Islamization of Education

Pedagogy, Power, and Discourse: Transformation of Islamic EducationAuthor(s): Aziz TalbaniReviewed work(s):Source: Comparative Education Review, Vol. 40, No. 1, Special Issue on Religion (Feb., 1996),pp. 66-82Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Comparative and International EducationSocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1188968 .Accessed: 22/12/2011 07:16

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Pedagogy, Power, and Discourse: Transformation of Islamic Education

AZIZ TALBANI

Strong revivalist Islamization movements have recently emerged in a number of Muslim countries as a traditionalist response to modernity. They aspire to imbue all forms of knowledge with traditional Islamic values and arrest the secularization and modernization of knowledge. This inspiration arises out of a larger political struggle to establish a discourse linking the state and religion in a new power structure. The movement is rooted in the history of Muslim societies, where religious discourses mediated power and social control. This article will examine the historical evolution of knowledge and power linkages in Islamic societies and the use of Islamic education to reproduce and establish specific discourses of power. Recent changes in the concept of Islamic education using Pakistan as a case study will also be discussed.

Theoretical Framework

Islamization can be seen as a movement to make Islam a relevant source of power and social control. Clifford Geertz viewed the movement as an effort to make Islam "a universal, in theory standardized and essentially unchangeable and usually well integrated system of ritual and beliefs ... not merely as a religion but a complete and comprehensive way of life."' In some Muslim countries, this has been a predominantly sociopolitical and economic struggle, but it emerges essentially from the acceptance and interpretation of revealed and traditional knowledge as a priori knowledge. Education in this context plays a pivotal role in reproducing Islamic culture and promoting the ideological goals of Islamization.

The transformation of societal discourse sought by Islamization would mean fundamental changes in power structure and social controls that legitimize and regulate knowledge and meaning in society. Each society, according to Michel Foucault, has its regime of truth, its "general politics of truth, that is, the type of discourse it accepts and makes function as true."2 He sees society as an arena for a struggle to establish and pass on

' Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia (Chicago: Univer- sity of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 14.

2 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. and trans. Colin Gordon (Sussex: Harvester, 1980), p. 131.

Comparative Education Review, vol. 40, no. 1. ? 1996 by the Comparative and International Education Society. All rights reserved. 0010-4086/96/4001-0005$01.00

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TRANSFORMATION OF ISLAMIC EDUCATION

a regime of truth and develop techniques and procedures to inculcate and transmit values considered to be true. Hence, a discourse could be an "instrument of power or an effect of power," as well as "a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy."3

Societal discourse mediates its power and control through institutions and elites "who are charged with saying what counts as true."4 A regime uses political, economic, and social apparatuses to control and dominate. Truth is established through the discourse of power that is relayed, pre- served, and legitimized. This involves a struggle involving political debate and social confrontation-an ideological struggle.5

Hence, the creation of educational or social institutions is part of the power struggle to establish, expand, and sustain a particular notion of truth through control over the power of legitimacy. Foucault states that truth should be understood as a "system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of state- ments."6 In its attempts to establish an absolute notion of truth, Islamiza- tion is an all-encompassing movement with political, economic, and sociocultural aspects. Politically, it involves a struggle to resist or accelerate the formation of new power groups. Economically, at issue is the mainte- nance of class interest during the transition from an agricultural economy to an industrial one-which implies changing control over the means of production from feudal lords to urban bourgeoisie. And in the sociocultural sphere, knowledge discourses arise. Islamization also has profound implications for educational systems, as educational sites are centrally involved in the propagation, selective dissemination, and "social appropri- ation" of discourses.7 Foucault states, "Every educational system is a means of maintaining or modifying the appropriateness of discourses with the knowledge and power they bring with them."8 Basil Bernstein echoes this idea by stating, "The way a society selects, classifies, distributes, transmits, and evaluates educational knowledge reflects both the distribution of power and the principles of social control."9

In Islam, the Qur'an-considered the core of knowledge-is the major "power" or force to legitimize, produce, and operationalize truth in society.'o Hence the Qur'an, believed to be divine, is the primary source

s Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," in Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Herme-

neutics, ed. H. L. Dreyfus and P. Rainbow (Brighton: Harvester, 1982), p. 101. 4 Foucault, Power/Knowledge, p. 131.

5 Ibid., p. 132. 6 Ibid., p. 33. 7 Stephen J. Ball, ed., Foucault and Education: Disciplines and Knowledge (London and New York:

Routledge, 1990), p. 3. 8 Michel Foucault, L'ordre du discours (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), p. 46. 9 Basil Bernstein, "On the Classification and Framing of Educational Knowledge," in Knowledge

and Control, ed. Michael Young (London: Collier Macmillan, 1987), p. 47. 10

S. H. Nasr, Islamic Life and Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981), p. 49.

Comparative Education Review 67

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of knowledge. Its transcendent divine nature guards it from human inter- polation. According to this belief, the "Koran contained everything in the way of knowledge needed to ensure salvation, plus the essentials in the fields of belief and rules of behavior."" Traditionalists believe that the Qur'an is the source of perennial knowledge and provides guidance for all matters concerning human life. Change of time and place cannot affect nor invalidate the Qur'anic injunctions (ahkam). However, its power of legitimacy is mediated through people who possess control over its interpretation. In other words, political power lies in the control over religious interpretation and the discourse that the religious group uses to exert such control.

