Ireland's Foreign Relations in 1996

Ireland's Foreign Relations in 1996Author(s): Nicholas ReesSource: Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 8 (1997), pp. 163-189Published by: Royal Irish AcademyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30002050 .

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Ireland's Foreign Relations in 1996

Nicholas Rees

Department of Government and Society, University of Limerick

Ireland took centre stage on the international scene in 1996 as a result of its presidency of the European Union. High points of the year included publication of the government's White Paper on foreign policy, the tanaiste's address to the UN General Assembly on behalf of the EU, the presentation of a draft EU treaty to the European Council in December and the taoiseach' s representation of the EU at the OSCE summit and at the World Trade Organisation, both in December. All told, the tinaiste was estimated to have travelled 150,000 miles on 43 foreign trips over 80 days,' ranging from locations within Europe to the Palestinian Territories, Latin America, South East Asia and the United States. The taoiseach, the ministers of state at the Department of Foreign Affairs and the president also undertook heavy international commitments during the year.

In Ireland the coalition government was occupied with implementing a range of new policy measures (e.g. the Criminal Justice Act, the Sexual Offences Act) and dealing with a number of other problems that included a legal challenge to the divorce referendum, the hepatitis C tribunal fiasco, the Dunnes payments scandal, the beef crisis and the report of the Constitutional Review Group. The Irish economy provided an important backdrop to Ireland's foreign relations. In 1996 Ireland's GNP increased in real terms by 6.5% and by nearly 23% between 1994 and 1996.2 Thus, Irish living standards have improved significantly and are much closer to the EU average. Low budget deficits and inflation (1.8%) and moderate wage increases provided a stable economic climate for growth. However, long-term unemployment remained high and accounted for 7.25% of the unemployment rate of 12.25% in 1996. On this basis, Ireland was well on the way to meeting the Maastricht con- vergence criteria for membership of EMU but was also facing problems over retaining its high levels of structural support from the European Union.

1The Irish Times, 31 January 1997. 2Annual Report of the Central Bank of Ireland for 1996, Quarterly Bulletin of the Central Bank

(1997).

Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 8 (1997)

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THE GOVERNMENT'S WHITE PAPER

On 26 March the government's foreign policy White Paper Challenges and opportunities abroad was published.3 The White Paper, which had been delayed from the previous year, was the first such paper to be published by any Irish government. It was, therefore, in many ways a landmark and claimed to provide for the first time a comprehensive official survey of Irish foreign policy. Dick Spring, speaking at the launch of the paper, stated that it aims to 'remove some of the mystique from foreign policy and open it up as an area for full public debate and discussion'.4 He went on to emphasise the need to balance the values of the people with interests in foreign policy, and to state that, without such a balance, foreign policy would be meaningless."

The government's White Paper comprises an introduction, a summary and sixteen substantive chapters and is 348 pages long.6 The first two chapters set the context, laying out the challenges and opportunities facing Ireland in international affairs, while chapter two also presents a brief background to Irish foreign policy. The chapters then focus respectively on the EU and the new Europe, international security, the UN, disarmament and arms control, peacekeeping, human rights, development cooperation, regional issues, trade and international economic cooperation, the Irish abroad, the environment and cultural relations. The latter two chapters include discussion of the Irish foreign service and the democratic accountability of foreign policy. With the exception of the chapter on Europe, the paper principally focuses on issues in a thematic way, with possibly the most important aspects of Irish foreign policy being dealt with first and issues like the environment left to the end of the paper. Most attention is focused on Europe, with this being the longest chapter and the one clearly in the minds of most Irish officials in the run up to the presidency and the IGC. In contrast, relatively little time is devoted to Anglo-Irish affairs or relations with the USA.7 Clearly some such omissions were not accidental and represent political decisions taken by the coalition government.

The area that attracted the most interest concerned the government's approach to peace and international security. The White Paper suggests that the central tenets of Irish security policy are a policy of military neutrality, promotion of international law and peaceful settlement of disputes, equity and justice in international affairs, commitment to collective security through the UN, participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, participation in the EU, promotion of disarmament and arms control, and a commitment to regional organisations (para. 4.3).8 The key issues relate to Ireland's continuing neutrality, its participation in the EU and the Common

3The decision to prepare a White Paper on foreign policy was taken by the tinaiste and minister for foreign affairs, Dick Spring, in February 1994. The White Paper, whilst prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs, was the product of considerable consultation and drafting with other government departments, such as the departments of Defence, Finance, Environment and others.

4The Irish Times, 26 March 1996. 5The Irish Times, 27 March 1996. 6For an overview and assessment of the White Paper see Paul Gillespie, 'Ireland in the new world

order: interests and values in the Irish government's White Paper on foreign policy', Irish Studies in International Affairs 7, 143-56.

7The transatlantic relationship is briefly discussed in paras 3.112-3.117 in the context of the chapter on the EU and Europe.

"For a more detailed discussion of the options facing Ireland in the security arena see Patrick Keatinge, European security: Ireland's choices (Dublin, 1996).

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Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and its relationship to the Western European Union (WEU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Partnership for Peace.

On the first issue the White Paper makes a continuing commitment to Irish neutrality stating '...that policy will not be changed unless the people of Ireland decide otherwise in a referendum' (para. 4.9). It goes on to note that 'the government will not be proposing that Ireland should seek membership of NATO or the WEU, or the assumption of their mutual defence guarantees' (para. 4.10). However, in recognising that the demands being made on the UN outstrip its potential for action, the paper acknowledges that there is an important role for regional organisations. In the case of Europe, the view taken in the White Paper is that the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) should play that role in security policy. 'Ireland's policy will be to strengthen the OSCE as a permanent organisation for European security cooperation and to further develop the Organisation' s capacity for preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping' (para. 4.27).

In relation to the European Union, the White Paper notes Ireland's commitment in the original 1972 White Paper on accession of Ireland to the EEC to participate in its 'future political development'. It further notes that this has meant participation in European Political Cooperation and, most recently, the Common Foreign and Security Policy. In this context, since the Maastricht Treaty, security issues in all their aspects have been discussed by the member states. The Union has not, however, developed a common defence policy or common defence. Ireland has advocated a broad and comprehensive approach to security in its relations with the Union. The Maastricht Treaty also provided for a closer relationship between the EU and WEU, with the latter being seen as an integral part of the development of the Union, and possibly acting on its behalf in some instances. Arising out of a decision in 1992, the WEU has also taken on additional duties, known as the Petersburg Tasks, which include humanitarian and rescue, peacekeeping, and crisis management. The White Paper then goes on to consider Ireland's participation in WEU; it notes that Ireland is currently an observer and that, while not proposing membership of the WEU, it does propose that Ireland should consider participating on a voluntary basis in certain operations envisaged under the Petersburg Tasks, and to that end the government will discuss with the WEU its participation.

On the third issue, concerning the relationship with NATO, the White Paper notes the reappraisal that has gone on within NATO of its role in the post-Cold War environment. For example, support of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia and the implementation of the Peace Agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina. At no stage, however, does the White Paper consider membership of NATO. This is seen as incompatible with Irish neutrality. In relation to the Partnership for Peace (PFP), the paper describes the origins, members and function of PFP and concludes that, while PFP is not a stand-alone organisation from NATO, membership of PFP does not involve membership of NATO. In these terms, the paper asserts that 'participation on appropriate terms would not affect Ireland's policy of neutrality' and the government will therefore explore the possible benefits that might accrue from participation in PFP. Any such decision, however, will only be taken in the light of con- sultations with the committees of the Oireachtas and with its approval (para. 4.53).

Aside from these three sets of interrelated issues, the security chapter of the White Paper also discusses the IGC and Ireland's interests in relation to security and

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defence issues. It notes that three issues are likely to be discussed in the IGC: the role and contribution of the EU to Europe's security and defence capabilities in prevention and crisis management; the relationship of the EU to the WEU; and the question of a mutual defence guarantee. In outlining Ireland's approach to these issues, the White Paper focuses particularly on the relationship between Ireland and the WEU. Three options are discussed: membership of the WEU, maintaining the status of observer, or constructive participation in selected activities. It then more broadly considers the notion of a common defence policy and notes that Ireland will participate in discussions concerning this issue but hedges its bets by stating that 'it would be difficult, and possibly counter-productive, to pre-determine negotiating positions at this stage' (para. 4.112).

