Race Relations Within the US Military - WordPress.com · tary race relations, Moskos & Butler (1996) fail torecognizethemilitary’sheterogeneity.Con-tact theory usefully identiﬁes

SO38CH19-Burk ARI 2 June 2012 12:35

Race Relations Withinthe US MilitaryJames Burk1 and Evelyn Espinoza21Department of Sociology, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas 77843;email: [email protected] of Sociology, Universidad del Valle de Guatemala, Guatemala City,Guatemala 01015; email: [email protected]

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2012. 38:401–22

First published online as a Review in Advance onMarch 9, 2012

The Annual Review of Sociology is online atsoc.annualreviews.org

This article’s doi:10.1146/annurev-soc-071811-145501

Copyright c© 2012 by Annual Reviews.All rights reserved

0360-0572/12/0811-0401$20.00

Keywords

all-volunteer force, discrimination, institutional racism, militaryservice, moral contract, racial disparities

Abstract

Sociologists now often say that the US military is a model of good racerelations. Although there is no denying progress made in military racerelations, especially since establishment of the all-volunteer force, thisreview challenges that comfortable claim as research done over the pasttwo decades supports it only in part. Instead, we conclude that dispar-ities in military allocations of goods and burdens sometimes disadvan-tage racial minorities. This conclusion rests on a review of institutionalanalyses in five arenas to which researchers have paid close attention:racial patterns in enlistment, officer promotion rates, administration ofmilitary justice, risk of death in combat, and health care for woundedsoldiers. Although not a direct or intended result of military policy andpractice, in three of five cases there was evidence of racial bias and insti-tutional racism. Further work is needed to identify mechanisms throughwhich the bias and racism arose.

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INTRODUCTION

The American military is widely regarded as aninstitution that has served and still serves as amodel of positive race relations. This judgmentwas not always warranted but rests on a com-pelling history of institutional reform. Over thecourse of six decades, the military abandoned itspast as a segregated institution upholding thevalues of Jim Crow to become an integrated in-stitution embracing the value of diversity (Burk2007, Mershon & Schlossman 1998, Moskos &Butler 1996, Segal 1989, Nalty 1986).

President Truman began the process in1948 by issuing Executive Order 9981 to deseg-regate the military. Progress toward fulfillingthe order was slow and controversial. The Armywas particularly reluctant to comply with it anddid so only when effective combat operationsin the Korean War required large numbers ofAfrican American soldiers to serve in deseg-regated units. After the Korean War, in 1954,all military units were desegregated (Armor &Gilroy 2010). Still, full integration remainedelusive. Race riots within the military duringthe Vietnam era proved that establishing effec-tive racial harmony required more than formaldesegregation. Ending the draft in 1973 furtherintensified demands on the military to confrontand root out institutional racism, leading it topursue racial diversity as a positive goal. Theensuing reforms made racial disparities anddiscrimination significantly less in the militarythan elsewhere in civilian life (Lundquist 2008,Quester & Gilroy 2002, Nordlie 1987). Inshort, the military radically revised the moralcontract governing relations between it and itsmembers. By moral contract we mean the setof values, sustained by institutional practice,that specify how an institution should treatthose who fall under its control (Burk 2007).In this case, the military abandoned its oldcontract based on racist principles. It adopteda new contract to govern the distribution ofmilitary goods such as enlistments, promo-tions, justice, risk of death in combat, and carefor the wounded. Pledging not to discriminate,the military distributed military goods in

accordance with general principles opposedto a racist institutional climate and supportinga climate of equal opportunity. Basic to theseare the principles of merit, equality, and need(Elster 1992, Deutsch 1985, Walzer 1983).

Under the terms of this new contract, the all-volunteer force was better able to attract minor-ity youth into service. Indeed, minorities, espe-cially African Americans, volunteered to servein numbers much larger than expected relativeto their presence in civilian society (Rostker2006, Janowitz & Moskos 1979, Gates 1970).High minority enlistment rates helped makethe volunteer force a success, at a time whenmilitary service was not popular. When the Per-sian Gulf War was fought in 1991, it was thefirst war in the twentieth century in which mili-tary race relations—measured by a lack of mediaattention—were not an issue. Moskos & Butler(1996) took this as confirmation that the newmoral contract worked; race relations in themilitary were good and its way of integrationwas one that other organizations might follow.

Nevertheless, our review of military racerelations finds a large but scattered literature,relying on institutional analyses, that doc-uments the persistence of racial disparitieswithin the military. It raises the question ofwhether these disparities stem from continuinginstitutional racism, are due to other factorsunrelated to racism, or arise from some com-bination of the two. Typically, these studiesaddress the question by examining the distri-bution of a specific military good. Considerthe distribution of military occupations. Kirbyet al. (2000) found that the underrepresentationof black soldiers in special operations forces is acomplex result of structural factors (low scoreson qualification tests, failure to meet swim-ming requirements), perceived barriers (lackof identification with special operations forces,perceived racism in special operations forcesespecially among blacks), and free choice (blacksoldiers’ preference for military occupationsthat teach skills transferable to the civilianlabor market). Although some of these factors(perceived racism) are problematic, otherfactors (preference for noncombat-related

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occupations) simply represent a rational choiceby minorities to pursue a certain career path.Put together, these studies allow one toidentify where racial disparities can be foundwithin the military and whether the disparitiesare institutional products of unfair or biasedtreatment based on race or ethnic identity.

This approach to institutional analysis, firstsuggested by Elster (1992) in Local Justice, fo-cuses on the allocative principles that institu-tions follow when deciding who should receivehow much of a particular institutional good.But it is equally concerned to explain departuresfrom a purely principled allocation of goods. Aswe shall see, allocations can be distorted by thedirect or indirect effects of government poli-cies, by choices recipients make when they se-lect among alternative goods, and by the unin-tended consequences of some allocations madewithin the institution.

