Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question

8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question

1/38

Di Mauro-Nava 0

Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question

Stefania Di Mauro-Nava

General University HonorsProfessor Schneider

4 May 2010


2/38

Di Mauro-Nava 1

Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question

Introduction

Ask most Italians where they are from and most of the time, you are guaranteed to hear a

regional area before you hear the word Italy, or even Europe.1

This paper will argue the

failure of the Italian state to unite in a uniformed manner in the 1800s has directly impacted the

relative weakness of a national identity today, especially in contrast to the stronger nationalist

identities in Northern Europe.

In the current atmosphere, it seems unlikely that regions will cease to be important and

that Italian identity will predominate. Regions hold lot of power in terms of determining laws

and policy, much like the states in the United States do. The historical process of state formation

helps explain why these regionalist tendencies continue to persist in this state. For example, the

recognition of territorial differentiation, which was established in the 19482, continues to give

validity to these cleavages in Italian society.

The goal of this Capstone project is to explore the question of the creation of a collective

identity formation, by examining how the unification of the Italian state occurred and why

regionalism continues to plague this Southern European state. While some scholars have done

general research on regionalism, namely in the North and the phenomenon of the Lega Nord,

however, there has been surprisingly little research on the persistence of regional identities in

Southern Italy. Such research might shed light as to why old identities persist even when those

states have been superceded or merged into a larger entity. Italy was chosen because, unlike most

of its respective Western European brethren, especially those of the original six founding

1Personal observation made through two month travel in Italy and interaction with Italian nationals both

in Italy and outside of the state.2Amoretti, Ugo M. "Italy: Political Institutions and the Mobilization of Territorial Differences."

Federalism and Territorial Cleavages. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2004, 186.


3/38

Di Mauro-Nava 2

member states, Italys state formation led to a weak central government and the persistence of

regional enclaves.

Literature Review

In international studies, the role of cultural identity and its importance to political

structure are not agreed upon between the different ideological fields of IR research and

academics. In this case, the definitions and role of nation and identity and the role of institutions

and how these perceptions of the self do have an impact on not only present day but future

processes of cultural integration and governmental action.

The root of the internal Italian struggle for identity, according to the late Charles Tilly,

can be traced back to the very origins of the process of the state creation. The tolerance of the

states of Southeastern Europe for linguistic, cultural, and religious diversity stand in sharp

contrast to the intolerance of the Northwestern brethren, and surely stood in the way of effective

state-making. For Italy this process resulted in state weakness as Italy was formed from a

conglomerate of city-states, which did not wish to belong to a larger national state. The failure to

homogenize increased the likelihood that a state existing at a given point in time would fragment

into its cultural subdivisions at some time in the future.3

As Tilly argues a state and what it comes to represent is the result of a process; it did not

just exist. Transactional[social process] accounts take interactions among social sites as their

starting points, treating both events at those sites and durable characteristics of those sites as

outcomes of interactions.4In Europe, Tilly argues that war-making, capital and coercion are all

parts of the equation that lead to European states. When the Muslims left Europe by the 14th

and

15th

centuries, Europeans were in the position to expand into these areas left open by their former

3Tilly, Charles. Reflections on the History of European State-Making. The Formation of

National States in Western Europe. Ed. Charles Tilly. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1975, 44.4Tilly, Charles.Identities, Boundaries, and Social Ties. New York: Paradigm, 2005, 14.


4/38

Di Mauro-Nava 3

conquerors. It was through those in positions to coerce and their negotiations with those in

possession of capital that lead to the different formations of state creation.5

For Italy, war making was not a part of their story until much later in the state-making

process. The northern states began to look outside of their pre-set boundaries and continued to

draw Italy into their conflicts. According to Tilly:

In Italy, the alteration of warfare had devastating consequences. By the 1520s, Hapsburgs

and Valois were fighting their dynastic wars on Italian territory. In 1527, the Hapsburg

emperors mercenaries sacked Rome. As of 1540, Milan and Lombardy had fallen under

Spanish rule, France occupied such of Savoy and Piedmont, Florence had become a

Medici-ruled duchy., and Naples was an appanage [sic] of the Spanish crown. Of the

greater Italian powers, only the most maritime, Venice and Genoa, had maintained their

oligarchic institutions. Even they lost their pre-eminence in the Mediterranean.6

As the process of state development continued to form and develop from roughly the 15th

to 17th

centuries, European states of the time were very cautious in the development of national identity

within their territorial boundaries and those outside of them. This is a major distinction between

the development of Western and Eastern European states as well as a distinction between those

in the North and South. As Tilly argues in the European model of state making, In a large

perspective, the European state-making process minimized the cultural variation withinstates

and maximized the variation amongstates7. In a similar vain, Giorgio Chittolini argues that the

lack of consolidation of the Italian states is due to the strength of municipal traditions dating

back to the Middle Ages:

5Tilly, Charles. Coercion, Capital, and European States: Ad 990 - 1992. Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.:

Blackwell, 2006, 14.6Ibid, 78.

7Tilly, Charles. Reflections on the History of European State-Making. The Formation of

National States in Western Europe. Ed. Charles Tilly. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1975, 79.


5/38

Di Mauro-Nava 4

A unitary Italian state only formed in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Although

this tardiness was due to many other factors besides the strength of Italys cities, the roots

of a strong municipal tradition dating back to the Middle Ages certainly held back the

forces tending toward the countrys territorial unification. Most notably during the later

Middle Ages and the Renaissance, at precisely the time when the great western

monarchies were consolidating, the political system of central and northern Italy was

characterized by the city-states great fragmentation and spirit of autonomy.8

This system of developing a cultural identity differs from the state-making process and as such is

usually identified as nation-building. Nation-building is meant to reinforce these internal

differences from those on the exterior and create loyalty from those within the pre-determined

boundary9.

Tillys model for European state creation brings into light many of the historical aspects

that influence stare formation and how this process, unique to every state, does influence its

character and behavior. By applying the concepts of coercion and capital to the Italian model

Tilly demonstrates how the current division between North and South are not impossible.

The great disparity between North and South Italy is not questioned, it is accepted by

most scholars. However, the reasons for this disparity are contested, and one of the biggest

voices in this enterprise in Robert Putnam. According to Putnam, the main reason that Northern

Italy is more developed than the South is because the North has a tradition of civil society and

political participation. Additionally, Putnam argues, effective democracy is correlated with

8Chittolini, Giorgio. "Cities, "City-States," and Regional States in North-Central Italy." Cities andthe Rise of States in Europe, A. D. 1000-1800. Ed. Charles Tilly and Wim P. Blockmans. New York:

Perseus Books Group, 1994,28.9Almond and Powell qtd. inIbid,79.


6/38

Di Mauro-Nava 5

socioeconomic modernization10

In order to test his theories, Putnam and his associates took to

the streets of Italy and in a quantitative research model, attempted to gauge the level of civic

participation in order to verify to what extent these differences existed. In their model, they

tested civic community on the level of members unions, church and political parties had in these

regions.

According to their results, the North had a higher level of civic community as opposed to

the South, which for Putnam translated to higher democratic values and a more horizontal

social and political network as opposed to the South, which displays a more vertical structure.

