Islam and Muslim Societies

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FALL 2008 Newsletter No. 3 ISSN 1942-7948

Contents

* Interview with Sherry Jones on Her Novel The Jewel of Medina, Islam and Free Speech* The Strange Case of the UIJ, or the evolutions of Uzbek Jihadism by Didier Chaudet* 'Hizb ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan: A Postcolonial Perspective' by Reed Taylor* Islamic Banking by Husnul Amin

Dear All,

Itwasacouple ofweeksago that I received

anemail froma colleague ofminewhowastellingmeaboutacontroversialnovelwrittenbySherryJonesontheProphetMuhammeds(SAV) wife, Aisha. First, I thought that this

was just another Islamophobicprovocation.However, after conducting some moreextensiveresearchonthetopic; Idecidedto

i nt er vi ew She rr y J ones i n o rd er t ounderstand what she really thinks andb el ie ve s a bout I sl am . I s s he r ea ll y

Islamophobic? Or is she a nave Westernerwhoistryingtopromoteherselfbyusingtheprivate life of the most sacred person inIslam?Orarethere anypoliticalmotivationsbehind this novel? I believe that we as

Muslims either by culture or religion shouldunderstandanddifferentiatebetweentheOrientalistframeworkwhichis basedon

the imperialistic/racist approach similar towhathappenedintheDanishcartooncrisisinthe name of free speech; with people who

may havegood intentions but really do notunderstand cul tural d i f ferences andsensitivities.Ididnotreadhernovel,Ihaventreadanyofhernovels;however,personallyI

wouldlikeQindoutwhoshereallyis.RandomHousecancelledthepublicationofhernovel,

TheJewelofMedina, asaresultofapossibleterroristreprisalattack.Ontheotherhand,Pakistaniborn Kamran Pashas new novel,Mother of the Believers will be released inApril of2009. Asfar as I know PashasnewnovelisnotdifferentthanSherryJonessThe

JewelofMedina. Iwonderwhysomepeopleare suddenly interested in studying and

writingaboutProphetMuhammedspersonallife, instead of writing in the constructiveframework.Myintentionistounderstandthemotives behind these writings. I have only

questions, no answers, but answers will beprovidedbytheauthorherself, andyou, thereaderswilldecidewhethersheisgenuineornot.

Peace and Salam to you all,

Tugrul Keskin

October, 2008 / Blacksburg, Virginia

VIRGINIA TECH - Department of Sociology 560 McBryde Hall Blacksburg, VA 24061 - USA


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Interview with Sherry Jones

on Her Novel The Jewel of Medina

Islam and Free Speech

TugrulKeskin:Thankyouforacceptingthisinterview. I will be very honest and

straightforward with you in this interview.This is a very sensitive issue for Muslimsthatyouhave broached, intrying todig upand question the Prophet Muhammed's

(SAV) private life; and I believe that as aMuslim, you have a right to criticize Islamand Muslims, however, there is thin linebetween criticism andinsult/racism, like inthecaseof theDanishcartooncrisis.Wouldyou please tell us about yourself and your

recentnovel,TheJewelofMedina?

Sherry Jones: I came across the story of

Aisha for the Qirst time shortly after theWorld Trade Center attacks in 2001. As awoman and a feminist, Iwas captivated byherwit,intelligence,andstrength.IbegantoreadmoreaboutAishaandhersisterwives,andaboutMuhammad andtherevealingof

Islam, and I was hooked. My goal was tobringthesetales,alreadyfamiliartoMuslimsin the rest of the world, to Western

audiences. Iwantedto honorAishaandtheotherwives by bringingthemto lifeonthepageandallowingtheirvoicestobeheardin

ahistoricaltraditionthatlargelyfocusesonthemen.

Tugrul Keskin: I don't think that manyWesternersunderstand the levelor contextof certain sensitivities in other cultures.Frommy perspective,manyWesternersnotonlycriticize,butalsolookdownonMuslims

and demonize Islam in the name of freespeech. Thisisnotthewayto buildbridges;itisthewaytodestroybridges. Areyouoneofthesepeople?Basically,whydidyouwritethenovelabout theprivate lifeofthemostsacredpersoninIslam?Whatwasorisyour

aim?

SherryJones:AsIsaid,myaimwassimplyto

tell Aishas story. I felt called to her, a

spiritual calling. She embodies thewoman

thatIwouldlike to be: smart, strong, witty,spiritual, loving, giving, and honest withherself about her Qlaws. As I wrote andresearched,Idevelopedarespectandregardfor the Prophetand forIslam. At thesametime, I regard him as a human being, a

mortalman,ashecalledhimself. Hemusthaveexperiencedthedesires,hungers,fears,and failings that we all struggle with. Ibelieve that, by bringing those qualities tolight, wehonorMuhammadasabeingwhotranscended his Qlawed humanity by the

graceofGodandsoservedasanexampleofwhat is possible for us all, if we seek andstriveashedid.

TugrulKeskin: Today, especially after 9/11,many people call themselves an expert onIslam and Muslim societies. We can Qind

t he se p eopl e i n Washi ng ton DC o runiversities, or at think tanksas just a fewexamples.Eveninmyuniversity,peoplewhohave never been in any Muslim populatedcountriesanddon'tspeakanylanguagesarecalled Middle East experts or experts onMuslimsocietiesandIslam.Ofcourse,many

oftheseexperts use books onIslam fromanegative viewpoint to "educate" students.HowmuchdoyouknowaboutIslamandtheProphet's Muhammed's (SAV) life? Wheredidyoulearnthis?Whatsourcesdidyouuseforyourbook?