Adopting this approach has at least tworelated advantages over alternative approachesto the study of race relations and the military.First, it treats the military as a heterogeneous,not a unitary, actor. Doing so allows for it toexhibit varying degrees of compliance with theterms of its moral contract. Relying instead oncontact theory as a guide to their study of mili-tary race relations, Moskos & Butler (1996) failto recognize the military’s heterogeneity. Con-tact theory usefully identifies institutional con-ditions associated with the promotion of goodrace relations. But it treats these conditions asif they yielded a single prognosis for whetherthe military possessed or failed to possess goodrace relations. The military is too complex tobe studied (or judged) in such a simple way.Second, our approach leaves room for thepossibility that there are multiple independentexplanations about whether and why racial dis-parities persist within the military. Quite often,macro-oriented studies of race relations andconflicts over foreign and domestic policies areless nuanced (Browne-Marshall 2007, Dudziak2002, Borstelmann 2001). They operate on alevel of analysis too high to discern how anyone of the various institutional processes withinthe military individually shapes race relations.

A third approach to the study of military racerelations is based on the life course perspec-tive (MacLean & Elder 2007). Life course the-orists have examined whether military servicehas been a turning point in people’s lives, alter-ing the trajectory of their life for better or worseas it is measured (for instance) by income oreducational attainments (Teachman & Tedrow2007; Teachman 2004, 2005; Mare & Winship1984), intergroup marriage (Lundquist 2004,Jacobson & Heaton 2003), marital stability(Newby et al. 2005, Gimbel & Booth 1994),health (MacLean 2010, Elder & Clipp 1989),and rates of recidivism (Greenberg et al. 2007,McCarroll et al. 2000, Sampson & Laub 1996,Mattick 1960). These studies are valuable forrevealing how the life chances of minorityveterans have changed over time in compari-son with the life chances of majority veteransor minority nonveterans. But this approach—focused as it is on the life course after militaryservice—provides little or no insight into theintrainstitutional processes of allocation thatdefine the quality of race relations within themilitary, and that is our primary concern.

This review examines the military’s distri-bution of five key goods: admission into theenlisted ranks, promotion rates, administrationof military justice, risk of death in combat, andcare for wounded veterans. These goods wereselected because there was a stream of research,active over the past 20 years, about their allo-cations. That was not the case with all militarygoods. For example, the military’s distributionof medals, although intrinsically interesting,has not been included because the literature onthis subject is too sparse. The goods selectedranged from goods of entry into the military(enlistment) to goods of exit from the military(care for wounded, unable to continue in ser-vice). They included goods important to thoseactive in their military service (promotion,military justice, and risk of death in combat).Finally, each good examined is representativeof at least one of the three general principlesrelied on to allocate goods in an institutionbound by its moral contract to sustain anequal opportunity climate. Enlistment and

www.annualreviews.org • Military Race Relations 403

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promotion are governed by the principle ofmerit; military justice and the risk of death incombat are governed by the principle of equal-ity; and care for the wounded is governed bythe principle of need. Adherence to theseallocative principles varied empirically, withevidence suggesting that military race relationsin some instances are still discriminatory in part.

RACE AND ENLISTMENT

Before the US government established theall-volunteer force in 1973, minority represen-tation within the military was limited. It roseno higher than the minority’s proportion inthe population as a whole. Usually it was less(Segal & Segal 2004). Historically, underrepre-sentation reflected the reluctance of the largersociety to arm racial minorities (Segal 1989,Nalty 1986). With the end of World War II,these historical restraints were largely aban-doned (Mershon & Schlossman 1998, Bogart1992). In the all-volunteer force era, AfricanAmericans, Hispanics, Asians, and NativeAmericans were all welcome to volunteer forservice in the military—as long as they wereotherwise qualified (Rostker 2006). Underlyingthis development was the military’s realizationthat, in the wake of the unpopular VietnamWar, the military would have trouble meetingits recruiting goals if it relied solely on recruitsfrom the dominant white majority. Increasedparticipation from minorities—both men andwomen—was required. As a result, in the1970s, for the first time, racial minoritieswere overrepresented in the armed forces.The problem for research was to describe andexplain the changing patterns of representationthat occurred.

Trends in Minority Representation

The basic demographic data needed to de-scribe trends in minority representation in themilitary are readily available through two re-ports published annually by the Department ofDefense, the Annual Demographic Profile (1976–2009) and the report on Population Representa-tion in the Military Services (1997–2009). Based

on these data, researchers have identified twomajor trends, one for African Americans andone for Hispanics. (Other race or ethnic groupsmake up less than 10% of the military, withthe largest of these groups—Asian Americans—representing between 3% and 5% of themilitary.)

African American representation in the mil-itary grew markedly, doubling between 1972and 1981, from 11%, about the same propor-tion of blacks in civilian society, to 22%, slightlymore than twice the proportion in civilian so-ciety. The rise was most dramatic in the Army,which saw black representation peak at 33%of the service in 1981, with most serving inthe combat arms. Black representation in theArmy remained at or above 30% from 1979through 1984 (Department of Defense 2002).After this surge in African American enlistmentin the 1970s, black representation in the mili-tary stabilized at slightly more than 20% andremained at this level throughout the 1990s.There was also a shift in black preferences formilitary occupations, moving away from servicein the combat arms toward service in combatsupport and administrative specialties. At theend of the 1990s, African American represen-tation began to drop below 20% and reached alow of 13% in 2006 (Segal & Segal 2004). Sincethen, black representation has risen but remainsbelow 20% (Armor & Gilroy 2010).

Trends in Hispanic representation havebeen less volatile than trends for AfricanAmericans. From 1976 through 1991, His-panic enlistments made up roughly 4% of allaccessions. After 1991, the trend turned up-ward, reflecting a gradual increase of Hispanicsamong all new enlistments, from just below5% of total enlistments to nearly 11% of newenlistments in 2009. Increased enlistments ledto increased representation in the military as awhole. Hispanics, who made up just 1% of theforce in 1973, grew to 11% of the force in 2007,with the greatest number serving in the MarineCorps. This compares with a Hispanic popu-lation of 14.3% of all youths between 18 and24 years old (Department of Defense 2007).These numbers have to be used with care. In


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2003, the Hispanic category was redefined andset apart from other race or ethnic categoriesto recognize that Hispanics may also be black,white, Asian, etc. (Armor & Gilroy 2010). Still,the changed definition did not alter the maintrends. In brief, for the first 20 years of thevolunteer force, Hispanics were consistentlyunderrepresented within the military. Overthe past 20 years, Hispanic representationhas increased and seems poised to equal orexceed the representation of Hispanic youthsin the population as a whole, though it hasnot yet done so (Department of Defense 2009,Dempsey & Shapiro 2009, Segal & Segal 2004).

