Irian Jaya the Intractable Conflict

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Irian Jaya: The Intractable ConflictAuthor(s): Justus M. van der KroefSource: Asian Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Nov. - Dec., 1978), pp. 119-133Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30171703 .

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IrianJaya:The IntractableConflictJUSTUSM. VAN DER KROEF

I N APRIL 1978, Indonesianmilitaryorcessharplyacceleratedtheircampaignagainst heinsurgents f the socalledFreePapuaMove-ment (Organisasi Papua Merdeka-OPM) in Indonesia's easternmostprovinceof IrianJaya,or WestNew Guinea.Withinweeks, these op-erations--conducted lose to OPM rebel strongholdsnear the borderof Papua-NewGuinea--hadbecomea considerable ourceof concernto the Australiangovernment,which (as the AustralianFinancialRe-viewputit) was nowfacinga "potentially xplosivesituation"becauseof its specialeconomicandsecurity ommitmentso the newly-indepen-dentstateof Papua-NewGuinea.'By mid-July, ome640 IrianJayavillagershad crossed he borderinto Papua-NewGuinea as a result of the Indonesianmilitaryaction;and in subsequentweeks,additionalhundreds ollowed.In the face ofadversepublicityover the severityof the Indonesianmilitaryactionagainst he rebels,the IndonesianAmbassador o Papua-NewGuinea,MajorGeneralSurjowinoto,elt constrained o point out that recentIndonesian erialbombings f border ebelpositionshadinvolved"non-lethal"plasticbombs,containingno shrapnel.But more concern de-velopedwhen Indonesianpatrols reportedly trayed nto Papua-NewGuinea erritoryn pursuitof theinsurgents, estroyingettlements ndgardens.After Indonesianplanesrepeatedly ttackedvillagessuspectedof harboring nsurgentsnear or on the border, he PortMoresbygov-ernment-despite considerable riticism-pulled back its frontier re-enforcementsn orderto forestalla clash with the Indonesians.The tactical wisdomof Indonesia'suse of OV-10F aircraft,spe-ciallydesigned win-engine ounterinsurgencylanes,againstthe scat-teredOPMguerrillas as beenwidelyquestioned.OneleadingAustral-1Citedin Asia ResearchBulletin,August 31, 1978,p. 476.

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120 AsianAffairs

iandailyremarkedn thisconnection hatattacksby jet aircraftagainstinsurgentsoperatingunder jungle cover are "highlyineffective, asVietnamproved,"and would simplylead the insurgents"to crosstheborderwiththeir families o seek sanctuary."2Papuanresistance o Indonesiancontrol,in the opinionof mostobservers,has neverinvolved more than two or threehundredor so"regular"OPMguerrillas.But sympathyor theOPMoppositionmove-mentamongthe Papuanpopulationof IrianJaya,whichtotals about900,000, is muchbroader hanthe numbers f guerrillaswouldsuggest.There s someevidenceof "part-time,"irregular,"r occasionalguer-rillaactivityon the partof hundredsof otherindividuals.And amongIrianJaya'ssmallindigenouselite, there is also (in the words of oneAustralian esearcher)"apassionatePapuannationalism,"whichis asstrongnow as when it surprised nothernoted Australian pecialistonIndonesiawhenhe visitedIrianJayanearly 15 yearsago.3Australia'sgrantof total independence o adjacentPapua-NewGuinea on Sep-tember16, 1975,continues o inspire he severalhundredPapuanexilesfromIrianJayawhoover theyearshave foundsanctuaryn the easternhalfof theisland,and alsoscoresof Papuanemigresn theNetherlands.The anti-Indonesian apuanmovement,directedtowardthe achieve-ment of independence or Irian Jaya and its transformationnto aRepublikPapuaBarat(Republicof WestPapua) is now morethan 15yearsold;anddespiteserious nternaldisputesamongthe OPM leader-ship, the movementshows no sign of disappearing-as the renewedIndonesianmilitaryoffensivesince April againconfirms.For Indonesia,alreadyconfrontedwithsecessionistmovements nAcheh (NorthSumatra),East Timor,and, in more atentform,in theSouthMoluccas,the OPMproblem s particularly ettlesomebecauseof itsimpacton twoimmediately eighboringtates,Papua-NewGuineaandAustralia.The OPM'sevidentstayingpowerhas increasinglybe-comea significant ynamicof theIrianJaya problem.By July 1978, inthe assessmentof one Australianobserver,"OPMcredibility"keptincreasing n proportionas weeks of systematicIndonesianbombingandpatrolactivity ailedto have any visibleeffect on the insurgency.42 Post-Courier (Port Moresby), May 23, July 24 and 26, 1978; SydneyMorning Herald, July 12,1978 (also in IndonesianNews Selections,hereaftercited as INS, September1978, p. 8).3 JuneVerrier,"IrianJaya, 1975,"New Guinea (Sydney), August 1975,p. 14;and HerbertFeith,"Visit o West Irian,"Nation (Sydney), April 18, 1964, p. 7.4SydneyMorning Herald,July29, 1978 (INS, September1978,p. 10).