In the D~iil debate on the White Paper, Dick Spring directed much of his attention to the issue of Partnership for Peace (PFP), arguing that much of the discussion on this issue had so far been misleading.9 He stated that 'PFP is a flexible arrangement which allows each participating state to focus on its own interests in the security area. Ours is that of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations and environmental and drugs issues. It is incorrect and misleading to suggest that PFP is a back door for Irish entry into NATO'. Alan Dukes, chairman of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, claimed that the paper went some way towards addressing security issues but was still designed to cajole the 'myth peddlers' who still felt threatened by the Eastern bloc countries even after the Cold War. Bertie Ahern reacted by stating that any change in the state's defence policy that involved NATO or the WEU would require a referendum. He did not, however, oppose the idea that Ireland should participate in tasks runs by the EU in which Ireland had been previously involved. He noted that Fianna Fiil was proud of Ireland's policy of positive neutrality.10 Ray Burke, however, stated that his party was opposed to membership of the Partnership for Peace that would amount to 'second-class membership of NATO'. Kathleen Lynch, of Democratic Left, stated that her party opposed membership of PFP and supported a policy of positive neutrality built on peacekeeping. PFP was portrayed as simply a vehicle for American control of European security arrangements and NATO was seen as 'an American-led militarist alliance'. Des O'Malley, of the Progressive Democrats, called the White Paper long-winded and inadequate on neutrality, suggesting that it did not go far enough and that, in joining Europe, it was also necessary to defend it. In The Irish Times Patricia McKenna, Green Party MEP, asserted that 'members of the Partnership for Peace are not solely dedicated to peacekeeping but allies of a military bloc which remain committed to nuclear deterrence in spite of the end of the Cold War and whose members are prepared to wage war'." In the Seanad, Professor Jim Dooge, addressing its members on an Institute of European Affairs report on the Intergovernmental Conference, told them that Ireland should not join the WEU. In response to a question, he stated: 'I would never support it because it is nuclear. As far as I am concerned, the WEU is out.'l2

Aside from the debate in the Diil, more general debate on the White Paper was muted, reflecting the fact that the opening of the IGC and the British beef crisis

9Dick Spring in an Irish Times article noted that the government was discussing with NATO its possible involvement in PFP (The Irish Times, 3 October 1996).

'0Ddil Debates, vol. 436, cols 1272-354, 1454-72 (28 March 1996); see also Seanad Debates, vol. 147, cols 20-54 (24 April 1996).

"The Irish Times, 29 March 1996. '2Seanad Debates, vol. 1932, cols 1932-56 (28 March 1996).

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tended to occupy both the political 61ite and the public. In the newspapers the focus on the White Paper was largely on the issue of neutrality and security concerns. One of the few more general assessments was made by Garret FitzGerald, who was critical of the White Paper for its inability to reconcile ideals of the Irish people with the protection of their interests.13 Some criticism was made by NGOs of the White Paper for its lack of commitment to increasing aid by 0.5% of GNP per year, as had previously been the case, rather than its more aspirational commitment to the UN goal of 0.7% of GNP. Andy Storey, in Tr6caire's North South Issues, noted: 'It is fair to conclude that the White Paper confirms and enhances the predominantly ideals- based thrust of Irish development aid policy'.14

THE PRACTICE OF FOREIGN POLICY

In contrast to the White Paper, Ireland's role in international affairs was the focus of considerably more activity in the DAil and the Seanad than would usually have been the case, as a result both of developments in the Northern Ireland peace process and Ireland's presidency of the EU. Northern Ireland featured prominently in the business of the Diil, being raised on 39 occasions during DSil debates, while the European Union was the focus of debate on 24 occasions, residual issues arose on twenty occasions,"5 and the White Paper occupied the debate on three days. In contrast, international affairs featured less prominently in the Seanad, where the main international debates were focused on Northern Ireland, the government's White Paper on foreign policy, the situation in Taiwan, East Timor, international day of peace, Rwandan refugees, Israeli Supreme Court judgement, Great Lakes region of Africa, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and human rights in Colombia.

A number of the issues raised in the debates were also the focus of attention in the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, which in 1996 produced two major reports on European Union presidency conferences'6 and ten reports on official visits,17 and undertook the preparatory work on two further reports on peacekeeping/ enforcement and on draft revision of the EU treaties.1" During the course of the year the committee held a number of sessions, at which issues ranging from the treatment of orphans in China to Israeli actions in the Middle East were discussed and various

'^The Irish Times, 30 March 1996. '"Andy Storey, 'Sectional interests and professed ideas-an assessment of the Irish government's

White Paper on foreign policy', North South Issues no. 20 (July 1996). SResidual issues ranged from statements on Chinese children, refugees in Zaire, the crisis in

southern Lebanon, membership of UNHCR, Nigerian human rights abuses and UN reform. '6Report on the Conference of Chairmen of Foreign Affairs Committees of European Union

Parliaments and of the European Parliament (24-5 July) and Report on the Conference of Chairmen of Foreign Affairs Committees of European Union Parliaments, the European Parliament and the Applicant States (27-8 November).

17Reports on official visits to the Conference of the Presidents of the Foreign Affairs Committees of the EU Parliaments and of the European Parliament (Rome), Assembly of the WEU (London), Norwegian Parliament (Oslo), Inter-parliamentary Conference on the role of national parliaments in pan-European construction (Paris), meeting with parliamentarians in Westminster (London), fact- finding visit to Cuba, Croatia, Israel and Gaza, World Food Summit (Rome), and Parliament of the Czech Republic (Prague).

18The Joint Committee was established in 1993.

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experts were asked to attend and comment on their state's actions.19 In June the Oireachtas passed the Refugee Act (1996), which was the only piece

of legislation that had a direct bearing on Ireland's foreign affairs. The act was a response to the growing issue of refugees in Ireland. The issue has taken on more importance and salience as the number of individuals seeking asylum in Ireland has risen. There were 31 applications in 1991, 39 in 1992, 91 in 1993, 355 in 1994, and 424 in 1995, excluding the 560 Vietnamese refugees and 600 Bosnians already in Ireland.20 In comparison with many other EU states, however, this number is very small. Nevertheless, many of these refugees have experienced inordinately long waiting periods, up to two and a half years, before being told whether they will be given asylum, and relatively few of these get refugee status. One of the main problems has been the small number of officials in the Department of Justice dealing with the applications. The Irish Refugee Council, the main group concerned with refugees, welcomed the act, which, it suggested, would 'place Ireland in the forefront of progressive international law on asylum'. Meanwhile, Joan Burton, minister of state at both the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Justice, and the minister who was largely responsible for the act, tried to clear the backlog of asylum applications.21

More generally, the government gave a commitment at the global level to the problems of refugees in the White Paper (para. 9.18) and to joining the UNHCR Executive Committee, but the White Paper paid little attention to refugees in Ireland. As one commentator noted, 'the omission from the White Paper of any reference to Ireland's asylum policies, and the emphasis around the discussion of EU asylum policy on questions of criminality, reflect a government perception that such matters impact on Ireland in terms of perceived security interest, and not foreign policy or human rights ideals'.22

Finally, Ireland's diplomatic links in 1996 included 49 resident diplomatic and consular missions.23 This included some 40 bilateral embassies,24 four multilateral missions and five consulates. Included are five embassies and one consulate that operate primarily as Development Cooperation offices in African countries. Ireland opened an embassy in Israel (May), which had been delayed for a number of years, as well as diplomatic relations with Vietnam. In Ireland the South African government opened a new embassy (July), as did Israel and Romania, and Mexico upgraded its mission to an embassy (September). The state was also represented on twelve overseas visits by President Mary Robinson (see Appendix 3). Some of the more

190n 10 October the tinaiste addressed the Joint Committee on European Affairs and Foreign Affairs on the subject of the Intergovernmental Conference. Noel Dorr, the Irish government's personal representative and chairman of the IGC, also addressed the committee on 26 September. Department of Foreign Affairs, 'Tinaiste's address to the Joint Committee on European Affairs and Foreign Affairs on the Intergovernmental Conference', 10 October 1996 [http://www.irlgov.ie/iveagh/foreignaffairs/ press/s 10-10-96.html].

20The Irish Times, 14 September 1996. 211n late October, 155 Cuban refugees were told that their applications for asylum had been refused

raising fears that applications might be being dealt with in groups. See The Irish Times, 23 October 1996.

22Andy Storey, op. cit. in note 14, 5. 23See Pursuing Ireland's external interest: strategy statement ofthe Department of Foreign Affairs

(Dublin, March 1997). 24New links were established with Malaysia, the Czech Republic and Hungary in 1995 and with

Israel in 1996.

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notable visits included official state visits to South Africa (March), Britain and the United States (June). These and other visits underpin the important role President Robinson has had in contributing to Ireland's positive image abroad, raising the profile of the state and generating significant good will.

