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Islamic Education among Chechens andIngush: Pupils', Teachers' and Experts'OpinionsIrina Molodikova & Victoria GalyapinaPublished online: 22 Sep 2011.

To cite this article: Irina Molodikova & Victoria Galyapina (2011) Islamic Education among Chechensand Ingush: Pupils', Teachers' and Experts' Opinions, Religion, State and Society, 39:2-3, 263-279,DOI: 10.1080/09637494.2011.584711

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Islamic Education among Chechens and Ingush:

Pupils’, Teachers’ and Experts’ Opinions

IRINA MOLODIKOVA & VICTORIA GALYAPINA

ABSTRACT

This article offers an examination of the situation of young people in the Northern Caucasus,focusing particularly on the children of Chechens and Ingush, and looking at their religiousenvironment with particular emphasis on Islamic education. It shows a variety of sources from

which this education is received, such as school, family, mosques, Islamic Institutes (often attachedto mosques) and television. The article analyses the role of Islamic education in socialisation ofyoung people within the context of the complex situation in the region, the impact of armedconflicts, politically extremist versions of Islam, and reforms proposed by the Russian federal

government. The analysis is based on pupils’ essays, interviews, focus groups involving schoolteachers and expert opinions.

Introduction

Many commentators have pointed out that despite Islam’s historic presence in Russiafor centuries and Russia’s 1997 law Freedom of Conscience and ReligiousAssociations, supposedly ensuring equality of religions, Islam does not have a statusequal to that of Russian Orthodoxy (Malashenko, 2004). Further, unlike RussianOrthodoxy, Islam has no centralised authority, but is divided into dozens of differentjurisdictions (Spiritual Administrations (Dukhovnyye upravleniya)).

This paper looks at Islam in the Northern Caucasus, where the situation isextremely complex, focusing particularly on Chechens and Ingush, but employingcomparative material from other republics. The majority of Russians consider theregion to be the source of radical extremist Islam, popularly known as ‘Wahhabism’.1

Indeed, some local Muslims tend to be disillusioned with democracy, and with bothcentral and local governments, and to advocate a more just society based on ‘pure’Islamic principles. The number of adherents in the Northern Caucasus has beenestimated as being in the tens of thousands (Malashenko, 2004) out of an estimatedtotal population of 142 million in the Russian Federation. The growth of‘Wahhabism’ became particularly significant during and after the two Chechen wars(1994–96 and 1999–2009).2 The conflicts between the federal authorities and the localpopulation claimed many lives and have not been followed by a peaceful resolution.

Religion, State & Society, Vol. 39, Nos. 2/3, June/September 2011

ISSN 0963-7494 print; ISSN 1465-3974 online/11/2-30263-17 � 2011 Taylor & Francis

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2011.584711

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(Tishkov, 2001, 2007). Ongoing anti-terrorist operations in the Northern Caucasusrepublics have not prevented an increase in suicide bombers in recent years. Most areyoung and a significant number are women. The increase suggests that the authorities’governance policy in the Caucasus is failing. As an illustration we might take theproclamation of the ‘Islamic State of the Caucasus Emirate’ on 7 October 2007 by thewarlord Doku Umarov,3 who encouraged his supporters to organise a still-continuingseries of terrorist attacks, including suicide bombings, leading to a further deteriorationin the situation in the Northern Caucasus. According to Umarov, the militants havewidened the concept of ‘fighting the enemy’ to include civilians as well as theauthorities. Umarov advocates expanding military operations from the Caucasus areato the entire territory of Russia. In February 2010 he said that ‘[The war] won’t just beon television somewhere far away in the Caucasus’ (Teraktam, 2010).

Lacking a viable civil alternative, people in the Northern Caucasus are ofteneffectively limited to a political choice between ethnic nationalism and radical Islam.In this context, what are the choices facing young people and what do they choose?

According to the World Bank survey in 2006, religious activity among young peoplein the area had been rising over the previous decade. Many feel that an expansion ofIslam would provide a basis for better governance in the republic, in particular byremoving the current system, seen to be based on personal connections and bribery.At the same time, many young people have no desire to live in an Islamic state. Theybelieve in the separation of religion and the state, particularly as they think the statecorrupts Islamic values. ‘Wahabbists [sic] were said to be successful in attractingyoung people because they had money and were able to help young people who feltalone to form social networks’; however, ‘young people in the survey who talkedabout Wahabism [sic] saw it as a real threat in their republic – both to security and totrue Islam’ (La Cava and Michael, 2006).

One of the most vigorous opponents of Wahhabism is the current president ofChechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, the son of Akhmad Kadyrov, a Muslim cleric andformer president of Chechnya (2003–04) who was assassinated on 9 May 2004 inGrozny, the Chechen capital. Ramzan Kadyrov is a clear example of an ethno-nationalist leader. According to Aleksei Malashenko, Kadyrov’s ‘aim is to preserveand raise the status of his ethnic group using all possible means’. He sees himself as adevout traditional Muslim and as having no role independent of Islam. He usesreligion to consolidate Chechen society. In his internal policy, he attempts to defeatthe militants and those who ‘hide in the forest’ waging guerrilla war4 (Malashenko,2009b, pp. 144–46). However, as he admits, this is proving to be a daunting task:

The tactics of the Wahhabis have changed . . . . Look – we are talking aboutchildren between 14 and 17 years old who have seen nothing of life. They[the Wahhabis] are looking for teenagers, including girls . . . . They don’thave a shred of interest in ideas or the faith. Many are children fromdisadvantaged families who have lost their parents. They are given somemoney, trained in honour and revenge killing, exposed to violence, subjectedto psychological pressure and told to ‘Go and die’. (Pronin, 2003)

The explosions in the Moscow subway on 29 March 2010 killed 40 people andinjured over 150. One of the two terrorists was the 17-year-old schoolgirl DzhanetAbdullayeva, the widow of a warlord killed by federal troops in December 2009. Theother woman was a schoolteacher who taught with her parents (Kots and Steshin,2010). These two young women are representative of the increasing number of suicide

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bombers, predominantly young people prepared to die for Muslim values (Teraktam,2010).