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Irian Jaya: The Intractable Conflict 121

Sympathyn Papua-New Guinea for "ourPapuanbrothers"nIrian Jaya is clearlygrowing,while some Papuan advocates of theRepublikPapuaBaratidea are now articulatinghe possibilityof theeventualunificationof "West"New Guinea(Irian Jaya) with "East"New Guinea (Papua-New Guinea). Some years ago, one long-timePapuanemigrenationalist eader,NicolaasJouwe,put the matterthisway.5One cannotcallWestNew Guineabythe artificial ameWestIrian(IrianJaya) and geographically onsider t to be part of Asia,while the easternpartof the island is considered o be a partofOceania.The peoplesof Papua/New Guinea and West Papua/New Guinea("WestIrian")wouldverymuch want to be united.At the moment,there are few political leaders in Papua-NewGuineawhoopenlyendorseJouwe'sdeas. Onthecontrary, s we shallsee, officialpolicyis not to encourage he OPM in any way, but ratherto maintainfriendlyrelationswith Indonesiaon the basis of mutualrespectfor each other'sterritory.On the other hand, the idea of amergerof the two halves of New Guineawas reportedly iven seriousattentionamonga segmentof the Papua-NewGuinea eadershipmore

thana decadeago,and theOPM'sstrugglenevitablykeepstheconceptalive.6In the meantime, he seeminganomalyof Papua-NewGuinearepresentativesn the UnitedNationsurging hecompletendependenceof Namibia rom SouthAfrica,while at the sametimerefusing o con-siderthe OPM'sdemand or an independentRepublikPapua Barat, isbecominga matterof publicdebate n Papua-NewGuinea.'II

Theoriginsof theOPM'sstruggleie in theprogram f accelerated elf-government ndeconomicdevelopment ndertaken y the Dutchgov-ernment n IrianJaya (then West New Guinea) in the period afterWorldWar II. West New Guinea was the one part of their formerEastIndiesempirewhich was not transferredo the sovereignty f the5 Nicolaas Jouwe, "IrianIrridenta,Papua'sWorden Door Vreemed Ras Onderdrukt,"Zelfbe-schikking(Groningen), Janmary-February972, p. 16.6 See John Wilkes,ed., New Guinea,FutureIndefinite?Proceedingsof the 34th SummerSchool,Australian Instituteof PoliticalScience,Sydney (London: 1968), p. 81.7 "WhyNamibia,but not IrianJaya?"Post-Courier,July 10, 1978.



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independent ndonesianRepublicat the close of the latter's ndepen-dence struggle (1945-49). After a campaignof increasedpoliticalpressureand military hreat,Indonesiaformally acquired ull controlover West New Guinea(callingit first IrianBarat or WestIrian,andlaterIrianJayaor Greater rian) on May 1, 1963, under he termsof aUnitedNationsagreement.Thisagreementprovided,however, hatbe-fore the endof 1969, the Papuan nhabitants f the territorywouldbegiven the opportunity o participate n an "act of free choice" (theterm"plebiscite"was carefullyavoided) as to whether heywishedtoremainwith Indonesiaor become ndependent.8In JulyandAugust 1969, the "act of free choice"did in fact takeplace in IrianJaya.But outsideobserverswere almost unanimous nquestioning he fairnessand representativenessf the exercise.9TheBoliviandiplomat,Dr. F. Ortiz Sanz, who was the principalUnitedNationsrepresentativen West New Guinea at the time of the "act offreechoice,"notedthat the Indonesiansat all timesexercised"a tightpoliticalcontrolover thePapuans," ndhe expressedhis "reservation"as to whetherPapuanfreedomof choice--which the Indonesianshadpledged o guarantee--had n fact prevailed.'0As early as 1962, when the Jakartagovernmentwas graduallytakingovercontrolof WestNew Guinea romtheDutch,independence-mindedPapuans lashedviolentlywith the Indonesianmilitary;and insubsequent ears, there was to be continuous ighting.On April 27,1967, the Indonesianmilitarycommander,BrigadierGeneralBintoro,confirmed hattherehadbeen a Papuanuprisingn the townof Mariok-wari,and that the IndonesianAir Force hadbeen compelled o strafethetown,killing40 people.Late in April 1969, some30,000 Kapakautribesmen n and around he town of Enarotali n the westernCentralHighlandsof Irian Jaya, rose in revolt against Indonesianofficials,hoisting the "WestPapua" flag and temporarilyoccupying severalairstrips.Withtheproclamation f an independentRepublikPapuaBarat,8 For a detailed and well-balanced analysis of the Dutch-Indonesiandispute over West NewGuinea and the UN involvement,see William Henderson, West New Guinea, The Dispute andItsSettlement(SouthOrange,N.J.: SetonHall UniversityPress, 1973).9Justus M. van der Kroef, "IndonesiaandWest New Guinea: The New Dimensions of Conflict,"Orbis,Summer1970,pp. 366-400.1o Report of the Secretary General Regarding the Act of Self-Determination in West Irian,United Nations GeneralAssembly.Twenty-fourthSession,November6, 1969, A/7723, p. 70.