This means that in the North, citizens take a more active role in politics and participating in

local/regional activities that influence political leaders. Inversely in the South, Putnam claims

that citizens view politics as something that the notabilior elites deal with, and there is little

incentive to partake in debate because corruption is seen a normal.11

There are several problems with Putnam and others who relegate the South as an

uncivil and backwards society. The first issue with Putnam is that he assumes the South is less

democratic than the North because of the Norths civic community. While the data cannot be

disputed that the North does in fact have a more active civic society, this does not necessarily

mean that they were always more democratic. Putnam fails to mention in his book on several

occasions that those regions in Italy, which are now the most democratic, were the bases of

fascist organization in the early 20th

century. Having civic community means that ideas can

circulate to a wider audience and for an extended period of time, it does not mean that these

ideas are necessary democratic in nature.

10Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti.Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions

in Modern Italy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP, 1994, 84.11

Ibid, 115.


7/38

Di Mauro-Nava 6

Another issue with Putnams argument is his lack of consideration for how economic

progression has made the two different.12It is proven that the North is more economically

developed than the South, however, the South did not have the same opportunities to develop as

the North. The North has always had an advantage over the South, first as trade ports and

merchants and now in industry. The North had traditionally relied upon the South for sources of

cheap labor and agricultural production.13

Edward Banfield makes the same false assumptions, when he claims in his book, The

Moral Basis of a Backward Society, that:

the extreme poverty and backwardness of which is to be explained largely (but not

entirely) by the inability of the villagers to act together for their common good, or, indeed

for any end transcending the immediate, material interest of the nuclear family. This

inability to concert activity beyond the immediate family arises from an ethos-that of

amoral familism- which has been produced by three factors acting in combinations: a

high death rate, certain land tenure conditions, and the absence of the institution of the

extended family.14

It is the latter part of this, especially the absence of the institution of the extended family is

debatable. According to Gunther et al inDemocracy and the State in the New Southern Europe,

clientalism and familism play a role in the structure of the family unit and culture of Southern

Italy. In the South, home ownership is more prevalent than in than in the North and traditional

gender roles are more common in the South than in the North. This is because while the

12Tarrow, Sidney. "Making social science work across space and time: A critical reflection on Robert

Putnam's Making Democracy Work. " The American Political ScienceReview 90.2 (1996): 389-397.

ABI/INFORM Global, ProQuest. Web. 29 Apr. 2010.13Calavitas, Kitty.Immigrants at the Margins: Law, Race and Exclusion in Southern Europe. New York:

Cambridge UP, 2005.14

Banfield, Edward. The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. New York, The Free Press, 1958.


8/38

Di Mauro-Nava 7

economic situation may not be good, families tend to live with several members of their

extended family and at least the patriarch has some sort of income, with other family members

contributing in the form of pensions, watching the children or facilitating the running of the

household.15

Unlike Putnam and his notions of civic community, Sydney Tarrow has focused his

scholarly work on the power of social movements and their importance to state structure.

According to his work, four prerequisites need to exist in order for social movements to occur,

political opportunity, a diffuse social network, familiar forms of collective action and cultural

frames that resonate throughout a population.

16

Tarrow and his associates divide these social

movements in contained contention and transgressive [sic] contention. The majority of episodes

examined, including those of Italy, fall within the transgressive category, which is defined by

Tarrow as:

[contention which] consists of episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of

claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of

claims, or a party to the claims, (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of the

at least one of the claimants, (c) at least some parties to the conflict are newly self-

identified political actors, and/or (d) at least some parties employ innovative collective

action. ) Action qualifies as innovative if it incorporates claims, selects objects of claims,

15Gunther,Richard,NikiforosP.

Diamandouros,andA.Sotiropoulos.

DemocracyandtheStateintheNew

SouthernEurope.Oxford:Oxford

UP,2006.16McAdam, Doug, Sidney G. Tarrow, and Charles Tilly.Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge:

Cambridge UP, 2001, 246.


9/38

Di Mauro-Nava 8

includes collective self-representations, and/or adopts means that are either

unprecedented or forbidden within the regime in question.)17

As Tarrow then highlights, the social movements of the 1960s in Italy broadcast how these

movements lead to the creation of other movements with similar goals. When the first wave of

protests began in 1967-68 in Northern universities, where students were protesting to reform in

response to the end of the Italian economic miracle. These various protests led to a clash between

the right and left political parties, with the left loosing ground and the rise of the right in Italian

politics, especially in the North where these protests concentrated.18

This specific example and others as illustrated by Tarrow show how the Italian state

continues to redefine its regional boundaries s and how the relationship between the North and

South, and between populous and government continues to change as internal conditions change.

The rebellions of the 1960s were partially due to the loss of cheap Southern labor, easing of Cold

War tensions and secularization.19

However, as the rest of the material suggests, these instances

in contentious Italian politics are not localized to the 20th

century, as rebellion and resistance are

part of the Italian narrative since before the inception of the modern Italian state.

Why are developments in the two regions so different? Scholars acknowledge that some

of this difference is attributed to the regional governments found in each of Italys twenty

regions.20

The struggle within these regional governments to form a solid regional identity and

common foundation has led to regional loyalty, yes, not national but also to a more problematic

national disloyalty to opposing regions. The creation of political parties such as the Lega Nord

17Ibid, 7-8.18

Ibid, 30-31.19

Ibid, 30.20Mammone, Andrea, and Giuseppe A. Veltri. "Italy in Chiaroscuro: the dark shadows of modern

Italian society."Journal of Modern Italian Studies13 (2008): 297-304. Academic Search Premier.

EBSCO. Bender Library, Washington. 21 March 2010.


10/38

Di Mauro-Nava 9

(Northern League) in the North has led to tension among the regions of the North and the South

as the LN calls for secession from regions they deem to be holding the North back from full

development21

.

The understudied regions of Southern Italy allow for misconceptions to be formed of the

region and why it continues to not be at the same economic and political standards of the North.

As some in the field have tried to explore, the problem of Southern Italy is larger than simply

economic infrastructure, but a larger question of cultural norms and how the creation of the state

has led to disparity between the two regions.

Same Problem, Different Perception

Culture and identity are an integral part of a persons self-awareness because they have

become social constructs that as a society we all try to define.

Identify is a bifocal concept. Identity has the dimension of identified as, a categorical or

emotional concept. Identity in both dimensions maps onto the nation-state dyad. Scholars,

even the most perceptive, often conflate identified as and identified with leading to

conceptual as well as terminological slippage. National citizenship was the standard

legal mechanism that nation-states used to bind individuals to the polity and to bridge the

gap between a categorical conception of identity and an emotional attachment (Marshall

1964).22

In fact, howwe choose to go about the defining process is itself a result of culture and identity

and the two are interconnected with how people within a state view themselves in the context of

21Giordano, Benito. "A Place Called Padania?: The Lega Nord and the Political Representation of

Northern Italy."European Urban & Regional Studies6 (99): 215-31. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO.

Bender Library, Washington. 21 March 2010.22

Ibid52.


11/38

Di Mauro-Nava 10

that statein other words whether their loyalties lie with the region, state or larger global

community.

