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Introduction
The Oroville Dam Failure Response Plan (ODFRP) outlines
immediate response activities with a focus on evacuations,
mass care, research and rescue in the event of a total failure
of the Oroville Dam. Although total failure is highly unlikely,
the impetus for this Plan was Oroville Dam spillway erosion
occurring in early February 2017 that led to the evacuation of
nearly 200,000 individuals in cities below the dam. This
framework supports the Department of Water Resources
Oroville Dam Emergency Action Plan and does not replace
existing local plans. While the Plan contemplates total failure,
it may be scaled and adapted to a lesser dam event.
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Background
In January of 2017, record rainfall in the Feather River watershed led Department of
Water Resources (DWR) officials to release water down the Lake Oroville flood
control spillway. In early February 2017, DWR increased releases through the flood
control spillway to offset higher inflows from rainfall. During this process, DWR
discovered a large amount of debris coming out of the concrete-lined spillway and
stopped all releases to inspect the damage.
Given the extensive nature of the damage to the concrete, DWR authorities opted to
reduce flows to the damaged spillway. The lake, swollen from heavy storms, rose
nearly 50 feet in five days and on February 11, 2017 overtopped its emergency
spillway for the first time. On February 12, 2017, flows down the emergency spillway
caused erosion to progress up the right side of the emergency spillway. DWR officials
feared the erosion would cause the collapse of a concrete slab holding water in the
reservoir. Consequently, local officials ordered the mandatory evacuation of people in
towns downstream. DWR increased the gated control spillway releases to draw down
the water level. Within hours, water ceased flowing over the emergency spillway. On
February 14, 2017, authorities lifted the mandatory evacuation order, but asked
residents to remain vigilant. Crews have been working around the clock to repair the
eroded areas below the emergency spillway.
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NCCFRP
Planning Support and Coordination
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Catastrophic Planning Process For Base Plan and Unified Coordination Group (UCG) Approval
Management Objectives- Prepare for changing conditions in a dynamic situation and be prepared to adjust plans. - Keep cost commensurate with values at risk. - Provide public with key information, maintain positive public relations.
Control Objectives- Provide for public and emergency responder safety. - Position appropriate resources to anticipate changing conditions. - Coordinate information between cooperating agencies. - Evacuate or rescue citizens as necessary. - Provide for evacuee short and long term needs.
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Catastrophic Advance Planning Process Step One: Define the Mission and Expectation for the Unified Coordination Group (UCG) Approval
[Estimates Defined]
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Catastrophic Advance Planning Process Step Two: Establish Baseline Planning for Gap Analysis/ESF Capability Based Response
[Gap Analysis]
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Catastrophic Advance Planning Process Step Three: Identify ESF Capability Based Objectives to Provide Resource Phased Support
[ESF Priority and Support Objectives Defined]
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Catastrophic Advance Planning Process Step Four: Synchronize ESF Capability to Resource Phased Support and Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments
[ESF Synchronization – Putting it all Together]
Pre-Incident Post-Incident
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•
•
Resource Phasing Resource Phasing by ESF
Developed in accordance with UCG recommendations – Director will
be able see critical resource management by phase pre or post event
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•
•
Resource Phasing by ESF
Developed in accordance with UCG recommendations – Director will
be able to pull the trigger on a mission pre or post event
Pre-scripted Missions
May 1, 2017
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Risk / Current Threat If severe weather causes high inflows for sustained durations, reservoir levels will rise and
encroach into the operating freeboard. As a result, gated control spillway releases would be
increased to prevent the use of the emergency spillway. Currently, the Hyatt Power Plant’s
capacity to outflow up to 13,000 cubic feet per second has been impaired. Efforts are underway
to bring that outflow capacity back online to assist with potential high, sustained inflow events at
Lake Oroville. Extremely high releases in the gated control spillway could continue the erosion of
the spillway chute, but should not lead to a failure of the dam or the flood control gate structure.
In the event that the emergency spillway must be used, erosion areas in the spillway channel
and at the base of the spillway have been armored with boulders, aggregate, and cement slurry
to minimize further erosion and weakening of the emergency/auxiliary spillway.