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Irian Jaya: The IntractableConflict 123

nearMarkasVictoriaon July 1, 1971, by a self-styledPapuangeneralnamedSethRumkoren formerlya lieutenant n theIndonesianArmy),the scatteredand sporadicPapuanresistancemovementacquiredanew point of organizationalocus. A greatermeasureof coordinationalso developedamongPapuanemigres,and especiallyamongPapuanresidents n theNetherlands,manyof whomhadbeen in Dutchcolonialservicebefore he Indonesianakeover.At no time, however,did Rumkorenestablisheffectivecontrolover all Papuanrebel groups,some of which-like the "FreePapuaMovement"GerakanPapuaMerdeka-GPM)---continuedo operateindependently.The term OPM thereforedenoted the anti-IndonesianPapuanmovement n general,rather hana unifiedorganization.ButRumkoren's100-manguerrilla orce, operatingunder the name WestPapua National LiberationArmy (KOPASTEM), did encourageawider, f poorlyorganized, esistance.Thus n August1973, therewereforeignreportsof new Papuanuprisings n the BaliemValley, whereinsurgents singcaptured ndonesianweaponsoccupiedthe airfieldatWamenaandrepeatedly ngaged n ambushesof Indonesianpatrols.1By 1977,if Papuan nsurgent ourcesare to bebelieved, herewerenewrebelattackson Wamena;additionalguerrillabases werebeingestab-lisheddespitean intensification f Indonesianaerialattacks;and "thecopper pipelineof the huge American-ownedreeportIndonesiaLtd.copperminingcompany(was) beingblownup at differentplaceseverynineor tendays."12Thecircumstancesurroundinghese andsimilarncidentsare notalwaysclear.It wouldprobablybe incorrect o viewall of theseclashes,as Papuanemigrequartershave been wont to do, as expressionsofOPM or "nationalist" apuanfervor.Thus, the 1973 Baliem Valleyrisingappears o have been inspired,at least in part, by Papuandis-satisfactionover the inadequate mplementation f local, Indonesian-directed Papuan economic developmentprojects, when agriculturalequipmentandothersuppliesprovidedby the Indonesiangovernmentwere (allegedly) suddenlytaken away by the IndonesianArmy andsold in the marketsof the territorialapital,Jayapura.'3Moreover, he11"FiveThousand n 'StoneAge' War,"SundayTelegraph(London), August 19, 1973.12ProvisionalRevolutionaryGovernment of West Papua New Guinea (London Office), SouthPacific News Service,PressRelease No. 59, October15, 1977,p. 1.13 "GuerrillasAttackPatrol in IrianJaya,"Post-Courier,September3, 1973.



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interiorof IrianJayaremainsone of the least developedregionsof theworld,whereany policyof "modernization,"s the Dutch learned ongago,is aptto encounter esistance.On the otherhand,there s little doubt that in dealingwith IrianJayaanditspopulation, ndonesianofficialsquickly ell into somethingakin to a colonialmentalityas theysought o "uplift"hePapuans.Theresultingresentmentwas sharpenedby the influx of Makassareseandother Indonesians rom nearby islands into Irian Jaya, where theyquicklyestablishedhemselvesn virtualcontrolof the localdistributingtrade.'4ThoughPapuansare increasing n the local civil service,twoAustralian esearchers ave notedthat "themiddle andupperechelonsof the bureaucracy"n IrianJaya"arestaffedvery argelywithpersonsfrom otherprovinces."15Given tslimitedmeans, heIndonesian overnment'sevelopmenteffort n IrianJaya,both undertaken ndprojected,hasbeen consider-able.On a per capitabasis, the centralgovernment'subsidies o IrianJayahave been several imeshigher hanfor theprovinceson theislandof Java. Subsidies o Irian Jaya rose from $24.3 millionfor routineexpenditureand $1.9 million for development n 1970-71, to $53.2million and $14.4 million, respectively, n 1978-79. Literacy,healthcare, and communitymodernization re demonstrable rioritiesof In-donesiandevelopmentpolicy;16 nd while'administrativebottlenecksand shortageshave occasionally mpeded mplementation,he obviousrealityof these economicprograms annotbe reconciledwith the often-articulatedPapuannationalist entimentaboutallegedlyrapaciousIn-donesian xploitation f the area.On theotherhand,concretemeasures owardaccelerateddevelop-ment (as the Dutch also discovered)have sharpenedPapuanpoliticalself-awareness ndstrengthened distinctive egionalnationalism.Notonly has Papuannationalismbegunto thrive on its own symbolsandmythology, uch as the frequentlyheardcharge-repeated ad nauseamby Papuannationalist eaderslike the late HermanWomsiwor,self-14 Far EasternEconomicReview, May 22, 1971, pp. 66-67.15 RossGarnautandChrisManning,"An EconomicSurveyof West Irian,"Bulletinof IndonesianEconomic Studies (AustralianNationalUniversity), November 1972, p. 58.16Asia Research Bulletin, August 31, 1978, p. 47. For the Indonesian development effort, seeDepartemenDalam Negeri, Sektor ChususIrianJaya, LaporanPembangunanLima Tahun Irianlaya (Jakarta: 1970-75), and Task Force PembangunanMasjarakatpedalamanIrian Barat (Pro-pinsi Irian Barat, KeputusanMenteri Dalam Negeri/Ketua Sektor ChususIrian Barat, Jakarta:1972).