SherryJones: Iam certainlynoexpert, onlyan interested Westerner who is always

learning. I havenot been able to afford totravel to Saudi Arabia, whereThe Jewel ofMedina takes place, and where travel hasbeensorestricted. Atanyrate,14centurieshave certainly altered the culture and thelandscapeagreatdeal.Ididstudytwoyears

ofArabicallthatwasofferedatthetimeattheUniversityofMontana, and I tookanIslamic history course taught by MehrdadKiafromIran.

As for my sources, I have read everythingwritten in English that I could Qind. Mybibliography comprises some 30 books,includingafourvolumebiographyofthe


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Prophet by Ibn Kathir, written in the 14thc e n t u r y ; v a r i o u s c o l l e c t i o n s o fHadith;Women in Islam by the Moroccan

scholarFatimaMernissi;andMuhammad:ABiography by the noted Western religioushistorian Karen Armstrong. My completebibliography is available on my weblog,http://sherryjones.blogspot.com.

TugrulKeskin:HowdoyoudeQinefreespeechaccordingtoyourbook?Doyouhavetheright

totalkaboutmyprivatelife,doyouthinkthisisfreespeech?

Sherry Jones: My right to free speechcompassesmy right to artistic expression. IntheUnited States, we grow up learning thattheright to freedomofspeech, thought, andexpressionareasfundamentalastherightto

breatheandlive.

Tugrul Keskin: If this isa free speechissue,thenwhy didtheWest not pay attention toNorman Finkelstein when he could not gettenure at DePauw University, or WardChurchill who was Qired from theUniversityof Colorado as a result of the free speech

argument? Do you think that free speech isusedas anexcuseto insultanddiscriminateagainst people and cultures who are not

White/Christian/Western?Sherry Jones: I cant speak to these cases,becauseImnotfamiliarwiththem.However,IcantellyouthatourFirstAmendmentrights

are always being debated and discussed inthis country. Schools and libraries, publiclyfunded, banbooksbecausethey aredeemedoffensive, and people protest. Racists makestatementsthatoffendcertaingroups;peoplewrite books that offend others. But we

tolerate these hateful forms of expressionbecause, ifwestart banning one form, thenwheredoesitstop?

No onewantsto liveina totalitarianregime,whereeverywordismonitored.

Exceptions would be forms of speech thatendangerothers, such as death threats, andformsofexpressionthatcauseactualharmto

others, suchas childpornography. Theseareconsidered prosecutable offenses under thelaw.

Tugrul Keskin: Do you think Muslims needanother Rudyard Kipling's the White Man'sBurdeninordertoreformIslam?

Sherry Jones: Need isnotthe issuehere. Ididnt write my book because I thoughtanyone needed it. Iwrote itbecauseI wasexcitedabout theremarkable AishabintAbiBakrandIthoughtotherswouldliketoreadabouther, too. However, Ido think theworld

wil l beneQ it f rom learning about theegalitarian underpinnings of Islam and thecrucialroleofwomeninformingtheUmma.

TugrulKeskin:Today,therearethreetypesofpeople who study Islam in the WesternUniversities and Societies. First, Orientalistswho are not genuine andare thepoliticallymotivated crusaders; second, Populists who

study Islam because Islam is an importantsubjectto specializein, inorder toQinda jobandnichefortheircareers;third,peoplewhostudy Islam, who genuinely want to learnabout Islam and MuslimSocieties; I believethis third category of people are more

objective than therest. Wheredo you placeyourself?

Sherry Jones: Ill bet there are more thanthree kinds! But I approached my researchwith a genuine interest in learning more.WhatIlearned,Iwantedtosharewithothers.Of course, what Ive written is just MYinterpretationofwhat Ive read. Its notthe

deQinitive version of Aishas life, only myvisionofwhatherlifecouldhavebeenlike.

Tugrul Keskin: On September 30, 2005,

JyllandsPosten Newspaper from Denmark,publishedcartonsoftheProphetMuhammed(SAV) and this fueled tensions betweenMuslimsandWest/Europe/US. Do youthink

thatthiswasanhonestmistake?Orwas thepublishingofthesecartoonsintentionalwithpolit ical motivations behind i t? Mostimportantly,how do youcompareyour bookwiththisincident?
http://sherryjones.blogspot.com/http://sherryjones.blogspot.com/http://sherryjones.blogspot.com/


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Sherry Jones: The publishing of the Danishcartoonswas another exercise of freedom ofexpression.Themessagewasclear: Islamhas

becomeperceived, intheWesternworld, asareligion of violence and destruction. Thosewho protested with violence did nothing tochangethatperception.

Mybookis abookofwomensempowermentthat also attempts to promote Westernunderstanding ofa religionthat is Qilledwithmisperceptions in the States. I feel uniquely

situated to write this book, and its sequel,because Iheld those same erroneousnotionsofIslambeforeIbeganmyresearch.

Tugrul Keskin: Do you believe Islam is apeacefulreligionorareligionofwarassomeWesternconservativecrusadersclaim?

