Ish and Steve Lose Section 34 Case

7/28/2019 Ish and Steve Lose Section 34 Case

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THEFOLLOWINGISTHEJUDGMENT

REPUBLICOFTRINIDADANDTOBAGO

INTHE

HIGH

COURT

OF

JUSTICE

Cv.#.2012/04052

BETWEEN

STEVEFERGUSONCLAIMANT

AND

THEATTORNEYGENERALOFTRINIDADANDTOBAGO

THEDIRECTOROFPUBLICPROSECUTIONSDEFENDANTS

BEFORETHEHONOURABLEMADAMEJUSTICEM.DEANARMORER

APPEARANCES

Mr.E.Fitzgerald,Q.C.,Mr.F.Hosein,S.C.appearedonbehalfofSteveFerguson.

Mr.M.Beloff,Q.C.,Ms.N.Singh,MsC.HugginsinstructedbyMr.R.Otwayappearedonbehalfof

MaritimeLifeCaribbeanLtd.

Ms.S.Chote,S.C.,Mr.V.DeonarineinstructedbyMs.N.AvirajappearedonbehalfofAmeerEdoo.

Lord Pannick,Q.C.,Mr.G. Ramdeen, instructed byMs. A.Mamchan appeared on behalf of the

AttorneyGeneral.

Mr.

A

Newman,

Q.C.,

Ms.

E.

Honeywell,

S.C.,

Mr.

S.

Parsad,

Ms.

N.

Nabbie,

Mr.

C.

Chaitoo

instructed

byMs.Z.HaynesandMs.A.RamsookappearedonbehalfoftheAttorneyGeneral.

Mr.I.Benjamin,Mr.S.WonginstructedbyMs.N.JagnarineappearedonbehalfoftheDPP.

TABLEOFCONTENTS

Introduction.3

ProceduralHistory..6

TheEvidence..8

Facts10

Submissions27

Law

...38

PresumptionofConstitutionality.38

TheSeparationofPower:GeneralPrinciples.41

LegitimateExpectation..92

DueProcessofLaw.114

PopulistPressure.125

AbuseofProcess.128

AdmissibilityofMaterialfromtheHansard..135

ReasoningandDecision137

AppendixI..172

AppendixII..175


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JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION1.Thisclaimhaspopularlybeenreferredtoasthesection34matter.Itwould,however,bemore

appropriately labeledthe repealof section34 since it isagainst the repealof section34of the

AdministrationofJustice(IndictableProceedings)ActNo.20of2011(theAct),thattheclaimanthas

institutedtheseproceedings.

2.Bythisclaim,underPart56oftheCivilProceedingsRules(CPR)theclaimant,SteveFerguson,alleges

thattherightsguaranteedtohimbysection4(a)and(b)oftheConstitutionofTrinidadandTobago

(theConstitution)havebeencontravened.

3.InDecember2011theAdministrationofJustice(IndictableProceedings)Act(TheAct)wasenacted

byboth

Houses

of

Parliament

and

received

the

assent

of

His

Excellency

the

President

on

the

16th

of

December2011.TheActwhichcontainedaprovisionthatitwouldenterintoforceuponPresidential

ProclamationprovidedforsubstantialchangestothecriminaljusticesysteminTrinidadandTobago.

Included intheActwassection34whichprescribedalimitationperiodof10yearsinrespectofall

offenceswiththeexceptionofthoselistedinSchedule6totheAct.

4.InAugust,2012,thethenMinisterofJusticeapproachedCabinetseekingtheearlyproclamationof

afewsectionsoftheAct,amongthemwassection34.FollowingtheapprovalofCabinetsection34

wasproclaimedon28thAugust,2012andbecamelawon31stAugust,2012.

5.Thenwerethefloodgatesthrownopenwithapplicationsseekingdeclarationsofinnocenceand

dismissal

of

criminal

charges.

Among

them

was

the

claimants

application

together

with

those

of

personsaccusedinthehistoricPiarcocorruptioncases.

6.TheDirectorofPublicProsecutionswasalarmedattheeffectofsection34.Hedrewhisconcerns

to theattentionof theAttorneyGeneral. InearlySeptember2012, therewasahurried return to

Parliament.TheAdministrationofJustice(IndictableProceedings)AmendmentAct(theAmendment

Act)wasenactedwithaspecial3/5thParliamentarymajority.TheAmendmentActwhichrepealed

Section34withretroactiveeffect,providedthatallpendingproceedingsbevoidandthatnorights

,privileges,obligationsorliabilitiesshouldbedeemedtohaveaccruedundertherepealedsection

34.

7.

With

equal

dispatch

the

claimant,

with

all

the

host

of

section

34

applicants

approached

the

High

Courtpursuanttosection14oftheConstitutionclaimingthattheirrightshadbeeninfringed.

8.ByOctober,2012,some42applicationshadbeenfiledunderthenowrepealedsection34.Linked

toeachoftheseapplications,wereclaimspursuanttosection14oftheConstitution.Eachclaimant

soughtprincipallyadeclarationthattherepealofsection34wasunconstitutionalnullandvoid.

9.Itwasagreedbylearnedattorneysforallpartiesthatthreeclaimsshouldbeselectedforhearing

andthatallothersshouldabidetheirhearinganddetermination.

10.TheselectedclaimswerethoseofSteveFerguson,theclaimantherein,AmeerEdoo,andthejoint

claimofthreecompaniesMaritimeLife(Caribbean)Limited,MaritimeGeneralInsuranceCompany

Limited,andFidelityFinanceandLeasingCompanyLimited.


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11.Inthecourseofthehearinganddeterminationoftheirclaim,thecourtconsideredthesignificance

ofthedoctrineofseparationofpowersinthecontextoftheWestminstertypeConstitutionsandthe

typeoflegislationwhichwouldconstituteabreachofthedoctrine.

12.The

court

considered

as

well

the

circumstances

in

which

it

would

be

appropriate

to

find

the

existenceofasubstantivelegitimateexpectationaswellasthefactorswhichwillentitleaclaimantto

theenforcementofsuchexpectations.

13.Thecourtconsideredthemeaningofconstitutionaldueprocessaswellastheroleandfunctionof

theDirectorofPublicProsecution(theDirector)andwhetherhisactionsconstituteaninterference

withpendingproceedings.

14.Inadjudicatingonallthoseissues,thecourtwasassistedbythesubmissionsoferuditeQueens

CounselandSeniorCounsel.

PROCEDURALHISTORY

15.On3rdOctober,2012theclaimant,SteveFerguson,commencedproceedingspursuanttoPart

56:7oftheCPR.Hesoughtthefollowingitemsofrelief:

1. A declaration that the provisions of the Administration of Justice (Indictable Proceedings)

(Amendment)Act,2012violatesthedoctrineoftheseparationofpowers,andiscontrarytotherule

oflaw,andisthusunconstitutionalandvoid.

2.FurtherorinthealternativeadeclarationthattheprovisionsoftheAmendmentActabridgesand

infringessections4(a)and(b)oftheConstitutionandisnullandvoidandofnoeffect.

3.AdeclarationthatnotrialshallcommenceoftheApplicantinrespectoftheconductallegedin

theprosecutionscolloquiallyknownasPiarcoNo.1andPiarcoNo.2.

4.Adeclarationthattheapplicantisentitledtobedischargedandtonotguiltyverdictsrelativetoall

the

charges

in

the

prosecutions

known

as

Piarco

No.

1

and

Piarco

No.

2

such

as

he

was

entitled

to

undertheoriginalprovisionsofsection34(3)oftheadministrationofJustice(IndictableProceedings)

Act2011.

5.Alternativelyadeclarationthatthecontinuationofthecriminalproceedingsrelativetotheconduct

alleged in theprosecutionsknownasPiarcoNo.1andPiarcoNo.2wouldconstituteanabuseof

processofthecourtandwouldabridge,infringeandviolatethedueprocessprovisionsofsection4

(a)oftheconstitutionandaswellastheapplicantsrighttotheprotectionofthelawundersection

4(b)oftheConstitution.

6.FurtherorinthealternativeanorderthattheprosecutionsknownasPiarcoNo.1andPiarcoNo.2

bestayedindefinitely

7.Suchfurtherand/orotherrelief,ordersordirectionsastheCourtmayinexerciseofitsjurisdiction

under

section

14

of

the

Constitution

and

under

its

inherent

jurisdiction

consider

appropriate

for

the

purposeofenforcingandprotectingorsecuringtheenforcementandprotectionoftheClaimants

saidrights.

16.On19thNovember,2012,inthecourseofapretrialreview,theCourtheardtheapplicationof

the Director of Public Prosecutions (the Director) to bejoined as an interested party to the

proceedings.Theapplicationwasgrantedbyconsent.

17.On19thNovember,2012,theCourtalsoheardtheclaimantsapplicationforastayofpending

criminalproceedings.TheDirectordidnotconsenttothestay,butagreedtoseekanadjournmentof

pendingcriminalproceedingsto1stFebruary,2013bywhichtimeitwasanticipatedthathearingof

the constitutional motions would have been completed. The Director agreed to seek a further

adjournmentto12thApril,2013pendingtheCourtsdecisionintheconstitutionalmotion.


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18.ThepartiesagreedthattheconstitutionalmotionsbySteveFerguson,MaritimeLife(Caribbean)

Limited,MaritimeGeneralInsuranceCompanyLimited,FidelityFinanceandLeasingCompanyLimited

andAmeerEdooshouldbeheard togetherandthatallrelatedmattersbeadjournedpendingthe

hearinganddeterminationofthoseclaims.Thiswasdoneon19thNovember,2013andtheCourt

gavedirections

for

the

filing

and

service

of

further

affidavits

and

of

written

submissions.

19. The Court received written submissions from all parties. These were supplemented by oral

submissionscommencing28thJanuary,2013.On1stFebruary,2013,theCourtreserveditsdecision

toadatetobefixedbyNotice.

THEEVIDENCE

20. The evidence before the Court consisted of affidavit evidence only. There was no cross

examinationand the factswere largelyundisputed,withdifferencesarisingonlyas to theproper

inferencestobedrawnfromundisputedfacts.Thepartiesreliedonthefollowingaffidavits:

FirstaffidavitofSteveFergusonfiledon3rdOctober,2012(thesupportingaffidavit).

Second

affidavit

of

Steve

Ferguson

filed

on

9th

November,

2012

(filed

in

support

of

an

application

forastayofcriminalproceedings).

ThirdaffidavitofSteveFergusonfiledon23rdNovember,2012.

FourthaffidavitofSteveFerguson filedon20thDecember,2012 (inreplytotheaffidavitof the

AttorneyGeneral).

Fifth affidavitof Steve Ferguson filedon20thDecember, 2012 (in reply to the affidavitof the

Director).

SixthaffidavitofSteveFergusonfiledonthe9thJanuary,2013(forthepurposeofannexingthe

transcriptproceedingsintheMagistratesCourt).

SeventhaffidavitofSteveFergusonfiledon25thJanuary,2013.

AffidavitofRogerGaspard(theDirector)filedon12thDecember,2012.

Affidavit

of

Roger

Gaspard

(the

Director)

filed

on

18th

January,

2013.

AffidavitofKeinoSwamberfiledonthe9thJanuary,2013.