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IrianJaya:The IntractableConflict 125styled"VicePresidentof the ProvisionalGovernment f the RepublikPapuaBarat"-that thePapuan ndependencetrugglen IrianJayahasalreadycost 30,000 Papuan ives at the hands of the Indonesians.'?thasalsobeenableto profit romconflicting ndonesian tatements s totheconditionof the insurgencyn IrianJaya,which n turnkeeperod-ingtheJakarta overnment'swncredibility.OnFebruary18, 1976, for example, ndonesianForeignMinisterAdamMalikdismissed oreignreportsof large-scaleuprisingsn IrianJayaas unfounded; ndon February19, 1976, Jakarta adioreportedthatthe"securityituation"n IrianJayawasnowmorestable,"thanksto the awareness f thepeopleof the region." rianJayamilitarycom-manderBrigadierGeneralImamMunandar lso reportedat this timethatabout a thousandPapuanswho hadpreviously"goneastray" thatis, hadjoinedthe insurgents)had now returned o theirvillagesto re-sumea normal ife.'8A weeklater,however, he IndonesianAmbassa-dor to Papua-NewGuinea,BrigadierGeneralRijitro,was quotedbyAustralian adioas saying hat"rebelsaregiving rouble"n IrianJaya,and had even slipped nto the territory's apital,Jayapura,and killedbothciviliansandsoldiers,eventhoughrebelnumbers, ccordingo theAmbassador, addwindled o "about500."9OnJune 1, 1978, GeneralMunandarwas quotedby the Indonesianwireservicesas statingthat the securitysituation n IrianJaya"is ex-cellent, everything s in order, and development ffortsrun unham-pered."20essthanthreeweeks ater,however,Munandarwas reportedby Reuter's romJayapuraas havingwarned hePapuanrebels to sur-renderesttheybe "crushed,"ndas condemningheOPM forattempt-ing to destroypublicorder.Munandar'swarningcame after Papuaninsurgents,n a daringraid, had kidnappeda numberof Indonesianmilitaryand civilofficialsandheldthem orransom.21n June1977, the17Tilman Ziilch, Von Denen Keiner Spricht, UnterdriickteMinderheiten-Von der Friedens-politik Vergessen (Reinbekbei Hamburg:Rowohlt TaschenbuchVerlag, 1975), p. 140. On the30,000 Papuanskilled by the Indonesians,see also the reportof Henk de Mari in De Telegraaf(Amsterdam), October 11, 1974. On Papuannationalistsymbolismand mythology, see, for ex-ample, the "BlackBook" published by the representativesof the "ProvisionalGovernment ofWest Papua" n the Netherlands:ZwartboekNieuw Guinea,Een van de laatste Strohalmenvanhet Kolonialisme in deze Wereld (The Hague: Information Service, Provisional Government,Republicof West Papua, 1977).18Agence France Presse despatch, Jakarta, February 18, 1976; and Radio Jakarta, DomesticServicein Indonesia,February 19, 1976 (Foreign BroadcastInformationService,hereaftercitedas FBIS,February19 and20, 1976).19 RadioMelbourne,OverseasService n English,February26, 1976 (FBIS,March2, 1976).20AntaraDaily News Bulletin,June2, 1978,p. 111.