Sherry Jones: Islam in its pure form is areligionofpeace, inmy opinion. MuhammadadmonishedBelievers to Qight in selfdefenseonly, and he practiced that. He forgave his

enemies even those, such as Abu Sufyanswife,Hind, who didntask for it.He said,Weareall createdfromthesame soul.Youcantgetmuchmorepeaceful,andegalitarian,thanthat. Unfortunately for moderate Muslims,

violent extremists within the faith havecreated a negative portrait of Islam in the

Western world. Some believe that Muslimswant to conquer and rule the world underSharialaw.Ihopemybookwillhelpthosewhoread it to understand the true Islam, as

Muhammadintendedit.

TugrulKeskin: Do you think that the current

US foreign policy toward Islam and MuslimSocietiesarebasedonanimperialistagenda?

SherryJones:Yes,Ido.Anditisarealtragedy.

The United States is now perceived amisperception based on the actions of ourgovernment asabully.MostpeopleI knowdontagreewithourforeignpolicyconcerningthe Middle East. Ive participated in several

protestsandvigilsforpeace, andIholdgreathope that anew president will bring change.Killing only begets killing, and producesnothingbuthatredandfear.IwanttheU.S.out

ofAfghanistanandIraq.Iwantustorejectthisculture of fear imposed upon us both byviolent rel igious fanatics and our own

government.Iwishforusallcourageouslives.

SherryJones:Ajournalistfor28years,Sherry

Jones has worked as a st aff reporter fornewspapers in suburban Philadelphia, North

Carolina, andMontana, and has published innumerous magazines including Newsweek,Southwest Art, CMJ, American Cowboy, andRider. She is a freelance correspondent for

BNA Inc., aninternational newsagencyin theWashington,D.C.areaandPlatt'sMetalsWeekandWomen'seNewsinNewYork."TheJewelofMedina"isherdebutnovel.

About the Novel: "The Jewel ofMedina" bySherryJonesisahistoricalnovelaboutthelifeof A'isha bint Abi Bakr, the youngest, andfavorite, wifeof the ProphetMuhammad. Set

in 7thcentury Saudi Arabia, it details thefounding of Islam, completewith battlesandpolitical intrigue, and examines the role ofwomenintheearlyIslamiccommunity.

Announcement: MESA get-

together

Dear Mideast sociologists and fellow-travelers,

I hope that you will join me for an informalget-together at the Middle East StudiesAssociation conference at 3 p.m., Monday,

November 24, 2008. We will meet at thelobby of the conference hotel and, dependingon our numbers, grab refreshments at thehotel cafe or a nearby eatery while learningabout each others' research and concocting

potential collaborations.

I realize that some of you have sessions atthis time, and I apologize for the inevitablescheduling conflicts!

--Charles KurzmanDepartment of SociologyCB#3210, 155 Hamilton HallUniversity of North CarolinaChapel Hill, NC 27599 USAPhone: (1) (919) 962-1241Fax: (1) (919) 962-7568E-mail: [email protected]: http://www.unc.edu/~kurzman
http://www.unc.edu/~kurzmanhttp://www.unc.edu/~kurzmanmailto:[email protected]://www.unc.edu/~kurzmanhttp://www.unc.edu/~kurzmanmailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


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The Strange Case of the UIJ, or the

evolutions of Uzbek Jihadism

Didier Chaudet

The French Institute of International Relations

[email protected]

Historically, Uzbek Salafism is, to someextent, unique in Central Asia. It is the only onein the area that has stayed strongly revolutionary,uncompromising, and prone to violence from itsbeginning in the Ferghana Valley at thebeginning of the 1990s to its new safe heaven inWaziristan, Pakistan. Like their Tajikcounterparts, they had the desire to conquerpower, but contrary to them, their path madethem go further and further from the Islamistmainstream to an al qaedan way of thinking.Its final result is the Islamic Jihad Union. Thisgroup is probably not very important in terms ofnumbers, but it can organize itself from GreaterCentral Asia to Europe, and it sees its fight as aninternational one. Such an evolution makes it apotential global security threat in the future. Howcome a local islamist fight in Central Asia canevolve in such an unnatural way?

The Islamist situation in Uzbekistan wasno different from the one in Tajikistan after theindependence. Groups like Islam Lashkarlari(Warriors Of Islam) and its military wing Adolat(Justice) wanted to create an Islamic state,something that meant nothing else than a stateable to deal with the post-Soviet situation.Indeed, the people in Uzbekistan lost a lot withthe fall of the Soviet Union: free medicalservices, free education, and more importantly,

control of the prices of primary goods. They sawmafia getting stronger, being able to challengethe state, and the society becoming more andmore unequal and unsecured. But from 1992, thepath of Tajik and Uzbek Islamists went in verydifferent paths: during this year already, IslamKarimov had been able to reaffirm its power andto strike hard against any kind of opposition.Tajik official power has not been that strong, and

the country fell into civil war. So from thebeginning of the 1990s, for the outside world,Uzbekistan looked like an example of stability inCentral Asia. But nothing could have beenfurther from the truth.