EUROPE-IRELAND'S PRESIDENCY AND THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE

Preparations for the presidency and Ireland's participation in the EU troika occupied much of the early part of the year as it had the latter part of the previous year.25 Ireland's fifth presidency was deemed by some to be perhaps the most important, owing to the need to work on the ongoing Intergovernmental Conference, and to ensure that Ireland was seen to act in an efficient and impartial manner during its presidency.26 In practice, this meant that many of the traditional priorities of Irish foreign policy as defined in the government's White Paper would have to be put to one side during the presidency. The emphasis, therefore, was on European concerns rather than Irish ones. That said, however, the Irish government was also concerned with ensuring that the role of small states in EU decision-making was safe-guarded- including the role of the presidency and the system of rotating presidencies-thus Ireland's interests had also to be taken into consideration in the IGC negotiations.

The priorities of the Irish presidency included employment, the fight against illegal drugs and organised crime, meeting the concerns of citizens, work on EMU and the single currency, consolidating the advantages made by the Single Market, the IGC and a range of external relations issues.27 The aim, more generally, was to bring the EU closer to the citizens and make the EU relevant to their daily lives.28 Aside from managing developments within the Union, much of the presidency was by necessity devoted to dealing with the EU's external affairs. Some of the more important areas in which developments occurred were the Middle East peace process, which dominated the first European Council, the implementation of the peace process in Bosnia, relations between Greece and Turkey, the EU summit with Japan, the tainaiste's address to the UN General Assembly on behalf of the EU, the meeting of the OSCE, and a ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organisation.

251in response to the demands likely to be made on the Department of Foreign Affairs some 130 extra officials were drafted into the department for the six-month stint. See The Irish Times, 13 May 1996. Planning for the presidency began back in 1994.

26The intensity of meetings and the sheer scale of the work-load faced by the Irish presidency was reflected in the initial round of meetings on 2 July. The meetings, on this the first working day of the presidency, involved nineteen European commissioners, fifteen government ministers and seventen ministers of state (The Irish Times, 2 July 1996). Overall Ireland had to chair some 2000 meetings at ministerial and official level during the presidency. Ministers had to chair over 40 meetings of the Council of Ministers in Brussels and Luxembourg, as well as anumberin Ireland, while officials chaired meetings of the 200 Council working groups. See Department of Foreign Affairs, 'Fact sheet on Ireland's presidency of the European UnionJuly-December 1996', 12 June 1996 [http://www.irlgov.ir/ iveagh/eu/facteu.html].

27See 'Priorities of the Irish presidency of the Council of the European Union' published by the presidency of the European Union (Dublin, 1996). Also the report of the Conference on the Priorities of the Irish Presidency (Dublin, May 1996) and Brigid Laffan, Constitution building in the European Union (Dublin, 1996).

28See The Irish Times, 1 July 1996, and the special Irish Times supplement on The EU presidency, 2 July 1996.

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Much of the focus of the presidency was on the IGC, which had been formally convened on the 29 March 1996 in Turin under the auspices of the Italian presidency. The meeting, however, was somewhat overshadowed by the British beef crisis and the fear that the British might further block EC decision-making unless a resolution was found.29 Nevertheless, at the June European Council the heads of state and government charged the incoming Irish presidency with preparing the provisions for a draft treaty in time for the Dublin European Council in December. It was also agreed that a further special nieeting of the European Council should take place on 5 October in Dublin.

Within this framework, the Irish presidency's role was to carry out the detailed negotiations and much faith was placed in the tinaiste and minister for foreign affairs, Dick Spring, and Noel Dorr, the Irish chairman of the working group of personal representatives. The Irish presidency's approach to the IGC was to move forward by means of a deliberate and methodical discussion of the issues identified during the Italian presidency. The presidency undertook to do this at an early stage by distributing 'Presidency Notes' on the major issues.30 The Irish presidency's task was a difficult one. In particular, Britain's ongoing beef crisis, John Major's slim majority in the House of Commons, and the looming British elections meant that considerable diplomacy and skill were needed to keep the British involved in the process and to avoid a confrontation between Britain and the other fourteen member states. Thus, the Irish presidency's incremental and overt approach to the negotiations ensured that differences of opinion on key issues were acknowledged but that no attempt was made to resolve them and thereby risk a deadlock in the talks. The strategy was effective in that it avoided major confrontations and ensured that Britain as well as the other EU states were kept on board.

In early October a special European Council was called to consider the progress being made in the IGC negotiations.31 The discussions at the summit were, however, dominated by the Middle East peace process, leading to a request to the presidency to send the tfinaiste on an urgent mission to the Middle East the next day. The heads of state and government, however, reconfirmed their commitment to the IGC agenda and reiterated their wish to see a framework outlining draft provisions and possible options at the December European Council. The meeting also ensured that the French president's desire to accelerate the process and Chancellor Kohl's fears that a Maastricht III would be necessary were kept in check in an attempt to maintain cohesion among the member states.

The Dublin European Council on 13-14 December marked the culmination of the Irish presidency and the end of a hectic six months for many Irish officials. The overriding priority of the Irish presidency had been to present a general outline for the draft revision of the treaty, one that was relevant to European citizens. As the Irish taoiseach, John Bruton, noted, in his letter to the EU's heads of state and government in the week before the meeting, the main challenge of the Dublin summit 'is

29The beef crisis also had an impact on Ireland, with export trade to Libya, Jordan, Egypt and Russia (Moscow) being cut off at various points during the year, necessitating high-level ministerial intervention by Ivan Yates, Gay Mitchell and John Bruton to restore exports. The Irish government also feared that, unless the crisis was resolved at the Florence summit in June, it would spill over into their presidency and the British would continue to block decision-making in the EU.

3"For further details see IGC update, no. I (Dublin, 14 September 1996), 4. 31See IGC update, no. 2 (Dublin, 17 September 1996).

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to show our citizens that the Union has the capacity and will to deal with the issues of greatest concern to them, unemployment and personal security'.32 The success of the Irish presidency therefore depended on ensuring that the European Council endorsed its draft proposals and making certain that this was accepted as the framework for discussion by the incoming Dutch presidency.

At the European Council 100 minutes were devoted to discussing the draft text, which was introduced by John Bruton and then commented on by each of the heads of state and government. There was little overt criticism of the text and only praise for the Irish presidency. President Chirac was, in fact, very complimentary, although he did point out that there was still no agreement on institutional reform or on the flexibility clause. Chancellor Kohl responded by suggesting that little agreement was likely to be reached on these areas until the run-up to the Amsterdam European Council. The general view was that the Irish presidency had done a good job during a difficult period and had avoided any major pitfalls.

The draft document, entitled 'The European Union today and tomorrow: adapting the European Union for the benefit of its peoples and preparing it for the future', provided a general outline for a draft revision of the treaties. It was not a finished text but rather one that highlighted areas in which there was a consensus and on which action might be taken, and areas in which there was no consensus and in which various options were open to the member states. The document is in three parts and is 140 pages long. Part A, by far the longest part of the document, is devoted to the main areas of discussion in the IGC: freedom, security and justice; the Union and its citizens; an effective and coherent foreign policy; the Union's institutions; and enhanced cooperation by means of flexibility. Part B briefly notes other issues raised at the IGC but not yet discussed. Part C touches on the simplification of the treaties. Of these, part A is the most important as it establishes the basic priorities for reform.33 While the level of detail and overall agreement over the priorities varies, the document represents the best efforts of the Irish presidency to provide a draft document. The initial order of the priorities reflects the Irish presidency's objectives. The emphasis on these areas may also reflect Ireland's own concerns as a small state and one used to fighting to establish its rights and those of others in international affairs. In a number of areas, such as institutional reform, there was no overall agreement thereby leaving the issues for further discussion under the incoming Dutch presidency. The reform of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, an area which might have proved difficult for Irish negotiators, did not progress beyond limited discussion, and the anticipated push on security matters did not occur.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

However, in relation to the presidency's other initial priorities, it chalked up a number of accomplishments.34

32The Irish Times, 11 December 1996. 33The five priorities included freedom and security in the Union; bringing the Union closer to its

citizens; enhancing the Union's capacity to act in international affairs; the reform of the EU's institutions; and enhanced cooperation by means of flexibility.

34For a more detailed analysis of actions taken during Ireland's presidency see Presidency of the European Union 'Development in the European Union', 49th report (covering the period from I July to 31 December 1996), (Dublin, 1997).

