Introduction to International Rela-tions

Jaechun Kim

Realism vs. Liberal-ism II

REALISM VS. LIBERALISM – PART II NEO-NEO DEBATE (NEO-REALISM VS. NEO-

LIBERALISM)

Prisoner’s Dilemma and Problem of Collective Ac-tion in Int’l Relations

Assumptions of the game!!!Rationalist assumption One-shot game No communications between actors…

Mancur Olson, Logic of Collective ActionIt is difficult to provide collective (public) goods in the absence of central authority…Introduction to International Relations

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Jane

JohnPrisoner's Dilemma

DC > CC > DD

Characteristics of collective goods? Non-excludability (transitivity of usage) Problem of “Free Riding”

 Application in IR

Cooperation between states is “quasi-public goods”e.g., disarmament, free trade…

 How can we overcome this problem? How can we elicit cooperation among states in the ab-sence of int’l government?

Neorealist – states would seldom cooperate… Neoliberals – not necessarily… states can cooper-ate even in the absence of central authority… !!int’l institutions (or int’l regimes) can replace the role of central authority…

NEO-LIBERALISM (aka., NEO-LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM also

Regime Theory) 

Emphasizes the independent role of int’l institu-tions…

Uses realist assumptions anarchy assumption of unitary-rational actor; uses game theory

 Major arguments

Pathology of anarchy can be mitigated (if not elimi-nated) by the role of int’l institutions (or international regimes)…Cooperation under anarchy is not easy, but int’l institutions (or regimes) can facilitate it… Therefore international institutions are independent ac-tors that can compete with states!

Why do int’l institutions (or international regimes) matter?

Reduce transaction costs of cooperation

What is “transaction costs”? the costs and risks associated with carrying out an agreement..Int’l institutions provide rules of agreement and coordina-tion mechanism lower transaction costs induce coop-eration

Increase transparency Int’l institutions provide correct information this will reassure states that they are not being cheated.. (in-crease transparency) induce cooperation

Induce participants to make commitments through sunk costs…

You invested a lot of money into a cooperative agree-ment, then leaving it would impose you additional costs… induce cooperation

Provide enforcement mechanism Make sure that defectors are penalized!! Make explicit threat of retaliation to defection… in-duce cooperation

Create and foster norms of reciprocityMake sure that the game is played as iterated game..

If the game is iterated… You can keep track of past behavior of other

states… reputation matters!! This will create shadow of the future (promise of future gains) … states would not discount the future value of cooperation… induce cooperation

Neorealist’s answer to Neoliberalist?

Relative gains matter more! Because “intl relations” is zero sum game!

 (Neo)liberal Institutionalism

Third leg of liberalism

DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY

An important liberalist theory

First leg of liberalist paradigm of int’l relations (theory)

Role of liberal political institution; liberal democracy

cf. Second leg of liberalism?

• Role of liberal market economy and economic inter-dependence

Democratic Peace finding is statistically very robust!

Then why Democratic Peace?

Institutional explanationRestraining effects of public opinion and the checks and balances of democratic political institutions..

Normative explanation Democratic norms and culture shared by democracies…