdom and United States of America)
(Preliminary Objections) (Judgment) [1954] ICJ Rep. 19, at 32. See also Land and Maritime Boundary between
Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria) (Merits) [2002] ICJ Rep. 303, at 421 (para 238). 83 E.g. – Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipidan (Intervention), infra note 119, Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc
Weeramantry, at 643-647 (paras 24– 29). See also Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy)
(Application of Greece for Permission to Intervene) (Order of 4 July 2011) [2011] ICJ Rep. 494, at 501-502 (paras
24-26). 84 IDI Resolution, supra note 58, at paras 19-21. See further Military and Paramilitary Activities in and around
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (Judgment) [1984] ICJ Rep.
392, at 430-431; East Timor (Portugal v. Australia) (Preliminary Objections) [1995] ICJ Rep. 90, at 102.
18
strategy, yet conflates two discrete concepts: joinder as party, occasionally based on the
indispensable party principle, and a legal interest in intervening as non-party.85
The Committee recommends that the ICJ amend the relevant rules86 to clarify the distinction
between joinder as party and intervention. The rule on joinder could provide that a State may
invoke a right or possibility to join proceedings subject to two criteria: 1) a jurisdictional basis;
and 2) an engaged legal right or claim. Should its application be granted, the State would
acquire the status of a party, including the right to introduce new claims and to appoint a judge
ad hoc, while being bound by the judgment. Conversely, intervention would require only that
the State demonstrate the existence of a legal interest in the case and that the intervenor is not
entitled to the procedural rights of a party87; the intervenor would also not be bound by the
judgment. New parties should also contribute to costs as required, whereas intervenors should
not. Third States would thus have a bifurcated choice: 1) to join as a party; or 2) to intervene
as a non-party.
Due to the jurisdictional implications of joinder of new parties, Article 47 of the ICJ could
stipulate a time-limit (e.g. – 60-90 days from the filing of application) for applications to join
as new party. This would reflect the reality that a State applying to join is potentially raising a
jurisdictional objection to the proceedings without their participation. Should the application
be granted, the time-limit for the appointment of a judge ad hoc (if applicable) by the new party
would accord with that for the other parties. Should the application be contested, it would be
addressed as a jurisdiction/admissibility proceeding;88 this approach would further sharpen the
distinction between the rationales of intervention and joinder as new party.
Since Article 31(3) of the ITLOS Statute renders judgments binding upon intervenors, it is not
possible to distinguish between joinder and intervention in the ITLOS Rules. Nonetheless, the
Committee suggests that the Tribunal amend Article 103(3) of its Rules to afford intervenors
the right to appoint judges ad hoc and to object to discontinuance, as the existing position
makes intervention unattractive.89
2. Alternative methods of participation for State and non-State actors
The Committee examined alternative modes of participation of non-disputing States in
contentious proceedings, and favoured proposals aimed at granting participatory rights to
States, based on systemic interests, while refraining from encouraging the admission of
unsolicited brief from non-State actors.
The Committee considers there to be persuasive policy grounds for enabling third States to
submit their views on the ‘general development of the law’ (e.g. – a customary rule at issue in
the case) before the ICJ and ITLOS. However, the Committee considers that such a mechanism
should be limited to keep the proceedings orderly and efficient. The Committee makes two
proposals, either 1) lowering the threshold of ‘legal interest’ for the purpose of intervention, or
2) creating a new mechanism (e.g. – ‘amicus curiae’) distinct from intervention.
85 The definition of ‘interest of a legal nature’ in Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia)
(Application by Costa Rica for Permission to Intervene) (Judgment of 4 May 2011) [2011] ICJ Rep. 348, at 358
(para 36). 86 Arts 47 and 81 of the ICJ Rules. 87 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Intervention)(Judgment), supra note 81, at 432 (para 29), 434 (para 37). 88 The party applying to join should have the right to appoint a judge ad hoc in the jurisdiction/admissibility
proceedings, as the judgment concerns an asserted right. 89 See, however, the requests by Benin and Togo for copies of the pleadings in the Atlantic Ocean Case, infra note
183, at paras 42, 46.
19
The first proposal could be enacted through judicial practice90 in the application of Article
81(2)(a) of the ICJ Rules. A useful amendment to Articles 85(3) of the ICJ Rules and 103(3)
of the ITLOS Rules would render participation of intervenors in the oral hearings subject to
the decision of the judges rather than automatic. On this approach, the degree of participation
of third States could be tailored to the intensity of the ‘legal interest’ that they assert: for
example, a third State seeking to make its views known on relatively narrow and/or minor
issues could obtain the right to intervene in writing only, and possibly subject to a word limit.
Whereas Article 17(5) of the PCA Rules provides for the joinder of a third party to an
arbitration, it does not address the possibility of intervention. In South China Sea, Viet Nam,
inter alia, reserved ‘the right to seek to intervene … in accordance with the principles and rules
of international law’.91 The arbitral tribunal stated that it would address the possibility of
intervention ‘only in the event that Viet Nam in fact [make] a formal application for such
intervention’,92 which did not occur.
The arbitral tribunal declined the Philippines’ request that the hearings be public but agreed to
publish the corrected transcript and provided for ‘interested States’ to attend the hearing ‘upon
receipt of a written request.’93 It accordingly granted leave to attend the hearings on jurisdiction
to several requesting States, all located in the general vicinity of the South China Sea.94 Whilst
the arbitral tribunal granted leave to Australia and the United Kingdom to attend the hearings
as ‘neutral observers’, it rejected an application from the United States on the ground that it
was not party to the UNCLOS.95 Though the status of observers arguably implied that the third
States did not have the right to address the proceedings, Malaysia submitted a written note
verbale to which the Philippines objected.96
To provide clarity for the modalities of future requests to intervene or to participate as
‘observers’, the Committee propose that the PCA add a provision to Article 17(5) of the PCA
Rules to provide for the possibility of third State participation: 1) by intervention; or 2) as
observer. In both cases, participation could be by authorisation of the arbitral tribunal in
consultation with the Parties: whereas intervenors could be entitled to submit written or oral
observations, observers could be permitted to attend hearings without the right to comment.97
As intervenors would not join as party, they would not be bound by the award.98
The Committee recommends tribunals to admit unsolicited written briefs by third States
claiming that the decision could affect their rights, and possibly regulate their participation in
the proceedings similarly to that of non-disputing parties of multilateral treaties, subject to a
preliminary scrutiny of relevance. The possibility of proper intervention by third countries as
90 The case-law of the Court is not clear-cut on the point, yet seems to suggest that ‘legal interest’ requires a link
to a concrete and existent claim that is indirectly connected to the case – Territorial and Maritime Dispute
(Nicaragua v. Colombia) (Application by Honduras for Permission to Intervene) (Judgment) [2011] ICJ Rep. 420,
at 434 (para 37). 91 South China Sea, supra note 20, Award (12 July 2016), para 36. 92 Ibid., para 43. 93 Ibid., Award on Jurisdiction on and Admissibility (29 October 2015), para 73. 94 Ibid., Award (12 July 2016), para 50. 95 Ibid., paras 65-68. 96 Whilst Malaysia ‘request[ed] that the [Arbitral] Tribunal show due regard to the rights of Malaysia’, she
‘emphasised that [she] was not seeking to intervene in the proceedings’; nonetheless, the Philippines considered
Malaysia’s communication to be, inter alia, ‘untimely, in light of the fact that Malaysia had been an observer
since 10 June 2015 and…made no effort to raise [her] concerns’ – ibid., para 105. The Arbitral Tribunal
‘acknowledged to Malaysia that it had received and taken note of its Communication.’ 97 E.g. – DSU Art 10(2); UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Investor-State Arbitration 2014, Art 5. The rule
in WTO procedure is distinguished by the fact that only WTO Members may apply to intervene. 98 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes 1907, Art 84.
20
disputing parties, instead, does not warrant specific analysis and is neither discouraged nor
encouraged. The recommended model would resemble that of third parties in WTO
proceedings and that available to the Contracting Parties to the London Convention on Marine
Pollution seeking to intervene in an arbitration procedure, claiming a legal interest that ‘may
be affected by the decision in the case.’99 Intervening States have the right ‘to present evidence,
briefs and oral argument on the matters giving rise to [their] intervention.’100
The second proposal – which could apply also to ITLOS proceedings – would introduce a new
category of participation, which could be legislated through a new Article (86bis in the ICJ
Rules; 104bis of the ITLOS Rules) and could be granted also in arbitration proceedings. Third
States wishing to submit brief views on ‘the development of the law’ could do so by right in
writing only, filing their brief by the closure of the written phase. Though adjudicators would
not be bound to take their briefs into account, this would be an alternative mechanism for third
States to participate in the event that they fail to meet the time-limit for applications to
intervene, as proposed below, or lack intervention rights altogether (in arbitration). Like
interveners, amici curiae States would be able to apply for copies of the pleadings. A new
Article 104bis to the ITLOS Rules would be particularly welcome to facilitate participation by
third States (e.g. – to express views on particular provisions of the UNCLOS and/or custom),
in a setting where intervention is unprecedented and unlikely.
The practice of third parties in WTO panel proceedings straddles intervention and participation
by reason of an interest in the development of the law. Under the DSU, third parties have
limited rights to submit views, access documents, and participate in a special session within
the first substantive meeting.101 According to several WTO Members, third parties’ rights
should be enhanced by default to include the right to attend the entire first substantive meeting
(and sotimes the second one) and receive all documents submitted in the dispute.102 Further
enhanced rights could include the right to submit a written statement after the first substantive
meeting (rather than before).103 Occasionally, third parties might even request the right to ask
questions to parties and other third parties during the substantive meetings.104 Enhanced third
party rights are granted only exceptionally,105 typically with the disputing parties’ agreement
and never when both parties object. 106 In practice, many third parties provide written
submissions and make oral statemenst during the first panel meeting.
The Committee supports, as most Members have done, the proposal by the Chair of the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) Special Session, codifying certain aspects of the practice,107 that third
99 Art 6, Annex III. 100 Ibid. 101 DSU Art 10.2 and 10.3. Reto Marco Malacrida and Gabrielle Marceau, ’The WTO Adjudicating Bodies’, in
Robert Howse, Hélène Ruiz-Fabri, Geir Ulfstein and MQ Zhang (eds), The Legitimacy of International Trade
Courts and Tribunals (CUP 2018), see also the template Working Procedures, Annex 3 to the DSU, Art 6. 102 Coly’s 2019 report (n 70) para 2.28, speaking of a ‘general convergence’ within the WTO membership. 103 Ibid, referring to proposals advanced by a group of States, led by Canada. 104 EC – Bananas III, WT/DS27/R, Panel Reports, para 7.9; EU – Poultry (China), WT/DS492/R, Panel Report,
para 7.49. In one case, third parties were allowed to make statements and question the parties. This arrangement
occurred in the framework of a case where hearings were open to the public, see US – COOL, WT/DS384/R,
Panel Report, Annex F, para 3. 105 A typical case is when co-complainants run parallel disputes against the same measures, and act as third parties
in the parallel disputes. Sometimes, the third party appeared to have an economic interest that was directly
implicated by the measure challenged. See Graham Cook, ‘Confidentiality and Transparency in the WTO’s Party-
Centric Dispute Settlement System’, forthcoming in Molina and Huerta Goldman (eds), Practical Aspects of WTO
Litigation (Kluwer 2020) for a gallery of cases. 106 E.g.– Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, WT/DS512/R/Add.1, Annex B-1 to Panel Report, para
1.8. 107 Coly report supra note 70, 15, para 2.31.
21
parties adopt an active role (oral and written submissions, questioning by the panels, full access
to documents including parties’ answers to panel’s question) at least until the first substantive
meeting and a passive role afterwards (attendance and reception of submissions). In light of
the very tight procedural framework, it would be reasonable to reserve the second meeting for
the disputing parties, which would be able to focus on the panels’ questions and instructions,
without further input from the third parties.108 Specific rules adopted to handle the submissions
of confidential information (see below) require, in specific cases, that written submissions be
redacted before they are shared with third parties, and/or that the latter might be excluded from
a portion of the substantive meeting.
An issue can arise with respect to the incidental steps of the proceedings made necessary to
address preliminary or procedural questions. The participation of third parties in these
incidental phases is determined ad hoc by WTO panels, after consultation with the disputing
parties.109 When a procedural incident arises in the first written submission or thereafter, third
parties in principle are precluded from expressing their views. The Committee recommends, in
furtherance of basic procedural fairness, that panels should adhere to the uniform practice of
securing the participation of third parties for all preliminary questions that may be raised by
the main litigants
Whilst several individuals expressed interest in expanding participation for non-State actors in
the Counsel Survey,110 recent practice indicates that there has been no appetite for this even at
the ITLOS111 or in inter-State arbitration,112 which are not subject to statutory constraint.
Whereas the Committee proposes below that the Court call witnesses more pro-actively as a
means of including non-State actors, it has decided not to endorse their participation as amicus
curiae due to the debate concerning Article 34 of the ICJ Statute. The Committee does not
advocate a liberal approach to participation by non-State actors due to the cost implications,
but rather recommend that the ITLOS, arbitral tribunals and WTO panels prescribe modalities
in the rules of procedure for such participation when authorised, using detailed rules, such as
those found in the CAFTA-DR agreement or in the proposed DSB decision for standard
procedures on the filing of amicus curiae briefs,113 as a template.114
3. Time-limits
The time-limits applications to intervene are the closure of the written phase at the Court
(Article 62)115 and thirty days after the Counter-Memorial becomes available at the Tribunal.116
108 Even the so-called ‘Friends of Third Parties,’ a group of States advocating the extension of third party rights,
recognise the need for balance, see Coly report (n 70), 79: ‘The proponents are mindful of the need to maintain a
distinction between the role of the Parties to a dispute and that of the third parties; as well as the need to avoid
any interference with the efficiency of the Panel's proceedings. In this regard, the Proponents are of the view that
a balance should be achieved between efficiency of the proceedings on the one hand; and a meaningful
participation of third parties on the other hand.’ 109 E.g.– US – Countervailing Measures (China), WT/DS437/4, Communication from the Panel, para 1.3. 110 Crawford and Keene, supra note 48, at 229. See also ICSID Arbitration Rules 2006, Art 37(2); UNCITRAL
Transparency Rules 2014, Art 4; ICSID Secretariat, ‘Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules’, Working
Paper #3 (August 2019), 66-67 (Arbitration Rule 66). 111 See further, e.g. – No. 22 The ‘Arctic Sunrise’ Case (Netherlands v. Russia)(Provisional Measures)(Order of
22 November 2013) [2013] ITLOS Rep. 230, at 234 (paras 15-18). 112 E.g. – Arctic Sunrise Arbitration, supra note 20, at paras 35-40. 113 See Coly’s report supra note 70, 36 (based on an earlier proposal, see JOB/DS/14) and also para 2.95. 114 Infra note 255, Art 20.10(1)(d); Model Rules of Procedure, Rule 53. See also the European Union-Korea Free
Trade Agreement, Annex 14-B (Art 11); European Union-Ukraine Association Agreement, Annex XXIV (Rules
37-39). See also Rule 37 of the ICSID Rules on Arbitration; Art 4 of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules. 115 ICJ Rules Art 81(1). 116 ITLOS Rules Art 67(1).
22
The position differs at the ICJ for Article 63 interventions, made by declaration,117 which must
be filed by the date fixed for the opening of the oral proceedings.118 The Court has never
rejected an application for tardiness. 119 The laxity of this deadline prolongs the merits
proceedings by interjecting a deadline for the commencement of incidental proceedings at a
juncture wherefrom the merits cannot proceed to the oral phase, creating an unwelcome
interruption.
The Committee suggest that Article 81(1) of the ICJ Rules could be amended to require
applications to intervene to be filed in accordance with the time-limit for the filing of the
Memorial, unless they are motivated by putative counter-claims. In the event that the
Application is vague or incomplete, the Court could demand the Applicant to amend and clarify
it. Since applications and orders fixing time-limits for written pleadings are published by the
Court through its website, putative intervenors would have at least six months to consider their
position. Should the application to intervene be granted, the time-limit for the filing of written
observations could be fixed at six months to coincide with the filing of the Counter-Memorial.
Alternatively, the third State could file a short brief as amicus curiae.