In fact, the 1990s were the time of anextreme radicalisation of Uzbek Salafism. First,

one can easily make the case, through the actionsofAdolat, that the Uzbek movement was alreadyprone to violence. But once in exile, the Islamistscould not get the peace of the defeated. Indeed,the Uzbek regime continued its fight regionallyagainst its opposition, sending secret services totarget Islamist and non-Islamist enemies of thestate. The regime was only beginning to stabilizeitself, and the fear of a Tajik fate made Tashkentchoose drastic methods to avoid destabilization.As explained by Islam Karimov himself in July1992: It is necessary to straighten out the brainsof one hundred people in order to save the livesof thousands. It meant, by the end of the 1990s,a strong repression against the religious andindependent part of the population, withoutdistinction between simple believers and possiblesuspects. Such politics reinforce tensions insidethe country, making it easier for the Islamists inexile to organize sleeper cells. OutsideUzbekistan they clearly positioned themselves as

struggling in a regional, and not only national,war, fighting the Tajik government with the localIRP (Islamic Revival Party). They clearlyappeared as hardliners, refusing the inter-Tajikpeace in 1997. They also opposed their allies onnationalism: the Tajik Islamists were in favor ofthe Afghan Tajik Ahmad Shah Masoud, when theUzbeks, on purely ideological ground, preferredto support the Taliban. Those divergencesexplain the formal birth of the IMU (Islamic

Movement of Uzbekistan) in 1996. From 1999 to2001, this group has been able to put pressure onall the countries surrounding the FerghanaValley. Indeed, its military commander, JumaNamangani, was able to use the Tajik part of theValley, and the Afghan Emirate of the Taliban, ashis bases, and to strike forcefully in Kyrgyzstanand in Uzbekistan. He was also able to play thosethree Central Asian countries against one another
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]


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through his military actions, making themdistrust one another, and pushing Tashkent toextreme reactions, this time against itsneighbours. For example, Islam Karimov didnot hesitate to order the bombings of Kyrgyzterritory, or to mine the Uzbek borders withthose two countries. During this period,Namangani has been able to organize effective

sleeper cells, in Kyrgyzstan in particular, as wellas to continue to use rug trafficking in order tofinance his war against the Uzbek regime.

Without the American campaign againstAfghanistan by the end of 2001, this is verypossible to imagine a Central Asian region beingmore and more disrupted by the consequencesof IMUs military actions. The loss of theAfghan safe heaven has clearly been a terribleblow for the IMU: Juma Namangani died in

Afghanistan fighting for the Taliban, theorganization lost its training camps, and theother leader of the IMU, Tahir Yuldashev, hasnot been able to keep the group united.Numerous fighters decided to abandon themovement at that time. This is interesting tonote that those who did so disapprove the focuson other targets than the Near Enemy, i.e. theUzbek regime. They did not see the fight for theTaliban, or against others than Islam Karimov,

as relevant. It means that the ones who kepttheir affiliation, and their desire to fight, weremuch closer of the al qaedan vision of a totalwar against the Nearandthe Far Enemy. In hisspeeches, Tahir Yuldashev still tried to keep abalance between those interested in a concretefight against the post-Soviet Central Asianregimes of the Ferghana Valley, and those whosaw the war in much broader terms.

Some in the lat ter group grewdisillusioned with this approach and decided tosplit from the original movement. They formedtogether the Islamic Jihad Union, or IslamicJihad Group, in 2002. If numerous Islamistgroups in Central Asia seem to exist only onpaper and in the head of the members of Uzbeksecret services, this one is very real. It appearsthat this group has been responsible of the firstsuicide bombings in Central Asia (March-April

2004), and the first attacks against the FarEnemy in the area, i.e. the US and Israel(suicide attacks against the embassies, June2004). It has to be connected with suicidebombings of Uzbeks against the Coalition inAfghanistan, expressing a deeper involvementagainst the Far Enemy than ever before. Thechoice of this new group to see the war in a

broader sense was proved again in November2006, when an IJU plot failed, this time inIslamabad, with Pakistani recruits, who tried toattack government buildings. Last, but not least,September 2007 saw the discovery of IJUsleeper cells in Germany, recruiting German-Turks and German converts in order to strikethis European ally of the US in the war forAfghanistan. At the same period, the groupengaged itself in an intense propaganda

campaign on Turkish Islamist sites in order tomake it better known. The leadership is stillUzbek, but it is now clear that the IJU became akind of Turkic Al Qaeda: clearly internationalistin its vision, its first goal is a revival of theAfghan Emirate of mullah Omar. Such asituation is particularly disturbing, as it is aproof that local politics in Greater Central Asia,and the support received for them from theGreat Powers made such a radicalisation

possible.

Didier Chaudet is a Research Fellow at IFRI

(The French Institute of International Relations IFRI is one of the main think tanks in theEuropean Union). He is a Lecturer at theInstitute of Political Studies in Paris (SciencesPo Paris) on Security in Greater Central Asia(Post-Soviet Central Asia, Afghanistan,Pakistan). He was a Fox Fellow at YaleUniversity


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'Hizb ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan: A

Postcolonial Perspective'

Reed Taylor

The Alliance for Social, Political, Ethical, andCultural Thought

Virginia [email protected]

This article is a summary of a study thatbegan from a research project on Hizb ut Tahrir(HT) in Indonesia, where I sought to explain theappeal of the organization using a post-colonialapproach. While I was doing research on thisorganization through Hizb ut Tahrir Indonesia(HIT) website, I came across an article on the

plight of HT members in Uzbekistan and howimportant it was for HTI to support its fellowmembers. This is interesting because mostIndonesians do not know where Uzbekistan is,or feel a connection to the people in Uzbekistanbecause of its Muslim population. In contrast,HTI has disseminated several articles on theimportance of solidarity between Indonesianmembers and Uzbekistan members. And fromthis, I began to question a common assertion

that HT is a relatively disconnected politicalmovement based primarily on regional andnational borders. Instead, I propose that as apan-Islamic movement, HT should beunderstood as a group whose members seethemselves as belonging to an identity thatcrosses regional and national boundaries.Therefore, I argue that the post-colonialapproach that I have used in the case of Hizb utTahrir Indonesia can also shed some light, at

least in part, on the case of Hizb ut TahrirUzbekistan.