While concepts like democracy and civil society are important to understanding the

development of national and regional identity, there is insufficient attention to the concept of

culture and self-identity as predictor of historical narrative. Historical narrative is an important

element to consider because these stories form the basis of how a group of people see

themselves and this in turn affects their actions and outlook on all facets of life, whether it be

familiar, community, or outside of the perceptions self. The basic problem with only looking at

concepts like democracy and civil society is that these are relatively modern developments that

arise afterregional or state identity have been forged, and how these are practiced depends on

how a society views the definition and role of each. Before we can consider the contributions of

institutions and other national and transnational actors, it is first important to build upon those

norms and cultural identities that already exist because it is through that lens that people perceive

and understand the events and actions that are taking place around them

Opportunity spirals, identity shift, competition, and brokerage were some of the

mechanisms at work in the creation of a unified state that superimposed a highly

centralized administration upon a society rife with regional differences. If life were

simple, these differences would have produced recurring movements of peripheral

nationalism. Instead, they produced a nation-state without hegemony.23

These weak models of unity and state building have been examined by other scholars like

Antonio Gramsci and Gaetano Salvemini who even several centuries ago:

23McAdam, Doug, Sidney G. Tarrow, and Charles Tilly.Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge:

Cambridge UP, 2001, 246.


12/38

Di Mauro-Nava 11

criticized the obvious costs and dysfunctions of this weak pattern of integration and

particularly the fact that integration took place through elites, encouraged corruption, and

at the margins blended with criminality. It left many ordinary southerns the prey of

landowners, Mafiosi, and corrupt politicians.24

There are several factors that can be attributed to this disparity, including economic disadvantage

and regional formation and integration into the state. A part of this weakness can be explained by

the history of some of the Southern regions, one of which is Sicily. Sicily was under external

control for the majority of its existence, and all of its rulers were non-Italian entities. For several

centuries, Sicily served as the midway point between the mainland the territories beyond Europe,

with each of its conquerors benefiting from its location in the Mediterranean25. Before Italian

unification in 1861, Southern Italy was an independent sate, with its own economic, political and

social structures and after unification, these structures continued to exist in conjunction with

those of the North. However, the South was opened to the commercial penetration of northern

industrial goods while its own industrialization was inhibited.26

This culture of exploitation

would remain in the narrative of Sicily and other Southern regions until the present day.

The Italy of today is not much different from the one of even two centuries ago. Problems

with a corrupt central government, organized crime and economic disparity continue to divide

the nation-state and those that have the power to create a stronger national identity do not care to

or feel the need to exercise this power. This is namely the role of political parties in the region,

which continue to hold onto regional powers as a method of holding onto their constituent base.

In the South, This base is made up of agricultural workers, sharecroppers, small farmers and

24Ibid

25Tilly, Charles. Coercion, Capital, and European States: Ad 990 - 1992. Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.:

Blackwell, 2006, 163.26

Tarrow, Sydney. Peasant Communism in Southern Italy. New Haven: Yale University, 1967,13.


13/38

Di Mauro-Nava 12

artisans, all of which generally lean towards the left (sympathetic to Communist ideology)27

and

against the rhetoric that has made the Lega Nord so popular in the North.

The Development of the Italian State

Although there are several historical moments in Italian history that have shaped the

modern-day state, there are two key periods that are beneficial to study in an attempt to

understand why and how the attitudes and characteristics of the regions and state as a whole

developed to its present-day form. One is the time beginning after the French invasion of several

Italian city-states in 1494 to the signing of the Peace of Utrecht in 1713. Although this key

period covers approximately 219 years of history, these years were vital to the development of

Italian region identity under French and later Spanish dominance28. The Italian Renaissance

had all but disappeared and the city-states were struggling to maintain cultural independence

from their conquerors. This is important because during a time when the Italian city-states could

have been developing connections with each other, they were in essence divided by foreign

powers and preserving their own regional culture.

Another key period is 1848-1861, during which the present-day regions in Italy fought a

revolution for unification. By 1861, Italy was declared the Kingdom of Italy (predecessor of

present-day Italian Republic), built upon the ideas of Guiseppi Mazzini and the failed revolts of

the early 1800s. Mazzini was an Italian philosopher and political activist who in the 1830s gave

democratic thought in Italy a distinct program and form of organization that distinguished it from

the model of liberal government: a concept of Italy that found expression in a unitary, republican

state.29

Mazzini was different from other revolutionary theorists of his time in that he

27Ibid, 205.

28Killinger, Charles L. The History of Italy. New York: Greenwood Group, Incorporated, 2002, 80-84.29Ridolfi, Maurizio. "Visions of republicanism in the writings of Giuseppe Mazzini."Journal of Modern

Italian Studies 13.4 (2008): 468-479. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web. 25 Apr. 2010.


14/38

Di Mauro-Nava 13

recognized the cultural and historical relevance emphasized by those who would create the

Italian nation and in his writings, he spoke about an image of the patria as a democratic

association of free individuals, of citizens called upon to act responsibly in the service of public

institutions.30

It was through his works and political activism that he rallied thousands of Italian

youth to mobilize in various parts of Italy, including Milan and Sicily, however these forces were

no match for elite forces in the area. Mazzinis failed attempts at revolution in the early half of

the 19thcentury would have to wait until the latter part of the same century when external forces

threaten these regions.

Even during this time of unification the roles the North and South played in the move

towards declaring a unified state varied greatly with each city-state region acting up at different

times as a direct result of a particular injustice being faced at the time31

. Up until the 1800s, the

regions of modern-day Italy had not wanted nor were they willing to unite to form a unified

republic. It was the threat of a common oppressive regime that lead to renewed efforts to forge a

unified state and not when it was originally suggested centuries before with Machiavelli and his

writings32.

For Italians, initial steps at becoming a Republic did not occur until the Peace of Lodi in

1454, and this effort was only made by five large city-states. The agreement was not very strong

however, and the invasion by France in 1494 opened Italy to foreign occupation for almost two

centuries afterwards. This occupation period further divided the Italian city-states, as foreign

powers ruled, traded, suppressed and took control of the various regions. Italy would not begin to

see true movement towards unification until the mid-1800s, when the Risorgimento movement

30Ibid

31Tilly, Charles, Louise Tilly, and Richard Tilly. The Rebellious Century: 1830-1930. Cambridge:

Harvard UP, 1975, 129-133.32

Killinger, Charles L. The History of Italy. New York: Greenwood Group, Incorporated, 2002, 83.


15/38

Di Mauro-Nava 14

would provide the incentive for these individual city-states to finally unite for a common

purpose: to remove all foreign influence from the region.33The Risorgimento was mostly due to

the efforts of the northwestern region of Piedmont (then the Kingdom of Sardinia), which used

diplomacy, war and coercion to unite the peninsula.34

In 1848-49, the Piedmont began supporting

uprising in those areas under Austrian occupation with little result; a decade later, the Piedmont

was finally able to rid itself of its Austrian ruler and annex the region of Lombardy. Lombardys

annexation was shortly thereafter followed by the annexation of several central regions such as

the Duchies of Parma and Moderna and the Grand Duchy of Tuscany. These annexations were

peaceful, in that these duchies were asked if they wished to join the Kingdom of Italy. The

same cannot be said for the annexation of the Southern regions, especially that of Sicily, which

was under Bourbon rule. The Piedmont, now with forces from a larger contingency was able to

defeat the Bourbons and take Sicily and the Southern regions.35While the Piedmont was

successful in uniting Italy and ousting external ruling factors such as the Austrians and

Bourbons, unification did not translate into equality amongst the regions or a shared sense of

cultural and historical identities.

