Investigating the influence of resource …...Investigating the influence of resource dependencies on compliance to national policies of geo-information: A resource dependence perspective

Investigating the influence of resource dependencies on compliance to national policies of geo-information: A resource dependence perspective. A case study of geo-information sector in Uganda

Henry Makumbi March 2010

Investigating the influence of resource dependencies on compliance to national policies of geo-information: A resource dependence perspective.

A case study of geo-information sector in Uganda

by

Henry Makumbi

Thesis submitted to the International Institute for Geo-information Science and Earth Observation in

partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Geo-information Science

and Earth Observation, Specialisation: (Land Administration)

Thesis Assessment Board

Chairperson: Prof. Dr. Ing. P. Y. Georgiadou

External Examiner: Ir. B. Van Loenen

Supervisor: Ir. W. T. de Vries

Second supervisor: Dr. G. Miscione

Member: Ir. M. C. Bronsveld

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR GEO-INFORMATION SCIENCE AND EARTH OBSERVATION

ENSCHEDE, THE NETHERLANDS

Disclaimer This document describes work undertaken as part of a programme of study at the International Institute for Geo-information Science and Earth Observation. All views and opinions expressed therein remain the sole responsibility of the author, and do not necessarily represent those of the institute.

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Abstract

Geographic information sharing is essential for public organizations. National policies could enforce this sharing, yet compliance to these policies is not a given. This thesis deals with how and why public organizations comply with geo-information sharing policies. A multiple case study of the geo-information sector in Uganda was used: a comparative study of compliance to geo-information policies in three administrative areas. Multiple case designs are considered more robust than single-case designs. The study analysis was qualitative and interpretive in a bid to understand and validate the subjective interpretations of the various actors involved in geo-information policy efforts in Uganda and was limited to the resource dependence perspective. The findings show that – Financial dependency has more outstanding influence in bringing about compliance variations. Information dependency has influence on the compliance of organizations depending on others for information. Information dependency has no influence on compliance for organizations that are ‘informationally’ independent. Public administration authority instruments only have influence on the compliance of geo-information organizations in instances where local government decisions have a direct bearing on the organization’s compliance. Future research could look at the role of enforcement instruments like support supervision, rewards and penalties in influencing compliance to geo-information policies. Keywords: geo-information, policy, compliance, Resource dependency theory, Uganda

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Acknowledgements

I extend my sincere gratitude to my supervisors at ITC, Mr. Ir. Walter T de Vries and Dr. Gianluca

Miscione for the unrelenting support supervision, valuable advice, comments and suggestions spurred

me on throughout the entire research phase to a logical conclusion. Indeed, I thank all the ITC

lecturers and support staff that contributed to the success in my study and my well being. Noteworthy

is the L.A course coordinator, Mr. Ir. M. C. Bronsveld, whose correspondence was instrumental even

before I joined the University. To the Netherlands Fellowship Programme, which made it possible for

me to undertake and complete my course, goes my appreciation.

For their comradeship and constant support, I appreciate my fellow classmates from L.A 2008; with

whom we effectively tackled the challenges we faced through cooperation and encouragement. A vote

of thanks to the geo-information organizations in Uganda that were the empirical basis of the research

and cooperated during the field data collection.

Finally, but not least important, my utmost thanks to God, my bride Pamela, auntie Getty and country

mates – in that order, whose companionship and moral support has been instrumental throughout the

time at University. To all my fans, one word – peace.

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Table of contents

1. Introduction .........................................................................................................................1

1.1. Background.................................................................................................................1 1.2. Definitions ..................................................................................................................2 1.3. Case description..........................................................................................................3 1.4. Public administration in Uganda - Decentralization...................................................4 1.5. Local government finance...........................................................................................5 1.6. Research problem .......................................................................................................6 1.7. The Research Approach..............................................................................................6 1.8. Justification of Research.............................................................................................7 1.9. Research Aim, Objectives and Questions...................................................................7 1.10. Research Matrix......................................................................................................9 1.11. Proposed outline of chapters for the research. ......................................................11

2. A theoretical review of the issue ‘compliance’ .................................................................12 2.1. Introduction...............................................................................................................12 2.2. Literature search strategy..........................................................................................12 2.3. How various theories approach the issue ‘compliance’............................................14

2.3.1. Transaction Cost Economic Theory approach .................................................................15 2.3.2. Resource Dependency Theory approach..........................................................................16 2.3.3. Evaluating Transaction cost and Resource dependency theory .......................................18

2.4. Conceptual framework..............................................................................................18 2.5. GI policy initiatives in Uganda.................................................................................20 2.6. Concluding remark ...................................................................................................22

3. Data collection method on compliance .............................................................................23 3.1. Introduction...............................................................................................................23 3.2. Research design and Methodological framework.....................................................23

3.2.1. Case explanation...............................................................................................................23 3.2.2. Employing a multiple case study......................................................................................23 3.2.3. Using qualitative methods ................................................................................................24

3.3. Data collection ..........................................................................................................25 3.4. Relation of observables to the concepts....................................................................27 3.5. Formulation of propositions .....................................................................................28 3.6. Observations .............................................................................................................28 3.7. Reliability and validity of findings ...........................................................................29 3.8. Problems and Limitations .........................................................................................30 3.9. Concluding remark ...................................................................................................30

4. Nature of compliance to GI policy ....................................................................................31 4.1. Introduction...............................................................................................................31 4.2. Financial resource findings.......................................................................................31 4.3. Information resource findings from interviews ........................................................35 4.4. Findings on compliance concept from interviews....................................................37 4.5. Finding on concept of public administration authority from interviews ..................39 4.6. How compliance is enacted ......................................................................................43 4.7. Reasons for (non) compliance ..................................................................................46 4.8. Reflection..................................................................................................................46

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4.9. Concluding remarks ..................................................................................................47 5. Analysis and interpretation of findings..............................................................................48

5.1. Introduction...............................................................................................................48 5.2. Does compliance relate to resource dependencies? ..................................................48

5.2.1. The Influence of public administration authority............................................................ 49 5.2.2. The most crucial resource dependency............................................................................ 52 5.2.3. Role of information dependency in compliance.............................................................. 53

5.3. Concluding remarks ..................................................................................................54 6. Implication of findings.......................................................................................................56

6.1. Introduction...............................................................................................................56 6.2. Implication of findings..............................................................................................56 6.3. How to adapt a policy to influence compliance ........................................................56 6.4. Limitation of the study..............................................................................................58 6.5. Concluding remarks ..................................................................................................58

7. Conclusion and recommendations.....................................................................................59 7.1. Conclusions...............................................................................................................59 7.2. Recommendation ......................................................................................................61

Reference: .................................................................................................................................62 Appendix 1: Map of Uganda with study area (Entebbe, Kampala and Mukono) .....................65 Appendix 2: Weekly report showing how activities are planned to enact compliance.............66 Appendix 3: Data matrix showing the relation of answers to concepts and indicators ............67 Appendix 4: List of respondents ...............................................................................................70 Appendix 5: Field work schedule 28 September- 23 October 2009 .........................................73

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List of figures

Figure 2-1: The total cost curve from transaction and enforcement cost .....................16 Figure 2-2: Conceptual picture showing dependent and independent variables ........20 Figure 4-1: Showing budget funding for Kampala Central Division...............................32 Figure 4-2: showing cash flow for NWSC ..........................................................................33 Figure 4-3: Showing budget funding for DWRM...............................................................34 Figure 4-4: A large-scale color scanner and filing cabinet for cadastral plans ............36 Figure 4-5: Showing data dissemination media at Entebbe LSD and DWRM ............36 Figure 4-6: Activity diagram showing how compliance is enacted in a ministry ..........43

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List of tables

Table 1-1: Research Matrix ....................................................................................................9 Table 2-1: Summary and comparison of theories.............................................................13 Table 2-2: Conceptual framework .......................................................................................19 Table 3-1: Showing an overview of offices vis-à-vis practitioners sampled. ................25 Table 3-2: How Resource dependency theory was decomposed. ................................26 Table 3-3: Analytical concepts, their indicators and the kind of evidence employed .27 Table 3-4: Table showing formal prescriptions that relate to GI.....................................29 Table 4-1: Data on finances .................................................................................................32 Table 4-2: Data on information ............................................................................................35 Table 4-3: Data on compliance............................................................................................37 Table 4-4: Supplementary Data on compliance................................................................38 Table 4-5: Table of organizations involved in policy design vis-à-vis those that comply...................................................................................................................................................39 Table 4-6: Data on public administration authority ...........................................................40 Table 4-7: Organizations with their GI legal framework...................................................41 Table 4-8: Showing GI related Acts, major objectives and degree to which organizations comply .............................................................................................................42 Table 4-9: Reasons for compliance and non compliance ...............................................46 Table 5-1: Brief of compliance relation with resource dependencies............................49 Table 5-2: Summary on influence of public administration authority.............................51 Table 5-3: Summary of influence of financial dependency on compliance ..................53 Table 5-4: Summary of influence of information on compliance....................................54

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List of acronyms

CODI Committee on Development Information

DWD Directorate of Water Development

DWRM Directorate of Water Resources Management

EMC Entebbe Municipal Council

FGDC Federal Geographic Data Committee

FIG International Federation of Surveyors

G2G Government to Government

GEOSS Global Earth Observation System of Systems

GI Geographic Information

GIDEON National Vision and Implementation Strategy for Geo-information

GIS Geographic Information System

GPS Global Positioning System

GSDI Global Spatial Data Infrastructure Association

GTZ German Technical Cooperation

ICT Information and Communication Technology

INSPIRE Infrastructure for Spatial Information in Europe

IOR Inter-Organizational Relationship

ISO International Standards Organization

JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency

JRJ Job Record Jacket

KCC Kampala City Council

LSD Lands and Survey Department

LSSP Land Sector Strategic Plan

MTC Mukono Town Council

NEMA National Environmental Management Authority

NFA National Forestry Authority

NIMES National Initiative of Monitoring and Evaluation Systems

NRM National Resistance Movement

NSDI National Spatial Data Infrastructure

NWSC National Water and Sewerage Corporation

OGC Open Geospatial Consortium

RDT Resource Dependency Theory

SDI Spatial Data Infrastructure

TCT Transaction Cost Economics Theory

UBOS Uganda Bureau of statistics

UEB Uganda Electricity Board

UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

UTM Universal Transverse Mercator

WFS-T Web Feature Space - Transaction

WHO World Health Organization

WMS Web Map Service

WSP Web Service Processing

INVESTIGATING THE INFLUENCE OF RESOURCE DEPENDENCIES ON COMPLIANCE TO NATIONAL POLICIES OF GEO-INFORMATION: A RESOURCE DEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE. A CASE STUDY OF GEO-INFORMATION SECTOR IN UGANDA

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1. Introduction

This research studies motivation for inter-organizational relationships for organizations involved in

the production and use of geographic information. The use of geo-information in government is a

study area of increasing relevance and urgency (Georgiadou and Stoter 2010). Many of the larger

Geographic Information System (GIS) policy initiatives (both formal and informal) are based on the

assumption that many data producers working collectively to develop large volumes of data combined

to describe relatively large areas with an expectation that this data will be widely available accessible

to potential users (Tulloch and Harvey 2005). Optimal geo-information use is prescribed in influential

texts—policies, principles and declarations of global associations, that attempt to change people’s

behaviour. Included among these initiatives is the stimulation of national policies (e.g. free or for-a-

fee access policies), national and supranational principles (e.g. promoted by GIDEON and INSPIRE)

and declarations promoted by global, professional and academic associations in the field of GIScience

like global geospatial data/information infrastructures (often abbreviated as GSDI), FIG, GEOSS

(Georgiadou and Stoter 2010). Others are the Digital Earth initiative, National Spatial Data

Infrastructure (NSDI), regional and local administrations, as well as cross-organizational initiatives

such as authentic registers and streamlining of (geo-information) base data (de Vries 2007; de Vries

2008). These initiatives indirectly and implicitly aim at new forms of cooperation between public

authorities, and assume non-problematic networking and cooperation of public authorities (de Vries

2008; Smit, Makanga et al. 2009). The predominant view is that a hierarchical approach following

administrative jurisdictions is most effective; hereby the SDI policy is implemented at a national level

first, and then dependent provincial governments and municipalities harmonize their policies with the

national ones. The result would be a seamless spatial data management and sharing practice across

vertical jurisdictions, whereby national level policy can support uniform NSDI standards and foster

interoperability at lower levels of government (Smit, Makanga et al. 2009). Whereas all these policy

initiatives, declarations and regulations aim to guide compliance to optimal use of geo-information,

this research investigates how resource dependencies among organizations can influence compliance

with nationally established Geo-Information policies and how it does not influence. One view is that

organizations implement national policies or public sector reform programs only if they meet their

strategic needs. If they don’t, then such organizations would establish autonomous alternative

implementation strategies. This difference is called degree of compliance. I do not attempt to provide

a yardstick or standard for measuring compliance nor suggest a recipe for attaining compliance.

Rather, as a step to a larger goal, I discuss how variations in resources have an influence on policy

compliance or non compliance. Understanding the significance of these relations could help explain

compliance behaviour and know the relations that affect compliance. To carry out the research, an

interpretive study of policy implementation and data sharing practice of organizations that play a key

role in Geo-information in Uganda was carried out.

1.1. Background With the increasing use of GIS in industrialized and developing countries, the availability of geo-

information has become an issue that affects many public and private sector organizations. They are

faced with the high cost and substantial effort involved in the generation of geo-information and so

the sharing of this data is increasingly being seen as a way of overcoming expense, easing availability


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and access. Organizations seek to minimize costs through vertical integration and quasi-integration

governance structures for the purpose of adapting to environmental uncertainty. This can provide a

way of using GIS effectively only if the key players involved in the use and supply of spatial data are

willing to share (de Montalvo 2003). The response to this phenomenon by many people involved with

local government GIS continues to be apprehension and resistance resulting in data sharing networks

that exhibit a variety of patterns (Tulloch and Harvey 2005). Whether as a means of data

dissemination or acquisition, data sharing has become an essential element of local government GIS

activities. Despite the prominence of this activity and its centrality to the day-to-day function of many

local government systems, decisions about these activities are rarely made following a thorough

consideration of the organizational and political complexity (Tulloch and Harvey 2005).

Access to data under ad hoc arrangements was largely allowed initially but as GIS institutions

continue to grow more organizations are developing policies and practices that formalize the ways in

which their geospatial data can be used and disseminated (Tulloch and Harvey 2005). Nonetheless,

little is known about how systems become institutionalized yet the institutionalization of such is even

more complex given that it implies the cooperation among different institutions involved in producing

and managing spatial data. Institutionalization will not occur just because of the will of a government

expressed in accords and decrees; rather, institutionalization will be the result of effective and

conscious political action (Silva 2007).

1.2. Definitions For this study, unless the context or subject matter otherwise requires—

Spatial data sharing is defined as the (normally electronic) transfer of spatial data/information

between two or more organizational units where there is independence between the holder of the data

and the prospective user. The transfer may be in the form of periodic bulk transfers, routine daily

transfers, or on-line access driven by individual transactions (Tulloch and Harvey 2005).

Geo-information is a specific type of information that involves the interpretation of spatial data (de

By, Georgiadou et al. 2004).

Spatial Data Infrastructure (SDI) is used to denote the relevant base collection of technologies,

policies and institutional arrangements that facilitate the availability of and access to spatial data. The

SDI provides a basis for spatial data discovery, evaluation, and application for users and providers

within all levels of government, the commercial sector, the non-profit sector, academia and by citizens

in general (GSDI 2004; Homburg and Georgiadou 2009).

The Oxford English Dictionary defines the term compliance as acting in accordance with, or the

yielding to a desire, request, condition, direction. Compliance may, but need not, involve willing

agreement to behave in this way: grudging compliance is still compliance (Weiner, Simpson et al.

1993). Compliance, for this research is behaviour that is consistent with policy objectives. The

concept, degree of compliance is defined as a measure of varying choices and decisions that

organizations take in fulfilling policy requirements and utilization of the policy in carrying out day-to-

day activities. There is total or full compliance when there is no uncertainty on expected actions (less

autonomy) whereas there is less or no compliance when there is high uncertainty or high transaction

costs.


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The behaviour of non-compliance is herein this research referred to as autonomous behaviour. Oxford

English Dictionary defines the term autonomy as the possession or right of self-government, freedom

of action and having its own laws. Policy refers to a course or principle of action adopted or proposed

by an organization or individual. A Regulation is a rule or directive made and maintained by an

authority. A Guideline is a general rule or piece of advice (Weiner, Simpson et al. 1993). For this

research, policies, regulations and guidelines are compliance references within an institution. An Act

of parliament is a compliance reference within and outside a particular sector or institution.

Government-to-Government (G2G) refers to applications and services that are used between

governmental agencies with or through the use of Information and communication technology (ICT)

(de Vries 2008).

Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised

constraints that shape human interaction [norms of behaviour and self-imposed codes of conduct that

individuals follow in their daily lives] (North 1990; Piotti, Chilundo et al. 2006).

Organizations are coalitions altering their purposes and domains to accommodate new interests,

sloughing off parts of themselves to avoid some interests, and when necessary, becoming involved in

activities far afield of their stated central purposes (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003).

Transaction costs can generally be defined as all costs associated with obtaining and using a product,

apart from the actual purchase price paid (de Vries, Lewis et al. 2003).

1.3. Case description The empirical data come from cases within the geo-information sector of Uganda. This included both

at national and local government level. A contextual understanding of the existing political,

institutional, professional, and legislative relationships is important in any study (Babbie and Mouton

2001). These relationships largely determine the geographic information activities at local government

agencies. To study compliance with GI policies in Uganda, three administrative areas (Kampala,

Mukono and Entebbe) were chosen that are affected by local government policies due to

decentralization as well as hierarchically determined GI policies for implementation in a column

power structure for example a ministry and its departments. A multiple-case (holistic) design was

used for the study. The main components of the research design were as according to (Yin 2003) were

study questions, propositions, unit of analysis, the logic linking data to the propositions and the

criteria for interpreting the findings. The strategies for analyzing evidence were use of theoretical

propositions and rival explanations.

At the national level, institutions that are instrumental in GI policy formulation and implementation

were considered; the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, the Ministry of Water and

Environment (NWSC) as well as the Ministry of Local Government located in Kampala city which is

the head quarter for central government. The actors considered at the national level were ministry

commissioners, strategic managers and working group leaders. The main activities (among others) of

these practitioners to which attention was given are GI policy formulation and technical supervision


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on GI policy implementation with the aim that generated data can be reused, shared or built upon and

ultimately good public service delivery. The other actors at national level alongside the central

government ministries are the lobbyists, development partners and technical consultants.

At the local level, three districts were considered; Kampala, Mukono and Entebbe as shown later in

appendix 1. Organizations visited in Entebbe district were Surveys and mapping, Entebbe Municipal

council and Directorate of Water Resources management. In Kampala district were Kampala water

and Kampala City Council. Mukono district had Mukono town council and Lands and Surveys

department. The actors at local level considered are those involved in fulltime GI practice and policy

implementation; the departmental heads, surveyors, planners and GI technical staff like cartographers.

The activities of the actors lead to production of topographic maps, deed plans, various thematic maps

for buildings, roads, ground and surface water maps. The actors at national level and local level will

later be considered in modelling compliance through an activity diagram in figure 4-6. The field

research was carried out within a period of four weeks, October 2009.