AffidavitoftheAttorneyGeneralMr.AnandRamloganfiledon18thDecember,2012.

Affidavit by Permanent Secretary, Reynold Cooper. This affidavit exhibited a statement of the

Honourable PrimeMinisterMrs.Bissessar. The affidavitwas regarded as containing inadmissible

hearsayandwasstruckoutbyconsent.

AffidavitofKerriAnnOlivierreoftheChiefStateSolicitorsDepartment,filedon21stFebruary,2013

onbehalfof theDefendant/AttorneyGeneral for thepurposeof annexing a listpreparedby the

RegistraroftheSupremeCourt.Thelistshowsallsection34applicationswhichhadbeenfiledbefore

therepealAct.

FACTS

TheAdministrationofJustice(IndictableProceedings)Act,2011(theAct).

21.On18thNovember,2011theAdministrationofJustice(IndictableProceedings)BilltheBillwas

readandpassedintheHouseofRepresentatives.TheBillwasreadandpassedintheSenateon29th

November, 2011. On 9th December, 2011 the House of Representatives agreed to the Senate

AmendmentsandtheBillbecamelawwhenitreceivedtheassentofHisExcellencythePresidenton

16thDecember,2011.Bysection1(1),theActwouldcomeintoforceonadatefixedbythePresident

byProclamation.

22.TheActwasintendedtoengenderreformstothecriminaljusticesystembyaddressingendemic

backlogsofcriminalcases intheMagistratesCourt.OneofthemethodsprescribedbytheActfor

achievingthisgoalwasbytheabolitionofpreliminaryenquiries.


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23.Section34oftheActintroducedalimitationperiodforcriminalmatters.Thefulltextofsection34

is setout inAppendix Iof thisjudgment.Theportionof section34whichwas relevant to these

proceedingsconferredonanaccusedpersontherighttoapplytothecourtforthedismissalofcriminal

chargesagainsthimwhereten (10)yearshadelapsedsincetheoffencewasallegedtohavebeen

committed.

24.Section34wasnothoweverunrestricted.ThefacilityofapproachingtheCourtundersection34

wasnotavailablewheretheaccusedhadevadedtheprocessorwheretheoffenceinquestionwas

listedinSchedule6totheAct.TheoffenceslistedinSchedule6includedsexualcrimessuchasrape,

incestandbuggery,crimesofviolenceanddrugrelatedcrimes.Whitecollarcrimesandcrimesof

fraud and corruptionwerenot listed in Schedule6.Persons accusedofwhite collar crimeswere

thereforeentitledtoseekverdictsofnotguiltyundersection34,iften(10)yearshadpassedfromthe

dateoftheallegedoffence.

25.On6thAugust,2012,thethenMinisterofJusticepresentedaNoteforCabinetinformingCabinet

thatafter

consultation

with

the

Honourable

Chief

Justice,

it

had

been

agreed

that

the

Act

should

come

intoforceinitsentiretyon2ndJanuary,2013.

26.ThethenMinisterofJusticerecommendedtheearlyproclamationofcertainsectionsoftheAct

including section 34. The recommendation of the Minister of Justice was later embroiled in

controversy and ledultimately to thedismissalof theHonourableHerbertVolney asMinisterof

Justice.Thenetresultwas,however,thatbyPresidentialproclamationon28thAugust,2011section

34becamelawwitheffectfrom31stAugust,2012.

Piarco1and2.

27.Theclaimantwasanaccusedpersoncaughtbysection34.Atthetimeof theproclamationof

section

34,

he

was

among

persons

facing

charges

with

various

acts

of

corruption

allegedly

committed

toobtaincontractpackagesforthePiarcoAirportDevelopmentProject.Thecaseswereandcontinue

tobereferredtoasPiarco1andPiarco2.ThePiarco1casesinvolvedsomeeightpersons,naturaland

corporate,whowereallegedly receiving corruptpayments inexchange for theawardof contract

packages.InJanuary2008,theclaimanthadbeencommittedtostandtrialforPiarco1offences.These

offenceswereallegedtohavebeencommittedbetweenMarch1997andDecember2000.

28.Piarco2casesrelatedtochargesofoverallconspiracytodefraudtheAirportsAuthorityofTrinidad

andTobago,NIPDECandtheGovernmentofTrinidadandTobagobythefraudulentmanipulationof

thebidprocessforPiarcoAirportConstructionPackages.Thesechargeswereinitiallylaidin2004.The

relevant offences were alleged to have been committed between 1st January, 1995 and 31st

December,

2001.

29.In2006,theGovernmentoftheUnitedStatessoughttheextraditionoftheclaimantandofhisco

accused IshwarGalbaransingh inconnectionwithallegedoffencesofmoney launderingandfraud.

TheAttorneyGeneralexercisedthepowerofsurrenderundertheExtraditionActCh.12:04.

30.TheclaimantandMr.GalbaransinghsuccessfullychallengedthedecisionoftheAttorneyGeneral.

The Honourable Justice Boodoosingh granted an order quashing the decision and declaring the

appropriateforumtotrytheclaimantforthePiarcooffencestobeTrinidadandTobago.

31.TheclaimantallegedwithoutcontradictionthatheviewedtheParliamentarydebateswhichled

to the enactment of the Act.He testified further that he believed that once the legislationwas


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proclaimedhewouldbeentitledtomakeanapplicationtoajudgeoftheHighCourttoseekverdicts

ofnotguiltyinrespectofbothsetsofproceedings.

32.TheclaimantreliedaswellonthearticlebyExpressJournalistKeinoSwamber.Thearticlewas

published in theDaily Expressof 5th September, 2012under the caption Scrapping Preliminary

Enquiries.Volney:

Only

Deadwood

cases

to

go.

This

article

was

exhibited

both

by

the

claimant

as

S.F.7andbyKeinoSwambertoanaffidavit filedon9th January,2013.Theclaimant reliedonthe

articleforthestatementofMinisterVolneythatthestatehastenyearstoprosecutesomeone(if

afterthattime)youcannotprosecutethatpersonyouwillneversucceedonthat indictment.Mr.

SwamberdeposedthatheaskedMinisterVolneywhethersection34wouldbeapplicabletowhite

collarcrimesandthatMinisterVolneyansweredintheaffirmative.

33.On10thSeptember,2012theclaimant,throughhisattorneys,filedanapplicationseekingaverdict

ofnotguiltypursuanttosection34oftheAct.

34.Whiletheclaimantsapplicationwasstillpending,theHonourableAttorneyGeneralpilotedaBill

forthe

repeal

of

section

34.

On

12th

September,

2012,

the

Administration

of

Justice

(Indictable

Proceedings)AmendmentAct(theAmendmentAct)waspassedintheHouseofRepresentatives.It

waspassedintheSenateonthefollowingdayandreceivedtheassentofHisExcellencythePresident

on14thNovember,2012. It istherepealstatutewhich ischallenged intheseproceedingasbeing

unconstitutional.Thesalientprovisionsaresetoutbelow:

2.ThisActisdeemedtohavecomeintoforceon16thDecember,2011

4.ThisActshallhaveeffecteventhoughinconsistentwithsections4and5oftheConstitution.

5.Section34isrepealedanddeemednottohavecomeintoeffect.

6.Notwithstandinganylawtothecontraryallproceedingsundertherepealedsection34whichwere

pendingbeforeanycourtimmediatelybeforethedateofassentshall,oncomingintoforceofthis

Act,bevoid

7.

Notwithstanding

any

law

to

the

contrary,

no

rights,

privileges,

obligations,

liabilities

or

expectations

shallbedeemedtohavebeenacquired,accrued,incurredorcreatedundertherepealedsection34

ComplaintofAdHominem

35.Theclaimantcontended that theenactmentof the repealstatutewasdirectedathim,atMr.

IshwarGalbaransinghandattheotherpersonswhowerefacingchargesinPiarco1andPiarco2.

36.Insupportofhiscontentiontheclaimantexhibitedandreliedonextractsfromnewspaperarticles

aswellasreportsfromParliamentarydebates.Therewasnoformalobjectiontotheuseofeither

newspaperarticlesorHansardReports.Therewasalsonoapplicationtohaveexhibitsofnewspaper

articlesorHansardReportsstruckoutasinadmissible.LearnedQueensCounsel,LordPannickhowever

underscored

the

need

for

the

Court

to

be

careful

in

relying

on

both

kinds

of

documents.

37.TheweightwhichtheCourtwillplaceontheseexhibitswillbedeterminedlaterinthisjudgment.

Fullreferencewillhoweverbemadetothematthisstage,whenthefactsarebeingsetout.

NewspaperReports

38.TheprintmediashonethespotlightontheclaimantandMr.Galbaransingh.InearlySeptember,

2012followingtheproclamationofsection34theSundayGuardianpublishedanarticleunderthe

headingIshandStevetowalkfree

39.Similarly,theenactmentoftherepealstatutewasportrayedbythenewspaperasbeingconcerned

exclusively with the claimant and Mr. Galbaransingh. Thus, on 13th September, 2013 Newsday

reportedtherepealofsection34undertheheadingIsh,Stevecutdown.


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40.Inmyview,thedangerofrelyingonanewspaperreportisobvious.Aslongagoasthemid1980s,

theCourtofAppealofTrinidadandTobagoregardedtheuseofnewspaperreportsasinadmissible

hearsay(see:AttorneyGeneralvK.C.Confectionery).ThejournalisticemphasisonSteveandIsh

clearlyhasnobearingonthelegislativeintentionofParliamentandinfactachieveslittlemorethan

identifyingthe

issue

to

which

the

journalist

wishes

to

focus

public

attention.

The

Court

will,

therefore,

disregardnewspaperreportsinsofarastheyhavebeenpresentedassupportingthecontentionthat

thelegislationwasadhominem.

HansardReports

41.Atparagraph22ofhissupportingaffidavit,theclaimantreferredtotheParliamentaryDebateon

12thSeptember,2012.HeallegedthatitwasclearfromtheParliamentarydebatesthattheobjectof

theamendmentwas to remove the rightsofallwhohadapplied for reliefunder section34.The

HansardReport inrespectofthedebateof12thSeptember,2012wasexhibited totheclaimants

secondaffidavitandmarkedS.F.22.LearnedQueenCounselfortheclaimant,Mr.Fitzgerald,made

extensivereferencetothisextractonthefirstdayofhisaddress.

42.Ithasnotbeendisputedthaton12thSeptember,2012theHonourablePrimeMinisterconvened

anemergencysittingofParliament.Theemergencysittingwasconvenedinthewakeofaletterfrom

theDirectorofPublicProsecutionstotheHonourableAttorneyGeneralon11thSeptember,2012and

a predawn conference between the Honourable Prime Minister and the Attorney General the

followingday.ThedetailsoftheinvolvementoftheDirectorwillbeconsideredlater.

43.InthecourseofhisaddresstoParliamenttheHonourableAttorneyGeneralalludedtohisdecision

inthepreviousyeartoforegoanappealagainstthedecisionoftheHonourableJusticeBoodoosingh

inSteveFerguson&IshwarGalbaransinghvTheAttorneyGeneral.

44.

The

Attorney

General

had

this

to

say:

mydecisionnottoappealwasinfluencedinnosmallmeasureandindeedwaspredicatedonthe

factthattheaccusedcanbetriedinTrinidadandTobagobeforeourcourts

Andiftheeffectofthatprovisionwastodenyorpreventthattrialfromtakingplacethenthepremise

onwhichmydecisionwasbasedwouldhavebeenpulledout.