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1. Under the Irish presidency considerable work was undertaken in the area of employment, which was seen as a key priority for the presidency. The two most prominent developments were the completion of a joint ECOFIN/Social Affairs/ Commission report on the implementation of the Essen employment strategy and agreement on the 'Dublin Declaration on Employment'. The former provided the basis for a discussion on employment and growth at the Dublin European Council and led to the Dublin Declaration. In practice, the declaration was not particularly innovative, as it restated much of what was agreed at the Essen European Council in December 1994 and in President Santer's proposed Employment Pact. It had taken a steering group of officials three months and eighteen versions to reach agreement on the draft presented to the European Council. Whether this will pave the way for a new chapter on employment policy in the next treaty has yet to be seen, given continuing British opposition to EU action in this area and Prime Minister John Major's contention that 'solutions were not to be found in new treaty language on the issue but in actions in the member states'.35 Indeed, Major only agreed to sign the text provided that it would not be seen as tacit agreement to include a new chapter on employment in the final treaty.

2. The presidency reported at the European Council on a number of actions taken in the areas of justice and home affairs (JHA). This included a report prepared by the JHA Council in November on the implementation of the Madrid Action Programme on Drugs. The presidency recorded that seven joint actions and five resolutions in a range of areas had been agreed by the Council. Specifically, agreement was reached on a package of measures to fight drug trafficking by reducing cross-border trafficking and improving police cooperation in the exchange of information and joint operations. In relation to organised crime, the European Council authorised the creation of a high-level group to draw up a comprehensive action programme by early 1997. Thus, the varied range of actions agreed to in this area represented significant progress in operationalising the third pillar, Justice and Home Affairs, in a way that is of direct benefit to EU citizens.

3.The presidency was charged with undertaking further preparatory work leading up to the third stage of EMU. This included reaching agreement on arrangements for securing budgetary discipline in EMU and promoting currency stability. The difficulty of achieving agreement in relation to these issues threatened the December European Council meeting and ended in a last-minute victory for Ruairi Quinn and his officials in the Department of Finance when European finance ministers finally agreed on the Irish presidency package on EMU and a single currency. The con- troversy largely revolved around German insistence that strict rules be adhered to by the member states after accession to the monetary union on the post-single currency 'Stability and growth pact'. The question concerned whether states that joined the euro could be fined for running deficits in excess of 3% of GDP. After much heated debate a last-minute agreement was reached on the eve of the European Council. Specifically, it was accepted that penalties would not apply if member states faced a severe economic recession.36 Agreement on the principle elements of the pact was

35See The Irish Times, 14 December 1996. 36"Integral to this was the definition of what constituted a severe economic recession, which was

defined as being where a drop of 1.5% in GDP occurred, or 0.75-1.5%, depending on the advice of the Council of Ministers. See The Irish Times, 14 December 1996.

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a major achievement for the presidency. Other notable achievements included Minister Hugh Coveney's chairing of the Budget Council (which was the first time that an Irish government had handled this task) and agreement on new ERM measures.

4. The presidency managed a complex array of external issues confronting the Union in the second half of 1996. As a result the tinaiste spent considerable time representing the EU on the international stage and dealing with a number of major international issues (see Appendix C). He represented the EU at the EU-ASEAN summit in July, at the opening of the 51st General Assembly of the UN in September, and at the EU-US summit in December. In addition, the

t.naiste also visited a

number of non-EU states: Argentina, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, East Jerusalem, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Namibia, Russia, Syria, Turkey and the USA and. Irish officials therefore found themselves confronted with a vast array of problems, in areas such as the Great Lakes region of Africa, East Timor, and Burma, which they were expected to address on behalf of the EU. The major areas of external activity during Ireland's presidency were the Middle East peace process, implementation of the peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina, political dialogue with Russia, an action plan for the Ukraine and relations with the US.

The tinaiste found himself directly involved in the Middle East peace process when he was dispatched by the European Council in early October on an urgent mission to Israel, Gaza and Egypt. On one level the object of his mission was to try to stop Israel from blocking the peace process and to arrange an early withdrawal from the West Bank town of Hebron. On another level, this was a response to a feeling that the EU was being excluded from the peace process by the USA and Israel. The European Council also agreed that a special EU envoy to the region would be appointed by the end of October. The reaction to the EU's initiative, however, was not very positive. The Israeli prime minister, Netanjahu, agreed to meet the tinaiste, despite some fears that this might not happen, but with little real outcome. The United States also gave a muted response to EU involvement, while the PLO were the only ones to welcome the initiative. At the end of October a further confrontation between Israel and the EU occurred over the planned visit of the tinaiste and the EU troika to Orient House, the PLO headquarters in Jerusalem. In December the European Council issued a further strong declaration on the Middle East peace process, expressing its concern at the deteriorating peace process and calling for a renewed effort by the Israeli government and the Palestinian authorities. It further reiterated the EU's desire to play a role in the process and the part to be played by the special EU envoy.

The presidency contributed to the talks to implement the Bosnian peace plan that took place at the Peace Implementation Council in Paris in November and in London in December. The European Council at its December meeting issued a declaration on the former Yugoslavia outlining its work to date, its position and view on the peace process and its hopes for the future.

Under the Irish presidency, political dialogue with Russia was intensified, progress being made on the ratification of thePartnership and Cooperation Agreement, and with the Ukraine, by means of an action programme agreed at the European Council in December.

In contrast, relations with the United States varied during the year. The Helms- Burton Act, which directly threatened Irish firms doing business in Cuba, was of

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grave concern to the EU, leading to a clash between the EU and US.37 The tuinaiste, Dick Spring, was urged by President Clinton not to refer the legislation to the World Trade Organisation for fear that this might spark a trade war.38 Relations were somewhat better when in December the taoiseach and the tinaiste met President Clinton at the biennial EU-US summit to discuss progress on New Transatlantic Agenda issues.

Finally, while not perhaps as significant an issue, East Timor was also of concern to the Irish presidency. It was discussed by the European Council in June and then raised by Spring at the joint EU-ASEAN meeting in July. The EU pledged itself to facilitate talks being sponsored by the UN secretary general and committed itself to improving the situation, living conditions and human rights of people in East Timor.39

SECURITY POLICY

Aside from the issues discussed in the White Paper, a number of other security questions arose during the year. These concerned arms and disarmament, the continuing use of land mines and attempts to ban their use, and the role of the defence forces and peacekeeping. The government's White Paper very clearly laid out Ireland's continuing desire to play a role in the areas of disarmament and arms control through activities of the UN and the OSCE. One particular area in which activity occurred during the year was the continuation from 1994 and 1995 of the negotiations in the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva concerned with a test- ban treaty. Agreement on the treaty was blocked in June by India's demand that it should include a timetable for nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, in September the UN adopted the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by 158 votes to three with five abstentions.40 On 24 September, at the opening of the 51st Session of the UN, the t~inaiste, Dick Spring, signed the treaty. Further actions during the year included approval by the Diil in June (with all-party support) for a Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as approving action for Ireland to join the International Seabed Authority and International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.

Progress with regard to conventional weapons reduction continued to be discussed in the OSCE. At its summit in December agreement was reached to relaunch talks on the reduction of weapons as provided forunder the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty during 1997. John Bruton, as president of the EU, welcomed the proposals and went on to argue for strengthening the preventive diplomacy and crisis management capacities of the OSCE. The agreement was, however, a partial attempt to pacify Russia over plans for NATO enlargement due to be agreed in 1997.

One further area that came under scrutiny during the year concerned arms exports. The government's White Paper made specific commitments relating to the trade in arms. On disarmament and arms control the government committed itself to export restraint, to participation in a new Multilateral Export Control Arrangement (para. 6.88) and to working within the EU on arms export policy, and transparency and restraint in arms transfers (para. 6.77). However, press reports in The Irish Times

37The Irish Times, 16 July 1996. 3"The Irish Times, 6 September 1996. 39'EU pledges action over East Timor', The Irish Times, 5 July 1996. 40The Irish Times, 12 September 1996.

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noted that a dozen or so Irish firms 'flout policy on neutrality' and have links with the arms trade. The article noted that a study done by the solidarity group AfrI (Action from Ireland) had identified firms that made, among other things, radar equipment that had been sold to Turkey and Saudi Arabia.4'

Regarding the role of the defence forces, Irish forces continued to participate in fourteen UN peacekeeping missions during 1996, ranging from UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon to UNFICYP in Cyprus. Ireland's force in Southern Lebanon found itself in a particularly precarious situation when Israel attacked Southern Lebanon in operation Grapes of Wrath, which delayed the rotation of the Irish UN contingent and caused some concern at home for the safety of personnel. The government also agreed to commit 850 defence force personnel to the UN on a standby arrangement for peacekeeping.42 The ttinaiste, Dick Spring, speaking in New York, stated that this commitment reflected Ireland's belief 'in the need for an increased emphasis within the UN system on preventive diplomacy' and a more rapid response to crisis. The force would consist of an infantry battalion, a transport company, military observers and up to two officers to serve at the headquarters of the unit in New York.

