44 Fall2011 21st Century Science & Technology

Clinton Bastin was responsible for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)’s reprocessing of pluto-nium, and plutonium scrap operations, plu-tonium-238 produc-tion, transuranic ma-terials processing, tritium and deuterium production for weap-ons programs, radio-active waste management, and related activities at the Department of Energy’s Savannah River Plant in South Carolina. He was also involved in the diplomatic side of U.S. international nuclear efforts, and he was president of the Federal Em-ployees Union at the Department of En-ergy headquarters.

Upon his retirement, Bastin was recog-nized by the DOE in a Distinguished Ca-reer Service Award, as the U.S. authority on reprocessing and initiator of total quality management and partnering agreements. Bastin served as a Marine in World War II and was an instructor in chemistry for the Marine Corps Institute.

He was interviewed on Nov. 18, 2011, by managing editor Marjorie Mazel Hecht, and this is a shortened transcript of the interview.

***21st Century: As a nuclear scientist

and chemical engineer, who for decades directed U.S. programs for production and processing of nuclear materials and components for weapons, you have as-serted that there is no weapons threat from Iran. What is your assessment of Iran’s nuclear program?

Bastin: It’sanuclearpowerprogram.Iranmadeacommitment to fulluseofnuclearpowerin1970,orderedfivenu-clearplantsfromtheUnitedStates,whichpromised,butlaterdenied,reprocessingtechnology.ThisresultedinIran’scancel-ling the U.S. plants and ordering them

from others, which were can-celledduringtherevolution.ButIranhasstayedcommittedtonu-clearpower.RussiaisbuildingIran’snu-clearplant,whichisreadytostartopera-tion.

Because of thedenialofreprocess-ing,Iranisreluctanttorelyonothers,sothey wanted to en-

rich their own uranium,which is essential for nu-clear power. That’s whatthey’redoing.TheirreactorisaU.S.-typelightwaterre-actor.TheRussians startedbuildingthemsuccessfully,andIthinkit’sfine.

IbelievePakistanprovid-ed the gas centrifuges,

whichhavehadproblems.Iwasamem-berof theAtomicEnergyCommission’ssteeringcommitteeforgascentrifugede-velopment,andIknowthattheyareverysensitive, run at high power, and oftencrash. Isuspectproblemsarerelatedtothat,andnotcomputerhacking.Iranalsohasaresearchreactor,Osiris,whichwasbuiltbytheFrenchanduses20percentenriched uranium, which they’ve beengetting from others and would like to

NUCLEAR REPORT

Iran Has a Nuclear Power, Not a Weapons Program

Bushehr

Tehran

A model of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, exhibited in the Iranian pavilion of EXPO 2010 in Shanghai. The map shows the location of Bushehr.

Iran made a commitment to full use of nuclear power in 1970. The German firm Kraftwerk Union AG signed an agreement to build two nuclear plants at Bushehr in 1975, and withdrew in 1979, when both plants were partly completed. Reportedly, Germany was pressured by the United States to withdraw. During the Iran-Iraq war, 1984-1988, the Iraqis damaged the plant site in air strikes. Bushehr I was completed with Russian assistance in September 2011.

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21st Century Science & Technology Fall2011 45

makethemselves.Twentypercentis not weapons material. Weap-onsmaterialisabout90percent.DavidAlbrighthasbeenclaimingthatyoucanmakeaweaponwithit,butitwouldbeincrediblydif-ficult,andit’snotarationalthingtotry.

Iran Cannot Make A Nuclear Weapon

21st Century: You mean he’s claiming that you can make a weapon with 20 percent enriched uranium?

Bastin: He said theoreticallyyoucould—butyoucouldnot.Agun-type weapon would requireseveral tons of highly enricheduranium, and wouldn’t makesense. Anyway, that’s not a realconcernunderthesecircumstanc-es.Tomakeabomb,Iranwouldnotonlyhavetofurtherenrichtheuraniuminitsexistingfacilities—whichwouldbedifficulttodo—but after they complete furtherenrichment, they would have toconvert the gas to metal. Irandoesn’thavethefacilitiesorexpe-rience to do that. It would takeyears.Themostimportantthingtorealize is that any diversion ofuranium for further enrichment or any-thingelsewouldbeimmediatelydetect-ed.It’sveryeasytodetectdiversionfromagascentrifugefacility.