45.Laterinhisaddress,SenatorRamlogansaid:

whatweareseekingtodoistocorrectwhatwasaclearoversightbytheentireParliament.

46. Learned Queens Counsel, Mr. Fitzgerald, drew the Courts attention to page 28 of the

ParliamentaryReportwhere theHonourableAttorneyGeneral recountedhis discussionwith the

Director,

his

approach

to

the

Prime

Minister

and

the

later

decision

to

convene

Parliament.

47. Mr. Ramlogan explained his view on the impact of the then extant section 34. Saying that

Governmentcouldnotsupportabadlaw,theHonourableAttorneyGeneralalludedtoothermatters

suchas:

thecollapseandfinancialfiascoofCLICOandtheHinduCreditUnion

48.Inthecourseofthesamedebate,SenatorPrescottdecriedtheproposedlegislationsaying:

ItisclearthatthisParliamentisbeingaskedtosaytothosewhohavefiledactionswearecoming

afteryou.

49.TheauthoritieswhichrestricttheCourtsrelianceonHansardReportswillbeconsideredlaterin

thisjudgment.Atthisstage,itis,inmyview,adequatetopointtoTheAttorneyGeneralofMauritius


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vKhoyratty[2007]1AC80,adecisionoftheJudicialCommitteeofthePrivyCouncil,whereLordSteyn

quotedextensivelyfromHansard inconsideringtheoverridingpurposeofthestatute.Iwasofthe

viewthatthisCourtcouldnotfallintoerrorbyfollowingtheexampleofLordSteyn.

TheAttorneyGeneralsDefence

50.The

Honourable

Attorney

General

Mr.

Ramlogan

placed

before

the

Court

an

affidavit

which

constitutedhispersonaltestimony.Inhisaffidavit,theAttorneyGeneraladmittedthathecouldnot

speak for Parliaments objective in enacting the repeal statute.He set out, however, to explain

governmentsintentioninintroducingtheBill.

51.TheAttorneyGeneral,inthesaidaffidavitdeposedthattheAmendmentActbecamenecessary

because the original Act had farreaching and unintended consequenceswhich had escaped the

attentionofParliament.

52.TheAttorneyGeneralcontinued:

Itwas never intended by the Government that this limitation period should apply to preclude

prosecutionsfor

historic

corruption

or

other

serious

offences.

53.ItwastheAttorneyGeneralsevidencethattheenactmentofsection34wasanunfortunateerror

andoversightonthepartoftheentirelegislature.

54. The Attorney General deposed thatGovernment never intended that the criminal limitation

provisioncontained intheoriginalsection34shouldbeapplicabletopersonschargedwithserious

criminaloffences.

55.TheAttorneyGeneralreferredtotheearlyproclamationofsection34underthestewardshipof

theHonourableJusticeVolneywhoatthematerialtimehadbeentheMinisterofJustice.

56. The AttorneyGeneral deposed that Minister Volney had approached the Cabinet with a

recommendationforproclamationoftheentireActbyJanuary,2013andearlyproclamationofselect

sectionsincludingsection34.

57.TheAttorneyGeneralreferredtotheallegationthattheMinisterofJusticehadmisledCabinet

andtotheeventualrevocationofhisappointmentbythePresidentontheadviceoftheHonourable

PrimeMinister.

58.TheAttorneyGeneralexhibitedtheNotewhichhepresentedtoCabinet.TheNoteforCabinet

dated11thSeptember,2012providesthefollowingreasonfortherepealAct:

Cabinet

is

advised

that

the

early

proclamation

of

the

said

section

34

can

possibly

attract

widespread

criticisminviewofthepotentialconsequencesforhighprofilecases

59.TheAttorneyGeneralreferredtoallegationsofcorruptioninStateenterprisessuchasCLFinancial

andHinduCreditUnion.TheAttorneyGeneralalsodeposedthattheGovernmentrealizedthatthe

originalsection34couldjeopardizeothercredibleprosecutions.

60.TheAttorneyGeneralalso identified corruptionprobesunder investigation suchas Petrotrin

WorldGTL,UdeCott,EvolvingTechnologies,UniversityoftheWestIndiesandTrinidadand

TobagoElectricityCommission.Hedeposedthatthoseinvestigationsdatedbackto2002.

61.InrespectofStateAgenciesunderinvestigation,theAttorneyGeneralstated:


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Inthe lightofthedates involved itbecamecleartomethat therewasarealpossibilitythat if

criminalprosecutionswereinduecoursecommencedinrelationtoanyofthosematterstheywould

beaffectedbytheapplicationofsection34

62.TheAttorneyGeneralalludedtothepublicconcernthattheclaimantandMr.Galbaransinghmight

bereleased:

withouttrial,wasacauseofgreatpublicconcerninearlySeptember2012

63.However,theAttorneyGeneralmadethisdistinction:

Thatwasthepublicsconcern

Hethenproceededtoemphasize:

asAttorneyGeneralIwasalsoparticularlyconcernedinrelationtotheimpactofsection34ona

numberofongoinginquiriesintohistoricalcorruption

64.TheAttorneyGeneralstoutlydeniedthattherepealstatutewastargetedatanyindividualcase.

Hedeposed:

Onthecontrary,werecognizedtheimportanceofapproachingthemischiefcausedbysection34

inaglobalmanner

InvolvementoftheDirector

65.RogerGaspardwasatallmaterialtimestheDirectorofPublicProsecutionsdulyappointedbythe

JudicialandLegalServiceCommissiontoholdthatofficepursuanttosection90oftheConstitution.

66.On2ndMarch,2011hereceivedawritteninvitationfromthethenMinisterofJusticetocomment

ontheBill.TheDirectorprovidedhiscommentson6thMay,2011,butdeposedthathewasnever

invitedtocommentonclause34oftheBill.

67.InFebruary2012,thePermanentSecretaryintheMinistryofJusticerequestedinformationasto

thenumberofmatterswhichwouldbecaughtbysection34whenproclaimed.TheDirectordirected

Mr.GeorgeBusby,AssistantDirectortoprovidetheinformationsought.Mr.Busbyinhisletterdated

the26thMarch,2012citedtheprovisionsofclause34andsuggestedthatonewillbeunable to

indicategenerallythenumberofmatterstowhichthesaidsection34(3)wouldapply.

68.TheAssistantDirectorthenproceededtoindicatethatitwaspossibletoquantifythenumberof

mattersforwhichcommittalpapershadbeenreceivedinrespectofnonschedule6offences.

69.Theinformationwasnotsuppliedintheletterof26thMarch,2012.However,on22ndMay,2012

the

Assistant

Director

again

wrote

to

the

Permanent

Secretary

in

the

Ministry

of

Justice

in

order

to

providethisinformation:

permitmetoindicatethatwehavenowbeenabletoquantifythenumberofmattersforwhich

committalpapershavebeen received foroffencesnot listed inSchedule6 thatwereallegedly

committedmorethanten(10)yearsagothatnumberasofthisdatestandsat47

70.On 24th July, 2012 theDirectorparticipated in ameetingof the Judiciary and Justice Sector

Committee.ThemeetingwasheldintheConferenceRoomoftheChiefJustice,withtheHonourable

MinisterofJustice,Mr.Volney,theDirectorandatleastfifteenotherpublicofficials.

71.TheDirectorexhibitedtheMinutesofthismeeting.TheMinutesreflectedthefocusofthemeeting

asbeingtheimplementationprocessfortheregimecreatedbytheAct.TheHonourableChiefJustice

enquiredastothereadinessofthePoliceService,theDirector,theDepartmentofForensicsandof


10/68

the Legal Aid and Advisory Authority. In that meeting the Honourable Chief Justice reportedly

cautioned against early proclamation of section 34. TheHonourable Chief Justice is recorded as

warningthatiftheproclamationdateisbroughtforwardallstakeholderswillbeplacedinaposition

oftryingtorespondtoastateofurgency

72.At

paragraph

18

of

the

Minutes,

the

Honourable

Minister

Volney

is

recorded

as

having

conceded

that a proclamation date in September or October was not feasible . At paragraph 34, the

HonourableMinisterVolney advised that the proclamationdatewillbe revised to 2nd January,

2013.

73. The Director testified that following themeeting of July, 2013, he had no indication of the

possibilityofearlyproclamationofsection34. In factheknewoftheearlyproclamationafterthe

eventon31stAugust,2013.

74.On6thSeptember,2012theDirectorreceivedserviceofanapplicationbyAmrithMaharajfor

reliefundersection34.Onthefollowingday,on7thSeptember,2012thePiarcoproceedingswere

listedbefore

her

Worship

Ejenny

Espinet.

On

this

occasion,

the

Director

requested

an

adjournment

to

considerhowthePiarco2casesmightprogressinthelightofsection34.

75.On10thSeptember,2012theDirectorwrotetotheAttorneyGeneralprincipallyforthepurpose

ofprovidinginformationastothePiarco2prosecutions.TheDirectorendedhisletterbyinvitingthe

AttorneyGeneraltoconsidereithertheretroactiverepealofsection34ortheproclamationofsection

27(4)oftheActortheamendmentofSchedule6toincludethetypeofoffencesinPiarco1and2.The

DirectorsuggestedaswellthatSchedule6shouldbeamendedtoincludeotherseriousoffencesof

seditionterrorismpiracyandLarcenyandForgeryActOffences

76.TheDirectoragainwrote to theAttorneyGeneralon11thSeptember,2011. In this letterhe

reminded

the

Attorney

General

of

discussions

which

had

taken

place

that

day

pertaining

to

the

AttorneyGeneralsintentiontorepealsection34.TheDirectorexpressedthisview:

tobeeffectiveanysuchamendmentorrepealshouldexpresslydeclarethatitisofretrospective

effect

77.TheDirectoralsoissuedaPressRelease.Atparagraph17ofhisaffidavithestatedthepurposeof

thePressRelease.

Tolaybeforethepublicthehistoryofsection34andmyofficeslackofinputintothismatter,Iissued

aneight(8)pagePressReleaseinrelationtothePiarcoAirportProceedings.

78. InhisPressReleasetheDirectoraddressedthegravityof thePiarcomattersand theeffectof

section

34

on

the

Piarco

matters.

79.He sought to inform thepublic thathehadnotbeenconsultedonsection34andnoted that

offences such as sedition, terrorism, piracy and money laundering were not excluded from the

operationofthesection.

80.TheDirector informedthepublicofhisapproachtotheAttorneyGeneralandtotheAttorney

GeneralsstatedintentiontoreconveneParliamentwithaviewtorepealingtheintendedsection.He

expressedtheviewthatthestateofaffairswhichobtainedunderthesection34regimecouldnotbe

allowedtoremainextant.

81.TheDirectorendedhisreleasebystating:


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Hopefullythesituationcanstillberetrievedandtherampartsofthestatesrighttoprosecutethese

mattersremainintactastheyproperlyshould.

82. TheDirector set out his views on the draft bill in a letter dated 13th September, 2013 and

addressed to theAttorneyGeneral.The lettercame to theAttorneyGeneralsattentionafter the

repealBill

had

been

passed.

