EIectoraI Studies ( 1989). 8:s. 28 I -287

Ireland

NEIL COLLINS

Magee College, University of Ulster, Derry BT48 7JL, Northern Ireland

The outcome of the 1989 European Election in the Republic of Ireland was a decrease in the vote for the two largest parties, a clear swing towards the left and the emergence of the Green party. In addition, a party which had established itself domestically since the last European elections, the Progressive Democrats, made its mark in Europe for the first time. The current disposition of Irish members is 6 Fianna Fail, 4 Fine Gael, 1 each for the Labour party, Progressive Democrats, and Workers Party and 2 Independents.

The election to the European Parliament marks a considerable reverse for the governing Fianna Fail party which lost 2 of their previous 8 seats. The party’s upset in Europe was, however, overshadowed by its disappointment in the national election which was held on the same day. The Taoiseach (Prime Minister), Mr Charles J. Haughey, called a general election to coincide with the European contest. The announcement of the national election came only three weeks before the polling date. Speculation on a general election had. however, been rife for some time. Opinion polls had been indicating that Mr Haughey’s minority government might win an overall majority in a general election. Fianna Fail had 80 seats, 4 short of the 84 needed. In the event, Fianna Fail also lost seats at the national contest. Ireland was thus faced with several weeks of uncertainty before a coalition government involving Fianna Fail and the Progressive Democrats was formed in mid- July. The Progressive Democrats are mostly former members of Fianna Fail and both parties are centre/right in the Irish political spectrum.

The party system in Ireland differs from that in other European countries because it is not based as clearly on social cleavages such as class or religion. The major issue after independence in 1922 was the Anglo-Irish Treaty, which established the new state. The division which it produced formed the basis of the Irish party system. This issue has, however, subsided since the 1930s. The success of Irish parties now depends on their economic appeal to the electorate in general and the loyalty of their traditional supporters.

The Campaign

Ireland’s entry to the European Community in 1973 was heralded by many as a great chance to lessen decisively the intluence of Britain on Irish life. It has indeed had a major impact and Irish enthusiasm for Europe remains high. There has been some resistance to the EC from groups who fear a loss of Irish sovereignty but overall Ireland has been an enthusiastic, co-operative and active Community member.

Since accession to the European Community, Ireland has received considerable

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financial transfers from Community funds. In fact, approximately 8 per cent of the government’s current budget comes from Brussels. Nevertheless, the attention of the Irish public to Europe is somewhat spasmodic. Speculation as to who was to fill Ireland’s European Commissioner post caused some public interest in the autumn. The preparation and publication of Ireland’s national development plan, part of the

process under which the structural funds are to be doubled, focused attention on Europe in the early part of 1989. The presence of Irish MEPs on the official visit to the Carribean was the subject of adverse press comment during the run up to the European election. As usual the newspapers also ran stories highlighting MEPs generous pay and allowances. Overall, however, European issues tend to be relegated to a poor second place compared with national ones. In 1989, even coverage of the farm price proposals of Agriculture Commissioner, Ray MacSharry, and the eventual ‘deal’ were largely unexceptional. Wider issues such as defence (discussed largely in terms of Ireland’s neutrality) and European monetary union (generally linked to the position of sterling rlis-ri-uis the EMS) excited little public attention. Against this background, it is difficult for European candidates to gain much public attention. In 1989, however, the popular imagination was aroused by the list of party nominees.

In the Munster constituency, the Fine Gael ticket was unusual in that the party nominated a politician from Northern Ireland, Mr John Cushnahan, to replace their outgoing MEP Mr Tom O’Donnell. At the previous European election in 1984 O’Donnell had polled the second highest number of first preference votes in Munster but decided to retire. Mr Cushnahan, formerly leader of the Alliance Part) in Northern Ireland, joined Professor Tom Raftery. sitting MEP on the Fine Gael ticket. In order to maximize Fine Gael’s electoral appeal, he set up his headquarters in Limerick at the opposite end of the constituency from Rafter);.

The Cushnahan intervention for Fine Gael took most of the party’s activists and supporters by surprise. Traditionally Irish candidates have had an established power- base within the constituency. Cushnahan had not run for public office in the Republic at any level before. He only gained the nomination after defeating a local member of the DPil (the Irish Parliament) at the selection convention. The Alliance Party and Fine Gael were linked to different European party groups and Cushnahan had no background in agriculture or other aspects of politics generally considered important in this largely rural southern constituency. In addition, many nationalists, most actively Irish-American groups, opposed his record in Northern Ireland.