The Tradition of Learning in Islam: A Historical Perspective

Although no formal tradition of learning existed in central Arabia before Islam's inception, education became important in the following 100 years as the prophet Muhammad's teachings encouraged Muslims to seek knowledge. Friday (Jama'a) mosques in particular became centers of learning, emphasizing memorization of the Qur'an.'2 These centers were supplemented by the traditions (ahadith) and biographical narratives (sira) from the life of Muhammad.

Disciplines such as philosophy, chemistry, mathematics, and astrology were also popular. These subjects were pursued with no fixed curriculum and with teachers appointed by parents. Teachers accepted responsibil- ities according to their level of education,'3 and often traveled in search of better opportunities, as did students who sought better teachers and more knowledge. Public libraries, hospitals, baths, and the private houses of elites, ministers, or professors were also centers of learning. Great works of ancient philosophy, science, and literature were translated into Arabic during the ninth century, while Muslims subsequently produced extraordinary original works of literature, philosophy, and science.

When the madrasa, or traditional religious school of higher learning (literally, "place of study," plural madaris), first emerged during the ninth century as a major center of organized learning, it superseded all other centers of learning.14 The madrasa gradually became the source through which all forms of knowledge were legitimized. Its curricula consisted of the Qur'an, traditions of the prophet Muhammad (ahadith), jurisprudence

" Jean Jolivet, "The Development of Philosophical Thought in Islam: Its Relationship with Islam up to Avicenna," in Islam, Philosophy and Science (Paris: Unesco, 1981), p. 40.

12 George Makdisi, The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981).

' A. S. Tritton, Materials on Muslim Education in the Middle Ages (London: Luzac, 1957). "4 . Pedersen and G. Makdisi, "Madrasa," in Encyclopaedia of Islam, new ed. (Leiden: Brill,

1960-[94]), 5:1123-27.

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(fiqh), and the Arabic language. All forms of knowledge not patronized by madaris and not part of Islamic learning, such as philosophy, chemistry, astronomy, and mathematics, were pursued privately and to an extent secretly under the guise of other subjects such as the traditions or medicine. 15

Discourse of Knowledge: Curriculum and Teaching in Madrasa

In madaris the objective of education was the achievement of bliss (sa'ada) in the hereafter. Inasmuch as religious knowledge was the only possible means to achieve sa'ada, the curriculum was confined solely to religious and linguistic studies.'6 If other subjects had to be mastered to facilitate the acquisition of this religious knowledge, they were merely auxiliary. Such subjects included grammar, rhetoric, logic, and some philosophy.'7 The acceptance of Arabic language and literature in the madrasa system, for instance, was based on the idea that linguistic studies would help in understanding the Qur'an. Similarly, knowledge above that mini- mally required to meet daily social and economic needs was considered dangerous. Subjects such as astronomy, medicine, or mathematics that exceeded religiously justifiable needs were seen as unnecessary.18

Al-Ghazzali (died A.D. 1111) and his successors systematically elabo- rated on the scope and nature of Islamic pedagogical knowledge based on epistemological dichotomies. The first division was between revealed (wahy) and acquired (iktisabi) knowledge. Revealed knowledge was sacred and given to the chosen few, namely, prophets. As a priori knowledge, it was to be transmitted as revealed without any rationalization or other form of manipulation. Transcendent and absolute, it should be accepted without question.

Acquired knowledge included transmitted traditions (naqli) and ratio- nal knowledge ('aqli). These two categories were further divided into good or desirable (mahmud) and condemned or undesirable (madmum). The latter, which included philosophy and ancient sciences, was excluded from the curriculum. Mahmud included religiously approved knowledge, such as medicine, logic (with certain restrictions), and mathematics. How- ever, these were also divided into necessary and excessive.19

Approved forms of knowledge were to be acquired only to the extent necessary for survival, while research and inquiry should be forsaken. According to Al-Ghazzali, "One must forbid men to look for those myster-

15 Makdisi, Rise of Colleges, pp. 281-82. 16 Pedersen and Makdisi, pp. 1123-24. "7 Ibid. 18 G. E. Von Grunebaum, Islam: Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition (Menasha:

American Anthropological Association, 1955), p. 114. '9 Ibid., p. 118.


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ies and must turn them [instead] to the pronouncements of religious law, where there is sufficient proof for the believer to be content with."20 This rigid framing and classification of knowledge based on religious law and dogma inevitably madejurists and traditionalists (muhdith) final authorities in religious and worldly matters. Religious scholars became self-appointed interpreters and guardians of religious knowledge. People were to follow without questioning (taqlid) in all matters, and these scholars condemned all other forms of knowledge as well as inquiry and research. Even independent study of the Qur'an and traditions was forbidden. Hujwari (died ca. 1077) argued, for example, that "knowledge is obligatory only in so far as is requisite for acting righteously. God condemns those who learn useless knowledge."''21 In short, madrasa learning was confined to the trans- mission of traditions and dogma, and was hostile to research and scientific inquiry.