The high proportion of young suicide bombers calls for a careful examination of thesituation of young people in the Northern Caucasus, looking at the religiousenvironment. Children in the region typically receive their religious education from avariety of sources: school, family, mosques, Islamic Institutes (often attached to mos-ques) and television. This article analyses the role of Islamic education in the NorthernCaucasus, within the context of reforms proposed for the region by the Russian federalgovernment. The analysis is based on pupils’ essays, on interviews and focus groupdiscussions with teachers from local schools, and on the opinions of experts.

Some Theoretical Approaches and Methodology

In order to evaluate the importance of religious sentiments in a society undergoing adramatic transformation, we turn to the arguments put forward by Giovanni et al.(2001) and discussed by Derluguian (2005). They predicted that population reaction inpostsoviet countries to all uncertainties ‘would range between frustrations andcynicism on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the promise of alternative moralcommunities offered, at least in the short run, either by a nationalist replication ofstateness or a religious fundamentalist negation of stateness’ (Derluguian, 2005, p. 7).In this context Derluguian argues that in the Northern Caucasus ethnic culture isplaying an essential role in how an ethnic group ‘construes both itself and itsexpectations regarding others – sometimes fatefully’ (Derluguian, 2005, p. 9). In ourturn, we argue that if building an Islamic state is claimed by some warlords as themain goal of the protracted conflict and many young people are ready to die for it,they are likely to have been brought up with religious feelings. Other scholars(Bennigsen and Wimbush, 1986; Tishkov, 2001; Yemelianova and Pilkington, 2003;Yemelianova, 2010; Dannreuther and March, 2010) present evidence of the increasingimportance of Islam in the region. The social location of religious education is movingfrom individual families, where it was during the Soviet period (when Islamicknowledge was transferred from generation to generation as customs, oral history andrituals) to the public domain. Our qualitative study of religious education focuses onthis process of its institutional relocation.

The ongoing conflicts in the region complicate field research. People’s fear of beingaccused of supporting radicals determined our choice of qualitative methods. Werejected direct questioning of individuals in favour of focus group discussions. Wefrequently found local people to be scared and unwilling to talk openly about theirreligious feelings.

We conducted research among Northern Caucasian young people and theirteachers in 2007 and 2009, using both qualitative and quantitative methods, and inconjunction with training for teachers and children supported by the Open SocietyInstitute (OSI) Budapest Education Support Program, within the framework of theNorthern Caucasus Initiative Program (Molodikova, 2008). The major studiesinvolved children in Chechnya and in the Prigorodny raion in North Ossetia-Alania,where a significant proportion of the population are Muslim Ingush.5

Information came from several sources.First, we analysed 199 essays written by Chechen pupils in grades 6 and 7 (11–13

years old) and grades 9–11 (15–18 years old), and 124 essays by 11–18 year-old pupilsfrom North Ossetia-Alania. The set subject was ‘How I spent my time last Friday’.The topic was designed to reveal how children conducted their lives on a typical

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Friday, without asking direct questions about the significance of religion for thechildren and their families. In order to avoid directly interventionist questions, weasked the teachers not to emphasise the religious aspect when assigning the essays. Thechildren were able to decide for themselves what had been important for them on theprevious Friday. As a result, the children did not feel under pressure to mentionreligion specifically when describing their activities.

Second, we organised seven focus groups for teachers on the role of religion in theparticipants’ lives. Ninety-three people from the Chechen Republic took part.

Third, we did twelve in-depth individual interviews with teachers and educationalprofessionals about the development of religious education. Four people fromIngushetia, five from Chechnya, two from Dagestan and one from Karachai-Cherkessia took part.

On the basis of these studies, we have been able to draw some conclusions about thesignificance of religion in shaping the lives of today’s young people.

Children’s Religious Life as Described in their Essays on ‘How I Spent my Time Last

Friday’

We suggested the essay topic to teachers in Chechnya, where the population ispredominantly Muslim, and in Prigorodny raion, where Ossetian Christian childrenand Ingush Muslim children go to different schools. In the case of the Christianchildren, we asked them to write about how they spent their time the previous Sunday.

Of the 72 Christian Ossetian children living in the same area as the Ingush, onlytwo, one girl and one boy, wrote that they had attended church on the previousSunday. There were no further indications of the performance of any religious rites,nor of actively religious behaviour. The North Ossetian children, who were between15 and 18 years old (grades 9–11), mentioned entertainment, communication withrelatives and visiting sports clubs. In contrast, Ingush children described Friday as theday of Islamic communal prayers (‘Ruzban De’ (‘Big Prayer’)).