Currently, HT in Uzbekistan is explainedin terms of a clash of civilization model, or interms of a resurgent Marxist-Leninist model. Iargue that both of these theories are antagonisticand coming from Eurocentric perspectives. Analternative is to consider the postcolonial

condition that, I would argue, has had a muchlarger influence on the formation of HT and itsappeal in a postcolonial context. Beyondexplaining the development and structure of HT,postcolonial theory points towards a reificationof a neo-colonialist mentality by internalizingand negating a hybridized identity between the

colonizer and the colonized. If one agrees withthe thesis proposed in this paper, it can beargued that there is another threat ofneocolonialism that emerges from within. Weshould consider changing our discourse to focuson the postcolonial conditions of HT inUzbekistan and less on the call for an authenticIslamic identity.

Hizb ut-Tahrir is a modern politicalIslamic movement that aims at establishing aglobal Islamic state that is meant to subvert thecurrent postcolonial conditions in predominantlyMuslim regions of the world. Hizb ut-Tahrirdoes not want to work from within the currentpolitical arrangements to establish political andsocial change; instead it is trying to form aviable alternative in the form of a transnationalstate. What is not being overtly stated in Hizbut-Tahrirs writings is the underlying connectionbetween the colonized psyche and mimicry ofthe colonizer as an attempt to reverse the pre-

determined roles that are being questioned inHizb ut-Tahrirs ideology (Bhabha, 1994).

A postcolonial critique offers severaladvantages over approaching Hizb ut-Tahrirfrom the perspective of a Clash of Civilizationswith the West.It has been customary to refer toan impending battle between civilizations in thediscussions of Hizb ut-Tahrir and even withinHizb ut-Tahrirs own discourse presented ononline on their websites and in their texts (Hizb

ut-Tahrir, 1998, 1999, 2001, n.d.). However, ifwe consider the historical development of Hizbut-Tahrirs ideology and if we reconsider theirtexts form a postcolonial critique, Hizb ut-Tahrirno longer embodies a homogenous Islamicculture that is purportedly antagonistic to amodern Western culture. Instead of creating adivide between Islamic populations and Western


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countries, a postcolonial critique is applied todestabilize and decenter these fixed borders tomove beyond a reification of colonialism. Byappealing to Homi Bhabhas postcolonialdiscourse, the emphasis is placed on identityformation and the violent effects on the psychefor both the colonized and colonizer. It is the

decentering of these binaries within colonialismof the Self/Other, black/white, core/periphery,etc. that creates the foundation for postcolonialmovements such as Hizb ut-Tahrir.

In Hizb ut-Tahrirs writings, there areseveral important concepts that have beenappropriated from modern political Islamistsdiscussed above that are used to justify a globalIslamic state. The most important concept isKhalifa, which is used by Hizb ut-Tahrir toappeal to the nostalgia of a return to the time ofthe first four Caliphs as way to remove thecontemporary Muslim from the coercive powersof secularism, democracy, and capitalism. Inaddition to Khalifa, Hizb ut-Tahrir appropriatesseveral other terms in making their argument fora global Islamic state, including the concepts ofummah, kuffar, and ijtihad; each correspondingto a wider discourse of anti-democracy, anti-human r ights , and ant i - individual i smrespectively. Through the use of each of these

terms, I argue that Hizb ut-Tahrir is reacting tothe colonial model rather than attempting toreturn to a more egalitarian and pious past.

In Homi Bhabhas (1994) The Locationof Culture, Bhabha wrote that the identity ofsomeone colonized is not simply defined bybeing marked as other to the colonizer, but it is adecentering of the I as the intervening space ofthe Other as an enunciation that is inscribing thecolonizers Self. Hybridity for Bhabha can only

occur in this in-between state of fluidity, whereantagonistic binaries of self/other, black/white,core/periphery, etc. are being rearticulated as,neither the One nor the Other butsomething else besides ((Bhabha, p. 41). It is inthis Third Space that the lens of the Self andOther are dissolved and a transformative processof hybridity takes place. What should bebecoming clear is that hybridity is not the

replacing of one cultural language for anotherand it is not simply the incorporation of onecultural language into another; it is thenegotiation between interconnected culturallanguages with drastically different relations topower. However, power is not clearly defined; itis distorted such that the colonizer/colonized are

both trapped by having to define themselvesbased on the interstices of the Other, neitherescapes unharmed (Bhabha, p. 153-154).

Another important concept found inBhabha that is an aspect of cultural hybridity ismimicry. Part of the structure of colonialism isthat a segment of the colonized population isneeded to act as a middleman between thecolonizer/colonized; they are required to mimicthe colonizer by copying his language, customs,and dispositions. From the colonizersperspective, it is not enough to simply dress andact like him; they must hold the same values andappreciate the world as he does. However, thiscan never be an exact replica of one culturallanguage for another because of theambivalence and power inequalities of theinteraction. For the colonized, mimicry is afurther depersonalization and suppression of theI in identity because it only validates thecolonizers Self and leaves the colonized with

an empty shell of the Other that is only visiblethrough the colonizers eyes.