21st Century: Do you mean detection by the IAEA inspectors?

Bastin:Yes,theyaregoodatit,andit’sappropriatefor themtodoit.That’s theonlythingthatyoucancountontomakesure that nobody’s building weapons.The nonsense of drawings of this, ordrawings of that—it’s really just non-sense.ElBaradei,theformerIAEAdirec-torgeneral,recognizedthisandhesaid,during our conversation, that no, therewasnothreatfromIran’snuclearpowerprogram.

21st Century: You’ve criticized the IAEA report’s claim on Iran’s nuclear program as incompetent. Can you give some examples of this?

Bastin:Yes,that’swhat’sgoingonrightnow.The IAEAdirectorgeneralnow—Iguesshe’sapoliticalperson,Idon’treal-

lyknow.I’velookedatsomethingsabouthim,and it sounds likehe’sbeenmorelikeapoliticalperson.Ithinksomepeo-plecomein,asintheDepartmentofEn-ergy, and they accept everything thatpeopletellthem.AndIthinkhe’scomein,andbelievesallthoseinspectorsthathaveseenthings,havefoundthings,thatthey shouldn’t really—they have longtrigger lists of things to look for, and itmisleads them.The inspectorsdon’t re-allyknowanythingaboutnuclearweap-onsproduction,buttheyhavethislonglistofitemsthataremostlynormalchem-icalengineering-typeprocesses,usedinoperations,or similar things that they’llruninto.

Now,onthedrawings:I’msureinIranthattherearepeoplewhoareupsetabouteverything—youknow,theyhavelotsofproblemsasacountry.Thedrawings,I’msure,aremadebypeoplethataresortoftickedoff,here,there,andyonder.Draw-ingsforaweaponsprogram:IhadallthedrawingsintheAtomicEnergyCommis-sionforallweapons.Nobodyeversees

thoseexceptpeopleIwanttoseethem.Thedrawings the inspec-torshaveseenaresomethingthatsomebodyhasplayedwith.

21st Century: So you think that inside Iran, some people have produced drawings that these inspectors find, and the drawings are just manufactured.

Bastin:Yes.Ithinksomescien-tistsmight haveplayed around,butinarealisticmanner.Draw-ings of assembling a hypotheti-calnuclearweaponwithamis-sile are particularly unrealistic.I’ve watched U.S. nuclear war-headsbeingattachedonmissilesfor theU.S.weapons.Youhavetoknowwhattheweaponlookslike.Youcan’tbuildahypotheti-calweaponinameaningfulway,andputitonahypotheticalmis-sile,orevenarealmissile,ifyoudon’t know what everythinglookslike.Thewholethingisstu-pid.It’ssortofstupid,andwhenIsay they’re ignorant, it’s reallyworsethanthat.

‘Nobody Knew Anything’

21st Century: Is it different now in the IAEA than it used to

be? Are inspectors less trained now than they used to be?

Bastin:Theyare trained todetect thediversionofnuclearmaterial,andthat’swhattheydo.Butthey’realsogivenalistofthingstolookfor,thatsuggestweap-onsactivities.But the IAEA doesn’t have people who know about nuclear weap-ons. They don’t build nuclear weapons. I’ve never met anybody—and I’ve been to the IAEA many, many times—and I’ve never met anybody who knows anything about nuclear weapons.

That’salsotheprobleminWashington,D.C.Forthe25yearsIwasthere,wheninvolvedwithnuclearweaponsbusiness,withinteragencyandothercommittees,nobodyknewanythingaboutwhatIwastellingthem.Itwasinterestingat times.Once I met at the Department of Statewith a group involved with concernsaboutnuclearprograms in India. IwasaskedtogotoIndiaandtakealookandmade a report.The representative fromthe Arms Control and DisarmamentAgencysaid,“We’vebeenlookingatthis

Iran’s nuclear program began during the Atoms for Peace program, in collaboration with the United States. In 1967, the Tehran Nuclear Research Center was estab-lished by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, which operated a 5-megawatt research reactor supplied by the United States.

Here, an Iranian newspaper clipping from 1968 with a photo of Iranian Ph.D. scientists in front of the research reactor. The caption reads: “A quarter of Iran’s Nuclear Energy scientists are women.”

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46 Fall2011 21st Century Science & Technology

problemforfouryears,anditlookslikewenowfinallyknowwhatwe’retalkingabout.”