The general character of the essays from Chechnya was similar to that of the Ingushessays. A child’s age largely determined his or her involvement in Friday prayers. Of70 children aged 11, only two mentioned prayers (namaz), but 11 out of 40 childrenaged 12 mentioned them. In the oldest age range of 15–18 years (grades 9–11), only afew essays did not mention them. Overall, in the majority of essays, prayers werementioned from three to five times a day. In addition, the boys also described theirvisit to the mosque. Indeed, the majority of children’s essays described their Fridaythrough the prism of saying prayers. Their day was structured around prayer timesand all activities rigidly adhered to them. The children wrote: ‘It is the last prayer’;‘Said a prayer and fell asleep again’; ‘Took a bath, said a prayer’; ‘At 12 o’clock wentto the mosque for a prayer. After the prayer . . .’; ‘If I did not have time to pray, then Idid all the prayers later’; ‘At certain times of the day I said the remaining threeprayers’; ‘Made my morning prayer’; ‘Said my daily prayer’; ‘Said the rest of myprayers and went to sleep, that’s all’; ‘There are two major reasons why I should get upin the morning: prayer and school’; ‘When the time came, said my prayer’; ‘Said myprayer, and then watched TV until the next prayer time came’; ‘I’d just finishedcleaning and then it was time to pray’; ‘After prayers I went to help my mother’;‘Because I could not say all the prayers in one go, I read them at night, although Iknow that’s a sin’; ‘On entering the house, I said my dinner prayer’.

The common pattern seemed to be to wake up, say a prayer, go to school, comehome and say a midday prayer, have a meal, do some tasks around the house and the

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yard, say a prayer, go for a walk to see friends, watch television, say a prayer andprepare for sleep, then say a final prayer. One boy even expressed disappointment thathe was not able to go to the mosque:

I was only worried about one thing. I was full of desire to go to the mosquethat day. And, suddenly, like a bolt from the blue, my older brother cameand told me the terrible news: ‘Get ready, we’re going to plant trees’. I hadthought I would be free to visit the mosque.

Six Important Factors in Islamic Education

On the basis of the children’s essays from Chechnya and Prigorodny raion, weidentified six factors as important in their Islamic education:

(1) The role of family members (mother, father, grandparents, brothers, otherrelatives);

(2) The role of Friday prayers and related events;(3) The role of school and its relationship to religious education;(4) The role of Islamic (educational) Institutes (Islamsky institut);(5) The role of the mullah (sometimes called the imam) and his sermons;(6) The role of religious programmmes on television.

Let us now look at each of these in more detail in order to gain insights into Muslimupbringing in the region.

The Role of Family Members

Many children mention female members of the household in their essays: mothers,sisters, aunts, grandmothers. This is clearly because women are more often at homeand spend more time communicating with children. Boys and girls do household worktogether with their mothers and sisters, which is why the mother is usually the firstperson to manage the children’s prayer time:

My mother woke me up for morning prayer, which took me ten minutes.After school I rushed home because I had to be prepared for the after-lunchprayer. When I got home my mother reminded me about praying. I changedquickly, and prayed, had a meal and started helping mother with thehousework. We finished by 5pm and again I hastened to say a prayer. Ididn’t finish my homework until midnight. I wanted to sleep; nevertheless Isaid a prayer before I went to bed. (Boy, 7th grade)

The role of male family members is much less frequently described. They usually takethe boys to the mosque.

The Role of Friday Prayers and Related Events

The male population stops work and goes to Friday prayers; this is not an establishedpractice among Russian Muslims. ‘At [midday] my father and brother returned homeso that they could go to the mosque’ (Girl, 9th grade).

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Often male family members get together and go to mosque. ‘There are no classeson Friday at the Islamic Institute and I stayed at home. In the afternoon dad camehome from work, and took my uncle and me to the central mosque’ (Boy, 6thgrade).

The role of grandparents is also important: in the Northern Caucasus older peopleare highly respected. ‘I just remember the story of my grandfather, about how he andothers were not able to learn how to pray, about all the difficulties they went through.But today in Chechnya there is a huge mosque in the centre of Grozny that is named‘‘The Heart of Chechnya’’!’ (Girl, 9th grade).

Even more respect is usually paid to people who have gone on the hajj. It is verydifficult to make this journey, not only because of the cost, but also because the quotagranted by Saudi Arabia to the Northern Caucasus republics is not large.

Friday is the day of communal prayers. Every Friday, my grandfather goesto the mosque to pray. He says that on this day Muslim people must puteverything aside and go to the mosque. Often when visiting my grandfatherone could hear a lot about Allah’s sermons. Grandfather visited the holyplaces of Saudi Arabia for hajj. He was selected for hajj . . . . I love to lookat him and listen carefully to him talking about the Quran, the preaching ofGod. He gave all his life to children; he worked for 35 years in school. (Girl,9th grade)

One of the important parts of preparing for prayer is washing beforehand. Childrentry to keep this rule even if they are in a hurry. In their essays, they often write thatthey washed their hands or feet before prayers. For instance, a ten year-old girl: ‘Mygirlfriends and I were playing so happily that we didn’t notice how quickly the timehad passed, and that it was midday already. We had to pray and go to school. Wecame home and I washed my hands and said a prayer.’

The Role of School and its Relationship to Religious Education

Schools’ attitudes to Islam play an important role: ‘The school administrationsupported our wishes and reduced the length of the school day, so that we would notbe late for the mosque. At home, I washed myself and made ablutions, because onFriday everyone should be clean, not only their body but also in their soul’ (Boy, 10thgrade).

Some schools allow all the boys and girls to finish early for Friday prayers, butsome do not and their pupils have to continue school after prayers: ‘After morningprayer I went to school . . . at lunch time I was in the mosque for Friday prayer, thenreturned to school’ (Boy, 6th grade).