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Australianpress reportedthat Dhani tribesmenhad risen in revoltagainstIndonesianrule,while otherreports ndicatedthat local Indo-nesianpolice stationsat Arso and Paget, nearJayapura,had been at-tacked,anda numberof local policeofficialskilled.22Whileconcedingthatthe Dhanishadrisen,anIndonesianmilitary pokesman eniedthatthey had rebelledagainstthe Indonesiangovernment,and suggestedinsteadthat the unrest was a manifestation f a kind of tribalunrestwhich ourists, nxious orglimpsesof "theprimitiveife of tribes,"ikedto see.23Othermilitaryofficialshad alreadyadmitted,however, hattheDhaniinsurrection ad in fact cost the lives of at least six Indonesiansoldiersand 20 Papuans, hatseveralairstripshad been blockedby theDhani,andgovernment osts putto the torch.24Amidsuchcontradictoryccounts, nd nlightof thedifficultywhichforeignjournalistshave in enteringand movingabout Irian Jaya inorderto assessthe situation or themselves, he extentof Papuanresis-tancetodaycan only be speculatedupon, thoughquiteevidently t ischronicand oftenappears o be extensive.Through ts "London nfor-mationOffice,"he RepublikPapuaBarat has continued o reportde-tailedaccountsof ongoingpopular esistance, f whichonemay perhapsbe citedby wayof illustration.25In Yamas(a villageheavilyhit by bombingattacks n the last 12months),villagersassistedby OPM militantshavecaptureda pla-toon of 43 Indonesian oldiers.Enragedby the slaughterof theirmen,women,andchildren,and thedestruction f theirhomes andfood gardens, he villagerskilled the 43, throwing he corpses nthe river.In the Holomba-Waris-Bewanirea, fightinghas continued,withmore than30 Indonesian roopsbeingkilledin engagements.Be-tweenJune 16th and June 30th, more than 350 small armswerecaptured yfreedom ighters.Withthehelpof thesearms, reedomfighters ttackedGenyem nearJayapura)on June25th, 26th,and

21StraitsTimes (Singapore), June21, 1978.22CanberraTimes, May 28, 1977;and TapolBulletin(London), June 1977,p. 2.23Antaradespatch,Jakarta,December 5, 1977.24NRC-Handelsblad(Rotterdam), May 27, 1977.25Republicof West PapuaNew Guinea,London InformationOffice,News Bulletin, August 13,1978,p. 1.



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27th. In the attacks, 23 RPKAD (that is, Indonesian) troops werecaptured. Musa Gewai from Sarmi village led the attacks.Whatever the veracity of such reports (which have never been de-nied by the Indonesians), a new high in the OPM's campaign wasreachedwhen well-authenticatedaccounts indicated that guerrilla unitsof the socalled National Liberation Army (Tentara Pembebasan Na-sional-Tepenal), led by Martin Tabu, captured nine Indonesian mili-tary and civil officials on May 16, 1978, among them the Commanderof the Jayapura Military District, Colonel Ismael, and the Irian Jayaprovincialintelligence chief, Colonel Ameral. Tabu variouslydemandeda ransom of $400,000 for his prisoners, and an international confer-ence, to be called by Australia and Papua-New Guinea, to discuss theindependenceof Irian Jaya.2"Though three of the hostages were killed,the remainder were eventually set free after it became apparent thatneitherCanberranor Port Moresbycould be coerced into calling such aconference, and that public opinion in Papua-New Guinea was begin-ning to turnagainstthe OPM because of the incident. But the captureofIsmael is widely believed to have launched a new insurgent tactic ofterrorkidnapping,thus deepening the bitterness of the OPM-Indonesianconfrontation.

IIISerious as the OPM struggle may sometimes appear to be, Indonesiancontrol over Irian Jaya is not in any immediate danger. A principalreason for this is the organizational fragmentationof the OPM itself.MartinTabu's Tepenal, for example, which numbersperhaps 50 regu-lars, is an offshoot of Rumkoren'sKopastem force, and was created afterTabu and Rumkorenreportedlyfell out over a questionof tactics. Fromits inception, the hothouse Papuan emigre environment in the Nether-lands, with its ancillaries among dissident Papuans in Irian Jaya itself,has fostered organizationalfissions and tactical quarrels.Early in April1963, for example, some 40 Papuan exiles in the Netherlands estab-lished the first Papuan independence organization to claim resistancefollowers in Irian Jaya itself, the Front Nasional Papua. Marcus W.26Haagse Courant (The Hague), May 31, 1978; Nederlands Dagblad (Amersfoort), May 30,1978;Post-Courier,June 9, 1978.