Worth noting is that all the organizations at district level are administratively under the district local

governments due to decentralization with the aim of making their administration more autonomous

but at the same time the organizations functionally have a responsibility to their respective parent

ministries as a result of vertical integration. The GI organizations are to comply with both the ministry

policies as well as the local government policies. The unit of analysis, compliance behaviour, in case

study research is rarely isolated from and unaffected by factors in the environment in which it is

embedded. The case under investigation is something that already exists and is not something that is

artificially generated for the purposes of research (Babbie and Mouton 2001; Denscombe 2003).

1.4. Public administration in Uganda - Decentraliza tion The rubber hits the road in local government yet there is still a lack of understanding on how GI is

practically interwoven in mandated and legislated activities. Compliance to policies is best understood

as part of other activities. The concept of local government is a product of decentralization, a strategy

which was embraced by the current government following the advice of the international community.

On its ascension to power in 1986, the present National Resistance Movement (NRM), saw

decentralization as a “necessary condition for democratization” and hence central to the fulfilment of

their goal of establishing a “popular democracy” in Uganda. The government has since then embraced

fundamental economic and institutional reforms. One of the most ambitious has been its

decentralization policy, considered the most far-reaching local government reform programs in the

developing world. The political context of the NRM era has been a unique system of “no-party”

democracy. In these circumstances, decentralization had provided a democratic gloss in the eyes of

both international donors and local actors (Francis and James 2003).

The legislative framework of decentralization is provided by the Local Government Statute of 1993,

the 1995 Constitution and the Local Government Act 1997. The key aspects of the decentralized local

government system in Uganda which has devolved functions, competency and resources to elected

local government councils. Administrative and technical personnel are found at the district and sub

district levels headed respectively by a Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) and a Sub county Chief

(SCC). The conventional conception of decentralization comprises a national project, transmitted


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outward from the capital through the establishment of a set of formal structures and procedures.

Actual local government systems are often described in terms of these structures as exemplifying

devolution, de-concentration, or a hybrid of the two (Francis and James 2003).

Decentralization has several distinct aspects. A common categorization distinguishes political (or

democratic) decentralization, administrative decentralization (or de-concentration), and fiscal

decentralization. Since the 1980s decentralization has been promoted as a solution to many of the

problems of administration and governance constraining local and national development, as well as a

means of improving performance in poverty reduction. The benefits of decentralization are considered

to include improved efficiency of public service provision, more appropriate services, better

governance, and the empowerment of local citizens (Francis and James 2003).

These benefits are held to arise in a number of ways. Devolved decision-making mechanisms can

facilitate the active participation of communities, articulating local priorities and helping to ensure

that programs are appropriate to local needs. Decentralization is thus considered to be a cornerstone of

good governance both in promoting local accountability and transparency, and enfranchising local

populations. Attractive though the potential benefits of decentralization are, numerous studies have

shown that they are seldom realized. While decentralization has been included in public sector reform

in many sub-Saharan African countries, “there are no real success stories as far as improved

development performance at the local level is concerned.” (Francis and James 2003).

1.5. Local government finance The extent to which elected local government representatives actually control district finances free

from central government interference is fundamental to the realization of local autonomy. Yet the

degree of control which local politicians have over either locally raised revenues or central transfers is

never entirely unconstrained, and varies widely. In rural Africa, the local revenue base is often so

weak that central transfers dominate district budgets. While a high proportion of central transfers is

not as such incompatible with local autonomy, the conditions frequently attached to these transfers

can undermine genuine local decision making (Francis and James 2003). Owing to the large financial

dependence on the central government even when they should be self-supporting, the districts find

themselves in the fierce grip of whoever happens to be running the country at any one time.

District resources come from locally generated revenues and central funding of three kinds:

unconditional grants (UCG), conditional grants (CG) and equalization grants (EG).

Conditional funding increasingly dominates, now accounting for over 80% of all central transfers.

Conditional grants are programmed at the national level, and earmarked to support specific national

sectoral programs in the districts. Of late the complexity and inflexibility of the conditional grants

system has been criticized, as district councils demand more decision-making power over centrally-

derived resources. Centrally allocated funds, accounting, as a national average, for 90% of income,

therefore dominate district finances. It is this combination of centrally originating conditional grants

and limited local resources which gives decentralization in Uganda its specific and contradictory

character (Francis and James 2003).


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1.6. Research problem The government of Uganda’s efforts to have a national policy guiding GI activities in organizations in

the country has been started by the process of institutionalizing the SDI Decree, ministerial GI

policies, enacting the National Initiative of Monitoring and Evaluation Systems (NIMES) and

memorandum of cooperation among key GI stakeholders. Some of the organizations have been

cooperative and complied with the implementation of these efforts aimed at facilitating access to and

optimal use of geo-information to improve decision making. Others on the other hand are still

reluctant to comply even with their respective ministry policies on access, standards, pricing,

custodianship and privacy among others. Accordingly, this study seeks;

� To investigate how and identify why some organizations comply with common GI sharing policies while others do not.

� To investigate how and identify why some organizations comply with their respective ministry GI sharing policies while others do not.

The overarching challenge is why policy targets recurrently fail to comply with what policy designers

desired and anticipated even when compliance is perceptibly to their advantage.

1.7. The Research Approach A qualitative approach of inquiry was chosen for the research with the intention of providing an in-

depth description of the case (Mouton 2001). The study is interpretive in that the focus is to

understand the subjective interpretations of the various actors involved GI policy implementation

efforts in Uganda and is limited to the resource dependence perspective as one view that shapes and

influences compliance. This theory conceives inter-dependency of organizations as direct result of

exchange of resources of organizations with each other and with their environment (de Vries 2007;

Homburg 2008). The organization is viewed as existing in an environment that is made of resources

and constraints. The environment is more complex with many other factors, besides resources, that

can influence an organizational compliance but this study is restricted to resources. A case study

strategy following (Yin 2003) was considered suitable because the degree of compliance to GI

policies, herein investigated, did not appear obvious. The boundary between the case and the context

was not directly sharp. The case study method would allow the investigator to retain the holistic and

meaningful characteristics of real-life events such as organizational and managerial events. The unit

of analysis is individual compliance behaviour. The views, opinions and behaviour of individual

respondents are considered representative of collective behaviour of the organization. The study is

multilevel in that data gathering is to be carried out at the national and the provincial / district levels

(Piotti, Chilundo et al. 2006). This approach is required not only to gain insight into issues of

compliance and non compliance to hierarchical policies in a column power structure but also ascertain

the influence of local government authority on compliance. The overall research question is to find

out how and why some organizations follow nationally established rules, while others don’t? The

approach was theoretical, methodological, observational, descriptive, and interpretational as detailed

in the research matrix (Table 1-1). The descriptive approach was intended to describe, uncover what is

on the ground (what is out there, what has been done) and make lists and inventories. To this end, I

sought to establish rapport with the subjects, who are GI practitioners in order to achieve these goals

(Mouton 2001). Furthermore, this approach allowed me to give an accurate and in-depth account of

the observations and interviews carried out during the study, while capturing “thick” data as described

and experienced by the interviewees (Babbie and Mouton 2001). A multiplicity of methods was


7

employed in the data gathering process, including structured interviews with staff from different

functional areas and administrative levels, observation and an analysis of secondary data which was a

way of triangulating the findings as detailed in the research matrix. A research diary was maintained

to document interview notes and observations. In addition to these notes, various photographs of

artefacts were taken to strengthen the interpretive analysis. The research sub-questions are also shown

in the research matrix in table 1-1.

1.8. Justification of Research This research contributes to the body of literature on inter-organizational relationships specifically on

GI sharing practice by showing the motivations of organizations for engaging in collaborations with

their environments. It highlights the extent to which compliance or non compliance with hierarchical

GI policies can be explained by the resource dependence theory. An understanding of how variations

in resource dependencies influences compliance contributes to public managers’ better understanding

of the gap between policy expectations and practice in the formulation of appropriate national GI

policies. It is a follow up on recommendations of previous research by (Chaminama 2009) on analysis

of public sector cooperation and GI sharing using resource dependency perspective. As with most

researches, this study can also be used to test the feasibility of undertaking a more extensive study on

how resource dependencies influence organizational compliance to GI policies. All theorizing in

social research adds, implicitly or explicitly, upon the notion of human behaviour.

1.9. Research Aim, Objectives and Questions The study seeks to investigate the extent to which compliance to GI sharing policies in Uganda’s

public sector is dependent on the kind of resource relation. In other words, which type of resource

dependent relation (finance, information, and public administration authority) dominates when

complying and when not complying. The overall research question is to find out how and why some

organizations follow nationally established rules, while others don’t? To achieve the aim of the

research, objectives and sub-questions to collect the data have been included in the given research

matrix (Table 1-1).

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rix

Th

is r

ese

arc

h m

atr

ix in

clud

es r

ese

arc

h a

ppro

ach

, ob

ject

ives

, su

b-q

uest

ions

, me

thod

s an

d ex

pect

ed o

utco

me

s.

Tab

le 1

-1: R

esea

rch

Mat

rix

Res

earc

h ap

proa

ch

Res

earc

h ob

ject

ive

Res

earc

h su

b qu

estio

ns

Met

hod

(s)

Exp

ecte

d O

utco

me

Ch

apte

r 2

Th

eore

tical

(aim

:

sum

mar

izin

g

view

s an

d

con

stru

cts

fro

m

liter

atu

re)

1. T

o co

mpa

re

exis

ting

theo

ries

w

hic

h ex

pla

in

and

desc

ribe

typ

ical

pro

cess

es a

nd

diff

icu

lties

re

late

d to

(h

iera

rch

ical

) co

mpl

ianc

e

• W

hat

are

the

opp

osin

g vi

ews,

def

initi

ons

, lo

gics

an

d

con

stru

cts

in li

tera

ture

to

des

crib

e co

mpl

ianc

e?

• H

ow a

re t

hese

co

mm

on,

diff

eren

t fr

om e

ach

oth

er?

•

Wha

t is

th

e ad

vant

age

or

dis

adva

nta

ge o

f us

ing

each

o

f th

ese

view

s, d

efin

itio

ns a

nd

con

stru

cts?

•

How

ar

e th

ese

view

s,

def

initi

ons,

co

nst

ruct

s tr

ansl

ated

to

obs

erva

bles

, va

riab

les,

and

em

piric

al

con

stru

cts?

•

Wha

t is

the

stat

us

of

GI i

n U

gand

a?

�

A c

om

pila

tion

of

artic

les

/ b

ook

s o

n h

ow t

he

pro

cess

of

com

plia

nce

or

no

n co

mp

lian

ce i

s vi

ewed

fro

m a

Res

ourc

e D

epen

den

ce T

heo

ry (

RD

T)

per

spec

tive

and

/or

from

a T

ran

sact

ion

Co

st T

heo

ry

(TC

T)

per

spec

tive.

�

A

co

mp

ilatio

n

of l

itera

ture

on

GI

in

Uga

nd

a.

�

A t

able

sh

owin

g su

mm

ary

of

theo

ries

and

th

eir

view

o

n c

ompl

ianc

e

Ch

apte

r 3

Met

hod

olo

gica

l

(aim

: to

get

an

d

colle

ct d

ata)

2. T

o ob

serv

e co

mpl

ianc

e •

Wha

t m

ech

anis

m is

in p

lace

fo

r d

ata

shar

ing?

•

Whi

ch o

rgan

izat

ions

co

mp

ly, h

ow

an

d w

hy?

•

Whi

ch o

rgan

izat

ions

do

no

t co

mpl

y, h

ow

an

d w

hy?

•

Whi

ch o

rgan

izat

ions

are

invo

lved

in p

olic

y d

esig

n?

�

Str

uctu

red

and

ope

n e

nded

in

terv

iew

s o

n p

olic

y re

quire

men

ts

and

imp

lem

enta

tion

. �

O

bser

vatio

ns

of

impl

emen

tatio

n p

ract

ice.

�

D

ocu

men

tary

st

ud

y o

f fo

rmal

p

resc

riptio

ns,

di

rect

ives

an

d

dec

rees

fo

r o

rgan

izat

iona

l dat

a sh

arin

g.

�

A

list

of

form

al

pre

scrip

tions

�

A

ta

ble

o

f or

gani

zatio

ns

invo

lved

in

p

olic

y d

esig

n

Vis

-à-v

is

tho

se

that

co

mpl

y.

�

A t

able

sh

owin

g ho

w

thes

e th

eory

are

obs

erve

d

Ch

apte

r 4

Ob

serv

atio

nal

/

empi

rical

(a

im:

to

ob

serv

e /

colle

ct d

ata)

.

3. T

o in

vest

igat

e h

ow

lo

cal

and

n

atio

nal

ag

enci

es

per

ceiv

e /

enac

t co

mpl

ianc

e.

• W

hat

doe

s st

aff

at t

he

top

(n

atio

nal

org

aniz

atio

ns)

fe

el a

bou

t w

hat

loca

l o

rgan

izat

ion

s sh

ou

ld c

ompl

y to

, an

d h

ow

they

sho

uld

com

ply

with

that

?

• W

hat

is t

he l

ocal

/d

istr

ict

off

icia

l’s v

iew

abo

ut

what

is r

equ

ired

fro

m n

atio

nal

org

aniz

atio

ns?

•

Wha

t do

es

staf

f at

nat

iona

l le

vel

and

lo

cal

leve

l co

mm

uni

cate

ab

ou

t w

hen

th

ere

is

an

issu

e o

f co

mp

lian

ce?

• W

ho a

re t

he k

ey p

laye

rs /

sta

keh

old

ers

invo

lved

in

d

ata

shar

ing?

•

Do

org

aniz

atio

ns

com

ply

with

d

ata

shar

ing

pre

scrip

tions

?

�

Str

uctu

red

and

ope

n e

nded

in

terv

iew

s o

n p

olic

y aw

aren

ess,

per

cept

ions

an

d b

ehav

iou

r.

�

Doc

um

enta

ry

stu

dy

of

form

al

pre

scrip

tion

s,

dire

ctiv

es

and

d

ecre

es

for

org

aniz

atio

nal d

ata

shar

ing.

�

D

etai

ls r

egar

din

g da

ta e

xch

ange

s an

d re

qu

ests

.

�

A

list

of

reas

on

s w

hy

peo

ple

at

loca

l le

vel

com

ply

and

wh

y no

t.

�

A

UM

L ac

tivity

d

iagr

am

sho

win

g h

ow

co

mp

lian

ce

fro

m

top

to

d

own

is

en

acte

d.

INV

ES

TIG

AT

ING

TH

E IN

FLU

EN

CE

OF

RE

SO

UR

CE

DE

PE

ND

EN

CIE

S O

N C

OM

PLI

AN

CE

TO

NA

TIO

NA

L P

OLI

CIE

S O

F G

EO

-IN

FO

RM

AT

ION

: A R

ES

OU

RC

E D

EP

EN

DE

NC

E P

ER

SP

EC

TIV

E. A

CA

SE

ST

UD

Y O

F G

EO

-IN

FO

RM

AT

ION

SE

CT

OR

IN U

GA

ND

A

10

Res

earc

h ap

proa

ch

Res

earc

h ob

ject

ive

Res

earc

h su

b qu

estio

ns

Met

hod

(s)

Exp

ecte

d O

utco

me

Ch

apte

r 4

Des

crip

tive

(aim

: fin

d

ou

t

wh

at

is

ou

t

ther

e; w

hat

has

bee

n do

ne;

mak

e lis

ts

and

inve

nto

ries

)

4. T

o de

scrib

e w

hic

h el

emen

ts

of N

atio

nal

G

I sh

arin

g po

licie

s re

qui

re

com

plia

nce

and

w

hat

sort

o

f co

mpl

ianc

e ac

tion

s ar

e ta

ken

.

• W

hich

n

atio

nal

o

rgan

izat

ion

s h

ave

wh

ich

G

I p

olic

ies?

•

Wha

t ac

tion

s ha

ve th

e G

I pol

icie

s re

sulte

d in

?

• W

hat

are

char

acte

ristic

s o

f U

gan

dan

hie

rarc

hy o

f p

ubl

ic a

dm

inis

trat

ion

? D

o lo

cal

org

aniz

atio

ns t

end

to

wai

t fo

r n

atio

nal

inst

ruct

ion

s, o

r d

o t

hey

ten

d

to

act

auto

nom

ousl

y?

• D

o pu

blic

org

aniz

atio

ns

in U

gand

a ty

pic

ally

ten

d t

o

com

ply

with

hie

rarc

hic

al p

resc

ript

ion

s?

�

Bib

liogr

aph

ic

and

hi

sto

rical

co

mp

ilatio

n o

f N

atio

nal

do

cum

ents

. �

D

ocu

men

tary

st

udy

on

key

stak

eho

lder

s /

cust

odi

ans

of

fun

dam

enta

l dat

aset

s.

�

Doc

um

enta

ry s

tud

y on

im

plem

enta

tion

pro

cedu

re

for

pol

icie

s,

pres

crip

tions

, d

ecre

es a

nd

initi

ativ

es.

�

Str

uctu

red

int

ervi

ews

with

prim

ary

GI

min

istr

ies

and

GI i

nst

itutio

ns.

�

R

evie

w

of

do

cum

ents

o

n O

rgan

izat

ion

al g

oal

s an

d s

trat

egie

s �

P

erip

her

al o

bse

rvat

ion

wh

ere

chan

ce is

av

aile

d.

�

A t

able

sh

owin

g a

list

of G

I re

late

d

pol

icie

s,

a lis

t of

p

rimar

y ac

tors

an

d

a su

mm

ary

of

maj

or

ob

ject

ives

of

the

polic

y.

�

A

colu

mn

in

th

e ab

ove

ta

ble

w

ith

exam

ples

of

ac

tion

s ta

ken

by

min

iste

rial

staf

f.

Ch

apte

r 5

Inte

rpre

tatio

n

(aim

: fin

din

g

pat

tern

s;

find

ing

repe

ated

actio

ns

and

beh

avio

r;

find

ing

con

sist

enci

es

and

inco

nsi

sten

cies

5. T

o in

terp

ret

ho

w

dep

end

ence

on

wh

ich

reso

urce

in

fluen

ces

com

plia

nce

to

nat

ion

al

GI

shar

ing

po

licie

s.

• W

hy

do

so

me

org

aniz

atio

ns

follo

w

nat

ion

ally

es

tab

lish

ed r

ule

s w

hile

oth

ers

don

’t?

• W

hat

are

the

mot

ivat

ion

/ a

dva

ntag

es /

gai

ns f

or d

ata

sh

arin

g?

• W

hat

are

the

dis

adva

nta

ges

of

dat

a sh

arin

g?

• W

hat

are

the

pen

altie

s o

f n

on

com

plia

nce

/

viol

atio

n?

•

Do

the

pen

altie

s re

ally

mat

ter?

�

Str

uctu

red

and

ope

n e

nded

in

terv

iew

s o

n m

otiv

atio

n f

or

(non

e) c

om

plia

nce

. �

Q

ualit

ativ

e in

terp

reta

tion

on

re

aso

ns

for

com

plia

nce

or

non

com

plia

nce

. �

U

nder

stan

din

g an

d c

omp

aris

on

of

the

way

com

plia

nce

to

po

licie

s in

GI

as i

t re

late

s to

oth

er n

atio

nal

po

licie

s.

�

Foc

us

gro

up

disc

uss

ion

to

com

par

e b

ehav

iou

r w

ith o

ther

org

aniz

atio

ns.

�

A

des

crip

tion

of

ca

use-

effe

ct

anal

ysis

lin

kin

g b

ehav

iour

(e

nact

men

t)

to

exte

rnal

an

d

inte

rnal

ca

use

s.