83.TheDirectorsworeasecondaffidaviton18thJanuary,2013whichwasalsofiledonthesameday.

Bythisaffidavit,theDirectorsoughttoanswerqueriesmadeinanunexhibitedletterfromMr.Robin

Otway,learnedinstructingattorneyfortheclaimant.Inanswertothesequeries,theDirectorannexed

alistintabularformunderthecaptionMattersaffectedbytheProclamationofsection34.Eleven

(11)matters appear in the first row of the table. These have been identified by theDirector as

pertainingtothePiarcoprosecutions.

84.Additionally,therewerethirtyfivematterswhichwerenotrelatedtothePiarcoprosecutions.

SUBMISSIONSMr.Fitzgerald,Q.C.

85.Mr. Fitzgerald, learnedQueenCounsel for the claimant, Steve Ferguson argued that thepre

repealedsection34conferredontheClaimanttherightnottobeputontrial.Mr.Fitzgeraldsubmitted

thattheClaimantsrightcrystallizedandbecamevestedinhimuponproclamationbythePresident.

86.Itwastheargumentof learnedQ.C.Mr.Fitzgeraldthattheclaimanthadacquireda legitimate

expectationthathewouldnotbetriedforhistoricoffences.Thatlegitimateexpectationarose,inhis

submission,fromthepublicandunequivocaltermsinwhichtherightnottobeputontrialwascreated

bytheenactmentandproclamationofsection34. IntheLearnedQ.C.ssubmission,the legitimate

expectationalsoarosebythepublicstatementsoftheformerMinisterofJustice.

87.Mr.Fitzgeraldarguedthatthelegitimateexpectationoftheclaimantwasprotectedbothunder

the Constitution and at common law. Inmaking his submissions, he relied on the authorities of

PaponettevAttorneyGeneralandRv.SecretaryofState forHomeAffairsexpartePierson .Mr.

Fitzgerald argued that theAmendmentActwas invalidby virtueof itsbreachof the doctrineof

separationofpowers. Inhissubmission,section5oftherepealstatutewas invalidbecause itwas

retrospective,adhominemandinterferedwiththeexerciseofjudicialpower.

88. Section 6of theAmendmentAct, in the submission ofMr. Fitzgeraldwas invalid because it

targetedpendingproceedingsand impermissibly sought todictate to the courthow todealwith

pendingapplications.

89.Inrespectofsection7,learnedQueenCounselcontendedthatthissectionwasinvalidbecauseit

soughttoremovevestedrightsandtooustthejurisdictionofthecourttodecideontheviabilityof

accruedprivilegesandexpectations.

90.CitingthedecisionofthePrivyCouncilinThomasandBaptistevAttorneyGeneral,Mr.Fitzgerald

contendedthatitwascontrarytotheprotectionofthelawforeithertheexecutiveorthelegislative

tointerfereinthejudicialprocess.

91.Mr. Fitzgeraldargued thatasamatterofprinciple, the courtwillnotpermit the initiationor

continuationofaprosecutioninbreachofapromisebyarepresentativeofthestate.


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92.LearnedQ.C.arguedthatsection7oftherepealstatutewasbothwideandvagueandrelyingon

the case of Raymond v Honey learned Q.C. invited the court to adopt a narrow, interpretative

approachtosection7oftherepealstatute.

TheHonourableMichaelBeloff,Q.C.

93.Learned

Q.C.

Mr.

Fitzgerald

adopted

the

submissions

of

learned

Q.C.

Mr.

Beloff,

who

argued

in

supportoftheclaimofthethreecompanies,MaritimeLife (Caribbean)Limited,MaritimeGeneral

InsuranceCompanyLimitedandFidelityFinanceandLeasingCompanyLimited.

94.Mr.Beloffreliedontheargumentsadvanced in theSkeletonArguments filedonbehalfofthe

threecompanieson8th January,2013andReplySkeletonArguments filedon21st January,2013.

TheseargumentsweresupplementedbythelearnedQueensCounselsoralsubmissionsbeforethis

Court.

95. LearnedQueens Counsel identified the following five (5)main arguments in support of his

submissiononbehalfofthethreecompaniesthattheAmendmentActisvoid:

(i)The

Amendment

Act

violates

the

principle

of

separation

of

powers

because

(a)

section

5involves

adhominem and retrospective legislation that interfereswith the exercise ofjudicial power and

removesvestedlegalrights;(b)section6targetsidentifiableproceedingsalreadybeforethecourts,

whichwerebroughtbyidentifiablepersonsandalsoimproperlysoughttodirectthecourtastohow

to treat suchproceedingspending;and (c) section7 removedvested rightsandousts the courts

jurisdictiontodecidefor itselfwhetheranyrights,privilegesorexpectationshavebeenaccruedby

virtueoftheproclamationandtheconsequentcomingintoforceofsection34.

(ii)TheAmendmentActrepresents interferencebythe legislaturewithmattersthatwerepending

beforetheCourtinrespectofwhichtheStateisalsoaparty.

(iii)

The

Amendment

Act

is

unconstitutional

and

constitutes

an

abuse

of

process

because

its

enactment

resulted inabreachofanundertakinggivenbythestatuteaswellasofficialstatements,thatthe

proceedingsagainstthethreecompanieswouldbeterminated.Inotherwords,Mr.Beloffsargument

isthatonceadefendanthasbeenexpresslyorimplicitlytoldthattheproceedingsagainsthimwillnot

proceed to trial, it is contrary to principle for Parliament to legislate to reverse that legitimate

expectation.Thisisparticularlyso,hecontends,whenasintheinstantcase,theexpectationcreated

hasbeenactedupon.

Mr.BeloffdisagreedwiththeAGsandtheDirectorssubmissionsthattheClaimantenjoyednothing

more than a temporary procedural right. It is inadequate, he contends, to describe what the

companiesexpectedtoenjoyasmerelyaproceduralright.Inhissubmission,Immunityfromtrialis

notmerelyproceduralinnaturebecause,fornaturalpersons,theirliberty,forlegalpersonssuchas

the

three

companies

their

property

and

for

both,

their

reputations

are

all

potentially

threatened

by

exposuretotrial.

(iv)TheAmendmentActisunconstitutionalandanimpermissibleresponsetopopularpressurethat

thethreecompaniesandtheotherapplicants,shouldstandtrial.

(v)Therepealofsection34isnotreasonablyjustifiableinasocietythathasaproperrespectforthe

rightsandfreedomsoftheindividual.

96.Mr.Beloff supplementedhiswritten submissionsbyhisaddress to theCourton29th30th

January,2013.DuringthecourseofhisaddressMr.Beloffmadeextensivereferencetotheaffidavits

oftheHonourableAttorneyGeneralandoftheDirector,insupportofhiscontentionthattherepeal


13/68

ofsection34was triggeredbyapublic furorwhich followed thePresidentialproclamationof the

sectionon28thAugust,2012.

97.ThelearnedQ.C.reliedaswellontheaddressoftheHonourableAttorneyGeneraltoParliament

on12thSeptember,2012todemonstratethatthePiarcocaseswerethefocusoftheAmendmentAct.

Ms.Chote,

SC,

who

appeared

for

Ameer

Edoo

98.LearnedQueensCounsel,Mr.FitzgeraldreliedaswellontheargumentsofMs.Chote, learned

SeniorCounselfortheClaimant,AmeerEdoo.Ms.ChotearguedthateveniftheCourtweretofind

thattheAmendmentActwasvalidandconstitutional,thecriminalproceedingsagainsttheClaimant

ought to be stayed indefinitely on the ground that the Claimants continued prosecutionwould

amounttoanabuseofprocessatcommonlaw.

99.Ms.ChotescontendedthattheDirectorlacksthepowertostepoutsideofthefunctionsidentified

inSharmavBrowneAntoineandOthers,thatistosaythosedefinedbysection90oftheConstitution

aswellasbytheUKCodeforProsecutors.

100.It

was

the

submission

of

learned

Senior

Counsel

that

the

actions

of

the

Director

effectively

amountedtoaninterferencewithproceedingstowhichhewasalsoaparty.CitingthecaseofConnelly

vtheDirector,learnedSeniorsuggestedthattheprosecutionmanipulatedormisusedtheprocessof

the Court so as to deprive the defendant of a protection provided by the law or to take unfair

advantageofatechnicality.

101.AccordingtoMs.Chote,theDirectorwaswellawareoftheClaimantsapplicationundersection

34following itsproclamation,butdidnothingtosuggestthattheClaimantwasnotentitledtothe

reliefsought.Instead,heconductedbehindthescenescommunicationswiththeAGtochangethe

lawsothattheClaimantwouldbedeprivedofthereliefwhichhebecameentitledtobyvirtueof

section34.For the reasonsadvanced, learnedSeniorcontended that theproceedingsagainst the

Claimants

should

be

permanently

stayed.

Mr.BenjaminfortheDirectorofPublicProsecutions

102.Inadditiontohiscarefullycraftedwrittensubmissionsinanswertotheclaimantssubmissions

onthemainissuesofseparationofpowers,legitimateexpectationanddueprocess,Mr.Benjamin

devotedthegreaterpartofhisoraladdresstodefendingtheactionsoftheDirector.

103.Inhisvivavocesubmissionon31stJanuary,2013 learnedCounselreferredtothedecisionon

Sharmav.Antoineandformulatedtheseseven(7)propositionsagainstwhichtheCourtwasinvited

to

assess

the

conduct

of

the

Director

:

(i)TheDirectorisrequiredtoexerciseindependentjudgmentunaffectedbypoliticalpressure.

(ii)TheDirectorisrequiredtoexerciseindependentjudgmentunswayedbypublicopinion.

(iii)TheDirectorisrequiredtomaintainpublicconfidenceintheadministrationofcriminaljustice.

(iv)TheDirector isrequiredand isempoweredtoexerciseawidediscretionhavingregardtoboth

publicpolicyandthepublicinterestinsofarastheyimpactandimpingeupontheadministrationof

criminaljustice.

(v)TheDirectorasappointeeoftheJudicialandLegalServiceCommission,occupyinganindependent

office does not have any legislative,judicial or in the narrow sense executive functions. He is

independent. He has no power over any arm of the three arms of Government. His proper

constitutionalroleistoadviseandcounsel.


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(vi)TheDirectorhasadiscretionabouttheadvicethathemustcarefullyandindependentlyconsider

astocontent,fairnesstimingofanyproposedchangestobothproceduralandsubstantivelawwhich

governandimpactupontheadministrationofcriminaljustice.

(vii)TheDirectorhasadiscretionconcerningtheadviceandthestepsthateitherhetakespersonally

ordirecthissubordinatestotakeinconnectionwiththecommencement,continuationortermination

ofcriminal

proceedings.

104.LearnedCounselsubmittedthattherewasnobasisinlawnorwasthereanyevidentialbasisupon

whichtheconductoftheDirector,inrelationtotheAmendmentAct,couldbeimpugned.Accordingly

hesubmittedthattheDirectorsconductwasentirelyproperandinaccordancewiththeruleoflaw

andhisoverridingobligationtosupporttheproperadministrationofcriminaljustice.