In traditional Islamic pedagogy, authoritative acceptance of knowledge is stressed, with learning often based on listening, memorization, and regurgitation. The collection of traditions, including the Qur'an, is termed "that which is listened" (al-sam'); greater emphasis is placed on listening to a teacher, who is active as a transmitter of knowledge, while the student is passive.

As the result of this attitude, education became static during the twelfth century. Curriculum consisted mostly of scriptures and books of the earlier theologians and jurists. Only commentaries and tributes were written about these works, and the writing of explanation (sharh) and marginal notes (hashiyah) on the text (matn) of earlier writers became the dominant literary activity. Control over education was exercised through various means. For instance, teachers were licensed (ijaza) to teach (actually, to transmit) particular books.22 Because this meant the reproduction of what had been said in the past, the rewriting and reinterpretation of doctrine were hindered. Educational knowledge became increasingly irrelevant to changing socioeconomic realities and to new expectations and aspirations among Muslims. In other words, outside the madrasa everything was changing and inside everything remained static.

This had far-reaching cultural and intellectual consequences for Is- lamic civilization. With few exceptions, Muslims were apathetic toward scientific and philosophical matters. In spite of the great contributions their scientists had once made, Muslims failed to continue scientific en- deavor and soon lagged far behind. All matters were studied within a

20 Ibid. "21 Ibid. 22 J. Pedersen, "Some Aspects of the History of the Madrasah," Islamic Culture 3, no. 4 (1929):

525-37, at 528.

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religious and moral framework, and their outcome was judged in eschatological terms. Qur'anic verses emphasizing research, inquiry, and contem- plation about the nature of the world were interpreted so that scientific aspects of these matters were ignored and theological implications were emphasized.23 Paul Hurst summarizes the basic issues succinctly. "Islamic learning is based on ... a central body of knowledge which was of divine origin. What else was known in Islam depended on argument by analogy and the consensus of learned authorities.... Unfortunately, Orthodox Islam developed an ethos of conformism and respect for authorities which meant scholarship tended to stagnate."24 Thus, pedagogical discourse produced by the madrasa became an effective device for social control, and resulted in an educational stagnation that still persists.

State Control and Madrasa

The madrasa as a social institution relied heavily on the state and elites for political and financial support. Its function was to disseminate specific discourses for cultural reproduction and preservation. Muslim societies during the tenth and eleventh centuries were marked by enormous political, linguistic, cultural, and sectarian differences, and the madaris became an important instrument of social and ideological containment. The state patronized some madaris by giving them financial resources and status, while others were neglected. This paved the way for effective state control of madaris, which were used to propagate state ideology and legitimize a particular religious interpretation. The goal was to halt so-called hetero- doxy and provide the state with an orthodox bureaucracy.25

Various devices were used to control education in madaris. Since freedom of thought was considered a threat to political stability, control was increasingly tightened as political conditions deteriorated. The ruling authorities became active in the appointment of teachers and students, the administration of awqaf, the general orientation of the curriculum, and the organization of official functions within madaris.26 The madrasa thus sought to control the religious scholars ('ulama) and, through them, to control the masses.27

The relationship between madaris and the state was generally cordial as madaris provided the knowledge, skills, and values that enabled its

" M. H. Al-Afendi and N. A. Baloch, Curriculum and Teacher Education (Jeddah: Hodder & Stoughton, 1980), p. 16.

•Paul Hurst, "Africa and Middle East," in International Handbook of Education Systems, African and Middle East, vol. 2, ed. J. Careron and P. Hurst (London: Wiley, 1983), pp. 1539-40.

25 H. Nashabi, "Educational Institutions," in The Islamic City, ed. R. B. Serjeant (Paris: Unesco, 1980), p. 85.

26 Ibid., p. 87. 27 George Makdisi, "Muslim Institutions of Learning in Eleventh Century Baghdad," Bulletin of

Oriental and African Studies 24, no. 2 (1961): 1-56, at 55.


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graduates to perform judicial, civil, and economic functions within the state bureaucracy. As petty feudal/military dynasties rose during the medieval period, masters of the sword (Sahib al-Saif) and pen (Sahib al-Qalam) became universally accepted by Muslims as those with power over the masses.28 The military thus became legitimized as the protector of faith and scholars as the guardians of religious knowledge. Because both knowledge (power of legitimacy) and power (political will) were held by those committed to the status quo, Muslims lived in a rigidly structured and static society, with decreasing political and intellectual freedom.

The outcome of Muslim political socialization was a discourse that strengthened and legitimized the existing social and political order. Imita- tion, respect, and obedience to authority-religious or political-became a necessary part of Muslim cultures. Finally, these traditions and values, customs, and knowledge gave rise to a strong cultural and political identity. To be a Muslim meant to identify oneself with symbols of social-political obedience and to extend loyalty to traditional authority systems. As a result, the imposition of colonial rule created a serious threat to these religiously oriented identities and loyalties.