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Kaisiepo,a formermemberof the New GuineaCouncil,the territory'sproto-parliamenturing he Dutch colonialera,becameFNP Chairman.Kaisiepoalso proclaimedhimself "President" f the state of "WestMelanesia."Anotherformer New Guinea Councilmember,NicolaasJouwe,seceded rom the FNP in August 1964 to form the WestPapuaFreedom Committee (Komite Kemerdekaan Papua Barat-KKFB),which becameparticularly ctive in addressingpetitionsto the UnitedNations,and in appealing o the Organization f AfricanUnity and tothe member states of OCAM (Organisation Commune Africain etMalgache).The PapuanbusinessmanHermanWomsiwor,meanwhile,whowas at odds with bothKaisiepoand Jouwe,becamea principal orcebehind the formationof yet a thirdgroup,the "ProvisionalGovern-ment"of theRepublikPapuaBarat,proclaimed n July 1, 1971, withGeneralSeth Rumkorenas "President."Womsiworwas named "VicePresident,"and helped to forge what might be called its Japaneseconnection,the Nippon-PapuaFriendshipAssociation n Tokyo. TheSecretaryGeneralof this association s MatsumiyaTomio,who servedas a lieutenant n theJapaneseArmy n WestNewGuineaduringWorldWar II. He and his fellow members,most of themreported o be ex-servicemen nd estimatedat about 10,000 in number,have been col-lecting funds, communications quipment,and possibly weapons aswell, for the partisansof the Republik Papua Barat.27One of Rumkoren'sollowers,JacobPray,whosenameappearsonsomeRepublikPapuaBaratdocumentsas "President f the Senate ofthe Republicof West Papua," ell out with Rumkoren n 1976. Thissplitapparently adanethnicbackground,n that Rumkoren ndmanyof his followersare from the Biak region,whereasPray's supporterscome from the Jayapuraarea.28By July 1978, the "ProvisionalGov-ernment"had a new "Cabinet,"n which Pray was "President" ndRumkoren"DefenseMinister."More recently,the "ProvisionalGov-ernment" as againbeen thrown nto disarray.Earlyin October1978,Papua-NewGuineaauthorities rrestedPrayat Vanimo,nearthe IrianJaya border,because of an unauthorized ordercrossing.He and a27Coen van Harten, "Papoea'sin Nederland: Verdeeldheid en Geheimzinnigheid,"Elsevier'sMagazine (Amsterdam), March 13, 1976, pp. 17-19; Haagse Courant,May 31, 1978.28Peter Hastings, "The Papua New Guinea-IrianJaya Border Problem,"Australian Outlook,April 1977,p. 55.



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followerreportedly adhopedto make contactwiththePrimeMinisterof Papua-New Guinea, Michael Somare. Somewhatearlier, two ofPray's losest ollowers,Dr. DariusMauryandAmosIndey,hadcrossedintoPapua-NewGuineaand requestedpoliticalasylum.29omeKopa-stemelementsnowappear o havegravitatedo the eadership f MartinTabu,whileNicolaas Jouwe has apparentlybeen attempting o rallyvariousOPMadherentsn a new"Cabinet."The persistent actionaldisputesand lack of coordinationwithinthe OPM movementhave not prevented upporters utsideIrianJayafromprovidingvariousgroupsof insurgentswith weapons, supplies,and publicity.It is the presentauthor's mpression hat the Nippon-PapuaFriendshipAssociationplaysan important ole here. One knowl-edgeableAustralianournalist,RobertDarroch, ecently eported afteraninvestigationn New Guinea)as follows.30That the rebels are now gettingsomeoutsidehelp is undeniable:the extent s still notknown,at least not publicly.Military ourcestold me that there had been persistentrumorsof ships landingarmsalongthe New Guineacoast for the rebels.Europeansandotherforeignershad beenseen with Prai'smen... Sumsof up to$40,000 have been collectedfor the rebel cause in Japan,mainlybyanorganization f ex-servicemenympathetico the FPM (thatis, OPM). Other funds have come from Holland and even Aus-tralia.

Since July 1, 1975, the Republik Papua Barat has had an official in-formation ffice n Dakar,Senegal,one of the OCAM(formerFrenchcolonial) states n Africa,virtuallyall of whichbeforethefinal "act offree choice" n IrianJaya in 1969, and duringUN discussionsof the"act"tself,hadexpressed ympathyor the OPM cause.SenegalPresi-29Asiaweek (Hongkong), October 13, 1978, p. 12; Far EasternEconomic Review, March 10,1978, p. 24. On November 3, 1978, the "InformationOffice" of the "Provisional Government"of the Republik Papua Barat in Dakar, Senegal, issued a press release describing"recentsplitswithin our revolutionaryranks."The pressreleasecharged that Pray had attemptedto persuadeRepublikleadersto adopt "Marxism-Leninisms the leadingideology,"but that he had been re-buffed and that "ourstruggleis a national liberationstruggle,not a class struggle." Pray'srecentarrestmakes the matter academic for the moment.But it is not clear to what extent Pray'sallegedovertures o the "EasternBloc" (as the earliercitedpressreleaseputs it) reflectan ongoingrift inOPM ranks.30Robert Darroch, "PapuaNew Guinea-Another East Timor?"Bulletin (Sydney), November19, 1977,p. 18.