Initially, the conglomerate of city-states in modern-day Italy held significant differences

in function and services. As Stein Rokkan notes, the early Northern Italian city-states were

geographically more distant than those of the South, which had stronger ties to the old Roman

Empire and Catholic Church. When the process of state-making began in Western Europe, the

majority of this process was occurring through the already-established trade-route cities of

33Killinger, Charles L. The History of Italy. New York: Greenwood Group, Incorporated, 2002.

34Gold, Thomas W. The Lega Nord and Contemporary Politics in Italy. New York: Palgrave

Macmillian, 2003, 13.35

Ibid


16/38

Di Mauro-Nava 15

Europe, of which many city-states in Northern Italy belonged.36

Present-day Italy was one of the

first decentralized regions in Europe to initiate the state-making process, however, Italy would be

one of the last modern-day states to conclude the formalization of its current state. This is

because the present-day regions of the modern Italian state were in the 15-17th

centuries at

constant war with each other. Each wanted to dominate the other in terms of trade or other

commodities. It was not until the 18th

century that the common foreign threat forced this mish-

mash of city-states to unite to fend off external violence. Even still, old prejudices and mistrust,

years of foreign occupation and a cycle of compromises and disagreements made true unity

unattainable for the city-states of Italy, creating the vast regionalism that still exists today.

The Italian Question

From the onset of the cultural development of what is present-day Italy, regional identity

has been important to the people who come from these different regions. "The regionalism that is

still so strong today in Italy originally stems from the differences between all these groups

[Italics, Etruscans, Faliscans, Samnites, and Umbrians]," says professor Nicola Terrenato. "They

are our cultural roots.37These groups, once conquered by the Romans, continued to thrive under

Roman rule and this, inversely, continued the trend we see today.

Unlike some of its European counterparts, in Italy this lack of initial homogenization was

a link in the chain of events that would lead to an eventual separation of the two major regions in

the formalized country. Another impediment to state building was Italys location in the South

Mediterranean and the inhabitants of the region beginning in the 15 thcentury. This was because

the dynamics and political changes experienced by each region, North and South, were distinct

36Rokkan, Stein. Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building: A Possible Paradigm for

Research on Variations Within Europe. The Formation of National States in Western Europe. Ed.

Charles Tilly. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1975, 575-576.37Zwingle, Erla, and Louis O. Mazzatenta. "Italy Before the Romans."National Geographic207

(2005): 52-77. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Bender Library, Washington D.C. 25 Feb. 2010.


17/38


18/38

Di Mauro-Nava 17

from much of the rest of Western Europe at this time42

. As mentioned before, Sicily was the one

great exception, refusing to fall in line with the remaining city-states.

This was an era [1860s] in which Sicilian intellectuals began retelling the islands

glorious, if tragic, history of repeated invasions and publishing dictionaries in the Sicilian

vernacular. Few Sicilians thought seriously of carrying the flag of Italian nationalism for

Pidemontese [sic] Victor Emmanuel.43

So although the 19thcentury was one in which modern-day Italy saw much internal change in

political and social dynamics, the pull of old regional ties remained firmly in place.

This relatively newly established identity still presents itself in various aspects of the

Italian identity, most notably the continued existence of regionalism and the differences in

attitude towards several aspects of government within the country.

Of course we cannot hope to fully understand the divisions between the regions of Italy

without also understanding the underlying tensions between the North and South. While both

belong to the same state, the mentality and perspectives held by the citizens of Northern and

Southern Italy are decidedly distinct as well.

Italys location exposes it to a plethora of ideas and influences from surrounding

countries ranging from low-context neighbors like Switzerland in the North, to high context

interactions with African nations in the South. The pull and influence of these nations, on top of

Italys already segmented identity help create the two very distinct cultural differences in the

regions, which in turn has led to the development of several distinctions between the two

regions; most notably, their economies. One of the results of this exchange of ideas is the

42Chittolini, Giorgio. "Cities, "City-States," and Regional States in North-Central Italy." Cities and

the Rise of States in Europe, A. D. 1000-1800. Ed. Charles Tilly and Wim P. Blockmans. New York:

Perseus Books Group, 1994,33-34.43

McAdam, Doug, Sidney G. Tarrow, and Charles Tilly.Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge:Cambridge UP, 2001, 239.


19/38

Di Mauro-Nava 18

introduction of Protestant ideology into Northern Italy by Switzerland. As more traditional

ideology lost hold in the North, the region was able to adapt and incorporate new technology to

develop its economic structure, while the South, holding on to its traditional values (like those of

the Catholic Church) remained resistant to economic change and development.

It is valid to include political structure as a reason for why the economies of the two

regions are not equal, however this reason alone is not sufficient. Other modern components

make up this complex web of culture interacting with economic infrastructure (such as the

continued existence of the Mafia44

) but the larger question remains as to why these elements

exist in the first place and why they continue to have an impact.

In the Italian case, it is important to not only focus on the past several decades to

determine the disparity of North and South economies but to also focus on the history of the

country. Several developments in class structure have shaped the new Italian society but

remnants of the old elitist mentality continue to have hold, especially in the South where they

were most prominent. Even ancient forms of generating wealth continue to exhibit patterns

today: The North began as a region of finance and commerce while the South developed wealth

based on the products of the land. Today, the North is more industrialized and produces more

manufactured goods, while the South relies on agriculture45. However, because culture itself is

complex, this author argues there has to be another major series of cultural links that have

promoted the drastic divergence of the two economies. Historically, Italy was a series of

independent regions, which developed their own series of characteristics and strengths. These

developments in characteristics extend to more than just political structure (although that is one

44Mammone, Andrea, and Giuseppe A. Veltri. "Italy in Chiaroscuro: the dark shadows of modern

Italian society."Journal of Modern Italian Studies13 (2008): 297-304. Academic Search Premier.

EBSCO. Bender Library, Washington. 21 March 2010.45

Ibid


20/38

Di Mauro-Nava 19

component) but to several other factors that helped shape the identity of several regions such as

how they deal with government, how involved a community is in civic activity and how these

levels of involvement in other areas of culture affect the development of the two economic

structures found in Italy46

.

The same holds for political identity. When the Northern regions of Italy succeeded in

coercing the Southern regions into integrating with them in the 19th

century to form a unified

Italy, they were not able to rid the region of the practices performed by its long history of

external rulers.

nothing has changed completely, in the sense that no new, modern organization of

social roles has yet crystallized. Politically, the same thing is true; the Bourbon monarchy

and its trappings are long since gone, but the liberal, democratic institutions imported

after the Risorgimento function in a manner their founders never intended.47

Unlike Northern Italy, which has developed several organizational structures for governmental

operations, such as institutions and groups that carry out the functions of the regional and central

government Southern Italy ahs developed no such mechanisms. However, because these

mechanisms are not in place does not mean that they do not exist. The fragmentation of social

roles that continues to exist in Italy (traditional gender roles, etc,) translates into the political

field, with clientelismo substituting for more traditional bodies of government.48

Simply belonging to this form of political structure does not mean that political

participation is less than it would be if the South followed more traditional political bodies.

