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The Impossible Scheme: the Oswald Imposter Theory

Nearly 50 years after the assassination of JFK, people are still trying to make

sense of it. Its complexity invites speculation, raises questions, and for many, suspicions

as well. It is fraught with so much controversy that it would be difficult to list all the

conspiracy theories that have emerged into schools of thought--not simply because of the

volume, but also because of how finely nuanced the theories are. Some versions argue

about the details of an event, while others insist the same event never even occurred. A

notable example of this contentiousness is Oswalds trip to Mexico City and the question

of whether he was impersonated.

Powerful evidence, primarily consisting of handwriting analysis and eyewitness

accounts, indicates that the real Oswald was in Mexico City. Given this evidence, an

imposter scenario seems highly improbable. However, certain actions of the CIA, the

agency that led the governmental investigation of the assassination, are rather suspicious.

Some people have taken them as indications of deceit and manipulation for the purpose

of either framing Oswald or making him an unwitting accomplice, while some theorists

have even suggested he was a recruited asset.

Though these actions of the CIA can be seen as suspicious, they are far from

damning, at least, in the way conspiracy theorists would have them be. These actions

could be interpreted as machinations, but there is another possible interpretation, one that

holds an unglamorous truth for Americans: the CIA, one of the most powerful divisions

within the government, makes mistakes. Lots of them. Organizations such as the CIA,

FBI, Secret Service, etc. have a certain mystique which makes people see them as

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immune to fault. As the select few, they are looked upon with reverence by those from

the outside. It comes as a surprise then, when they are shown to be flawed.

The assassination investigation was full of contradicting memos, inaccurate

reports and other confusion, and while these errors seem surprising in hindsight, they are

far more believable as mistakes than the wildly complicated red herrings, cover ups and

schemes that conspiracy theories generally necessitate. The CIA undoubtedly withheld

certain information in the years following the assassination and even made false

statements, but these practices are consistent with how it operates as an investigative

agency. The trail of conflicting information, incorrect statements, and puzzling gaps has

led some to believe that it all hints at something sinister. If this trail, however, is

examined in a context that allows for human fallibility, a more plausible conclusion can

be reached.

Oswald traveled to Mexico City by bus, arriving on Thursday, September 26th,

1963. Over the next two days he made several visits to the Soviet and Cuban embassies

when the visits occurred, however, is a matter of dispute. It is certain that he visited the

Soviet embassy twice, once on Friday and once on Saturday. It appears Oswald made

three visits to the Cuban embassy, but some claim the visits all occurred on the same day,

while others believe there were two visits on Friday, and one on Saturday morning. This

issue will be revisited at a later point. Oswalds stay in Mexico City was brief, and having

failed to obtain a visa for Cuba, he began his trip back home the morning of Wednesday,

October 2nd.

This is the timeline of Oswalds trip to Mexico City if one accepts that he did in

fact travel there. Mark Lane, an extremely vocal critic of the Warren Commission,

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believes the CIA framed Oswald. Indeed, Lane states that a a decade after the

assassination it became apparent that the case that the CIA had so painstakingly

constructed, placing Oswald in Mexico City at the two embassies, had fallen apart as if it

were a house of cards. Not one material bit of evidence remained.1

He further explains

that the CIA charade, which evidently included employing an imposter for Oswald,

began no later than October 1, 1963.2

Lane promotes an elaborate theory in which not

only was Oswald framed, but the CIA even had an impersonator laying the foundation for

the set-up. Although Lanes theory is not endorsed by many, as there is substantial

amount of evidence that indicates Oswald was in Mexico City, it does, nevertheless, have

supporters.

Lane cites a number of issues regarding the evidence of Oswalds presence in

Mexico City. First, Silvia Duran, the employee Oswald allegedly spoke to at the Cuban

embassy, was arrested and roughly interrogated by the Mexican authorities. According to

Lane, she was pressured to sign a statement prepared by the CIA that identified Oswald

as the visitor.3 While there are documents that reveal the CIAs clear instruction that her

interrogation be kept secret, and that Duran be kept in isolation until her release, it does

not follow that her account was total fabrication. It is quite telling that Durans statements

did not change over the years. When she testified before the HSCA in 1978, her

statements were essentially the same, and in fact, she was quite adamant in recalling

certain points. Duran has been interviewed many times over the years, decades after the

assassination, and she has never admitted to making false statements due to coercion.

Lane also appears to overlook the other consulate employees who testified that they too

1 Mark Lane, Plausible Denial (New York: Thunders Mouth Press, 1991), 74.2 Ibid., 64.3 Ibid., 59.

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spoke with Oswald, most notably, the consul Eusebio Azcue. He certainly was not

arrested and brutally interrogated, yet with the exception of when Oswalds visits

occurred, his statements were consistent with Durans.