Should a party object to an Article 62 application, the Court could decide the matter
concurrently with the progression of the case on the merits, omitting oral argument.120 For
example, the Court could fix a time-limit of two months for the filing of written pleadings and
render its decision by the end of the following four months, synchronising with the filing of
the Counter-Memorial. Should the application be granted, the intervenor could be provided
with a short time-limit (e.g. – two months) in which to file its written observations and the
parties could comment on them at the hearings. Were counter-claims to be filed, then the time-
limit for applications to intervene could be two months thereafter; where the admissibility of
the counter-claims and/or applications to intervene are contested, these could be decided by
written argument in order to coincide with the filing of the Counter-Memorial.
If the Court dismisses the application as a result of upholding a preliminary objection, requests
to intervene would no longer need to be decided. Otherwise, the application to intervene could
still be decided by the time-limit for the filing of the Counter-Memorial on the merits. The
time-limit for the filing of Article 63 declarations could also be aligned with the Counter-
Memorial rather than the start of the hearings,121 thereby providing more time to parties to
incorporate the pleadings of Article 63 intervenors into their oral pleadings. Due to the differing
rules on intervention at the Tribunal, the Committee sees no need to revise their time-limits.
4. Access to Pleadings
Successful intervenors have the automatic right to view all pleadings per Article 85(1) of the
ICJ Rules and 103 of the ITLOS Rules. Though there is ‘no inextricable link’ between the two
117 Declarations of intervention may nonetheless be ruled inadmissible. See, e.g. – Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and around Nicaragua (Declaration of Intervention by El Salvador) (Order of 4 October 1984) [1984]
ICJ Rep. 215, at 216. 118 Rules Art 82(1). Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan, New Zealand Intervening) (Declaration of
Intervention by New Zealand) [2013] ICJ Rep. 3, at 4 (declaration filed 20 November 2013, closure of written
phase 9 March 2013). 119 E.g. – Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipidan (Indonesia v. Malaysia)
(Intervention) (Judgment of 23 October 2001) [2001] ICJ Rep. 575, at 583-586 (paras 19-26), esp. 585-586 (paras
21-23). 120 In the period under quantitative review, intervention proceedings generated a mean average of 103 pages of
written pleadings (as opposed to 292 pages in preliminary objections cases and 1912 pages in merits cases) and a
mean average of 7 hours of oral argument (versus 12 hours and 26 hours, respectively). 121 ICJ Rules Art 82(1).
23
procedures,122 a potential intervenor may apply to be furnished with the written pleadings and
documents filed by the parties. Whereas the clause ‘to a State entitled to appear before it’ in
Article 53 of the ICJ Rules and Article 67 of the ITLOS Rules suggests that pleadings should
be provided after intervention is granted,123 in practice the Court grants access to the pleadings
beforehand unless one of the parties objects.124 In light of the proposed change to the time-limit
for applications to intervene, the Committee suggests that third States decide whether to
intervene by reference to the Application. In the event that an Application is vague concerning
the essence of the case (e.g. – the prayer for relief) the Court or Tribunal could demand
clarification or further detail to enable all concerned, including third States, to grasp the case
and to take their decisions accordingly. Should an applicant request an extension to the time-
limit for the filing of the Memorial in response to such a demand, then the Court or Tribunal
could grant the extension within the range proposed below.
In WTO proceedings, third parties receive the parties’ submissions up to the first substantive
meeting.125 The Committee recommends that as a rule third parties be also given access to other
written submissions – and not only the first set of submissions – not covered by confidentiality,
for instance those exchanged in the context of an incidental issue (preliminary or procedural)
in which they have an interest.126
5. Transparency of proceedings
While ICJ and ITLOS proceedings are largely public and it is possible to access the pleadings
when the hearings start,127 the publicity of arbitration and WTO panel proceedings is largely
for the parties to determine. In the case of arbitration, the parties normally opt to open the
proceedings to public scrutiny, and in any event are free to choose otherwise.
The confidentiality of WTO panel proceedings is required by the DSU and the Rules of
Conduct,128 which also impose a duty of confidentiality on all the subjects involved in the
proceedings, even after they are concluded.129 The template Working Procedures attached to
the DSU provide for a comprehensive regime of confidentiality for the proceedings (relating
to the hearings and all documents).130 Hearings have been opened on occasion by agreement
of the parties. In any event, any Member can waive the confidentiality of its own submissions
and pleadings at the hearings. Moreover, parties must always provide to a requesting Member
a non-confidential summary of its submissions.131
122 Pulau Litigan (Intervention), supra note 119, at 585 (para 22). 123 By contrast, see ITLOS Rules Art 104(1). 124 E.g. – Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Application of Costa Rica to Intervene), infra note 81, at 354 (paras
7, 10, 12). See also South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 20, at paras 46-48. 125 DSU Art 10(3). 126 In certain cases it is doubtful that such interest exists, or that the involvement of third parties is expedient. For
instance, when the panel selects experts in SPS disputes, certain preparatory activities (gathering CVs, parties’
comments on areas of concern) can be carried out before the first meeting to save time, and normally third parties
are not involved. In US – Large Civil Aircraft (second complaint) (Article 21.5-EU), WT/DS353/RW,
Communication regarding third party rights, dated 25 January 2013, Panel Report, Annex E-4, the panel granted
the third parties’ request to be informed of objections to jurisdiction or admissibility issues and panel’s information
requests to the parties under Art 13 DSU. 127 ICJ Rules Art 53(2); ITLOS Rules Art 67(2). 128 See Arts I to III. 129 Ibid., Art VII(2). 130 See Arts 2 and 3 of the Working Procedures in Appendix 3 of the DSU. See also Art 18.2 DSU. For a recent
panel report discussing the scope of the confidentiality obligation in DSU Art 18 (2), see Panel Report, Russia-
Traffic in Transit, Confidentiality Ruling (Annex B-2) paras 5.9-5.16. 131 DSU Art 18 (2).
24
Calls for enhanced transparency by default have so far been rejected, and when hearings have
been held openly attendance has been generally poor.132 Further efforts could be made open
hearings more accessible, for instance using a broadcasting system.133 Given the reasonable
logistical effort of organising streaming (as the ICJ does), the Committee recommends that
parties and panelists consider, when hearings are not confidential, to organise a streaming
service. Given that by far the most interesting part of the meeting is the Q&A sessions, it should
also be ensured that, when the meeting is open, its publicity is not limited to the opening
statements but extends to the parties’ responses to the panel’s questions.
In WTO panel proceedings, the confidentiality of proceedings can affect even the transparency
of the applicable rules. Working procedures are adopted by the panels in each case, with the
input of the Secretariat and in consultation with the disputing parties. Normally, they are
publicly available only when the report is published. In recent cases, due to some parties’
willingness to make documents publicly available sooner, some panels’ working procedure and
other procedural rulings or documents have been made available before the publication of the
report.134 The Committee recommends the parties to agree to the prompt publication of these
orders, to facilitate their gradual consolidation in good practices and open-access templates that
the panelists and parties can consider and modify.135
H. Joinder of Proceedings
Whereas joinder entails the formal merger of multiple proceedings, the Court and the Tribunal
may also direct that the written or oral proceedings, including the calling of witnesses, be
conducted in common without ordering joinder.136 Joinder of proceedings may also be effected
with joinder of parties where one or more applicants bring claims against one or more
respondents.137 In theory, joinder of proceedings promotes both procedural economy and the
equality of parties; the directing of common procedural action, however, does not promote
equality due to the possibility of differing procedures (e.g. – composition of the panel) and
outcomes in proceedings conducted in parallel on substantively similar subject-matter.138
1. Joinder of Bilateral Proceedings
Joinder of bilateral proceedings arises where the substantive issues of two cases featuring the
same two parties are connected. After the problems encountered in the Certain
Activities/Construction of a Road Cases in which joinder was ultimately ordered while the
132 Gabrielle Marceau, Mikella Hurley, ‘Transparency and Public Participation in the WTO: A Report Card on
WTO Transparency Mechanisms’ (2012) 4(1) Trade L. & Dev. 19-44, 38; Cook (n 105). 133 See https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/october/tradoc_125546.pdf, answer to Question 1. 134 See for instance the panel’s Preliminary Ruling in Canada - Measures Concerning Trade in Commercial
Aircraft, WT/DS522/12, Communication from the Panel. 135 Marisa Goldstein, ‘Legal Basis and Procedures for Consulting with Experts and International Organizations in
WTO Dispute Settlement’ (2018) 9(3) Journal of International Dispute Settlement (referring to the practice of
appointing experts) 431: ‘the lack of at least a minimum set procedure means that parties still face some
uncertainty as to how these issues will be dealt with by individual panels and a potential for disparities in
treatment.’ 136 ICJ Rules Art 47; ITLOS Rules Art 47. 137 E.g. – South West Africa Cases; Legality of the Use of Force Cases; Nuclear Disarmament Cases; Cases Nos
3 and 4 Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan) (Provisional Measures) (Order
of 27 August 1999), at paras 2, 5, 9-14. See also Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom)
(Preliminary Objections) (Judgment) [1998] ICJ Rep. 9, Joint Declaration of Judges Bedjaoui, Guillaume and
Ranjeva, at 32-34 (paras 1-7), 44-45 (para 21). 138 In the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases, the Court decided 9-5 not to join the proceedings the due to the objections
of the Applicants (Germany and the United Kingdom) – Fisheries Jurisdiction (Germany v. Iceland) (Merits)
(Judgment) [1974] ICJ Rep.175, at 177 (para 8).
25
counterclaims were ruled inadmissible,139 a welcome turn in recent practice was the prompt
joinder of the Maritime Delimitation/Land Boundary Cases.140 As the rationalisation of the
modalities of joinder of bilateral proceedings in relation to counter-claims would be a valuable
reform, the Committee proposes the amendment of Articles 47 of the ICJ Rules and ITLOS
Rules for this purpose.
In light of the proposed reform to counter-claims below, the Committee suggests that the test
for joinder of bilateral proceedings be harmonised with the test for counter-claims. On this
approach, a respondent wishing to introduce claims that have general links (e.g. – a shared
factual matrix) but not a ‘direct connection’ to ongoing proceedings would be able to apply to
do so through joinder, subject to jurisdiction and admissibility. This test would warrant the
joinder of two or more proceedings, ordered proprio motu or upon application, subject to the
same criteria of ‘connectivity’ and time-limit as for counter-claims. In aligning the procedures
for joinder in bilateral proceedings and counter-claims, the incentive for the indirect
introduction of counter-claims via new application would be removed.
2. Joinder of Multilateral Proceedings
Joinder of multilateral proceedings entails the merger of multiple, similar applications by
multiple applicants and/or against multiple respondents. Whilst the Committee opines that this
change would benefit procedural economy and equality, it would require a solution to the
problem of the composition of the panel, as proposed above. An additional problem arising in
cases of joinder involving multiple parties is access to pleadings. 141 In the view of the
Committee, the principle of equality demands automatic right of access of each party to
pleadings in the joinder of proceedings. For example, in a situation where State A is the
Applicant and States B, C and D are the Respondents, State A has automatic access to pleadings
submitted by States B, C and D and is thus able to take into account the pleadings of States C
and D when preparing its arguments in its case against State B. States B, C and D would thus
be in a disadvantageous situation if they have no access to the pleadings submitted by the other
Respondents. Where joinder is not effected, this should as a matter of principle be due to
substantive differences between the applications, not the reluctance of a party.
The approach of the WTO dispute settlement to parallel claims142 is to run them in parallel with
identically composed panels that usually follow the same timetables. In the EC – Hormones
cases Canada and the US each acted as third party with enhanced rights in the other dispute,
and the panels organised a joint meeting with the scientific experts for ‘economy of effort.’
The Appellate Body validated this approach and cited due process and fairness as justification
for the enhanced rights of the third parties in each case.143 The Continued Suspension cases,144
139 Section II(H), infra. 140 Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)/Land Boundary in the Northern Part
of Isla Portillos (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) (Order of 2 February 2017). The Application in the first case was
introduced by Costa Rica on 25 February 2014, the written phase closed and Court-appointed expert opinions in
progress when the second Application was filed by Costa Rica on 25 January 2017 with a request for joinder and
short time-limits of six weeks; Nicaragua requested a time-limit of six months and the prior release of the expert
opinions. The Court promptly joined the two proceedings and fixed time-limits of six weeks without the prior
release of the opinions; this enabled the oral phase for the joined proceedings to be held from 3 to 13 July 2017. 141 E.g. – Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. Pakistan), supra note 21, at para 6. 142 Unless the claimants agree to establish a single panel under DSU Art 9 (-1), see recently in US – COOL (Canada
and Mexico complainants), WT/DS384 and WTO/DS386; Horticultural Products (New Zealand and US),
WT/DS477 and WT/DS478. 143 EC – Hormones, WT/DS26/AB/R, Appellate Body Report, paras 153-154, explaining the rationale of the third
parties’ participation in the second substantive meeting. 144 US – Continued Suspension, WT/DS320/R; Canada – Continued Suspension WT/DS321/R, Panel Report, para
1.7 (explaining the joint meeting with the experts).
26
the Hormones claimants turned into parallel respondents with respect to related (but not
identical) claims by the original respondent (the EU). The procedure of Article 9 DSU was
followed by analogy, with the same panelists on both panels and a coordinated timetable.
Granting enhanced third-party rights by default or ad hoc (see above) would considerably
reduce the practical disadvantage of non-joined parallel cases.
I. Counter-claims
Due to the increasing frequency of counter-claims and problems arising in practice, the
Committee considers rationalisation of this area to be a valuable potential reform at the ICJ.
The scarcity of practice at the ITLOS and inter-State arbitration, and their absence in WTO
panel proceedings, renders this comparison across the board less pressing.145
Counter-claims concern the filing by the respondent of claims that are ‘directly connected’ to
the subject-matter of the claims brought by the other party.146 Although there has been rise in
counter-claims in the period under review, recent experience has shown that the procedure can
unduly prolong proceedings.147 In the Certain Activities/Construction of a Road Cases,148
incidental proceedings (including an additional round of written pleadings on the merits
authorised by the Court) concerning the admissibility of counter-claims added 42 months and
5444 pages of written pleadings to the case. The Court joined the two cases as they were based
upon similar facts149 and rejected the admissibility of the counter-claims for failing the test of
‘direct connection’ to the original Application.150
The directness of the link between the counter-claims and the application was also problematic
in earlier cases.151 Even though the direct connection test did not need to be applied in the
Jurisdictional Immunities Case (Germany v. Italy), the sequential nature of the procedure
added 7 months to the case.152 Most recently, the Court admitted two and rejected two of the
145 DSU Art 3.10 generally states that ‘complaints and counter-complaints in regard to distinct matters should not
be linked.’ The issue may be relevant in compliance proceedings involving competing claims original complainant
and the original respondent, respectively. E.g. – EC and certain Member States – Large Civil Aircraft (Article
21.5), WT/DS316/AB/RW, Appellate Body Report, paras 5.2, 5.6, 5.8, and 5.11. 146 ICJ Rules Art 80(1); ITLOS Rules Art 98. See also, e.g. – Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro))(Counter-Claims) [1997] ICJ Rep. 243, at 256 (para 27). 147 E.g. – Armed Activities in the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) (Merits)
(Judgment) [2005] ICJ Rep. 168, at 176-177 (paras 5-10). 148 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)/Construction of a
Road along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica) (Merits) (Judgment) [2015] ICJ Rep. 665. 149 Certain Activities (Joinder of Proceedings) (Order of 17 April 2013) [2013] ICJ Rep. 166, at 170-171 (paras
19-24). 150 Certain Activities/Construction of a Road (Counter-Claims) (Order of 18 April 2013) [2013] ICJ Rep. 200, at
209 (para 24), 211-215 (paras 30-38). See also the Declaration of Judge ad hoc Guillaume, ibidem, at 220-221
(paras 15-17). 151 Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States of America) (Counter-Claim) (Order) [1998] ICJ Rep. 190, at 203-205
(paras 33-39); Armed Activities in the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda)
(Counter-Claims) (Order) [2001] ICJ Rep. at 678-682 (paras 35-45); Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia) (Counter-Claims)
(Order) [1997] ICJ Rep. 243, at 258-259 (paras 33-36). 152 Jurisdictional Immunities of a State (Germany v. Italy) (Counter-Claim) (Order of 6 July 2010) [2010] ICJ
Rep. 310, at 311-313 (paras 3-6), 316 (para 16), 320-321 (para 30); Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cançado
Trinidade, ibidem, at 332-342 (paras 4-40).