Girls have the choice either of returning home or staying at school to help withtasks: ‘After the classes finished, our male classmates went to the mosque to pray andto say prayers. They always go to the mosque on Friday. My girlfriends and I cleanedthe classroom . . . I said my prayer at home’ (Girl, 9th grade).

School administrations that support Islamic education often organise pilgrimagesfor children and their parents to holy sites within the republics (such as tombs of localsaints). Fifteen essays describe a trip made on 26 October 2009 by the pupils of thesixth grade and their parents: ‘On Saturday, our whole class decided to go to Groznyto see the main mosque called ‘‘The Heart of Chechnya’’. We are planning the trip forthe next Friday’ (Girl, 10th grade).

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Another pupil describes her family’s feelings on a similar trip:

My whole family, including my grandmother, went to Grozny. We visitedthe biggest and most beautiful mosque in the world named Hadzhi AkhmadKadyrov, or ‘The Heart of Chechnya’. This house of God is a wonderful giftto all the Muslims in our country. It is a gift from our president – RamzanKadyrov. All of my family prayed in this enchantingly beautiful mosque.When we went out, we took photographs in front of the mosque assouvenirs. Sitting near the fountain, I felt as if I was in a fantastic world. Itwas so beautiful that I had no words to describe it. I really want to go againto the city of Grozny to visit this piece of art. The Heart of Chechnya – thisis our pride. (Girl, 6th grade)

Such trips are very important for children, because they have so few opportunities forthem and they evidently enjoy them very much. ‘Thanks to Kadyrov we travelled fromthe madrassah to various holy places in our republic . . . . I am his [Kadyrov’s] friend’sdaughter. I am proud that I am Muslim and that I am Chechen. I can study and thereis no war and I live in the peace for which my father died . . . . Thank you Ramzan!’(Girl, 9th grade). The girl’s main pride is that she is Muslim. Her ethnic identity asChechen comes second. Another pupil identifies himself as Muslim because he believesthat religion helps people in their lives, allowing them to find answers to manyquestions and keeping them from harm. ‘In general, visiting mosques and listening tothe mullahs’ preaching makes me a better person. I simply want to say to everybody,‘‘My brothers, I have such trust in all of you’’’ (Boy, 11th grade).

The Role of Islamic Institutes

Islamic Institute (madrassah) classes are a relatively new form of Islamic education thathave developed since perestroika. A report by the Ministry of Regional Developmentindicates that the number of such Institutes is mushrooming (Gosudarstvennaya, 2008).Nevertheless, only five boys and five girls out of 199 children write that they attendIslamic Institutes. The Institutes organise classes for children in the mornings andafternoons, because the state schools have two or even three shifts per day. ‘After thesixth lesson we got together with friends to go to the mosque for Friday prayers. AfterFriday prayers, I went to my uncle’s, had dinner and went home. I changed my schooluniform, took my stuff for studies and went to the Islamic Institute’ (Boy, 9th grade). Inthese Institutes children study the Arabic language, the Quran, prayers and religiousrituals. The curriculum depends on the capacities and level of the particular Institute: ‘Iwent to the Arabic language classes for two hours’ (Boy, 5th grade); ‘I’m studying in 1stgrade at the madrassah. On Friday they do not have classes there. During the rest of theweek, I spend a lot of time there learning the Quran’ (Girl, 9th grade).

The Role of the Mullah (Imam) and his Sermons

According to the essays, mosque prayers and the personality of the mullah are twovery important elements in children’s religious development. Mullahs can encourage apositive attitude toward Friday prayers. A welcoming, calm environment thatpromotes brotherhood, equality between people and a sense of belonging to thecommunity is evidently important for children’s development. The mosques also playa role in binding the generations together:

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As usual after school we went to the mosque. Elders and young men gatherthere together. They listen to sermons and prayers and Quranic verses. Ireally like the thoughtful talk of the elders. I love to listen to them. I wouldlike to share with you some of the prayers that I learned last Friday . . . .‘Give me the patience and faith to study and deepen my belief. Amen’ . . . .In our life we usually lack patience. Every Friday gives me somethingimportant and interesting. (Boy, 9th grade)

The subject-matter of sermons is also evidently an important element in religiouseducation and is discussed in some essays: ‘I went to the mosque for Friday prayer.Almost all the village elders and young men and even boys were gathered there. Wesaid several prayers. Then after praying, our imam, Musa Hadzhi, had a constructiveconversation with us. We got a lot from his sermon.’ The sermon topics vary, but theyare all relevant to everyday life. They include such things as the relationship betweenreligion and science; justice; friendship; what is sinful, what is permitted and what isforbidden; the characteristics of a true Muslim: ‘Muslim people should never lie, butmust be kind and honest’ (Boy, 9th grade).