Another issue Lane points to is the matter of certain photographs produced by the

CIA that supposedly depicted Oswald outside an embassy in Mexico City.4 The man in

the photographs, however, clearly was not Oswald and truly bore no resemblance. Of

course, the CIAs error was obvious and quickly realized after the assassination. Some

theorists find the absence of any photograph showing Oswald at either embassy

compelling proof that Oswald was never there to begin with. There is, however, some

explanation for why no cameras captured Oswald.

In addition to the confusion about who the man in the photos actually was, there

was some difficulty in establishing when the camera coverage of the embassies had even

taken place. When Oswald visited Mexico City, the Cuban consulate entrance was not

covered by cameras yet, and in fact, there had been no photographic coverage of

consulate entrance for some two years prior to Oswalds visit.5 A camera was supposed

to be installed on Friday, September 27th, but difficulty was experienced in the

installation and technicians had to machine a part for the equipment.6 As a result,

photographic coverage of the Cuban consulate did not commence until sometime in

October.7 This information was provided by the CIA to the HSCA in 1978. In another

response to the HSCA, however, regarding the Cuban embassy coverage, the CIA

4 Ibid., 61.5 Draft Response to HSCA on CIA Coverage of Oswald in Mexico City, October 18, 1978. 104-10146-

10132. http://0-www.maryferrell.org.libus.csd.mu.edu/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?docId=26111,

3.

6 Ibid., 3-4.7 Ibid., 4.

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reported that there was, no evidence of technical difficulties or camera problems during

the months of September and October. The coverage within the time and day limitation

seems to be constant and comprehensive.8 Here, is an instance of contradicting reports,

but that merely proves poor communication, not that Oswald was never in Mexico City

simply because there is no photograph that shows him in an embassy there.

While there were no photographs of Oswald entering or leaving an embassy,

there were some photographs of him that came from Mexico City. Photographs were

required as part of the visa application. Duran explained that Oswald or in Lanes

scenario, whoever was impersonating him did not have photographs with him, so he

went to have them taken after Duran suggested a nearby shop where he could do so. The

photographs that were attached to Oswalds application depicted the real Oswald. Duran

confirmed that she looked at the photographs when she stapled them to the application

and compared them to the person standing before her and they did, in fact, match.9 There

really is no plausible explanation for how a genuine photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald

was attached to the application, other than that the real Oswald visited the embassy.

One major obstacle to Lanes theory is the handwriting analysis done on several

signatures from documents produced from Oswalds trip to Mexico City. In 1978, the

Cuban government gave the United States Oswalds original application for a transit visa

to Cuba. Handwriting analysis conducted by experts for the House Select Committee

confirmed that the two signatures on the application were indeed written by Oswald.10

To

8 Summary of Photographic Surveillance of Cuban Embassy for Sep-Nov 63, 180-10142-10499. http://0-

www.maryferrell.org.libus.csd.mu.edu/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?mode=searchResult&absPageI

d=528089. 3.9 HSCA, Vol. III, June 6, 1978. http://0-

www.maryferrell.org.libus.csd.mu.edu/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?docId=954&relPageId=33. 29.10 Ibid., 172. http://0-

www.maryferrell.org.libus.csd.mu.edu/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?docId=954&relPageId=176.

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fool a handwriting expert is no easy feat, but to fool more than one is an even greater

challenge. Still, a person could argue that a highly skilled forger might be able to pull that

off. The application, however, was not the only handwritten evidence of Oswalds

presence in Mexico City.

During his trip, Oswald stayed at the Hotel del Comercio, which kept a register

with guest signatures, one of which belonged to him.11

It seems unlikely that a person

could forge a signature multiple times and not have even the slightest variances that an

expert would catch. And again, it is significant to note that more than one expert

performed the analysis and determined it belonged to Oswald. This is extremely

compelling evidence that the real Oswald was in Mexico City. Some people, while

acknowledging that as powerful testament, might have lingering doubts and require

evidence of a different nature. Aside from Duran though, Lane does not examine the

accounts of several eyewitnesses who claim they saw Oswald in Mexico City.

Oswald traveled to Mexico City by bus, encountering quite a few other

passengers during his travels. He crossed into Mexico at Nuevo Laredo on Thursday,

September 26th, early in the afternoon. There, he caught the bus that would take him to

Mexico City. On that bus, were a few other English-speaking passengers, including a

young British couple, John and Meryl McFarland, and two Australian women, Pamela

Mumford and Patricia Winston, who boarded the bus at a later stop in Monterrey. Oswald

was seated in the front of the bus near the McFarlands, while Mumford and Winston

found seats towards the rear. Oswald briefly spoke with the McFarlands, stating that he

was traveling to Cuba and informing them of his status as the secretary of the New

11 HSCA, Vol. IV. http://0-


257.