105.Mr.BenjaminpointedoutthattheCourtwasnotdirectedtoanypieceofevidencetosupport

theClaimantssubmissionthattherewasadirectionfromtheDirectortothelegislature.Noneofthe

Directorsactions,Mr.Benjaminstronglysubmitted,couldsensiblybedescribedasan interference

withthelegislativeprocessorasamanipulationofthejudicialprocess.

106.Mr.Benjaminwentonfurthertosubmit,however,thateveniftheCourtfindsthattheDirectors

actions amounted to an interference, itwouldnot amount to an infringement of the Claimants

constitutionalrights.

107.Mr.BenjaminmaintainedthattheDirectorhasaresponsibilitytoconsiderandadviseinrelation

to legislationas itaffectsand impactsupontheadministrationofjustice.TheDirectorspowersas

contained insection90oftheConstitution,Counselsubmitted,cannotbeabasisfordisablinghim

fromprovidinghisadviceandrecommendationasandwhentheyareaskedforandasorwhen,ex

propriomotu,hethinksitisappropriatetodoso.

108.LearnedCounsel,Mr.Benjaminmadesubmissionsastothepropermeaningoftheconceptof

due

process

of

law

and

drew

the

Courts

attention

to

the

judgment

of

the

Honourable

Justice

of

Appeal

Kangaloo in Ferguson andGalbaransingh vAttorneyGeneral . In thatdecision, Justice ofAppeal

Kangalooconsideredthecompetinginterpretationsoftheconceptofdueprocessasexpoundedon

theonehandbyLordMillettinThomasandAnothervCiprianiBaptisteandOthersandontheother

byLordHoffmaninTheStatevBradBoyce.

LordPannickfortheDefendantAttorneyGeneral

109.LordPannickidentifiedthefollowingeight(8)issuesasthosearisingfortheCourtsconsideration

inthisclaim:

(i)SeparationofPowers

(ii)TheUnwrittenPrincipleoftheRuleofLaw

(iii)

Constitutional

Right

to

Due

Process

(iv)LegitimateExpectations

(v)PopulistPressure

(vi)ParliamentaryProcessandtheconductoftheDirector

(vii)AbuseofProcess

(viii)RelevanceoftheHansardmaterialandcorrespondence

110.Openinghissubmissionsbyreferencetothepresumptionofconstitutionalityofparliamentary

enactmentsLordPannickemphasizedasecondprinciple,thatistosay,thatCourtsarenotconcerned

with theproprietyand theexpediencyof the Legislation,butonlywith its constitutionality.This

principlewasenunciatedbyLordBinghaminSurattvA.G.


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111.Inanswertosubmissionsonthedoctrineoftheseparationofpowers,LordPannickaccepted

thatanAct inbreachoftheprincipleofseparationofpowerscouldnotbeprotectedbyaspecial

parliamentarymajoritypursuant to section13. Itwas,however, theargumentof learnedQueens

Counselthattherewasnobreachoftheprincipleoftheseparationofpowersbytheenactmentof

theAmendmentAct.LordPannickdistinguishedLiyanagevRandarguedthattherearefourlinked

reasonswhy

the

Amendment

Act

does

not

violate

the

separation

of

powers

principle

:(a)TheAmendmentActisnotadhominembutappliesgenerallytoallcases.Itis,heargued,general

intermsandeffectandnotconfinedtothePiarcodefendants.LearnedQueensCounselalsoreliedon

thecasesofNicholasvTheQueen ,RidgewayvR ,LiyanagevR ,ZunigaandOrs.vTheAttorney

GeneralofBelize.

(b)Retrospectivelegislationisnotofitselfabreachofseparationofpowers.LordPannicksubmitted,

relyingonthePolyukhovichvTheCommonwealthofAustraliacase,thatso longasthe legislature

doesnot tell the courtwho isguiltyor innocent retrospectivecriminal law isconsistentwith the

separationofpowersdoctrine.SeealsoBritishColumbiavImperialTobaccoCanadaLtd.

(c)Thereisnogeneralprinciplethattheseparationofpowersprincipleisbreachedbylegislationthat

removesoraffectsrightsinpendinglegalproceedingsevenifcriminal.

(d)Whether

legislation

breaches

the

separation

of

powers

principle

by

addressing

or

removing

rights

inpendingproceedingsdependson thecircumstances. In fact inthiscircumstance theremovalof

section34facilitatesthefunctioningofthecourttoadjudicateonthecriminalcases.SeePolyukovich

, Nicholas , Australian Building Construction Employees & Builders Labourers Federation v

Commonwealth,ChuKhengLimvMinisterforImmigration.LordPannickalsosubmittedthattheU.S.

vKleinreliedonbytheclaimantshasbeendistinguishedinmorerecentauthorities.Seeforexample

MillervFrench.InadditionthecaseofBuckleyandOthersvTheAttorneyGeneralreliedonbythe

claimantisa1947case,decidedlongbeforethemoremodernlawonseparationofpowers.

112.WhereasLordPannickmadeextensivesubmissionsinanswertotheremainingissues,itwashis

submissionthatthesewere, inthefinalanalysis irrelevant.ShouldtheCourtacceptthattherehad

been

a

breach

of

the

doctrine

of

separation

of

powers,

the

claimant

would

not

need

to

rely

on

the

remainingissues.Conversely,shouldtheCourtacceptthedefendantssubmissionontheissueofthe

separationofpowers,anychallengesastotheremaining issueswouldberesolvedbytheconjoint

effectofsection13oftheConstitutionandthemajoritywithwhichtheAmendmentActhadbeen

passed.

LAW

PresumptionofConstitutionality

113.ThepresumptionofconstitutionalityofActsofParliamentisacardinalprinciple,whichhasbeen

appliedbyCourtsofthehighestauthority.Thisprinciple,wasreaffirmedbytheirLordshipsatthe

JudicialCommitteeofthePrivyCouncilinSurrattvAttorneyGeneralofTrinidadandTobago,where

Baroness

Hale

of

Richmond

stated

at

paragraph

45

of

her

judgment:

It is a strong thing indeed to rule that legislation passed by a democratic Parliament is

unconstitutional.

The constitutionality of a parliamentary enactment is presumed unless it is shown to be

unconstitutionalandtheburdenonapartyseekingtoproveinvalidityisaheavyone

114. Instatingtheprinciple,BaronessHalereferredtoGrantvRwhichwasalsoadecisionofthe

JudicialCommittee,wheretheirLordshipsheardanappealfromtheCourtofAppealofJamaica.In

thecourseofconsideringwhethersection31DoftheEvidenceActwasinconsistentwithsection20

oftheJamaicanConstitution,LordBinghamstatedtheprincipleinthisway:

Itisfirstofallclearthattheconstitutionalityofaparliamentaryenactmentispresumedunlessitis

showntobeunconstitutionalandtheburdenonapartyseekingtoproveinvalidityisaheavyone:

MootoovA.G.ofTrinidadandTobago[1979]1WLR1334


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115.Seetooparagraph11ofFergusonandGalbaransinghv.AttorneyGeneralwhereJusticeofAppeal

Kangalooformulatedtheruleinthisway:

Thestartingpoint inalljudicialdeliberationsof thisnature is the fundamentalprinciple that the

constitutionalityofaparliamentaryenactmentistobepresumedunlessthecontraryisshown.

116.EquallyentrenchedistheprinciplethattheCourtistheultimatearbiteroftheconstitutionality

ofanActofParliament.ThisprinciplewasconfirmedbyJusticeofAppealKangalooatparagraph15

ofFergusonandGalbaransingh,inthesewords:

Be that as it may it ultimately falls to the court to decide the challenged legislation infringes

constitutionalrightssetoutinsections4and5.ThecourtsaretheguardiansoftheConstitutionand

theruleoflawandcannotbyvirtueoftheConstitutionitself,yieldthisjurisdictiontoanyotherarm

oftheState.Itthereforefollowsinmyviewthatwherethesection13procedureisusedandanActis

passed with a special majority, it does not automatically mean that the legislation infringes

constitutionalrights.ItistheviewofParliamentthatitdoes,howeverthecourtsmustengageintheir

owndeliberationonthisissue.ThecourtstartsonthebasisthatParliamentwasoftheviewthatthe

provisionsof

the

legislation

were

inconsistent

with

section

4and

5and

therefore

required

aspecial

majority.TheCourtcanrationallycometotheconclusionthattheprovisionsdidnotsoinfringeand

no specialmajoritywasnecessary. This ishardly ever likely tohappen inpractice,but thepoint

remainsthatitisalwaysforthecourtstodeterminewhethertheprovisionsofanActareinconsistent

withs.4ands.5tosuchanextentordegreeortousethewordsofLordDiplockinHindsareofsuch

acharacter,thatthelegislationisthereforedeclaredunconstitutional.

TheSeparationofPowers:GeneralPrinciple

DonJohnFrancisLiyanagevR

117.AnydiscussionastotheseparationofpowersinthecontextofWestminsterModelconstitutions

must

begin

with

Liyanage,

the

facts

of

which

are

set

out

below.

118. An Abortive Coup detat took place in Ceylon on 27th January, 1962. The appellantswere

sentenced to ten years rigorous imprisonment and forfeiture feature of all their property. The

appellantswho had been convicted under the Criminal Law Special ProvisionActNo. 1 of 1962

appealedtheirconvictionssharingacommongroundthattheconvictionsshouldbequashedowing

totheinvalidityofthe1962Act.

119. Prior to the enactment under consideration, a White Paper had been prepared by the

GovernmentofCeylon.TheWhitePapersetoutthenamesofthirtyallegedconspirators.TheWhite

Paperendedbyobservingthatadeterrentpunishmentofaseverecharactershouldbeimposed.

120.On16thMarch,1962,theParliamentofCeylonpassedtheCriminalLaw(SpecialProvisionsAct)

No1of1962.LordPearceinhisjudgmentwrote:

thatitwasdirectedtowardsparticipantsinthecoupisclear

121.TheActofMarch1962wasalsogivenretrospectiveforce,inthat,itwasdeemedtocomeinto

forceon1stJanuary,1962.Section19oftheMarch1962Actlimiteditsapplicationtotheparticipants

inthecoupbyproviding:

theprovisionsofPart1shallbelimitedinitsapplicationtoanyoffenceagainstthestatealleged

tohavebeencommittedonorabout27thJanuary,1962.

122.PartIlegalisedthedetentionoftheallegedperpetratorsofthecoup,whilePartIIoftheMarch

1962ActalteredthemodeoftrialasspecifiedintheCriminalProcedureCode.UndertheMarch1962


17/68

Act,theMinisterwasempoweredtodirectthatpersonsbetriedbythreeJudgeswithoutajury,the

threeJudgestobenominatedbytheMinister.ThisstatutewasconsideredbytheverythreeJudges

nominatedby theMinister.Theyconcluded that thepowerofnomination in theMinisterwasan

interferencewiththejudicialpoweroftheState.Theydeclaredsection9oftheMarch1962Acttobe

ultravires.

123. There was no appeal against the declaration of invalidity. Parliament however, passed an

amendment ActNo. 31 of 1962. The Amendment Act retrospectively allowed arrestswithout a

warrant for theoffenceofwagingwaragainst theQueenandaltered thepenalty forwagingwar

againsttheQueenbyinsertingaminimumpunishmentofnotlessthantenyearsimprisonment.