Madrasa and the Encounter with Modernity

Muslims encountered modernity through colonialism, which stripped their political power and brought about structural, normative, and attitu- dinal changes for both individuals and society. Modernization stands in opposition to traditionalism, with values such as individualism, secularism, rationalism, and consumerism that threaten traditional systems. As modern institutions replaced traditional ones-which had protected and passed on enduring values and knowledge-the locus of power to control and legitimize change shifted. The result has been profound changes in the normative, psychological, and material aspects of Muslims' lives.29

In the Indian subcontinent, the British adopted policies that made it difficult for indigenous institutions to grow and undercut the power base of colonized people. Such measures included the confiscation of proper- ties owned by religious organizations like madrasa and the establishment of a parallel educational system. The traditional educational institutions resisted change and became anachronistic in the modern world. A. L. Tibawi, a traditionalist Muslim writer, complains, "Islamic education is a mere shadow of its past.... Its modernization has led to its complete transformation."30 During the British Raj, the concept of education funda-

28 Marshal Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974).

29 S. N. Eisenstadt, Tradition, Change and Modernity (New York: Wiley, 1973), p. 25. 30 A. L. Tibawi, Islamic Education: Its Traditions and Modernization into the Arab National Systems

(London: Luzac, 1972), p. 192.

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mentally changed as secular education became a necessary qualification for jobs. The colonial bureaucracy opened new employment opportunities and required different types of qualifications than those offered by madaris. After an initial resistance, Muslims began to accept and partici- pate in the new secular educational system because of its wider accessibility and economic utility.31 However, opposition to modern education by traditional Muslims continued.

Colonization also changed the objectives of education in madaris from achieving bliss in the hereafter and providing government bureaucrats to defending the faith against colonial infiltration. One of the madaris in its mission statement interpreted the colonial situation as such: "When the British imperialism took over the Indian sub-continent the glory of Islam declined and religious values diminished. The British started un- dermining religious institutions and spreading innovations and indecent practices. These practices of evil and heresy weakened Muslims.... Therefore, the 'ulama came out to fight against all such evils."32

Hence, madaris continued to produce religious scholars trained to defend religion and protect traditional values. The objective of this education was not to get individuals positions in government, teaching, or any other vocation, but only to achieve religious knowledge to serve the faith.33 Education sought to conserve and transmit traditions and accepted dogma. Pedagogy was based on rote memorization, which was considered the way to achieve maximum benefit from learning and obedience to authority, and imitation of teachers was regarded as virtuous. Hence, although the mission of madrasa education changed during the colonial period, its content and pedagogy generally remained the same.

In the postcolonial era, the traditionalists continued to believe that Western secular education promotes immorality and anti-Islamic or some- times Christian ideas, and continued to oppose and modify it. Pakistan became a salient arena where the traditionalist and modernists fought their struggle.

Religion and Education in Pakistan: A History of Conflict

After the independence of Pakistan in 1947, most of the traditional madaris were replicated and many 'ulama from the region migrated there. Fundamentalists saw the nation as an Islamic state where Islamic religious law (shari'a) should be implemented. The early struggle was at the consti-

s' W. C. Smith, Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis (New York: AMS, 1974). 32 Wafaq El-Madaris, Wafaq al Madaris al-Arabiyya Pakistan: Introduction, Constitution and Its Courses

of Study (Multan: al-Maktab al-Raisil Wafaq al-Madaris al-Arabiyya, n.d.), pp. 1-2. 33 M. Y. Benori, DalilJamia al-Ulum al-Islamiyya (in Arabic) (Karachi: Jamia al-Ulum al-Islamiyya,

1984), p. 4.


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tutional level, where Islam was accepted as the religion of the state and sovereignty was attributed to God. The "Objective Resolution and the Principles of State Policy" explicitly mentioned a knowledge of the Qur'an and "Islamiat" as essential for Muslims.34 In addition, the first All Pakistan Education Conference in 1947 proposed that the educational system should be inspired by Islamic ideology.35

The members of Pakistan's initial government were mostly Muslims educated in the West, however. Because they emphasized values such as social justice, democracy, equity, and individualism that were Western in character and had never been part of traditional Muslim societies, Islam came to be interpreted in more liberal terms. To overcome the conflict between the traditionalists and modernists, the first independent Pakistani government suggested as a compromise that a course on Islamic religion and history be established for all grade levels. At the tertiary level, depart- ments of Islamic studies were proposed.36 However, ambiguity in the Objective Resolution about the definition and role of Islam made the religion a legitimate part of Pakistan's political discourse. The 'ulama, who had opposed the very idea of Pakistan, manipulated that Islamic clause to change the nation into a theocracy its modernist leadership had never envisioned.

In the 1959 Report of the Commission on Education, Pakistan's president stated that "there was a need for reorganization and reorientation of the existing educational system so that a national system could evolve which would better reflect our spiritual, moral and cultural values."37 This report emphasized the inculcation of values such as universal brotherhood, toler- ance, self-sacrifice, social services, truth, justice, and so on. Religious education (i.e., learning about religion) was a part of the curriculum from the first to eighth grades. The teaching of religion was intended to emphasize justice, equality among individuals, the importance of practical goodness, piety, and virtue.