According to Tarrow, the participation is simply different, which leads Northern Italians to

46Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Y. Nanetti.Making Democracy Work : Civic

Traditions in Modern Italy. New York: Princeton UP, 1993.47

Tarrow, Sydney. Peasant Communism in Southern Italy. New Haven: Yale University, 1967, 71.48

Ibid, 74.


21/38

Di Mauro-Nava 20

believe that the South is not willing to become involved in politics or they simply do not care,

which is not the case whatsoever.

Thirdly, the issue of social structure is one that continues to divide the North and South.

As explored by Tarrow, Southern Italy is still very much a system of social class, because prior

to the formation of the Italian state, the nobility held a prominent place in Southern Italian

culture, while upward mobility for peasants was not at all common.

The bourgeoisie was perhaps the most strategic class in the formation of the modern

social and political system of the Mezzogiorno. Its most significant feature is its

concentration in the tradition professions, in landholding, and in administration, and its

detachment from role-shaping, productive process in industry.49

This is different from the North, which saw an influx in emigration from the South in the years

after unification until about the 1960s (the end of the Italian miracle). This influx of emigrants

restructured standards of living for those who moved and local Northern Italians adapted to the

growth of the region by becoming more urbanized and industrialized.

In todays economic, political and social context, many of thee issues have yet to be

resolved, or at least accepted as valuable differences. The North continues to see the South as a

money-leeching region, in part because of the rhetoric of the Lega Nord and their desire to see

Italy become more regionalized. Moreover, the Southern economic system, more dependent

upon underground economies50

will not be able to compete with the more advanced North,

which perpetuates the existing bad blood among the two regions; the North wishes to keep

more of its financial gain, the South believes the North has an unfair advantage. In terms of

political and social structures, the North, with its more malleable population and political

49Ibid, 49.

50Calavitas, Kitty.Immigrants at the Margins: Law, Race and Exclusion in Southern Europe. New York:

Cambridge UP, 2005.


22/38

Di Mauro-Nava 21

structures will be continues to be seen by those outside of Italy as the only ones that are

modernizing with the rest of Europe. However, these presumptions are unfair, as studies in

Southern Italy are still lacking as compared to those in Northern Italy and calling a region

backward because it follows a different political, economic and social structure is not useful to

closing misperceptions and understanding differences between the two major regions.

Further Study

Future studies into the dichotomy of Italy and why these regional identities continue to

persist would go a long way in understanding not only Italy but also the other regional actors in

Europe. However, empirical data, as collected by Putnam in the early 1990s, has shown how

preconceived notions of incivility and disregarding periods of history are not the most effective

way to study regional narratives and disparities. Should scholars want to take on the project of

cultural differences in Italy, exploring individual stories and relationships of the South to the

North and vice versa, can prove more detailed knowledge as to why further integration has not

yet occurred.

Implications: Italy as a Microcosm for the EU

As Italy now becomes further integrated with the European Union, we begin to see how

similar issues; economic disparities among member states, cultural differences and perspectives

of history are challenging the creation of a Pan-European identity. As the Union continues to

expand and different cultures are juxtaposed and made to work together, discourse and lack of

understanding threaten to slow down the growth of the European Union and the implementation

of the Lisbon Treaty. This is because regionalism and nationalism threaten to undermine efforts

by the Union to create a supra-national identity. It is because of these elements that Italian

regionalism will persist and a Pan-European identity will be difficult to achieve.


23/38

Di Mauro-Nava 22

The processes and perceptions of historical context and self-image that a collective holds

dictate all economics, politics and social norms and how they choose to interact with and

interpret a new element in their sphere. By using Italy as a basis for comparison, we can compare

Italy and its regions to the member states of the European Union and the central government of

Italy as the EU. The point of this comparison is notto say that politically or economically these

are similar, but how individualsand cultureinfluence whether or not importance is given to the

entity perceived as closest to those cultural norms developed over a long period of time.

As some will argue, the unique forces that created the various European identities that

make Europe heterogeneous are now playing against Europe in the further consolidation of

European states in the European Union.

Every European nation-state accomplished political and cultural consolidation in

different time periods and with different degrees of fit between culture and the polity.

In formal terms, the nation-state is a dyad linked by territorial consolidation on the one

hand and cultural consolidation on the other (Berezin 1999b). In practice, nation and

state, culture and structure, are enmeshed inextricably. But separating the nation and the

state is an analytic move that provides conceptual leverage. It lends clarity to the issue of

Europeanization, where scholars often discuss institutions and identities as if they were

independent of each other, It [sic] permits rigorous conceptualization that may be brought

to bear upon the relation between rightwing populism and the advancing European

project.51

Just as Italy has internal forces that push her in different directions, so does the European Union.

In fact, several states within the Union face similar cases to the Italian example and therefore add

51Berezin, Mabel.Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times. New York: Cambridge UP, 2009, 49.


24/38

Di Mauro-Nava 23

to the growing mixture of voices clamoring to be heard on the larger EU platform, which clearly

makes for the establishment of a Pan-European identity much greater.

The European Union is the result of history, a history of empires, conquests, war, famine,

division, union, expansion and revolution. The past 50-odd years since the creation of the EU

have shown that although this continents fraught nationalistic tendencies have led awry and to

upheaval, a common goal could unite them in the hopes of turning a new page and writing a

more peaceful future. However, the success of the European Economic Community which in

turn led to the creation of the European Union has not, in its short existence, been able to

supercede core human identity values and beliefs. For while the benefits of the euro and the ease

of belonging to Schengen have made belonging to the EU a plus for many members, especially

economically, xenophobia, nationalism and a resistance to perceived loss of sovereignty have

made the transition of the EU from a purely economic entity to a dual economic and political

entity challengingas has accepting a common European identity.

As a member of the original six, Italy has a unique relationship with the EU and so this

paper and the comparison of Italian regionalism to the larger question of European identity make

for a peculiar comparison and point of inquiry. In contrast to France, Italian politicians of all

political persuasions have embraced Europe even if for different reasons.52Like this author

mentions, this statement is really not that difficult to believe, in the larger context that Italians

have not found a national voice, so they hope to be able to find a supra-national one. Italy is

paradoxically finding its national voice in Europe that is, Europe as an object of identification

is helping to produce an Italian national identity that looks outward as well as inward.53

However, the Italian example does help explain how lacking unifying events, such as the French

52Berezin, Mabel.Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times.Cambridge UP: New York, 2009, 223.53

Ibid, 240.


25/38

Di Mauro-Nava 24

revolution movement or the German collapse of the Wall can hinder the process of identity

building and why the EU is not wholly ready to accept a Pan-European identity.

Not all members of the European Community are as hesitant to presume that a common

European identity is to far off in the future. Unsurprisingly, one of these proponents of a

common EU identity is an Italian politician, Gianfranco Fini.