124.TheAmendedActprovidedretrospectivelyforthealterationofthepenaltyforconspiringtowage

waragainsttheQueenbyinsertingaminimumpunishmentoftenyearsimprisonmentandforfeiture

ofallproperty.Italsoincludedanewoffenceexpostfacto.

125.Theappellantswere triedbythreejudgesnominatedbytheChief Justice. InApril,1965, the

appellantswere

convicted

and

sentenced.

The

appellants

advanced

three

main

arguments

as

to

the

unconstitutionalityoftheAct.ThesecondandthirdargumentsfoundfavourwiththeirLordships.At

page287DE,LordPearcehadthistosay:

The Constitution is significantly divided into parts: Part 2: The Governor General, Part 3: The

Legislature andPart6 the Judicaturealthoughnoexpressmention ismadeof vesting in the

judicature the judicial power which it already had there is provision under Part 6 for the

appointmentofjudgesbyaJudicialServiceCommission

126.Atpage287G,LordPearcecontinued:

Theseprovisionsmanifestanintentiontosecureinthejudiciaryafreedomfrompolitical,legislative

andexecutivecontrol.TheyarewhollyappropriateinaConstitutionwhichintendsthatjudicialpower

shall

be

vested

only

in

the

judicature

Theconstitutionssilenceastothevestingofjudicialpowerisconsistentwithitsremainingwhereit

hadlainformorethanacenturyinthehandsofthejudicatureItisnotconsistentwithanyintention

thathenceforthitshouldpasstoorbesharedbytheexecutiveorthelegislative

127.LordPearceconsideredwhethertheActof1962usurpedorinfringedthejudicialpowerandat

page289DE,madethefollowingobservation:

Itgoeswithoutsayingthatthelegislaturemaylegislateforthegeneralityofitssubjectsbythecitation

ofcrimesandpenaltiesorbyenactingtherulesrelatingtoevidence.ButtheActsof1962hadnosuch

generalintention.Theywereclearlyaimedatparticularknownindividualswhohadbeennamedin

theWhitePaperandwereinprisonawaitingtheirfate.

128.Atpage289F,LordPearceconsideredtheLegislationbeforetheBoardandhadthistosay:

Thatthealterationsinthelawwerenotintendedforthegeneralityofthecitizensordesignedasany

improvementofthegenerallawisshownbythefactthattheeffectofthosealterationswastobe

limitedtotheparticipantsintheJanuarycoupandthatafterthesehadbeendealtwithbythejudges

thelawshouldreverttoitsnormalstate.

129.LordPearcethenissuedthiscaveatatpage289G:

theirLordshipsarenotpreparedtoholdthatveryenactmentinthisfieldwhichcanbedescribed

asadhominemandexpostfactomustinevitablyusurporinfringethejudicialpowernordothey

finditnecessarytoattempttheimpossibletaskoftracingwherethelineistobedrawnbetweenwhat

willandwhatwillnotconstitutesuchasinterferenceeachcasemustbedecidedinthelightofitsown

factsandcircumstancesincludingthetruepurposeofthelegislationthesituationtowhichitwas


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directed,theexistenceofacommondesignandtheextenttowhichthelegislationaffects,bywayof

directionorrestriction,thediscretionorjudgmentofthejudiciaryinspecificproceedings.

130.LordPearcethenconcluded:

It is thereforenecessary toconsidermore closely thenatureof the legislationchallenged in this

appeal.

131.Atpage290ELordPearceendorsedthesummaryformulatedbyMr.Gratiaen.Mr.Gratiaens

summarywasoutlinedinthisway:

Mr.GratiaensuccinctlysummariseshisattackontheActsinquestionasfollows.TheActwaswholly

bad in that itwasa specialdirection to thejudiciaryas to trialofparticularprisonerswhowere

identifiable(inviewoftheWhitePaper)andchargedwithparticularoffencesonaparticularoccasion.

ThepithandsubstanceofbothActswasalegislativeplanexpostfactotosecuretheconvictionand

enhancethepunishmentofthoseindividuals.

132.LordPearcecontinuedwiththeoutlineofMr.Gratienssummary:

Itlegalized

their

imprisonment

while

they

were

awaiting

trial.

It

made

admissible

their

statements

inadmissiblyobtained.Italteredthefundamentallawofevidencesoastofacilitatetheirconviction.

Andfinally,italteredexpostfactothepunishmenttobeimposedonthem

133.LordPearcereiteratedhisearlierindications:

legislationadhominemwhich isthusdirected tothecourseofparticularproceedingsmaynot

alwaysamounttoaninterferencewiththefunctionsofthejudiciary

134.OfthestatutebeforetheBoard,LordPearcehadthistosay:

Butinthepresentcase,theirLordshipshavenodoubtthattherewassuchinterference;thatitwas

notonlythe likelybuttheintendedeffectofthe impugnedenactments;andthatitisfataltotheir

validity

135.OftheimpugnedlegislationLordPearcesaid:

Thetruenatureandpurposeoftheseenactmentsarerevealedintheirconjointimpactonthespecific

proceedingsinrespectofwhichtheyweredesigned,andtheytaketheircolour,inparticular,fromthe

alterationstheypurportedtoastheirultimateobjective,thepunishmentofthoseconvicted.

136.Inconclusion,LordPearceenvisionedtheerosionofjudicialpoweriftheActsbeforehimwere

valid.Hehadthistosay:

IfsuchActsasthesewerevalid,thejudicialpowercouldbewhollyabsorbedbythelegislativeand

takenoutofthehandsofjudgeswhatisdoneonce,ifitbeallowed,maybedoneagainandina

lesser

crisis

and

less

serious

circumstances.

And

thus

judicial

power

may

be

eroded

such

an

erosion

is

contrarytotheclearintentionoftheConstitution.

KeniloreavTheAttorneyGeneral

137.ThecaseofKeniloreawasadecisionoftheCourtofAppealoftheSolomonIslandsinwhichthe

NationalParliamenthad, inMarch1982,passed thePriceControlActof1982.AlthoughthePrice

ControlActhadneverbeenbroughtintoforce,ordersweremadeundertheActcontrollingtheretail

andwholesalepriceofbutanegas.CompanieswhichwereaffectedbytheOrdersbroughtproceedings

againsttheAttorneyGeneralseekingadeclarationastotheinvalidityofOrdersmadeundertheAct,

onthegroundthattheActhadneverbeenbroughtintoforce.

138.Whileproceedingswerestillpending,theNationalParliamentpassedasecondAct:thePrice

Control (RetrospectiveOperation and validation)Actof 1983. The effectof the 1983Actwas to


19/68

validateretrospectivelyOrderswhichhadbeenmadeunderthe1982Act,priortoitsentryintoforce.

Theimpugnedsectionsofthe1983Actweresections4and5.

139.Thetermsofsections4and5ofthePriceControl(RetrospectiveOperation&Validation)Act

1983aresetoutbelowforthepurposeofcomparingtheimpugnedsectionswiththosethatpresently

occupythe

Courts

attention.

140.Section4providedasfollows:

TheprincipalActisherebyamendedbyinsertingimmediatelyaftersection10thefollowingsection

asfrom26thMarch,1982

11.Thevalidityoroperationofanordermadeundersections4or6shallnotbeaffectedbynon

complianceofprovisionscontainedinsection3(2)orsection4(5)orsection10(3)northevalidity

oroperationofanysuchordershallbecalled inquestionbyorbeforeanycourtmerelyonthe

groundsofthenoncomplianceorinadequatecompliancewithanysuchprovision

141.Theimpugnedsection5wasmoreextensiveprovidingatsection5(C):

Nocourt

shall

entertain

any

legal

proceedings

:(a)questioningthevalidityandcontinuedoperationofanyaction;or

(b)claiminganycompensationforlossfoundedonanyaction,anditscontinuedoperationmerely

onthegroundthatwhentheactionwastakentheprincipalActhadnotcomeintooperation

142.Section5(d)containedanexpressdirectiontotheCourtinthefollowingterms:

(d)whereanyimpugnedlegalproceedingsinstitutedonanysuchgroundbependinginanycourt

thecourtshallexerciseitsjurisdictionbydecidingthatimpugnedlegalproceedings

a.byupholdingthevalidityoftheactionandofitscontinuedoperation;or

b.byrejectingtheclaimforcompensationforwardedonthataction

onthegroundthattheprincipalActwasvalidlyandeffectivelyinoperationandcontinuedtobein

such

operation

on

the

date

of

the

action

on

the

ground

that

the

non

compliance

...

with

any

directory

provisionhasnotaffectedthevalidityorcontinuedoperationoftheaction

143.ConnollyJ.A.atpage7ofthereportreferredtothedecisionoftheJudicialCommitteeofthe

PrivyCouncil inLiyanagevtheQueen .Noting that theConstitutionofCeyloncontainsprovisions

similartothoseofSolomonIslands,ConnollyJ.A.madethefollowingstatementofprinciple,

theConstitutionofSolomonIslandsdoesindeedprovideforaseparationofpowersandthatthe

separatepowerinthejudicatureundertheConstitutioncannotbeusurpedorinfringedeitherbythe

executiveorthelegislative.UndertheConstitutionasitstandsthejudicialpowercannotbeabsorbed

bythelegislatureandtakenoutofthehandsofthejudges.Itisthedutyofthiscourttoensure

that there isnot erosionof thejudicialpowerwithout themachinery of the amendmentof the

Constitution

being

employed

144.ConnollyJ.A.quotedtheevergreenpronouncementofLordDiplockinHindsvR:

The new constitutions were evolutionary not revolutionary. They provided for continuity of

governmentthroughsuccessorinstitutionslegislature,executiveandjudicialofwhichmemberswere

tobeselectedinadifferentway

145.ConnollyJ.A.squotationfromHindscontinued:

WhathoweverisimplicitintheverystructureoftheconstitutionontheWestminsterModelisthat

judicialpower,howeveritistobedistributedfromtimetotimebetweenvariouscourtsistocontinue

tobevestedinpersonsappointedtoholdjudicialofficeinthemannerandonthetermslaiddownin

thechapterdealingwiththejudicatureeventhoughthisisnotexpresslystatedintheconstitution


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146. Inapplying theprinciplesenunciatedbyLordPearce in Liyanage ,Connolly J.A. restated the

principleinthisway:

Itiswhenthelegislationceasestobeofageneralcharacterandisdirectedtoaparticularpersonand

evenmore sowhen it is foundedonpast acts that thedifficultquestion ariseswhether the line

betweenthelegislativeandthejudicialpowerhasbeentransgressed.

147.ConnollyJ.A.issuedthiscaveat:

it isnoteveryenactmentwhichcanbedescribedasadhominemandexpost factowhichwill

infringeandusurpthejudicialpower.Instancesoflegislationwhichisplainlybeyondthepowerofthe

legislaturearegivenbyLordPearceandtheyincludethepassingofanActofattainderagainstsome

personorlegislationwhichinstructsaJudgetobringaverdictofguiltyagainstsomeonewhoisbeing

tried

148.ConnollyJ.A.continued:

What isclearhowever isthat legislationwhich isnotpassedforthegeneralityofthecitizensbut

which isclearlyaimedatknown individuals, thealterations in the lawnotbeing intended for the

generalityof

the

citizens

or

designed

as

any

improvement

of

general

law

and

directed

at

aparticular

pending litigation and to have no effect once that litigation is terminated will amount to such

transgression

149.ConnollyJ.A.concludedatlengththateachcasemustbedecidedinthelightofitsownfactsand

circumstances.Byhisjudgmentsuchcircumstancesincluded:

thetruepurposeofthelegislationthesituationtowhichitwasdirectedandtheextenttowhichthe

legislationaffects,bywayofdirectionor restriction thediscretionorjudgmentof thejudiciary in

specificproceedings

150.ApplyingthestatedprinciplestotheimpugnedlegislationConnollyJ.A.heldthatparagraphs(d)

and

(e)

of

section

5

in

terms

direct

the

High

Court

as

to

the

manner

in

which

it

should

deal

with

pending

litigation.ConnollyJ.A.observedaswellthattheimpugnedsection:

forbidthecourttoexecuteitsownjudgment.