Racial Disparities in Patternsof Enlistment

Three major factors explain racial disparities inpatterns of enlistment: merit-based criteria forqualified personnel; the propensity (or willing-ness) of youth to enlist; and the prevailing socialcontext as defined by economic cycles, accumu-lations of social capital, and prospects for war.

The military defines high-quality recruitslargely in terms of two merit-based achieve-ments. One is graduating from high school,which indicates an ability to work successfullywithin an institutional setting. The other is do-ing well on the Armed Forces QualificationTest (AFQT), a test of intelligence. It is pos-sible that candidates for enlistment who lack ahigh school diploma or fail to score high enoughon the AFQT may be granted a waiver and al-lowed to enlist. Although possible, waivers arerarely granted. If the AFQT is misnormed, itcan seriously affect the quality of enlisted per-sonnel. This happened in the 1970s, when mis-norming the test effectively lowered the bar forenlistment. It allowed many African Americans(and others) to join who otherwise would nothave been allowed. Once the misnorming wasdiscovered, the error was corrected and sol-diers with low AFQT scores were not allowedto reenlist. Through the 1980s, these effortsled to reductions in black overrepresentation inthe Army (Department of Defense 1995). As aconsequence, African Americans who joined or

remained in the force scored higher than thoseenlisted in earlier years. With higher scores,they turned away from combat specialties tocompete successfully for combat support andadministrative jobs, acquiring skills transferableto the civilian labor force (Moskos & Butler1996, Segal & Verdugo 1994, Teachman et al.1993). Reliance on merit-based criteria mayalso help explain underrepresentation in the en-listment of Hispanics in the all-volunteer forceera. As a relatively new and fast-growing im-migrant group, Hispanic youths may not haveimmediately met educational, language, or res-idency requirements for enlistment (Segal et al.2007, Gifford 2005, Pew Hisp. Cent. 2003).But, over time, as more Hispanics qualified forservice, Hispanic representation in the militaryhas grown.

The propensity (or willingness) of youth toserve in the military is the best single indicatorof whether youths will enlist (Dempsey &Shapiro 2009, Segal & Segal 2004, Bachmanet al. 2000). Since 1970, the Departmentof Defense has annually gathered data onpropensity, relying currently on its Youth Polland on the University of Michigan’s Monitoringthe Future Survey to do so (Mil. Leadersh.Divers. Comm. 2010b). A propensity to serve isindicated when high school seniors say they willdefinitely or probably enter the service withina few years. More than two-thirds of seniorswho report a propensity to serve actually doserve within six years of high school graduation(Woodruff et al. 2006). The data gatheredusing this measure consistently show thatmen have a greater propensity to serve thanwomen. Within gender, African Americans andHispanics have a higher propensity to enlistthan whites. Overall, Hispanic males report thehighest propensity to enlist and white womenthe lowest (Segal et al. 2007, Dempsey &Shapiro 2009, Mil. Leadersh. Divers. Comm.2010b). Since the Persian Gulf War, thepropensity to enlist for all groups has declined(Mil. Leadersh. Divers. Comm. 2010b).

The final factor affecting patterns of raceand recruiting is the social context, broadlyconceived. It is well established that the social


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context for recruiting varies inversely witheconomic cycles. Interest in joining the militaryrises during economic downturns and fallswhen the economy recovers (Kleykamp 2006,Gorman & Thomas 1993, Kearl & Nelson1992, Petersen 1989, Brown 1985, Dale &Gilroy 1983). Still, economic effects are notall-determinative. African Americans fromfamilies with incomes below the poverty levelwere more interested in joining the militarythan were similarly poor whites (Gorman &Thomas 1993). Their interest was justified.Black youths living in poverty at age 17 who en-listed in the military in the early 1980s escapedpoverty by 1990 (Seeborg 1994). Also affectingthe social context for recruiting are minorityexpectations that military service confers socialcapital that can be cashed in for social recog-nition or higher social status within the largercivic life (Burk 2007, 1999; Krebs 2006; Salyer2004; Levy 1998; Nalty 1986). In some cases,status gains within a minority community maycount for as much or more than status gainsfrom the dominant group (Ledesma 2006,Leal 2005, Knouse 1991). The prospects forwar also matter. In general, minorities andwomen have been less supportive than whitemen of post–Cold War military interventions(Nincic & Nincic 2002, Schroeder et al. 1993).After the Persian Gulf War, the rate of blackenlistments, which had been high, began to fall.The fall accelerated with the onset of the warsin Iraq and Afghanistan, which were unpopularin the African American community (Armor& Gilroy 2010, Rohall & Ender 2007). Thisresulted in a difficult recruiting environmentfrom 2003 through 2008. Serious recruitingshortfalls were averted only by paying largeenlistment bonuses and by lowering enlistmentstandards (Asch et al. 2010).

Other Factors AffectingMinority Representation

Other factors affect patterns of minority rep-resentation in the military. Consider, for in-stance, occupational segregation and retentionrates. As noted briefly above, since the 1980s,

when given a choice, African American servicemembers have not chosen to hold direct combatmilitary occupations. Instead, they have chosenoccupations that require skills transferable tothe civilian labor force. With majority servicemembers, the preference has been reversed.This has created occupational segregationwithin the force. As of fiscal year 2009, morethan 30% of white service members held com-bat occupations, whereas less than 10% heldadministrative occupations. In contrast, nearly30% of black service members held adminis-trative occupations, whereas 12% held com-bat occupations (Department of Defense 2009).That black service members prefer adminis-trative military employment is well advised.Kleykamp (2009) shows that civilian employ-ers prefer to hire black veterans who possesstransferable skills over black nonveterans. Incontrast, employers show no preference to hireveterans with experience in the combat arms.

Firestone (1992) has shown that gender-based occupational segregation is less pro-nounced in the military than in civilian soci-ety. The military’s more equitable distributionis due in the first place to the military’s commit-ment to equal opportunities. But it also reflectsthe overrepresentation of blacks among womenin the service, which has other causes. In gen-eral, African American women are more likelythan other women to hold nontraditional jobs.They are as a result more likely to seek militaryemployment, which includes employment innontraditional military occupations. This con-tributes to a more representative distributionof women and men across military occupations(Firestone 1992). The distribution is reinforcedby high minority retention rates. Comparedwith whites, black male and female enlistedpersonnel are far more likely to remain in themilitary, especially if they are married (Moore2002). Their high retention rates are a responseto push factors in the civilian economy. Minori-ties join and remain in the military because theybelieve it provides better opportunities for themthan can be found in the civilian sector.