27
counter-claims presented in the Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea
Case, though each of the claims related to the same factual matrix.153
The Committee proposes amendment to Article 80(1) of the ICJ Rules and Article 98(1) of the
ITLOS Rules to delete the word ‘directly’ from the requirement of connection to the original
claim: by relaxing this criterion, counter-claims such as those brought in the Construction of a
Road Case and the Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea Case would
be more easily accommodated, thus narrowing the scope for objection and delay.154
In addition, the Committee proposes that Article 80(2) of the ICJ Rules be amended to align
the time-limit for the filing of counter-claims with the time-limit for the filing of the Memorial
(on jurisdiction/admissibility or the merits, as the case may be).155 These measures would
eliminate the incentive to introduce counter-claims via new application, constrain the
deployment of counter-claims as a tactic to gain a time advantage for the preparation of
pleadings and compress the incidental proceedings by disposing of them concurrent with the
progression of the merits. This would also synchronise with the proposed timings for
intervention.
Whilst counterclaims are not commonplace in inter-State arbitration, they have arisen in
practice156 and are foreseen in Article 21(3) of the PCA Rules.157 There is no requirement of
connectivity, and arbitral tribunals have adopted different approaches to the matter. Recently,
the Annex VII tribunal in Enrica Lexie stated that the ‘direct connection’ requirement is a
‘general principle of procedural law.’158
Since the rationale of admitting counter-claims is identical to that discussed in relation to the
ICJ and the ITLOS, the Committee advises the PCA to amend Article 21(3) to include a test of
simple ‘connection’159 between the claims, and a time-limit for the filing of counter-claims
synchronised with that for the filing of the memorial on jurisdiction and admissibility or on the
merits. The Committee also recommends that arbitral tribunals include this provision in their
first procedural orders.
153 The decision in each case was based upon whether the counter-claims were of the same character of ‘sovereign
rights’ as the claims, see Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea
(Nicaragua v. Colombia), Order of 15 November 2017, 154 This would also remove the otiose discretion of the Court – never exercised – to reject otherwise admissible
counter-claims – Murphy, ‘Counter-Claims’ in Zimmerman, supra note 15, 1000-1025, at 1005. 155 This would also preclude the introduction of counter-claims in a second round of pleadings, the admissibility
of which remains an open question – Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) (Merits) (Judgment)
[2010] ICJ Rep. 14, at 105 (paras 279-280). 156 E.g. – The Carthage (France v. Italy), PCA, Award (6 May 1913), 2; The Manouba (France v. Italy), PCA,
Award (6 May 1913), 3; Case No. B 1 Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America (Counterclaim), Iran-
US Claims Tribunal, Interlocutory Award (9 September 200) 4, Award No. ITL 83-B1-FT, 2004 WL 2210709;
PCA Case No. 2004-02 Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Award (11 April 2006), para 214,
Rules of Procedure (16 February 2004), Art 9(2)(c); Guyana and Suriname, supra note 37, Award (17 September
2007), para 410; Enrica Lexie, supra note 35, Procedural Order No. 3 (1 June 2017), Rules of Procedure (19
January 2016), Art 9(2); Coastal State Rights, supra note 35, Rules of Procedure of 18 May 2017, Art 11(1). 157 Reading: ‘In its statement of defence, or at a later stage in the arbitral proceedings if the arbitral tribunal decides
that the delay was justified under the circumstances, the respondent may make a counterclaim or rely on a claim
for the purpose of a set-off provided that the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction over it.’ 158 Enrica Lexie, supra note 35, Award (21 May 2020), para 256. 159 A requirement of ‘close connection’ might be ultimately excessive and counterproductive, but the plain
‘connection’ requirement, arising from the factual matrix of the dispute, would prevent the grouping of unrelated
disputes within the same proceedings (for instance through raising any UNCLOS-based counterclaim in an Annex
VII arbitration, counting on the extent of the tribunal’s competence over any UNCLOS-based claims, E.g. –
Detention of Ukranian Vessels, supra note 256, Rules of Procedure, Art 12.1).
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J. Costs Orders
The default position in international litigation is that the parties shall bear their own (party)
costs, although it is possible to hypothesise cost orders in special circumstances.160 The Statutes
and the Rules of the ICJ and the ITLOS are silent on the question of the recoupement from the
parties of actual costs incurred by the Court or by the Tribunal,161 which is the default scenario
in arbitration. Costs orders could serve a useful function in financing extraordinary expenses
that are impossible to predict. WTO panels have no power to order the payment of any costs to
the parties.
On occasion, the Court has ordered parties to bear actual costs. Most notably, in Gabćikovo-
Nagymaros Project, the parties proposed to jointly bear the costs of the site visit (principally
travel and accommodation) undertaken by the Court.162 Whereas this was done at a time of
prodigious financial strain amidst the UN budgetary crises, this precedent could catalyse the
greater use of fact-finding powers by diminishing the need to apply to the General Assembly
for funds. The experience of arbitration indicates that an increased use of fact-finding powers
is well-received by parties,163 showing that parties are willing to fund an arbitral tribunal, even
at greater expense, when its effectiveness is enhanced.
The Committee proposes amendments to Articles 97 of the ICJ Rules and 125 of the ITLOS
Rules) to stipulate that the Court and Tribunal may at any time order the parties to bear
extraordinary costs of proceedings (e.g. – site visits, expert opinions, inquiries) incurred on a
case-by-case basis. Special consideration may be given to parties relying upon the UN
Secretary-General’s Trust Fund, the ITLOS Trust Fund, the PCA Trust Fund and the WTO
Advisory Centre. Tribunal’s costs that incurred when a party is not appearing, in interstate
arbitration, inevitably weigh on the appearing party.
K. Written Phase of Pleadings
During the written phase, written submissions, exhibits and legal authorities are typically
voluminous. The timeframes for adjudicators and parties can also slow down the proceedings
unnecessarily. In this section, the Committee chose not to make recommendations regarding
arbitration proceedings – beyond a general call to moderation in the interest of efficiency – in
light of the parties’ power to shape the procedure. With respect to WTO panel proceedings, the
procedural timeframe is very tight and in no need of acceleration.164
1. Time-limits
Time-limits for the filing of the first round of pleadings are generally fixed by the Court and
Tribunal at the first case management conference. Likewise, arbitral tribunals set the
160 ICJ Statute Art 64; ICJ Rules Art 97; ITLOS Statute Art 34; ITLOS Rules Art 125. Whereas Article 294
UNCLOS does not specify the consequences of a finding of an ‘abuse of legal process’, a costs order may be
considered to be one logical outcome. 161 Art 33 of the ICJ Statute provides that the expenses of the Court shall be borne by the by the United Nations,
but this does not proscribe the generation of income from other sources, which are credited to the budget of the
Court, though UN rules require any year-end surplus to be credited to the UN general budget rather than rolled
over – Espósito, ‘Article 33’ in Zimmerman, supra note 15, 563-570, at 569-570. 162 Gabćikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) (Order of 5 February 1997) [1997] ICJ Rep. 3, at 5. For
a site visit example from inter-State arbitration, see further, e.g. – PCA Case No. 2010-16 Maritime Delimitation
in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh v. India) (Award of 7 July 2014) at paras 18-26. 163 Section IV, infra. 164 In fact, the timeframe is normally so tight (see para 12 of Appendix 3, which grants 3-6 weeks to the
complaining parties and 2-3 weeks for the respondents) that, in the proposal by the Chair of the DSB in Special
Session and recent practice, the respondent is granted a longer time than is granted to the complaining party. See
Coly’s report supra note 70, para 2.7.3 and Timetable in case Canada – Measures Concerning Trade in
Commercial Aircraft, WT/DS522/12.
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procedural timetable in consultation with the parties when they adopt the rules of procedure.
WTO panels adopt the working procedures (including for confidential information and the use
of experts when relevant) and timetable after consultations with the parties at the organisational
meeting.165
For the Court, there is no standard time-limit;166 during the period under review, the mean
averages of time-limits fixed were, respectively, 11 months in 34 merits cases and 6 months in
16 preliminary objections/jurisdiction cases.167
In comparison, the Tribunal took the ‘six-month rule’ proposed at the fiftieth anniversary ICJ
colloquium more seriously.168 Time-limits are usually calculated from the date of the order, not
from the date of the initiation of proceedings. In the period under review, the six-month rule
has been respected by parties and the Tribunal not only in the fixing of time-limits but also in
the granting of extensions.169 Consequently, this innovation may be judged a success.
There are compelling arguments for the adoption of the ‘six-month rule’ by the Court, while
preserving some flexibility, as there may be logistical difficulties (e.g. – obtaining documentary
evidence) justifying limited extensions. The Committee accordingly suggests the amendment
of Article 44(1) of the Rules to establish a range of standardised time-limits, which could
include an exception under the control of the Court. Practice suggests that ranges of 4-6 months
for jurisdiction and admissibility and 6-9 months for the merits pleadings are appropriate. The
Committee also suggests the amendment of Articles 44 of the ICJ Rules and 59(1) of the ITLOS
Rules to clarify that time runs from the date of application, not from the date of the Order
setting the time-limits, to reflect the fact that applicants can work on the Memorial from the
point of application, if not beforehand.
Whilst the Court can reject requests for extensions, it invariably grants them in practice.170
Extensions produces a mean average of 13 months for merits cases and 11 months for
preliminary objections cases. Whereas no great harm is done by short extensions (e.g. – 1
month171), repeated and lengthy extensions172 are inefficient. It is noteworthy that the ITLOS
has taken a strict line in including extensions within the ‘six-month rule.’ The Committee
suggests a more moderate approach through the amendment of Article 44 of the ICJ Rules to
introduce a cap upon extensions; a length of three months appears to be appropriate. Parties
wishing to explore settlement negotiations should do so through the mechanism of suspension
(whether by a published or in camera order) rather than time-limit extensions.
165 It should be noted that Annex 3 to the DSU, providing a template for the panels’ timetable, is no longer a
reliable representation of the typical timetable. 166 ICJ Rules Arts 44(1); 48. 167 The norm of 4 months envisaged by Practice Direction V has been realised in recent practice. 168 ITLOS Rules Art 59(1). 169 This has applied even to the more complex delimitation cases of Bay of Bengal and Atlantic Ocean. The only
exception was the Swordfish Case in which proceedings were suspended to facilitate settlement negotiations. 170 In the period of review, extensions were granted in 9 merits cases with a cumulative total of 130 months
(ranging from 1 to 36 months) and in 4 preliminary objections/jurisdiction proceedings with a cumulative total of
42 months (ranging from 3 to 24 months). 171 E.g. – Avena (Mexico v. United States of America); Black Sea Coastal State Rights (Romania v. Ukraine). 172 E.g. – Legality of the Use of Force Cases; Arrest Warrant (DRC v. Belgium); Certain Criminal Proceedings
in France (Republic of the Congo v. France).
30
2. Length of Written Pleadings
The filing of verbose written pleadings is endemic to international litigation. The Court took
notice and tried to steer parties away from wordiness.173 Statistical analysis of the period under
review shows calls for their reduction to be well-founded.174
The record of proceedings over the past fifteen years proves that the Court’s Practice Directions
have not led to greater succinctness. Costs and delay in the written phase should be contained.
To curb the length of pleadings, the Committee proposes that Articles 44 of the ICJ Rules and
63 of the ITLOS Rules be amended to provide for the fixing of word limits on a case-by-case
basis (including annexes) to be fixed following consultation with the parties at the first case
management conference. Based on the statistical data in the period under review, as an
indication, the ranges could be 100-150 pages (converted to words) for jurisdiction and
admissibility and 250-350 pages for the merits (including annexes). WTO panels and arbitral
tribunals could consider giving a recommendation, in the working procedures, of the adequate
length of written submissions, after noting the parties’ views. 175 A WTO arbitration, ‘to
facilitate the efficient conduct’ of the proceedings, imposed a 125-page restriction on parties’s
submissions, subject to the possibility of granting extensions.176 The inflation of submissions’
length, while often unnecessary, is probably an important cause of stress upon the capacity of
the ICJ and WTO panels to work properly and, especially in the case of WTO panels, comply
with the deadlines established in the DSU.
3. Simultaneous Filing
Simultaneous filing of pleadings, a peculiar feature of special agreement cases, continues in
ICJ and ITLOS proceedings.177 Each of three cases introduced after the adoption of Practice
Direction I has featured simultaneous filing with three rounds of pleadings in the first two cases
and two rounds in the third (which also envisaged the possibility of a third round).178 As the
practice of simultaneous filing is inefficient, the Committee calls for its abolition through
amendment of Article 46(1) of the ICJ Rules and Article 61 of the ITLOS Rules to prescribe
that the order of pleadings in cases brought by special agreement be determined by the parties
or, in the absence of agreement between the parties, by lot. The party to plead first in the written
phase would be the party to plead first in the oral phase, unless the parties agree otherwise.179
4. Number of Pleadings
Whereas the Court announced in 2002 that one round was thereafter to be considered the norm
per Article 45(1) of the Rules, it has authorised additional rounds in 21 cases in the period
173 ICJ Rules Arts 49(3), 60; ICJ Practice Directions I, III. 174 The mean average length of a representative sampling of memorials was 121 pages in 11 preliminary objections
cases and 473 pages in 24 merits cases; the total mass of pleadings was a mean average of 311 pages in 11
preliminary objections cases and 1995 pages in 24 merits cases. 175 Appellate Body in 2017 noted a ‘significant increase’ in the length of written submissions, invited WTO
Members to consider the possibility of word-limits and finally dropped the idea, see Appellate Body, WT/AB/27,
Annex 2, pp. 100-101. 176 EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft (Article 22.6), WT/316/ARB/Add.1, Annex A-1, para
3(2)(a). 177 ICJ Rules Art 46(1); ITLOS Rules Art 61. 178 Frontier Dispute (Benin v. Niger), filed on 3 May 2002; Pedra Blanca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and
South Ledge (Malaysia v. Singapore), filed on 24 July 2003; Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Niger), filed on
21 July 2010. See also Sustainable Conservation and Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-East Pacific
(Chile v. European Community) (Order of 20 December 2000), at para 2. 179 Whereas the parties may not impose simultaneity upon the Court, they may jointly propose to displace the
proposed rule in favour of simultanaeity, subject to the approval of the Court or Tribunal – ICJ Rules Art 101;
ITLOS Rules Art 48.
31
under review. In spite of the terms of Article 60(2) of the ITLOS Rules, two rounds of equal
length have featured in each of the 5 contentious cases at the Tribunal. In precluding further
delay (e.g. – extensions) a single round yields efficiency benefits by reducing the mass of
pleadings and accelerating the closure of the written phase.180 The Committee accordingly
suggests that Articles 45(2) of the ICJ Rules and 60(2) of the ITLOS Rules be redacted so as
to abolish multiple rounds, apart from incidental proceedings (e.g. – intervention,
counterclaims). If either party considers a second round to be necessary, they may request it to
the Court or the Tribunal,181 which should, when granting such requests, provide instructions
relating to the issues on which the parties should focus and the expected maximum length of
the written submissions, especially if no word-limit had been set for the first round of written
pleadings. Likewise, parties and tribunals are recommended to allow a single round of
proceedings in inter-State arbitration, and so are WTO panels setting the calendar for incidental
proceedings (e.g., procedural objections).
5. Closure
The ICJ Rules do not regulate closure, though a number of procedural events (e.g. – submission
of documents; initial deliberations; applications to intervene) depends on it. In practice, closure
occurs either with the filing of the final written pleading or the expiration of its time-limit, or
by a decision of the Court where it has ‘reserved the subsequent procedure for further decision’
or a Special Agreement envisages for the possibility of a further round of pleadings upon
decision of the Court. To provide clarity for the parties, the Committee suggests that Articles
54(1) of the ICJ Rules and 60 of the ITLOS Rules be amended to define closure as coinciding
with the expiry of the time-limit for the filing of the counter-memorial (or the last written
submission, as the case may be).