Nevertheless, his candidacy was helped by his public recognition. Fine Gael also nominated a well-known Northern politician for a Dublin seat in the national

election. Another surprise candidate in the Munster constituency was Father Patrick Ryan.

Fr Ryan had been at the centre of an extradition row involving Britain with both Belgium and Ireland. British authorities have alleged that Fr Ryan was linked to paramilitaF groups in Northern Ireland. Although the priest was a member of the Pallotine Fathers he had been absent from the Order for a number of years. His candidacy was disapproved of. both by the local bishop, who spoke in the most forthright terms, and by the Pallotinc Fathers themselves. His campaign did. however, gain support from well-known nationalist personalities in both the Republic and Northern Ireland. Sinn Fein. an extreme Republican party, withdrew candidates to assist Ryan’s chances.

The Munster constituency also saw the nomination of the independent MEP, Mr

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T.J. Maher, a popular farmers’ leader. Maher’s nomination came only after he reversed a decision on whether to stand. His nomination was thought to be

particularly significant for Fianna Fail as that party’s candidate, also a farmers’ union leader, was thought most likely to gain a large proportion of Maher’s poll topping

vote of 1979 and 1984.

Another candidate who drew attention to the European election before the announcement of a general election was Mr Raymond Crotty. Crotty had successfully challenged the validity of the Single European Act and caused the holding of a referendum on the subject in 1987. His aim in announcing his candidacy was to express concern about the increasing moves towards the integration of the European Community (EC). He looked for his support in the Dublin constituency to the 35 per cent of the electorate in the city and county who had voted against the Single European Act in the referendum. Of the ‘personalities’ to fight the European election, Crotty had the poorest organizational and financial support.

European candidates in general face the problem of retaining public interest in their personal campaigns. This is particularly important under the Irish voting system because the electors are often able to choose between several nominees for each party. Thus an individual candidate may suffer even if his party is being relatively successful. By the same token, a secure personal following can insulate a candidate from a downturn in his or her party’s standing with the electorate. For the smaller parties, which normally nominate only one candidate, it is important to put forward a candidate known throughout the European constituency. This requirement is quite exacting because Dail elections are often fought on a very localist basis. For this reason both the leftist Labour and Workers parties and the Progressive Democratic Party nominated nationally-known members from among

the party leadership. For senior members of the small parties the European Parliament can be more

attractive than permanent opposition at home. The Irish parties take a relatively tolerant view of the dual mandate. Candidates in 1989 who held seats in the Dail usually declared that they would make up their minds on which legislature to choose after any forthcoming national elections. Seven out-going Dail deputies were candidates in both the European and national elections. Two other former deputies contested the European election alone as did two members of the Irish upper house, the Seanad. Only three candidates declared before hand that, if they were elected for both Parliaments, they would maintain a dual mandate.

The official party campaigns for the European Parliament began in April. The governing party, Fianna Fail, opted for the shortest possible European election campaign in an attempt to gain tactical advantage over the others. Even at the launching of the party campaigns, the prospect of a national election being called at the discretion of the Taoiseach distracted the parties attempts to discuss European issues. The Labour party leader called on the electorate to use the European poll to give their verdict on the government. Nevertheless, the largest opposition party Fine Gael sought to focus on Europe, Fine Gael argued it had a particular advantage in comparison to Fianna Fail because of its membership of the large European People’s Party. The EPP, so party spokespersons claim, provides Fine Gael with the means to have a decisive intluence on European policies.

On the whole, the European campaign was dominated by domestic concerns. Candidates such as Crotty, and the Greens, who attempted to widen the issues were exceptional. Each party emphasized its ‘national’ advantages. The left wing parties,

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in particular Labour and the Workers Party, urged their supporters to transfer their next highest preference votes to other left wing candidates. They sought in the European election, as in national politics, to typify their opponents collectively as part of a ‘right wing consensus’. The Progressive Democrats and Fine Gael. who

eventually formed an election pact for the national poll, stressed their responsible role in opposition. On the other hand. Fianna Fail pointed to their record on economic issues and claimed that their efforts were put in jeopardy by the uncertainty of their minority position in the Diil.