The sympathy toward Islam among modernists was partly political rhetoric to cool off militant tendencies. Nevertheless, increased unemploy- ment among the educated, massive poverty, urban migration, and the failure of modernist leaders' economic policies led youth to join political

34 E. I. J. Rosenthal, Islam in the Modern National State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. 349. See also Anita M. Weiss, ed., Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan: The Application of Islamic Laws in a Modern State (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1986).

35 Parveen Shahid, Implementation of National Education Policies (Islamabad: Academy of Educa- tional Planning and Management, 1985), p. 10.

36 U.S. Government, Area Handbook for Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Areas Studies Divi- sion, 1965), p. 203.

37 Government of Pakistan, Report of the Commission on Education (Karachi: Government of Paki- stan, 1960).

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activist groups of either the extreme right or left. Consequently, the orthodox influence in politics increased.

In the 1970s there was a rise of fundamentalism in Muslim countries, with Pakistan a particular hotbed for this movement. The Zulfikar Ali Bhutto regime (1971-77) was the target of this violent movement. To please fundamentalists, Bhutto announced some measures of Islamization such as declaring Friday a holiday, making the teaching of the Qur'an an integral part of education, and establishing the Federal 'Ulama Academy. However, fundamentalists considered these measures mere window dressing.38

In 1977 the military-under General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq-ov- erthrew the Bhutto government and became allied with the fundamentalists. One result of this staunch alliance was an effort to implement an Islamic sociopolitical system and construct a new power relationship between the state and religion with new social realities based on medieval categories of knowledge. The government devised an educational policy aiming to establish a new discourse and to socialize students into the official ideology of the state and of the religion of Islam.39 As stated in "The National Education Policy and Implementation Program-1979," the primary aim of education was to "foster in students a loyalty to Islam, a sense of being a dutiful citizen of the Pakistani nation as a part of universal Ummah [Muslim community] with a full knowledge of the Paki- stan movement, its ideological implications based on the precepts of Qur'an and Sunnah."40

Immediate measures taken by the government included the design of new syllabi and the writing of new textbooks. Other steps included the enforcement of women wearing the head scarf (chadar) in educational institutions, the organization of congregational afternoon prayers (zuhr) during school hours, compulsory teaching of Arabic as a second language, reading of the Qur'an (nazara) as a matriculation requirement, the use of religious knowledge for selecting teachers at all levels of education, and the revision of conventional subjects to emphasize Islamic values.41

Islamization and the Transformation of Pedagogical Discourse

Islamic education has assumed a new definition and received wider application by traditional Muslims during the last 2 decades. In 1977 an

"38 M. Geijbels, "Pakistan, Islamisation and the Christian Minority in the Islamic State of Pakistan," Al-Mushir (The Counsellor) 21, no. 2 (1979): 31-51, at 41.

39 Ibid., p. 46. 40 Ahmad Hasan Dani, "Educational Progress in Pakistan: Challenge and Response (1947-

1985)," in Bulletin of Unesco Regional Office for Education in Asia and Pacific, no. 27 (Hong Kong: Unesco, 1986), p. 64.

41 P. Hoodbhoy and A. Nayyar, "Rewriting the History of Pakistan," in Islam, Politics and the State, ed. Asghar Khan (London: Zed Books, 1985), p. 164.


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important meeting-the World Conference for Muslim Education-was held in Mecca, where a group of predominantly fundamentalist Muslims emphasized the need for education relevant to Islam's sociocultural values, relevance being seen in moral and eschatological terms.42 They argued that education could redirect and reshape the attitudes of Muslim children by shifting their orientation from Western to Islamic values. The role of Islam, defined in terms of its worldview and dogma, was seen as determining the objectives of education and influencing educational processes. This, they believed, could be achieved by rejecting current practices colored by Western cultures and ideologies. "For them, if there was a change it could only be for the worse, and the worse could only be cured, not be creating something new, but by renewing what had once existed."43 In short, these traditionalists "viewed education as an important means of creating an Islamized society and an instrument for forging a new national identity."44 With this in mind, they attempted to reformulate educational objectives, redesign curricula, and rewrite textbooks.

Recent Islamization efforts differ significantly from the revivalist movements of the early twentieth century. In the past, Islamic religious scholars and jurists clearly distinguished between religious and secular forms of knowledge as they attempted to revive traditional Islamic knowledge and ethics. The recent Islamization movement, by contrast, attempts to eliminate that dichotomy and reconstruct social discourse within the eschatological worldview of Islam. Islam thus becomes the legitimizing discourse for the production and regulation of knowledge. To transform various facets of Muslim society, Islamists coin terms such as Islamic education, Islamic economics, Islamic democracy, Islamic science, and so on.45

For fundamentalists, educational discourse must be based on religious knowledge. Since it is infallible divine knowledge, it is an instrument in the selection and validation of pedagogical knowledge. A. R. S. Abdullah, a traditionalist writer, states, "The superiority of revealed knowledge is due to the fact that it is derived from the truth (Haqq) while some other types of knowledge are based on speculation (zann) or desires (hawa)."46

42 A. A. Engineer, "Islam and Reformation," Islam and the Modern Age 9, no. 1 (1978): 86-95; W. M. Watt, "Cultural Clashes in a 'Perfect' World: The Challenge of Progressive Ideas to the Islamic World," Times Higher Education Supplement (June 13, 1986), p. 13A.