�

A

des

crip

tion

w

ith

a p

erso

nal

vi

ew

on

(i

n)

con

sist

enci

es.

�

Inte

rpre

tatio

n o

n

reas

on

s fo

r co

mp

lian

ce

or

non

co

mpl

ianc

e.

Ch

apte

r 6

Gen

eral

izat

ion

6. A

sses

s if

com

plia

nce

is

a us

efu

l an

gle

to

inve

stig

ate

dat

a sh

arin

g.

• W

hat

new

ligh

t is

com

plia

nce

shed

din

g o

n p

rob

lem

s o

f G

I dat

a sh

arin

g an

d c

oop

erat

ion

?

�

Inte

rpre

tive

�

Inte

rpre

tatio

n of

w

hat

com

plia

nce

and

R

DT

ca

n

(not

) ex

pla

in c

on

cern

ing

GI

shar

ing

and

coo

per

atio

n.


11

1.11. Proposed outline of chapters for the research . The discussion of compliance to GI policies in the Ugandan public sector is in seven chapters.

Chapter 1: Introduction

This chapter introduces the topic under investigation. The researcher lays out the problem statement,

background to the study as well as aim and objectives of the study.

Chapter 2: A theoretical review of the issue ‘compliance’

This chapter gives an account of the literature consulted on the research topic, and describes how the

topic fits into existing literature as well as its significance. It includes an explanation and justification

for the use of the resource dependency theory over transaction cost economics and institutional

theory, followed by a description of the operationalization of the theory. It answers research objective

one.

Chapter 3: Data collection method on compliance

This chapter describes the research design and methodology utilized during the study, as well the

shortcomings and possible errors encountered. Research objective two is answered herein. The aim is

to get and collect data in a methodological way. The emphasis is on how to observe compliance.

Chapter 4: Nature of compliance to GI policy

This chapter provides an overview of the results and discusses the findings of the study in Uganda.

Research objective three and four is answered herein. The emphasis is on describing what is out there,

what has been done, to make lists and inventories.

Chapter 5: Analysis and interpretation of findings

This chapter analyses and interprets the findings of the study fulfilling the fifth objective of the study.

The emphasis is on how to explain the findings.

Chapter 6: Implication of findings

This chapter bases on the interpretation to highlight any new knowledge about compliance, data

sharing and the theories used beyond the Ugandan case. This research objective six is addressed.

Chapter 7: Conclusion and Recommendations

Based on the findings of the research, the chapter provides the answer to the overall research

objective by answering the research questions and recommendations were made.


12

2. A theoretical review of the issue ‘compliance’

2.1. Introduction This chapter addresses the first research objective of comparing existing theories which explain and

describe typical processes and difficulties related to hierarchical compliance. The approach is

theoretical with the aim to summarize views and constructs from literature that explain compliance.

The method I employed is a search and review of literature viewing compliance. The resource

dependency theory (RDT) perspective was preferred over Transaction cost theory (TCT) perspective

and the institutional theory perspective. The sequence that I address the objective is by first studying

the theories to decompose them to assertions or ideas that can be observed. Ascertain the theory ideas

that relate closest to my concepts. The outcome is a table showing how elements of these theories can

be observed and the relation of concepts to the theory ideas.

2.2. Literature search strategy The choice of literature used for the study was guided by the key elements from theoretical definition

of compliance. I particularly targeted a number of articles which relate to compliance from public

administration theories and governance theories including TCT, RDT, agency and institutional

theories. The literature search was iterative and partly guided by related previous research that draws

from the same theoretical perspective as building block. The selection criterion was such that the first

step was to isolate articles with substantive relevance i.e. those that relate to the theoretical framework

and those relating to institutional policy compliance. For this purpose, the criteria for searching

literature was articles having titles containing phrases such as ‘DATA SHARING and

INSTITUTIONAL theory*’, POLICY and COMPLIANCE were used. In a first scanning of the issue

and based on recommendations of previous M. Sc. research like (Chaminama 2009) on resource

dependence perspective , I chose ‘PFEFFER and (or) SALANCIK’ as well as ‘WILLIAMSON’ as

author search terms. Secondly, keywords central to the theories were chosen as search criteria to

eliminate non relevant articles, title keywords ‘RESOURCE DEPENDENC*’, INSTITUTIONAL

THEORY as well as ‘TRANSACTION COST ECONOM*’ were used. By scanning through the titles

of multiple search results, relevant articles were selected. Relevant ‘Related articles’ from search

engines were also retrieved. Some articles were simply forwarded by resourceful colleagues that knew

my research interests. A brief summary of the of the relevant literature search results are shown in

table 2-1 bellow with the comparison of perspectives theories. The theory details are explained in

subsequent sections.

INV

ES

TIG

AT

ING

TH

E IN

FLU

EN

CE

OF

RE

SO

UR

CE

DE

PE

ND

EN

CIE

S O

N C

OM

PLI

AN

CE

TO

NA

TIO

NA

L P

OLI

CIE

S O

F G

EO

-IN

FO

RM

AT

ION

: A

RE

SO

UR

CE

DE

PE

ND

EN

CE

PE

RS

PE

CT

IVE

. A C

AS

E S

TU

DY

OF

GE

O-I

NF

OR

MA

TIO

N S

EC

TO

R IN

UG

AN

DA

13

Tab

le 2

-1: S

umm

ary

and

com

paris

on o

f the

orie

s Is

sues

In

stitu

tiona

l The

ory

R

esou

rce

Dep

ende

ncy

Theo

ry

Tra

nsac

tion

Cos

t Eco

nom

ic T

heor

y

Uni

t of

an

alys

is

Ind

ivid

ual

, o

rgan

isat

iona

l an

d

inte

r-

orga

nis

atio

nal

be

havi

ou

r /

actio

n

Org

aniz

atio

nal

rel

atio

n t

o e

nvir

onm

ent

The

tra

nsa

ctio

n

Foc

us

Pro

cess

o

f in

stitu

tion

al

chan

ge.

Org

anis

atio

ns

ma

ke

nor

mat

ivel

y ra

tion

al

choi

ces

sha

ped

by

soci

al c

on

text

. F

ocu

s o

n

exte

nt

to w

hic

h o

rgan

isat

ion

al b

ehav

iour

is

com

plia

nt,

hab

itual

, u

nre

flect

ive

and

soci

ally

d

efin

ed

(im

itativ

e fo

rces

an

d

trad

itio

ns)

Org

anis

atio

nal

b

eha

vio

ur

is

ratio

nal

an

d

eco

nom

ical

ly

just

ified

(s

hap

ed

by

eco

no

mic

cont

ext)

.

Fo

cuse

s o

n

the

orga

niz

atio

n’s

co

mp

eten

cies

and

capa

bilit

ies

of

coo

rdin

atin

g p

rod

uct

ive

reso

urc

es.

Mai

n fo

cus

on

co

stlin

ess

of e

con

omic

exc

han

ge,

(in)

effi

cien

cies

in p

rod

uct

ion

an

d se

rvic

e p

roce

sses

.

Sel

ectio

n p

roce

sses

sh

ape

the

surv

iva

l of o

rgan

isat

ion

al fo

rms.

An

d

on

tran

sact

ion

s an

d

the

cost

s th

at

go

to

com

ple

ting

tran

sact

ion

s b

y o

ne in

stitu

tiona

l mo

de r

athe

r th

an

ano

ther

.

Vie

w

of

Com

plia

nce

Org

anis

atio

ns

ten

d

to

com

ply

w

ith

pred

om

inan

t n

orm

s, t

radi

tions

and

so

cial

influ

ence

s in

th

eir

inte

rnal

an

d ex

tern

al

envi

ron

men

ts

lead

ing

to h

om

ogen

eity

in

thei

r st

ruct

ure

s an

d a

ctiv

ities

.

Exp

lain

s b

oth

th

e p

ersi

sten

ce

and

the

hom

oge

neity

of p

hen

om

ena

Co

mp

lianc

e (r

elat

ions

hip

) ex

ists

b

etw

een

soci

al

syst

em

s,

to

the

exte

nt

that

th

e

mai

nte

nan

ce o

f so

cial

sys

tem

s is

in

so

me

wa

y

relia

nt o

n o

ne o

r m

ore

res

ourc

e sy

stem

s.

Det

erm

inat

ion

of

wh

at

is

and

wha

t is

n

ot

with

in o

rgan

izat

ions

’ str

ateg

ic n

eed

s ar

e re

sult

of

po

litic

al

neg

otia

tion

pro

cess

es

in

wh

ich

org

aniz

atio

ns

pre

ss

for

rule

s an

d

pra

ctic

es

whi

ch b

enef

it th

eir

inte

rest

s.

Co

mp

lian

ce i

s ex

pre

ssed

as

a ki

nd

of

cost

, n

amel

y e

nfo

rcem

ent

cost

.

The

hig

her

th

e nu

mb

er o

f ru

les,

th

e hi

gher

th

e co

st o

f en

forc

ing

com

plia

nce

e.g

. in

cas

e o

f a la

rge

bur

eau

crac

y.

Cen

tra

l cl

aim

is

that

tra

nsa

ctio

ns

will

be

hand

led

in

suc

h a

way

as t

o m

inim

ize

the

cost

s in

volv

ed i

n c

arry

ing

them

ou

t (lo

oks

at

effic

ien

cy o

f tr

ansa

ctio

ns)

so

hie

rarc

hie

s cr

eate

hig

h c

om

plia

nce

envi

ron

me

nt w

ithin

the

org

anis

atio

n.

The

lev

el o

f ve

rtic

al i

nteg

ratio

n i

s d

eter

min

ed b

y th

e re

lativ

e

cost

s o

f us

ing

mar

kets

o

r em

plo

ying

ca

pita

l w

ithin

th

e

org

anis

atio

n.

Rol

e of

en

viro

nmen

t

A

sou

rce

o

f pr

actic

es

to

whi

ch

orga

nis

atio

n c

onf

orm

s.

A

sou

rce

of

reso

urc

es

on

w

hic

h an

org

anis

atio

n d

epen

ds

and

so

urc

e o

f co

nstr

ain

ts

A

sou

rce

of

opp

ort

un

ism

, un

cert

ain

ty

aris

ing

fro

m

th

e

com

ple

xity

and

dyn

amis

m o

f tec

hn

olo

gy a

nd

mar

kets

.

Ele

men

ts/

inde

pend

ent

varia

bles

Org

anis

atio

nal

tr

aditi

on

s,

legi

slat

ion

,

soci

al b

elie

fs,

polit

ical

pre

ssu

res

Fu

nct

ion

al p

ress

ure

s (p

erfo

rman

ce)

Info

rmat

ion

, fin

ance

s,

hum

an

reso

urc

e,

tech

no

logi

cal r

eso

urce

s in

clu

din

g IC

T

un

cert

ain

ty,

tran

sact

ion

s fr

equ

ency

,

asse

t-sp

eci

ficity

Ass

umpt

ion

Org

anis

atio

ns

con

form

to

ext

ern

al n

orm

s.

Peo

ple

sat

isfie

r.

Org

aniz

atio

ns

do

su

rviv

e be

caus

e th

ey

are

com

ply

ing

with

th

e d

eman

ds

/ co

nst

rain

ts

fro

m t

hei

r en

viro

nm

ents

.

The

b

elie

f th

at

the

risk

of

op

port

unis

m

is i

nh

eren

t i

n

man

y

tran

sact

ion

s.

Sou

rce

(Eis

enh

ard

t 1

98

8;

Oliv

er

199

7;

Dac

in,

Goo

dst

ein

et a

l. 2

002

)

(Pfe

ffer

and

Sal

anci

k 2

003

; d

e V

ries

20

07;

de

Vrie

s 2

008

; H

om

bu

rg 2

008

), (

Oliv

er 1

997

)

(Hill

19

90;

No

rth

19

90;

Gh

osh

al a

nd M

ora

n 1

996

; D

avid

and

Han

200

4;

Car

ter

and

Ho

dgs

on 2

00

6).


14

2.3. How various theories approach the issue ‘compl iance’ Organizations, just like institutions, provide a structure to human interaction. Modelling organizations

is analyzing governance structures, skills, and how learning by doing will determine the organizations

success over time. Both what organizations come into existence and how they evolve are

fundamentally influenced by the institutional framework. In turn, they influence how the institutional

framework evolves. The major role of institutions in a society is to reduce uncertainty by establishing

a stable (but not necessarily efficient) structure (of rules) to human interaction (North 1990).

Organizational studies such as institutional theory, transaction cost economic theory and resource

dependence theory can be used as a theoretical framework to explain organizational compliance

behaviour to rules and policies as shown in table 2-1. Compliance assumes at least two organizations

interacting. From one view, Resource dependency theory perspective: I consider organizational

dependency on the both internal and external interactions and how institutions guide those

dependencies. The internal interactions are the managerial choices within the organisations decision-

making guided by an economic rationality and by motives of profitability. External interactions are

strategic factors that influence what resources are selected, as well as how they are selected and

deployed (Oliver 1997). The focus is on how organisations are related through resources. From

another view, Transaction cost economic theory perspective: I look more at the efficiency of

institutions (Amburgey and Rao 1996; Groot 2001; de Vries, Lewis et al. 2003). The focus is on the

degree to which organisations incur enforcement costs. From another view on organisational

compliance behaviour: the institutional theory perspective, the emphasis is on the social framework of

norms, values, and taken-for-granted assumptions about what constitutes appropriate or acceptable

economic behaviour. Organisational choices are constrained not only by the technological,

informational, and income limits but also socially constructed limits that are distinctly human in

origin, like norms, habits and customs (Oliver 1997).

There is advantage of looking at organizational dependency because organizations depend on both the

internal and external interactions. External interactions can be changes in institutional environment

say a change of laws. Likewise, there is advantage of looking at efficiency of institutions because

organizations seek to minimize costs, effort and time involved for interaction taking place among

them. Organizations seek to minimize costs through vertical integration and (seemingly) quasi-

integration governance structures for the purpose of adapting to environmental uncertainty (de

Montalvo 2003). Additionally, there is advantage in studying organisational compliance by looking at

the way organisational behaviours and actions are influenced by socially constructed limits and

conformity to social expectations (Oliver 1997). The reasons of organisational behaviour are further

than economic optimization to social rationalization and social responsibility.

However, institutional theory emphasizes that organisational structures and processes become similar

with accepted norms for organisations of a particular type. New organisations adopt practices

common at their time of founding. Overtime, these practices become the standard way of executing

tasks (Eisenhardt 1988). Due to the uncertainty in establishing what the contextual conditions were

that existed at the time of founding all the individual organisations; coupled with challenges of

discerning, in terms of compliance, what constitutes habits, norms, traditions and beliefs, the

institutional theory perspective was not considered feasible as a theoretical framework for this study.


15

For my objective, two main theories; TCT and RDT that extensively describe the issue of compliance

in their view on integration and inter-dependency of organizations were considered. I concisely

outlined the theory’s main tenets to gauge consistency on how these are operationalized, and assessed

their empirical support as further on discussed in detail.

2.3.1. Transaction Cost Economic Theory approach

In a multilevel public administration dealing with information, one could expect transaction costs

when more than one agency is involved. In other words, with any information exchange, one could

expect transaction cost but especially in case of trans-vertical, trans-horizontal information exchanges,

transaction costs may get so high that there would simply be no incentive for any transaction (de Vries

2006). The costliness of information is the key to the costs of transacting, which consists of the costs

of measuring the valuable attributes of what is being exchanged and the costs of protecting rights and

policing and enforcing agreements. The costliness of economic exchange distinguishes the transaction

costs from traditional economic theories (North 1990).

TCT, at its core, focuses on ‘transactions and the costs that go to completing transactions by one

institutional mode rather than another’ (David and Han 2004). The transaction, a transfer of a good or

service, is the unit of analysis in TCT, and the means of effecting the transaction is the principal

outcome of interest (David and Han 2004). According to TCT theory, the level of vertical integration

is determined by the relative costs of using markets or employing resources within the firm (Rasheed

and Geiger 2001). TCT looks at efficiency of transactions. The efficiency of transaction is the sum of

both production and transaction cost. The total costs of production consist of the resource inputs of

land, labour and capital involved both in transforming the physical attributes of a good and in

transacting – defining, protecting, and enforcing property rights to goods (the right to use, the right to

derive income from use of, the right to exclude, and the right to exchange). In other words, in addition

to transformation costs, transaction costs are a part of the costs of production. When individuals are

fully informed about the exchange commodity and the terms of trade known to both parties, no effort

is required to effect exchange (low uncertainty). But when the costs of acquiring information and,

specifically, of measuring are added, the problems become major ones. The measurement plus the

costliness of enforcement together determine the costs of transacting (North 1990).

Parties to an exchange must be able to enforce compliance at a (transaction) cost such that the

exchange is worthwhile to them. Compliance relates to the enforcement costs and the degree to which

behaviour is regulated. Enforcement issues arise because of not knowing the attributes of the good or

service or all the characteristics of the performance of agents. Enforcement can come from second

party retaliation. It can also result from internally enforced codes of conduct or by societal sanctions

or a coercive third party (the state). Enforcement poses no problem when it is in the interests of other

party to live up to agreements - – that is, in terms of costliness of measuring and enforcing

agreements, the benefits of living up to contracts will exceed the costs (North 1990).

Shown in figure 2.1, the transaction costs, as opposed to enforcement costs, are the costs and effort

involved to interact between organizations. The more the rules and regulations, the less the transaction

costs (less conflict), and the more the effectiveness. Enforcement costs are directly related to


16

compliance. The enforcement costs are the costs of enforcing compliance to the rules say in case of a

large bureaucracy. If the rules are many, then enforcing compliance is costly whilst the transaction

cost, the cost and effort to interact between organizations, is low as shown at point E. This is because

with no uncertainty, there is less autonomy leading to high compliance with policies. And if the rules

are complex, more transaction costs incurred to search hence total costs increase as shown at B. That

is because of the high uncertainty, leading to high transaction costs hence low compliance. Such

transactions must thus carry a very heavy importance for the transaction costs to be justified (de Vries

2006).

Figure 2-1: The total cost curve from transaction a nd enforcement cost

2.3.2. Resource Dependency Theory approach

Drawing from previous M. Sc. research and recommendations by (Chaminama 2009), this study also

uses the resource dependence theory to explain GI organization practice in Uganda regarding to their

compliance and non-compliance to GI sharing prescriptions. The resource-based perspective, unlike

the transaction cost economic theory, takes a broader view of resources, focusing on the

organization’s competencies and capabilities of coordinating productive resources that are not

transaction specific (Rasheed and Geiger 2001). Resource Dependency indicates that a relationship

exists between social systems, to the extent that the maintenance of social systems is in some way

reliant on one or more resource systems (Becker 2006; de Vries 2007). The resource can be in terms

of observables like information, financial, human resource, access to public infrastructure or

technological say ICT (de Vries 2007; de Vries 2008).

In order to gain access to external resources, organizations may have to comply with arrangements

that have not been designed to suit them (Homburg 2008). As organizations get increasingly

connected, the very determination of what is and what is not within their strategic needs or within

their coerced strategies is likely to be the result of political negotiation processes in which

organizations press for rules and practices which benefit their interests. Organizations with power will

advocate rules which permit them the widest possible use of their power, while those organizations in

less powerful positions seek rules that protect them from the powerful (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003; de


17

Vries 2008). The power of geo-information is most pronounced in spatial policy making (Georgiadou

and Stoter 2010). The idea is that power operates by actors pursuing their particular interests by

reflecting on and interpreting their own situations. An organization A exercises power over

organization B when A makes B do something B would otherwise not do.