The National and European Elections

It was inevitable that the European issues would be eclipsed by national ones once a general election was called by the Taoiseach on 25 Mav. The calling of the election , was influenced by public opinion polls showing that Fianna Fail were likely to increase their representation in the Dail. Similar polls, however, showed that both Fianna Fail and Fine Gael would drop one seat each in the European election. As shown above the major issues of the electoral campaigns were national in character. They largely involved the public’s assessment of the performance of the Fianna Fail minority government. The major topics of unemployment and reductions in health facilities were dominant. Fianna Fail seem to have underestimated the impact of their cuts in public finance particularly as they affected hospital services. Other concerns of the voters were the level of emigration, high personal taxation, the provision of social welfare, inflation. cuts in the education service and the cost of living. In some Dail constituencies local problems of army pay, fishing licences and factory closures were also prominent. An underlying theme of many speeches and editorials was that the national election was unnecessary and opportunist.

Electoral Procedure

The European election procedure was essentially the same as for all Irish contests. Voting in Ireland was, as usual, on the single transferable vote (STV) system in multi- member constituencies. There were 4 constituencies, as in the previous European Parliament elections, returning a total of 15 MEPs for the Republic. Three further MEPs for Northern Ireland are part of the UK representation. The largest constituency is Munster with 5 seats. Dublin returns 4; and Leinster, and Connacht lllster 3 each. The election was held on 15 June, but counting was carried out on

Sunday 18 June. In 198-t, when local elections coincided with the European separate ballot boxes were used for each contest. As a result in busy polling stations some papers were misplaced. In 1089 the same boxes were used for both elections. The ballot papers were divided after polling ended on Thursday. The European papers were not processed until Sunday though the national count began once the

polling stations closed.

The voter in the STV system may mark the ballot paper according to their order of preference between candidates irrespective of party. Each vote can be transferred if the most preferred candidate is eliminated from the contest with too few first preference votes, or. if the preferred candidate is elected with more votes than necessary. From each candidate’s point of view. the important considerations. therefore. concern. first preference votes and, to a lesser extent, transfers from other candidates.

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As in 1984, each party published the names of substitute candidates before the election. If an elected member vacates a seat, then that place is taken by the first substitute of the elected member’s party. It had been thought likely in 1984 that

this Irish procedure would have been challenged. It was, however, allowed to stand and will do so until a common electoral system can be introduced. One of the beneficiaries of the procedure, Mr Chris O’Malley, who became an MEP as a result of being drafted from the replacement list did, however, cause some legal difficulties for the national election. O’Malley’s unsuccessful legal attempt to stop the general election was based on figures showing that 17 out of the 41 Dail constituencies varied from the constitutionally-prescribed national average.

European electoral procedure in 1989 has been controversial for somewhat different reasons. These arise from confusion on the part of electors between the national and European elections held on the same day. Many voters began their preferences on the general election ballot paper and continued them on the differently-coloured European paper. Such voting papers were rejected in the Leinster and ConnachtKJlster constituencies. Similar votes were, however, allowed in Dublin and Munster. Because the voting for the final place in Leinster was particularly close, even after a recount, a legal challenge is being mounted to the overall conduct of the election on the basis that different interpretations of European electoral law were adopted by the four returning officers.

The Result

Both Fianna Fail and Fine Gael got a lower percentage of the European vote than they did in the national election. The left wing parties, the Independents and the Green Party, all increased their vote compared with 1984. The new competitor, the Progressive Democrats, also scored a notable success despite its national reverses. Overall, however, the disproportionate influence of personalities on the contest, the small number of seats and the impact of the national contest make comparisons with 1984 difficult. Fianna Fail share of the 1984 European poll was 39.2 per cent, in 1989 it had dropped to 31.5 per cent, for Fine Gael, 32.2 per cent in 1984 was reduced to 2 1.6 per cent (see Table 1).

The turnout, 68.3 per cent was the same as for the national election. The number of spoiled votes, over 14,000 in Leinster, was high (2.5% ) because of the strict

interpretation of some returning officers of papers on which voters were confused as to the two separate elections.