6. Late Filing of Documents
Since the adoption in 2002 of Practice Direction IX by the ICJ, problems concerning the filing
of documents between the closure of the written phase and the opening of the oral phase have
arisen in 8 cases.182 It has also occurred at the Tribunal.183 Late filing could be due to genuine
logistical difficulties, such as the coordination of government ministries to locate historical
documents in archives or solicitation of third States to identify and secure documents in their
possession. Nevertheless, the Committee proposes the amendment of Articles 56(2) of the ICJ
Rules and 71(2) of the ITLOS Rules and the inclusion of provisions in arbitral procedural rules
to prescribe indicative criteria for authorisation of late filing. Without the consent of the
opposing party, such criteria might be that the document was discovered or retrieved after the
180 E.g. – Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of the Congo v. France) (Order of 16 November
2010) [2010] ICJ Rep. 635, at 636-637; Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan, New Zealand Intervening)
(Merits) (Judgment) [2014] ICJ Rep. 226, at 235 (para 6); Separate Opinion of Judge Greenwood, at 418 (para
36); Dissenting Opinion of Judge Owada (at 301, para 3). 181 ICJ Rules Art 101; ITLOS Rules Art 48. 182 Croatia Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia) (Preliminary Objections); Territorial and Maritime Frontier (Cameroon
v. Nigeria, Equitorial Guinea Intervening); Croatia Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia) (Merits); Territorial and
Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Honduras) (Merits); Frontier Dispute (Benin v. Niger) (Merits); Avena (Mexico
v. United States of America) (Merits); Pedra Blanca/Pulau Batu Puteh (Malaysia v. Singapore) (Merits); Coastal
State Rights (Romania v. Ukraine). 183 No. 2 The M/V Saiga (No. 2)(St Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea)(Merits)(Judgment of 1 July 1999), at
para 20; No. 18 The M/V Louisa Case (St Vincent and the Grenadines v. Spain) (Merits) (Judgment of 28 May
2013), at paras 22-26; No. 19 The M/V ‘Virginia G’ Case (Panama v. Guinea-Bissau) (Merits) [2014] ITLOS
Rep. 4, at 17 (para 41); Case No. 8 The ‘Grand Prince’ Case (Belize v. France) (Prompt Release) (Judgment of
20 April 2001) at paras 28-29; Affaire No. 23 Différend relatif à la délimitation de la frontière maritime entre le
Ghana et la Côte d’Ivoire dans l’Océan Atlantique (Ghana c. Côte d’Ivoire) (mesures conservatoires), Compte-
rendu (30 mars 2015, après-midi), pages 4 (lignes 24-40) et 6, lignes 45-50.
32
closure of the written phase, or that it supported a rebuttal made necessary by the last written
submission; the document must also be material to the proceedings, though its weight would
remain to be assessed at a later stage.184 In WTO proceedings, panels often use two criteria
(rebuttals/answers and other good cause),185 which could work as minimum template for the
codifying recommendation made above for the Court, the Tribunal and arbitral tribunals.
Another problem is tactical withholding in an attempt to wrong-foot the other side. Debate
concerning the meaning of ‘publication readily available’,186 the surreptitious insertion of
undeclared documents in judges’ folders187 as noted in Practice Direction IXter and the posting
of documents on websites shortly before the start of the oral hearings188 suggest intent. The
policy problem is to balance the avoidance of prejudice to the parties and the deterrence of
tactics. Articles 56(4) of the ICJ Rules and 71(5) of the ITLOS Rules should be amended to
clarify that documents must be publicly available at the time of closure of the written phase.
7. Data Security
The importance of data security is growing in parallel with the sophistication of data
interception techniques. The fact that adjudicators and assisting staff may work on case
materials remotely from various points in the world, including public wi-fi networks,
exacerbates the risk of data interception. The Committee recommends that security protocols
be reviewed to fortify the control of the adjudicators and the supporting institutions over
judicial secrecy, particularly in relation to cybersecurity. Confidential information could be
transmitted in digital form by encrypted data stick or printed in limited copies and held in vaults
in a secured room to be consulted by time-limited signature or exclusively in the room itself.
Electronic and telephone communication could be encrypted while deliberations concerning
cases could be restricted to secure locations as a counter to electronic surveillance.189
L. Oral Phase of Pleadings
The point between the closure of the written phase and the opening of the oral phase is an
important bottleneck. By enabling the ‘back-to-back hearing of cases’ and ‘forward planning’,
the ICJ cleared its backlog in 2010.190 In the period under review, the mean average duration
of the oral phase has been 19 months (versus 12 months for the written phase and 6 months for
deliberations) in jurisdictional proceedings and 11 months (versus 31 months for the written
phase and 6 months for deliberations) in merits proceedings.
The experience of the ITLOS suggests that the ‘six-month rule’ of scheduling oral hearings to
take place within six months of the closure of the written phase is a viable one. Though six
months may be considered to be insufficiently ambitious timeframe, the Committee propose
184 The 2012 UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings are vague: ‘49. The arbitral tribunal may
wish to clarify that evidence submitted late will as a rule not be accepted. It may wish not to preclude itself from
accepting a late submission of evidence if the party shows sufficient cause for the delay.’ 185 E.g., Russia – Transit, Working Procedures, Annex A-1 to the report, see para 1.7: ‘Each party shall submit all
factual evidence to the Panel no later than during the first substantive meeting, except with respect to evidence
necessary for purposes of rebuttal, answers to questions or comments on answers provided by the other party.
Exceptions to this procedure shall be granted upon a showing of good cause. Where such exception has been
granted, the Panel shall accord the other party a period of time for comment, as appropriate, on any new factual
evidence submitted after the first substantive meeting.’ 186 ICJ Rules Art 56(4); ICJ Practice Direction IXbis. See, e.g. – Pulp Mills, supra note 155, at 27 (paras 18-19). 187 ICJ Practice Direction IXter. 188 See the Atlantic Ocean Case, supra note 183. 189 WTO is moving to a secure database for e-filing purposes to move away from email. 190 ICJ Report (2009-2010), UN Doc. A/65/4 (1 August 2010), at 6 (para 22).
33
the adoption of this rule through amendment to Article 54. As delay and cost can arise and the
usefulness of hearings has been criticised,191 the Committee considers reform in this area to be
important.
WTO panels operate on a compressed timeframe, and the scheduling of the substantive
meetings is not unnecessarily delayed. On the contrary, the first substantive meeting occurs
very early in the proceedings, and makes the holding of a second one appropriate. In arbitration,
scheduling is subject to the parties’ wishes; the Committee, however, draws attention to the
disruption on scheduling caused by arbitrators serving on many cases in parallel.
1. Scheduling
Scheduling may be disrupted by congestion or sudden developments (e.g. – incidental
proceedings). The adoption of the proposals made elsewhere in this Report, such as tighter
time-limits in the written phase, standardisation of protocols on evidence and the identification
on the key issues on which the parties should concentrate their efforts, would enable
expeditious organisation of the oral phase by case management conference upon the closure of
the written phase. As the calendar of the ITLOS and ICJ (e.g. – vacation periods) would inform
the General Assembly and the public about their workings, the Committee recommends that
they be published as general administrative practice.
Conflicts between the diaries of judges and arbitrators and proposed dates for hearings can
occur in practice. Scheduling conflicts on the part of counsel and/or agents may also cause
delay, though the modern reality of large legal teams enables substitution of agents and/or
advocates whose diaries precludes attendance.192 Diary clashes should not be allowed to delay
proceedings for more than one month, as a guide. The Committee suggests a strict general rule
of six months for the organisation of the oral hearings in the ICJ and ITLOS, as proposed above,
as well as publication of the reasons for delay to the fixing of hearings in press releases, orders
and judgments for transparency. WTO panelists serve part-time, so by definition they have to
divide themselves across jobs. Rapid scheduling might at least alleviate the difficulty of finding
convenient dates for the meetings.
2. Duration and Utility
The ICJ and ITLOS Rules stipulate that oral statements shall be ‘succinct’ and ‘directed to the
issues that still divide the parties’.193 In the period under review, the duration of oral hearings
has been a mean average of 12 hours in preliminary objections/jurisdiction cases and 26 hours
in merits cases; at the Tribunal, the duration has averaged 34 hours per case – a striking
difference, as there have been only 4 merits cases as opposed to 22 cases at the Court. Oral
argument may usefully be forgone in certain cases, particularly for incidental proceedings (e.g.
– applications to intervene).
191 E.g. – Peck and Lee (eds), Increasing the Effectiveness of the International Court of Justice (1997), at 128,
142 (Highet), 148 (Crawford); United Nations Institute for Training and Research, A Dialogue at the Court/Un
dialogue à la Cour (2006), at 20-25; Miron, ‘Working Methods of the Court’, 7 Journal of International Dispute
Settlement (2016), 371-394; Cot, ‘The bar’ in Bannelier et al., The ICJ and the Evolution of International Law:
The enduring impact of the Corfu Channel case (2012), 21-38; Quintana, Litigation at the International Court of
Justice: Practice and Procedure (2014), at 359; Shaw, Rosenne’s Law and Practice of the International Court
1920-2015 (2016)(Vol. III), at 1325-1328; Oda, ‘The International Court of Justice Viewed from the Bench’, 244
Recueil des cours (1993), online at: <http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/the-hague-academy-collected-
courses/*-ej.9789041100870.009_190>, at 119; Pellet, ‘Remarques sur l’(in)efficacité de la Cour internationale
de justice et d’autres jurictions [sic.] internationales’ in Badinter et al., Liber amicorum Jean-Pierre Cot (2009),
193-213, at 208. 192 E.g. – ICJ Practice Direction X. 193 ICJ Rules Art 60. Also ICJ Practice Direction VI. See also Art 75 of the ITLOS Rules.
34
The Counsel Survey shows broad support for more dynamism in the oral hearings and greater
use of Article 61 of the Rules to indicate issues to counsel prior to and/or during the course of
hearings.194 The effectiveness of this measure depends on the ability of the Court to compose
a list of precise topics; while the communication of questions after initial deliberations by the
Tribunal has informed the presentations of the parties, it has been of marginal value as it has
not framed the debate in the hearings. One reason is timing: the initial deliberations are held
shortly before the hearings, by which time the parties’ presentations are already prepared.
To improve the utility of the hearings, the Committee proposes that Article 1 of the Resolution
on Internal Judicial Practice be amended to specify that the initial deliberations be held within
a certain period, e.g. no later than four weeks, after the termination of the written phase; Article
1(1) should also be amended to specify that ‘a deliberation’ should be held within a certain
period, e.g. two weeks after the termination of the written proceedings. The President, duly
informed, would then hold the case management conference within the stipulated period, in
which he/she would consult the parties regarding a list of issues.
Thereafter, the ICJ would decide by order the list of issues and speaking-times alongside other
procedural matters: rather than present independently-prepared, holistic sets of submissions
delegation-by-delegation in the current two-round structure, counsel would plead sequentially
and issue-by-issue. Legal teams could be provided with ‘reserved time’ for the presentation of
arguments (e.g. – rebuttals) developed during the course of the hearings. This approach would
inculcate focus and conversation in pleading, particularly sensible agreements and concessions.
This restructuring of the hearings would also enable the interrogation of witnesses at the outset
of the hearings.195
The Committee proposes that this method of organisation of the oral hearings be piloted in
judicial practice in order to determine its usefulness relative to the traditional approach. Since
this is a matter to be decided in judicial practice, the Court may hold traditional holisitic sets
of pleadings where it finds that the circumstances of the case so require. It is also to be reminded
that the parties may jointly so propose to the Court.196 The part-time character of the Tribunal
calls for a stronger formal role for the President, as the sole full-time judge.
The Committee accordingly recommends that Article 75(1) of the Rules be amended to
empower the President, following consultation with the Tribunal (e.g. – conference call) in the
initial deliberations, to order a common structure of issues for the hearings. Article 68 of the
Rules should also be amended to enact a time-limit, e.g. four weeks, following the closure of
the written phase for the deliberations.197
3. Virtual Hearings
Whereas the conduct of case management conferences and deliberations using virtual
technology has been a regular practice, virtual hearings in place of face-to-face hearings have
been rare outside of investor-State arbitration.198 In consequence of the disruption to travel and
face-to-face working practices caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, certain international courts
and tribunals have resorted to enable cases to proceed. There have hitherto been three novel
aspects of virtual hearings: 1) most of the participants in the hearings, as opposed to some,
194 Crawford and Keene, supra note 48, at 226, 228. 195 Section II(L)(2), infra. 196 ICJ Rules Art 101; ITLOS Rules Art 48. 197 Paragraph 2(1) of the Resolution on Internal Judicial Practice would also need to be amended to bring forward
the current deadline of five weeks for judicial notes (e.g. – to two weeks). 198 In 2019, sixty percent of the two hundred hearings and sessions organised by ICSID were held by video-
conference – ICSID News Release, ‘A Brief Guide to Online Hearings at ICSID’ (24 March 2020),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/News.aspx?CID=362.
35
participate virtually; 2) restrictions upon international travel constraining the ability of teams
to collaborate face-to-face under control measures; 3) the virtual taking of testimonial evidence.
Whilst virtual hearings do not in themselves raise procedural issues that are unique, they
amplify the importance of certain issues in virtue of the working methods necessarily
employed. To ensure procedural fairness in pandemic conditions, a consideration may be the
equality of arms, such as the ability of one team relatively concentrated in a single jurisdiction
or time zone to be able effectively to prepare and to collaborate as opposed to another team
that is dispersed. In deciding whether to opt for a virtual hearing, a consideration is the number
and category of participants; for example, three versus fifteen members of a panel, the number
of counsel or interrogation of expert versus lay witnesses.
In April 2020, a three-day virtual hearing was held in a pending ICSID arbitration in which
every participant was in a separate location. In a webinar held with the arbitrators, legal teams
and Secretariat lawyers the following month, the participants concluded that ‘video hearings
work but they require various adjustments in approach in terms of preparation, pleadings,
examinations, team communications, and so forth.’199 A decision to hold hearings virtually
may be taken over the objections of a party, which may include: difficulty in organising
hearings due to time zone spreads; unavailability of necessary technology; unreliable nature of
technology; difficulty in taking instructions remotely; difficulty in working with an electronic
bundle of documents; cybersecurity risk; COVID-19 social distancing requirements for
witnesses requiring special assistance; ensuring that witnesses are not influenced in their
testimony. Tribunals may proceed over such objections through a reasoned procedural order in
which they are severally addressed, rather than opt for a long delay until some form of face-to-
face hearing become practicable.
The central role of virtual technology required not only adequate technological resources (e.g.
– audio-visual rooms) and expertise (latent participant knowledge; internet technology support)
for the institution and access to the requisite technology for the participants but also investment
in time to familiarise each of the participants with the selected tools in preparation for the
hearing (e.g. – practice sessions). The ease and convenience of the platform interface as well
as its capacity to accommodate participant numbers, share documents and the strength of
participants’ internet connexions are important factors. A platform feature that is important for
international adjudication and arbitration is simultaneous interpretation. Security is a
consideration, such as the provision of end-to-end encryption by the virtual platform. Due to
the pandemic disruption, the dissemination of documents by electronic means rather than
printed copies or USB key by courier necessitated encryption measures.
Preparation by arbitrators and counsel included not only familiarisation with the virtual
platforms to be used but also provision and proficiency with necessary equipment, such as
headphones, adequate internet connexion (e.g. – by ethernet cable) and microphone. The use
of screens was a consideration with three screens recommended as an optimal solution, one for
the video, one for the documents and one for the transcript. Scheduling necessitated sensitivity
to the time zones of the various participants (in that case, a seven-hour range) and compromise
by individuals in terms of personal inconvenience. For example, a six-hour working day
commencing at 0700 hours for the GMT-5 time zone and concluding at 2000 hours for the
GMT+2 time zone.
The ICJ announced on 23 April 2020 that it had arranged for the use of virtual meetings and
other adjustments to working methods to enable remote working during the pandemic,
199 ‘Webinar: The Art and Science of a Virtual Hearing’ (5 May 2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xroz4e8Ctv0&feature=youtu.be at 2:30 (McGill).
36
including its first virtual plenary meeting,200 On 25 June, the Court amended Articles 59 and
94 of its Rules of Procedure to clarify that the Court may decide for health, security or other
compelling reasons to hold a hearing or to deliver a judgment partly or entirely by video link.201
On 30 June, the Court held its first virtual hearings in the Arbitral Award of 3 October 1899
Case (Guyana v. Venezuala) which was a mixed format featuring the majority of the Members
of the Court and Court personnel convening in person under control measures at the Peace
Palace, certain Members and the judge ad hoc as well as the legal teams participated remotely
by videolink.202 At the WTO, parties have thus far resisted virtual hearing, preferring to
postpone or to opt for a written exchange; however, panellists have deliberated virtually. In
certain cases, it may be an option to dispense with oral hearings or to deliberate in writing.203
In light of the nascent character of the practice of virtual hearings, the Committee neither adopts
a view concerning its merits or demerits nor proposes any measures with respect to it. Rather,
the Committee acknowledges the importance and complexity of this emerging practice, which
impacts upon a potentially broad range of procedural issues. While parties to disputes, legal
teams and international courts and tribunals continue to adapt to the changed environment, the
opportunity arises to experiment with new working methods.