Bhabhas discussion centers on theongoing legacy of colonialism that continues tohave a profound effect on the formation of acontemporary Muslim identity. He prescribes arenewal of a historically informed culturalidentity that can potentially overcome thelegacies of colonialism. However, Hizb ut-Tahrir rejects a negotiation between cultural

languages and calls for an outright gation ofWestern culture, in a similar vein to thecolonialist model that Hizb ut-Tahrir is trying toovercome. The basis for this application is adesire to form a uniquely non-Western Islamicidentity ; however, such an identity cannotignore the mental and material reality of thepostcoloniality within the gatio. Instead, Hizbut-Tahrir ends up reversing the I from Other to


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Self without escaping the fundamentaldynamic that gationes this colonialist model.It is due to this lack of negotiation that Hizbut-Tahrir is unable move beyond colonialism.The problem is that by not negotiatingbetween a contemporary Muslim identity anda Western hegemonic cultural identity, Hizbut-Tahrir is re-inscribing through mimicry the

current postcolonial arrangements but in thega of colonizer through the revival of apure Islamic cultural identity (Bhabha,122-126). It is in this blurred copy ofcolonialism that Hizb ut-Tahrir has positioneditself.

In contrast to this postcolonial critique,Hizb ut-Tahrir is generally presented as beinga radical political Islamic movement inaccordance with a traditional Islamic culture

that clashes against a modern Western cultureor, if read literally, as a political Islamicmovement that advocates a return to the pastglory of Islam through establishing atransnational Caliphate. The essential problemwith both of gat readings of Hizb ut-Tahrir isthat they emphasize divergence withoutleaving room for a Third Space of enunciation(Bhabha, 56). Hizb ut-Tahrir is best viewed asa gation of Western hegemonic culture fromwithin, instead of an external culture that isdistinct and antagonistic towards the West.Based on the above postcolonial positioning ofHizb ut-Tahrirs ideology, it can be argued thatthey are neo-colonialists in the making.

BibliographyBhabha, Homi. The Location of Culture. 1994.New York: Routledge Classics, Reprinted2004.Hizb ut-Tahrir. The Islamic State. 1998. 12

Dec. 2007.Hizb ut-Tahrir. The Social System in Islam.1999. 12 Dec. 2007.Hizb ut-Tahrir. Structuring of a Party. trans.4th ed. London: Al-Khilafah Publications,2001. 12 Dec. 2007.Hizb ut-Tahrir. The American Campaign toSuppress Islam. n.d. 12 Dec. 2007.

Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia. 02 Aug. 2008.Empat Muslimah Uzbekistan Ditahan Antara3 dan 5 Tahun Penjara Karena MenyebarkanIslam 14 Sept. 2008.Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia. 11 Sept. 2008.Pejabat Uzbek Perintahkan Polisi AwasiKaum Muslim Beribadah di Masjid Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia. 14 Sept. 2008.

Reed Taylor received his bachelors from theUniversity of New Mexico in 2001 inPhilosophy and History with his senior thesisin Asian Studies on Writing IndonesianHistory. He was an exchanged student at theUniversity of Hull in Applied Ethics andSoutheast Asian Studies, and received hisMasters of Philosophy in 2004 from ErasmusUniversity Rotterdam in Philosophy andEconomics. He is currently a second year PhDstudent in the Alliance for Social, Political,Ethical, and Cultural Thought, a newinterdisciplinary graduate program at VirginiaTech. Current research interests includeinterdisciplinary approaches to gender andpolitics in Indonesia, Islamic political thought,indigenous separatist movements, andpostcolonial theory.

Contactinforma,on:

Reed W. TaylorPhD student, 2011 ASPECT211 Lane Hall (0226)Virginia TechBlacksburg,VA24061

[email protected]


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Islamic Banking

Husnul Amin

Institute of Social Studies, ISSThe Hague, - The Netherlands

[email protected]

Capitalist system has always beentagged with inherent financial fragility andbusiness cycles. The recent credit crisis hasmade many staunch supporters of free marketmechanism think to question its efficientworking without active state supervision andintervention. For socialist comrades whathappened in the last few months is quite naturaland it was supposed to happen. For Islamists,

Muslim economists and activists of Islamicpolitical, this is the begining of the fall ofcapitalist economic system and replacing it withan Islamic financial system which is interest-free, more stable and socially responsible. Inthis brief essay questions such as : does the ideaof Islamic bank offers a panacea to the currentcrisis? Is there such thing as interest-freebanking system free of all inherent fragilitiesdeemed to be the hallmark of the interest-based

financial system? How and to what extent theoperations of Islamic banking have retained theideals of offering interest-free arrangements inits actual practice?

Of all the capitalist institutions the onlyone that has posed itself as the most intimidatingchallenge to the Muslim thinkers is the moderninstitution of banking. To scuffle this specter,an army of Islamic scholars, intellectuals andMuslim economists have set out to model the

idea of an Islamic alternative i.e., Islamicbanking. Enormous energies have been put inthis direction in the last four decades. A numberof theoretical models of Islamic banking havebeen proposed in the literature and applied inpractice. A number of enterprising individualsand states have tried to implement these modelsand produce a model of Islamic banking system.

Pakistan, Iran, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, Sudanand Malaysia are to name a few such states.Several academic institutions were establishedsuch as the International Institute of IslamicEconomics (IIIE) in Islamabad and IslamicResearch and Training Institute (IRTI) at IDBJeddah to offer courses and degree programs, to

teach and research and train individuals forIslamic banking operations. Such academicpursuits were co-supported by an active mediacampaign run by different Islamic banks andIslamic institutions to publicize and promote theinstitutions of Islamic banking. In Pakistan anumber of electronic channels broadcastedsponsored programs on Islamic banking and itsShariah-compliant products. Most of theresearch conducted in the area of Islamiceconomics was conducted on different aspectsof Islamic financial system with less focus onother areas such as poverty alleviation anddistribution issues. This issue of research-bias isbeautifully explained by scholars such asTaimur Kurn and Izzuddin Pal in their seminalworks on Islamic economics.