43 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 1983), p. 83.

44 Pervez Hoodbhoy, "Ideological Problems for Science in Pakistan," in Islam, Politics and the State, ed. Asghar Khan (London: Zed Books, 1985), p. 174.

"45 Zial Haq, "Islamisation of Society in Pakistan," in Islam, Politics and the State, ed. Asghar Khan (London: Zed Books, 1985).

46 A. R. S. Abdullah, Educational Theory: A Qur'anic Outlook (Makkah: Umm ul-Qura University, n.d.), p. 83.

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For traditionalists, a strong link exists between education and theology. Education is not an enterprise of free inquiry and research but an exten- sion of theological learning.

Tibawi also believes that the Qur'an and the collected traditions of Muhammad comprise the essential knowledge upon which to build an educational system. "The single fundamental fact that determines the concept, dictates the content, governs the evolution of the philosophy of Muslim education, is the belief that God's final message to mankind was revealed in its entirety through Mohammed and is enshrined in the

Qur'an.'"47 To traditional Muslims, the ethical implications of the scientific mode

of thought is a sensitive issue: "Modern science is guided by no moral values but naked materialism and arrogance. The whole branch of knowledge and its application is contaminated by the same evil."48 Furthermore, knowledge "divorced from faith is not only partial knowledge, it can even be described as a kind of new ignorance.49" Traditionalist Muslims permit subjects such as science, technology, mathematics, and history only if they pass the "test of validity and effectiveness in fostering a deeper awareness of the Divine Presence in the Universe."50 Traditionalists also believe that humans have a divinely fixed destiny and role on earth that requires moral teaching and religious upbringing of children. Since traditionalists believe education must be based on an ethical and religious foundation, only jurists are qualified to develop an Islamic educational system.51

Crisis of Legitimacy for Science

In fundamentalist discourse, science is an ideological tool by which Western civilization extends its hegemony over Muslim societies. Hence, the transformation of Western scientific discourse was the major issue debated at the 1977 World Conference on Muslim Education in Mecca.52 The basic problem identified by participants-mostly traditionalist Mus- lims-was that no applied or social sciences were drawn from religion.53 "[In Islamic society] originality, innovation, and change were never up- held as intrinsic values. The ideal of Islamic culture was not mechanical evolutionary progress but the permanent immutable transcendent di-

47 A. L. Tibawi, "Philosophy of Muslim Education," Islamic Quarterly 4, no. 2 (July 1957): 78-89. 48 Maryam Jameelah, Modern Technology and the Dehumanisation of Man (Lahore: El-Matbaat

ul-Arabia, 1983), p. 8. 49 S. S. Hussain and A. A. Ashraf, Crisis in Muslim Education (Jeddah: King Abdul Aziz University/

Hodder & Stoughton, 1979). 50 Ibid. "51 Abdullah (n. 46 above), p. 35. 52 Engineer; Watt (both cited in n. 42 above). 53 Watt, p. 13.


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vinely revealed moral, theological, and spiritual values of the Qur'an and Sunnah."54

The fundamentalists advocated that all subjects must reflect Islamic beliefs and values. This implied a change in objectives, curricula content, pedagogy, and other aspects. Because all textbooks were perceived as

being imbued with the ethical values of Western writers, traditionalists

argued that Islamic sciences must be distinct and foster Islamic values. In other words, Western sciences have a secular character that can be

changed by infusing Islamic values into them. They proposed that "Mus- lim writers should write books on the basis of Islamic ethics and assimilate that which is in conformity with Islam and reject the rest."55 Fundamental- ist writers now contend that because Western sciences are taught without

any mention of Allah or Muhammad they are the sources of "straying from the truth" (gumrahi). Specifically, "Reflection on the nature of modern education and customs immediately reveals their contradiction with the nature of Islamic education and customs. You teach young minds

philosophy which seeks to explain the universe without Allah. You teach them science which is a slave of reason and the senses. You teach them economics, law, and sociology which, in spirit and in substance, differ from the teachings of Islam. And you still expect them to have an Islamic

point of view?""56 Now there is to be no separation in Islam of religious (dini) from worldly (dunyawi), suggesting that, "In the new system of education, a new course on religious education (diniyat) is not needed, indeed all courses should be changed into courses of dinyat."57

For fundamentalists, it is necessary to exorcise the evil (secular) spirit from Western science and "Islamize" it. They assume that these applied and social sciences were developed in Islam, were thrown into the back-

ground during the colonial period, and must be revived in present times. Yet that assumption ignores the historical fact that the Muslim

clergy-like clergy in many other religious traditions-had earlier opposed science and philosophy. Ahmed Sirhindi, a fundamentalist during the reign of the Mogul emperor Aurangzeb, for example, issued religious decrees (futwa) declaring mathematics and sciences to be forbidden (haram), and demanded the education of Muslims be exclusively along religious lines.58

54 Jameelah, Modern Technology and the Dehumanisation of Man, p. 8. See also, by the same author, Islam and Western Society: A Refutation of the Modern Way of Life (Lahore: Mohammed Yusuf Khan, 1976).