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dentLeopoldSenghor upports he InformationOffice,which s runbytheRepublik'spresent"ForeignMinister,"Ben Tangghama,rom"pri-vatediscretionaryunds,"althoughOCAMdoesnot, so far as is known,sendhelpto the OPMin IrianJaya.31n the Netherlands,he StichtingDoor de EeuwenTrouw (FoundationFaithfulThroughthe Ages), aprivateorganization f conservative nd ReformedChristian upportersof thePapuan ause,have dentifiedhemselveswith theRepublikPapuaBarat, althoughother Papuanemigresdomiciled in Holland, amongthemNicolaasJouwe,have beensharply riticalof the Foundation.IV

But the mostimportantoreignpolitical ulcrumof the IrianJaya ques-tion is Papua-NewGuineaandAustralia.Both PortMoresbyandCan-berra have been determinednot to let the OPM strugglebecome acasus belli between themselvesand Jakarta.The Indonesiangovern-ment's invasion and annexation of PortugueseEast Timor in De-cember1975 had producedpublicreactions n both countriessharplycriticalof Indonesianpolicy. Papua-NewGuinea has cooperatedwithIndonesiaovertheyears n clarifyingts borderwith IrianJaya,andin1973 a new borderagreementwas signed. The Papua-New Guineagovernment, lthoughrecognizingn principle he conceptof politicalasylum,hasrepeatedlywarnedPapuanrefugees rom IrianJayathat itsterritorymaynotbe usedfor anti-Indonesianropaganda ndagitation.In 1974, Papua-NewGuinea entered nto a formalarrangementwithIndonesiawhereby t agreedto returnPapuanrefugeesto Irian Jayaexceptwhenpoliticalasylumhadbeengranted.In more recentyears,as the OPMinsurgencypersisted, ndonesiahas seemedparticularly nxiousto develop ts variousagreementswithPapua-NewGuinea nto the kindof formalbilateralsecurityarrange-ment it now has with Malaysia.32 his arrangement, irectedagainstCommunist uerrillasn theBorneoborderregion, nvolves oint patrol-ling, "hotpursuit" cross the frontier,andothermilitaryoperations ostampout the insurgency.But the Papua-New Guinea government,mindfulof domesticpublic sympathy or the OPMcause,has thus farresisted uchIndonesian vertures.Hastings, loc. cit., p. 55.32Nonie Sharp, The Rule of the Sword, The Story of West Irian (Malmsbury,Aus.: KibbleBooks-Arena, 1977), p. 52.



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At the conclusionof Prime MinisterMichael Somare'svisit toJakarta n January1977, a communiquewas issuedin which the twocountriespledged hat theirrespective erritorieswouldnot be usedtoconducthostileactivitiesagainsteach other. But Papua-NewGuineacontinues o resistIndonesianpressure or more forcefulactionagainstthe OPM. An example s the statementof ForeignMinisterEbia Ole-wale at the conclusionof a visit to Jakarta n May 1978, in whichhestressed he "complexproblems"acedby Papua-NewGuinea n deal-ingwithrefugeesromIrianJaya.Headded hathisgovernment wishedto act responsibly,aking nto accounthumanitarianspectsand otherinternationalbligations."33Inrecentmonths,ntensifiedndonesianmilitary perations gainstOPM insurgentshave increasedthe streamof PapuanrefugeesfromIrian Jaya into Papua-New Guinea. By mid-September 978, PortMoresby ources eportedhat"at east 1,000 Irianese-and possiblyasmany as 1,400-have crossed the northernborderinto Papua-NewGuinea" n recentweeks, "bringingickness,hunger,and tales of ha-rassment yIndonesianroops."''34he 1974 borderarrangement,nderwhich heborderbetweenPapua-NewGuineaandIndonesia s officially"sealed"and Port Moresby (except in cases of requestsfor politicalasylum)is committed o returning rianJaya Papuanrefugees, s nowunder severe strain.35 ndonesianforces straying into Papua-NewGuinea erritory ave created urtherproblems.WhileJakarta fficially"welcomed" remierSomare's eassurance hat his governmentwouldnot tolerateOPM use of Papua-NewGuineaterritory,he First Secre-taryof the IndonesianEmbassy n PortMoresbycreateda furor whenhe demanded hat Papua-NewGuinea take firmeraction againsttheOPM,andthat"ifwe wanted o invadePapua-NewGuinea,we woulddo it now when it is still weak. We wouldnot wait until later whenPapua-New Guineabecomes strong.""'36Port Moresbyappearsto see its principal oreignpolicy role inpromotinginksbetweenASEAN (the Associationof SoutheastAsianNations,a largelyeconomicregionalgrouping hat includesIndonesia,Malaysia,Singapore, he Philippines,and Thailand), with the newly33AntaraDaily News Bulletin,May 27, 1978,p. 1.84FarEasternEconomicReview,September15, 1978,p. 37.a5Nonie Sharp,"WestIrianWarHeatsUp,"National Times (Sydney), August 5, 1978.36 FarEasternEconomicReview,June2, 1978,p. 30; andAntaradespatch,Jakarta,June 14, 1978(FBIS, June 16, 1978).