NORTHERN IRELAND-TALKS AND ELECTIONS

The coalition government's approach to Northern Ireland had by 1996 taken on a fairly distinctive approach but, while it was proactive to events, it lacked a viable partner on the UK side. The main concerns were with the establishment of all-party talks, the restoration of the IRA ceasefire, and the work of the Forum for Peace and Reconciliation, with its commitment to the principle of consent. The Dublin/London twin-track approach, agreed in November 1995, with its emphasis on making progress on decommissioning by means of the independent International Body on Decommissioning, and on groundwork talks with all the political parties, provided much of the focus during 1996.

The International Body on Decommissioning, chaired by former US senator George Mitchell and including Harri Holkeri, former Finnish prime minister, and the Canadian, General John de Chastelain, began meeting in mid-December (1995), broke for Christmas, and resumed its discussion in January. The remit of the decommissioning body was very broad with a report expected by late January. In its submission to the decommissioning body, Sinn F6in emphasised that paramilitary groups should dispose of their own weapons subject to third-party verification. The proposal was welcomed by Dick Spring as a positive move forward and a sign that Sinn F6in was willing to enter discussions. Further submissions concerned the possibility of creating an elected body in the North. These proposals were supported by the British government, which had also drafted a number of working papers in this area. The SDLP and Sinn F6in, however, argued that this was a non-runner. Dick Spring warned that elections to a new assemblywould be divisive.

On 23 January the eight-page report of the International Body was published;43 it

41 The Irish Times, 24 July 1996. See Links: Ireland's links with the arms trade and military industry, Action from Ireland (1996).

42The Irish Times, 27 October 1996. 43Department of Foreign Affairs, Report of the International Body, 22 January 1996 [http://

www.irlgov.ie/iveagh/foreignaffairs/angloirish/mreport.html].

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failed to find agreement between the political parties on the issue of decommissioning. After a short discussion of the issues, it made a number of recommendations premised on the principles of democracy and non-violence. These have become known as the Mitchell principles and proposed that the parties to the negotiations affirm their commitment

(a) to democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues; (b) to the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations; (c) to agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an

independent commission; (d) to renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force,

or threaten to use force, to influence the course or the outcome of all-party negotiations;

(e) to agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree; and

(f) to urge that 'punishment killings' and beatings stop and take effective steps to prevent such actions.

On the issue of decommissioning, the report, while acknowledging that there was a commitment to decommissioning, concluded that 'the paramilitary organisations will not decommission any arms prior to all-party negotiations'. It suggests that the details concerning decommissioning should take place during the process of all- party talks and that this would provide support for the political process. Two of the more important paragraphs, nos 34 and 35, provided something of a compromise proposal, suggesting that decommissioning might occur while talks were ongoing. Towards the end of the report, in paragraph 56, the idea of an elected assembly was raised as one possibility. The decommissioning body therefore suggested that if such an elected assembly would contribute to confidence building it might be worth undertaking such elections.

The reaction to the report was varied. In general, the parties in the Diil accepted the report without reservations as a positive move forward. The issue of elections, however, provided the focus for many of the more hostile comments by the Northern parties. In particular, Sinn F6in and the SDLP were hostile to the idea of elections, while the more general concern was that such elections might detract from all-party talks and become the focus of attention. John Major, however, favoured the idea and obtained the tacit support of Tony Blair. He emphasised the elections as a means of getting around the prior decommissioning problem. John Bruton, in Strasbourg at the time, insisted on an end of February deadline for all-party talks. Equally, Mitchell warned that, if all-party talks did not begin, there might be a split in the IRA, with an even more bloody return to violence.

Following publication of the report, further negative fallout occurred. The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) stated that it would not talk to the Irish government in a groundwork format and Sinn F6in stated that it would not take part in an elected assembly, while Dick Spring, on RTE radio, accused John Major's government of 'divide and conquer tactics' in relation to Northern Ireland. Further talks between John Hume and John Major also yielded no result, rather John Hume perceived this as buying off the Ulster Unionists. Equally, after the meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference in London on 2 February, no agreement was reached and the meeting was adjourned to the following week. The Irish government, in an attempt to save

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the process, proposed 'Dayton-type' multilateral proximity talks to the Northern Ireland secretary, Sir Patrick Mayhew. On 8 February the Anglo-Irish Inter- governmental Conference was reconvened in Dublin. In a joint statement both governments endorsed the Mitchell Report and agreed on a need to intensify the twin-track talks.44 The Irish government's proposal meant thata multilateral proximity meeting would take place in which all the parties would be in the same building, but not at the same table, over a two-day period. The objective of the talks being to get agreement on the basis and timetable for all-party talks. This was rejected by the Unionist parties.

Events took a turn for the worse when, on 9 February, the IRA ended its ceasefire. The bombing of Canary Wharf, London, in which 43 people were injured and two killed, marked perhaps the low point of the year. Commenting on the incident, Gerry Adams expressed regret but did not condemn the bombing; rather he blamed the British government for its inability to move the peace process forward. The Irish government, Fianna Fiil and President Clinton all condemned the outrage. On the Unionist side, loyalist paramilitaries had to act to stop a retaliation attack that would have brought their own fragile ceasefire to an end. As a result of the attack, the Irish government stated that it would have no further ministerial contacts with Sinn F6in until a new ceasefire was in place, although at an official level contacts were to continue. Bertie Ahern, the Fianna FLiil leader, in contrast to the government, proposed that one further meeting take place with Gerry Adams to give him a formal hearing. He also proposed that George Mitchell be appointed as US peace envoy to Northern Ireland.

Meanwhile the Forum for Peace and Reconciliation continued its work in Dublin, receiving submissions from various bodies such as the Catholic bishops. In early February an all-party report, 'Paths to a political settlement: realities, principles and requirements', was tabled. Agreement on the draft, however, was not forthcoming. In particular, Sinn F6in was concerned about the principle of consent. In mid- February, following the end of the ceasefire, the Forum was suspended for four weeks until 15 March and then until 29 March. Finally, on 29 March it was recessed until the ceasefire was restored.

On 20 February John Bruton called on the British government to set a date for all- party talks and the restoration of the IRA ceasefire. In the Dail Bruton reiterated this goal.45 There followed a series of meetings in an attempt to get the process back on track but the mood among the participants was very negative. Matters were also not helped by the increasingly slim majority of the Major government. On 27 February the Major government appeared dependent on the Democratic Uionist Party (DUP) for a one-vote victory in the House of Commons vote on the Scott report on the arms- to-Iraq affair.

On 28 February, at the London summit, a joint communiqu6 was issued by the Irish and British governments. It noted with regret the end of the IRA ceasefire and condemned the attack by the IRA at Canary Wharf in London's docklands. It was agreed that, following elections to the Forum, all-party negotiations would begin on 10 June. Details of the elective process were left to the parties in Northern Ireland and the British government. The two governments agreed to conduct intensive

44The Irish Times, 8 February 1996. 45See Seanad Debates, vol. 146, cols 598-698, 744-90 (20-1 February 1996).

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multilateral discussions to find an accepted electoral process; to seek agreement on the basis, participation, structure, format and agenda of all-party negotiations; and to consider the possibility of holding a referendum in Northern Ireland and the Republic to secure a mandate for supporting a process leading to lasting peace.

Reacting to the communiqu6, the IRA issued a holding statement, while the UUP and DUP turned down official invitations to the proximity talks. The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) opposed the elections and preferred instead to promote the idea of a referendum. Nevertheless, on 5 March intensive multilateral discussions began, with Sinn F6in staging a 'lockout'. The talks ended on 14 March with no agreement, although the parties had presented a number of proposals on the election process. Following the talks, Spring and Mayhew met in Dublin to discuss the outcome. On 16 April the two governments published Ground rules for substantive all-party negotiations, which laid down the principles for participation and proposed a three-stranded structure for the negotiations. In Washington on the following day, John Bruton met President Clinton, who pledged that America would act as guarantor of the outcome of talks.

A row broke out over the contents of the consultation paper when the Unionists complained about Ireland's role in the overall coordinating committee. Following discussion by Sir Mayhew and Dick Spring in Belfast, John Major announced that the election of 110 representatives to the Forum on Northern Ireland would take place on 30 May. Of the 110 seats in the Northern Ireland forum, 90 were to be filled from eighteen Westminster constituencies (by means of party lists), while the other twenty seats would go to the ten parties that received the highest vote throughout Northern Ireland, thereby ensuring loyalist representation. As before, the Irish government's position was cautious. There were negative reactions from Sinn F6in, the SDLP, DUP and UUP. Support was voiced for the election proposals by President Bill Clinton.