55 G. N. Saqeb, "Modernisation of Muslim Society and Education: Need for a Practical Ap- proach," in Education and Society in the Muslim World, ed. M. W. Khan (London and Jeddah: Hodder & Stoughton and King Abdul Aziz University, 1981), pp. 48-49. See also Hussain and Ashraf (n. 49 above), p. 59.

56 A. Maudoodi, Talimat (Lahore: Islamic Publications, n.d.), p. 20. 57 Ibid. 58 Hoodbhoy, "Ideological Problems for Science in Pakistan" (n. 44 above), p. 183.

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The total assimilation of all subjects into an Islamic moral and religious framework means that they are all to be judged on their moral outcome and are to go through a process of scrutiny and censorship before being accepted in so-called Islamic polity. According to A. Maudoodi, "Taking Guidance from the Qur'an, one should make not only a survey of existing scientific knowledge, but also make new observations and discoveries of physical laws along lines specified by Qur'an."59 He assumes that the Qur'an gives rules and methods to study various subjects, and that science is a static subject that can be surveyed and transformed into an Islamic model. Further, the complexity, differentiation, and specialization within various branches of knowledge and the complicated nature of methods applied are disregarded. Considering traditional wisdom as core knowledge, "Western sciences are considered mere peripheral and technical matters which can be absorbed into the standard Islamic view without changing it at all in essentials.""6 As a result of this understanding, science at all levels is taught conservatively with critical and analytical methodol- ogy absent. One author critical of this situation writes, "Physics and chemistry are taught no differently from, say, Pakistani studies of Islamiat. Authority is infinitely remote and unchallengeable, this or that is true because it is in the text. Deliberately and systematically, schools rob a child of natural creative powers.""61

Unfortunately, products of science cannot be arbitrarily separated from science as method.62 Scientific knowledge develops critical thinking and avoids the uncritical acceptance of traditional answers to human inquiry. Science challenges the validity and relevance of all discourses of knowledge, because nothing is accepted as permanent or sacred. Unlike theology, science permits the critical comparison of competing theories and frameworks.6" While the mark of a scientific theory is that it is test- able,64 religious knowledge is empirically untestable and demands unques- tioning acceptance and practice.

Political Construction of Historical Discourse

History is another subject that was transformed and reconstructed within the parameters of Islamic ideology. According to a University Grants Commission directive, history textbooks should "demonstrate that

"59 Maudoodi, p. 93. 60 Watt, p. 13. 61 Hoodbhoy, "Ideological Problems for Science in Pakistan," p. 190. 62 Paul Hurst, "Critical Education and Islamic Culture," in Cultural Identity and Educational Policy, ed. Colin Brock and Witold Tulasiewicz (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp. 1-2. "63 K. R. Popper, "Normal Science and Its Dangers," in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, ed.

I. Lakatos and A. Musgraw (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 281. 64 J. W. N. Watkins, "Against 'Normal Science,' " in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, ed.

I. Lakatos and A. Musgraw (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 29.


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the basis of Pakistan is not to be found in the racial, linguistic or geographic factors but, rather, in the shared experience of a common religion. To get students to know and appreciate the religious basis of independence, and popularize it with slogans, to guide students toward the ultimate goal of Pakistan, that is the creation of a completely Islamized state."65

The so-called ideology of Pakistan has been defined in rigid dogmatic terms, as are reasons for the nation's creation (a topic in which socioeconomic and political reasons are ignored). Mohammed Ali Jinnah, a thor-

oughly Westernized secular leader, is depicted in history books as a man of orthodox religious views. In the social studies textbook for elementary grade 6, for example, a chapter on Pakistani history states, "Muslims conquered India and settled here, and there was nothing in common between the Hindus and the Muslims. The Muslim society is based on the principles of equality and democracy. ... Muslims and Hindus eat different kinds of food, wear different kinds of dress, and speak different languages."''66 This interpretation suggests that Muslims in India were conquerors who came from outside, not mentioning that most Muslims were an indigenous people who converted to Islam, thus sharing many customs, dress, language, and eating habits with other communities. Exag- gerating minor cultural variations to emphasize differences between the two religious communities seems to be the purpose.