151.ThenechoingthesentimentsofLordPearceinLiyanage,Connollypresaged:

ifsuchprovisionasthesewerevalidthejudicialpowercouldbewhollyabsorbedbythelegislation

andtakenoutofthehandsofJudges.

152.Inconclusion,ConnollyJ.A.grantedadeclarationthatparagraphs(d)and(e)ofsection5ofthe

PriceControl(RetrospectiveOperationandValidation)ActwerebeyondthepoweroftheNational

Parliamentandthereforeinvalid.

153.Theothertwojusticesofappeal,JusticesWhiteandPrattbothagreedwiththedecisionofJustice

ofAppealConnolly.ThejudgmentofPrattJ.A.wassignificantinhisconcludingparagraphwherethe

learnedJusticeofAppealhadthistosayatpage12:

ThelegislaturehasdeprivedtheCourtentirelyofdiscretionandhassimplydirectedtheJudgeasif

heweresomeclerkapplyingarubbertosomeformofCourtorder

StateofMauritiusvKhoyratty

154.KhoyrattywasadecisionoftheJudicialCommitteeofthePrivyCouncilandwasrelieduponby

the claimants in these proceedings as authority for the proposition that the term sovereign

democratic state has substantive content and significance, which includes the doctrine of the

separationofpowersbetweentheexecutive,thelegislatureandthejudiciary.


21/68

155.Therespondent,AbdoolRachidKhoyratty,hadbeenchargedwithanoffencelistedundersection

32oftheDangerousDrugsAct,2000asoneinrespectofwhichtheaccusedwouldnotbeentitledto

bailuntilthefinaldeterminationofproceedingsagainstthem.

156.Havingbeendeniedbail,Khoyrattymounted a constitutional challengenotonly against the

DangerousDrugs

Act

2000

which

identified

the

offences

for

which

bail

would

be

excluded,

but

also

againsttheConstitutionofMauritius(Amendment)Actof1994whichpavedthewayfortheActof

2000.

157. The Constitution of Mauritius (Amendment) Act 1994 purported to amend constitutional

provisionsforbailatsection5oftheConstitution.The1994Actwaspassedwithathreequarters

majority,whichwastherequisitemajorityforanamendmenttosection5.

158.Notwithstandingthespecialmajoritywithwhichsection5wasamended,thecriticalquestion,in

thewordsofLordRodgerofEarlsferry,waswhether:

by purporting to insert section 5(3A)into the Constitution, section 2 of the 1994 Act had in

substancesought

not

only

to

amend

section

5

but

also

to

alter

the

form

of

the

democratic

state

guaranteedbysection1oftheConstitution

159.Thiscriticalquestionwasanswered in theaffirmativeby theirLordshipsonwhosejudgment

learnedQueensCounselfortheclaimantrelied.ReferringtolearninginAhneevTheDirectorofPublic

ProsecutionsandHindsvRLordSteynhadthistosay:

WhilethejudgmentinAhneescase[1999]2AC294doesnotaffordtheanswertothequestionunder

considerationitisrelevantinemphasising:

a.thatMauritiusisademocraticstatebasedontheruleoflaw.

b.thattheprincipleofseparationofpowersisentrenched.

c.thatonebranchofgovernmentmaynottrespassontheprovinceofanyotherinconflictwiththe

principle

of

separation

of

powers

160.Atparagraph12ofhisjudgment,LordSteynidentifiedanumberofconceptsinvolvedintheidea

ofdemocracy.ThelearnedLawLordformulatedtheminthisway:

Thefirstisthatpeopleshoulddecidewhoshouldgovernthem.Secondlythereistheprinciplethat

fundamentalrightsshouldbeprotectedbyanimpartialandindependentjudiciary.Thirdlyinorderto

achieveareconciliationbetweentheinevitabletensionsbetweentheseideas,aseparationofpowers

betweentheexecutivethelegislatureandthejudiciaryisnecessary

161. Inthecourseofhisjudgment,LordSteyn,quoted fromhisownjudgment inRvAndersonv

SecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment:

In

R

v

Trade

Practices

Tribunal,

Exp.

Tasmanian

Breweries

Party

Ltd

(1970)

123

CLR

Windeyer

J

explainedthedifficultyofdefiningthejudicialfunctionasflows:Theconceptseemstometodefy

perhaps itwerebettertosaytranscendpurelyabstractconceptualanalysis.Itinevitablyattracts

considerationofpredominantcharacteristicsandalsoinvitescomparisonwithhistoricfunctionsand

processesofcourtsoflaw

162.InrespectoftheobservationofWindeyerJLordSteyncommentedasfollows:

Nevertheless, ithas longbeensettled inAustralia that thepower todetermine responsibility for

crimeandpunishmentforitscommissionisafunctionwhichbelongsexclusivelytothecourts.Ithas

beensaidthattheselectionofpunishmentisanintegralpartoftheadministrationofjusticeandas

suchcannotbecommittedtothehandsoftheexecutive


22/68

163. Lord Steyn referred to and quoted Lord Bingham in A v Secretary of State for the Home

Department:

thefunctionofindependentjudgeschargedtointerpretandapplythelawisuniversallyrecognized

asacardinalfeatureofthemoderndemocraticstate,acornerstoneoftheruleoflawitself.

164.Lord

Steyn

noted

that

the

quoted

decisions,

while

not

conclusive

of

the

issue

before

their

Lordships:

gave important colour to the words of section 1 of the Constitution that Mauritius shall be a

democraticstate

165.Atparagraph15ofhisjudgment,LordSteynunderscoredtheimportanceoftheprovisionthat

Mauritiusshallbeademocraticstate.HisLordshipemphasizedthatthisprovisionwasmorethan

amerepreambleoraguidetointerpretation.LordSteynhadthistosay:

In this respect it is to be distinguished frommany other constitutional provisions. It is of first

importancethattheprovisionthatMauritiusshallbeademocraticstateisanoperativeandbinding

provision. ItsverysubjectmatterandplaceattheverybeginningoftheConstitutionunderlies its

importance

166.Ultimately,theirLordshipsagreedthattheConstitutionofMauritiusAmendmentAct,1994which

purportedtoamendConstitutionalprovisionsrelatingtothegrantofbail, in factcontravenedthe

provisionbywhichMauritiuswasdeclaredtobeasovereigndemocraticstate.

167.Section5(3A)oftheConstitutionaswellastheDangerousDrugsActof2000weredeclaredtobe

inconsistentwiththeConstitutionandthereforevoid.

TheDirectorofPublicProsecutionsvMollison

168.Thewellknown factsofMollisonbeginwith thesixteenyearold respondent,whohadbeen

convicted

of

murder

and

sentenced

to

be

detained

pursuant

to

section

29

of

the

Juveniles

Act,

1951

atthepleasureoftheGovernorGeneral.

169.TheCourtofAppealof Jamaicaheld that this sentencewasunconstitutional.At the Judicial

CommitteeofthePrivyCouncil,theirLordshipsdismissedtheappealoftheDirectorandheldthat

section29oftheActof1951hadinfringedtheprincipleofseparationofpowersbyconferringonthe

GovernorGeneral,asanofficeroftheexecutive,thepowertodetermineanoffenderspunishment.

170.CitingthedecisionoftheHouseofLordsinR(Anderson)vSecretaryofState,LordBinghamof

Cornhillcommentedasfollowsontheexerciseofdeterminingthelengthofanoffendersdetention:

Itisclearthatsuchdeterminationisforalllegalandpracticalpurposesasentencingexercise.

171.

At

page

422

of

the

Report,

Lord

Bingham

noted

the

concession

made

by

the

Director

that

section

29(1)contravenedrightstolibertyandtotrialbyafairasguaranteedbytheConstitutionatsections

15(1)(b)and20(1)respectivelyandnotedfurtherthatMr.FitzgeraldQCfortheRespondentbasedhis

primary attack not on incompatibilitywith specific rights but on its incompatibility with the

separation ofjudicial from executive powerwhichwas a fundamental principle onwhich the

Constitutionwasbuilt

172.LordBingham referred toHindsvTheQueen , thewater shedauthoritywhereLordDiplock

delivered the landmark expositionon the doctrine of the separationofpowers and observed as

follows:

ItdoesindeedappearthatthesentencingprovisionsunderchallengeintheHindscasewereleadto

beunconstitutionalnotbecauseoftheirrepugnancytoanyoftherightsguaranteedbysections in


23/68

Chapter IIIof theConstitutionbutbecauseof their incompatibilitywith aprincipleonwhich the

Constitutionitselfwasheldtobefounded(seeDPPVMollison[2003]atAC411at424).

173.LordBinghamofCornhillthenobserved:

WhateveroverlaptheremaybeunderconstitutionsontheWestminsterModelbetweentheexercise

ofexecutive

and

executive

powers,

the

separation

between

the

exercise

of

judicial

powers

on

the

one

handand legislativeandexecutivepowerson theother istotaloreffectivelyso.Suchseparation,

based on the rule of law, was recently described by Lord Steyn as a characteristic feature of

democracies.IntheopinionoftheBoard,Mr.Fitzgeraldhadmadegoodhischallengetosection29

based on its incompatibility with the constitutional principle that judicial functions must be

exercisedbythejudiciaryandnotbytheexecutive.

174. LordBingham then considered the submissionof theDirector that section29was saved as

existing legislation. Quoting the learning of Lord Diplock in Hinds v The Queen Lord Bingham

commentedthattheBoardfoundthisapuzzlingpassage.

175.Finally

holding

that

Lord

Diplocks

statement

in

Hinds

vR

at

page

228

had

been

obiter,

Lord

Binghamruledasfollows:

NowhereintheOrderortheConstitutionistheretobefoundsocomprehensiveasavingprovision

whichwould indeedunderminetheeffectofsection2oftheConstitution. (SeeTheDirectorof

PublicProsecutionsvMollison[2003]2AC411at425D).(Section2oftheConstitutionprovides:

ifanyotherlawisonconsistentwiththisConstitution,thisConstitutionshallprevailandtheother

lawshall,totheextentoftheinconsistencybevoid

176.The casesofDPPvMollison,Khoyratty vA.G. andHinds vRpay tribute to theprincipleof

separationofpowersandthefundamentalpositionwhichitoccupiesinConstitutionsbasedonthe

Westminstermodel.Theseauthoritiesassertthatanylawwhichisincompatiblewiththeprincipleis

void

even

if

it

was

existing

law

or

if

it

had

been

enacted

with

a

constitutionally

prescribed

special

majority.