In sum, racial disparities arise from enlist-ment (and reenlistment) decisions throughout


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the all-volunteer force era. Yet one would behard-pressed to conclude based on the researchcited here that the disparities are discriminatoryoutcomes of organizational practices within themilitary. Larger social processes are at work.Most important is the role of economic factors:The military labor market is less discriminatorythan the civilian labor market, offering betteropportunities for minorities, especially duringeconomic downturns. The propensity to serveis also shaped by variable perceptions held byminority families and in minority communitiesabout the opportunities young people have toaccumulate social capital through military ser-vice and about public support of war.

DO RACIAL DISPARITIESMATTER?

In this section we review studies that examineracial disparities in the distribution of pro-motions to officers, punishments under theUniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), andthe risk of death in combat. In each case, ques-tions are raised about whether racial disparitiesassociated with these distributions result fromdiscriminatory practices within the military.

Promoting Officers

Throughout the all-volunteer force era, mi-norities have been underrepresented in the of-ficer corps. Over time, the extent of the un-derrepresentation has lessened. In 1980, nearly91% of new officer accessions were white.Fewer than 7% were black and slightly morethan 2% were Hispanic (Hosek et al. 2001). By2009, 76% of new officer accessions were white.Slightly more than 9% were African Ameri-can and 5.6% were Hispanic. The race andethnic representation of new officers in 2009nearly mirrored the race and ethnic distribu-tion of civilian college graduates ranging from21 to 35 years old. Indeed, new white officerswere underrepresented whereas new black offi-cers were overrepresented when compared withtheir civilian counterparts. Still, white officersare predominant in the officer corps. White

officers held 92.5% of the general officer slotsin 2009. Blacks meanwhile held 5.5% and His-panics 1.7% of the slots (Mil. Leadersh. Divers.Comm. 2010c, Department of Defense 2009).

Currently, three mutually compatibleapproaches are taken to understand underrep-resentation of racial and ethnic minorities inthe officer corps. The first examines percep-tions by officers that the promotion processis racially biased. Minority and white officersdiffer in their perceptions of equal opportunityavailable in their units. Data for this claimcome from surveys that the military conducts toassess (among many things) service members’perceptions about problems of discriminationwithin the service at large and within each unit.As Dansby & Landis (1998) report, taken over-all, officers have positive perceptions of theirunit’s equal opportunity climate. But closerexamination reveals differences in responsesbased on race and ethnicity. Numerous studies(Truhon 2008, Bergman et al. 2007, Hoseket al. 2001, Dansby & Landis 1998, Rosenfeldet al. 1998) have found that racial and ethnicminority officers—men and women—morenegatively perceive the equal opportunityclimate than do white officers. The largestgap separates white male officers, whoseperceptions of equal opportunity climates arethe most positive, from African Americanfemale officers, whose perceptions of equalopportunity climates are the least positive.

The second approach examines ethnicdisparities in promotion rates. The question iswhether racial and ethnic minority officers arepromoted at lower rates than are white maleofficers (Mil. Leadersh. Divers. Comm. 2010c;Baldwin 1997, 1996; Daula et al. 1990; Zucca& Gorman 1986). The data seem at first todisclose no difference in promotion rates. Ina large study by RAND examining officer pro-motions from 1967 to 1991, Hosek et al. (2001)found that African American male officers wereas likely as white officers to reach higher ranks.The likelihoods were 36% and 37%, respec-tively. But the result is spurious. In fact, theresearchers report black male officers were 29%less likely to be promoted than their white male


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counterparts. The confusion arises because inthe military those who are not promoted mustquit the service, reducing the proportion ofminorities in the pool for the next round ofpromotions. The finding of low promotionrates for blacks was initially masked becausepromoted blacks were 20% more likely thanpromoted whites to remain in the service untilthe next promotion review, increasing the num-ber of minorities left in the promotion pool. Inbrief, the choice of black officers to remain inthe military when white officers choose to leavecreates the mistaken impression that white andblack officers are promoted at the same rate.

The third approach studies language usedin officer fitness reports to describe the ac-complishments of officers up for promotion.At issue is whether descriptors affect the rateat which officers are promoted. Thomas et al.(1998) closely examined the words used todescribe an officer’s quality in officer fitnessreports. All the words used were positive. Yetthere were systematic differences in words usedto describe white versus black leaders. Johnson(2001) extended this analysis to discoverwhether different descriptors used in fitnessreports were associated with recommendationsfor promotion. She found that descriptorsassociated with recommendations for earlypromotion were more often ascribed to whiteofficers, whereas descriptors associated withrecommendations for on time or no promotionwere more often ascribed to black officers.Johnson (2001) concluded that the associa-tions between words and promotions wereunintended, perhaps the result of deep-rootedstereotypical responses. The causes of theassociation remain to be established.

Before moving on, we might briefly askwhether promotion rates among enlisted menvary by race. Butler’s (1976) seminal study ofthe matter concluded that blacks were discrim-inated against. Among equally qualified blacksand whites, blacks waited longer than whitesfor initial promotion to sergeant and to highernoncommissioned officer ranks. (Earlier pro-motions from private to corporal or specialistare virtually automatic.) Butler’s findings went

unchallenged until it was shown by Daula et al.(1990) that they were the result of a statisti-cal artifact. Butler’s data were censored. Theyomitted observations on individuals who leftthe service after they were promoted. Once ad-justing for the censoring, but otherwise usingthe same data Butler used, Daula et al. (1990)found no simple relationship between minor-ity status and time to promotion. Minoritieswere promoted more rapidly than whites inthree occupation/pay grade combinations, asrapidly in two combinations, and less rapidly inone. Most recently, the Military Leadership Di-versity Commission (2011a) revisited the ques-tion. Its analysis of enlisted promotion rates wascrude, based on raw promotion rates and lack-ing a full set of controls. With a few exceptions,the commission concluded that below-averagerates of promotion were less common for mi-norities who were noncommissioned officersthan they were for minorities who were officers.