Organizations will see little benefit in supporting and participating in initiatives that they consider

pointless. In terms of the institutionalization of a system, it follows that the support of local officials

(organizations) is fundamental yet it will not occur if the system presented is meaningless and not

beneficial to their organizational interests. Conversely, local officials would support the

institutionalization of a system that aims to solve their problems. Institutionalization is an issue that

has to do with power (Silva 2007)

For that reason, managing external demands doesn’t imply that organizations rush to comply.

Compliance, although important for maintaining an immediately critical exchange relationship, is a

constraint, an admission of limited autonomy and may not be in long-term organization interests. This

presents a predicament for public managers, involved in formulation of national GI policies,

concerning the willingness of some organizations to ignore constraints and of other organizations to

ignore their violations as only two factors that influence whether sanctions really affect organizational

discretion (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003).

Similarly, (Oliver 1990) highlights the importance of the distinction between voluntary and mandated

relationship formation, where organizations establish linkages or exchanges with others to meet

necessary legal or regulatory requirements from higher authorities that otherwise might not have

occurred voluntarily, because explanations and consequences of relationship formation associated

with each are fundamentally different. It gives understanding on organizational choices with less

focus on internal dynamics but more on situations within which the organization is located, pressures

and constraints that emanate from such.

According to (Oliver 1990; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003; Homburg 2008), the need for resources to

attain their goals; including financial, physical resources, information, legal authority, political and

social legitimacy obtained from the external environment, makes organizations engage in exchanges

and transactions with others because organizations are not self sufficient. For continuing to provide

this support, the external organizations or social units may demand certain actions from the recipients

in return. This fact of organizational dependence on external sources of resources makes the external

control of organizational compliance behaviour both possible and almost inevitable. Much as the

organizational environment can be made of many complex aspects to which an organization can

comply for resources, this study focuses on the aspect of hierarchical national GI policies and the

elements therein demanding compliance. It should be recognized that resource dependency is only one

component of the relationship between social systems and broader environmental systems in which

resource systems are embedded (Becker 2006).

(Oliver 1990) proposes six critical contingencies of relationship formation as general determinants of

Inter Organizational Relationships (IORs) across organizations, settings, and linkages: necessity,

asymmetry, reciprocity, efficiency, stability, and legitimacy. These contingencies, she asserts, are the

causes that prompt or motivate organizations to establish IORs, that is, they explain the reasons why


18

organizations choose to enter into relationships with one another. Although each determinant is a

separate and sufficient cause of relationship formation, these contingencies may interact or occur

concurrently when the organization decides to establish an IOR in say the public sector (Oliver 1990;

de Vries 2007).

Oliver (1990) however states two delimiting assumptions that underlie the proposed contingencies.

First, the organizations make conscious, intentional decisions to establish an IOR for explicitly

formulated purposes. Second, the contingencies explain why organizations enter into relations from an

organizational (top-management) perspective, even though IORs may occur between the sub-units of

two organizations or between individuals at lower hierarchical levels.

2.3.3. Evaluating Transaction cost and Resource dep endency theory

Transaction cost theory uses three critical dimensions for characterizing transactions as uncertainty,

the frequency with which transactions recur, and the degree to which durable transaction-specific

investments are incurred (Carter and Hodgson 2006). There is a significant amount of discrepancy and

disagreement regarding the operationalization of these three core constructs and the interpretations of

their key relationships (David and Han 2004). The uncertainty variable for example, provides the most

frequent reason for a study being characterized as partly inconsistent. There is support for asset

specificity but a number of studies find mixed and conflicting results for uncertainty, depending on

the form, definition and the way that it is operationalized (David and Han 2004; Carter and Hodgson

2006).

Generally, in any empirical study, more than one type of theoretical explanation could be consistent

with the data. In particular, and especially because of difficulties in observing and directly measuring

transaction costs: enforcement costs for that matter, and the lingering doubt about its empirical

grounding; the resource dependency theory, a non-transaction cost explanation was considered to be

viable. Furthermore, in the absence of transaction cost measures, even where the results from the

studies are consistent with the predictions of TCT, it would not demonstrate that the outcomes are

necessarily associated with transaction cost minimizing behaviour. The transaction cost arising from

the effort and time needed to find information (in registers and/or databases) and data mining costs are

difficult to explicitly address (de Vries, Lewis et al. 2003). Given that TCT was found to be on shaky

ground without solidifying the empirical foundation: with abstract dimensions; challenges in

ascertaining contextual conditions, practices and norms at the time of organisational founding for the

use of institutional theory, a broad competence or resource-based explanation of vertical integration

that is more consistent with my case empirical basis and the phenomenon being investigated

(compliance behaviour) was thus more adequate to the task (Carter and Hodgson 2006).

2.4. Conceptual framework The study is interpretive in that the focus is to understand the underlying reasons for compliance

behaviour; validate the subjective interpretations of the various actors involved GI policy

implementation efforts in Uganda and is limited to the resource dependence perspective. For this

research, I decided to focus on three resources: information, public administration authority and

financial resource as the organizational environment. The organization is viewed as existing in an

environment that is made of these resources as well as constraints. The three are not exhaustive but


19

represent a useful viewpoint to explain compliance from a RDT perspective. The environment is more

complex with many other factors that can influence an organization but this study is restricted to these

three resources. The thrust of this research was on ascertaining which of the three resources is most

crucial for compliance, the one not necessarily crucial or how a combination of resources can

influence compliance.

Compliance, the act of one following another, is considered a kind of behaviour. Organizational

compliance behaviour is shaped by interaction with the environment in terms of resource exchange.

The unit of analysis is individual compliance behaviour. The views and opinions of the individual

respondents where GI compliance behaviour is concerned are representative of collective GI

compliance behaviour of the organization. Collective individual compliance behaviour is taken to be

organizational compliance behaviour. Individual respondents are considered to comply if they wholly

abide by the GI policies and regulations. Organizations are considered to not comply to GI policies if

the GI practitioners undertake independent autonomous decisions where a policy requires compliance.

Selective / partial compliance, where suitable elements of a policy are complied to and others ignored,

is considered as no compliance. Table 2-2 shows the concepts, the dimensions on which the concepts

can be observed and the implication of the dimensions variability to the concept of compliance and

autonomy.

Table 2-2: Conceptual framework

Dimension Concept

Type of Resource Autonomy Compliance

Financial -

economic

Money,

Finances.

A lot of own money leads to

high autonomy. Little own

money leads to low

autonomy.

Little own money leads to

high compliance.

A lot of own money leads

to low compliance.

Information Data, aggregate data.

A lot of own information

leads to high autonomy.

Little own information leads

to low autonomy.

A lot of own information

leads to low compliance.

Little own information

leads to high compliance

Public

administration

authority

Coercion instruments;

laws, regulations,

externally enforced

codes.

Low influence of public

administration authority

(coercive third party) leads

to high autonomy.

High influence /

enforcement from public

authority lead to high

compliance.

The conceptual figure 2.2 shows the concepts and the types of resource dependencies considered.

Compliance and autonomy are the dependent variables while information, finances and public

administration authority dependencies are the independent variables. The study is to investigate how

variations in the three types of resources lead to variations in organizational behaviour leading to

compliance or autonomy from the RDT perspective.


20

Figure 2-2: Conceptual picture showing dependent an d independent variables

2.5. GI policy initiatives in Uganda According to (Karatunga 2002; Batungi 2005; Chaminama 2009), there is no nationally coordinated

policy on GI access and use that government, private organizations and users have to follow to

purchase, share, and exchange and deliver geo-information services. The major effort towards a

national GI policy is the Decree on Spatial Data Infrastructure which states that Uganda shall have the

spatial data infrastructure needed to support its economic growth, social and environmental interests,

backed by national standards, guidelines, and policies on community access to data and or

information. An overview of initiatives towards the establishment of a Uganda Spatial Data

Infrastructure (USDI) were highlighted with emphasis placed on aspects of the SDI framework like

core datasets, common policies on access, pricing, privacy, custodianship and memoranda for data

sharing and obstacles to implementation. The concerned institutions were supposed to accomplish

particular requirements to the coordinating body within one year (2002-2003), like agreement on

fundamental datasets, standards and custodianship, although this has not materialized for all despite

multiple implementation efforts over the past six years. The SDI decree (a result of World Bank GIS

report) has since remained a draft policy awaiting implementation by parliament as is the

constitutional requirement in Uganda.

The delay has mainly been attributed to the political nature of Government-to-government integration

with rope pulling among ministries in a bid to reinforce existing power balances (de Vries 2007; de

Vries 2008; Georgiadou and Stoter 2010). In essence, the national mapping agency, under ministry of

lands, housing and urban development, historically commands and controls the largest resource by

way of geo-information and related GI technology (ICT) for data capture and manipulation and its a

legal requirement to have the country’s land related data centralized in this ministry. Most

organizations are dependent on this ministry’s information resources for all their base datasets. With

this legal and historical advantage as instruments of organizational manipulation, the ministry desires

to be the resident home for the NSDI citing issues like data quality control to which other ministries

have contested because of their shared interest in the same. This is evidence for the assumption that

the role of ICT in G2G is political in nature, aiming to reinforce existing power balances (de Vries

2008; de Vries 2008).

Registered achievements are the inclusion of GIS/SDI work in the NIMES under the prime minister’s

office and Uganda Info medium term programs, formation of GIS User/Partners Group, election of

R

D

T

Compliance

Autonomy

Public Admin. Dependencies

GI Organization Financial dependencies

Information dependencies


21

Uganda on UNECA-CODI committee and acceptable and harmonized data collection specifications

and sharing among spatial data producers of core data sets (Muhwezi 2007). ECA has been providing

assistance to Member States in developing national geographic information infrastructures (NSDI) by

seeking to integrate SDI policies into the very successful work on National Information and

Communication Infrastructure (NICI) plans and strategies although progress has been very slow, due

mainly to poor awareness and understanding of the link between the content and components of the

SDI on the one hand, and the day-to-day decisions and activities of society on the other.

Developing an SDI has sometimes been seen as an end in itself. Therefore, given the limited financial

resources available to government, priority is given to supposedly more pressing activities without

realizing the dependence of most of them on the availability of timely, accurate and reliable geo-

information resources as they don’t see a close link between the geo-information products and societal

needs. This funding constraint has stalled some of the activities for concrete implementation of

technical components of NSDI. The National Information policy enables governments have a direct

impact through legislation: copyright; freedom of information; and data protection (Muir and

Oppenheim 2002). An additional challenge with Uganda National Information and Communication

Technology Policy (NICI) under ministry of Works Housing and Communication (MWHC) is that it

focuses on information as a resource for development and the mechanisms for accessing it but does

not recognize the role of geo-information in the nation’s sustainable development process. The GIS

Task Force that was established by Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development in year

2000 has for long been non-functional (Karatunga 2002).

Article 41 of the 1995 Ugandan constitution provides for the right of access to information in the

possession of the state. Pursuant to this article 41 is the ‘Access to Information Act of 2005’ that

prescribes the classes of information referred to in that article; the procedure for obtaining access to

that information, and for related matters such as the fee as the cost of retrieval or reproduction and the

power of the minister to prescribe in the regulations for contravention of any of the regulations. This

legislation is concerned primarily with facilitating general access to information created by, or held by

Government, while ensuring that individuals are aware of, and have some control over data that

concerns them at personal level. Thus the basic principle of the Act is that government-held

information should be freely available to those who seek it unless good reason can be shown in a

particular case why it should not be. Typically there’s also a right of appeal to an independent body

against decisions made by a government department refusing access. An open and transparent public

sector also requires a right to receive information disseminated by the government on its own

initiative (Muir and Oppenheim 2002).

The 1998 Land Act and the Access to Information Act of 2005, legislatively actualized most of the

reforms provided for in the 1995 Constitution, while the Land Sector Strategic Plan (LSSP) 2001-

2011 provided the implementation framework for execution of sector wide reforms in the land sector.

One of the strategic objectives under LSSP was the development of a national land policy to serve as

a systematic frame work for addressing the role of land in national development, land ownership,

distribution, utilization, alienability, management and control. It is worth noting that even with

legislation in place which indirectly affect GI, there is no specific national GI policy yet. In principle,

an Act of parliament should follow the policy because it is the Act that operationalizes the policy. The

policy is vital in guiding implementation of the provisions of the Act, streamline its objectives and


22

guard against contradictions and inconsistencies. Given that there is no specific functioning GI policy

and regulation guiding the practice, values emerge and decline at both central and decentralized level

(Nyemera 2008; Miscione and de Vries 2009).

Major data producing organizations are controlled by different ministries. Procedures and regulations

guiding the data producer organizations are created by individual parent ministries / organizations.

Data producers are encouraged to have memorandums of understanding signed to effect data

exchange amongst them for this is most likely to have a positive impact on reducing the price of

datasets besides the formalization of collaborations. In this way, data exchange between organizations

would be institutionalized thus enabling lawful transactions like the memorandum of cooperation

between Karamoja Data Centre (KDC) and Directorate of Water Development (DWD). Apart from

the private institutions, copyright of data producers are nonexistent. Copyright policy in the geo-

information sector is necessary to protect the works of the public and data producers (INSPIRE,

UNECA, FGDC) (Nyemera 2008). There are varying standards and dissemination methods

(Karatunga 2002; Nyemera 2008). Various organizations use different standards leading to various GI

datasets and projections. Some organizations like Ministry of Local government (MLG) consider

standards to be uncontrolled and developed by unofficial consensus with no controlling body while

others like LSD state that its controlled by law. Organizations like LSD use national level standards,

metadata and international standards. The National Bureau of Standards is the controlling body

though lacks expertise on GI aspects hence every organization derives uses its own depending on their

needs and interests (Nyemera 2008).

Ultimately data sharing networks are made up of people and the relationships between those people.

Any system relying on people and relationships is subject to the complexities of social coordination

and the influences guiding or motivating involved individuals. One of the most difficult factors to

address or change may be the fundamental beliefs or attitudes of individuals with authority over

decisions regarding data sharing (Tulloch and Harvey 2005). The sharing of data among different

organizations would require them to develop and adopt standards that cannot be attained without

intense coordination and negotiations among the different institutions involved (Hanseth, Monteiro et

al. 1996).

2.6. Concluding remark A number of key papers that could explain compliance were evaluated. One theory which is

prominent in many of these papers is Resource Dependency Theory (RDT). This theory approaches

compliance from the perspective of how different organizations are related through resources. The

alternative was Transaction Cost Theory, which views compliance primarily as the degree to which

organizations incur enforcement costs. Due to its broader view of resources by RDT, difficulties in

observing and directly measuring the abstract transaction costs and the lingering doubt about TCT

empirical grounding, the RDT theory perspective was preferred to over TCT perspective in the this

study on organizational compliance to national GI policies. Financial, Information and public

administration authority were considered as the three resources in operationalizing the Resource

dependency theory and data about these is collected in the next chapter. An overview of GI policy

initiates and integration efforts in Uganda was also presented.


23

3. Data collection method on compliance

3.1. Introduction This chapter addresses the second research objective of how to observe compliance. The aim is to get

and collect data in a methodological way. I employed a qualitative method based on interviews,

documentation, observation, archival records and physical artefacts. The sequence of the subsections

in this chapter is the research design, data collection, formulation of propositions, and reliability of

findings as well as the limitations encountered. The intended outcome was a list of descriptions how

organizations comply with policies.

3.2. Research design and Methodological framework

3.2.1. Case explanation

To observe compliance to GI policies, key organizations at both the national and local level that are

involved in GI policy design and implementation were select. These were from three administrative

areas of Kampala, Mukono and Entebbe. The organizations that were considered at national level

were the ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, NWSC and the ministry of Local

Government all found in Kampala City which is the seat of the central government. The actors in at

the national level are mainly commissioners, strategic managers, lobbyists and technical consultants.

These are involved in GI policy formulation and supervising policy implementation.

The districts of Kampala, Mukono and Entebbe were considered at the local level. The organizations

in Kampala district were Kampala City Council and Kampala water; Mukono district had the

department of Lands and Surveys and Mukono Town Council; Entebbe district had Entebbe

Municipal Council, DWRM and the department of Lands and Surveys. The actors at this level were

the GI practitioners involved in fulltime work with geo-information and implement the GI policies.

These involve the departmental heads, surveyors, cartographers and GI technicians. There activities

lead to the production of topographic maps, cadastral layouts / plans, road networks, land use and land

cover maps. The study was carried out in a period of four weeks in the month of October 2009.

3.2.2. Employing a multiple case study

I chose to rely on explanatory multiple-case (holistic) design. Such is a design where the units within

the case: geo-information organizations, are examined with the same unit of analysis: compliance

behaviour, but in three different administrative contexts: Kampala, Mukono and Entebbe. In other

words, organizations’ compliance to GI policies in the three cases was studied and compared using the

same unit of analysis. It is useful because multiple-case designs are considered to be stronger than

single-case designs (Yin 2003). The case study methodology was preferred in studying organizational

compliance to GI policies because the focus was on a contemporary phenomenon (compliance

behaviour) within a real life context. Also, the research questions are posed to gain an understanding

on the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions (Yin 2003).


24

The focus was on just one instance; that is the compliance behaviour of the GI organizations that were

investigated and this was carried out within the organizations’ premises. The logic behind

concentrating efforts on one case rather than many was that there would be insights gained by looking

at the one that can have wider implications that would not easily be realized if one tried to cover a

wider scope. The aim was to illuminate the general (theoretical understanding) by looking at the

particular (Denscombe 2003). The method allowed the researcher to retain the holistic and meaningful

characteristics of real life events – such as organizational and managerial processes. The detailed

workings of relationships and social processes were emphasized, rather than restricting attention to

the outcomes from these.

The main components of the research design were as according to (Yin 2003).

1. The study questions: the overall research question is to find out how and why some organizations follow nationally established rules, while others don’t? Detailed sub questions were shown in research matrix in section 1.10.

2. The propositions: the study propositions are shown later in section 3.5. 3. The unit of analysis: is compliance behaviour. 4. The logic linking data to the propositions: was by synthesis and combination of similar data

to find patterns, consistencies and inconsistencies in relation to propositions 5. The criteria for interpreting the findings: was done by comparing the empirical findings with

the theoretical propositions. Where there was possibility of rival explanation from the initial theoretical proposition, the findings were contrasted with both the initial and rival proposition.

3.2.3. Using qualitative methods

To understand and explain the underlying reasons for organizational compliance or non compliance

behaviour, qualitative case study methods were used. A key characteristic of this approach is that

understanding humans and organizations does not only depend on theories, techniques, social and

institutional conditions, but also on personal involvement and access to the people and organizations

under consideration (de Vries 2006). The research was a comparative study of why some

organizations comply with GI sharing policies while others do not. A relation of what the policies

require versus their implementation practice. To obtain first hand knowledge on implementation

practice, the research strategy would normally be qualitative, aimed to seek meaning and significance

of certain perceptions, actions and circumstances. In other words, how one can read between the lines

of what is being said or done (de Vries 2006).

The qualitative nature of the research sought to gather an in-depth understanding of organizational

behaviour and the motives that govern such behaviour pertaining to compliance with GI policies. This

paradigm was appropriate for the study to enable provision of in-depth descriptions of phenomena

(Mouton 2001). The research uncovered rich material on the dimensions of the organizations and gave

the researcher a “hands-on” approach whereby personal interaction with the interviewees produced

deeper information. An inductive approach was employed which allowed the researcher to immerse

himself in the natural setting, describing events as naturally as they occurred (Babbie and Mouton

2001; Mouton 2001), while slowly building themes that would make sense of the observations.