Fini argued that a national and a European identity are complementary and do not

exclude each other: European culture isEuropean identity. Can one think of a Europe

that is not profoundly steeped in single national cultures and of Italian culture in

particular? (p.21) Fini argues that a European demosis forming. Youth are at the core

of the demosas well as the Internet, which breaks down barriers. Paradoxically, Fini

supports that idea that since English is the language of technology it will also be the

language of Europe even if one must continue to learn and use ones national language.

When asked if he is committed to a human or a national identity, Fini replies, We cannot

neglect that fact that the concept of identity is always married to the concept of

community, the smallest is the family, the largest is already Europe today. Although

according to others, it is not Europe but the West.54

Is it enough simply to belong to this larger community to efface centuries old ideas and create

a new identity?

While the European Union has proven it is a force to be reckoned with in terms of

economic strength, this may not be enough to solidify the entirety of the people living within the

Union to create and establish themselves within the perception of a supranational identity that

supercedes that of their own national one.

54Berezin, Mabel.Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times.Cambridge UP: New York, 2009, 241.


26/38

Di Mauro-Nava 25

It cannot be ignored that the efforts of the European Union to integrate the states of

Europe has led to some new ideas about what it means to be European in the broader sense of the

word.

Important EU-level developments have challenged and impacted on collective nation-

state identities and are constitutive of a European identity. These include the emergence

of the European public space through the establishment of supra-national institutions and

the formation of transnational European discourses, as well as the establishment of a

European polity through the transfer of competences from the nation-state to the

European level and the ensuing importance of inter-subjective meanings that people

attach to the Europeanisation [sic] process as a whole.55

The greatest of these has been the success of the economic integration of the members of the EU

and how this economic integration ahs changed several aspects of how everyday living functions

have altered.

is the obvious economic success of the process of European integration [have

promoted the development of a European political community]. the greater

permeability of national borders after the agreement of Schengen, as well as the ever-

increasing contact frequency of European citizens as a result of progressing economic

integration, might have promoted perceptions of community and mutual solidarity among

EU citizens.56

The development of the euro, the EU flag, EU institutions and other Pan-EU entities create a

sense of ownership for not one state but for all of those that belong to the club in the same way

55Matonyte, Irmina, and Vaidas Morkevicius "Threat Perception and European Identity Building: The

Case of Elites in Belgium, Germany, Lithuania and Poland."Europe-Asia Studies61.6 (2009): 967-985.

Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web. 2 March 2010.56Scheuer, Angelika, and Hermann Schmitt "Dynamics in European Political Identity."Journal of

European Integration31.5 (2009): 551-568. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web. 26 Feb 2010.


27/38

Di Mauro-Nava 26

that lowering borders amongst the member states should create a sense of belonging to not

only the territory in which you reside in but to any of the other states which you wish to travel or

live in. The common currency is the strongest symbol of European unity because it comes

closest to citizens' everyday life (Risse 2003). In the same way, the introduction of European

citizenship is a symbol that imitates the nation-state in order to stimulate a European political

community.57

However, while these economic benefits have been great for accepting the

supranational elements for the European Union, the truth is these elements have not been enough

to overcome national prejudices against neighbors mistrust and obliterate memories of past

wrongs. So while its true that the members of the EU will never go to war with each other again,

this does not mean that they necessarily see their neighbor as equal to themselves.

The recent accession of Eastern and Central European states has significantly challenged

the concept of what it means to be European as people from many of these states were once

considered to belong to the other, especially post WWII and the rise of the Iron Curtain.

If we drew a map of European Union identifications in the early 2000s, a centre-

periphery picture would come to the fore. The highest level of identifications exists in the

six original member countries, closely followed by European South; the further away one

gets from this core of the Union in geographical and/or temporal terms, the weaker

identifications become.58

This is because just like a state is a process of key events and the outcomes of those decisions

that lead to an outcome, the formation of identity and making one identity supercede another is

equally challenging and a process that needs to be achieved with more than a common currency

and flag.

57Ibid58

Ibid


28/38

Di Mauro-Nava 27

The European Union of today clearly stems for initial ties in purely economic policies

that slowly over the years and with the aid of several treaties incorporated a more political

structure.

The increasing role of supranational, as opposed to intergovernmental, decision-making

and the establishment of a European citizenship might have promoted the development of

a political community of the EU. But the growing-together of a political community

depends at least as much on people's self-perceptions and identifications as on the

provision of rights of citizenship or on predominant modes of government.59

As scholars in the field have highlighted and studied, the EU can only continue moving forward

so long as the citizens of the EU do not see the EU as trying to overtake their own identities and

abilities to make decisions.

further EU integration is perceived by citizens to fundamentally alter the nature of the

nation-state. The pooling of sovereignty at the EU level may be seen by citizens as

constraining the power of states to act independently, leading to the undermining of the

symbolic value of the nation-state.60

Much of Europe comes from divisions of empires and wars and struggles from foreign reign,

making sovereignty an integral part of national identity and an important component to the way

they view how their government should care for their citizens and the way the EU should

function for the member states.

even if integration itself has been economic in nature, ordinary Europeans may not

perceive it this way. She argues that with the move to the generation of a common

59Ibid

60Garry, John, and James Tilley "The Macroeconomic Factors Conditioning the Impact of Identity on

Attitudes towards the EU."European Union Politics10.3 (2009): 361-379. Academic Search Premier.

EBSCO. Web. 25 Feb 2010.


29/38

Di Mauro-Nava 28

citizenship, with citizens having an EU passport, the end of different national currencies,

the coordination of policies relating to asylum and immigration matters and the

generation of a military force at the European level, integration is beginning to appear

less and less economic in nature . . . integration seems to pose a threat to national identity

by seeking to reduce nationalist sentiment (McLaren, 2004: 8967).61

So the perception of the function of the EU has shifted, much like the perception of national

identity and sovereignty shifts in states as historical events change the dynamic of a state.

Berezin argues that the rise of the populist right is an effort to step away from the conglomerate

that is the European Union:

The modern nation-state is the institutional location of a relationship between a polity and

a people that provides security for its members. Legal institutions of the modern nation-

state, such as citizenship requirements, structurally inscribe individuals in the polity and

society. National cultural practices from common language to shared norms cognitively

and emotionally inscribe individuals in the polity and society.Experience, individual and

collective, is a temporal and cognitive phenomenon that consciously or unconsciously

draws upon the past to access the future.62

the experience of the ordinary European is

still national- that is, their cultural and social capital, as well as their economic

possibilities, are still firmly tied to the national state.63

With this in mind, it does not seem too ludicrous to assume that with newer generations reverting

back to nationalistic tendencies, the exponential growth and expansion of the European Union

will start to curb. While the function of the EU may or may not have changed, the fact that

citizens perceptions of it has changed needs to be taken into account because these perceptions

61Ibid62Berezin, Mabel.Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times. New York: Cambridge UP, 2009, 6-7.63

Ibid, 8


30/38

Di Mauro-Nava 29

influence attitudes towards the EU and how they wish to address the EU to reflect national

identity.