Whatever the causes of minority underrep-resentation in the officer corps, the militarybelieves that this underrepresentation detractsfrom military effectiveness, and so each servicehas been required to implement affirmativeaction plans to solve the problem (Leach2004, Moskos & Butler 1996, Stewart &Firestone 1992). Recently, however, federalcourts have restricted the scope of these plans(Mil. Leadersh. Divers. Comm. 2010a). Theyno longer allow promotion boards to considerhow minority status affected an officer’s recordbefore deciding whom to promote (Saundersv. White 2002). Similarly, military retirementboards cannot use racial preference as a factorwhen allocating involuntary retirements re-lated to downsizing the force (Berkley v. UnitedStates 2002, Christian v. United States 2000). InGrutter v. Bollinger (2003), the issue waswhether professional schools could use race-conscious admission standards to ensure adiverse learning environment and greater di-versity within the profession. The case focusedon law school admissions but had broaderimplications. A decision against race-consciousadmission into law school risked endingmilitary outreach efforts to increase minority


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representation in the service academies, inROTC programs, and ultimately in the officercorps. This probable adverse effect on themilitary helped to narrowly persuade the Courtto reach its decision, permitting race-consciousadmission policies in professional schools(Toobin 2007). These reverse discriminationcases are politically controversial (Barnes 2007,Leach 2004). The relevant point for this reviewis that the military has been legally constrainedby these decisions from implementing policiesit believes would create a more representativeofficer corps.

Administering Justice

American military justice has historically mir-rored the race biases found in the civilian justicesystem. Recent studies (Kaplan 2005, Lilly &Thomson 1997) document that African Amer-icans serving in Europe during Word War IIwere denied due process and were more likelythan whites to be executed in capital cases.Following that war, the military justice systemunderwent wholesale reform, represented byenactment of the UCMJ and by creation ofwhat is now called the Court of Appeals for theArmed Forces. Both reforms strengthened themilitary’s commitment to enforce standards ofdue process and equal protection under the law(Lurie 1998). Nevertheless, it remains a matterfor dispute whether the military justice systemcontinues in some ways to reflect racial bias.

The evidence can be puzzling. Numerousstudies find no difference in the length ofsentences given to punish blacks and whites forthe same crime (Edwards et al. 2001, Verdugo1998, Landis et al. 1997, Edwards & Newell1994, Perry 1977), suggesting an absence ofracial bias in meting out punishment. YetAfrican American service members are roughlytwice as likely as whites to be incarcerated whilein the military (Mil. Leadersh. Divers. Comm.2011b, Moskos & Butler 1996), suggestingthat racial bias exists. Black soldiers certainlythink so. In a 1992 survey, more than 8% ofenlisted black males reported that they hadbeen discriminated against in a UCMJ action

within the last year, twice the percentagefor whites. Only 38% of black enlisted menbelieved that white and black enlisted menin their unit received the same punishmentfor the same crime (Verdugo 1998). Verdugo(1998) suggests that differences may emergeat the gateway into the military justice system,where commanding officers have discretion todetermine what charges and punishments (ifany) might be levied before a formal process ofcourts-martial is convened (Lurie 1998).

Moskos & Butler (1996) offer a differentexplanation. They discount the disparity inincarceration rates and the significance ofminority perceptions doubting the fairnessof military justice. They do not deny thedisparity, but they emphasize that differencesin incarceration rates found in the militaryare much lower than those in civilian society,where African Americans are six times as likelyas whites to be incarcerated. They also doubtthe significance of the disparate perceptionsheld by blacks and whites about the equalopportunity climate. They note that only 686formal complaints of racial bias were filed in1994. Of these, only 20% were judged to havemerit. Because the number of complaints andthe proportion of claims found to have meritwere so low, Moskos & Butler (1996) concludethat the evidence does not support minoritysoldiers’ beliefs that they are discriminatedagainst. This conclusion may be hasty. Theyfailed to consider whether lower minority in-carceration rates in the military might stem lessfrom a reduction in racial discrimination withinthe military than from the special character ofmilitary life—a carefully screened populationwith relatively high education, living in acommunity of relatively low or no poverty,under conditions of full employment. Nor didthey provide a standard for knowing whetherthe number of complaints or the proportionfound to be warranted was high or low.

In addition, we cannot be sure how manycomplaints of racial bias go unreported. In1983, the Supreme Court (Chappell v. Wallace1983) denied enlisted members the right to fileequal opportunity complaints in federal courts,


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including complaints about military punish-ment. The Court held that adequate channelsexisted within the services to adjudicate suchcomplaints. Thirteen years later, the GeneralAccounting Office (GAO 1996) found signifi-cant problems with these complaint systems andconcluded that the problems were sufficient tokeep service members from filing complaints. Amore recent report (GAO 2008) compared var-ious pilot programs established to deal with thebacklog of equal opportunity complaints withinthe Department of Defense. The need for pro-grams to deal with this backlog casts doubt onthe adequacy of existing military channels tomanage equal opportunity complaints.

Data other than incarceration ratesdocument that black service members areoverrepresented in the military justice system.Walker’s (2001) analysis of disciplinary actionstaken from 1987 through 1991 tells that thenumber of courts-martial convictions droppedby 52% over this period. Black convictionsalso dropped, but only by 35%, which meantthat the proportion of convictions of AfricanAmericans rose during this period from 27% to37%. In contrast, the proportion of convictionsfor whites dropped from 65% to 54%. Walkerobserved a similar trend for less serious,nonjudicial offenses (see also Dansby 2001,Landis & Tallarigo 2001, Verdugo 1998).

What explains this persistent overrepresen-tation of black minorities in the military justicesystem? Some (Edwards et al. 2001, Dansby2001) argue that overrepresentation is due inpart to cultural differences between blacks andwhites, at least with respect to violations ofArticle 91 of the UCMJ. Article 91 prohibitsacts of disrespect or insubordination towardofficers. Edwards and colleagues (2001) suspectthat behaviors that are part of the normalrepertoire of urban blacks might be consideredconfrontational or insubordinate to mem-bers of a predominately white officer corps.Accepting this possibility, Dansby (2001) rec-ommends that high rates of Article 91 offensesfor black enlisted men might be mitigatedwith programs to socialize new black enlistedmen into the culture of military society. The

researchers failed to consider whether thenormal behavioral repertoire of white officersmight be considered to be offensive andprovocative by black enlisted men. Nor didthey consider whether socialization programsmight be expanded to include training forofficers, helping them to become more attunedto the various cultures found in an increasinglydiverse force.