Claims of Muslim economists andIslamic banks are mounting. They claim formulti-billion dollars deposits and financing witha higher rate of return on deposits. The rate of

return is legitimized on the basis of the elementof risk and thus its variability. The growth andexpansion of Islamic banks worldwide is alsoshown to be tremendous. Its popularity and isclaimed to be not only among the Muslimcountries but also in Europe and the USA.Claims are also made that non-Muslim countriesalso desire Islamic banking branches andIslamic windows. Although, less effort has beenmade to enquire why this desire is common

among the non-Muslim countries? Is it thequality of Islamic banking and novelty of itsproducts over the interest-based commercialbanks or the underlying motivation for attractingmore savings of the Muslim communities?

Islamic banks offer a number of so-called Islamic modes of financing. There aremodes of financing such as Modaraba and


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Musharaka which are considered at the core ofthe Shariah as permissible and interest-freeamong all the scholars. And there are other toolssuch as Murabaha etc which are found to be onthe margins of the Shariah-complacency.History of Islamic banking practice reveal thatan initial moving passion was shown for the

former tools and less for the latter one. But laterthis composition changed and more enthusiasmwas shown for the relatively risk-free modesand less for the other tools. Although, the formerhad more risk involved but close to Shariah inletter and spirit. What happened that in actualpractice the true banking instincts (no risk, moreprofit) prevailed over this altruistic passion andthe operations switched to tools such asMurabaha etc. There are also empiricalevidences of how the profit motive hascompelled the Islamic banking practice toprovide more resources to trading than to moreproductive sectors such as agriculture andindustry.

All Muslim economists do not fullyendorse the current practice of Islamic banking.Within the ranks of Muslim economists, anumber of dissidents can be found. They are onthe margins and often less heard but these arevoices to be voiced. Some have serious

reservations over the very notion of the idea andcurrent practice of Islamic banking system. Onesuch renown scholar when asked about thecurrent status of Islamic bank was reported tohave responded as if the possibility of anIslamic prostitution can exist then an Islamic +Bank might be sellable what is supposed tobe the ideals of the Islamic banks are in contrastto the very instincts of the banking industry.Banks are not supposed to be risking itself and

its customers nor deemed to be working foralleviation of poverty. If they have to be, thenthey will convert to another form and will ceaseto be known as banks. Banks are not NGOs, norwelfare organizations. Banks are institutions forearning profits through lending and borrowingwithout risking its loans and profit and thecapital of its customers. (face to face interview2005)

Some basic theoretical work is done byGhamidi (2008) and his students to promote theconcept that all institutions of capital formationand its management be under the control of thepubl ic sector. The model proposes adichotomous arrangement where financialmanagement should completely come under the

control of the state and the real sectorcomprising by industry, agriculture and trade begiven in the private hands. Ghamidis assertionis that it doesnt matter how much effort is doneto eliminate interest from the bankingtransactions it will re-enter through backdoorand will hamper all such efforts of eliminatinginterest from financial transactions. This ideacouldnt gain currency among the populistMuslim economists and corporate-Ulama.

Overw helmin g major i ty of thecontributors to the theoretical models are thosewho were trained in the Western new-classicaltradition of economics. And since these moderneducated economists were Muslims too, theycame up with banking models with a patchworkof Islamic tools engineered by traditionalUlama. The so-called Islamic tools were re-energized by traditional Ulama from Fiqhliterature. These were Arabic names for differenttransactions now baptized as corpus of holy

words which can never be disagreed. TheseArabic names were labeled, packaged andmarketed as if these were revealed as alternativeIslamic tools to the modern tools of commercialbanking. The social construction of non-ArabMuslim societies is that they surrender to anysuch names and labels that sounds in Arabic. Allsuch names would be respected, blindlyfollowed and never put to criticism. It happenedthat interest is being sold to Muslims under the

beautiful packaging of these Arabic titles calledIslamic modes of financing.

The Muslim scholarship is engaged in afierce battle with the elimination of interestfrom transactions. Less attention is paid to theidea of engaging with the institution that propelsinterest i.e., modern banking industry. In reality,the problem is not with the interest/usury/riba


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with the very institution of banking that isdependent on interest for its survival. Imaginingbank without interest is to conceive a Muslimwithout Ieeman (belief/faith). If Islamiceconomics and the so-called Muslim economistshave to contribute something new and originalto the capitalist world then they should come up

with an original alternative ofthe modernbanking system. After reading and reading onIslamic banking system and Islamic economics,I can very safely say that the model of Islamicbanking is nothing but a blend of the modernfinancial tools with a patchwork of Arabicvocabulary presented as Islamic financialmodes.

Whenever there is a financial crisis or amove towards Islamization of economy, the ideaof Islamic economics and Islamic bankingsystem is presented such as if it is a newdiscovery or an amazing exploration. The fact ofthe matter is that it has lost all its potential, itsoriginality and vitality very soon after it cameinto existence.