In late April the Northern Ireland (Entry to Negotiations) Act was enacted into law in the House of Commons.46 The act provided for the holding of elections, whereby the top ten parties would be entitled to participate in elections and in a Northern Ireland forum. The talks were to be conducted at three levels (or strands). On 1 May, Bruton, in a major policy speech atthe Irish Congress of Trade Unions, made the case for a ceasefire and negotiations, in the hope of persuading the Republicans to support such a ceasefire. There followed speculation that a ceasefire might be imminent. On 9 May, Bruton and Major reviewed the situation and the state of play was again discussed a week later. On 13 May, Sinn F6in's Martin McGuinness conceded that a ceasefire was required for real talks to take place. John Major, in an Irish Times article, reassured Sinn F6in and stated that a 'glimpse of lasting peace must be turned into reality'.47 The objectives of the exercise were to reinforce Bruton and to try to encourage a ceasefire.

Details of the rules and procedures relating to the election were announced in mid- May. In the document it was accepted that 'both governments are also agreed to the resumption of ministerial dialogue with Sinn F6in, and their participation in negotiations, requires the unequivocal restoration of the ceasefire of August 1994'.48

46See House of Commons Debates, 18, 22, 23 April 1996, and House of Lords Debates 25 April 1996.

47The Irish Times, 16 May 1996. 48See Department of Foreign Affairs, 'Ground rules for substantive all-party negotiations', May

1996 [http://www.irlgov.ie/iveagh/foreignaffairs/angloirish/grules.html].

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Sinn F6in also had to commit themselves to the Mitchell principles and consider its proposals on decommissioning as a part of the confidence-building measures. During this period there was fairly intense pressure from the United States on the IRA to restore their ceasefire. Seemingly bowing to pressure, Gerry Adams stated that Sinn F6in would commit themselves to the Mitchell principles.

At the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference on 22 May in London the British and Irish governments were deadlocked over key issues in readiness for all- party talks on 10 June, particularly over the issue of arms decommissioning. A further informal IGC took place on 28 May in Dublin, at which time a role for George Mitchell was agreed. Meanwhile in the Diil Bruton stressed paragraph 34 of the Mitchell Report, wherein it was suggested that some decommissioning would take place during all-party negotiations.

The election to the Northern Ireland Forum took place on 30 May.49 The turnout was relatively high at 64.5%, with votes and seats allocated as follows.50

Table 1. Outcome of elections

Party Votes (%) Total seats

UUP 24.2 30 SDLP 21.4 21 DUP 18.8 24 SF 15.5 17 Alliance 6.5 7 UK UP 3.6 3 PUP 3.5 2 UDP 2.2 2 NI Women's Coalition 1.0 2 Labour 0.9 2 Others 2.4 0

Source: S. Elliott, 'The Northern Ireland forum/entry to negotiations election 1996', Irish Political Studies 12 (1997), 119.

On 5 June Spring and Mayhew, after a four-hour meeting in London, made positive noises that there would be an agreement across the board although nothing had as yet been agreed. The following day agreement was reached on a negotiations framework after a fraught day of discussions involving further telephone diplomacy between Bnruton and Major. It was agreed that Mitchell would be given an over- arching role in the process and in early June three papers were published. Senator George Mitchell was nominated as independent chairman and was to chair the decommissioning sub-committee, General John de Chastelain was to chair North/ South talks (strand 2) and the business sub-committee, while Harri Holkeri was to act as an alternate for Mitchell. In addition, rules of procedure, a draft agenda and an opening framework for the negotiations were laid down. The reaction from the IRA

49See Sydney Elliott, 'The Northern Ireland forum/entry to negotiations election 1996', Irish Political Studies 12(1997), 111-23.

50Ibid., 119.

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was largely negative and senior sources indicated that a ceasefire was 'remote in the extreme' and that there would be no decommissioning 'this side of a settlement'. In an unrelated incident, but one that heightened the tensions and seemed to stretch the limits of patience, Detective Garda Jerry McCabe was shot dead and another garda injured in Adare, Co. Limerick, by the IRA during an armed robbery.

Talks began on 10 June with the British and Irish governments and the major Northern Ireland parties."' The British prime minister told delegates to 'take this opportunity with both hands', while Bruton emphasised his determination to achieve 'a balanced, honourable settlement acceptable to all'. Gerry Adams and Sinn F6in turned up at the gates but were not admitted on the grounds that the ceasefire had not been restored. Inside the talks the Unionists (DUP, UUP and the UK Unionist Party) argued over procedures and rejected Mitchell as chairman, so that Mayhew chaired the meeting while Mitchell remained in another room. The deadlock was resolved two days later when agreement was reached on the appointment of three independent chairmen. The peace was further shattered on 15 June when a bomb exploded in Manchester injuring 200 people. Tension was heightened by the marching season and the events surrounding the Orange parade at Drumcree on 7 July and the tense stand-off between the Orangemen and the RUC. Riots occurred in Derry on 12-14 July, and on 14 July the Killyhevlin Hotel in Enniskillen was bombed.

On 29 July the rules of procedure were agreed by the participants and the multi- party talks recessed until 9 September. On resumption of the talks, the DUP attempted to have the fringe loyalists banned after the threat made on the life of the paramilitary loyalist, Billy Wright. Similar accusations were made by the Alliance Party against the UUP, the DUP and the two loyalist parties, who they claimed had breached the Mitchell principles. The two governments, in assessing the claims, determined that the Mitchell principles had not been breached. Trimble stated that his party's approach to the talks would not differ from the past and that the events of the summer had not changed things.52 President Mary Robinson, on her fourteenth visit to Belfast, stressed the need for reconciliation but enraged the loyalists by shaking hands with Gerry Adams.53 Bruton, on a visit to America at the time, was optimistic about the talks and the possibility of a ceasefire, much to the surprise of the other parties involved. Equally, he suggested that there might be the possibility of a deal between David Trimble and John Hume over the decommissioning issue and a ceasefire. On 27 September the Forum finally adopted its rules and procedures. John Alderdice of the Alliance Party, commenting on the talks, suggested that the Forum was pointless without nationalist input and the participation of the SDLP.

At the beginning of October the two governments published a joint paper on the issue of decommissioning. They proposed that some decommissioning should take place as the all-party talks occur, rather than before or after the event.54 They sought in particular to create a committee on decommissioning, which had been postponed the previous July. The proposals were, however, rejected by the UUP.55 On 7 October the bombing by the IRA of the British army's headquarters in Lisburn,

51The Irish Times, 11 June 1996. 52The Irish Times, 7 September 1996. 53The Irish Times, 14 September 1996. 54See Department of Foreign Affairs, 'Suggested conclusions to the plenary address to

decommissioning', 2 October 1996 [http://www.irlgov.ie/iveagh/foreignaffairs/angloirish/decom.html]. 55The Irish Times, 2 October 1996.

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leaving 30 injured and one dead, raised fears of a loyalist backlash. Bruton, in a special debate in the Dail on Northern Ireland, accused the IRA of adopting fascist tactics.56 'This house, as the democratic representatives of the Irish people, will always reject and repudiate fascist tactics of the Armalite in one hand and ballot box in the other.' Hugh Coveney was highly critical of the UUP for refusing to agree to the two governments' proposals on decommissioning. The view was expressed that Trimble should shoulder some of the blame. Similarly, Dick Spring, in a statement to the Dail, argued that it was not the Irish government that was dragging its feet, nor the British government, rather they were waiting for Sinn Ftin, but the issue of decommissioning had proved to be a problem. It was suggested that some in the Unionist camp may have used it as a means of placing an insurmountable hurdle in the way of the Republicans.57 In the debate, Bertie Ahern described the Lisburn bomb as 'a deeply unpatriotic act' but went on to criticise the British government for its requirement of prior disarmament as wrecking the peace process and the Irish government for not being tough enough with its British counterpart. Mary Harney called on the government to cut off contacts with Sinn Fein.58

A plenary session on decommissioning began in mid-October and lasted until early November. Following the conclusion of the plenary session, a number of bilateral meetings took place. The SDLP, UUP and Alliance parties reached some agreement on the mechanism through which decommissioning might take place following the start of substantive negotiations. The issues of the timetable for decommissioning and the entry of Sinn Fdin remained unresolved.