That’stherealityintheU.S.,thereality in theU.N.,and the realityalmost everywhere—except per-haps Russia and China. I spent aweekwith theMinisterofNuclearEnergyinRussiaandalotofotherleaders,andIthinktheyknowmoreabout what they’re dealing with.AndIimaginethatChinadoestoo.Butoursystemisdysfunctional.Youknow, the Department of Energyhas lost theability toproducenu-clearmaterials,becausetheydidn’treallyknowaboutthings.It’sreallyawful.

21st Century: That’s not comfort-ing—

Bastin: Yes! Iran is just one ofmanythatI’vefocussedon,andI’mverymuchinterestedinitbecauseithasawfulpotentialconsequencesifsomebodyattacksthem.

21st Century: Absolutely. I know that you wrote a detailed letter to the Israeli Prime Minister, Netanyahu, about Iran’s nuclear weapons, or lack of such. Have you had a response?

Bastin:Yes,letmeelaborateonthis:IstartedthreeyearsagowiththeConsul-GeneralofIsraelinAtlanta.Isente-mailmessages, and inMarch2009,wehaddetaileddiscussions.I’msureeverythingIsaidwassenttoTelAviv,andIfeel100percentcertainthatheknewIknewwhatIwastalkingabout.

IsentsomeoftheinformationtoPres-identObama,andIgotacallfromtheFBI office in Atlanta saying that theywanted to meet with me. The WhiteHousereferredmetotheFBIweaponsofmassdestructionunit,andtheyaskedtomeetwithmetoverifythatthisinfor-mationwasvaluable.Aftermymeetingwith theConsul-General, therewasanarticleaboutastatementmadebyNe-tanyahu to Ahmadinejad of Iran thatIran’snuclearprogramsforweaponsaremeant to kill Jews, just like Hitler’s inWorldWarII.

Isentane-mailmessagetoNetanya-huthatGermanydidn’thaveanuclearweaponsprograminWorldWarII;theyhadanuclearprogram,buttheirscien-

tistsneverfocussedontheideaofanu-clear explosion.That’s from the bookAlsosbySamuelGoudsmit,whowastheprincipal scientist for theAlsos (GreekwordforGroves),theprojectthatlookedintonuclearworkthatGermanywasdo-ing.WhenGermanscientistsfoundoutabout the U.S. nuclear weapons, theywent intoshockbecause theycouldn’tbelievethattheU.S.scientistscoulddosomething that they had never beenable to figure out at all. Fascinatingbook!

“We acknowledge receipt of your e-mailtoPrimeMinisterBenjaminNetan-yahu, thecontentsofwhichhavebeendulynoted”—wastheresponsetomyin-formationtoPrimeMinisterNetanyahu.They didn’t say they were going to doanything,butIremember,afteronepar-ticular message, the next thing I heardfrom the White House, was that Israelhad stoppedmaking threats.TheWhiteHouse information said that it was be-causeoftroublewiththegascentrifuges,butmyfeelingisthattheyknewthattheinformationthatIwasprovidingissound.AndsodidtheFBI.

I’vewrittentotheSenatorsfromGeor-

gia,andallIgetistherhetoricandfolderolandsoforth,whichdoesn’thaveadamnthingtodowithwheth-erIrancanmakeanuclearweapon.Theyciteallthethingstheinspectorssay.TheIAEAinspectorsweresayingthesamethingsthattheyweresay-ing when ElBaradei was there, butElBaradeirecognizedthattheywerenot valid concerns.They were notthen,andtheyarenotnow.

Don’t Listen to Know-Nothings

21st Century: So you think El-Baradei had more sense about the situation?

Bastin:Hehadmoresenseabouttherealityofthingsinthissituation.Ienjoyedhimandlikedhisapproach.HegottheNobelPeacePrize.Iwasunion president at Department ofEnergyheadquarters,andhadinter-action with secretaries of energy.Mostofthemwouldgetinformationfromtheknow-nothingsandgowiththeflow.ButIcouldsensewithafewthat theywere interested ingettingreallygoodinformation.AndIthinkElBaradeiwasoneofthose.