The imam’s personality is important for social life, especially in rural areas. Forexample, in the essays from one rural school the majority of the boys mentioned thename of the imam. Many of them wrote about how interesting the sermons were, howmuch they learned from the mullah and wanted to be like him: ‘After the prayer comesthe sermon. Our imam, Musa Hadzhi, preached the sermon and offered useful advice.I enjoy listening to the imam and I want to be like my imam.’ This particular mullahconducted a very interesting and instructive dialogue with the boys:

We are learning how to pray properly and about how true Muslims shouldact. In our village, almost all the young men go to the mosque. They learnhow to behave with older people, with their parents and with other people. Ilike our imam very much. In our village, everyone prays. My elder brotherprays as well. I go to the mosque every Friday whenever possible and Iwould like everyone to go there. (Boy, 9th grade)

The mullah, especially in the villages, sets codes of behaviour: he has a very stronginfluence on children. Children believe they can trust their mullah. This is a veryimportant part of the educational process, because in the opinion of politicians,academics and journalists some of the factors leading people towards Wahhabism inthe Northern Caucasus are a strong sense of injustice and a distrust of authority(Rechkalov, 2005; La Cava and Michael, 2006; Malashenko, 2009a). ‘When weprayed, it was so quiet and peaceful there that it was impossible to express it in words.Every Friday a lot of people meet there, including my classmates. We all are equalbefore the Almighty Allah. When imam Musa Hadzhi reads the Quran the soulbecomes calm’ (Boy, 9th grade). As a result of feeling part of a community and theirconfidence in the mullah, children like going to the mosque: ‘After Ruzban De at themosque, I come back home in an excellent mood’ (Boy, 10th grade).

The Role of Religious Programmes on Television

Local television stations broadcast the Friday prayer and sermons and are thusanother aspect of religious education. The republican government supports thisprogramme as part of a strategy of using traditional Islam to influence children.

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Some children write that they regularly watch such programmes and like them. This isespecially true of girls. ‘I love to listen to the mullah preaching on the television aboutjustice, so that there will be kindness and humanity rather than evil between people’(Girl, 6th grade). ‘I enjoy watching the Muslim channel Path to Islam. It tells us howto behave with adults, parents, brothers and sisters’ (Girl, 10th grade). Sometimes thewhole family watches the religious programmes. According to the essays, parents tryto encourage their children’s interest in them: ‘Sermons are broadcast on television.My parents and I watch them and listen to them. I love to listen to the imams’ sermonsvery much. We will continue going to the mosque’ (Boy, 6th grade). ‘After school, Iwatch the religious programme on television. Mum tells me that I always should actjustly. You need to be fair to people if you are to be a good person’ (Girl, 6th grade).

The Ambivalence of Teachers: Caught between the Soviet Past and

an Uncertain Future

On the basis of the children’s essays we were able to draw some conclusions about thebenefits of bringing up children in accordance with Muslim traditions: the collectiveaim of family members, civil institutions, government, school and mosques seems tobe to raise honourable, civic-minded people. To test this conclusion, we also soughtteachers’ opinions through in-depth interviews and focus group discussions.

The first teachers’ focus groups in 2007 discussed children perceived to be at risk inthe Northern Caucasus republics. The teachers identified some dozen pupils. In somerepublics (Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia) ‘religious families’ were seen asproblematic for children’s development in secular schools. The issue of ‘children atrisk’ was the topic in a research assessment of school education in the NorthernCaucasus supported by OSI Budapest (see Molodikova, 2008) which focused onchildren who might drop out of education, or who did actually do so, in rural andurban areas. In the various republics a total of 140 teachers were asked in focus groupsand selective in-depth interviews to identify the most vulnerable groups. The groupswere different in each republic. For example, in Chechnya groups of children drop outof education in wartime; in Ingushetia the many children of internally displacedpeople were identified.

Later, in 2009, we held several workshops with teachers from the Chechen Republicand North Ossetia-Alania to discuss the roles of religion and religious education. Theteachers agreed that in the Soviet past little attention was paid to religion and religiouseducation: ‘It was fashionable to be an atheist’; ‘Few young people prayed’.Moreover, in the Soviet period ‘Many people lived double lives’. It was said that ‘Ifyou wanted a career, you couldn’t be a believer’. However, participants also pointedout that in the same period, ‘By and large everybody believed, but in secret, prayingthat nobody else noticed’.

During the 2009 discussions, teachers noted the powerful influence of religionduring and after the First and Second Chechen Wars. In the pre- and interwar periodsof stability and peace, ‘There may have been less need of religion, because there werefewer injustices’. This contrasted with the times of war when ‘Adults under intensepsychological pressure asked God for help, and their children followed their example’and ‘Belief brought a sense of security, a feeling that you were not alone’. The cravingfor religious comfort during the war was so great that ‘People made their way to themosque and to the holy places on foot, even during the curfew’. The participantsrecalled incidents from their own lives, and the lives of their relatives, confirming therewards that religious faith was seen to bring: ‘My aunt ran away and had no

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information about her children who remained in Grozny. She began to pray and threedays later she received news of them.’

‘Now that more attention is paid by schools and the media to religion, there arelessons on the history of religion’, said one teacher.

Every day from 5am to 7am all males, including boys and adolescents, goto the mosque. There are also special religious schools where mullahsinstruct children. This is a good thing. Previously, in Soviet times,children were instructed by school and by various youth organisationsand disciplined by their parents. The breakdown of the Soviet socialisteducational system brought about the disappearance in many areas ofchildren’s outdoor and after-school activities, such as free sports andtheatre groups and musical education. Centres of extra-school education,such as Houses of Culture, Palaces of Young Pioneers or Palaces ofSport (Dom kul’tury, Dvorets pionerov, Dvorets sporta) were closed downor demolished. In the 1990s they were still widespread, but nowadayslocal mullahs have taken their place. (Interview with a Dagestani teacher,April 2008)

The teachers agreed that religious education for children is beneficial. ‘The currentgeneration is healthier, it is more religious’; ‘Being in the mosque is better than sittingin a ruined shop’; ‘Youths come to the mosque to communicate’. They endorsedopinions such as ‘We feel sorry for non-believers’; ‘Religion is the salvation for thefamily’; ‘Harmony of mind comes through religion’; ‘The soul is drawn to traditionalIslam’.