In a joint statement of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference on 20 November the two governments reiterated past policy and a commitment to the recommendations of the Report of the International Body. In late November the SDLP and Sinn F6in proposed conditions under which a new ceasefire might be put in place. The key issue remained that Sinn F6in should be immediately included in talks on restoration of a ceasefire and that the talks would operate within a fixed timescale. On 28 November the British government responded to John Hume, who had been acting as a go-between, by reiterating that Sinn F6in's participation in the talks process would depend on the creation of a lasting ceasefire and the lapse of a period of time to ensure that the ground rules were being met. There followed intense discussions between Irish and British officials over the proposals. At the end of November the Irish government refused to endorse the British government position on admission of Sinn F6in to all-party talks. John Major rejected the Hume/Adams proposals, which, it was suggested, would have guaranteed a ceasefire if the British government had accepted them. In the House of Commons John Major stated that 'we cannot and will not change our policy in order to bargain for a ceasefire'. Ray Burke, the Fianna FAil spokesman on foreign affairs, suggested that if the IRA called a ceasefire and if Sinn F6in agreed to the Mitchell principles, Sinn F6in should be admitted to the talks.59

56Dail Debates, vol. 469, cols 2022-101, 2241-63 (10 October 1996). 57Department of Foreign Affairs, 'Statement by tinaiste and minister for foreign affairs, Mr Dick

Spring, TD, Diil Eireann', 10 October 1996 [http://www.irlgov.ie/iveagh/foreignaffairs/angloirish/ 10-10 ni.html]. See also Department of Foreign Affairs, 'Tanaiste addresses seanad on Northern Ireland peace process', 16 October 1996 [http://www.irlgov.ie/iveagh/foreignaffairs/press/1 6-10-96/html].

58See also Seanad Debates, vol. 148, cols 1720-87 (16 October 1996). 59The Irish Times, 28 November 1996.

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The Anglo-Irish summit, which took place on 9 December, failed to reach any agreement. One particular area of contention concerned the interpretation of para. 8 of the ground rules, which stated that the parties must 'establish' a commitment to exclusively peaceful means. No time-frame was agreed for the inclusion of Sinn F6in in talks. John Bruton appealed for a new IRA ceasefire. On 18 December the talks were adjourned for the Christmas period.60

60I wish to thank Justin Keoghan for his invaluable research assistance.

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APPENDIX A

Meetings of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference in 1996 1 and 7 February London and Dublin

22 May London 18 July London 20 November Belfast

Meetings between the taoiseach and the British prime minister 28 February London 29 March (Turin European Council) 28 May Dublin 10 June Belfast 21-22 June (Florence European Council) 5 October (Dublin European Council) 9 December London

13-14 December (Dublin European Council)

First official visit of President Mary Robinson to Britain 4-7 June

APPENDIX B

Joint statements of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference in 1996

7 February 1996

1. A two-part meeting of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference was concluded in Dublin on 7 February 1996. The initial discussion took place in London on 1 February 1996.

2. The Irish government was represented by the joint chairman, Mr Dick Spring, TD, tzinaiste and minister for foreign affairs, who was accompanied by Ms Nora Owen, TD, minister for justice. The British government was represented by the joint chairman, the Rt Hon. Sir Patrick Mayhew, QC, MP, secretary of state for Northern Ireland, who was accompanied by the Rt Hon. Michael Ancram, MP, minister of state, Northern Ireland Office.

POLITICAL MATTERS

3. The Conference conducted an extensive review of all recent developments in the peace process.

4. It recalled the objectives agreed by the two governments in the communiqud of 28 November 1995, in particular their firm aim of achieving the launch of all-party negotiations by way of the twin-track process, by the end of February.

5. The Conference welcomed the report of the International Body and expressed its gratitude to the members of the Body for the manner in which they discharged the mandate entrusted to them. Ministers endorsed all of the recommendations made by the Body. They considered that the report of the Body makes an outstanding contribution to the search for progress in relation to all-party negotiations designed to achieve a comprehensive three-stranded settlement.

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6. In furtherance of the two governments' firm aim of securing the launch of all-party talks by the end of February, the Conference reaffirmed its decision to intensify the twin-track process. Each side put forward proposals in this regard and work on them will be taken forward.

7. Subjects for discussion within this intensive dialogue will include the Body's report and the potential it offers for a way forward. Among other issues for discussion, and as foreshadowed in the November communiqu6, would be the question of whether and how, if it were broadly acceptable, with an appropriate mandate and within the three-stranded structure, an elective process could contribute to the building of confidence.

8. The Conference looked forward to full engagement in this intensified process on the part of all the parties. It called on all parties tojoin urgently with both governments and to play their full part in shaping an agreed way forward to all-party talks.

9. The Conference underlined the determination of both governments to remain in close contact at all levels over the coming weeks with a view to the achievement of their joint objective. It noted that the two governments would be meeting at head of government level later this month to review progress.

22 May 1996

1. A meeting of the AngIo-lrish Intergovernmental Conference was held in London on 22 May 1996.

2. The Irish government was represented by the joint chairman, Mr Dick Spring, TD, tinaiste and minister for foreign affairs, who was accompanied by Ms Nora Owen, TD, minister for justice, Mr Michael Lowry, TD, minister for transport, energy and communications, and Mr Emmet Stagg, TD, minister of state at the department of transport, energy and communications. The British government was represented by the joint chairman, the Rt Hon. Sir Patrick Mayhew, MP, secretary of state for Northern Ireland, who was accompanied by the Rt Hon. Sir John Wheeler, MP, minister of state, Northern Ireland Office, the Rt Hon. Michael Ancram, MP, minister of state, Northern Ireland Office, and the Baroness Denton, parliamentary under secretary of state, Northern Ireland Office. The commissioner of the Garda Siochlina and the chief constable of the Royal UIster Constabulary were present for discussion of security matters.

POLITICAL MATTERS

3. The Conference conducted an intensive review of the preparations which are being made for the all- party negotiations which are to commence on 10 June.

4. The Conference agreed that these negotiations would be conducted in full accordance with the principles and approach set out by the two governments in the communiqu6 of 28 February and in the ground-rules paper of 16 April.

5. The Conference reiterated the commitments of both governments to the report of the International Body in its entirely.

6. The Conference reaffirmed the hope of both governments that there will be an unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire, thus allowing Sinn F6in to participate in the all-party negotiations.

SECURITY SITUATION

7. The Conference reviewed the current security situation with the chief constable and the commissioner. It also condemned punishment attacks and called on all concerned to use their influence to end them.

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CONFIDENCE ISSUES

8. The Conference considered the measures which are being taken by the security forces in response to the current security threat. Emphasising the importance of confidence-building on all sides, it reaffirmed the willingness of both governments to respond appropriately to reductions in that threat.

9. The Conference considered parades and the outlook for this year's marching season. It called on all those involved in the planning of parades this year to exercise compromise and balance in the interests of the community as a whole. To that end agreements between all concerned should be encouraged.

10. The Conference discussed a number of prisons issues, including the question of prisoner transfers from the United Kingdom to the Republic.

S1i. Ministers discussed the British government's recent White Paper on policing structures as well as the reviews of other policing matters. The Conference noted that policing issues are expected to be raised during the forthcoming negotiations.

12. The recent decision to accord grant-maintained status to Meinscoil Feirste as of the next academic year was welcomed in the course of a discussion of Irish language education in Northern Ireland.

PUBLIC APPOINTMENTS

13. The Conference considered the response given to views and proposals put forward by the Irish government under Article 6 of the agreement. Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the objective of the widest possible public confidence in public bodies.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES

14. The Conference considered a report on the scope for North/South cooperation in relation to energy matters. Welcoming the wide-ranging cooperation which already exists in this area, it agreed on the need for further discussion of a wide range of options for future cooperation in relation to electricity supply and on the feasibility of developing a North/South gas interconnector with two-way trading. It also saw merit in the preparation of joint bids for support from the European Commission for the funding of energy projects. It agreed, furthermore, that work should continue on identifying opportunities for joint research and development in the energy field and on cooperation in other areas such as the contribution made by energy production to rural development.

15. The Conference noted the significant progress which has been made in the work which it commissioned on ways of improving RTE reception in Northern Ireland. It looked forward to a full discussion of this subject at a future date.

16. The Conference also noted the Springvale project.

18 July 1996

1. A special meeting of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference was held in London on 18 July 1996. The Irish government was represented by the joint chairman, Mr Dick Spring, TD, tinaiste and minister for foreign affairs, accompanied by Ms Nora Owen, TD, minister for justice. The British government was represented by the joint chairman, the Rt Hon. Sir Patrick Mayhew, QC, MP, secretary of state for Northern Ireland, accompanied by the Rt Hon. Sir John Wheeler, MP, minister of state, and the Rt Hon. Michael Ancram, MP, minister of state, Northern Ireland Office. The chief constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the commissioner designate of the Garda Siochina were also present.