May 9, 2017
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How to Use this Plan The Oroville Dam Failure Response Plan is a contingency plan developed to assist emergency
management through a pre or post catastrophic dam failure. The Plan outlines the Concept of
Operations (CONOPS) to achieve desired outcomes based on existing capabilities. It calls for
the formation of state, federal and private sector partnerships, assisting local/tribal government
in gaining access and the execution of strategies. But the Plan does not execute the response.
The successful implementation of this Plan requires decisive action on the part of emergency
managers, especially those in leadership positions.
Successful execution requires decisions and actions of leaders in the organization to:
• Deploy personnel through deployment orders and mission assignments, contracts, or
memorandums of agreement.
• Form personnel into organizations and task forces directed by the Operations Section of the
Unified Command Structure and/or Unified Coordination Group.
• Provide initial Resource Phasing of critical staff and equipment.
• Provide initial Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments to be validated, than executed.
• Develop an access strategy and a temporary supply chain. That supply chain is developed by
the deployment of staging area management teams, communications capabilities, contract
support and transportation resources. The result is a capability to move resources from
unaffected areas to affected, isolated areas.
• Conduct “Movement Coordination” to evacuate, source, broker, schedule and direct
transportation, commodities and shelter operations.
• Coordinate and direct the actions of subordinate organizations through plans, directives,
operations orders, movement schedules and mission assignments.
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Base Plan
• Introduction and Background
• Oroville Dam Failure Inundation Map
• Assumptions and Considerations
• Planning Factors for Evacuation/Transportation and
Mass Care
• Mission Essential Tasks
• Concept of Operations
• Timeline for Key Response Tasks
• Gap Analysis with Recommendations
Oroville Dam Failure
Inundation Map
• 1 million people exposed in the
dam failure inundation zone
(inundation impacted population
plus additional 5 mile buffer zone)
• Hours to max flood depth
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Statewide Response-
Time Map
• Estimated drive times to the center
of the Oroville Dam Inundation
Area from anywhere in the state
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Phases
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Annexes and Appendices
• Annex A: Task Organization
• Annex B: Situation/Intelligence
• Annex C: Operations
Appendix C-1: Mass Care Services
Appendix C-2: Law Enforcement
Appendix C-3: Mass Search and Rescue
Appendix C-4: Public Health, Healthcare, and
Emergency Medical Services
Appendix C-5: Public Information and Warning
Appendix C-6: Environmental Response / Health
and Safety
• Annex D: Logistics
• Annex E: Communications
• Annex F: Transportation/Evacuation Operations
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Annex A: Task Organization Unified Coordination Group
Area Command
North
South
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Annex B: Situation/Intelligence
• Information Collection Plan
• Essential Elements of Information
• Oroville Dam Information / Area Geography Info.
• Planning Area Demographics
• Flood Forecast and Warnings
• Information Collect Planning (ICP) Process
• Essential Elements of Information (EEI)
• ICP Desired Outcomes
• Inundation Maps (By County / Impacted Cities)
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Information Collection Plan
The Oroville Dam Failure Response Plan Information Collection
Plan (ICP) is the systematic process used by emergency
management to collect specific information, supporting all
operational response phases.
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Essential Elements of Information (EEI)
EEIs provide a flow of information/available intelligence in
understanding the situation and assisting operational response and
support agencies.
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Essential Elements of Information (EEI)
Organized by ESF: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 17
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Oroville Dam Aerial Overview
• Information Collection Plan
• Essential Elements of Information
• x
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Oroville Dam Frontal Overview
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Annex C: Operations
Mission
The mission of the joint state and federal organization is to save and
sustain human lives following a dam failure.
Response Planning Factors
Planning factors represent response requirements.
Specific requirements include:
• Support survivor movement consistent with existing movement plans.
• Gain access through a coordinated multi-modal (surface, air, and
waterways) access strategy that deploys teams and resources to
affected areas as possible.
• Support or conduct search and rescue and fatality management
operations.
• Conduct patient movement.
• Initiate a commodities distribution system to support shelter populations,
delivering food and potable water and durable medical equipment where
required.
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Annex C: Operations
• Comprised of six appendices.