Another factor may be that minorities fac-ing courts-martial are not well advised on howto navigate the military justice system (Verdugo1998, Landis et al. 1997, Nalty 1986). Blacks aresignificantly less likely than whites to engage inplea bargaining even though plea bargains typ-ically lead to shorter sentences than those im-posed when cases go to trial. When cases goto trial, blacks are more likely than whites tochoose trial by a jury of officers and enlisted per-sonnel rather than trial by a judge. Yet, in gen-eral, defense counsels believe that trials heardby judges alone are decided more favorably forthe accused. The result of these choices is to in-crease the representation of blacks among thosewho are charged and convicted of the samecrime (Verdugo 1998).

Risk of Death in Combat

At the heart of military service is the risk ofdeath in combat. The risk may be easier tobear in a volunteer force than in a drafted force(Moskos & Wood 1988). Yet when a volunteerforce is engaged in war, it remains true that thehuman costs of war are not far from the minds ofpolitical leaders or from the minds of the civil-ian population (Gelpi et al. 2009, Bennett &Flickinger 2009, Gartner 2008). In general, de-bates about combat casualties, the dead and thewounded, have considered two distinct issues.One is whether the rise of combat casualties di-minishes public willingness to support a policyof war (Gelpi et al. 2009, Burk 1999, Mueller1973). The other, which we focus on here, askswhether the risks of combat death are fairly dis-tributed, especially along racial and ethnic lines.

The question first arose in debates aboutthe Vietnam War, after President Lyndon


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Johnson expanded American participation inthat war in 1965 (Appy 1993, Nalty 1986,Binkin & Eitelberg 1983). The escalationincreased the death toll especially for AfricanAmericans, whose proportion of the war deadrose from 6.5% before 1965 to nearly 21%in 1966, a level that was more than twicethe proportion of African Americans in thecivilian population. This disparity drew publicattention. Civil rights leaders complained thatblack youths were being used as cannon fodderto fight a white man’s war (King 1967). TheNational Advisory Commission on SelectiveService (1967), known as the Marshall Com-mission, was tasked to identify problems withthe fairness of the draft. Among its findings, itcondemned racial disparities in combat deathsin Vietnam and asserted that racial, social,and economic groups should bear the riskof death in war only in rough proportion tothat group’s presence in society (Flynn 1993,Binkin & Eitelberg 1983). In response to thesecriticisms, the proportion of blacks representedin Army combat deaths dropped from morethan 20% in 1966 to 13.4% in 1967. Theproportion dropped further each year throughthe war’s end for Americans in 1972. Ulti-mately, calculated over the entire course of thewar, the proportion of blacks killed in combatwas roughly equal to the presence of AfricanAmericans in society (Moskos & Butler 1996).

Nevertheless, after the war, scholars contin-ued to debate whether the military had beenracially biased when allocating combat risks(Moskos & Butler 1996, Mazur 1995, Appy1993, Binkin & Eitelberg 1983, Janowitz 1978).The central question was whether the burdensof war had been racially biased or class biased.Janowitz (1978) argued that the class factor wascrucial: that one’s economic position, not one’srace, determined the unequal sacrifices made inVietnam. Appy (1993) argues that racial dispari-ties mattered most because it was rhetoric aboutthe ethnic disparities of casualties in the mid-1960s that galvanized public and political sup-port for policy change; otherwise the racial dis-proportions in casualties would have continued.Still others have argued that race and class are

so tightly entangled in American history that itis a fool’s errand to try to separate the effects ofone over the other. The main point, they say, isthat by war’s end there was no statistically sig-nificant relationship between race or class andthe level of casualties taken in Vietnam (Mazur1995, Wilson 1995).

What made these debates relevant in theearly years of the volunteer force was theoverrepresentation of African Americans inthe Army enlisted ranks, a trend we examinedabove. The social composition of the earlyvolunteer force, from the mid-1970s throughthe 1980s, would certainly have led to racialdisparities in combat deaths had that forcebeen called to war. Janowitz & Moskos (1979)worried at the time that the military’s lack ofsocial representativeness would undermine themilitary’s standing in society. But their worrieswere unnecessary. The overrepresentation ofAfrican Americans in combat roles was nota permanent condition. In any case, Moskos& Butler (1996) supply the evidence thatAfrican Americans were fairly represented asa percentage of those killed in the six combatoperations from the Mayaquez incident in1976 through the mission to Somalia in 1993.Blacks were 15% of those killed, a little abovethe proportion of the relevant age group ofblacks in civilian society (about 13%) andunderrepresented among the number of blacksenlisted in the military (about 19%).

In subsequent wars fought in Iraq andAfghanistan, African Americans were under-represented among casualties taken from 2003through 2009; in contrast, Hispanics have beenoverrepresented among those killed in com-bat (Fischer 2009). Compared with the debatesabout blacks killed in Vietnam, Hispanic deathsin Iraq and Afghanistan have generated littlecontroversy. This may be due to their status asvolunteers (Amaya 2007). More important thanrace or ethnicity in determining the risk of com-bat death, Gifford (2005) argues, are these threefactors: how volunteers are distributed acrossvarious units and occupational specialties, whatmix of units participate in a particular opera-tion, and the terms of engagement.


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There is no evidence that the risk ofcombat death has been allocated based onorganizational practices that are racially dis-criminatory during the all-volunteer force era.There is some evidence of racial (or class) biasin the risk of combat deaths in Vietnam inthe mid- to late 1960s. But once that evidencewas known, military organizational practiceschanged to erase the disparities—by what exactmeans or at whose direction, researchers havebeen at pains to discover, but without success(Appy 1993, Binkin & Eitelberg 1983).

CARING FOR WOUNDEDVETERANS

The military assumes responsibility for treatingthe effects of combat on those it sends to war.That responsibility includes caring for thosewho are wounded by war, not only while theyare in the service, but also afterward. What mat-ters is that the wounds were incurred while inthe service. Historically, the military has alwaysprovided some health care for service members,but the present expansive health care systemwas established in the wake of World War IIbecause the need for care was so great. Thenew health care system, administered by theUS Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), didnot replace military health care. It created twosystems. The military continued to care for itswounded soldiers as long as they remained onactive duty. The VA specialized in giving careto veterans, including those whose wounds wereso severe they could not return to active duty.This division of labor has created bureaucraticentanglements that impede patient care (Dole& Shalala 2007).