TARLE 1. Percentages of first preference votes (and seats in) 1989 and 1984

National Euro Euro 1989 1989 1984

Fianna Fail (EDA) Fine Gael (EPP) Labour (sot) Workers party (Comm) Progressive Dem (Lib) Independents and others

44.1 (77) 31.5 (6) 39.2 (8) 29.3 (55) 21.6 (4) 32.2 (6)

9.5 (15) 9.5 (1) 8.4 (-) 5.0 (7) 7.5 ( 1) 4.3 (-) 5.5 (6) 11.9(l) - (-) 6.6 (6) 17.9 (6) 16.0( 1)

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For Fianna Fail, its 1989 vote represented a decline in all four constituencies compared with 198-i. In ConnachUUlster the party vote of 32.7 per cent was 8.’ per cent down. The decline in Munster was 10.1 per cent and in Leinster 6.9 per cent, Fianna Fail’s Dublin vote dropped by a comparatively low 4.3 per cent but

defending MEP Eileen Lemass still lost her seat. The failure to hold two seats in Dublin may have been due to unfortunate vote-splitting. Andrews, whose name appeared first on the ballot paper, headed the poll while Lemass felt the impact of De Rossa (WP) in Dublin West where most of her support is to be found. There were, however. also opinion poll indications of Lemass’s weakness and Fianna Fail may regret not running a third candidate from a different part of the constituency.

The presence of the Progressive Democrats was the main cause of Fine Gael’s vote declining by 10.6 per cent. The party’s loss overall of two seats included two defeats of sitting MEPs, two) resignations and two gains. The success of John

Cushnahan in Munster was at the expense of the incumbent Tom Raftery. Despite his relatively high visibility since entering the EP as a substitute, Chris O’Malley did very poorly in Dublin.

The ‘big name’ strategy of the smaller parties paid off for them. The Progressive Democrats, who did badly at the national election, exceeded the necessary quota on the first count in Munster with party general secretary, Pat Cox. Similarly, Workers Party leader. Proinsias De Rossa, and Labour’s deputy leader, Barr) Desmond were returned in Dublin. This double success for the left was a surprise to many observers and was in part due to successful transfers of votes among the

smaller parties. De Rossa is likely to join the Communist and Allied Group, gain an EP chairmanship and then resign in favour of his substitute. Desmond’s success restores Ireland’s representation in the Socialist group lost in 1984.

The Green party, which elected its first member of the Dail at the national contest, failed to gain an EP seat but its substantial vote in Dublin signalled a remarkable increase in support. The Green candidates’ redistributed votes in Dublin went mostly to the left, A central plank in the Green’s campaign was the phasing out of

CAP and its Diil success was in a Dublin suburban constituency, it is probably fair to speculate that its European vote was an urban one.

The two independents, T.1. Maher in Munster and Neil Blaney in ConnachtIUster were both returned relatively easily. For Blaney. this marked a comeback after a very narrow defeat by Fianna Fail in 1984. He probably gained directly from Fianna Fail’s discomfiture because many party members feel he represents the ‘true republican’ wing of his former party. Blanev’s party label was Independent Fianna Fail. Maher. on the other hand. gained transferred votes from across the political spectrum in Munster, and now’. ironically finds himself in the same EP Liberal and Democratic group as the Progressive Democrats.

The major questions for Irish politics of the 1989 elections, particularly the contest for the Dail. concern the future role of Fianna Fail. Since its foundation in 1926 the party has provided the single party government on It of 19 possible occasions following general elections. Fianna Fail has eschewed coalitions and represented itself with some justification as ‘the national party’. IJnder Charles Haughev it has. hovvrv~er. failed to maintain its predominance. It looks likely that for the foreseeable hiture Fianna Fail will only be able to rule by sharing power.

As for MEPs, the 1989 election demonstrates once more that their fate is VCT) much determined by domestic considerations. Hard work in Strasbourg matters little for re-election purposes. It is an advantage to have an established personal

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popularity but it is difficult to gain prominence as an MEP. In electoral terms, incumbency may not be an advantage. Unless MEPs are given some direct role in national politics, Ireland’s EP representation will be dominated by those holding the dual mandate or moving on from some established place in Irish public life.

Since the beginning of the 1970s Ireland has been faced with growing inflation, unemployment and national debt. Generally the electorate has voted against the government. In the seven general elections from 1969 to 1987, the government has lost office each time. In 1989 the government also received a setback. The dominant puzzle of the Irish party system which is still to be resolved is whether the major partisan division, based on the split over the 1922 Treaty, will give way to one reflecting more explicit class or economic divisions in Irish society. The 1989 European election gives few reliable pointers. The national contest has, however, been seen as a potential watershed. There is evidence that the working class, long the bed-rock of Fianna Fail, moved support significantly to left wing parties while the government party increased its vote from the middle-class. It may not be too long before another national election tests the thesis that the Irish party system has been decisively changed.