M. External Professional Activities of Judges
A practice that has given rise to controversy in recent years has been the acceptance by
Members of the ICJ of appointments as investment arbitrators.204 The Committee opines that
appointments as arbitrator, alongside other forms of work whether gainful or not such as
academic lectures, constitute a ‘professional activity’ per Article 16 of the ICJ Statute. In
October 2018, the President of the ICJ announced that Court Members will normally not accept
arbitration appointments, with an exceptional possibility to take on one interstate arbitration
case upon authorization. 205 For the reasons given in its Interim Report, the Committee
commends this resolution, and recommends its codification in the Resolution on Internal
Judicial Practice.
These considerations do not apply in the same way to ITLOS judges, save for the President, as
they are part-time and not subject to the same statutory restrictions upon professional activity.
Nonetheless, the Committee advocate that ITLOS judges not undertake investment or
commercial arbitration appointments. By contrast, participation by ITLOS judges in inter-State
arbitrations may be allowed for the same reason and under the same terms as indicated above
with respect to ICJ judges. In particular, limited participation by ITLOS judges in UNCLOS
Annex VII arbitrations should be allowed, as it constitutes part of the UNCLOS dispute
settlement system. Scheduling conflicts, which have already occurred in at least one
200 ICJ Press Release No. 2020/11 (‘The Court adopts measures to ensure the continued fulfilment of its mandate
during the COVID-19 pandemic’). 201 ICJ Press Release No. 2020/16 (‘Rules of Court regarding hearings and reading of Judgmetns by video link’). 202 Arbitral Award of 3 October 1899 (Guyana v. Venezuela) – Public hearing on the question of the jurisdiction
of the Court (by video link)(30 June 2020), https://icj-cij.org/en/multimedia/5efb0f63045e586fcd737cea. 203 E.g. – ECHR Press Release 111 (2020)(‘The functioning of the Court during the period of confinement’);
Request no. P16-2019-001, Advisory Opinion Requested by the Armenian Constitutional Court (Grand Chamber,
29 May 2020), para 10. 204 E.g. – Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Brauch, ‘Is ‘Moonlighting’ a Problem? The role of ICJ judges in ISDS’,
International Institute for Sustainable Development (November 2017),
https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/icj-judges-isds-commentary.pdf. The net annual salary of ICJ
judges (omitting ancillary benefits) for the 2015 calendar year was 205,435€ or $228,687. Arbitrator fees can be
$3000 per day in ICSID arbitration or 500-700€ per hour in inter-State arbitration 205 ‘Speech by H.E. Mr. Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, President of the International Court of Justice, on the Occasion of
the Seventy-Third Session of the United Nations General Assembly’ (25 October 2018), https://www.icj-
cij.org/files/press-releases/0/000-20181025-PRE-02-00-EN.pdf, 11-12.
37
occasion,206 should be avoided, by limiting the number of arbitrations on which an ITLOS
judge could sit to one arbitration at any one time to reduce the risk of disruption to the duties
of the ITLOS (e.g. – applications for provisional measures and prompt release) from Members
being unavailable due to service on an arbitration.
III. Objections to Jurisdiction or Admissibility
Objections to jurisdiction or admissibility are commonplace in international legal proceedings,
and there is ample practice before the ICJ, ITLOS and arbitral tribunals, upon which the
Committee can draw to make its recommendations. While not expressly regulated, they are
common in WTO panel proceedings; in this respect, the Committee has explored the potential
of adopting procedures developed in other fora.
Whereas the scope for objections to jurisdiction or admissibility in inter-State arbitration is
theoretically reduced when parties arbitrate by special agreement, the possibility nonetheless
remains,207 particularly with respect to the admissibility of claims. Arbitration initiated by
application pursuant to a compromissory clause, such as Article 286 UNCLOS, also features
full scope for objections to jurisdiction or admissibility and bifurcation requests, including by
applicants.208
A. Objections to Jurisdiction or Admissibility in WTO Panel Proceedings
In WTO panel proceedings, parties often raise preliminary objections to the panel’s jurisdiction
and other issues of preliminary character, especially alleging the inclusion of claims or
measures that were not the subject of consultations and the lack of clarity regarding the
challenged measures. The DSU does not regulate this contingency.209 The panels’ ad hoc
regulation of preliminary objections, sometimes included in the working procedures, can raise
concerns ‘related to the content of the claims put forward, the timing of addressing the
preliminary rulings, the level of transparency, and third-party rights. Moreover, the usage of
preliminary ruling procedures in the absence of any guidance can have systemic implications,
such as harming the efficiency of panel proceedings, limiting the third-party rights and
transparency for systemic issues.’210
Panels’ working procedures, when they govern the issue, are open-ended: normally they do not
determine what the panel must do or cannot do, only what it may decide – for instance
bifurcating the proceedings or adjusting the chronology of submissions and meetings.211
The available practice is sufficient to extract some general guidelines for the procedure (a
single round of written submissions, no right to a dedicated hearing) that could be routinely
embedded in the working procedures, unless the parties opt for something different. The
working procedures often allow panels to issue preliminary rulings as early as possible, but
206 It appears that the ITLOS postponed the hearings for the provisional measures in the San Padre Pio case, to
allow a judge to sit in the hearings of the Annex VII tribunal in Coastal State Rights case. 207 E.g. – the parties might agree to bifurcate the proceedings in the Arbitration Agreement – Eritrea v. Yemen,
supra note 37, Award in the First Stage (9 October 1998), para 7. 208 E.g. – Arctic Sunrise (n 20) Award on Jurisdiction (26 November 2014), para 41. 209 This regulatory gap has been noted by the membership, DDG Jara and the adjudicators. See Minutes of
Meeting, Dispute Settlement Body, WT/DSB/M/328 (28 January 2013); Enhancing the efficiency of the panel
process at the WTO? A progress report on informal consultations – chapter 2’, 26 September 2013, available at
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/ddg_26sep13_e.htm; Colombia – Ports of Entry, WT/DS366/R,
Panel Report, para 7.13; Argentina – Import Measures, WT/DS438/R, WT/DS444/R, WT/DS445/R, Annex D-2
to Panel Report, para 3.14. 210 Malacrida Marceau (n 101) 66 211 Canada - Measures Concerning Trade in Commercial Aircraft, WT/DS522/14, Working Procedures of 8
March 2018, Art 4.1.
38
provide the reasoning at a later stage, e.g., as part of the Interim Report. This might contribute
to overall efficiency and guidance for future cases, but the succumbing party is left without
reasons until the end of the proceedings. Procedural deadlines, publicity,212 the rights afforded
to third parties,213 the content of the request: the parties and panels could regulate these
contingencies in advance before a preliminary question is raised in the proceedings.
A further specific problem may occur in cases involving the alleged violation of the Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement). Annex V to the SCM
Agreement provides for a special procedure, aimed at gathering information concerning the
requirement of ‘serious prejudice’ caused by a subsidy. This fact-gathering exercise is carried
out by a ‘facilitator’ in advance of the panel’s establishment, and must be concluded in 60
days.214 If the responding party does not cooperate with the facilitator, the panel ‘should draw
adverse inferences’ from its conduct.215 However, the responding party might have objections
to the panel’s jurisdiction and, therefore, refuse to cooperate with the facilitator for that reason.
In turn, the facilitator would have to close its mandate without having obtained any
information.216 The Committee recommends panels to explore and establish special procedures
allowing for the suspension or postponement of the Annex V procedure, to coordinate with the
lodging of objections to jurisdiction or admissibility.217
B. Bifurcation
Bifurcation is granted as a matter of course in ICJ and ITLOS proceedings. In inter-state arbitral
proceedings too, in principle the tribunal could order that jurisdiction and merits be pleaded
together. However, in practice the application of the objecting party to have the issue of
jurisdiction or admissibility examined preliminarily insofar as possible is typically granted.
The Committee reviewed the opportunity of this trend, and made recommendations on the
procedural timeframe of proceedings in which procedural objections are raised.
On 21 October 2019, the ICJ amended with immediate effect, inter alia, Article 79 of the Rules
of Procedure ‘as part of the ongoing review of its procedures and working methods’.218 Article
79 has been rearranged into three provisions ‘in order to distinguish provisions relating to
212 See Canada’s proposal on behalf of the ‘endorsing WTO members’ that share the best practices,
JOB/DSB/1/Add.10 of 10 July 2017, ‘Publication of working procedures, timetables, working schedules, and
preliminary or procedural rulings.’ 213 US – Large Civil Aircraft (second complaint) (Article 21.5-EU), Communication regarding third party rights
supra note 126. 214 See Annex V to the SCM, para 5: ‘The information-gathering process … shall be completed within 60 days of
the date on which the matter has been referred to the DSB.’ 215 Ibid., para 7. 216 Canada – Measures Concerning Trade in Commercial Aircraft, WT/DS522/11, Communication from the
Annex V Facilitator: ‘It should be noted that the Panel was only composed on 6 February 2018, i.e. more than
three months after the designation of the Facilitator and the launch of the Annex V procedures and more time will
be needed for the Panel to issue its preliminary ruling. By suspending the information-gathering process, I would
have compromised the ‘timely development of the information’ required by Paragraph 4 of Annex V. On the other
hand, if I decline to grant the request and the respondent maintains its position, the result contemplated in
paragraph 4 cannot be achieved either, because a crucial part of the information ‘necessary to facilitate expeditious
subsequent multilateral review of the dispute’ will be missing.’ 217 E.g.– US – Large Civil Aircraft (second complaint) (Article 21.5-EU), WT/DS353, Preliminary Rulings and
Decision regarding information-gathering under Article 13 of the DSU, dated 26 November 2012, Annex E-1
where the compliance panel ruled that an Annex V procedure had been initated in the compliance proceedings,
but in light of the complainant’s request and with the agreement of the respondent, the panel instead initated an
information-gathering process under Article 13 of the DSU that would seek to replicate, as far as possible, the
Annex V process that would have been applicable. 218 ICJ Press Release No. 2019/42 (‘Amendments to the Rules of Court’).
39
‘preliminary questions’ identified by the Court from those relating to ‘preliminary objections’
filed by a party to the case.’219 The new Article 79(1) provides:
‘Following the submission of the application and after the President has met and
consulted with the parties, the Court may decide, if the circumstances so warrant, that
questions concerning its jurisdiction or the admissibility of the application shall be
determined separately.’
The new Article 79bis(1) states:
‘When the Court has not taken any decision under Article 79, an objection by the
respondent to the jurisdiction of the Court or to the admissibility of the application, or
other objection the decision upon which is requested before any further proceedings on
the merits, shall be made in writing as soon as possible, and not later than three months
after the delivery of the Memorial. Any such objection made by a party other than the
respondent shall be filed within the time-limit fixed for the delivery of that party’s first
pleading.’
Article 79bis(4) requires the Court to ‘give effect to any agreement between the parties that an
objection submitted under paragraph 1 be heard and determined within the framework of the
merits.’ Under Article 79bis(3) and 79ter(2), upon receipt of a preliminary objection, the other
party submits a written statement of its observations following which any further proceedings
is oral unless otherwise decided by the Court. By Article 79ter(4), the Court retains the options
to uphold, reject or declare that an objection does not have exclusively preliminary character.
The Committee welcomes the decision to codify the practice of considering the question of
bifurcation at the first case management conference. However, the retention of the existing
time-limit of three months after delivery of the Memorial is regrettable. To realise the key
benefit of bifurcation – namely, economy of time – the Committee recommends that the ICJ
amend Article 79bis(1) to adopt the ITLOS time-limit of ninety days from the filing of the
application. To address the potential anxiety of respondents that the content of the application
may not be sufficiently developed to enable them to grasp the essence of the case, the President
of the Court could address this matter in the first case management conference and order
applicants to provide information or clarification as necessary.
Whereas the Committee supports the retention of the traditional sequence of filing of pleadings
for preliminary objections of respondents followed by applicants, the sequence could also be
usefully specified in Article 79(2) for preliminary questions. While this order could be the
requesting State followed by the other State when requested unilaterally, in cases of agreement
to bifurcate, the sequence could be decided by the drawing of lots when the Parties disagree.
The presumption in Article 79ter(2) that a single round of written pleadings will be followed
by oral hearings is a useful one, though the Committee would prefer the deletion of the clause
‘unless otherwise decided by the Court’. This is because it could be used to invert the
presumption of a single round of written pleadings to revert to two rounds, as has occurred to
frustrate previous reforms in 1972 and 2001 intended to improve procedural economy.
The Committee proposes that Articles 79ter of the ICJ Rules and 97 of the ITLOS Rules be
amended to codify the practice of ‘pleas in bar’220 which could serve as a backstop option for
219 Ibid. 220 E.g. – Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) (Merits) (Judgment) [2004]
ICJ Rep. 12, at 28-29 (paras 22-24), Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Sepúlveda (at 100-101). See also
Application of the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (Merits) (Judgment) [2007] ICJ Rep. 43, at 84-85 (paras 101-102), 94-
40
respondents to raise objections to jurisdiction or admissibility in response to events arising after
the preliminary objections phase.221 In such cases, objections to jurisdiction or admissibility
could be raised after the expiry of the time-limit for preliminary objections no later than the
counter-memorial on the merits; these would automatically be joined to the merits, thus
precluding unnecessary delay.
In inter-state arbitration, the time-limit and criteria for bifurcation have been obscure in
practice; 222 the Committee therefore recommends that the PCA amend Article 23 of the
Arbitration Rules as well as Sample Procedural Order No. 1 to specify that requests to bifurcate
be submitted no later than ninety days from the constitution of the arbitral tribunal with
bifurcated proceedings on jurisdiction and admissibility to feature a single round of written
pleadings followed by oral argument, if necessary. The Committee also suggests that arbitral
tribunals include such a provision in their first procedural orders containing the rules of
procedure. Moreover, the Committee recommends that, unless the parties decide otherwise, the
decision on bifurcation be handed down before the deadline for the submission of the
respondent’s counter-memorial on the merits. An instance of this good practice is the procedure
designed by the Coastal State Rights tribunal,223 which suspended the proceedings on the
merits and provided for a quick succession of procedural deadlines for the exchange of
submissions on jurisdiction.224
In WTO panel proceedings, the rules provide no guidance on bifurcation when the parties fail
to agree.225 Only rarely do panels grant a dedicated hearing for the discussion of preliminary
issues, even if the most common objections (on the panel’s mandate and the inclusion of claims
in the terms of reference) lend themselves to preliminary resolution.226 Panels have noted that
‘there is no established jurisprudence nor is there any established practice as to whether a panel
needs to rule on the scope of its terms of reference on a preliminary basis, i.e. before the
issuance of its Report to the parties.’227 Panels, of course, have occasionally provided reasons
of efficiency to support the decision to rule on a jurisdictional matter preliminarily228 or not.229
Occasionally, panels refuse to rule on a objections to jurisdiction or admissibility preliminarily,
not because the decision is better made after reviewing the full case, but because the hearing
on the merits might elucidate the terms of reference.230 This approach is objectionable in that
it appears to grant the possibility to cure retroactively a jurisdictional defect.231 Instead, the
planning of a round of submissions and possibly a hearing dedicated to the discussion of the
objections to jurisdiction or admissibility could be preferable. The Committee recommends
97 (paras 124-129); Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1992 (The Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia v. Greece) (Order of 12 March 2010) [2010] ICJ Rep. 11, at 12. 221 E.g. – the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution, as in the Lockerbie Cases, note 137, supra. 222 E.g. – Detention of the Ukrainian Vessel, infra note 256, Procedural Order No. 1 (22 November 2019), Art 5. 223 Coastal State Rights, Rules of Procedure of 18 May 2017, Art 10, in particular paras 5 and 6. 224 In particular, the applicant would have three months to respond to the preliminary objections, then respondent
and applicant would have two months each, successively, for further submissions. 225 Conversely, in case Canada - Commercial Aircraft, WT/DS522/12, Brazil did not object to Canada’s request
that its preliminary questions be answered before the filing of the written submissions. 226 Canada – Aircraft above, WT/DS522/R, Panel Report, para 9.33 (referring to EC –Bananas III and EC –
Computer Equipment). 227 China – Raw Materials, WT/DS394/9; WT/DS395/9; WT/DS398/8, Communication of 18 May 2010, fn 45. 228 Mexico – Soft Drinks, WT/DS308/R, Panel Report, para 7.2; China – Electronic Payment Services,
WT/DS413/4, Preliminary Ruling. 229 EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), WT/DS141/RW, Panel Report, para 6.8. 230 Colombia – Ports of Entry, WT/DS366/R, Panel Report, para 7.14 231 The concern was raised also by the Appellate Body in China – Raw Materials, WT/DS394/AB/R;
WT/DS395/AB/R; WT/DS398/AB/R, Appellate Body Report, para 233.