21st Century: Well, it’s a good quality not to listen to the know-nothings. One of the things you noted in the various things you’ve written is that most of the so-called scientific experts quoted by the press are not nuclear weapons ex-perts at all, but ideologues with an agen-da, like David Albright whose scare statements—

Bastin:DavidAlbrightandhisInstituteforScienceandInternationalSecurity.IknowhimandIknowhehasanagenda.I’minterestedintakingcareofthisbusi-ness,andit’sgot tobedonebypeoplewho know what they are doing. Davedoesnot.ImetDaveforthefirsttimeaf-terIhadtestifiedandshotdownsome-thing that Representative Markey ofMassachusettswastryingtodo.ButthenwhenIwasactiveinthenuclearweap-ons freeze campaign, I commendedMarkey for his support for this cam-paign.

21st Century: This must have been in the ‘80s.

Bastin:Yes,‘87,‘88—I’mnotsureex-actly. The session was about a GAO

The Shah planned to build 23 nuclear plants. This is a newspaper ad from the 1970s by American nuclear-energy companies.

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[GovernmentAccountabilityOffice] re-view of a report that I had determinedwasnon-valuabletotheJapaneseforre-processing.The GAO review and testi-monytoMarkeywasbyanuclearengi-neer who said that it was valuable forreprocessing.

IwasinJapanacoupleofmonthsafteritwasprovidedtotheJapanese,whosaiditwasworthless.ItwasdonebyBechtel,andrightafterthetestimony,IwasonanelevatorwithavicepresidentofBechtelandapologizedforassaultingthequalityof Bechtel work. He said: “Apologizenothing.Youdidagreatthing.Yougotusoffarealnastyhook.”Andtheyofferedmeajobafterthat.Ididn’ttakeit.

21st Century: What are some of the specific technical areas that you think people are being misled on by the so-called experts?

Bastin:The one I most emphasize isthe failure to recognize that a nuclearweaponcannotbemadeofgas.Thegasmust be converted to metal, a difficultandverydangerousprocessbecauseofthehighpotentialforacriticalaccident(likeanuclearreactorwithoutshielding)that would kill anyone in the room ornearby.

Iranhasnoexperiencewiththispro-cess,andnofacilitiestocarryitout.As-semblyofmetalcomponentswithhighexplosives isevenmoredangerous,be-cause a nuclear explosion would killthosewithinhalfamile.Becauseofthedifficulties, Iran would need 10 to 15yearstomakeaweapon,afterdiversionof low-enricheduranium,whichwouldbeimmediatelydetectedbyIAEAinspec-tors.Iran’sleadersknowthattheirfacili-tieswouldbeattackedfollowingadiver-sion.Sotheynotonlywouldn’tbeabletobuildaweapon—

21st Century: They’d lose a lot of their country—

Bastin:Okay,soifnobodybombs,and15yearslater,Iranhasanuclearweapon.Israel has 400 nuclear weapons, testedand deliverable. What kind of idiotswould make weapons under those cir-cumstances?Itisabsolutestupiditytobe-lievethattheyarethatidiotic.Theyarenot.

Iranisinterestedinnuclearpower,andnobody seems to appreciate that, be-

causeIranhasoil.Iranknowsitsoilisnotgoingtolastforever.

21st Century: And that decision was made way back in 1970, with the U.S. support at that time.

Bastin:That’sright.TheU.S.StateDe-partmentpromisedIranallthetechnolo-gyneeded.Butthereprocessingtechnol-ogypromisedtoIranhadfailedinU.S.programs.I’dbeentransferredtoAtomicEnergyCommissionheadquarterstodealwith those failures, and was given thestaff paper to review for the transfer oftechnology that would be provided toIran.

I recommendedthat thereprocessingtechnologynotbeprovided,andtheAECdeniedthetransfer.Thatled,partially,toanearlybreakdownofrelationsbetweentheU.S.andIran,and—inmyopinion—the oil embargo of 1973. I rememberreadingaboutIranianoilshipsthatwereatseaduringlongperiodsoftimeduringthatembargo.

21st Century: You’ve mentioned in your writings that similar unfounded claims about Iraq led to the U.S. deci-sion to invade Iraq, which cost hundreds of thousands of lives and a trillion dol-lars plus, and now, instead of us repeat-ing that situation, you’ve called for ne-gotiations based on mutual interest and

an end to foolish rhetoric and hostile ac-tions. What are the prospects for this, and what kind of support have you got-ten from the nuclear community for your campaign?