From the beginning, the VA was commit-ted to providing equal health care for all vet-erans regardless of race (Oddone et al. 2002).There is contemporary evidence that the com-mitment has been kept. Rosenheck & Fontana(2002) report there were no racial differences on8 of 11 treatment process and outcome mea-sures among white, black, and Hispanic pa-tients enrolled in VA programs for treatingposttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). These

results are consistent with earlier studies thatalso found no or few racial differences in VAtreatment outcomes (Rosenheck & Seibyl 1998,Rosenheck & Fontana 1996, Leda & Rosen-heck 1995). Nonetheless, these studies do notaddress whether there are racially significantdifferences in the risk of injury for PTSD orracial differences in gaining access to healthcare. To pursue these matters, we explore stud-ies of racial differences among veterans as theyrelate to the risk of suffering PTSD and tothe ability of gaining access to VA health carefacilities.

Risk Factors for PTSD

The incidence and severity of PTSD symp-toms among service members and veterans areassociated with exposure to war zone stressors(Tanielian & Jaycox 2008, Rundell 2006,Sonnenberg et al. 2005, Schleger et al. 1992,Kulka et al. 1990). These stressors include, forexample, exposure to direct combat, includingseeing a buddy killed or killing an enemy com-batant; exposure to atrocities or participationin the killing of innocents; and exposure to un-controllable or indefensible lethal attacks, say,roadside or suicide bombings (Friedman 2006,Beckham et al. 1998). Length of exposure tostressors increases the severity of the symptoms(Boscarino 2006), as does failure to seek earlytreatment or failure to receive support fromfamily and friends at homecoming (Fontana &Rosenheck 1994).

Wartime stressors do not invariably causePTSD. According to one estimate (Tanielian& Jaycox 2008), 18.5% of Americans deployedto Iraq and Afghanistan had PTSD; 81.5% didnot. In contrast, the rate for soldiers in theBritish Army who were deployed to Iraq orAfghanistan at roughly the same time was es-timated to be much lower, at 4% (Fear et al.2010). Other factors must be involved (Hoge& Castro 2006, Hoge et al. 2004). To seewhat these factors might be, Rundell (2006)examined the social demographic character-istics of military personnel who were evacu-ated from Iraq or Afghanistan primarily for


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psychiatric reasons. Of these, 82% were evac-uated within the first six months of their de-ployment. Compared with all those serving inAfghanistan and Iraq, the evacuated were morelikely to be young (under 30), in the NationalGuard or Reserves, enlisted, and female. Im-portant here, they were also more likely to beHispanic.

Whether studying PTSD among VietnamWar veterans or more recent service mem-bers, it is a common finding that minoritiesare more likely than nonminorities to acquirePTSD (Dohrenwend et al. 2008, Brinker et al.2007, Boscarino 2006, Rundell 2006, Ortega &Rosenheck 2000, Fontana & Rosenheck 1994,Schlenger et al. 1992). The differences canbe large. One study estimated rates of PTSDamong Vietnam veterans 15 years or more af-ter their service. The estimate for Hispanic menwas 27.9% and for black men 20.6%. For allother men, it was 13.7% (Schlenger et al. 1992).What accounts for such differences is not wellknown. Loo et al. (2007, 2005, 2001) exploredthis matter studying a sample of Asian Amer-ican Vietnam veterans. Using their own race-related stressor scale, they showed that adverserace-related stress is in itself a traumatic eventaccounting for variation in PTSD symptomsover and beyond variation associated with com-bat exposure [Sohn & Harada (2008), explor-ing a similar line of work, found that racial dis-crimination within the military was associatedwith lower physical, though not mental, healthamong minority service members]. Williams(2007) extended the work by Loo et al. by adapt-ing the race-related stressor scale for use withblack Vietnam veterans. He found that whenblack veterans experienced racial prejudice orother indicators of a racist environment withinthe military, including remarks that denigrated,harassed, or dehumanized Asians, they weremore likely than others to experience PTSDsymptoms.

Experiencing PTSD symptoms leads toother detrimental consequences. Those whoare PTSD-positive are more likely to encounterserious family problems and domestic violence,often targeted at the spouse (Teten et al. 2009,

Bell & Nye 2007, Sherman et al. 2006, Gerlock2004, Orcutt et al. 2003, Begic & Jokic-Begic2001, Jordan et al. 1992). They are also morelikely than their PTSD-negative counterpartsto be in poor physical health and to die younger(Boscarino 2006, Vieweg et al. 2006, Forneriset al. 2004).

Minority Access to VA Health Care

In the general population, racial minorities areless likely than nonminorities to receive high-quality health care (van Ryn 2002, Williams& Collins 1995). There are many factors thatmay explain this, including underlying clinicalconditions, patient ability to pay for care, pa-tient preferences, and the conduct of medicalproviders, who serve as gatekeepers into the sys-tem (Harada et al. 2005, Oddone et al. 2002,Collins et al. 2002). Decisions by providers togive or withhold care are known to vary withminority status under a variety of conditions.Nonwhite patients are less likely than whites toreceive adequate pain assessment and treatmentin a variety of health settings (van Ryn 2002).Black and low-income patients are less likelyto undergo a variety of diagnostic tests eventhough Medicare would pay for them (Oddoneet al. 2002). Blacks are less likely than whitesto receive kidney transplants, although theyare overrepresented in the population needingtransplants (Elster 1992). Psychiatrists are morelikely to prescribe antipsychotic drugs and toorder involuntary hospitalizations of minorityrather than white patients, independent of theunderlying clinical factors (van Ryn 2002).

Similar barriers erected by medicalproviders impede the veteran populationtrying to access the VA for treatment of PTSD.There is evidence, for instance, that blackveterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistanhave been less likely than whites to be screenedfor PTSD (Seal et al. 2008). Kilbourne et al.(2005) found some gaps in the follow-up carefor black versus white veterans who werediagnosed with a bipolar disorder. But gapsin care were not uniform; there were no racedifferences in the drug therapy prescribed or


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in follow-up care after hospitalization. Othershave found that blacks in the VA health caresystem are less likely than whites to be referredfor cardiac-related procedures (Murdoch et al.2003). Most important, black veterans wereless able than whites to gain a finding from theVA that their injury or illness was incurred asa result of military service. Without a findingthat the injury or illness is service connected,the odds of gaining access to VA servicesare low. Equal outcomes for VA treatmentare an incomplete measure of equal access ifminorities qualify for treatment at a lower ratethan whites. Yet Murdoch et al. (2003) haveshown that the black rate of service connectionwas substantially lower, at 43%, than it wasfor all others, at 56% (in a sample that didnot include veterans from the wars in Iraq andAfghanistan).