Although it is subjective in nature, the researcher had the opportunity to observe the respondents and

artefacts in their real world context and made conclusions based on what was seen.


25

Drawing from the work of (Gillham 2000), qualitative methods enabled the research to:

• Explore the complexities that are beyond the scope of more ‘controlled’ approaches.

• Get under the ‘skin’ of the organization to find out what really happens – the informal reality

which can only be perceived from the inside.

• View the case from the perspective of those involved.

• Carry out research into processes leading to results, rather than into the ‘significance’ of the

results themselves.

Qualitative research uses smaller but focused samples in this case the departments of lands and

surveys, water and city councils were selected because they are key GI stakeholders and

representative of other public organizations in the country operating in the same GI organizational

field. This was done at two levels: the national / policy making level (Kampala city) and the

implementation level / district level (Kampala, Entebbe and Mukono).

3.3. Data collection A non-probability, purposive sample was used in this study as the study was a case of GI

organizations, and qualitative in nature. I chose a particular group and place to study because it was

known to be the type that is wanted based on my judgment and purpose of the study (McNeill and

Chapman 2005). Representative GI public organizations were selected at national and district level

based on experience and external advice. I had general ideas and expectations which guided the

research. This was appropriate for the selection of the sample on the basis of this knowledge of the

population, its elements and the research aims (Babbie and Mouton 2001).

Primary data was obtained through face to face interviews that were carried out using a structured

questionnaire to obtain information from the respondents who provided substantive insights into the

contexts and practices of sharing and coordination. A total of 44 interviews of 20 to 30 minutes were

carried out and taped during the one month field study time as shown in the table 3-1. The

respondents consisted of organizational GI practitioners that were decision makers / administrative /

strategic managers and GI technicians that were also selected based on experience and external

advice. All these practitioners work with geo-information on a fulltime basis. Data was also collected

through observation of working environment (artefacts like furniture and equipment) and how

business is conducted on daily basis. A research diary was maintained to document interview notes

and observations.

Table 3-1: Showing an overview of offices vis-à-vis practitioners sampled.

Organization NWSC DWRM KCC EMC DSME MoLHUD LSM MTC

Sampled 10 8 5 2 10 2 3 4

Total 11 10 6 2 11 4 3 4

Percentage 90% 80% 83% 100% 90% 50% 100% 100%


26

Secondary data was collected by reviewing organization documents in place like official publications,

internal policies, budgets, annual reports, memoranda and Acts to triangulate the information

collected concerning the concepts as shown later in table 3-3. The use of multiple perceptions was

employed to clarify meaning, verify repeatability and reliability of an observation or interpretation

(McNeill and Chapman 2005). The secondary data documents were obtained from organizational

resource centres, data banks and also from their official websites (in as far as these were available)

and also from the Law Development Centre (LDC) Makerere where most government publications are

available.

Participant observation as additionally suggested by (Yin 2003) was not possible because I didn’t

have the opportunity of taking a functional role in the organizations’ setting. The table 3-2 shows how

the resource dependency theory was decomposed to collect data.

Table 3-2: How Resource dependency theory was decom posed.

Theory Observables / operationalization

• Financial (annual budget, cash flows) • Public administration authority (regulations, laws, influence)

Resource Dependency

Theory (RDT) • Information (aggregate datasets, data shared)

In relating theory ideas to compliance, RDT asserts that the more an organization has resources say

financial resource, the more it is independent and the less likely it will comply with GI policies. The

less an organization has access to resources like finances, the less autonomous it is and the higher the

likelihood that it will comply with policies. The issue of compliance can be influenced by financial

relations, by information relations and by public administration authority relations. Financial resource

is directly related to the information resource. In acquiring information either by organizations making

it themselves or acquiring the information from other sources requires finances by way human

resource and technology.

Information can be a source of power, finances can also be a source of power for organizations and

public administration authorities wield power. Organizations would like to control as much

information resource so as to decrease there dependence on others (thereby increasing their

autonomy) as well as increase others dependency on them so as to ultimately exercise power over the

less powerful organizations. Compliance and autonomy are the dependent variables while

information, public administration authority and finances are the independent variables. Dependency

on the organizations environment for finances, guidance or information will influence what the

organization complies to. As cited earlier, Organizations with power will comply with rules which

permit them the widest possible use of their power, while those organizations in less powerful

positions comply with rules that protect them from the powerful.

INV

ES

TIG

AT

ING

TH

E IN

FLU

EN

CE

OF

RE

SO

UR

CE

DE

PE

ND

EN

CIE

S O

N C

OM

PLI

AN

CE

TO

NA

TIO

NA

L P

OLI

CIE

S O

F G

EO

-IN

FO

RM

AT

ION

: A

RE

SO

UR

CE

DE

PE

ND

EN

CE

PE

RS

PE

CT

IVE

. A C

AS

E S

TU

DY

OF

GE

O-I

NF

OR

MA

TIO

N S

EC

TO

R IN

UG

AN

DA

27

3.4.

R

elat

ion

of o

bser

vabl

es to

the

conc

epts

T

he

Ta

ble

3-3

sho

ws

the

in

dica

tors

to

pra

ctic

ally

ca

ptu

re t

he c

once

pts

for

data

col

lect

ion

an

d th

e ki

nd

of e

vide

nce

em

ploy

ed.

Eac

h co

nce

pt i

s ob

serv

ed

thro

ugh

tang

ible

ind

ica

tors

. C

omp

lianc

e is

ob

serv

ed t

hrou

gh t

he

leve

l of

the

orga

niza

tion

in t

he h

iera

rchy

(p

rinci

ple-

agen

t re

latio

ns),

wh

ere

the

deci

sio

ns

are

mad

e fo

r th

e or

gani

zatio

ns,

seve

rity

of

sanc

tions

an

d re

wa

rds

for

non

com

plia

nce

and

com

plia

nce

, e

xten

t of

inte

rna

l an

d ex

tern

al s

uper

visi

on a

nd

whe

ther

th

e

orga

niz

atio

n is

inv

olve

d i

n po

licy

desi

gn.

Org

ani

zatio

nal

fina

nces

are

obs

erv

ed

fro

m L

eve

l at

whi

ch b

udg

et

fun

ded

by t

he

orga

niza

tion

own

mo

ney,

perc

ent

age

fund

ed

by g

ove

rnm

ent

and

th

at f

rom

ext

erna

l so

urce

s. I

nfo

rmat

ion

is o

bse

rve

d by

whe

ther

the

org

ani

zatio

n m

anuf

act

ure

s ow

n da

ta o

r its

info

rma

tion

is o

bta

ined

by

acc

ess

ing

data

fro

m o

the

r or

gani

zatio

ns.

Pub

lic a

dmin

istr

atio

n au

tho

rity

wa

s ob

serv

ed

by w

heth

er t

he o

rga

niza

tion

is c

ont

rolle

d,

influ

ence

d su

bsta

ntia

lly o

r a

ccou

ntab

le t

o su

ch a

utho

rity

. T

able

3-3

: Ana

lytic

al c

once

pts,

thei

r in

dica

tors

an

d th

e ki

nd o

f evi

denc

e em

ploy

ed

Con

cept

In

dica

tors

S

ourc

e of

evi

denc

e K

ind

of e

viden

ce

Co

mp

lian

ce

Leve

l of

part

icip

atio

n

Dec

isio

n m

akin

g

San

ctio

ns/r

ewar

ds

Su

ppo

rt s

uper

visi

on

Leve

l in

hie

rarc

hy

Po

licy

rele

van

ce o

r irr

elev

ance

Inte

rvie

ws

Doc

um

enta

tion

Fo

cuse

d

inte

rvie

w

usin

g st

ruct

ure

d q

ues

tion

nair

e o

n p

artic

ipat

ion

in

po

licy

des

ign

, sa

nctio

ns/

rew

ards

fo

r n

on c

om

plia

nc

e. D

ocu

men

ts o

n

Act

s, p

olic

ies,

mem

oran

da,

wee

kly

and

ann

ual

rep

ort

s.

Typ

e of

Res

ourc

e

Fin

ance

s, m

on

ey

Bu

dge

t fu

ndi

ng

gove

rnm

ent

and

ot

her

exte

rnal

sou

rces

.

Bu

dge

t fu

ndi

ng

by

the

orga

niza

tion

.

Inte

rvie

ws

Arc

hiv

al r

eco

rds

Dire

ct o

bse

rvat

ion

Ph

ysic

al a

rtef

acts

Inte

rvie

ws

on m

on

ey a

lloca

tion

and

sou

rces

; A

rch

iva

l rec

ord

s o

n an

nual

bu

dget

s; D

irect

obs

erva

tion

on

off

ice

set

up,

fu

rni

ture

, an

d te

chn

olo

gica

l

infu

sion

lik

e so

ftw

are;

ph

ysic

al

arte

fact

s lik

e eq

uip

men

t in

use

sa

y

plo

tter

s.

Dat

a, a

ggre

gate

dat

a D

ata

acce

ss.

Acc

ess

to

pub

lic

infr

astr

uct

ure

/

Tec

hno

logy

.

Str

ong

so

cial

net

wo

rk.

Inte

rvie

ws

Ph

ysic

al a

rtef

acts

Arc

hiv

al r

eco

rds

Str

uct

ure

d

inte

rvie

ws

dat

a ex

chan

ges

with

w

hich

or

gan

izat

ion

s,

stan

dar

ds,

P

hysi

cal

arte

fact

s lik

e m

aps,

p

hoto

s o

f pr

inte

rs,

plo

tters

,

scan

ner

s an

d c

om

pute

rs.

Co

erci

on

inst

rum

ents

;

law

s,

regu

latio

ns,

exte

rnal

ly e

nfo

rced

co

des

,

soci

etal

san

ctio

ns.

Leve

l of

con

tro

l / a

cco

unta

bilit

y.

Deg

ree

of

free

dom

to

dec

ide

wh

at r

eso

urc

es

do

wh

at a

nd

wh

ere.

Lev

el o

f su

per

visi

on.

Leve

l of

exte

rnal

influ

ence

.

Inte

rvie

ws

Doc

um

enta

tion

Fo

cuse

d i

nte

rvie

w u

sin

g st

ruct

ured

qu

estio

nn

aire

on

acc

oun

tabi

lity

and

role

o

f pu

blic

au

tho

rity.

D

ocu

men

tatio

n on

fo

rmal

c

ons

trai

nts

and

regu

latio

ns


28

From a theoretical perspective, I took this basic assumption as the way concepts were interrelated

as the notion to guide the research. With high access to finances by organizations and high

information under an organization’s control results in high power and consequently high

autonomy. This can lead to low compliance. Organizations with low finances, having low

information were assumed to essentially have low power. Such organizations will have low

autonomy and consequently have to comply with the policies from the environment that supplies

resources they require. Worth noting is that an organization may have low financial access but

can have a large information resource (for example by virtue of its work or core business). Such

an organization derives high power from the information and can enjoy high autonomy

consequently may opt not to comply with the direction of information since its independent.

Compliance appears to have more to do with power relations.

3.5. Formulation of propositions

Propositions were stated to direct attention to particular concepts that should be examined within

the scope of the study as according to (Yin 2003). These would help identify the relevant

information instead of covering ‘everything’ which is impossible to do. Propositions relating to

the concept of compliance, autonomy and resource dependency that are studied were formulated.

Proposition 1: Compliance occurs as a result of resource interdependencies of GI organizations.

Proposition 2: Dependency on authority from public administration authority is most dominant

in compliance.

Proposition 3: The higher the financial resource dependency, the more likely the compliance.

Proposition 4: Information dependency does influence the degree of compliance.

3.6. Observations From the interviews, respondents say that geo-information policies are designed at national level

by parent ministries and all organizations that are subject to the ministry are expected to comply

with the ministry policies. For example, the ministry of lands, Housing and Urban development

through its department of Surveys and Mapping, designs GI policies at national level which all

land offices at district level are expected to implement. In addition, the organizations at local

level are expected to operate within the context of the local government. I will use an activity

diagram in chapter 4 to model this sequence and relation of activities with regard to compliance.


29

Table 3-4 shows organizations with there respective GI related prescriptions as captured from

interviews and secondary data documents. Worth noting is that in as much as these policies are

designed by particular ministries, they are not bound to only the parent ministries. For example,

the ministry of Water complies when performing its duties that relate to Land, the Ministry of

Water is confronted with having to comply with the policies designed by the Ministry of Lands.

Table 3-4: Table showing formal prescriptions that relate to GI

Organizations Formal prescriptions

Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban

development ( Department Surveys and

Mapping, Entebbe )

• National land policy 2009. • Survey Act 1920. • The land Act 1998. • Registration of Titles Act 2004. • Land regulations 2004.

Ministry of Water and Environment

(DWRM, DWD, NEMA) • The Water Act 1997 • Water Resources regulation 1998 • WHO guidelines for water quality • OGC (WMS/ WSP/ WFS/ WFS-T)

Ministry of Local government (KCC). • The Local Government Act. • The Local Government Regulations 2007. • Town and Country planning Act 1964.

Ministry of Finance, Planning and

Economic Development (UBOS) • UBOS GIS policy • SDI Decree (draft)

Karamoja Data Center (Office of prime

minister) • National Initiative of Monitoring and

Evaluation Systems (NIMES)

3.7. Reliability and validity of findings The validity and reliability of data was enhanced in the qualitative paradigm using such tests as

the four highlighted by (Yin 2003).

• To construct validity, multiple sources like documentation and archival records like budgets, memos, ministerial circulars, Acts of parliament provided chain of evidence, an opportunity for repetitive reviewing in addition to being exact giving real detailed data. Photos of physical artefacts like large format printers, map plotters and scanners were also used which were insightful into technical operations. Interviews focusing directly on the research topic were also carried out and the observation of reality during data collection. During composition phase of the research, key informants reviewed the draft case study report.

• For internal validity, the researcher employed pattern matching as a technique in the analysis to compare an empirically based pattern with a predicted one. The researcher also addressed rival explanations during the data analysis.

• External validity was established by use of theory to set propositions which were corroborated or contradicted by the empirical data collected. The advantage of replication logic in the multiple-case study was used.


30

• For reliability, the researcher used case study protocol to guide in carrying out data collection and also developed a case study database. The protocol covered issues such data collection procedures, Case study questions as well as an outline of the report.

3.8. Problems and Limitations

• Half the total of the interviewees were not readily available for interview owing to their busy schedules. This slowed down progress and required one and at times two more trips than necessary.

• Limited access to secondary data like cited memos and technical reports due to poor record management in some organizations. Other data like policies and regulations were readily available in resource centres, book banks and bookshops.

• Integrity of some of the interviewees’ responses was questionable as some were not honest or exaggerated their responses.

• Some respondents were not available for verification of data collected being busy or out of office.

• Integrity of some interview responses questionable & contradictory. For example, respondents from the same organization would give contradictory percentages on budget funding; one says low (0-40%) and another high (60-100%). Solution is use of secondary data from finance department or published online organisational data in reports.

• Fewer organizations sampled due to time constraints. The research would have benefited from the redundancy and advantages of big samples.

• Focus group discussion for all respondents on the last Friday was not possible as planned due to financial constraints.

3.9. Concluding remark In collecting data on compliance, the resource dependency theory was decomposed into

indicators about which data was collected. Primary data was obtained through face to face

interviews using structured questionnaire that were guided by the indicators while secondary data

was collected from reviews of organizational documents to construct validity and observation of

physical artefacts. The respondents interviewed were decision makers, administrative, strategic

managers as well as GI technicians working with geo-information on fulltime basis. Geo-

information organizations involved in policy design and implementation were sampled at both

national and district level. The findings on compliance from this data collection are presented in

the next chapter.


31

4. Nature of compliance to GI policy

4.1. Introduction This chapter provides an overview of the results and discusses the findings of the study in

Uganda. I address the third research objective investigating how local and national agencies

perceive or enact compliance. The forth descriptive objective of describing the elements of

national GI sharing policies that require compliance and the compliance actions that have been

taken is herein addressed also. The emphasis is to describe what is out there, what has been done,

to make lists and inventories. The sequence that I follow to address the objectives is first –

showing the financial resource findings; then – showing the information resource findings; the

findings on compliance and then findings on concept of public administration authority from

interviews. This is followed by an activity diagram showing how compliance is enacted in

column power structure. The main actors are fulltime geo-information practitioners at the

national level: Kampala, and local level: Mukono and Entebbe. These involve ministry

commissioners and strategic managers involved in policy formulation: surveyors, planners and

technicians involved in policy implementation leading to production of aggregate data and maps.

The data about motivations for compliance and noncompliance from observations and interviews

is presented last. This final telling consists in connecting the interpretation of the data with

implications for theory and practice.

4.2. Financial resource findings In table 4-1, the empirical findings on finances from interviews and documents show that

remittances from the government are predominantly low for organizations in Mukono and

Entebbe. The exception is for the Directorate of Water Resource Management and National

Water and Sewerage Corporation which additionally receives donor funding that is channelled

through the government from the Joint Partnership fund and Europe Group. From the Level at

which budget s financed by internal revenue, all organizations working with geo-information as

core business have low capacity to generate their own finances. The exceptions like the Water

Corporation are service providers and collect finances from water bills and Municipal councils of

Entebbe and Mukono from licenses.


32

Table 4-1: Data on finances

Level at which budget financed by government budget allocation

Level at which budget financed by internal Revenue

National Water and Sewerage Corporation (Kampala Water)

Average High

Directorate of Water Resource Management

Average Low

Kampala City Council Low High Entebbe Municipal Council Low Average Department of Surveys and Mapping Entebbe

Low Low

Ministry of Land, housing and Urban Development.

Low Low

Lands and Surveys Mukono Low Low Mukono Town Council Low Average

The figure 4-1 below shows a summary of Kampala Central Division budget allocation from the

government funding and allocation from local revenue. The absolute amounts from the

government are lower than that from internal revenue. The Geo-information organizations

sampled in Kampala City Council (KCC) are administratively under Kampala Central Division

as the local government. As shown, Government grants are 5% of the local government budget

while the bulk of the budget: 95% is funded by local revenue as highlighted. There is low

external financial dependency since most income is earned locally from revenues.

Figure 4-1: Showing budget funding for Kampala Cent ral Division


33

The figure 4-2 shows the cash flow excerpt for National Water and Sewerage Corporation. The

organization activity, mainly water provision, has 80% of its activities financing coming from

donor partners and 10% from the central government. The high external financial dependency

renders the organizations autonomy and decision making power highly constrained.

Figure 4-2: showing cash flow for NWSC


34

The figure 4-3 shows the budget summary for Directorate of Water Resources Management

financial year 2008/09. Donor partners from the Joint Partnership Fund (JPF), EU and World

Bank finance 60% of the organization’s budget while 40% financed by the government. DWRM

has no local revenue hence wholly dependent on government and donor funding channelled

through the government. The organization has more funding (total) than what it budgeted for.

There is high external financial dependency.

Figure 4-3: Showing budget funding for DWRM


35

4.3. Information resource findings from interviews In table 4-2, the geo-information considered is that derived from manipulation of spatial data.

From the data, there are collaborations and interdependencies among organizations by way of

sharing geo-information. All organizations receive data from the Ministry of Lands as well as

from its department of Lands and Surveys in Mukono. Table 4-2: Data on information

Organization Level of accessibility to geo-information


From government organizations (Lands, UBOS, UEB)

From within the organization but other departments (GIS, Block

mapping)

We make data ourselves.