Bastin:Goodquestion.AfterU.S.offi-cials determined there was a weaponthreatinIran,Nuclear News,themonth-lymagazineoftheAmericanNuclearSo-ciety, published my letter that the ideathatIranwasanuclearweaponthreatbe-longsonthesameshelfasthenotionthat1radofradiationto1,000peoplewouldmeanthedeathofoneofthosepeople—thelinearno-thresholdhypothesis.

TheNew York Timespublishedtwoofmyletters,andtheAmerican Legion Mag-azine published my letter, but I reallyhavenothadmuchsupportfromthenu-clearcommunity,norfromU.S.officials.I’vegiventalkstocommunitygroupsinthisarea,andI’vesentthetextout,butoncethingsstartgoingoutofcontrol,it’shardtogetthemback.

21st Century: It’s true, but you have to keep it up.

Bastin:Yes,I’mgoingtokeepworkingonit.IdowhatIcan,Ihope.AndIwasreallyoverjoyedwithmyeffortswithIs-rael,which,inmyopinion,resultedinIs-raelendingtheirthreatstoIran’snuclearfacility.Butthat’spickedbackupagain.PeopleinIsraeldon’tunderstandthesitu-

IAEA

Former IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei addressing a press conference in Tehran at the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran in October 2009.

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48 Fall2011 21st Century Science & Technology NUCLEARREPORT

ation.Andtherearefewpeoplewhoun-derstandithere,oranywhere.

21st Century: Let’s try and get your in-terview out to more people on the LPAC-TV.

Bastin:Thatwouldbegreat.Iappreci-ateyourdoingthis,andIhopeitisofval-ue.

21st Century: I think so, and for the reason that all of the so-called experts in the press, as you have pointed out, are really not experts in this technical area. You are.

Bastin:ImentionedtoDavidAlbrightthat Pakistan’s gun-type weapons re-quireabout50kilogramsofhighlyen-riched uranium, and that the numbersthatappearinthenewspaperareprob-ably high. He said Pakistan’s weaponsare implosion-type, not gun-type, andhave solid metal components. I said,“Waitaminute,David,youknowbetterthan that.” I laughed.Hegotmadandcutmeoff, andweareno longer col-leagues.

Animplosion-typeweaponisahollowsphereof plutoniumoruraniummetal,

surroundedbyhighexplosiveswithdeto-nators on the outside. The explosionsqueezesthenuclearmaterialintoatinyball, which becomes supercritical andexplodeswithgreatforce.Butexplosiveswill not squeeze solid metal. David’scommentwasn’tjusttechnicallyinvalid,itwasstupid.

A gun-type weapon consists of twosolidchunksofmetal,oneacylinder,theotherwithaholethesizeofthecylinder.The cylinder is driven into the otherchunk,andboom!

21st Century: But it takes a lot more of the enriched uranium.

Bastin: The implosion weapon is ahollowsphereor spheroid, surroundedby explosives, with detonators on theoutside, all contained within a strongstructure.Soall the forcesqueezes thehollow sphere into a tiny ball, a verysmallandveryhighlycriticalmass,anditmakesabigexplosion.Andyoucan’tdoitwithsolidmetal,becauseitwon’tsqueeze.

21st Century: Was your point with Al-bright that Pakistan did not have the

technology to do an implosion-type weapon?

Bastin:Yes.Theyaremuchmorediffi-cult tomake,havetobetestedprior touse.The Manhattan Project had to testthe implosion weapon at Alamogordo,before it could be declared usable,whereasthegun-typeweaponwasusedatHiroshimawithoutanytesting.Theim-plosion-typeisamuchmoresophisticat-ed,complexweapon.

TheIsraeliweaponsaretheimplosiontype,butareofFrenchdesign.TheFrenchhelped the Israelis with their weaponsprogram. India’s is also an implosiontype,but it took thema long time,andthey’ve got an awful lot of very, verysmart physicists and others in India. Ittookalongtime,andIunderstandthatthey had some failed tests before theyweresuccessful.

Now,NorthKorea—I’mnotsurewhattheyhave.Becausetheyhaveaplutoni-umsystem.Thefirsttestwasadud,thesecond test apparently was successful.Whethertheyactuallyhadaplutoniumimplosionweapon, Idon’t reallyknow.MaybePakistanloanedthemsomething.It’shardtoknow.