In another distortion, a Pakistani historian writes that, "The All-India Muslim League and even the Quaid-i Azam (Jinnah) himself, said in the clearest possible terms that Pakistan would be an ideological state, the basis of whose laws would be the Qur'an and Sunnah and whose ultimate destiny would be to provide a society in which Muslims could individually and collectively live according to the laws of Islam."''67 In fact, however, the ideal that Jinnah had for Pakistan was that of a secular nation-state. In February 1948, for example, he said, "Make no mistake, Pakistan is not a theocracy or anything like it,"68 and in a famous speech given the previous August he had already laid out this position. "We are starting with the fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state.... Now I think that we should keep that in front of us as our ideal, and you would find that in due course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state ..... You may belong to any

65 Hoodbhoy and Nayyar (n. 41 above), p. 165. 66 Qutubuddin Khan, Social Studies, bk. 5 (Karachi: Rehber Publishers, n.d.), p. 1. 67 Hoodbhoy, "Ideological Problems for Science in Pakistan," p. 174. 68 Rafi Raza, "The Continuous Process of Rewriting the Constitution," in Pakistan in Its Fourth

Decade, ed. Wolfgang-Peter Zungel and Stephanie Zingel-Ave Lallemant (Hamburg: Deutsches Orient-Institut, 1983), p. 9.

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religion, caste, or creed-that has nothing to do with the business of

state."69 Jinnah's words clearly show that the Muslim leadership that fought for the existence of Pakistan envisioned a democratic nation-state rather than a theocracy.

History books, however, have highlighted the 'ulama- most of whom actually opposed the very idea of Pakistan-and the army in an apparent effort to legitimize the undemocratic and oppressive control by these

groups. One textbook states, "The services rendered by 'ulama and elder religious leaders (mashaikh) to the cause of the Pakistan movement are worthy of writing in golden letters."'7 The imposition of martial law by the generals who ruled Pakistan for more than 20 years is portrayed as

having saved the nation from chaos caused by the democratic process. The

splitting of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 is attributed to elections, thus implying that democracy threatens national unity. Further, modern education also is held responsible for that split. As one textbook states, "As a result of the 1970 elections the political differences between East and West Pakistan grew and led to their separation. The cause of Islamic Unity received a setback, but one should not interpret this as a rejection of Islamic ideology by the people. Indeed, unless Islam is pre- sented as a whole and not as just worship and prayer, it remains incom- plete. The forces of atheism and worldliness, in this case, can influence the minds of people through modern education and public media."71

Conclusion

In the past, Islamic discourse excluded non-Islamic forms of knowledge and was used by political regimes to foster their power and control. In modern times, traditional Muslims seek hegemony over political, economic, and educational domains, leading to the establishment of authori- tarian regimes in some Muslim countries and widespread violence in others.

Since Zia's death in 1988, democratic governments have ruled in Paki- stan. The legacy of the military regime he headed lingers, however, through a number of repressive laws introduced in the guise of religion during his tenure. Subsequent governments have been unable to rescind these religion-based laws because of the concerted opposition of fundamentalists. The introduction of Islamic laws has resulted in the oppression of vulnerable groups in Pakistani society, especially women and religious minorities. In contrast, the 'ulama, the military, and elites all benefited

"69 Abbas Rashid, "Pakistan: The Ideological Dimension," in Islam, Politics and the State, ed. Asghar Khan (London: Zed Books, 1985), p. 81.

70 M. D. Zafar, Pakistan Studies for Medical Students (Lahore: Aziz, 1982), p. 147. 71 Quoted in Hoodbhoy, "Ideological Problems for Science in Pakistan," p. 173.


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from Islamization. Emblematic of the legitimization of traditional elite classes is that the Islamic educational reforms were implemented in private elite schools.72

Islamization emerged partly because people were disenchanted with the failure of secular governments to provide either freedom or equal economic and educational opportunities. Taking advantage of this discon- tent, fundamentalists interpreted Islamization as an ideological system that offers equality and social justice. Hence, many unemployed youth took refuge in this movement and also used it as an outlet for their

anger toward repressive regimes. Yet Islamic experiments in some Muslim countries, including Pakistan, show that Islamic ideology has failed to

provide the promised equality and social justice. The 'ulama never reached a consensus as to what constitutes an Islamic educational, economic, or

political system, or how it could be implemented. Nevertheless, Islamic discourse gave tremendous power to the 'ulama.73

The impact of Islamization on the Pakistani educational system has been devastating. The emphasis on ideological education has intensified cultural and religious differences, resulting in communal conflicts and resentment of other cultures and other areas of knowledge. However, there is public resistance to this control. For example, in spite of warnings by Muslim clergy that Western model schools are anti-Islamic and pro- moters of immorality, people in Pakistan have flocked to such schools. Similarly, despite the Pakistani government's declaration that Urdu be a compulsory medium of instruction in schools, parents who can afford it send their children to private English-medium schools.74 Such popular resistance continues to be an important part of public discourse in Pakistan.

72 Pervez Hoodbhoy, Muslims and Science: Religious Orthodoxy and the Struggle for Rationality (Lahore: Vanguard, 1991), p. 50.

7' Rafique Zakaria, The Struggle within Islam: The Conflict between Religion and Politics (New York: Penguin, 1989).

74 In 1948, Urdu was made the national language and the medium of instruction in public schools. For a further discussion on the increasing popularity of English-medium schools, see Hoodb- hoy, Muslims and Science.

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Documents

Islamization of Education