According to many participants in the teachers’ focus groups, religion has helpedand continues to help many people to survive. However, when some participantsrecalled the Soviet period, they noted that although ‘Religion was prohibited duringthe Soviet period, there was more spiritual comfort before the Chechen wars, but thiswas due to the overall positive atmosphere in society’. There were some contradictionsbetween teachers’ statements about the rise of religious sentiments on the one side andyoung people’s increasing immorality and worsening behaviour on the other. Theprovocative statement that ‘Although there was no religious education during theSoviet period, young people were more loyal and law-abiding’ was supported byteachers. In individual interviews, all teachers reported that in contrast to previoustimes ‘Morality and spirituality have fallen sharply amongst today’s young people’;‘. . . internet access, use of cell phones . . . if you had only seen what pictures they sendeach other’; ‘No morality is left, no honour amongst either girls or boys’; ‘They go tothe mosque, but no one knows what they talk about afterwards’; ‘Young people treatreligious prayer formally, with no depth, without understanding the essence of it’;‘They interpret Islam as they want to’. Some suggested that too much religiouseducation or too frequent visits to the mosque can be harmful. The perception wasthat the radical wing of Wahhabi Muslims does not just entice boys with religiousinstruction but also forms them into terrorist gangs. A woman teacher had personalexperience of this:

My son started to go to the mosque. I noticed that he was drifting awayfrom me and I started to question him. He told me that he was talked intogoing to the forest and preparing for struggle against the infidels. I was veryfrightened and forbade him to go to the mosque without my husband.

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So gradually I have drawn him out of this group. (Interview with a Chechenwoman, March 2009)

Teachers expressed concerns that parents were ‘frightened that with every visit to themosque their children might be drawn into the Wahhabi movement. They said thatrecruiters look within the mosques to find vulnerable children (those from poorfamilies, for example).’ ‘There are many cases, but we can’t talk openly about them.’With very few exceptions, teachers were reluctant to discuss the problem of the Islamicradical groups and even denied the involvement of Chechen young people in suchgroups: ‘Our children will not enter the Wahhabi movement’; but the majority ofteachers noted that the current situation in the various republics had led to aheightened desire for justice: ‘For many people going into Wahhabism is a protestagainst injustices’; ‘There is a lot of injustice, young people see it and do not want toput up with this’; ‘If muftis or mullahs behave unjustly, they lose young men’s trust’.

The issue of compulsory wearing of the hijab by female teachers and students inChechnya was also raised in focus groups. At the beginning of 2008 PresidentKadyrov prohibited women from appearing without the hijab in official institutionsand announced that directors of such institutions would be fined for contraventions, aregulation that was never officially published but only articulated in his speeches.According to some of the teachers, girls who do not wear the hijab can provoke acts ofviolence, for example having stones thrown at them or being splashed with acid byradical Muslims. One teacher reported that during her lesson an inspector from theMinistry of Education came into the class, looked at her and loudly announced thather scarf did not properly cover her head: ‘You are not in a brothel and should makesure that your head is covered’ (Interview with a Chechen teacher, March 2009). Shefelt insulted and wanted to call her husband to defend her, but decided not to do sobecause the conflict could become more damaging to her.

According to some of the teachers the cooperation between religious authorities andgovernment institutions is very close. Sympathetic imams help local authorities todevelop local policies. One teacher said that

There are no common programmes of religious education, but in themosques, after prayers, the mullah preaches. People can speak freely andask him questions. Sermons are concerned with social order. For example, ifthe number of crimes increases, all the mullahs meet with governmentrepresentatives and talk about what can be preached to highlight theproblem of crime. As a result, all the mullahs try to highlight this problem intheir sermons. (Interview with a Chechen teacher, 2009)

The participants in the teachers’ focus groups agreed that some government controlson religious education should be established.

In general teachers talked about the positive influence of Islam on modern youngpeople, but frequently undermined their own statements by expressing criticisms andfears. Some expressed the opinion that parents supporting the early marriages of theirdaughters are acting immorally: ‘The senior classes in our villages are mostly boys. Allthe girls will have been married by their parents when they are between 13 and 14 yearsold.’ Some teachers expressed criticism of girls in the higher grades who do not attendsports lessons and who wear the hijab, but it was clear that in their personal livesteachers often follow similar local customs. For example, in two out of four sessions weheard that daughters of two of our trainee teachers had been abducted (as is practised

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by some local men and families) and then married to their abductors, with theirfamilies’ agreement. The parallel comes to mind of the case of one of the two terrorists(mentioned above) responsible for the explosions in the Moscow subway on 29 March2010. Dzhanet Abdullayeva was the 17-year-old daughter of a single mother fromDagestan. She should still have been attending school, but was abducted at 16 and afterthat given in marriage to her abductor, a well-known Dagestan warlord. Althoughmarriage by abduction is a traditional custom, in this case, according to a neighbour inthe family’s village, ‘She was given for marriage, but not in accordance with all thecustoms, not to the right person and not to the right place. She was left isolated,without relatives.’ The teachers only mentioned that she was a very sensitive girl andthat she had been abducted about one and half years earlier (Kots and Steshin, 2010).

We can conclude that teachers hold contradictory opinions about religiouseducation. On the one hand, they recognise the great importance of religion, whichhas helped many people to survive the wars and to overcome the consequences ofmisery and suffering. They also think that young men need to attend the mosque andto study Islam. Nevertheless, they also agree about some negative aspects of religiouseducation, although publicly they try not to raise those doubts. Only in individualinterviews did teachers sometimes express concerns about their students, for instancestating that they would seek to protect them from ‘excessive religiosity’.