41
panels to evaluate in each case whether bifurcation should be granted, with a suspension or an
extension of the timetable for the pleadings on the main case.232
IV. Evidence
Evidentiary matters, which attracted the most responses in the Counsel Survey,233 feature a high
degree of commonality across the jurisdictions, as far as the practicalities are concerned. Inter-
State courts and tribunals have developed various techniques to address these problems, and
comparison between them is facilitated by the relative similarity of their statutory texts and the
lack of documents codifying the law on evidence at the international level.234 This section
addresses the working practices for the handling of evidence rather than the evaluation of fact
(e.g. – burden of proof; standard of proof), thus sees less differentiation in the recommendations
of the Committee for the respective courts and tribunals.
A. Documentary Evidence
1. Requests for Evidence
Though documents are the principal category of evidence, they are not defined in the statutes
of any inter-State court or tribunal. There is no process of ‘discovery’ or of document
production before international jurisdictions; the only way for a party to request a document is
an ‘indirect discovery’, i.e. lodging a request to the adjudicator, a method piloted by Italy in
the ELSI Case before the ICJ.235 This system and its regulation are the object of debate.236
The Committee proposes the adoption of an ‘indirect discovery’ procedure through amendment
of the relevant ICJ and ITLOS Rules 237 and drafting of the rules of procedure for each
arbitration dispute,238 whereby parties could submit requests for documents to the Court or
Tribunal, to be filtered and transmitted by the Court or the Tribunal. Criteria could accordingly
be specified239 to direct the legal teams to keep requests brief, coherent and relevant. Requests
for documents should be presented shortly after the submission of the Counter-Memorial. The
same mechanism could be adopted in Article 27(3) of the PCA Rules and could be explored
and incorporated in the working procedures by WTO panels.
The governing principle in the evaluation of document requests should be the ‘premise of co-
operation of the litigating parties’ in the provision of evidence. 240 As so-called ‘fishing
expeditions’ must be avoided, parties could be encouraged to submit to one another and to the
232 Dominican Republic – Safeguard Measures, WT/DS415/R; WT/DS416/R; WT/DS417/R; WT/DS418/R,
Panel Report, para 1.11. 233 Crawford and Keene, supra note 48, at 226. 234 International Law Commission, Report on the work of the sixty-ninth session (2017), document A/72/10, see
report of Aniruddha Rajput on Evidence before international courts and tribunals, 242 ff. 235 ICJ Statute Art 49; ICJ Rules Art 62; Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy)
(Judgment) [1989] ICJ Rep. 15, at 26 (para 19). See also ITLOS Rules Art 77(1); The M/V Louisa Case, supra
note 183, at paras 36-37 for an instance of documents requested by the Tribunal ex proprio motu. 236 E.g. – Bosnia Genocide Case, supra note 220, at 129 (para 206); Dissenting Opinions of Judge al-Khasawneh
(at 254-255) and Judge ad hoc Mathiou (at 415-421); Avena, supra note 220, at 41-42 (para 57). 237 Art 62 of the ICJ Rules and Art 77 of the ITLOS Rules. 238 For instance, see Coastal State Rights, Rules of Procedure, Art 15.4. 239 E.g. – International Bar Association Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration (29 May
2010), Art 3(3). In Russia – Commercial Vehicles, WT/DS479/AB/R, Appellate Body Report, paras 5.131-5.134,
the WTO Appellate Body confirmed that ‘it could “conceive of circumstances in which a party [could not]
reasonably be expected to meet [the] burden [of adducing evidence in support of its claims or defences] by
adducing all relevant evidence required to make out its case, most notably when that information is in the exclusive
possession of the opposing or a third party.” In such circumstances, a panel may have to seek out that information
in order to make an objective assessment of the matter under Article 11 of the DSU.’ 240 E.g. – Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, WT/DS56/R, Panel Report, paras 6.40, 6.58: ‘parties do have a duty
to collaborate in doing their best to submit to the adjudicatory body all the evidence in their possession.’
42
adjudicators lists containing specific requests for documents believed to be in the possession
of the other party.
2. Confidentiality
Parties have invoked relevance, national secrecy or legal professional privilege as grounds to
not disclose or supply documents.241 Recent arbitral practice has featured differing approaches
to the problem – entrusting with an expert, the panel, or the President alone the scrutiny of
embargoed documents.242 The practice in WTO panel proceedings has also produced pertinent
practice.243
The Committee proposes the adoption (in the Articles 62 of the ICJ Rules and 77 of the ITLOS
Rules, or in the applicable procedural rules for arbitral tribunals or WTO panels) of a procedure
for the evaluation of requests by parties not to disclose or supply documents. Each of the
approaches taken by the different tribunals in recent inter-State arbitrations offers advantages
and disadvantages, and the Committee suggests bearing them in mind while approaching
requests on a case-by-case basis.
A related, though distinct, issue is the handling of sensitive documents by the adjudicators
when the party supplies them. Arbitral tribunals and WTO panels244 have used both internal
and external security protocols, such as access restrictions and expurgated versions, to control
such documents. For example, the arbitral tribunal in the Coastal State Rights Arbitration
issued a procedural order that included a precise definition of confidential information245 as
well as a process whereby a party might designate information as confidential, subject to
potential challenge by another party.
Detailed provision was also made concerning accessibility to confidential information, hearing
transcripts as well as awards and orders. 246 Confidentiality extends to use outside of the
241 A party’s designation of some information as confidential might entail the need to hold an entire section of the
hearing in camera. Recently, this arrangement was used before the ITLOS – Case No. 24 The ‘Enrica Lexie’
Incident (Italy v. India), Provisional Measures, ITLOS/PV.15/C24/2/Rev.1 (10 August 2015). See further the
approach of the Arbitral Tribunal in PCA Case No. 2015-28 The ‘Enrica Lexie’ Incident (Italy v. India), Rules of
Procedure (19 January 2016), Art 23.3; Procedural Order No. 7 (16 May 2019), Art 23.5. 242 Guyana v. Suriname, supra note 37, Award (17 September 2007), paras 16-20, 24-36, 44-47; PCA Case No.
2011-03 Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. United Kingdom), Award (18 March 2015), at
paras 35-49; PCA Case No. 2011-01 Indus Waters Kishenanga (Pakistan v. India), Partial Award (18 February
2013), paras 89-104; PCA Case No. 2017-16 Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov and Kerch Strait
(Ukraine v. Russia), Procedural Order No. 2 Regarding Confidentiality (18 January 2018). See also ITLOS Case
No. 23 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana
v. Côte d’Ivoire), Judgment of 23 September 2017, paras 21-23. 243 US – Large Civil Aircraft (second complaint) (Article 21.5 – EU), Decision regarding requests for certain
information, dated 23 October 2013, Annex F-1 to Panel Report, para 2.18: ‘a panel should exercise its authority
to request such information with some degree of circumspection, taking due account of domestic laws restricting
or preventing its production as part of its assessment of the difficulty faced by a Member.’ 244 EC – Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316, Additional Working Procedures for the Protection of Business
Confidential Information and Highly Sensitive Business Information, Annex E to the Panel Report. These
procedures restrict access to BCI and HSBI information to panel members, specified Secretariat staff, and
specified persons designated by the parties (representatives and outside advisors) and third parties (for BCI only).
The panel decides on contested designations. See also US – Large Civil Aircraft (second complaint), WT/DS353,
Additional Working Procedures for the Protection of BCI and HSBI, Annex D-2. 245 Coastal State Rights (n 242), Procedural Order No. 2, Rule A(1): ‘Confidential Information’ is defined as
information that either party considers confidential on one of the following grounds’: (a) commercial or technical
confidentiality; (b) special political or institutional sensitivity (including information that has been classified as
secret by a government or a public international institution); (c) information in relation to which a Party owes an
obligation of confidence to a third party; (d) personal data.’ This definition differed from the UNCITRAL Rules
on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration 2014, Art 7(2). 246 Ibid., Rules A.3-A.4.
43
proceedings, such as in other dispute settlement fora.247 The Tribunal also introduced the
category of ‘Restricted Information,’ the disclosure of which ‘seriously affect[s] a Party’s
national interests’ giving rise to ‘a real risk of material prejudice’ thereto.248 Treatment of such
information in the written phase and the hearings, as well as its disclosure to the Tribunal and
the other party, are regulated strictly according to the modalities decided by the Tribunal in
each instance.249
In the WTO, the panel in Canada – Commercial Aircraft agreed to the parties’ request that it
establish additional working procedures on BCI and Highly Sensitive Business Information
(HSBI).250 The system provided for special procedures to access BCI and HSBI information,251
and for a list of information that, alternatively, was deemed either BCI or HSBI, or neither.
The regulation of business confidential and secret information, especially in cases involving
trade remedies, is usually the subject of ad hoc working procedures adopted by the panels.252
In the course of work at the DSB secial session, the DSB produced a draft decision requiring
the Secretariat to publish all decisions relating to the protection of ‘strictly confidential
information’ (SCI).253
More in general, BCI has been the subject of a specific multilateral effort. It is important to
grant ‘assurance to individuals or entities providing BCI that their information will be used by
those authorized to access the information (i.e. the panel, the Appellate Body, the arbitrator,
the WTO Secretariat, the parties and the third parties) only for the purposes of the proceedings
in which the information has been submitted or forms part of the record.’254 The membership
did not agree on a specific recommended text. For this reason, the proposed DSB decision to
publish all past working procedures relating to the confidentiality of information was designed
to offer to parties and individuals and panelists the full range of possible safeguards, from
which to draw the specific provisions most adequate to each specific case. Critically, the DSB
Special Session Chair proposed an amendment to Article 18.3 DSU, which would make it a
requirement for the panel to adopt special procedures for the protection of SCI, upon request
by a party. In practice most panels using working procedures for confidential information
follow the same provisions.
247 Ibid., Rule A.5. In WTO panel proceedings, third parties obtain the first written submissions of the parties –
DSU Art 10(3). Panels may extend their rights of participation in individual cases. See above in section II.E.4. 248 Rule B.1. 249 Rule B.2: ‘Following receipt of a pleading containing information that is designated as Restricted Information,
the Arbitral Tribunal, after ascertaining the views of the Parties, shall decide the modalities of treating such
Restricted Information, including the extent to which it shall be made available to the Arbitral Tribunal or the
other Party. In the event that either Party intends to rely on Restricted Information at the hearing, that Party shall
notify the Arbitral Tribunal and the other Party at least 30 days prior to the hearing. The Arbitral Tribunal, after
ascertaining the views of the Parties, shall decide the modalities for the use and protection of such Restricted
Information at the hearing.’ 250Canada – Commercial Aircraft, WT/DS522/12, Procedures for the Protection of BCI and HSBI. Information
can be designated as BCI or HSBI when, respectively, its disclosure might cause harm or exceptional harm to the
originators. In that dispute, the special regime covered also the information provided by the businesses to the
Facilitator appointed under Annex V of the SCM Agreement. 251 Including the designation of special sites where the information is stored, special persons entitled to access it,
special rules of redaction referring to written or oral information, the use of stand-alone computers (unconnected)
or even sealed computers, etc. 252 For an extensive discussion on the topic, Cook supra note 105. 253 See draft decision in Coly’s report supra note 70 para 1.23-1.24. 254 Coly’s report supra note 70 para 2.51.
44
The CAFTA-DR trade agreement also contains innovative provisions regarding the treatment
of confidential information.255 These rules operate in the framework of public proceedings,
with open hearings 256 and public party submissions. 257 They are designed to temper the
openness of the proceedings to public scrutiny rather than to enable the Parties to withhold
information. Each Party must appoint ‘approved persons’ who are authorised to view
confidential information.258 The Parties and the Tribunal may not refer to the confidential
information in their submissions and decisions but may state conclusions and positions drawn
from that information while each Party must destroy, return or keep secret for ten years the
information.259
In this context of innovative and effective arbitral practice, the Committee recommends the
adoption of provisions governing the submission and control of confidential information. The
Committee acknowledges the importance of flexible rules to address the particular sensitivities
of each case. The adoption of a template for confidentiality and restricted information akin to
the Sample Procedural Order No. 2 of the PCA260 would assist parties and arbitrators to develop
rules to suit their circumstances. Likewise, dissemination of panels’ working procedures on
these matters would foster consistency. The rules used in the Coastal State Rights Arbitration,
those of recent WTO panel proceedings and of the CAFTA-DR Trade Agreement could offer
a range of effective options enabling parties to provide confidential information with
reassurance.
In light of the ubiquitous use of internet technology for the communication of information and
the concordant risk to data security,261 the Committee suggest the adoption by the ICJ, ITLOS,
PCA and WTO panels of administrative safeguards. These might include: encryption protocols;
provision to adjudicators of configured equipment with enhanced security (e.g. – fingerprint or
retina-based unlocking; pre-loaded documents); secure servers for the storage of electronic
documents; printed copies of documents stored in secured rooms with security protocols.262
3. Provenance
There are no pre-determined rules establishing the inadmissibility of evidence on grounds of
the irregularity or illegality of its origin, not of allegedly false documents.263 The admissibility
of published material has gained recent prominence in light of the Wikileaks phenomenon, as
255 Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement 2012, Annex 1 (‘Rules of Procedure for Chapter
Twenty’), Rule 15. The Model Procedural Rules defines it as ‘any sensitive factual information that is not available
in the public domain’ and for which one party has requested confidential treatment (Rule 15). 256 Ibid., Rule 40. Contra PCA Case no. 2019-28 Dispute Concerning the Detention of Ukrainian Naval Vessels
and Servicemen (Ukraine v. Russia), Rules of Procedure (22 November 2019), Art 28. 257 Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement 2012, Annex 1, Rule 13. 258 Ibid., Appendix 1. 259 Ibid., Appendix 2, Rules 4, 6-7. 260 Daly et al., supra note 39, 254. 261 Section II(J)(7), supra. The WTO is piloting a secure e-filing system which could serve as model for other
institutions. 262 See, e.g. – International Chamber of Commerce Commission Report, Managing E-Document Production
(2012), at https://www.iccwbo.be/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/20120516-Managing-e-document-Report.pdf, 263 Maritime and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahrain), ‘Interim Report Submitted by the State of Qatar’ (30
September 1998), at para 14; (Merits) (Judgment) [2001] ICJ Rep. 40, Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Fortier,
at 432 (para 6); Rights of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), CR 23 September 1959 (Morning) in
Oral Arguments and Documents, Vol. V, at 358; Lehigh Valley Railroad Company Case (No 3) [1932] 8 UNRIAA
at 121; Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906 (Honduras v. Nicaragua) (Pleadings)
(Vol. II) [1960] ICJ Rep. 1, at 164-165; The M/V Louisa Case, supra note 183, at paras 36-37, Separate Opinion
of Judge Cot, at paras 67-79.
45
in the Chagos Islands Arbitration.264 In the Seizure of Certain Documents and Data Case, the
ICJ was faced not with admission into evidence of documents allegedly obtained in breach of
national or international law, but with an application for their return on grounds of title and/or
breach of legal confidentiality. 265 The underlying issue is competing policies to sanction
unlawful conduct, to make pragmatic use of documents already published and to verify the
provenance of such documents.
In the Mauritius v. UK arbitration at the PCA, Mauritius furnished as evidence a diplomatic
cable leaked through WikiLeaks. 266 The tribunal pointed out that it did not consider it
‘appropriate to place weight on a record of such provenance.’267 In so doing, the tribunal used
the criterion of relevance (‘weight’) rather than admissibility, but clarified at the same time that
a document of illicit provenance under national or international law is tamquam non esset: as
good as inexistent. The reluctance to consider prima facie inadmissible evidence obtained
illegally is endemic in international adjudication.268 The approach, in these and other cases, has
been to ignore rather than engage with the potentially unlawful nature of leaked documents.269
264 Chagos Islands supra note 242, Memorial of Mauritius at 72-73; Oral Hearing (23 April 2014), at 191, 1165;
Award, at para 542. See also ConocoPhillips v Venezuela (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30), Decision on
Respondent’s Request for Reconsideration, 10 March 2014, at paras 3, 9; Dissenting Opinion of Georges Abi-
Saab, at para 64; PCA Case No. AA 226 Hulley Enterprises Limited v. Russia, Award (18 July 2014), at paras
1185-1186; Caratube International Oil Company and Mr Devincci Saleh Hourani v Kazakhstan (ICSID Case No.