2. The meeting was called at the request of the Irish government.

3. The Conference reviewed the serious deterioration in the situation in the aftermath of the decisions

taken in relation to recent parades.

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4. Both sides condemned the widespread violence, intimidation and damage to property visited upon both communities over the past fortnight.

5. They recognised the urgent need to rebuild confidence in the wake of these developments and reaffirmed the primacy of the political process as the means of achieving this. They underlined their absolute determination to do all in their power to achieve progress through the current political talks and to help bring about a comprehensive political settlement, an essential component of which is parity of esteem for both the nationalist and Unionist communities.

6. The two governments believe that there is no alternative to the resolution of differences around the negotiating table. They consider that, with sufficient determination and commitment on all sides, it should be possible to make sufficient progress in the multi-party talks which would enable substantive negotiation to commence in the very near future. They called on all participants to join with the two governments in playing their full part in facilitating this.

20 November 1996

1. A meeting of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference was held in Belfast on 20 November 1996.

2. The Irish government was represented by the joint chairman, Mr Dick Spring, TD, tinaiste and minister for foreign affairs, who was accompanied by Ms Nora Owen, TD, minister for justice. The British government was represented by the joint chairman, Sir Patrick Mayhew, QC, MP, secretary of state for Northern Ireland, who was accompanied by the Rt Hon. Sir John Wheeler, MP, minister of state, and the Rt Hon. Michael Ancram, MP, minister of state, Northern Ireland Office. The commissioner of the Garda Siochina and the chief constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, who were attending the Conference for the first time in their respective capacities, were present for discussion of security matters.

POLITICAL MATTERS

3. The Conference reviewed developments in the political talks process.

4. The two governments reiterated their commitment to the achievement of a comprehensive political settlement which would provide lasting peace and stability. They agreed that an inclusive and comprehensive talks process offered the best means of achieving such a settlement. They reaffirmed the hope of both governments that there would be an early and unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire as the necessary enabling condition for a fully inclusive talks process.

5. The Conference considered the current position in the light of developments to date in the talks, with particular reference to decommissioning. The two governments reaffirmed their commitment to the implementation of all aspects of the report of the International Body, including their support for the approach set out in paragraphs 34-5 of the report, as the best possible basis for progress in relation to decommissioning. They expressed the hope that all other participants would work with them to secure the implementation of all aspects of the report of the International Body, and to join with them now in effecting the earliest possible transition into substantive three-stranded negotiations on this basis. They reiterated their view that progress should be made on the basis of an inclusive and dynamic process in which mutual trust and confidence is built as progress is made on all the issues of concern to all participants.

SECURITY SITUATION

6. The Conference reviewed the current security situation with the chief constable and the commissioner. It congratulated both the commissioner and the chief constable on a number of important recent successes, including finds of weaponry and arrests.

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CONFIDENCE ISSUES

7. The Conference considered the measures which are being taken by the security forces in response to the current security threat. It reaffirmed the willingness of both governments to adjust their response if there should be reductions in that threat.

8. The Conference reviewed recent parades and discussed the prospects for next year's marching season. It underlined the need for those engaged in the planning of parades and the local communities involved to engage in dialogue, and to exercise compromise and balance in the interests of the community as a whole, with a view to reaching early agreements between all concerned. It looked forward in this context to the report of the Independent Review of Parades and Marches in Northern Ireland and recognised that early follow-up on the report's proposals would be an important factor in easing tensions in advance of next year's parades. The Conference recalled its long-standing view that the right to demonstrate must be exercised with respect for the sensitivities of others and with regard for public order.

9. Ministers discussed a number of prisons issues and noted recent prisoner transfers from the UK to the Republic.

10. The Conference also considered a number of reviews of policing matters which are in progress at present. It noted that the need to ensure that policing arrangements in Northern Ireland are impartial, sensitive to both traditions and command widespread acceptance across the whole community would be an important issue for discussion in the political negotiations.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES

11 . The Conference considered recent progress in the work which it had commissioned into ways of improving and extending RTE and Teileffs na Gaeilge reception in Northern Ireland. It looked forward to early agreement on this subject.

12. It also welcomed the recent decision to recognise Bunscoil an Ihuir in Newry and looked forward to the continuing facilitating of parental choice as regards Irish language schooling in Northern Ireland

13. It also discussed the future of the Springvale project.

APPENDIX C

Principal diplomatic visits during 199661

Date Visit to Ireland Visits by members of the Irish government and/or head of state

10-12 January Tinaiste to Cyprus 17 January Taoiseach to Italy 18 January Taoiseach to Holy See 23 January Tinaiste to East Jerusalem 30-1 January Deputy prime minister and minister

for foreign affairs of Croatia

9 February Deputy prime minister of Bulgaria 18-26 February President to USA

6'Includes major official working visits at the levels of head-of-state, head-of-government and foreign minister. For meetings of the Anglo-Irish framework, see Appendix A.

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21 February Minister for foreign affairs of Portugal 22 February Prime minister of Czech Republic 26-7 February Minister for foreign affairs of Morocco

1 March Taoiseach to Thailand 9-11 March President to Manchester

13 March Taoiseach to Egypt 14-17 March Taoiseach to USA and Canada 24-31 March President to South Africa 29 March European Council (Turin) 27-28 March Minister for foreign affairs of Iceland

11 April Tinaiste to USA 12 April Tinaiste to Chile 13 April T6naiste to Argentina 16 April Tinaiste to Bolivia 24 April Prime minister of Greece 25 April Minister for foreign affairs of Singapore 25 April Taoiseach to Poland

7-8 May Tinaiste to WEU (UK) 7-9 May Minister for foreign affairs of Sweden

14-17 May President of Finland 17 May Prime minister of Belgium 17 May Prime minister of Switzerland 17-19 May Minister for foreign affairs of

Netherlands 20 May Chancellor of Austria 21 May President to France 28-30 May President to Iceland 31 May President of EU Commission

4-5 June Taoiseach to Germany 4-5 June President to London

11 June Taoiseach to Belgium 12-15 June President to USA 14 June Prime minister of Finland 21-22 June European Council (Florence) 21-22 June Taoiseach/Turkish prime minister

(Florence) 23-25 June Taoiseach to Malta 28-30 June Czech president

1-2 July President of EU Commission 3 July Norwegian foreign minister 4-6 July President to London 8 July Deputy prime minister of Malaysia

11 July Taoiseach to France 12 July Prime minister of Hungary 12 July Prime minister of Luxembourg 17 July Tgnaiste to European Parliament 17-18 July Minister for foreign affairs of Poland 17-18 July Minister for foreign affairs of Turkey 22 July Tinaiste to EU-ASEAN summit

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2 August Prime minister of Lebanon 23 August Deputy prime minister of Canada

3 September Prime minister of Denmark 5 September Deputy prime minister of Israel 9-13 September Taoiseach to USA

12 September T6naiste to Finland 13 September President to Belfast 18 September Taoiseach to European Parliament 20 September Tinaiste to Germany 23-24 September Tinaiste to USA 29 September President to Germany 30 September Taoiseach to EU-Japan summit

2-4 October German chancellor 5 October European Council (Dublin) 5-8 October President to USA

10 October Foreign minister of Tunisia 23 October Tgnaiste to European Parliament 24 October Foreign minister of Slovakia 29 October President of Palestinian Authorities

8 November Premier of Newfoundland 8 November Tinaiste to Russia 9 November Tinaiste to Turkey

10 November T1naiste to Syria, Jordan, Israel and Gaza

11 November Tinaiste to Egypt 14 November Taoiseach to Greece 14 November Tnaiste to France 15 November World Food Summit, Italy 16 November Tinaiste to Namibia 18 November Deputy president of South Africa 21-22 November Taoiseach to Finland 21 November Prime minister of Netherlands 22 November Taoiseach to Austria 25 November Taoiseach to Spain 26 November Taoiseach to Sweden and Denmark 27 November Taoiseach to Luxembourg 27 November Taoiseach to Italy 28 November Deputy foreign minister of Iran

2-3 December Taoiseach to OSCE summit (Lisbon) 2-4 December President to London 4 December Tinaiste to London 4 December Prime minister of Israel 5 December Taoiseach to Belgium 9 December Taoiseach to UK

10 December Taoiseach to France 10 December Tinaiste to European Parliament 11 December Former president of France 13-14 December European Council (Dublin) 16-17 December Taoiseach and tinaiste to EU-US

summit 17 December EU-Canada summit (Ottawa)

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Documents

Ireland's Foreign Relations in 1996