The Opinions of Professionals about the Development of Islamic Education: Ignorance

or Lack of Political Will?

In order to highlight specific aspects of Islamic education, we conducted severalinterviews with school principals, local officials and social scientists. We also soughtthe opinions of educational professionals. According to republican Ministries ofEducation, Islamic education is sometimes regarded as problematic because of the lowsecular and religious educational attainments of some religious leaders (mentionedalso in a 2008 Ministry of Regional Development report) (Gosudarstvennaya, 2008).The level of people’s involvement in religious life varies from village to village andfrom town to town and depends on many factors, for example the number ofmosques, the imams, the presence of a religious school. Children are generally poorlyinformed about religious matters and often have a very narrow interpretation ofIslamic norms and values. For example, in one school, a teacher of the subject ofworld religions in the 10th and 11th grades said that

When lessons are about Islam, all the pupils listen carefully, but as soon as Istart talking about other religions such as Christianity or Buddhism, forexample, they get very noisy and I am not able to teach. When I challengethem about their bad behaviour, pupils tell me that they do not want to hearanything good about Russians or the Russian Orthodox religion, becausethe mullahs say it is sinful. (Interview with a teacher, 2009)

Social scientists (for example Malashenko, 2009a) and teachers agree that childrenlack proper knowledge of traditional Islam. They do not study the Quran on a regularbasis and they use bits and pieces from it as they want, which results in a shallowunderstanding. ‘Nowadays more attention is paid to the formal practice of prayers,not to deep knowledge . . . and children pay little attention to the religion as a whole;they only mechanically perform their prayers . . .’ (Interview with an expert from theMinistry of Education, Kabardino-Balkaria).

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The experts we interviewed agreed that the problem of religious education hasramifications beyond religion. The socio-economic situation in the region is very poor.Without good family connections or the money to buy themselves into employment,even graduates from higher education institutions have a very low chance of findingwork. This can lead to young men falling in with Wahhabi groups:

In Nauru [in Chechnya], two boys obtained their school-leaving diplomasand went into the forest. One boy was killed; the second returned home andwas asked why he had left home and gone to the forest. He replied that hehad been promised that he would be sent to study abroad if he went into theforest, that he would receive a scholarship, and that the Wahhabis wouldalso help him to find a job. He believed it was his only chance for a betterlife. He knew that he would get nowhere with his school diploma, andtherefore believed these people and joined them. (Interview with arepresentative of a local authority in Ingushetia, 2009)

According to another interviewee

There is a battle of ideas being waged for the hearts of young people, whofeel useless and insecure. The population of Chechnya is 1,238,000, andmore than 300,000 are unemployed. To save our children from extremismwe have to have the tools to fight for them. Unfortunately our teachers andeven psychologists do not have enough knowledge or skills for such astruggle. (Interview with a school principal, 2008)

It seems that traditional Islam helps people, but it is difficult to control all theimams. Several have their own agenda, especially if they have been educated in SaudiArabia, where Islamic traditions are different from those of Russian Muslims:

There are mullahs and mosques which are labelled ‘unreliable’ (‘neblago-nadezhnyye’) (and are placed under FSB watch). These mullahs may overtlyswear loyalty to Yevkurov [the president of Ingushetia], but in reality theyspread radical Islam in their sermons. Men attend the mosques with theirsons . . . . I know five such mosques. For example, they say one should notcommunicate with the Russians, because then one will become the same (inthe sense of being corrupted).’ (Interview with a representative of theMinistry of Education, Chechnya, 2009)

There is no employment in our republic for young people. Only in theCaucasus do young men want to be recruited into the army. In Russia it isnot popular, but in the Caucasus they even pay money to be recruited. Ruralfamilies have many children. In some villages young people can even be hiredas professional killers. (Interview with a university teacher, Dagestan, 2008)

‘There are some religious villages where some of our prophets lived’, said arepresentative of an Ingushetian NGO whom we interviewed in 2009. ‘These villagesare rich and people are very proud and they look down on people from other villages.’When we asked ‘Why are the villages rich?’, the expert replied ‘They deal in stolencars, and they smuggle goods and drugs.’ One expert we interviewed, a universityprofessor, commented on the differences between the Northern Caucasus on the one

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hand and Tatarstan and Bashkortostan on the other as far as radical Islam isconcerned. According to him the much more peaceful nature of Muslim communitiesin the Volga region can be explained by the socioeconomic situation in Tatarstan andBashkortostan, which is much better than in the Northern Caucasus. The professionof imam in Tatarstan carries less prestige than in the Northern Caucasus, partlybecause there are more and other opportunities to earn money and partly because ofsocial attitudes. Another significant factor is the number of children per family.Families in the Northern Caucasus republics generally have many children. Familiesin Tatarstan have the same very low reproductive rate as in Russia, and they are notwilling to lose their children to radical activities.

In the opinion of Yusup Adzhiyev, the leader of the Kumyk national movement inDagestan,

The government needs political will . . . . If a person has not been involvedin revenge killings he can easily be brought back from the forests. I used todo that with government support. I returned 67 people, gave them jobs andsome income. But the former president spoiled all my efforts. Returneeswere taken to the police, beaten and even tortured. As a result, 30 peoplereturned to the forests again and were killed. Every spring our young peoplego over to the militants. They have no alternative. Look at the village on thehill, there are 27,000 people living there. There are no jobs, no sports areas,no football field . . . . What can they do there? I am sure that 80 per cent ofthe people who go to the forests could be stopped, if the government waswilling to help them. (Kots and Steshin, 2010)

Conclusion

In the last two decades or so important changes have taken place in the perception ofreligion in multiethnic Russian society. Public education has reflected this process andmoved from official atheism to freedom of religion. In October 1997 the RussianDuma legalised the development of faith-based education. But the change has notonly been the result of legislative activity; it has also reflected grass-roots activism. Theresurgence of Islam in Russia provides clear evidence of this type of support from theMuslim population and has to be taken seriously by the Russian government.