ARB/13/13), Award (27 September 2017), para 150; OPIC Karimum Corporation v Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela (ICSID Case No ARB/10/14), Decision on The Proposal to Disqualify Professor Philippe Sands (5
March 2011), paras 11 and 23; ılıç İnşaat İthalat İhracat Sanayi ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Turkmenistan (ICSID
Case No ARB/10/1), Award (2 July 2013), paras 4.1.1 and 4.3.16. 265 Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data (Provisional Measures) (Order) [2014] ICJ Rep. 147,
at 148 (para 2), 152 (para 24). 266 See Annex 2 to the Notice of Arbitration and Annex 146 to the Memorial. The document purported to show
that the marine protected area had been envisaged to prevent the islanders’ resettlement to the Chagos islands. If
proven, this circumstance could have amounted to a breach of Art 300 UNCLOS. A similar scenario occurred in
the investment arbitration cases between Yukos shareholders and the Russian Federation, and in a case between
Conoco and Venezuela. In the former case, the claimant mentioned several leaked cables, which stated that an
audit firm was put under pressure by the government to revise previous audits. The Tribunal did include the leaked
cables among the means of evidence, and relied heavily on them to characterise the treatment of
PricewaterhouseCoopers en route to the award of damages. Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian
Federation (UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA 227), Final Award of 18 July 2014, para 1223. In another case,
Venezuela sought to introduce in the proceedings a leaked cable that detailed a discussion between the Claimant
and US diplomats, which would allegedly prove the Respondent’s good faith in negotiations, and required a
reconsideration of the tribunal’s decision on grounds of decisive factual error. The majority rejected Venezuela’s
request on procedural grounds. ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V., ConocoPhillips Hamaca B.V. and
ConocoPhillips Gulf of Paria B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30), Letter to
Tribunal Regarding Decision on Jurisdiction and Merits of 8 September 2013. Abi Saab dissented, noting that any
doubt regarding the admissibility (and relevance) of the new evidence should have been put to the tribunal. Abi
Saab, Dissenting Opinion, para 29. 267 Award, para 542. 268 This apparent conflation emerges also in the speech addressed by then President Tomka on 31 October 2014
to the UN General Assemply’s Sixth Committee (http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/files/8/18398.pdf, p. 3),
juxtaposing two seemingly contradictory statements: ‘Among limited exceptions of inadmissible evidence before
the Court, unlawfully obtained proof may obviously be excluded from the purview of what is acceptable, as was
emphasized by the Court in its Corfu Channel Judgment. The Court does not use any preliminary evidentiary filter
to weed out inadmissible evidence at the outset; rather, the Court possesses a wide margin of appreciation in
ascribing different weight to different evidentiary elements originating from varied sources’. It is recognised that
the distinction between admissibility and relevance is often blurred, see Kenneth J Keith, ‘The International Court
of Justice and Criminal Justice’ (2010) 59(4) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 895-910, at 905. 269 Jessica O Ireton, ‘The Admissibility of Evidence in ICSID Arbitration: Considering the Validity of WikiLeaks
Cables as Evidence’ (2015) 30(1) ICSID Review 231-242, referring in particular to OPIC Karimum Corporation
46
Doubts remain regarding materials obtained illegally by third parties, and published widely.270
In this case, there should be a procedure available to regulate States’ attempt to use leaked
materials as ‘information in the public domain,’ possibly producing them at a later stage of the
proceedings.271 Whereas there is no explicit basis for the practice, the ICJ has often taken
judicial note of publicly available information as a matter of weight.272 Though prominent in
default cases,273 this practice is by no means not confined to them.
On how to handle illegal evidence, a helpful model to inform the practice or to draft a new rule
– could be Article 9(2) of the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence. This provision empowers
the tribunal to ‘exclude from evidence or production’ any illegal or privileged material, or
material classified as secret.274 When there is unimpeachable information about the irregular
provenance of some documents, tribunals should expressly refer to it to motivate their
exclusion or irrelevance. However, the Committee suggests the prescription of criteria for the
determination of admissibility in Articles 62 of the ICJ Rules, 77 of the ITLOS Rules and
Sample Procedural Order No. 2 of the PCA Rules. This could distinguish challenges based
upon authenticity from those grounded in illegality in terms of time-limits: the former could be
brought ‘promptly’ – immediately upon becoming aware of the potential falsehood of the
documents in question – whereas the latter could be subject to a time-limit (e.g. – one month)
after the communication of the document. Whereas the Court directed the parties in the Qatar
v. Bahrain Case to address the issues of authenticity in their pleadings on the merits, it would
be more efficacious for the parties to file concise submissions focused on admissibility of the
relevant piece of evidence within a time-limit of one-two months while the case concurrently
progresses.
For instance, the tribunal could instruct the parties to refrain from submitting evidence obtained
in other proceedings which are covered by a confidentiality agreement, unless the third party
with which the agreement was stipulated has consented and indicated the confidentiality regime
it wishes the documents to observe.275 The Committee opines that this needs development
through judicial and arbitral practice rather than legislation in the rules at this stage.
4. Refusals to Produce Evidence
Tribunals ordering a party to provide evidence, proprio motu or upon request, might face the
party’s refusal to do so.
v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (ICSID Case No ARB/10/14), Decision on The Proposal to Disqualify
Professor Philippe Sands (5 March 2011) paras 11 and 23; ılıç İnşaat İthalat İhracat Sanayi ve Ticaret Anonim
Şirketi v Turkmenistan (ICSID Case No ARB/10/1), Award of 2 July 2013, paras 4.1.1 and 4.3.16. 270 As in the example of the cables published on WikiLeaks, or the hacking of Kazakhstan’s systems that resulted
in the use of leaked documents in investment arbitration Caratube International Oil Company and Mr Devincci
Saleh Hourani v Kazakhstan (ICSID Case No. ARB/13/13). 271 See for instance Art 56(4) of the ICJ Statute and Practice Direction IXbis, paragraph 2, letters i and ii. 272Art ICJ Statute, Arts 30, 48; ITLOS Rules, Art 77(1). See also in EC – Seals, WT/DS400/, Communication of
5 February 2013 on the removal of exhibits. The EU’s request that two exhibits be removed from the record, since
they were internal confidential acts. The complainants agreed to withdraw them, sparing the panel from deciding
whether their provenance made them inadmissible (para 3.1). The US had observed that there was no basis in the
DSU to reject the evidence (para 2.6). 273 E.g. – Tehran Hostages Case, supra note 31, at 10 (para 13). 274 See letters b) and f). 275 For instance, a WTO panel decided to ‘not consider’ a preliminary ruling submitted by the claimant, which
had been issued by another panel in an ongoing case and, therefore, was confidential. See panel China – Measures
Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DSDS94/9, Communication from the panel of 18 May
2010, para 42-44.
47
Article 49(2) of the ICJ Statute provides that ‘formal note shall be taken of any refusal’ to
produce evidence unpon the Court’s request.276 The rules applicable in ITLOS proceedings are
silent. Likewise, while Article 27(3) of the PCA Rules stipulates that the arbitral tribunal may
‘require’ the parties to produce documents, no consequence of a refusal is specified. Rules and
tribunals in specific disputes occasionally mention the possibility of adverse inferences, but are
rarely applied to this effect.277 The natural, though optional, consequence of a formal note of
refusal is the drawing of (rebuttable) presumptions of fact or (conclusive) adverse inferences
against the refusing party. The ICJ has rarely exercised its Article 49 power278 and the current
framework is opaque in that parties cannot predict the consequences of a refusal; the Iran-US
Claims Tribunal and WTO panels and Appellate Body have drawn adverse inferences, if
persuaded that the documents are material and in the possession of the party.279
The Committee suggests the greater use in judicial and arbitral practice of formal notes of
refusals to produce evidence, as a logical consequence of the abovementioned call for the
greater use of requests for evidence. The Committee proposes the codification of rebuttable
presumptions of fact in Articles 62 of the ICJ Rules, 77 of the ITLOS Rules and 27 of the PCA
Rules and panel working procedures, in the event of refusals to produce requested evidence.
Unlike an adverse inference conclusively establishing a fact, the inference would be
presumptive and evidentiary: it could be displaced by rebutting evidence. Courts, tribunals and
panels would not be bound to ultimately uphold it, though they would explain their reasons for
departing from it. This would provide predictability to the mechanism and increase the
incentive to comply with sufficiently specific requests.280 Should a party produce a requested
document after the time-limit, the presumption would be removed.
B. Testimonial Evidence
Though testimonial evidence has historically not played a major role in inter-State adjudication
and arbitration, it has become increasingly prominent in the procedure of the ICJ and ITLOS.281
Procedural modalities have had to be crafted on an ad hoc basis, prompting extensive
correspondence and negotiation,282 which delay the opening of the oral phase and add to the
litigation costs. Regularisation of best practices by the Court and the Tribunal on testimonial
evidence would facilitate expeditious handling by prescribing templates and foreclosing
276 Obscurely, Art 77 of the ITLOS Rules does not replicate this sentence. 277 Abyei arbitration, Letter of 11 April 2009, quoted at para 61 of the Award of 22 July 2009. 278 E.g. – Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania) [1949] ICJ Rep. 4, at 32; Dissenting Opinions of
Judge Krylov (at 75) and Ečer (at 129). See also Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Case (Paraguay v.
United States of America), ICJ Pleadings, at 85-88 cited in Quintana, supra note 191, at 417; PCA Case No. 6
Lighthouses Arbitration (France v. Greece) 23 I.L.R. 677. 279 See for instance Abyei Arbitration (Government of Sudan v. Sudan People’s Liberation Army) (PCA Case No.
2008-07), Award (22 July 2009), para 61; Argentina – Import Measures, WT/DS438/R, Panel Report, paras 6.32-
6.36. Contra, see how the Appellate Body rejected Brazil’s grounds of appeal claiming that the panel had
erroneously failed to draw adverse inference from Canada’s failure to provide evidence, Canada – Aircraft,
WT/DS70/AB/R, Appellate Body Report, paras 202-203 and 205. The WTO SCM Agreement specifically
provides (Annex V:7) that a panel should draw adverse inferences from parties’ non-cooperation in the special
information-gathering process established by the agreement. More generally, parties refusing to provide
information based on security reasons (under GATT Art XXI(a)) might stifle the panel’s power to draw adverse
inferences, see Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit, para 7.129. 280 The WTO Appellate Body reversed the panel’s finding that the respondent had failed to prove a fact (the
precise publication date of online press releases, which mattered for its transparency obligations), because it had
not requested it with sufficient specificity. See Korea – Radionuclides, WT/DS495/AB/R, Appellate Body Report,
para 5.186: ‘to the extent the Panel considered it was necessary for it to have such evidence, it should have sought
it from both parties to the dispute and should only then have drawn appropriate inferences.’ 281 ICJ Statute Arts 43(5), 51; ICJ Rules Arts 57-58, 62-65; ITLOS Statute Art 27; ITLOS Rules Arts 78-80. 282 E.g. – Croatia Genocide Case, supra note 14, at 17-23 (paras 17-44).
48
problems. Though the Committee has made recommendations for inter-State arbitration in light
of the fact that testimonial evidence has featured in recent practice, it has omitted proposals for
the WTO in light of its rarity in WTO proceedings.283
1. Witnesses of Fact
Witnesses are normally called by parties. In light of the fact that individuals, companies and
non-governmental organisations are not able to submit amicus briefs, the Committee suggests
that the Court and Tribunal consider in judicial practice the exercise of their autonomous power
to summon witnesses where appropriate to enable such entities to provide evidence. 284
Additional procedural measures for consideration include: 1) witness security; 2) pre-
testimonial communication between counsel and witnesses; and 3) the lack of a perjury
mechanism.
In the Croatia Genocide Case, the Court adopted a number of useful security measures to
conceal witness identities; 285 in some cases, it may be necessary to adopt even stronger
measures (e.g. – anonymised video-link in a separate chamber). The Committee recommend
that this template be codified by Practice Direction.
The US and Canadian practice of ‘witness proofing’, whereby counsel engage in model
question-and-answer sessions in order to optimise the witnesses’ efficiency under questioning,
is sometimes practised by legal teams. The difficulty is the risk that counsel may, accidentally
or intentionally, contaminate the natural presentation of evidence. The Committee suggests that
its explicit discouragement by the ICJ and the ITLOS in the form of a Practice Direction, as
well as by the PCA through amendment of Sample Procedural Order No. 2, would be useful.
Legal teams using proofing in spite of this discouragement would run the risk of the weight of
the testimony being adversely affected; for example, the ICJ, ITLOS or arbitral tribunals could
ask witnesses at the outset of the interrogation whether they have conducted question-and-
answer sessions with counsel as general practice.286 In virtual hearings, this issue is exacerbated
by the prospect of pre-hearing practice sessions by counsel to familiarise witnesses with the
technology and format as well as the possibility of extemporaneous, private communication
between counsel and witnesses during the course of testimony.287
283 In fact, the absence of any examination of witnesses in WTO proceedings is probably partly due to the lack of
regulation. See Isabelle Van Damme, ‘Eight Annual WTO Conference – an Overview’ (2009) 12(1) Journal of
International Economic Law, 175, 183: ‘[d]ue to the lack of clear disciplines on evidence and the under-developed
rules on fact witnesses in the DSU and Working Procedures—including on the protection of business confidential
information—panels often remain reluctant to engage with fact witnesses, at least if it is possible to avoid hearing
them. In none of the proceedings has a panel called its own fact witnesses.’ See also Cherise Valles, ‘Different
Forms of Expert Involvement in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings’ (2018) 9(2) Journal of International
Dispute Settlement 367. WTO panels have so far limited in-person testimonial evidence to SPS cases, with
scientific experts engaged by the panel or representatives of international organizations intervening in a special
session. Their testimony, usually, is for clarification rather than for direct fact-finding. 284 E.g. – Arctic Sunrise Arbitration, supra note 20, at paras 58-60. 285 Croatia Genocide Case, supra note 14, at 22 (para 39). 286 For admonitions on contacts with witnesses that ‘could compromise their independence or breach the terms of
their solemn declaratin’, see Croatia Genocide Case, ibidem, at 20 (para 33). See also The M/V Saiga (No. 2)
Case, supra note 183, PV.99/9 (12 March 1999, 10 a.m.), at 11 (lines 10-14, 23-45), 12 (lines 12-32, 45-49), 13
(1-49), 14 (1-7); PV.99/10 (12 March 1999, 2 p.m.), at 15 (lines 1-34), 29 (5-37). 287 Potential techniques could include the use of multiple cameras in the room or devices, such as ‘Meeting Owl’,
that enable a 360º view of the room – The Art and Science of a Virtual Hearing, note 199, supra.
49
As stated in the Counsel Survey, prescription of guidance in the Practice Direction on the
content and form of witness statements would assist.288 Clarification of the modalities of
affidavits (including the consequences of acceptance of their authenticity) would be
valuable.289 As the ICJ, ITLOS and arbitral tribunals at present lack the ability to compel
witnesses, the Committee also propose that they instigate negotiation with the respective host
country to create a perjury mechanism.290 In turn, it is acknowledged that any such mechanism
might suffer from the risk of partiality (actual or perceived) if a party to the dispute is the host
State, that should supervise to its operation, of another State that has with it a close relationship.
2. Expert Witnesses and Assessors
The use of experts by adjudicators has increased and attracted interest in recent years.291 ICJ
Judges Simma and Al-Kwasawneh in their Dissenting Opinion in the case Pulp Mills pointed
to the WTO practice in SPS disputes292 as a model for ‘readily consulting outside sources in
order better to evaluate the evidence.’293 Autonomous and efficient fact-fanding can assist
adjudicators.
There have hitherto been three methods by which experts may appear before the ICJ: 1) as
‘technical’ or ‘scientific’ counsel in the parties’ legal teams; 2) as a witness called by the parties
pursuant to Article 63 of the Rules; or 3) as an expert appointed by the Court pursuant to Article
67 of the Rules. The same classification holds true for ITLOS.294
As there is professional consensus welcoming the discouragement by the Court in the Pulp
Mills Case of the appointment of experts as counsel by the parties,295 a logical extension is to
codify this.