From government organization (Lands, UBOS, NEMA)

From within the organization but other departments (Water quality

management, planning and Assessment)

We make data ourselves

Kampala City Council From government organization (Lands, UBOS, UEB, Water,

NEMA)

From within the organization but other departments


Entebbe Municipal Council From government organization (Lands, Works)



Department of Surveys and Mapping Entebbe

From within the organization but other departments (Mapping,

Surveys)


Ministry of Land, housing and Urban Development.


Lands and Surveys Mukono We make data ourselves

Mukono Town Council From government organization (Lands, NFA)




36

The figure 4-4 (A) shows a large-scale colour scanner & copier at the department of Lands and

Surveys in Entebbe. In contrast, figure 4-4 (B) showing a filing cabinet with transparent paper

cadastral plans: as the storage media at the department of Lands and Surveys in Mukono. The

national level organizations employ better technology for managing their information assets.

Paper maps are converted to electronic format using more cost and time efficient methods. This

streamlines information access both internally and externally with other organizations.

Figure 4-4: A large-scale color scanner and filing cabinet for cadastral plans

Figure 4-5 (A) and (B) shows wide format plotters for data dissemination at the department of

lands and Surveys in Entebbe and DWRM. Data provision is both in terms of hard copies: using

A0 plotters steered by digital files or exchange of digital base data information resources. The

NWSC in Kampala also uses the same data dissemination technology. EMC, KCC, MTC and

Department of lands and surveys in Mukono still use manual data dissemination processes.

Figure 4-5: Showing data dissemination media at Ent ebbe LSD and DWRM


37

4.4. Findings on compliance concept from interviews In the discussion concerning compliance, from the table 4-3 column (level of choice to decide

Geo-data standards), in addition to using international standards or those that are from

government, the organizations are at liberty to also define their own standards. Given that there

are generally no repercussions for not complying with national guidelines as shown in table 4-3,

there is enough room to comply if it’s convenient or not comply.

Table 4-3: Data on compliance

Organization Level of choice to decide Geo-data standards to be used

Known consequences for not complying to National guidelines.


Uses the ISO 9001 standards for water quality

management by VERITAS to satisfy industry and

international requirement.

Uses the OGC standards—Simple feature OGC/

WMS/ WSP/ WFS/ WFS-T.

Also defined own standards based on ESRI.

Also uses the ones from Government e.g. Water Act,

Survey Act, Land regulations.

No ISO certification given if water

quality requirements flouted.

Germany technical cooperation (GTZ)

introduced OGC standards to fund and

support GIS development.

There are no repercussions e.g. where

government standards flouted.


Uses the ISO 9001 standards and WHO standards for

drinking water quality as international requirement

for safe water.

Uses the ones from Government like Water Act,

Water resources regulations 1998.

Defines our own standards where none is provided.

Cautioning done when flouting by Joint

partnership funds but usually no

repercussions.

Kampala City Council

We use the ISO 19101 standards for geographic

information referencing.

Defines own Standards where there is need / no

option. Uses the ones from government in Land

regulations, Town and Country Planning Act to

demarcate planning areas and land use zones.

Get cautioned when not complying but

no repercussions.

Entebbe Municipal Council

Uses standards from Government in Land Act, Town

and Country Planning Act to demarcate planning

areas.

No repercussion but may reduce in

budget when not complying because

planning facts are misrepresented.


Uses the ISO 19113 standards and others for

metadata and quality evaluation introduced under

JICA funding. Uses the ones from government e.g.

Registration of Titles Act. Define own standards too

e.g. for accuracy and plotting.

There are no repercussions if changes

are made on the work to comply.

Ministry of Land, housing and Urban D.

Defined own Standards in for example Land

regulations 2004.

There’re no repercussions in any way.

LSD Mukono Defined own Standards in addition to those from

ministry like Survey Act.


Mukono Town Council

Uses the ones from Government e.g. in Land

regulations, Town and Country Planning Act to

demarcate planning areas.

Defines our own Standards too.



38

Continuing the discussion concerning compliance, from table 4-4 column (level of participation),

some of the stakeholders are involved in policy design while some are not. This shows that

policies are not a result of mutual consensus. From column (level of provision of supervision), all

organizations supervise and control the work of GI practitioners.

Table 4-4: Supplementary Data on compliance Organization Level of Participation in policy

design Level of provision of supervision / approval to others.

National Water and Sewerage Corporation

(Kampala Water)

Does not participate in designing

rules and deciding data standards

for the ministry.

Supervision provided to private

Surveyors’ input data.


Participates in designing rules

and deciding data standards for

the ministry.

Supervises Work from Senior

Officers, Technicians, and

contractors.




the ministry.

To Private surveyors (3).

To Contractors work.




the ministry.

None.

To Physical planner.




the ministry.

Private surveyor work

To Cartographers work

Ministry of Land, housing and Urban D.



the ministry.

To Private Surveyors.

Lands and Surveys Mukono



for the ministry.

To the Cartographers.

Mukono Town Council



for the ministry.

To field surveyors.

To developers work e.g. building

plans.


39

Table 4-5 show the organizations that are involved in GI policy design and the organizations that

comply with GI policies as captured from interviews and secondary data documents.

Table 4-5: Table of organizations involved in polic y design vis-à-vis those that comply

Organizations that design Policies Organizations that comply

• Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban development ( Department Surveys and Mapping, Entebbe )

• Ministry of Water and Environment (DWRM)

• Ministry of Local government (KCC). • Ministry of Finance, Planning and

Economic Development (UBOS) • National Environmental Management

Authority (NEMA)

• National Water & Sewerage Corporation • Ministry of Water and Environment. • Directorate of Water Resources

Management. (DWRM) • Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban

development • Surveys and Mapping, Entebbe • Lands and Surveys Mukono • Kampala Water • Kampala City Council • Mukono Town council • Entebbe Municipal Council • Uganda Bureau of statistics (UBOS) • National Environmental Management

Authority (NEMA)

4.5. Finding on concept of public administration au thority from interviews

In table 4-6, the organizations at district level report to the Local government. Worth noting is

that all the sampled organizations in Kampala district like NWSC report to the respective

ministries apparently due to proximity and evidently due to there financial resource dependency.

The organizations in Kampala are more influenced by the parent ministries than by the local

government unlike the organizations in districts of Entebbe and Mukono. These various reporting

channels have an impact on the organizational autonomy and consequently their compliance to

GI policies. In addition to reporting to the local government say the department of Lands and

Surveys Mukono, the level at which decisions are made is at the ministry.

From the 4-6 column (level of participation in the decisions made), it is the senior officers and

international technical consultants that participate. The practitioners at the implementation level

that work with geo-information don’t have much input although it’s the senior officers that have

the role of internal supervision. There is no external supervision on the work of a ministry.

INV

ES

TIG

AT

ING

TH

E IN

FLU

EN

CE

OF

RE

SO

UR

CE

DE

PE

ND

EN

CIE

S O

N C

OM

PLI

AN

CE

TO

NA

TIO

NA

L P

OLI

CIE

S O

F G

EO

-IN

FO

RM

AT

ION

: A

RE

SO

UR

CE

DE

PE

ND

EN

CE

PE

RS

PE

CT

IVE

. A C

AS

E S

TU

DY

OF

GE

O-I

NF

OR

MA

TIO

N S

EC

TO

R IN

UG

AN

DA

40

Tab

le 4

-6: D

ata

on p

ublic

adm

inis

trat

ion

auth

ority

Org

aniz

atio

n Le

vel

of

Aut

onom

y (A

ccou

ntab

ility

to

w

hom

?)

Leve

l at

whi

ch d

ecis

ions

ar

e m

ade.

Le

vel

of

part

icip

atio

n in

de

cisi

on m

akin

g.

Leve

l of

in

tern

al

supe

rvis

ion

/ app

rova

l. Le

vel

of

exte

rnal

su

perv

isio

n / a

ppro

val.

NW

SC

(Kam

pala

Wat

er)

NW

SC

re

po

rts

to

Min

istr

y o

f W

ater

.

Kam

pal

a W

ater

is

auto

no

mo

us

exce

pt

finan

cial

ly.

Dec

isio

ns

mad

e at

dep

artm

enta

l lev

el.

Dep

artm

enta

l te

am j

oin

s w

ith

Inte

rnat

ion

al

Tec

hn

ical

con

sulta

nts

(G

TZ

),

JIC

A

to

mak

e d

ecis

ion

s.

Th

e d

epar

tmen

tal

man

ager

s

sup

ervi

se

som

e w

ork

an

d

oth

er is

no

t su

per

vise

d.

VE

RIT

AS

(f

or

ISO

Cer

tific

atio

n)

and

G

TZ

(fo

r fin

anci

al

dep

end

ency

),

no

o

ther

sup

ervi

sio

n.

Dire

ctor

ate

of

Wat

er

Res

ourc

e M

anag

emen

t

DW

RM

rep

ort

s to

th

e

Min

istr

y o

f W

ater

.

Dec

isio

ns

mad

e at

dire

cto

rs a

nd

dep

artm

enta

l

leve

l.

Sen

ior

Off

icer

s w

ork

w

ith

Inte

rnat

ion

al

Tec

hn

ical

con

sulta

nts

to

dec

ide.

Th

e P

rinci

pal

O

ffic

er

and

assi

stan

t co

mm

issi

on

er

in

that

hie

rarc

hy.

Th

e U

gan

da

met

rolo

gica

l

dep

artm

ent.

Kam

pala

C

ity

Cou

ncil

KC

C

rep

ort

s to

th

e

Min

istr

y o

f Lo

cal

Go

vern

men

t.

Dec

isio

ns

mad

e at

dep

artm

enta

l lev

el.

Th

e D

epar

tmen

t o

f la

nd

s an

d

Su

rvey

s w

ith

Inte

rnat

ion

al

Tec

hn

ical

co

nsu

ltan

ts.

Th

e h

ead

of

dep

artm

ent

and

Th

e co

mm

issi

on

er

in

the

Min

istr

y o

f La

nd

s.

Oth

er

wo

rk u

nsu

per

vise

d.

Th

e C

om

mis

sio

ner

o

f

Min

istr

y o

f La

nd

s.

Ent

ebbe

M

unic

ipal

C

ounc

il

Rep

ort

s to

th

e Lo

cal

Go

vern

men

t.

Dec

isio

ns

mad

e at

th

e

dis

tric

t se

rvic

e

com

mis

sio

n

Tea

m w

ork

of

dep

artm

ents

T

he

mu

nic

ipal

en

gin

eer

and

the

Loca

l go

vern

men

t.

Bes

ides

m

inis

try

of

wo

rks,

no

su

per

visi

on

.

Dep

artm

ent

of

Sur

veys

an

d M

appi

ng E

nteb

be

Rep

ort

s to

th

e

Min

istr

y o

f La

nd

s.

Dec

isio

ns

mad

e at

min

istr

y b

y sa

y th

e

Co

mm

issi

on

er

Eve

ry

Hea

d

of

the

sect

ion

par

ticip

ates

.

Th

e C

om

mis

sio

ner

o

f

surv

eys

and

map

pin

g.

Th

e C

on

sulta

nts

an

d t

he

end

use

rs.

Min

istr

y of

La

nd,

hous

ing

and

Urb

an

Dev

elop

men

t.

Th

is i

s th

e m

inis

try

of

Lan

ds.

At

the

min

istr

y b

y sa

y th

e

Co

mm

issi

on

er

Th

e H

ead

o

f th

e se

ctio

n

par

ticip

ates

Th

e C

om

mis

sio

ner

b

ut

the

use

rs c

an a

lso

hav

e in

pu

t.

No

ne.

Land

s an

d S

urve

ys

Muk

ono

Rep

ort

s to

th

e Lo

cal

gove

rnm

ent.

Dec

isio

ns

mad

e at

min

istr

y (C

om

mis

sio

ner

)

and

Dis

tric

t.

Th

e H

ead

o

f th

e se

ctio

n

par

ticip

ates

Th

e C

om

mis

sio

ner

. N

on

e.

Muk

ono

Tow

n C

ounc

il

Rep

ort

s to

th

e Lo

cal

gove

rnm

ent

At

loca

l go

vern

men

t le

vel

(To

wn

Cle

rk)

Th

e d

istr

ict

serv

ice

com

mis

sio

n d

ecid

es.

Th

e h

ead

of

dep

artm

ent

and

the

Co

mm

issi

on

er.

No

ne.


41

The table 4-7 shows organizations at both national and district level with there own policies and

regulations to comply with. Worth noting is that the district GI policies are a mirror reflection of

the policies of organizations at national level. This gives evidence to the way policies and

regulations are hierarchically passed in a top-down approach from national level to organizations

departments at district level. Additionally, the policies and regulations are not restricted to their

parent organizations but other organizations are confronted by additional policies as they depend

and interact with other organizations. For example, National Water & Sewerage Corporation,

under the Ministry of Water and Environment is obliged to comply with Land Regulations 2004

from the Ministry of Lands, simply because of the nature of their work and its dependence on

data from the Ministry of Lands. The act of parliament generally entails the organization’s

obligations and operationalizes the organizational policies and regulations contain the details to

be implemented. These are herein referred to as the compliance reference. Table 4-7: Organizations with their GI legal framew ork

Level Organization Compliance reference

National Water & Sewerage

Corporation

Directorate of Water Resources

Management.

• The Water Act 1997 • Water Resources regulation 1998 • The OGC (WMS/ WSP/ WFS/ WFS-T) • ISO 9001 standards and • WHO guidelines for water quality.

Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban

development

National

Surveys and Mapping, Entebbe

• National land policy 2009 • Registration of Titles Act 2004 • The land Act 1998. • Survey Act 1920 • Land Regulations 2004.

Lands and Surveys Mukono • National land policy 2009 • Survey Act 1920 • The land Act 1998 • Registration of Titles Act 2004 • Land regulations 2004

Kampala Water • The Water Act 1997 • Water Resources regulation 1998 • The OGC (WMS/ WSP/ WFS/ WFS-T)


Mukono Town council

District


• Town and country planning Act 1964

Table 4-8 below shows GI related Acts and regulations with their major objectives or

requirements and the degree to which organizations comply. Worth noting from table 4-8, the

implementation practice is such that policies requirements intended are not wholly implemented

because of influence from other factors not catered for in policy design yet exist at the intended

target area like lack of financial autonomy leading to influence by local government. Compliance

varies across policies; with some barely complied with like town and Country Planning Act and

with others’ compliance startlingly high like the Water Act 1997.


42

Table 4-8: Showing GI related Acts, major objective s and degree to which organizations comply

GI related Acts

Primary actors What is required for each actor Degree to which actors implement requirements

The Access to Information Act 2005.

All government

ministries,

departments,

local

governments

and statutory

corporations.

To provide right to access to

information held by state organs.

Promote an efficient, effective

transparent and accountable

government.

Individual ministries decide on the

conditions under which information is

accessed.

The land Act 1998.

Ministry of

Lands, Housing

and Urban

Development.

Forms of Land ownership / tenure.

Control of Land Use, planning and

zoning.

Land Management and powers of

land committees.

The land question still not solved with

various tenure systems coexisting.

Land use and management not

independent but politically influenced by

powers that be and personal interest (like

in wetlands).

Registration of Titles Act 2004

Ministry of

Lands, Housing

and Urban

Development.

Certificates of Title and Land

Registration.

Dealings with Land like transfers.

Surveys, Plans and boundaries.

Plotting scale for rural and town

land. UTM control countrywide.

Offences and penalties.

Land is surveyed, registered and

transferred (Mainly urban land due to

personal interest and subjectivity of GI

practitioners but to a less extent is rural

land surveyed). Boundaries of forested

areas illegally encroached. Offences and

penalties rather week and not enforced.

Land regulations 2004.

Ministry of

Lands, Housing

and Urban

Development.

Functions of committees, boards and

the commission.

Parcel identification and land

demarcation. Registration of land

rights. Fees to charge.

Mediation in negotiations.

The committees and boards perform

intermittently and out of convenience.

Various fees charged depending on

officer in charge.

The Water Act 1997

Ministry of

Water and

Environment.

To promote rational management

and use of waters in Uganda.

To allow for the orderly

development and use of water

resources.

To promote the provision of a clean,

safe and sufficient supply of water.

With donor partnering, implementation

done in populated city areas but village

and remote areas don’t have clean, safe

and sufficient water supply.

The Local Government Act.

Ministry of

Local

government.

To give full effect to

decentralization of powers,

responsibilities and services.

To ensure democratic participation

in decision making.

To establish sources of revenue.

No full exercise of local self governance,

effective responsibility and council

powers nationally influenced.

Sources of revenue created through taxes

but still low compared to need.

Participation in decision making by

senior officers.

Town and Country planning Act 1964.

Ministry of

Local

government.

Declaration of planning areas by

board.

Compensation and betterment like

determination of claims.

Planning areas demarcated.

Compensation and betterment not

commensurate due to lack of funds and

corruption.


43

4.6. How compliance is enacted act Business Process Model

. National level District level

Geo-information organisationLocal GovernmentDev elopment Partners / Central Gov 'tMinistry

Start

make policyrecommendations

Rev iew policy elementsand make submissions

Finalize requirements andprov ide funds

Prov ide Local gov ernmentpolicy and employ GI

organisation at districtlev el

Make both Technical andofficial implimentation

report

Accept funds,incorporate

recommendationsinto ministry policy

Impliment bothMinistry and Localgovernment policy

Recieve Technicalreport

End

Financial Accountability

Make Activ ityproposals, Design

policies

Adv ertise for consultants

Technical reportfor superv isor at

ministry

Official reportfor superv isor

at district

OK?Make changes and

Correct report

Recieve officialperformance report

OK?

Archiv ereport

end flow

Yes

Yes

B

A

No

No

Figure 4-6: Activity diagram showing how compliance is enacted in a ministry


44

The activity diagram figure 4-6 is a simplified representation of how compliance is enacted in a

column power structure for example a ministry at national level and its departments at the district

level. The key players considered are those at the national level, like the ministry and

development partners, expecting compliance from players at the district level like local

government and district GI organizations. The reality is more complex and includes many other

players and activities than modelled like the private sector. Each element box represents an

activity and for each player, the activities are partitioned by swim lanes. The interconnections

show the activity flow and those that follow or comply with each other at every level. At the

national level, specific ministries like the Ministry of Water and Environment design policies for

the public good. The ministry has technical staffs that draw activity proposals depending on their

plan like update of town maps by digital mapping. The source of funds for such an activity can

be the government and development partners. Through the lobbyists, development partners with

interest to fund the activity are sought since the government is dependent and doesn’t have

enough resources to fund ministry activities. When the funding resource is obtained, the ministry

of Lands advertises for consultants for technical backstopping. The development partners

(usually) choose the desired consultant like Japanese international cooperation (JICA) to

participate in the work and the finances are remitted. The consultant makes recommendations for

the activity implementation to the ministry committee or working group for review to suit the

historical, cultural and practical local context like status of maps and technological infusion. The

final recommendations are captured and owned in the ministry policy like plotting map scale

being 1: 5000.