Appendix C-1: Mass Care Services
Appendix C-2: Law Enforcement
Appendix C-3: Mass Search and Rescue
Appendix C-4: Public Health, Healthcare, and
Emergency Medical Services
Appendix C-5: Public Information and Warning
Appendix C-6: Environmental Response / Health
and Safety
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Appendix C-1: Mass Care Services
• Planning Factors
• Gap Analysis
• Shelter Coordination
• Identified locations of possible high density shelters
in the planning area
Fairground Shelter Sites
University and College Shelter Sites
• Capabilities
• Resource Phasing
• Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments
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Appendix C-2: Law Enforcement
• Geographical Area Command
• Resources
• Traffic Control and Evacuation Routes
Evacuation Corridors split into 9 areas.
• Coroner’s Mutual Aid, impact and response, with Gap
Analysis
• Gaps
• Resource Phasing
• Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments
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Appendix C-3: Mass Search and Rescue
• Swiftwater Flood (SF) Search and Rescue (SAR) Teams
FIRE - 31 total mutual aid SF SAR teams
LAW - One Type 2 SF team, a unit of the Butte County
Sheriff’s Search and Rescue Team
Remaining 9 counties - various levels of trained
water rescue personnel; at least 20 boats capable
and suitable for flood related operations
• At Cal OES, both fire and law jointly share the
responsibility to coordinate SF SAR mutual aid requests
• SF SAR Resource Typing identified
• Additional OA SAR information
• Resource Phasing
• Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments
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Appendix C-4: Public Health, Healthcare,
and Emergency Medical Services
• Public Health and Medical System
• General Acute Care Facilities, Acute Psychiatric
Hospitals, and Skilled Nursing Facilities identified in
or out of dam inundation area
• Resource Capabilities
• Essential Elements of Information (EEIs)
• Healthcare Facilities Data
• Resource Phasing
• Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments
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Appendix C-5: Public Information and
Warning
• Planning Factors
• Warning / Alert /Responsibilities
• Public Information – State Assets and Capabilities
• Emergency management’s alert and notification
process for an Oroville Dam failure (pre or post
incident)
• Dissemination Channels
• Organizational Structure
• Resource Phasing
• Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments
Appendix C-5: Emergency Management Alert Process
Appendix C-5: Public Information and Warning
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Appendix C-6: Environmental Health and
Safety
• Planning Factors
• Mission / Execution / Responsibilities
• State/Federal Assets and Capabilities
• Resource Phasing
• Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments
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Annex D: Logistics
• Staging Areas and
Incident Command Posts
• CA-ESF 7 Core Function
Units Emergency
Acquisitions
Facilities
Critical Assets
• CA-ESF 7 interactions
with other CA-ESFs
identified • Resource Phasing
• Pre-Scripted Mission
Assignments
•
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Annex E:
Communications
County Operational Area
contact information (phone #,
call sign, CLETS, OASIS, etc.),
regularly monitored channels,
and shared channel
infrastructure identified
Inundated Public Safety
Communications Answering
Points identified and mapped
Resource Phasing
Pre-Scripted Mission
Assignments
•
•
•
•
Annex F:
Transportation/
Evacuation Operations
• Primary highway evacuation
routes identified per county
• Air Coordination Group (ACG)
• Evacuation Planning Overview
• Resource Phasing
• Pre-Scripted Mission
Assignments
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Inundation Maps by County
and Specific Cities • Allows response and support elements to look
at individual flow rates impacting evacuation
routes, rescue operations, and support
operations
• Snapshot maps provide planners flow depths
for the inundated portions of impacted counties
upon Oroville Dam complete failure after 4, 8,
12, 16, 20, and 24 hours
124 8
16 20 24
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Inundation Maps by County
and Specific Cities
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Way Forward
• June 1, 2017 – Plan will be pushed out to ESF/OAs
• June 14, 2017 – Final Edits
• June 28, 2017 – ESF Functional TTX, Proof of Concept
• July 2017 – Executive/MARAC/OA Informational
CONOPS Briefing
Advance Planning Team Contacts
Nate Ortiz
Cal OES Disaster Planning
PMI, Project Manager
916-845-8795 Office
916-956-5780 Cell
Patrick T. Hammond Sr.
Cal OES Disaster Planning
SESC, Lead Planner
916-845-8777 Office
916-508-6089 Cell
Ron DeMayo
Cal OES Disaster Planning
ESC, Planner
916-845-8760 Office
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