There are several elements that are facing the EU in its battle to assume a common supra-

national or pan-national identity. One of these major challenges is the language barrier. While it

is true that most Europeans take it upon themselves to learn a second and even third language 64,

communicating in this fashion is never the same as being able to do so in your mother tongue.

The mere existence of currently 23 official languages of the EU specifies that language is an

important component of national identity and culture; with one not wanting their own language

to be less important than any other one. Although at the moment it is understood that official

languages and working languages are necessary to gets things done at the supranational level, the

thought of imposing a common European language and forcing all members of the EU to adopt

as a compulsory language (e.g. English or French) would seem completely ludicrous. Why?

Because this would severely infringe upon national sovereignty, would conflict with nations who

have historical problems with native English or French speakers and because allowing ones

language to take back seat to another nations language would be allowing a part of ones

identity to disappear, something that the collective EU is not ready for yet.

Another division amongst the members of the European Union is that of religion. Even

though the worlds population seems to be becoming more secular and agnostic as time

progresses, religion played a very important role in the development of several of the states in

the Union and continues to play a role in some states, even if it is only a social one.

Religious and linguistic differences essentially underlie the major ethnic cleavages that

have regularly been the reason for confrontation and war. Three religious cleavages are at

the basis of distinct socio-cultural areas on the European continent: the division between

64Personal observation made by the author of this paper


31/38

Di Mauro-Nava 30

Latin and Orthodox Christianity, that between the Christian and the Islamic world and,

finally, the division between Catholics and Protestants.65

As European history in general has shown, wars have been fought over which of these religions

should be practiced and even now, theorists like Edward Hall contribute unique cultural

attributes to religious groups.66Religions help form cultures and national identities, to the point

where religion is apartof national identity such as like in Italy.67

Today, Europe is still the

continent of great cathedrals and churches, and center for many religious organizations and

religions influence of national character is too important to not be considered, especially when

political parties (e.g. the Christian Democrats) continue to exert major influence in the political

landscape.

Another issue is the question of Euroskepticism and its impact on national identity.

Individuals in richer countries and individuals in net contributor countries are less enthusiastic

towards the EU.68

Additionally, this same study concluded that in states which political elites

are divided on the EU issue (the UK is currently the biggest name in the media) exclusive

national identity is a particularly strong predictor.69Other factors, such as fear of cultural threat

65Scheuer, Angelika, and Hermann Schmitt "Dynamics in European Political Identity."Journal ofEuropean Integration31.5 (2009): 551-568. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web. 26 Feb. 2010.66

Hall divides societies into high and low context, in this case, Protestants would fall under low-context(more time conscious, proactive, straightforward and in charge of their destiny) while Catholics and

Muslims would fall into the high context scale (less time conscious, have little sense that destiny is in

their personal control, etc.)67While separation of church and state legally exists in Italy, crucifixes are common fixtures in publicspaces, especially classrooms. On November 3, 2009, the European Court of Human Rights ordered the

Italian government to pay reparation damages to Soile Lautsi who brought the case to court. She wanted

crucifixes removed from school buildings where her children attended school. The majority of the Italian

public is outrages by the ruling. http://www.lifeinitaly.com/node/1238768

Garry, John, and James Tilley "The Macroeconomic Factors Conditioning the Impact of Identity on

Attitudes towards the EU."European Union Politics10.3 (2009): 361-379. Academic Search Premier.

EBSCO. Web. 25 Feb. 2010.69

Ibid


32/38

Di Mauro-Nava 31

and suspicion of immigrants also increase Euroskepticism, which in turn increases national

identity and the want to relate less with a greater EU identity.70

Regionalism is another identifying character of national identity and its importance on the

acceptance of a Pan-European identity. For countries like Belgium and Spain, regional

differences have caused their own regional identities, which differ from those of the rest of the

regions even within the same country. Identifying with fellow countrymen is a struggle, so

identifying with other Europeans, outside of economic terms would seem like a stretch.

According to a study conducted by Wil Arts and Loek Halman, for almost half of Europeans,

neither the European Union nor its member countries, but towns and localities offer fulfillment

of the need for roots. Attachment to the country as a whole is limited to less than a third of the

population and only a tiny minority identifies with Europe.71

In a larger scope, the same study found that many Europeans are now uneasy with the rapid

rate of expansion being experienced by the EU:

many Europeans of different nationalities also see the further unification of Europe as

posing a danger to the survival of national cultures and identities. The disappearance of the

internal borders between the European Union states may in the end, so they fear, result in a

loss of variety in national cultures and distinct national identities. Further unification may

cause problems of national identification and some observers have argued that it will

therefore generate a reemphasis on regional and local cultures.72

Such is the case in France where the new rise on Europeanization and the transfer of sovereignty

to the supra-national entity has caused an interesting dynamic in the French-EU relationship.

70Ibid

71Arts, Wil, and Loek Halman "National Identity in Europe Today."International Journal of Sociology

35.4 (2005): 69-93. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web. 24 Feb. 2010.72

Ibid


33/38

Di Mauro-Nava 32

The French state has displayed a peculiar ambivalence to various dimensions of European

integrations and has repeatedly pulled back from Europeanization in ways that support

national identity over European identity. The headscarf debate is the most publicized

example, but the regional language issue73

was a more telling if less prominent instance of

retreat74.

If we can conclude anything from these first studies in the field, it is that culture and national

identity remain very important to the definition of a persons character and how they choose to

interact with fellow member of the international community. The problem here becomes when

certain states begin to mistrust other states because of lack of common values or identity.

Majorities of EU citizens trust the people of other member countries. The people of the

new member countries in Central and Eastern Europe, however, are still less trusted, and

Turks are trusted the least. Figures on trust as well as on readiness to accept new members

show that European citizens have a rather clear-cut mental map of the Union, a shared

understanding of who is alike and who is different. The new Eastern member countries are

still considered different; the East-West continental divide remains detectable. It will take a

while for them to be fully integrated and accepted in the European ingroup [sic]. An

additional but somewhat minor difference is commonly seen between people from the

North and the South of Europe. A common view of all members is, however, that Turkey is

clearly different from what is considered European.75

The progress of enlargement has each time shaken what it means to be European and where the

73This is in reference to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, an initiative of the EU

to promote the preservation of regional languages. Former French president Jacques Chirac refused to

sign, stating it would require a revision of the French constitution that made French the language of

France and threaten one of the grand principles of the Republic. (Berezin, 207)74

Berezin, Mabel.Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times.Cambridge UP: New York, 2009, 208.75

Scheuer, Angelika, and Hermann Schmitt "Dynamics in European Political Identity."Journal ofEuropean Integration31.5 (2009): 551-568. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web. 26 Feb. 2010.


34/38

Di Mauro-Nava 33

boundaries end for who is and is not a part of the club. States, which would not have been

considered European in centuries past, are now up for consideration (Turkey) and even members

(Malta and Cyprus) and while this makes sense economically, the inclusion of different cultures

causes states to re-examine what it is that they stand for, what it means to be European and

sometimes these elements do not mix across borders.

This is not to say that members of the EU are not happy with the European Union and wish

to see its demise. On the contrary, as studies have shown, European citizens are for the most part

content to belong to the European Union and follow the EU as long as it continues to prove

benecial for them.