There are other barriers limiting minorityaccess to care in the VA health care system.Some of these are due to minority patientpreferences to limit treatments. Minorities andwhites may avoid seeking treatment for PTSDfearing it will label them as weak and adverselyaffect their military career (Friedman 2006).Non-Hispanic blacks, Hispanics, AmericanIndians, and Alaskan natives were less likelythan non-Hispanic whites to get a flu shot,emblematic of low trust in the VA health caresystem, with roots perhaps in memories ofthe Tuskegee syphilis studies (Straits-Trösteret al. 2006). In any case, blacks are more likelyto select out of PTSD treatment programswhen they are paired with white clinicians(Rosenheck et al. 1995). This issue is not con-fined to VA programs. Black patients in generalneed to build trusting relationships with theirphysicians before agreeing to invasive cardiacprocedures (Collins et al. 2002).

Because minorities are at higher risk forPTSD than whites, their well-being requires atleast equal access to the VA health care system,within which equal treatment outcomes can beexpected. But minorities do not have equal ac-cess to the VA health care system as long as theyare less likely than whites to have injuries classi-fied as service connected. The long wars in Iraq

and Afghanistan have ratcheted up demand forhealth care services at a time when the num-ber of uniformed mental health care providerssignificantly declined, due largely to financialreasons (Tanielian & Jaycox 2008). The capac-ity to care for those wounded by PTSD (andother service-connected injuries) is being sorelytested (Priest & Hull 2007, Dole & Shalala2007). Passing the test, this literature suggests,requires a better grasp on why there are racialdisparities in access to military health care andwhat can be done to overcome them.

CONCLUSIONS

There is consensus that military race relationsimproved dramatically from the late 1940s tothe present. That does not, however, meanno further improvements are required. Thereis evidence of racial bias and institutionalracism in three of the five cases reviewed here.Officer promotions were racially biased by lan-guage used in officer fitness reports and bycourt-imposed limitations on the military’s af-firmative action programs. Administering mil-itary justice was biased by inadequate systemsfor filing equal opportunity complaints and bydifferences in the pretrial paths traveled by mi-norities and majorities, lengthening sentencesimposed on minorities. Minority soldiers de-ployed in discriminatory environments were atincreased risk of suffering from PTSD. Yetcare for wounded minority veterans was bi-ased by barriers blocking entry into the VAhealth care system, demonstrated by low ser-vice connection rates for minorities comparedwith majorities. The evidence for each of theseclaims should not be overstated. Nonetheless,the evidence is sufficiently strong that fur-ther study is warranted to identify the meansby which discrimination occurs and might becurbed.

Our review found no evidence of negativeracial disparities either in the case of entryinto the military or in the risk of death incombat. Racial disparities were found. Patternsof enlistment varied by race, with AfricanAmericans trending in one direction and


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Hispanics trending in the other. Patternsreflected the different histories of the twogroups as each evaluated and adapted to theopportunities military service could provide.The point is that racial patterns of enlistmentin this case are simply evidence of diversity, notof discrimination. The case of combat death ismore complex. There surely was evidence thatblacks were more likely than whites to be atrisk of combat death in Vietnam in the early tomid-1960s. Yet public controversy protestingthe inequity of this institutional discriminationled to a compensatory response (or set ofresponses). Response to this controversy soaltered the distribution of combat deaths inVietnam that blacks, by war’s end, were nolonger overrepresented among them. How thathappened is not known. But African Americans’risk of combat death might have grown largeagain, in the early days of the volunteer forcewhen overrepresentation of blacks in the Armywas at its peak. But it did not. The distributionof combat deaths in military missions sinceVietnam has been race neutral.

Do these various outcomes matter? Theymatter, we think, in two ways. First, as a prac-tical matter, the US military must maintaingood race relations to be an effective armedforce. This basic insight justified on instru-mental grounds the military’s substantial com-mitments to equal opportunity and the valueof diversity (Moskos & Butler 1996). Our re-view makes plain that despite efforts to the con-trary, institutional racism can still be detected

in the distribution of goods that are importantboth to the military and its service members. Itopens the door for future research to help de-sign programs to overcome these instances ofdiscrimination.

Second, the outcomes matter for their con-tribution to emerging theoretical work aboutmoral contracts for military service. The cen-tral idea is that a moral contract specifies (oftenimplicitly) what norms bind the military and itsservice members to the state and to the largersociety (McCartney 2010, Burk 2007, Forster2006). The values of equal opportunity and di-versity, we have seen, are terms included in themoral contract of contemporary military ser-vice (Mason & Dandeker 2009, Soeters & vander Meulen 2007). This review shows in partic-ular cases how the contract has been breachedor upheld. When the military fails to provideminority officers a fair chance for promotion,the contract is weakened; trust is eroded be-tween minority service members and those withformal authority over them. A similar erosionof trust occurs among minorities who are un-fairly treated by the military justice system orwhose wounds are not found to be service con-nected. Evidence of such erosion is found in thepersistent gaps between minority and majorityperceptions of fairness in their treatment in themilitary. In brief, institutional analyses of mil-itary race relations specifically identify whereand why the moral contract is weak. It is the firststep toward knowing how the contract might berepaired.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The authors are not aware of any affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings thatmight be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We thank Jitka Maleckova for encouraging us to undertake this review; David Mason, B. MitchellPeck, Joe Feagan, Scott Efflandt, and an anonymous reviewer for helpful suggestions to improvethe text; and Walter Hart for his work as our graduate assistant. We also acknowledge, and givethanks for, a generous grant from the Russell Sage Foundation that made this work possible.


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Race Relations Within the US Military - WordPress.com · tary race relations, Moskos & Butler (1996) fail torecognizethemilitary’sheterogeneity.Con-tact theory usefully identiﬁes