The implementation of the work is done by the geo-information organizations at the district level

with supervision by technical staff from the ministry at national level. Since compliance is an act

of one following another, the head of department convenes weekly meetings to delegate activities

to GI practitioners using a task list as attached in annex appendix 2. The activity for a week can

be digitizing to update roads and houses and the work is confirmed by site visits by the

surveyors. Compliance interactions also depend on the setup. Proximity of offices at district

results into more interactions unlike those that are far off from national level. Communication is

mainly verbal but written down in case the message involves a higher level practitioner. The

work can take a week to be completed or depending on the work volume at hand. There is no

reward even if targets are met. No disciplinary action if targets are not met so long as there is an

explanation and new deadline fixed. Recurrent failure attracts a warning from monitoring and

evaluation department and is considered non-compliance. The finished work is submitted to the

ministry for approval through a technical report. Flouting recommended standards attracts mild

sanctions like; the work is not approved but returned back to the district for compliance with

standards to be enacted. For the cases where the required standards are met, work is approved

and financial accountability given to development partners showing that money was spent on

intended activity. An official report is also sent to the local government at the district. This is

because the GI practitioners at district level are administratively under the local government


45

because of decentralization and functionally under their respective ministries. This dualism has

an implication on the practitioners’ compliance behaviour.

The compliance flow explained above assumes seamless vertical integration where the national

and local governments are closely knit and complying to the same policies. However, the

compliance flow A between the ministry and its departments at local level is usually not effective

because of poor coordination between government levels and organizations that may be in

disagreement with the policy and execute it with little enthusiasm. This is usually when GI

policies lack social appreciation; when the GI organizations are largely financially dependent on

local government revenues, then the influence from compliance flow B is stronger and more real

than compliance flow A. Likewise, the compliance flow B between the GI organization and the

local government can be less influential than compliance flow A when the GI organization at

district level is largely or wholly financially dependent on the central government or

development partners through the parent ministry. In addition to variations in financial

dependency influencing compliance flows A and B, other factors like performance measures,

support supervision, rewards and penalties can also have a role to play.


46

4.7. Reasons for (non) compliance During the interviews, respondents gave a number of reasons as to why organizations comply

with GI policies, guidelines and regulations. Similarly, respondents highlighted a number of

reasons as to why they do not always comply with GI policies, guidelines and regulations. This

was in response to the question to give examples of how regulations have made the work less

effective as shown in table 4-9.

Table 4-9: Reasons for compliance and non complianc e

Issue Reason for Compliance Reason for Non compliance

Global trend To obtain ISO certification for

international recognition on quality to

secure funds, So that data is globally

compatible hence can use or share with

other colleagues’ data in similar

standards of mapping hence no need to

reinvent the wheel of standards and

there is uniformity in all data.

Some are old and out of date

(Survey Act 1920) requiring

revision to incorporate

advancements like use of GPS.

Acts, policies and guidelines are

not flexible and impede innovation

like JRJ file presentation, WHO

guidelines practically deny water

to some areas.

Implementation To be ethical and accountable say on

building standards so that buildings

don’t collapse, know what to follow to

get good accuracy results and avoid

errors (data integrity); to ease the works

say all in digital format regulation not

in analogue.

The regulations are good for

technocrats but bureaucratic to

outsiders / public.

The lack of guidelines to comply

with leading to various standards.

Enforcement So that the work is approved by

supervisor after submission, to avoid

obstruction due to complaints in

parliament, avoid a reduction in the

budget by donors and at the extreme, to

avoid getting fired or dismissed.

The regulations are not enforced

and when enforced, the penalties

are weak say the Town and

Country Planning Act. Influence

by local administration on say

planning.

4.8. Reflection Compliance with international regulations has been the emphases of the organizations’

development partners like JICA involved in implementing externally funded activities for say

regional and global data / information interoperability. According to the respondents, ‘the

challenge with adapting and institutionalizing international standards, they are hardly revised to

keep in step with the dynamic global trends’. A striking example is the Survey Act 1920 requires

the use of UTM standards which is very high accuracy cadastral survey not only impossible

countrywide because some places have no control network but also unnecessarily complicated


47

for surveying customary land holdings. The Town and Country Planning Act 1964 require

synchronization with current local government arrangements provided by the Local Government

Statute of 1993. More recently amended, the Registration of Titles Act 2004 still based on the

lengthy and difficult Torrens system for acquiring titles.

Significant to state is that both compliance and non compliance coexist. This presents a dilemma

in that practitioners comply with policies in the final stages of the activities to appease those that

provide resources by fulfilling policy requirements say using GPS coordinates throughout the

activities which are transformed to UTM coordinates required in the Survey Act as the files are

submitted for approval.

4.9. Concluding remarks The findings concerning public administration, information, financial resource and their

influences on compliance were majorly soft evidence. Hard evidence was obtained for

information interaction and financial allocations by way of budgets although the latest budget

allocations and sources of funds were not readily available due to irretrievability and privacy

reasons. Data on the notion of policy enforcement was not familiar for the local level

organizations as some were not only ignorant but also indifferent about implications of non

compliance to geo-information policies. The reasons for compliance and non compliance were

related for organizations for organizations at a particular level: national and local level. Some

other reasons for compliance like the role of professional bodies and affiliations in enforcing

professional conduct in terms of compliance to standards were not highlighted. Additional data

on interpersonal behaviours and motives was not obtained due to the impossibility of

functionally participate in the organizational activities.


48

5. Analysis and interpretation of findings.

5.1. Introduction This chapter addresses the fifth research objective of interpreting how dependence on which

resource influences compliance to national GI policies. The findings in chapter 4 are related to

the theoretical propositions that guided the case study. The approach to interpretation was by

comparing the empirical findings with the original propositions. If there was any indication that a

possible rival explanation (compared to the original proposition) for the empirical findings was

necessary, the findings were compared again to both the original and the rival propositions (de

Vries 2006). The aim was finding patterns, repeated actions behaviour, consistencies and

inconsistencies so as to explain through careful reading and reflection on the findings in chapter

4. Yin (2003) suggests three strategies; relying on theoretical propositions, setting up a

framework based on rival explanations and developing case descriptions. I relied on theoretical

propositions and rival explanations as the strategies to analyze the data. The sequence is first by

summing up whether compliance relates to resource dependencies; the influence of public

administration on compliance; the role of financial dependency; the role of information

dependency with a tabulated summary provided for each section showing empirical findings,

possible explanations and rival explanations. The propositions not only helped to focus attention

on certain data and ignore other data (data reduction) but also to organize the entire case study

and to define alternative explanation to be examined.

5.2. Does compliance relate to resource dependencie s? In observing compliance with GI policies, I observed how different levels of government in a

ministry comply with their particular ministry GI related policies and the motivations for

compliance or non compliance. I examined how policies from one ministry are adapted by other

ministries and the drivers for this compliance or non compliance. The influence of resource

dependencies on compliance also varies from one administrative region to another. The

propositions stated in chapter 3 are evaluated individually to ascertain as to whether they relate

to the findings.

Compliance to organizational policies, Acts and regulations is influenced by the three types of

resource dependencies in varying degrees. Table 4-9 showing reasons for compliance for

example shows that organizations like DWRM comply with ISO 9001 international standards of

quality due to financial dependency. In addition, Table 4-9 shows that organizations like NWSC

comply with the use of similar standards like Land Regulations 2004, Survey Act from Ministry

of Lands because of their dependence on other organizations’ information resource and also

comply with regulations due to influence of the ministry that has a supervisory role over them as


49

shown in table 4-6 for the organizations that report to national and district level and graphically

in the activity diagram in figure 4-6. Financial dependency, information dependency and

dependency on public administration authority were all found to have, although in varying

degrees, an influence on the implementation and consequent compliance with policies herein

studied. Table 5-1 shows a summary of how each resource dependency influences compliance.

Table 5-1: Brief of compliance relation with resour ce dependencies

Issue Empirical finding possible explanations - Propositions

Public Administration Authority

Due to decentralization,

districts are autonomous and

have administrative power over

organizations in the district.

Public administration authority decisions

have influence on the GI organizations

compliance where ministry policies are

inconsistent with local government

policies.

Financial resource

Organizations depend on own

resources while others on

government funding as well as

external funding.

Financially dependent organizations

comply with ministry and international

policies.

Information resource

Organizations depend on each

other for datasets like NWSC

depends on Land office base

maps.

‘Informationally’ dependent organizations

adapt and comply with policies of

organizations that provide information /

datasets.

5.2.1. The Influence of public administration autho rity

The local governments, as a product of decentralization, have autonomy and power at the district

/ local level to influence organizational compliance in all district departments. The Local

Government Act cap 243 of 1997 gives full effect to the decentralization of functions, powers,

responsibilities and services at all levels of local governments. Notable are the planning powers

vested in the district planning authority to establish procedures for itself. This is to ensure

democratic participation in, and control of, decision making by the people concerned.

Decentralized decision making enables articulation of local precedence and making certain that

programs are fitting to local needs.

The influence on compliance by public administration authority is dominant in the local

governments outside Kampala district as shown in Table 4-6 showing data on public

administration authority. The influence of public administration authority on GI organizations is

less dominant in Kampala because the influence of the ministries or central government and

development partners is higher in Kampala than those in Mukono and Entebbe. The

organizations in the districts of Mukono e.g. Lands and Surveys, Mukono Town Council and

Entebbe e.g. Entebbe Municipal Council report to their respective district local governments


50

whereas organizations in the district of Kampala e.g. National Water and Sewerage Corporation

reports to the parent ministry at national level. This can partly be explained as a result of the

activities of cited organizations in Kampala being largely dependent on external development

partners’ resources that are administered through the respective ministries shown in table 4-1

data on finances column (level at which budget financed by government) being average. Also

figure 4-2 shows the cash flow excerpt for National Water and Sewerage Corporation providing

evidence that although 80% of the budget activities are externally financed by donor partners,

10% is from central government. Whilst the organizations cited in Mukono and Entebbe (outside

Kampala), largely depend on own revenues and local government remittances.

From table 4-3 on data on compliance column (known consequences for not complying), non

compliance to JPF recommendations of worldwide ISO 9001 water quality standards in DWRM

and NWSC as well as OGC standards recommended by GTZ has financial implications.

Likewise as shown in table 4-3, there are no repercussions to organizations that report to local

government when they do not comply with hierarchical GI policies. This does not tally with the

proposition that dependency on public administration authority is most dominant in compliance

even for organizations that report primarily to the local government authority. I then infer that

dependence on public administration authority is most dominant in influencing compliance to

local government policies like the Local Government Regulations 2007, the Local Government

Act and least dominant in influencing compliance with GI policies for both international

standards like ISO 9001 and sectoral / ministry standards like Land Regulations 2004, the Land

Act 1998 so long as their implementation has no implication on the local government regulations

like guidelines on planning or social implication.

Additionally, policies and decisions like Land Regulations 2004 Water Resources Regulations

1998 are made at national level as shown in table 4-6 data on public administration authority

column (level at which decisions are made) yet implemented at district level. In Complying with

policies that may not be completely relevant, it’s a trade-off due to a conflict of rationalities

between efficiency, effectiveness and adaptivity in service provision, the priority of the public

administration authority, versus compliance to policy, the requirement of the ministry.

Organizations, to remain relevant to public administration authority, are at liberty to strike a

balance between service provision and compliance to policy responding more to the interest of

performance and end user service provision. Where adherence to policy compromises efficiency

in service delivery of public administration, organizations autonomously consider alternatives as

a trade-off.

Another explanation on how public administration authority can influence compliance is from

table 4-4 column (level of participation in policy design). It is evident that organizations at

district level do not participate in policy formulation at the ministries. This implies that the

design approach is used rather than the cultivation approach. The top-bottom approach where

policies are hierarchically mirrored to lower levels can have an implication on policy compliance


51

as organizations may not implement policies they do not own, understand and are unaware of.

Given that policies are hierarchical, other measures like rewards, penalties or sanctions for not

complying and supervision become key for implementation and consequent compliance. As

shown in the table 4-3 column (Known consequences for not complying with national

guidelines), with the exception of externally funded organizations like NWSC and DWRM, the

aspects of rewards, supervision and disciplinary action through sanctions and penalties are rather

not enforced in the Ugandan public sector which influences compliance behaviour.

Table 5-2: Summary on influence of public administr ation authority

Issue Empirical finding

Possible explanations - Propositions

Rival explanation

Authority Local

governments

have autonomy

and power over

district

departments to

establish

guidelines and

procedures for

itself.

Democratic participation

in, and control of,

decision making by the

people concerned enables

local precedence to fit

local needs. Enforcement

of local decisions not in

line with ministry

decisions leads to

organizational non

compliance.

From findings, Participatory plans

from various local levels of

government need to be

incorporated / harmonized with the

comprehensive and integrated

national plan.

There is social pressure exerted by

public administration authority for

policies that lack social

endorsement say on planning.

Organizations in Kampala are

majorly dependent and supervised

by the ministries even as

organizations in Mukono and

Entebbe largely influenced and

supervised by local public

administration authorities.

Variation between national level and local level.

The influence of

public

administration

authority is less

on national level

organizations in

Kampala than

local level

organizations in

Mukono and

Entebbe.

Organizations

compliance in Kampala is

more influenced by their

ministries and external

partners where as

organizations compliance

in Mukono and Entebbe

influenced by local

government performance

measures.

Organizations in

Kampala comply more to

policies than

organizations in Mukono

and Entebbe

Policies are designed at national

level yet implemented at local

level. Local level organizations

have as a trade-off between

efficiency and relevance in local

service provision versus

compliance to ministry policies.


52

5.2.2. The most crucial resource dependency

To evaluate the proposition that concerns the influence of the financial resource dependency on

compliance, table 4-1 showing data on organizational finances and table 4-3 showing data on

organizational compliance are considered. Table 4-1 with data on finances shows that financial

allocation from the government are predominantly low for both organizations at national level

and district level. The exception is for the Directorate of Water Resource Management and

National Water and Sewerage Corporation which additionally receives donor funding that is

channelled through the government from the Joint Partnership fund, GTZ and Europe Group as

shown in budget excerpts in figure 4-2 and figure 4-3.

From the table 4-1, column (Level at which budget financed by internal revenue), all

organizations working with geo-information as core business have low capacity to generate their

own finances. The exceptions like the NWSC are service providers and collect finances from

water bills and Municipal councils from operation licenses. In essence, low funding from

government coupled with low internal financial capacity in all the organizations renders GI

organizations to be financially dependent on their environment which influences their

compliance.

More insight on how financial dependency influences organizational compliance is in Table 4-3

showing data on compliance. An interesting conundrum is presented in the column (choice to

decide Geo-data standards); the organizations that report to the ministry at national level like

NWSC, DWRM, Department of Surveys and Mapping comply with worldwide standards like

ISO 9001 for water quality, ISO 19113 for mapping and OGC standards in addition to complying

with their ministry policies like Water resources regulations and Land regulations 2004. A

durable difference in the same Table 4-3 concerning data on compliance in the same column

shows that organizations that report to the local government at district level and with, in a

comparative sense, no external financial dependency like Mukono Town Council, Entebbe

Municipal Council and Lands and Surveys Mukono are not complying with the international

standards.

In addition, Table 4-3 column (known consequences for not complying) shows that non

compliance by NWSC, DWRM to OGC, ISO 9001 and WHO guidelines has financial penalties

from development partners whilst there are no repercussions for non compliance by KCC, Lands

and Surveys Mukono, Mukono town Council to standards from the government like Town and

Country Planning Act, Survey Act and Land Regulations. Table 4-6 column (level of external

supervision) shows that NWSC is supervised by GTZ technical staffs that provide funding while

Mukono Town Council, Lands and Surveys and Ministry of Lands have no external supervision.

This is in agreement with the proposition that the higher the financial resource dependency, the

more likely the compliance especially for no sector standards or international standards like ISO

9001. Financial dependency has higher influence on organizational compliance however in

combination with support supervision, rewards and penalties for non compliance.


53

Table 5-3: Summary of influence of financial depend ency on compliance

Issue Empirical finding

Possible explanations - Propositions

Rival explanation

National level organizations compliance

is because of fear of financial penalties

for non compliance by government and

development partners while local level

organizations do not comply because

there are no repercussions for non

compliance with ministry policies and

standards and not financially dependent

on the ministry.

Financial allocation

All

organizational

budgets

funding from

government is

low for

Mukono and

Entebbe while

national level

organizations

like NWSC,

DWRM

majorly depend

on central

government

funds.

Local level

organizations that do

not depend on

government funding

do not comply with

national policies

while organizations

in Kampala wholly

dependent on

government funding

comply with ministry

policies and

international policies.

National level organizational compliance

is also because of close support

supervision from both ministry and

external technical consultants. Local

level organizations have no influence by

way of supervision by ministry.

5.2.3. Role of information dependency in compliance

Continuing the discussion of how resource dependencies influence compliance, proposition 4

was evaluated based on the table 4-2 showing data on information, column (level of accessibility

to geo-information), With the exception of the ministry of lands and its department of lands and

surveys in Entebbe and Mukono that make all the data they need locally, all other organizations

sampled depend on data from other government organizations. This is evidence that

organizations engage in relationships with each other because of mutual dependency on each

other’s information resource. Stunningly similar is the fact that the Department of Lands and

Surveys is the common factor for all other organizations as the major source of geo-information

to organizations like NWSC, DWRM, KCC, EMC, and MTC. The ministry of lands with its

departments of surveys and mapping in Mukono and Entebbe, on the other hand, do not depend

on other organizations for geo-information. One explanation is that, being the national mapping

agency has the legal mandate for production of the base data that is used by other geo-

information organizations. This large information resource increases other organizations

dependency on the Ministry of Lands at the same time decreases Land’s dependency on other

organizations like NWSC, DWRM, KCC, EMC, and MTC for geo-information. This has an

implication as the ministry of lands and survey optimizes on this power from information


54

resource over other organizations to influence compliance to its policy and data standards by the

organizations that depend on this information use as base data.

Furthermore, from Table 4-3 Data on compliance column (level of choice to decide Geo-data

standards); it is remarkable that the policies designed from the Ministry of Lands and Surveys

like Land Regulations, Survey Act, are adapted and complied to by organizations belonging to

other sectors like NWSC, DWRM (belonging to Ministry of Water) and KCC, EMC and MTC.

This can be explained by the fact that other organizations like NWSC, DWRM, KCC, EMC,

MTC are confronted with these policies in the interaction with the Ministry of Lands due to their

dependency on the information resource from the Lands. In this regard, Information dependency

influences compliance by other sectors and organizations to the Acts and policies designed by a

particular sector. This is in agreement with the assertion of proposition 4 that Information

dependency does influence the degree of compliance.

Table 5-4: Summary of influence of information on c ompliance

Issue Empirical finding Possible explanations - Propositions

Rival explanation

Data sharing

National level

organizations depend

more on each other for

data while

organizations at local

level depend less on

each other for data. The

ministry of Lands and

its departments are the

major source of data to

all organizations.

Ministry of Lands does

not depend on other

organizations data.

National level organizations

(Kampala) comply with

policies because of their great

information

interdependencies while local

level organizations (Mukono

and Entebbe) comply less

because of their lower

interdependencies.

Compliance of

‘informationally’ independent

organizations not influenced

by information dependencies.

Information dependence

alone does not explain

compliance.

Organizations like those

from ministry of Lands, by

virtue of having the

mandate as the national

mapping agency and

because their core work is

information production do

not dependent on other

organizations hence no

influence on their

compliance.

5.3. Concluding remarks By relating the findings to propositions, interpretation was obtained on how resource

dependencies influence compliance. Although at varied extents, dependence on all the three

resources considered have an influence on organizational compliance. The national level

organizations comply more with the policies than local level organizations. Financial

dependency, in combination with supervision, rewards and penalties, was found to be the most

crucial in influencing organizational compliance especially for the international or regional GI


55

policies. To the degree that an organization is dependent on other organizations for information

does the information dependency influence compliance. The organizations independent of other

organizations are not influenced to comply because of information resource dependencies. Other

measures like financial dependency are effective in influencing compliance for such independent

organizations. Dependency on public administration authority was found to only influence

compliance for organizations affected by the local governments’ decisions and policies on say

planning. The relevancy of these findings beyond the case study is addressed in the next chapter.