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independent ndemerging tatesof MelanesiaandPolynesia.To bringaboutsuch a linkagebetweenASEAN and the "SouthPacificForum,"as the new regionalassociationof South Pacific states is known,goodrelationsbetweenPortMoresbyand Jakartaare seen as essential.Dur-ing his May 1978 visit to Jakarta,ForeignMinisterOlewaleproposedto his Indonesiancounterpart,MochtarKusumaatmaja,hat a "dia-logue"between he tworegionalgroupsbe initiated. n turn, heSuhartogovernment, oncernednot to exacerbatePapua-NewGuineaopinionfurther,has alsobeen attemptingo accentuate he positivein its rela-tions with its neighbor. n September1978, for example,PortMoresbywas informed hat Indonesiawas "at any time prepared"o startex-tending echnicalassistance o Papua-NewGuinea or the developmentof smallindustries uch as weaving,leathercraft, nd roof tile manu-facture.37Australiahasnot been anxious ogo throughanotherperiodof badrelationswith Jakarta.Canberra as been mindfulof thetensionsof theearly 1960s, which resulted rom Indonesia'smilitant"confrontation"policy aimed at acquiringDutch-heldWest New Guinea. A friendly,stableIndonesianneighbor iguresprominentlyn Australia'snationalsecuritystrategy.In recentyears, Australia and Indonesiahave heldjointnavalmaneuvers, nd the AustralianAir Forcehas even assistedthe Indonesiangovernmentn IrianJayain aerialmapping.38ndone-sianshave receivedtechnicalmilitary rainingat Australian acilities.Officially,he Frasergovernment onsiders he OPM to be a domesticIndonesianproblem;and to the extent that the Papuan nsurgency nIrianJayahasspilledover ntoPapua-NewGuinea,Canberra iewsthematteras somethingor the Jakartaand PortMoresbygovernmentsosolve. Australiahas refused o joinin sponsoring n international on-ferenceon IrianJaya, as Papuan nsurgentshave urgedit to do. OnJuly21, 1978, AustralianForeignMinisterAndrewPeacocksaid thatwhilehis governmentwas aware that on "rareoccasions" ndonesianshad been crossingfrom Irian Jaya into Papua-New Guinea, he ex-pressed"hope" hat such incidents"wouldbe handledby Papua-NewGuinea andIndonesia n an amicableandproperway."39 t the sameAntara despatch, akarta, eptember3, 1978 FBIS,September5, 1978).38SydneyMorningHerald, uly30, 1977,cited n NonieSharp,TheRuleof the Sword,p. 75.39RadioMelbourne, verseaservicenEnglish, uly21, 1978(FBIS,July26,1978).



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time,steppedup Indonesianmilitaryactivityalongthe borderdid elicitan Australian xpressionof concern.But the AustralianambassadornJakartawasreportedo haveemphasizedhat Australiahad "apositiveand obvious nterest"ngoodrelationsbetweenPapua-NewGuineaandIndonesia,and that Australia "does not want to be seen as takingsides."40Meanwhile, he Papua-NewGuineagovernmenthas complainedthat Australian ournalistsworking n Port Moresbyhave been main-tainingcontactswithIrianJayainsurgents; ndit is true that the Aus-tralianpressgivesextensivecoverageto the OPMinsurgency, herebystrengtheninghe impression hat the problem s not going away. Insome academicandintellectual ircles n Australia,and in the influen-tial, left-oriented rade union movement,Indonesia'sSuhartogovern-ment is held in low regard,becauseof the politicalprisonerproblem,Indonesia's ccupationof EastTimor,andthe allegedlyunequalsocialbenefitsof its economicdevelopmentpolicies.The OPMinsurgencysaccentuatedn thesecircles as yet anotherdarkaspectof a neighboringAsian regimewith which the Frasergovernments said to maintainmuch too sympathetic nd comfortable elations.On the otherhand,Fraser's riticshavenot persuasively rgued hat theAustralian overn-ment hasmeaningfulpolicyalternativesn dealingwith a problem hatremains ssentially domestic ndonesian ffair.As the anti-Indonesianmovementn IrianJayais now more than15 yearsold, however,and shows no sign of going away at any timesoon, both Papua-NewGuinea and Australiamay find themselves n-creasinglyat loggerheads. n a numberof Africanstates, moreover,amongwhomPapuanemigreshave issuedappealson behalf of "Ne-groidsof the Pacific"allegedly being suppressedby an "alien"race,sympathyor theOPMand the "NewGuinea rredentistause"also hassome potential.It is evident that despite the 1969 United Nations-supervised"actof freechoice," heworldhas not heard the last of theWestNew Guineaproblem.40 Ibid., July 24, 1978 (FBIS, July 26, 1978). After a meeting in Jakarta between Sir ArthurMacDonald, Chief of Staff of the Australianarmed forces, and Indonesianleaedrs at the closeof October 1978, it was agreed that during 1978-79, Australia would give Indonesia $6.9million in military aid, including Nomad N-22B aircraft, military vehicles, spare parts fornaval patrol craft (previously supplied), and communicationsequipment.Radio Jakarta,Do-mestic Service in Indonesian,October27, 1978 (FBIS, October31, 1978).

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Irian Jaya the Intractable Conflict