We look forward to a Muslimeconomist(s) who come(s) up with an originalidea of visualizing a financial system that isworkable on this earth. This would be possibleonly if we stop thinking about Islam as a

Complete System of life and start working asnormal human beings living on this planetmeeting its requirements. When we say Islamoffers a complete code of life from economy toevery part of life then we stop thinkingcreatively and just wait for Islamic sources toproduce a system before us. Whereas in realityIslam has nothing to do with producing"systems" but only with basic parameters. If wehave assumed that Islam has its own banking

and financial system that will challenge andreplace the existing capitalist system then weare mistaken. If we can just think differentlythat Islam has discussed only some basicparameters (those also very few with limitedscope and effect) then we can start thinking on'what' and 'how' to work on an alternativefinancial system. This is an idea the Muslim

economists will never bother to ponder over, Iam sure.

Husnul Amin is a PhD student at the Instituteof Social Studies, The Hague. Originally fromPakistan, he is studying Islamic institutions anddevelopment discourse in his home country,

with emphasis on poverty alleviation. The studyis constructed on three levels of analysis -Islamic political parties, Islamic religiousschools (madrassas) and individual Ulama. Hisstudy aims to explore how, and to what extent,issues concerning poverty are debated intheoretical discourses and in the practicalactivities of Islamic political parties, religiousschools and religious scholars in Pakistan. Healso writes for an Urdu daily newspaperDailyMashriq published from Peshawar, Pakistan.His columns can be accessed athttp://dailymashriq.com.pk/oppion/hussian.html

Contact Information:

PhD Fellow in Development Studies

Institute of Social Studies, ISSThe Hague,

The Netherlands

Room No. 5.17ISS,2502 LT
http://dailymashriq.com.pk/oppion/hussian.htmlhttp://dailymashriq.com.pk/oppion/hussian.html


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CALL FOR PAPERS: IBN KHALDUN TODAYPRECURSOR OR ALTERNATIVE?

Ibn Khaldun Symposium May 29-31 2009 Istanbul

International Ibn Khaldun Society

Co-sponsored by Duke Islamic Studies Center (DISC),Duke University; Department of Malay Studies,

National University of Singapore; Istanbul Foundationfor Education and Research (ISAR)

The symposium is organized by the International IbnKhaldun Society and cosponsored by Duke Universityand the National University of Singapore. Thisinternational symposium is the second on IbnKhaldun. The first took place in Istanbul in 2006where the participants decided to establish theInternational Ibn Khaldun Society and to convene ameeting every three years in Istanbul. Selected papersfrom the first International Ibn Khaldun symposium

have been published in Turkish (Turkish Journal ofIslamic Studies, 2006) and English (Asian Journal ofSocial Science, 2008). The papers from the secondInternational Symposium on Ibn Khaldun will also be

published in English and Turkish.

SUBMISSION INFORMATION: Papers can besubmitted through mail or e-mail. Submission of

papers should include:1) Cover page (containing: title,par ticipants name and institutional affiliation,participants e-mail address, telephone and faxnumbers if available) 2) Abstract (300 wordsmaximum) 3) Biographical statement of participantthat describes research interests and recent

publications (200 words maximum)

LANGUAGE OF THE SYMPOSIUM: Papers can bepr es en ted in Turki sh , Ar abi c, an d Engli sh.Simultaneous translation will be available. Selected

papers of the symposium will be published.

TIMETABLE: November 30, 2008: Deadline forsubmission of abstracts; December 30, 2008:Confirmation of the accepted abstracts; March 30,2009: Deadline for submission of papers; April 15,2009: Deadline for confirmation of participation; May29-31, 2009: Symposium

SCHEDULE: The symposium will begin on Friday,May 29, 2009 and end on Sunday, May 31, 2009.

FUNDING: Accommodation will be provided for allparticipants for three days. A limited amount offunding, particularly for participants from abroad, isavailable for travel expenses. Please contact theSymposium Secretariat for further information.

ACTIVITIES: Visits to historical and cultural sites ofIstanbul such as the Topkap Palace, the Saint Sophia,and the Blue Mosque, and a Bosphorus tour will bearranged for participants.

SECRETARIAT AND CONTACT INFORMATION

Mr. Hasim Koc: [email protected]

Tel: + 90-216 310 9920 ext 114 Fax: +90-216 3912633 Istanbul Foundation for Education and Research(ISAR) Glfem Hatum Mah. Aziz Efendi MektebiSok. No: 2 skdar 34672 Istanbul, TURKEY

SOCIOLOGY OF ISLAM & MUSLIM SOCIETIES

Sociology of Islam

&MUSLIM SOCIETIES560 McBryde Hall (0137)Department of SociologyVirginia TechBlacksburg, VA 24061 USA

.

Editorial Board:

Husnul Amin, Institute of Social Studies, ISS The NetherlandsHaimaa El Wardy - Al-Azhar, EgyptSharif Islam - University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USATugrul Keskin - Virginia Tech, USASadia Saeed - University of Michigan, USAYogi Sikand - Journalist, IndiaReed Taylor - Virginia Tech, USAJouni Tilli - University of Jyvaskyla, Finland

Jeremy Walton - University Of Chicago, USAPublication InformationThis newsletter is published from individual contributors, mailing list posts, web and other resources, and as such it represents adiverse set of views. The views and opinions published here are not necessarily those of the editors or publishersMailing ListThe Sociology of Islam mailing list is hosted at Virginia Tech. To subscribe to this listserv, send an email to: [email protected]://sociologyofislam.blogspot.com/ and http://www.sociologyofislam.org / Copyright 2008 by Tugrul Keskin. ISSN 19427956
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