56

6. Implication of findings

6.1. Introduction This chapter addresses the sixth research objective of assessing if compliance is a useful angle of

investigating data sharing. The interpretations in chapter 5 are related to the larger context

beyond the Ugandan case. The approach is by generalization in order to find relations that are

similar and relevant beyond the case study and findings unique to only the case study. The

findings on motivations for compliance behaviour and reasons for non compliance in section 4.7

are generalized to the national scale in section 6.3. The financial resource, information resource

and public administration findings are also generalized to the national scale and relevance to

other sectors in Uganda in section 6.3. From this generalization of the geo-information sector in

Uganda, insights can be drawn that are relevant to regional and global data.

6.2. Implication of findings The case study findings are broadly representative the way dependency on environmental

resources influences organizational compliance since the organizations tend to be influenced by

those who control the resources they require. There are many other factors that can influence

organizational compliance than considered in this research however, dependence on financial

resource came through as an outstanding and crucial measure of controlling organizational

compliance with any Act or policy. However, this may not hold for financially independent

organizations. It was noted that finances in themselves do not always guarantee organizational

compliance. Compliance with policies due to financial dependency is certain in combination with

rewards, support supervision to evaluate implementation performance as well as penalties for

non compliance. Compliance may not be obtained where supervision is expensive and difficult.

Since Acts and policies do not self-implement: unless it is to the advantage of organizations to do

so, significant resources ought to be devoted to supervision, enforcement and sanctions for non

compliance. This makes certain that compliance is rewarded and non compliance punished

without fail rather than haphazardly.

6.3. How to adapt a policy to influence compliance There is no specific answer on how to influence compliance. From the findings on reasons for

(none) compliance in section 4.7: the approach to influence compliance can be by admonishing

and use of incentives to attain compliance and penalties for non compliance. The idea of rewards

and penalties as consequences for compliance and non compliance respectively, is specific to the

Ugandan public administration. After decades of efforts to integrate national and local

organizations to complying with the same policies for public good, this research attests that the

practice for organizations in local governments outside the central government headquarters in

Kampala is still not a mirror image of national level organizations in the same sector. Proximity


57

does not satisfactorily explain the point in question—rewards and penalties, because for

neighbouring local governments like Mukono, the divergence between national and local level

has only grown larger, not lesser. Instead of continuing with obsession with the futile debate of

integration, this can be reframed to ascertain how it can be used (or the lessons drawn from it) to

for the common good. Local organizations have demonstrated that they place private benefit and

advantage beyond the interest of their sectors at national level. The national organizations are

indifferent or are incapable of influencing compliance of local organizations.

On the other hand, with donor partnerships, local organizations enthusiastically comply with

international GI standards like ISO 9001 for water quality as shown in section 5.2.2 with

finances as the most crucial resource. The financial penalties for non compliance provide insight

on how to incentivize organizational compliance to common national and regional GI policies.

The continued financial resources, in form of rewards for compliance, operate as an inherent

bribe turning the non complying organization into the most complying public organization in the

nation. The proponents of vertical integration are merely out of touch with reality by conducting

the debate with largely moral appeals making it complicated to convey such practical lessons on

board. Granted, high incentives do not always lead to high compliance. My argument may have

flaws but its orientation brings another view on how to attain multi level governance integration

and ultimately compliance to common national, regional and international GI policies.

Drawing from section 5.2.1, adapting and harmonizing policies to the context of public

administration priorities and strategic interests is also essential in influencing compliance

especially where the national and local governments are not closely knit or coordinated by way

of participatory policy design and in absence of enforcement and supervision. Organizations

exhibit selective behaviour in their choice of what is convenient to comply with for a fragmented

public administration or in the absence of consensus. Organizations that are greatly influenced by

public administration authority may lack the autonomy to comply even when compliance is their

preference. Organizations are more target or end user driven providing services with what works

best than policy driven to comply. They are manipulated by social context for policies that lack

social support and local authorities whose power base could be threatened by compliance. In this

case, policy designers should bias the policy to the communally preferred outcome. The result is

that compliance will be higher since non compliance will be considered communally improper –

as a belief.

From section 5.2.3, Information dependency has a non coercive influence on organizational

compliance. This compliance will exist if, among other factors, it is to the organization’s

strategic interests and advantage to comply. Otherwise, organizations that are financially capable

will regard to their interest opting to manufacture their own data / information. Some

organizations may not comply simply because they lack the link to public infrastructure or the

information resource they need to adjust to a policy even they are aware of the advantages of

compliance.


58

These research findings are not only specific to GI but generally cut across to other domains like

education and health information hence contribute to the body of literature on inter-

organizational relationships formation specifically on GI policy compliance by showing the

motivations of organizations for engaging in collaborations with their environments. The

relations between the case study areas of Mukono and Entebbe local governments and the way

they relate with Kampala, the head quarter of the central government is representative of the

relations of other local governments in Eastern, Western and Northern Uganda to the National

government in Kampala. Some variations may exist due to demographic factors like population,

political influence, instability but on the whole, the findings hold.

6.4. Limitation of the study The lack of scientific generalisability is a limitation to using case studies for research.

Generalizations can be made at a considerable risk of error (Thomas 2003; Yin 2003) given that

each ministry and organization has its own culture and practice. What happens in the ministry of

Lands can not happen exactly the same way in another ministry like Ministry of Water and much

less in another country. Generalization done on the basis of research into one instance like

compliance behaviour towards GI policies is risky as it is possible that the findings are unique

only to the particular case of multi-level organizations. I used resource dependency theory as the

main vehicle to overcome the limitation of lack of generalisability beyond the immediate case

study of the geo-information sector of Uganda. In studying whether organizations comply or not,

I majorly depended on the sincerity of the data from interviews that is consistent with secondary

data. I didn’t have the advantage of independently assessing compliance by playing an active role

in the organizations and participating in the implementation of daily activities.

6.5. Concluding remarks A better understanding of the reasons for organizational compliance and non compliance is

important in policy design and while adapting old ones. Policy makers should not assume

automatic and worldwide compliance wherever a policy is implemented. Potential grounds of

non compliance should be captured during policy design than adapting the policy in future.

Insights were gained on how policy makers can comprehensively tackle reasons for non

compliance by considering the less obvious grounds for non compliance like opportunity cost

involved in compliance. Increasing compliance is implicitly linked to strictness of the penalties

for non compliance. Non compliance can be a good indication of something incorrect in the

policy and not the intended / target organizations hence the need for policy makers to be in touch

with implementing organizations so as to capture their views. The policies ought not be too

complicated so as to enable compliance to be in line with the government interest of common

good for the citizens.


59

7. Conclusion and recommendations

7.1. Conclusions The main objective of this chapter is to provide the answer to the overall research objective. This

study sought to;

� To investigate how and identify why some organizations comply with common GI sharing policies while others do not.

� To investigate how and identify why some organizations comply with their respective ministry GI sharing policies while others do not.

Research questions were formulated such that in answering them, the objective of the research

would be achieved. These are answered below and finally the central message of the research.

Research question 1: How various theories explain and describe typical processes and difficulties related to (hierarchical) compliance? Resource dependency theory, Transaction cost theory and institutional theory were evaluated for

their views on compliance in section 2.2 and section 2.3. TCT views compliance being

determined by the relative costs of using markets or employing resources within the firm. TCT

focuses on transactions and the costs that go to completing transactions by one institutional mode

rather than another. Institutional theory views organisational compliance as shaped by social

context by complying with predominant norms, traditions and social influences in their internal

and external environments leading to homogeneity in their structures and activities. RDT views

compliance of organizations a direct result of resource exchanges of organizations with each

other and with the environment. The focus is on the organization’s competencies and capabilities

of coordinating productive resources. RDT was preferred over TCT and institutional theory

because of difficulties in observing and directly measuring transaction costs and the lingering

doubt about TCT empirical grounding; Institutional theory challenges in establishing contextual

conditions when an organisation started, what entails norms and traditions. The table

summarizing how the theories are observed is table 2.1.

Research question 2: How to observe compliance? Observing compliance is discussed in section 3.3 and was primarily through interviews on formal

GI prescriptions in place, observations on how organizations comply and not comply with

resource dependencies and documentary study of legal framework that acted as the compliance

reference. Not all organizations are involved in policy design. The way the resource dependency

theory can be decomposed to collect data is shown in table 3-2.

Research question 3: How do local and national agencies perceive and enact compliance? The way local and national agencies perceive and enact compliance is discussed in section 4.6.

The key players at national level are development partners and the ministry which designs the

policies for implementation at local level is the local government and GI organizations. The

practice is that largely organizations financially dependent on the ministry are the ones that


60

comply with such hierarchical policies. The national level organizations in Kampala comply

more with ministry and international policies as compared to local level organizations in Entebbe

and Mukono that are less compliant with policies and regulations. This variance in compliance is

because the organizations in Kampala city receive more financial resources, in addition to that

from government, from the development partners (channelled through government) unlike the

organizations in Mukono and Entebbe that essentially have their budgets locally funded by their

own local revenues. The national GI organizations are, because of financial resource

dependencies, not perfectly connected with the local organizations leading to both compliance

and non compliance co-existing. The key organizations involved in policy and those that comply

were highlighted in table 4-5. The reasons for compliance and non compliance are also discussed

in section 4.7.

Research question 4: Which elements of national GI sharing policies require compliance and what sort of compliance actions have been taken? The degree to which actors implement the policy requirements of various policies was discussed

in table 4-8. Some policies have all elements fully complied with while others are partially

complied with some elements not complied to.

Research question 5: Which type of resource dependence influence compliance to national GI policies? The influence of information dependency, financial dependency and public administration

authority on organizational compliance is discussed in section 5.2. Financial dependency was, in

comparison to the others, found to be more influential on organizational compliance to both

national and international standards. The role of support supervision, rewards and penalties was

found to positively compliment financial dependency in influencing compliance. Information

dependency was found to have a non coercive influence on organizational compliance especially

for organizations that are dependent on others for information. Public administration authority

was found to have an influence on organizational policy compliance for those organizations that

are financially dependent on the local government.

The central assumption of this thesis on organizational compliance is that – organizations comply

with GI sharing policies to the degree that they are dependent on external resources that require

the implementation of such policies. The central message of this thesis is that - Financial

dependency was found to have more outstanding influence in bringing about compliance

variations. Information dependency has influence on the compliance of organizations depending

on others for information. Information dependency has no influence on compliance for

organizations that are ‘informationally’ independent. Public administration authority instruments

only had influence on the compliance of GI organizations in instances where local government

decisions, like from district planning authority, had a direct bearing on the organization’s

compliance.


61

7.2. Recommendation The resource dependency theory could not fully explain the role of other factors like support

supervision, rewards and penalties in influencing organizational compliance to policies.

For future research on the influence of other resources like technological dependency on for

example facilities, equipment, legacy and experience, hardware and software like for GIS and

how this influences compliance or dependency on public infrastructure like geo-ICT.

Future research on how dependencies on non-governmental organizations and private sector GI

organizations have influence or a role on policy compliance.

Research on how to measure the unmeasured: the degree of compliance using some mathematical

quantitative decision criteria.

The results of this research are handy for regional and international bodies advocating and

funding integration efforts in countries like Uganda. This enables them get a grasp of

institutional, political and administrative context of the country thereby adding moral dimension

to the efforts.

The data obtained about financial dependencies, information dependencies, public administration

authority related dependencies fitted the objectives of the research – to investigate how and

identify why some organizations comply with common GI sharing policies while others don’t, to

investigate how and identify why some organizations comply with their respective ministry GI

sharing policies while others don’t.


62

Reference:

Amburgey, T. and H. Rao (1996). "Organizational ecology: Past, present, and future directions." The Academy of Management Journal 39(5): 1265-1286.

Babbie, E. and J. Mouton (2001). "The Practice of Social Research (Cape Town, Oxford University Press)."

Batungi, N. (2005). Applying Electronic government on Land Records in Uganda. Kampala, Makerere University.

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65

Appendix 1: Map of Uganda with study area (Entebbe, Kampala and Mukono)


66

Appendix 2: Weekly report showing how activities ar e planned to enact compliance.

INV

ES

TIG

AT

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TH

E IN

FLU

EN

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OF

RE

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whe

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u

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re

latio

n

to

Geo

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sp

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e h

iera

rch

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mo

re

pow

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dep

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the

org

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68

com

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fo

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with

sp

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you

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mee

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talk

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out

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a st

and

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and

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and

ard

s fr

om

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flue

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on

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tand

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ly

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be

alw

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mp

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whi

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com

plia

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is

pun

ish

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to

th

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o

f th

e

org

aniz

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lfilli

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hat

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e th

e co

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quen

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m

nat

ion

al

orga

niz

atio

ns

if yo

u d

o n

ot

follo

w n

atio

nal

gu

idel

ines

on

GI p

rod

uct

ion

?

o W

e ge

t fir

ed

or

pu

nis

hed

. o

We

get

a re

duc

tion

in

bud

get.

o

Ou

r b

osse

s ge

t fir

ed

or

obst

ruct

ed.

o T

her

e ar

e n

o

rep

ercu

ssio

ns

in a

ny

way

.

If fir

ed o

r p

unis

hed

, th

en h

eavy

sa

nctio

ns

linke

d to

no

n-c

om

plia

nce

h

ence

hi

gh

com

plia

nce

.

If n

one,

th

en n

o r

ewar

d f

or

per

form

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du

e to

lo

w

sed

uct

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h

ence

lo

w

com

plia

nce

.

Re

leva

nce

/

Ow

ner

ship

Leve

l of

exi

stin

g po

licy

rele

van

ce /

Imp

act

of p

olic

ies.

14

) C

an y

ou g

ive

an e

xam

ple

of

how

a n

atio

nal

G

I gu

idel

ine

has

m

ade

you

w

ork

m

ore

ef

fect

ivel

y w

ith s

pat

ial d

ata

? 1

5)

Can

you

giv

e an

exa

mp

le o

f ho

w a

nat

ion

al

guid

elin

e h

as m

ade

you

wo

rk l

ess

effe

ctiv

ely

with

sp

atia

l dat

a?

F

or

exam

ples

on

effe

ctiv

e p

olic

ies

mea

ns

hig

h

rele

van

ce

hen

ce

ther

e is

hi

gh

com

plia

nce

.

Co

mp

lian

ce

• A

cces

s to

po

licy

/

• P

ract

ice

/ •

Un

ders

tan

din

g

Th

e ex

ten

t to

w

hic

h

pol

icie

s ar

e p

ract

iced

.

16

) C

an y

ou

give

any

exa

mp

le o

f an

y re

gula

tion

th

at h

as m

ade

yo

u w

ork

mo

re e

ffici

ently

? 1

7)

Can

yo

u gi

ve a

ny e

xam

ple

of

any

regu

latio

n

that

has

mad

e y

ou

wo

rk le

ss e

ffici

ently

?

T

hos

e th

at g

ive

exam

ple

s ar

e aw

are

of t

he

po

licie

s so

th

ey c

an

pra

ctic

e th

em h

ence

hig

her

co

mpl

ian

ce.

Fin

anci

al

Res

ourc

e

Mo

ney

allo

catio

n.

Th

e ex

ten

t to

wh

ich

th

e

org

aniz

atio

n d

epen

ds

on

18

) H

ow

m

uch

d

oes

yo

ur

orga

niz

atio

n

get

allo

cate

d f

rom

the

go

vern

men

t b

udg

et e

very

ye

ar?

o 6

1 –

10

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o

41

– 6

0%

o

0 –

40

%

61

- 1

00%

rel

ies

on

go

vern

men

t b

udge

t,

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I

will

ca

ll th

is

heav

y fin

anci

al

INV

ES

TIG

AT

ING

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FLU

EN

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UR

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L P

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gove

rnm

ent

fun

din

g.

dep

end

ency

((

mo

re

com

plia

nt

du

e to

exte

rna

l co

ntr

ol

by

influ

enci

ng

the

agen

cies

’ d

ecis

ion

s th

rou

gh r

edu

cin

g or

incr

easi

ng

the

leve

l of

bu

dge

t gr

ante

d t

o

the

agen

cy))

Acc

ess

to

/ co

ntr

ol

ove

r fin

anc

ial

reso

urc

es.

Per

cen

tage

o

f bu

dge

t

fun

ded

by

loca

l rev

enu

e. 1

9)

Wha

t p

erce

nta

ge

of

inte

rnal

fu

nd

s of

yo

ur

orga

niz

atio

n is

der

ived

fro

m fe

es?

o

61

– 1

00

%

o 4

1 –

60

%

o 0

– 4

0%

O

ther

61

–

1

00%

, th

e o

rgan

izat

ion

h

as

high

acce

ss

and

hig

h

con

tro

l o

ver

finan

cial

reso

urc

e

hen

ce

hig

h au

ton

om

y /

emp

ow

erm

ent t

o m

ake

its

ow

n d

ecis

ion

s.

0

–

40

%,

Th

is

is

hig

h fin

anci

al

dep

end

ence

o

n

envi

ron

men

t.

Th

is

tells

that

its

actu

al c

apa

city

to

use

its

dec

isio

n-

mak

ing

po

wer

is s

eve

rely

co

nstr

ain

ed.

Pro

cess

es

and

pro

cedu

res

Leve

l o

f ac

cess

ibili

ty t

o

spat

ial d

ata.

20

) H

ow

do

es

you

r o

rgan

izat

ion

o

bta

in

spat

ial

data

? F

rom

an

oth

er

gove

rnm

ent

org

aniz

atio

n.

Fro

m

with

in

our

ow

n

org

aniz

atio

n,

yet

ano

ther

dep

artm

ent.

We

ma

ke

dat

a

ou

rsel

ves.

Fro

m

ano

ther

go

vern

men

t o

rgan

izat

ion

imp

lies

exis

ten

ce

of

pro

cess

es

and

pro

cedu

re

for

colla

bo

ratio

n

and

envi

ron

men

tal

inte

rdep

end

ence

h

ence

low

au

ton

om

y.

We

mak

e d

ata

our

selv

es i

mp

lies

a hi

gh

deg

ree

of

auto

nom

y an

d l

ow

dep

end

ence

on

en

viro

nmen

t fo

r in

form

atio

n

Info

rmat

ion

reso

urc

e

Po

licy

acce

ssib

ility

Le

vel

of

acce

ssib

ility

of

pol

icie

s.

21

) C

an y

ou g

ive

an e

xam

ple

of

how

a n

atio

nal

gu

idel

ine

has

mad

e it

easi

er

for

you

to

acc

ess

spat

ial d

ata

fro

m a

no

ther

org

aniz

atio

n?

22

) C

an y

ou g

ive

an e

xam

ple

of

how

a n

atio

nal

gu

idel

ine

has

mad

e it

mo

re d

iffic

ult

for

you

to

ac

cess

spa

tial d

ata

from

an

oth

er o

rgan

izat

ion

? T

he

mo

re

acce

ssib

le

the

pol

icy

is,

the

mo

re

it w

ill

be

kno

wn

an

d

the

resp

on

sibi

lity

to b

e co

mp

lied

to

.

INV

ES

TIG

AT

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E IN

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EN

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ION

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PE

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EN

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PE

RS

PE

CT

IVE

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AS

E S

TU

DY

OF

GE

O-I

NF

OR

MA

TIO

N S

EC

TO

R IN

UG

AN

DA

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endi

x 4:

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aniz

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in

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title

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71

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07

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