IanSeepersadandRoodalPanchoovA.G.

177.The appellants, Seepersad andRoodalPanchoo,hadbeen convicted in1986of theheinous

murderoftwoelderlywomen.Becausetheappellantswereminorswhenthecrimeswerecommitted,

theywere not sentenced to death, butwere sentenced to be detained at the States pleasure,

pursuanttosection79oftheChildrenActCh.46:01.

178.In2003,theAppellantsinstitutedproceedingsundersection14oftheConstitutionclaimingthat

the sentences which had been imposed on them offended the constitutional principle of the

separation

of

powers.

They

contended

as

well

that

the

failure

of

the

State

to

conduct

periodic

reviews

oftheirdetentioninfringedtheirfundamentalrightsundersections4and5oftheConstitution.

179.TheAppellantswerereleasedfromcustodyon26thJuly,2006.However,theycontinuedtopress

theirconstitutionalmotionsaswellas theirclaims forcompensation for the infringementoftheir

constitutionalrights.

180.TheirclaimsfordamageswereeventuallyheardbytheirLordshipsattheJudicialCommitteeof

the PrivyCouncil, and theunanimous decision of their Lordshipswasdeliveredby LordHopeof

Craighead.

181.Inthecourseofhisjudgment,LordHopeobservedthatsections79and81oftheChildrenAct

Ch.46:01hadbeenconsideredbyMendona J.(ashethenwas) inthecaseofChuckAttinvA.G.


24/68

(unreportedH.C.A.No.2175of2003.LordHopeobservedfurtherthatthejudgmentofMendonaJ.

hadfollowedthe lineofauthoritiescommencingwithHindsvR.[1977]RvSecretaryofStateExp.

Venables[1998]Ac407;BrownevR[2000]1AC45;TheDirectorofPublicProsecutionsvMollison

[2003]UKPC6.

182.At

paragraph

10

of

his

judgment,

Lord

Hope

distilled

the

law

which

was

established

by

the

cases

inthisway:

Thesecasesestablishthefollowingpropositions:

1...

2.TheseparationofpowersisabasicprincipleonwhichtheConstitutionofTrinidadandTobagois

founded.Parliamentcannotconsistentlywiththatprincipletransferfromthejudiciarytoanexecutive

bodyadiscretiontodeterminetheseverityofthepunishmenttobeinflicteduponanoffender.The

systemofpubliclawunderwhichthepeopleforwhomtheConstitutionwasprovidedwerealready

livingwhenittookeffectmustbeassumedtohaveevolvedinaccordancewiththatprinciple

183.Havingconsideredthecompetingsubmissions,theirLordshipsrestoredthefirstinstancedecision

thatthe

appellants

were

entitled

to

damages.

USv.Klein

184. In thedecisionof theSupremeCourtof theUnitedStates, theCourtheardamotionby the

AttorneyGeneraltoremandanappealfromtheCourtofClaims.Thiswasacourtestablishedin1855

forthepurposeofenablingClaimantsanavenueforexaminingandadjudicatingupontheirclaims.

185.ThefactswhichgaverisetothisdecisionaroseoutoftheAmericanCivilWarwhichtookplace

between 1861 and 1865. FourActs of Congresswerepassed between 1861 and 1867. TheActs

providedfortheseizureandforfeitureofpropertypassingbetweenloyalandinsurrectionarystates

(SeeActof13thJuly,1861)aswellasforthecollectionofabandonedandcapturedproperty(Actof

March,

12th

1863).

186.TheActof17thJuly,1862authorizedthePresidenttoofferpardonsonconditionsthathesaw

fitontheconditionthatthebeneficiaryofthepardontookaprescribedoath.Thiswasrepealedin

1867.

187.TheSupremeCourtwas,however,concernedwithaprovisocontainedintheAppropriationAct

of1870.Theprovisocontainedthefollowingdirections:

NopardonoramnestygrantedbythePresidentshallbeadmissibleinevidenceonthepartofany

ClaimantinthecourtofclaimsasevidenceinsupportofanyclaimagainsttheUnitedSates..

AndinallcaseswherejudgmentshallhaveheretoforerenderedintheCourtofClaims..infavorof

any

Claimant.this

Court

shall

on

appeal

have

no

further

jurisdiction

and

shall

dismiss

the

same

for

wantofjurisdiction.

188.Theprovisoalsocontainedthefollowingdirection:

suchpardonandacceptanceshallbetakenanddeemedinsuchsuit.conclusiveevidencethatsuch

person did take part in and give aid and comfort to the late rebellion.and on proof of such

pardon..thejurisdictionofthiscourt..shallceaseandthecourtshallforthwithdismissthesuit.

189.ThegeneralquestionwasoutlinedbythelearnedChiefJusticeinthisway:

.whetherornottheproviso.containedintheappropriationact.debarstheDefendantinerror

from recoveringasadministratorofV.F.Wilson (deceased) theproceedsof certain cotton.which

came into the possession of agents of the Treasury Department as captured or abandoned

property..


25/68

190.ThelearnedChiefJusticeconcludedthatproceedsofpropertywhichcametothepossessionof

thegovernmentbycaptureorabandonmentwasnotdivestedoutoftheoriginalowner.

191.AstotheeffectoftheprovisothelearnedChiefJusticehadthistosay:

Butthe

language

of

the

proviso

shows

plainly

that

it

does

not

intend

to

withhold

appellate

jurisdiction

exceptasameanstoanend.Itsgreatandcontrollingpurposeistodenytopardonsgrantedbythe

PresidenttheeffectwhichthisCourthadadjudgedthentohave.

192.TheChiefJusticecontinued:

It(theproviso)providesthatwheneveritshallappearthatanyjudgmentofthecourtofclaimsshall

havebeensoundedonsuchpardons.theSupremeCourtshallhavenofurtherjurisdictionandshall

dismissthesameforwantofjurisdiction.

193.ThelearnedChiefJusticeanalyzedtheeffectoftheprovisointhisway:

Thecourthasjurisdictionofthecausetoagivenpointbutwhenitascertainsthatacertainstateof

thingsexist,itsjurisdictionistoceaseanditisrequiredtodismissthecauseforwantofjurisdiction.

194.ThelearnedChiefJusticecommentedasfollows:

In the case before us no new circumstances have been created by legislation. But the court is

forbiddentogiveeffecttotheevidencewhichinitsownjudgmentsuchevidenceshouldhave.

195.BeforeemphasizingthevitalimportanceofseparatingpowersthelearnedChiefJusticeruled

finally:

WemustthinkthatCongresshasinadvertentlypassedthelimitwhichseparatesthelegislativefrom

thejudicialpower

AustralianAuthorities

196.

Learned

Queens

Counsel

for

the

Claimant

relied

on

a

number

of

Australian

authorities.

These

provide examples of judicial consideration of legislation, which were impugned as constituting

legislativeinterferencewiththejudicialprocess.Theyprovideprecedentsofthemannerinwhichthe

courtwill decidewhether the impugned legislation has crossed the line, alluded to in Liyanage,

betweeninterferenceandnoninterference.Asummaryofthecasesfollow.

ChuKhengLimvMinisterforImmigration,LocalGovernmentandEthnicAffairs

197.ChuKhengLimvMinisterforImmigration,alsoknownasTheCambodianBoatPeopleCasewas

adecisionof theHighCourtofAustralia.TheplaintiffswereCambodianNationalswhoarrived in

Australia in twogroups: the first inNovember1989and the second inMarch1990.Noneof the

plaintiffsheldvalidentrypermits.

198.TheyweredetainedincustodyandmadeunsuccessfulapplicationstotherelevantMinisterfor

refugeestatus.TheplaintiffssoughtreviewsoftheMinistersdecision.TheFederalCourtofAustralia

setasidetheministerialdecisionsandremittedthemforreconsideration.

199.Whiletheapplicationsforreviewwerebeingheard,theParliamentoftheCommonwealthpassed

theMigrationAmendmentAct1992.TheMigrationAmendmentAct insertedanewDivisionwhich

providedforthedetractionofdesignatedpersons.OfrelevancetotheproceedingsbeforethisCourt

wassection54Rwhichprovidedasfollows:

Acourtisnottoorderthereleasefromcustodyofadesignatedperson.

200.Amajorityofthehighcourt(BrennanJ,DeeneJandDawsonJ)heldthatsection54Rconstituted

adirectiontothecourt;wasmanifestlyinexcessofthelegislativepower;andwastherefore,invalid.


26/68

NicholasvtheQueen

201.ThiswasadecisionoftheHighCourtofAustralia,whichconsideredthevalidityofsection15Xof

theCrimes

Act

1914

as

amended

by

the

Crimes

Amendment

Controlled

Operations

Act

1996.

202.Thevalidityofsection15Xwasbroughtintoissuebytheapplicant,DavidMichaelNicholas,who

waschargedwith fournarcoticdrugoffences twoofwhichwerecontrary to section233Bof the

Customs Act. The offences involved drugswhichwere illegally imported into Australia by a law

enforcementofficer.

203.Ontheauthorityofanearlierdecision,RidgewayvtheQueen,theCourthadgrantedastayof

theprosecutiononthegroundthatthedrugshadbeenillegallyimportedbyanenforcementofficer.

204.TheCustomsAct1914wasthenamendedbytheCrimesAmendmentControlledOperationsAct

1996.This

amendment

introduced

anew

part,

Part

1AB,

which

provided

for

controlled

operations,

namelyoperationscarriedoutforthepurposeofobtainingevidencethatmayleadtotheprosecution

ofapersonundersection233BoftheAct.

205.WhenPart1ABenteredintoforcetheprosecutionappliedtohavethestaylifted.Inthecourse

ofthatapplicationaquestionaroseastothevalidityofsection15X,whichprovidesasfollows:

Indetermining,forthepurposesofaprosecutionforanoffenceagainstsection233BoftheCustom

Act1901.whetherevidencethatnarcoticgoodswereimportedintoAustraliaincontraventionofthe

CustomAct1901shouldbeadmitted,thefactthatalawenforcementofficercommittedanoffence

in importing thenarcoticgoodsor in aiding,abetting, counseling,procuringorbeingananyway

knowinglyconcernedintheirimportation,istobedisregarded.

206.TheApplicantlaunchedhisattackonsection15Xonthreegrounds:

Thesectioninvalidlypurportstodirectacourttoexerciseitsdiscretionarypowerinamannerwhich

isinconsistentwiththeessentialcharacterofacourtorwiththenatureofjudicialpower.

Secondly,thatsection15Xappliestoidentifiablecasesandisdirectedspecificallytotheaccusedin

thosecasesratherthantothepublicgenerally.

Thesectionconstitutesanattempt tosterilize theRidgewaydiscretion invalidlyundermines the

integrityofthecourtsprocessandpublicconfidenceintheadministrationofjustice.

207.ThemajorityoftheHighCourtofAustraliawasunanimousinrejectingallthreegroundsholding

thatsection15Xwasvalid.Inthecourseherjudgment,GaudronJreferredtoChuKhengLimvMinister

for

Immigration

(1992)

176

CLR

27

which

was

also

a

decision

of

the

High

Court

of

Australia.

In

that

case,itwassaidParliamentcannotmakealawwhichrequiresorauthorizesthecourtstoexe

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Ish and Steve Lose Section 34 Case