Moreover, the Committee opines that the practice of experts fantômes should not continue, as
the fact that the parties are unaware of their use contravenes the procedures set out in the Statute
and Rules. The Committee suggests that the Court and Tribunal consider appointing experts as
assessors, who do not have the right to vote, to assist in the deliberations.296 Terms of reference
could be agreed with the assessors, which may or may not include entry into the deliberations
room (i.e. – advice to the panel sitting collectively) and/or availability for consultation
individually by panel members. Whilst the identity and terms of reference of the assessors
could be published, the Court and Tribunal could decide the scope of the experts’ involvement
288 Crawford and Keene, supra note 15, at 228. See also Croatia Genocide, Declaration of Judge Donoghue, at
paras 3-5; The M/V Saiga (No 2) Case, supra note 183, PV.99/3 (9 March 1999, 10 a.m.), at 5 (lines 1-17); PV.99/4
(9 March 1999, 2 p.m.), at 7-8 (lines 23-48, 1-35); The M/V Louisa Case, supra note 183, PV.12/C18/4/Rev.1 (5
October 2012, 3 p.m.), at 3-9. 289 This has been a problem at the Iran-US Claims Tribunal – W. Jack Bukamier Case cited in Amerasinghe,
Evidence in International Litigation (2005), at 390-394. 290 This would require a waiver by the ICJ and the Tribunal of immunity for witnesses – UNGA Resn 90(I), 11
December 1946, para 5(b); Agreement between the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the Federal
Republic of Germany Regarding the Headquarters of the Tribunal, Art 24(2). 291 See for instance the professional comments and calls for reform in the Counsel Survey, Crawford and Keene,
supra note 15, at 229. 292 SPS Art 11, calling for panels to appoint experts in disputes involving ‘scientific or technical issues.’ 293 Pulp Mills, supra note 155, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Simma and Al-Kwasawneh at 105, para 16.
See also, Declaration of Judge Yusuf, para 1; Separate Opinion of Judge Caçado Trindade, para 151; Dissenting
Opinion of Judge ad hoc Vinuesa, para 1. 294 Philippe Gautier, ‘Experts before ITLOS: An Overview of the Tribunal’s Practice’ (2018) 9(3) Journal of
International Dispute Settlement 433-439. 295 Pulp Mills, supra note 155, at 72 (para 167). The Tribunal has not taken this up – Delimitation of the maritime
boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh v. Myanmar) (Judgment) [2012] ITLOS Rep. 4, at 8, 115 (para 444). 296 ICJ Rules Art 21(2); UNCLOS Art 289. This was arguably done in the Gulf of Maine Case.
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without comment by the parties, who could not comment upon the appointment procedure of
these experts, which falls under the adjudicators’ prerogative powers concerning deliberations.
There is a distinction between this form of assistance and the evaluation by an expert of factual
issues (e.g. – through a report). In the latter case, the parties have the right to be consulted on
the appointment process and raise objections if they believe the appointment is unlawful – for
instance because the expert is not impartial.297 In the Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean
Sea Case, the Court exercised for the third time298 its Article 67 power to appoint experts
proprio motu in consultation with the parties. This successful exercise of the power accords
with the consensus view in the profession concerning the best method of appointment. The
Committee accordingly recommends that this become the regular procedure for the taking of
expert evidence. To encourage celerity, Articles 66-67 of the ICJ Rules as well as 80 and 82 of
the ITLOS Rules could be amended to provide that requests for experts, inquiries and site visits
be received by the time-limit for the filing of the Memorial.
Such evidence should be called only if truly necessary in light of the financial cost. In Maritime
Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea, the General Assembly approved a reduced request of the
Court for extraordinary expenses.299 While the typical cost of experts is a relatively minor
expense for the parties, it is a significant one for the Court due to its small allowance for
unforeseen expenses; moreover, the triennial nature of the UN budgetary process inhibits
predictability. The Committee accordingly reiterates the proposal that parties be ordered to
contribute to such extraordinary costs, save for those who are supported by the Trust Fund.
On solicitation of experts (e.g. – by contacting professional associations in search of nominees)
a measure of flexibility in the consultations between the adjudicators and the parties is
necessary. The modalities could be prescribed in general terms in the ICJ and ITLOS Rules as
well as the PCA Sample Procedural Order No. 1 and special working procedures for WTO
panels300: timing, terms of reference,301 consultation of the parties, duty of cooperation and
opportunity for comment. In general, the question of appointment of expert witnesses could be
addressed in the first case management conference and the first procedural order in order to
allow time for logistics.302 The experience of the Caribbean Delimitation Case and others
suggests that an early time-limit (e.g. – the filing of the Memorial) for parties to request
court/tribunal-appointed experts is feasible. Though the voir dire procedure has been applied
on rare occasions,303 objections may be addressed in the Article 50 procedure.
Arbitral practice has demonstrated the advantage of relying on experts in proceedings with a
non-appearing party.304 For instance, the South China Sea tribunal made liberal use of experts
297 China — Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/AB/R, Appellate Body
Report, para 484. 298 Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea Case (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) (Order of 16 June 2016), at 33-
34. The Tribunal has yet to exercise its equivalent power under Art 82(1) of the Rules. 299 UNGA Resn 71/272 (23 December 2016), at VIII. 300 Korea – Radionuclides, WT/DS495/R/Add.1, Panel Working Procedures for Consultations with Experts,
Annex A-2 to Panel Rerport. See also US - Animals, WT/DS447/R/Add.1, Annex A-2 to Panel Report; India -
Agricultural Products, WT/DS430/R/Add.1, Annex A-1 to Panel Report; Russia – Pigs (EU),
WT/DS475/R/Add.1, Annex A-3 to Panel Report. 301 E.g. – Arctic Sunrise, supra note 20, Award on Compensation (10 July 2017), paras 44-46. 302 E.g. – Abyei Arbitration, supra note 279, Award (22 July 2009), para 74. 303 E.g. – Cases Nos 3 and 4 Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan) (Provisional
Measures) (Order of 27 August 1999), PV.99/20/Rev.2 (18 August 1999, 10 a.m.), at 35-41, esp. 38. 304 See above Section II.C.
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to ensure that the case of the Philippines was ‘well founded in fact and law.’305 In the Duzgit
Integrity case, the tribunal appointed an expert to assist with the evaluation of damage and
consulted the parties both on the individual appointed and the terms of reference.306 While the
issue of costs should not be overlooked, the Committee encourages adjudicators to explore the
use of experts especially in cases of default.
3. Examination of Witnesses
Whilst judicial practice in the period under review has led to a degree of regularisation of
procedures for the interrogation of witnesses, 307 problems nonetheless arise and there is
demand for further clarification.308
The propriety of expert witnesses not only reading (and potentially informing) written
pleadings but also observing the oral arguments of counsel309 is dubious. Expert witnesses,
whether Court-appointed or party-appointed, could be directed not to participate in the
preparation of pleadings or to observe their presentation; conversely, counsel could be directed
not to communicate with witnesses who are subject to recall, especially on the case.310 Where
their evidence is cited in the interrogation of other witnesses, they could be provided with the
relevant extracts if recalled.
Though the procedure of the ICJ on witness interrogation broadly follows the English model,
clarity is lacking on matters of detail. Whereas the rule on open and leading questions has been
adopted,311 it is not evident that the rule is always comprehensible to counsel. The resulting
scope for misunderstanding thus militates in favour of prescriptiveness through Practice
Direction on the detail of the procedure, such as contacts with witnesses under interrogation,
reference to personal knowledge, impeachment of the credibility of a witness and scope for re-
examination.312 Restructuring the oral phase, as proposed above, whereby testimonial evidence
305 Before the hearings on the merits, the tribunal appointed a hydrographer, after inviting the parties’ view on the
utility and timing of the appointment, and the desirable qualifications of the appointee. After the hearings on the
merits, it decided that it would benefit from appointing two further experts to facilitate the deliberation: one expert
on navigational safety issues and one on coral reef issues (who would address the environmental impact of Chinese
operations). Shortly after the appointment on the latter, the tribunal decided to appoint two additional experts ‘to
collaborate’ with him. The three experts prepared a joint report, which was submitted to the parties for comments,
see South China Sea arbitration, Award of 12 July 2016, para 95. 306 Duzgit Integrity, Award on reparation, paras 37ff. 307 E.g. – Whaling Case, supra note 180, CR 2013/9 (27 June 2013, 10 a.m.), at 38; Certain Activities/Construction
of a Road, supra note 148, CR 2015/3 (14 April 2015, 3p.m.), at 20-21; Coastal State Rights, Rules of Procedure,
Article 15.5; Article 16.1 of the Rules of Procedure of the case The Atlanto-Scandinavian Herring Arbitration
(The Kingdom of Denmark in respect of the Faroe Islands v. The European Union) 2013-30: ‘Each written witness
statement tendered in accordance with Article 14(1) shall stand as the witness’s evidence-in-chief.’ See also ibid.,
Article 16.4: ‘In general, the direct-examination of witnesses shall be restricted to a brief introduction of the
witness to the Arbitral Tribunal, and the notification of any minor corrections or updates to the witness’s
statement.’ See also Enrica Lexie, Rules of Procedure of 19 January 2016 and Arctic Sunrise, Rules of Procedure
of 17 March 2014. 308 Crawford and Keene, supra note 15, at 228. 309 E.g. – Whaling Case, supra note 180, at 53; at 20-21. Witnesses of fact, by contrast, are directed at both the
Court and the Tribunal to remain outside of the chamber until called. 310 Certain Activities/Construction of a Road Cases, supra note 148, Verbatim Record, CR 2015/12 (24 April
2015, 10 a.m.), at 20-21; The M/V Louisa Case, supra note 183, PV.12/C18/2/Rev.1 (4 October 2012, 3 p.m.), at
1 (lines 12-13); Arctic Sunrise Arbitration, supra note 20, Transcript (10 February 2015), at 2 (lines 23-25), 3
(lines 1-4); The M/V Virginia Case, supra note 183, P/V.13/C19/4/Rev.1 (4 September 2013, 10 a.m.), at 31 (lines
18-48). 311 E.g. – Croatia Genocide, supra note 14, CR 2014/11 (6 March 2014, 3 p.m.), at 33. 312 E.g. – The M/V Saiga (No. 2), supra note 183, PV.99/9 (12 March 1999, 10 a.m.), at 11-13; The M/V Louisa
Case, supra note 183, PV.12/C18/2/Rev.1 (4 October 2012, 3 p.m.), at 17-18. See also Detention of Ukrainian
Vessels, supra note 256, Rules of Procedure (Art 18.5).
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could be taken at the outset, would help to insulate witnesses from undue exposure to the
arguments. The prescription of such guidance by the PCA in its Sample Procedural Order No.
2 would also assist arbitral tribunals to address the matter in their procedural orders. Arbitral
Tribunals could also explore the possibility of arranging for testimony by videoconferencing,
which is a technique still in its infancy, but has been regulated expressly in arbitration.313
C. Site Visits
Tribunal’s site visits entail an inspection by the judges or arbitrators of a locality (as distinct
from site visits performed by expert witnesses, whether appointed by the parties or the court or
tribunal). Though the ICJ is empowered to order a site visit proprio motu,314 the sole site visit
in the Gabćikovo-Nagymaros Project Case was done with the agreement and financing of the
parties. 315 The experience of Gabćikovo-Nagymaros Project suggests that a time-limit
coincidental with the closure of the written phase for the consideration of a potential site visit
is viable. Two successful site visits were conducted with the cooperation and support of the
parties in the recent Indus Waters Arbitration.316 A site visit was also executed in the Bay of
Bengal Arbitration.317 The Committee recommend that these templates of best practice be
codified by the ICJ and the ITLOS in Practice Directions and by the PCA in its Sample
Procedural Order No. 2 for further development in judicial and arbitral practice.
V. Concluding Remarks
The Committee includes its recommendations in the Resolution attached, and in the following
Annex it wishes to highlight certain topics on which debate would be necessary, but on which
it did not made specific recommendations.
VI. Annex
For wider debate in the professional community, the Committee sets out the ideas below, on
which it decided not to make recommendations.
1. Implicit Claims: the Committee considered whether the Court and the Tribunal ought to
adopt a new Rule to define ‘implicit claims’, which would provide a legal test for
admissibility. Whereas this has been a problem in recent practice, the Committee
considered that such a Rule could intrude into the substance of the claims.
2. Default: the Committee debated the possibility of amendment to Articles 91 of the ICJ
Rules and 108 of the ITLOS Rules to empower the Court and the Tribunal to assign a
default case to the standing Chamber of Summary Procedure upon application by the
participating party in the absence of an objection, tendered by a duly appointed agent, by
the defaulting party. The Committee decided not to adopt this idea at this time, as it may
be perceived to conflict with the duty of international courts and tribunals to ensure that
their judgments are ‘well founded in fact and law’.
3. Composition of the Panel: the Committee discussed the possibility of adopting a formal
procedure for parties to challenge individual judges. The Committee did not form a
concrete proposal.
4. Judges ad hoc: the Committee discussed the Whaling case situation, where one of the
parties and a third State publicly agreed that the latter would participate as an Article 63
intervenor rather than as a party so that the ad hoc judge appointed by the party would
313 E.g. – Indus Waters Kishenganga, note 242, supra. 314 ICJ Statute Art 44(2); ICJ Rules Art 66; ITLOS Rules Art 81. 315 Supra note 162. Cost was a key factor in the rejection of requests for site visits in South West Africa Cases,
Gulf of Maine Case, and Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute Case. 316 Supra note 242, at paras 33-40, 77-88. 317 Bay of Bengal, supra note 162.
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remain notwithstanding the fact that one of the Members of the ICJ had the nationality of
the intervenor. The Committee did not form a concrete proposal.
5. Language: the Committee considered the potential promotion of ad hoc chambers to hear
cases in English only or French only where one of those languages is shared by the parties
as an official language. The Committee did not adopt this proposal, as concerns were
expressed that it may detract from the diversity of the panel. The Committee also
considered the potential use of the Spanish language in an ad hoc Chamber where three
Members of the ICJ are Spanish-speakers, taking into account Article 39 of the ICJ Statute;
the Committee explored but did not endorse the proposal that WTO panels circulate the
report in the original language before circulating its translated versions.
6. Chambers: there have been calls in the Counsel Survey and elsewhere for the greater use
of chambers. Whilst certain members felt that greater use of ad hoc chambers would detract
from the jurisprudence of the full Court, others opined that chambers can be more free to
adopt useful innovations. The Committee did not arrive at a consensus.
7. Written Notes: the Committee investigated options for deliberation, such as a judge
rapporteur system or a cap on written notes. The Committee did not adopt a proposal, as
some members felt that the institutions were best-placed to evaluate the different methods;
8. Individual Opinions: the Committee considered a cap on the length of individual opinions.
Whereas some members felt that this would set a moral example and that it would save
costs on lengthy opinions (e.g. – by judges ad hoc), others considered this to intrude into
the judicial function. In the absence of consensus, a proposal was not adopted.
9. Joinder of Objections: whereas some members favoured the abolition of joinder of
objections to the merits, others felt that this may intrude into matters of substance rather
than procedure. In the absence of consensus, the proposal was not adopted.
10. Inquiries: the Committee considered the potential expansion of the use of inquiries, such
as in cases of alleged violations of provisional measures. The Committee did not arrive at
a concrete proposal.
11. Limitations to hearings and written pleadings in arbitration: contrary to the
Committee’s conclusions relating to ITLOS and ICJ, there was no consensus that
arbitration necessitates strong efficiency-enhancing adjustments. Curtailing oral hearings,
limiting the page-count of the written submissions or the attachments, limiting the rounds
of written submissions – especially when simultaneous submissions are warranted: these
and other approaches were discussed. While each of them might be desirable in specific
scenarios, none garnered sufficient support to figure in a general recommendation.
12. Role of supporting staff in the drafting of arbitral awards: the role of tribunals’ or
chairpersons’ assistants in the deliberation and the drafting of the award may vary. The
Committee discussed whether clearer guidelines would be desirable, to avert contestation,
in light of the recent objections raised by the losing party regarding the authorship of the
Yukos award. While several documents exist that could be used to illustrate the best
practices (issued by the ICC, LCIA, HKIAC, UNCITRAL, AAA), the Committee preferred
not to adopt a specific recommendation. Likewise, the Committee decided to avoid
pronouncing on the role of the Secretariat in the preparation of WTO panel reports.