However, the diversity of Muslim communities in Russia defies any attempts tooffer a uniform approach to religious education that can fit every region. This problemis particularly acute in the Northern Caucasus. This region is affected by ethnic andpolitical tensions and conflicts, which create a sense of insecurity and injustice amonglocal people and enhance the importance of self-reliance and religious hopes assurvival strategies.

Our surveys of Chechen and Ingush children provide clear evidence that despite thelack of professionally prepared clergy some aspects of religious education are alreadywell developed at the family level. Children start learning rituals and prayers in theirearly schooling period, when they are supervised by their mothers, and by their teensthey become increasingly involved in religious practices and meetings. Family life isthus the main place where religion grows together with children, and this means thatthe tradition of private family upbringing remains very strong. At the same time, localgovernments and state schools have completely abandoned official atheism andinstead support religious education.

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These developments support the theoretical propositions of Giovanni et al. (2001)and Derluguian (2005) about the reproduction of specific aspects of Muslim identity ina situation of social crisis, as discussed at the beginning of this paper. We can suggestthat local Islam is growing together with children. Religious activities are in theunique position of uniting local communites every Friday. At a time when civilinstitutions in the region do not work properly, the mullah and imam often becomeleaders of these institutions. This creates a perceived need for religious professionalswho are well educated in the traditions of their region and who can become respectedlocal peacemakers.

Unfortunately religious extremism, terrorism and separatism are the most acuteproblems currently facing the Northern Caucasus. Many have sought to fill the vacuumcaused by the loss of Soviet-era social control and atheist ideology with religiousinstruction. Similarly, the dissolution of Soviet-era children’s organisations wasfollowed by a revival of nationalist and religious networks. The resurgence of Islam hasbeen accompanied by the establishment of a great number of religious schools.However, despite official accreditation, the quality of education they offer hasremained low. Unfortunately, even the Council of Muftis of Russia lacks well-qualifiedreligious leaders. There is no single recognised authority for Islamic teachings, and fewpeople in Russia possess a master’s degree in Islamic Studies (Gosudarstvennaya,2008). It has been suggested that the lack of educational traditions, the shortage ofqualified personnel and a limited vision about the needs of young Muslims have allcontributed to the popularity of more radical versions of Islam (Zagidullin, 2007).

President Medvedev has proposed a new initiative to support religious education insecondary schools in 18 Russian regions from 2010 (Yelkov, 2009). The basics ofreligious culture, history and ethics are to be covered, although in practice this is likelypredominantly to mean Russian Orthodoxy. However, the proposal raises morequestions than answers. For example, who is qualified to teach these subjects? Awidespread view, and particularly among secular educationalists, is that no suitablytrained teachers exist at present and they are unlikely to appear by 2012 (see forexample Gerasimenko, 2010; Polozhevets, 2006). Will history teachers be hurriedlyretrained? Will these courses be made compulsory? And will it be possible for childrento study non-traditional religious beliefs, if their parents wish, without being harassedby the teachers?

Local imams are increasingly in charge of religious education, which in reality usuallymeans teaching the most basic tenets of Islam. This is despite the assurances of thefederal government that religious education will be carried out exclusively by secularteachers. The government proposal to delegate religious education in schools to secularteachers is not working in the case of the Northern Caucasus. This means thatschoolchildren will acquire knowledge only of Islam rather than wider knowledge ofother faiths, which is the aim of the multicultural vision of the state school curriculum.Many people, from the unemployed to intellectuals and students, aspire to alternativemodels of social organisation, such as small communities that want to be independent ofwider society and which embody the ideas of equality, justice and brotherhood. In thiscontext, a fruitful route towards a solution would seem to be a dialogue with imams andefforts to raise their interest in broadening the religious education curriculum.

Notes

1 ‘Wahhabism’ is the name given to various different strands of radical Islam in Russia that

have little to do with historical Wahhabism and the Islam of Saudi Arabia.

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2 The Second Chechen War was officially called the Anti-Terrorist Operation (Kontrterror-

isticheskaya operatsiya (KTO)). This Operation continued until 16 April 2009 (V Chechne,2009).

3 For the official declaration of this Emirate, see Kavkazcenter (2007). The Emirate was basedon the model of the North Caucasian Emirate (Severo-Kavkazsky emirat) which existed on

the territory of Chechnya and western Dagestan during the Russian Civil War fromSeptember 1919 to March 1920.

4 ‘Those who hide in the forest’ is the term commonly used by the Russian media to refer to

small groups of militant Islamists who continue to wage guerrilla war against the Russianarmy and local armed police forces.

5 The North Ossetia-Alania republic is the only Christian republic in the Northern Caucasus, but

in Prigorodny raion there is a high percentage of Muslims. It is located between the capital,Vladikavkaz, and the border with Ingushetia. This Muslim enclave dates from Stalin’s timewhen this particular part of Ingushetia was given to North Ossetia. This territorial change

created ongoing conflict between Ingush and Ossetians that costs lives on both sides.

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