Concern for other Europeans is very low. in Europe neither a clear pattern of cross-

national differences in national identity nor clear developments over time are discernible.

in spite of these findings, support for the European Union is high and widespread. This

probably has more to do with expediency than with emotions and affections.76

So while membership is confined to something that constituents do not feel impacts them

directly, most everyone is perfectly content to belong to the EU. However, this does not mean

that most members of the EU are yet comfortable with identifying with all members of the Union

and still retain their individual citizenship and classify those living within their territories as

outsiders who do not quite fit with all of the customs and values pre-established by the state.

behind the image of a unifying Europe and the overall positive views about the integration

process diversity and heterogeneity prevail: the complexity of long term historical legacies,

institutional variance, political and economic interests do play a role.77

Clearly, the success of

76Arts, Wil, and Loek Halman "National Identity in Europe Today."International Journal of Sociology35.4 (2005): 69-93. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web. 24 Feb. 2010.77

Ilonszki, Gabriella "Introduction: A Europe Integrated and UnitedBut Still Diverse?."Europe-AsiaStudies61.6 (2009): 913-919. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web. 1 March 2010.


35/38

Di Mauro-Nava 34

the EU has given incentive to member states to continue to cooperate for the betterment of their

individual state and the progress of the EU in general terms. However, the success of the EU has

not incited politicians or individuals to want to form an identity outside of a common we are all

European because we live on the European continent or we are all European because we share

a common history to a certain extent.

Enlargement also has a big role in why a common Pan-European identity is difficult to

come by. Although the big bang enlargement of 2004 and the subsequent enlargement of 2007

have considerably depleted the candidate pool for entry, there are still a number of states that

wish to enter the EU, some with more European ties than others, and Turkey being the most

politicized and highly debated for cultural reasons. However, not everybody is welcome to the

family. Apparently, some politicians regard differences in cultural identity as sufficient reasons

for not including certain countries in the European Union.78So long as national identity is

perceived to be more important than economic benefit or that these differences are too great to

outcome, policy will not be able to forcibly mesh together groups of people that have a history of

conflict amongst them.

Italy, Europe and an Identity for All

Will a Pan-European identity ever form? Just like the development of the EU certain

criteria need to exist for the creation of a common identity.

ideas about European order, as well as transnationally [sic] rooted European and

national identity constructions, interact with given collective nation-state identities. The

more such European political visions and identity-building resonate with ideas about the

national political order embedded in collective nation-state identities, the more likely they


35.4 (2005): 69-93. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web. 24 Feb. 2010.


36/38

Di Mauro-Nava 35

are to merge with and be incorporated into these national collective views. It follows that

the very content of the 'European' collective nation-state identity might also vary,

depending on how various ideas about Europe resonate with visions of national

identities.79

So certain values and ideas are already held in common, otherwise the EU would not have been

created and things like the acquis communtairewould have absolutely no validity. Recent efforts

like Lisbon however, have shown just how un-ready the EU is to completely consciously forgo

national identity for the sake of the Union. Lisbon passed, but not before it was repacked and

efforts were being made towards a common European Security and Defense Policy may be at the

forefront of some politicians agendas, but little will come of it without it being on the agenda of

all 27 member states. These elements show that they are not enough to create a common

identity, a perception that we all belong together because the creation of the European state was

each unique to the next and because the creation of the EU is new to history as well.

The main obstacle to forming a Pan-European identity is defining what it means to be

European. There is a difference between being European (residing on the European continent)

and identifying as a European or more specifically a European of the EU, which encompasses

holding values that allEuropeans would hold; this is something that members of the European

Union have yet to attain.

Internationalization and globalization incite nationalistic counteractions. One of these

counteractions may be the emergence of a quasi-national European identity (De Beus

2001). Although European unification means a loss of national identity, it also means the

building of a more encompassing economic, political, and cultural community. At the

79Matonyte, Irmina, and Vaidas Morkevicius "Threat Perception and European Identity Building: The

Case of Elites in Belgium, Germany, Lithuania and Poland."Europe-Asia Studies61.6 (2009): 967-985.

Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web. 26 Feb 2010.


37/38

Di Mauro-Nava 36

practical level of policy, claims of competing identitiesthe European and nationalmay

come into conflict. 80

Are members of the European Union ready to give up elements of what makes them themfor the

sake of adopting a new identity? For now, the EU is too new, still growing and still trying to

determine and shape its itself into the structure that it will potentially become one day.

There is a debate among European leaders regarding what a European government should

be. On one hand, Europe might be a nascent nation-state on its way to becoming the United

States of Europe. In this image, common identity is seen as especially important, as it was

for the legitimation of states in an era of nationalism (Kohn 1944; Shafer 1955 and 1982).

On the other hand, the EU might be seen as something quite different than a nation-state,

perhaps a security community as envisioned by Karl Deutsch (1957), or even a looser

system of coordinated states (Adler and Barnett 1998).81

Without primarily identifying wherethe Union is headed in the next fifty years of its existence, it

may not be possible to ask for European citizens to challenge their ideas of nationalism and

cultural identity for an institution that has no clear path. Looking at the big picture, and leaving

moral consideration aside, the Italian pattern of unification shows a tradeoff between

legitimation [sic] and state strength, on the one hand, and between durability and state weakness,

on the other.82

Is the European Union willing to risk the same? As it stands now, the

appointment of Lady Catherine Ashton as the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and

Security Policy of the EU indicates that EU is still struggling to form its own identity outside of


35.4 (2005): 69-93. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web. 24 Feb. 201081Herrmann, Richard K., and Marilynn B. Brewer. "Identities and Institutions: Becoming European in theEU." Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield,

2004, 3.82

McAdam, Doug, Sidney G. Tarrow, and Charles Tilly.Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge:Cambridge UP, 2001, 246.


38/38

Di Mauro-Nava 37

its member states. Just like it took several decades and even centuries for the national identities

of some of the member states to form, so too will it take several decades of work and dedication

for a Pan-European identity to form if the members of the European Union decide this is the

trajectory they wish to take and there is no indication as of right now that any of the 27

member states wish to give up a piece of what they perceive makes them who they are to become

something else.

Even for Italy, a large supporter of the Union and its eventual goal of supra-national

identity, the EU has not entirely dismantled their internal differences and struggles to form an

Italian identity, outside of regional contexts.

These international events [Tangentopoli, Maastricht Treaty, and immigrant receiving

state] rearranged but did not eliminate what Bodei (1998) labeled as the divisions among

Italians. In addition, they created possibilities for new divisions. Europe writ large, the

presence of others from Africa, Eastern Europe and Albania, and even new political

parties, had to be incorporated into an Italian public grappling with new political parties

and ideas. 83

While the European Union has, can and will achieve a lot for the citizens of the EU and

help progress this region of the world and make it a more viable player in the international arena,

it is unlikely to be able to override narratives that continue to be perpetuated by generations.

Even though it makes sense that states with internal regional identities such as Italy, Spain and to

an extent Belgium would like to see the creation of a European identity because it would trump

the authority and emotional power of their internal governments, Europe at large does not face

this cultural and identity crisis as these states do.

Documents

Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question