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Orleans branch of Fair Play for Cuba. Later, Oswald walked to the back of the bus to

strike up conversation with the two Australian women. It was a conversation that

consisted of the typical small talk between strangers: where they were from, travel plans,

etc.12

Any person who came into Mexico through Nuevo Laredo had to have his tourist

ticket stamped by officials. Oswald and the McFarlands had their tickets stamped, thus

their names were placed on list of people who crossed into Mexico at Nuevo Laredo that

day.13 This card is critically important as it not only establishes the connection between

the other travelers and Oswald, but also because it was found among his belongings after

his death-- a fact which makes it far more difficult to argue that an imposter Oswald was

on that bus. Eventually, the McFarlands, the Australian women and Oswald went their

separate ways, but that shared bus ride would prove to be important in the months to

come. After the assassination, the McFarlands were shocked to see Oswalds picture in

the newspaper since they instantly recognized him as the man they had met on the bus in

Mexico. It should be noted that the McFarlands were in Liverpool when they saw the

photo in the newspaper, but they contacted the authorities immediately.

The McFarlands were not the only eyewitnesses to come forth. Mumford and

Winston were watching television in their hotel in Las Vegas on the evening of

November 22nd, when Oswalds picture came on the screen. Mumford, and Winston, too,

immediately recognized him as the man from the bus, even noticing that Oswald was

12 Gerald Posner, Case Closed (New York: Random House, 1993), 172-73.13 Warren Commission, Vol. XXIV.

http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/jfk/wc/wcvols/wh24/pdf/WH24_CE_2121.pdf. 10

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pictured wearing the same sweater he had worn on the bus.14

Just as the McFarlands had,

Mumford contacted the authorities right away. Some conspiracy theorists cite the

unreliability of eyewitnesses and give little weight to their accounts, but there are strong

reasons to give credence to the testimony of John McFarland and Pamela Mumford.

To begin with, they lack the suspicious or glaring inconsistencies that often call

eyewitness testimonies into question. Even in the absence of such weaknesses, however,

there is an element to eyewitness testimony, that while less obvious than inconsistencies

or outright deception, is just as dangerous: the power of suggestion. People have a

capacity to embellish memories or even form completely altered ones after an idea,

statement, or detail has been introduced. Unfortunately, many people come forth to serve

as witnesses unaware that their memories possess that vulnerability. In the cases of

McFarland and Mumford though, their accounts do not indicate that either party was

prone to suggestibility.

Oswalds trip to Mexico was reported in the newspapers three days after the

assassination so it is possible it created associations with Mexico City in the mind of

some witnesses. But, the McFarlands, Mumford and Winston all said that they

immediately recognized Oswalds picture when they saw the news. Undoubtedly they

would have seen a picture of the presidents killer at some point during the three days

following the assassination, before Oswalds trip to Mexico City was reported.

Furthermore, the statements of these witnesses corroborate each others in highly

significant ways, offering details about the other passengers on the bus, where different

people were seated, and with whom Oswald spoke. It is also important to note that

14 Testimony of Pamela Mumford, Warren Commission, Vol. XI. http://0-


231

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McFarland and Mumford made their reports individually, without knowledge of the

others as they were in different countries at the time.

In his affidavit, McFarland stated that he and his wife saw Oswald on the bus to

Mexico City on September 26th

. The list of travelers who crossed into Mexico at Nuevo

Laredo is concrete documentation that places the McFarlands and Oswald in close

proximity to each other, a fact which greatly bolsters McFarlands account. The affidavit

includes McFarlands recollection that Oswald discussed his involvement in the New

Orleans chapter of Fair Play for Cuba. According to McFarland, Oswald also expressed

his intention to travel to Cuba to see Castro. These pieces of information, however, were

known facts about Oswald and could perhaps have been read in the newspaper coverage

of the assassination. The most important information revealed in McFarlands affidavit

though, is the description of the passengers Oswald conversed with: two young

Australian women who boarded the bus on the evening of September 26th at Monterrey,

Mexico, and the elderly man who sat in the seat next to [Oswald] for a time. Here

again, McFarlands statement provides factual details that were confirmed by others.15

The Australian women did board the bus at Monterrey, and Mumford supported

McFarlands statements.

In her testimony, Mumford remembered a young English couple.and an

elderly English gentleman in his mid-or late-sixties.16 One can safely take the young

English couple to be the McFarlands, and the elderly gentleman to be the man the

15 Affidavit of John Bryan McFarland and Meryl McFarland. Warren Commission, Vol. XI. http://0-


224.16 Testimony of Pamela Mumford, Warren Commission, Vol. XI. http://0-


227.

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McFarlands described who sat beside Oswald. Random sightings are a given after any

major crime, and, as isolated events, they typically do not have any impact because they

either lack relevant information or are riddled with contradiction. After the assassination

there were a number of false sightings in Dallas. However, one must consider the

statistics.

The reliability of sightings in a large city, such as Dallas, which in 1963 had about

600,000 people, is always questionable given the high population. The greater the

number of people, the greater chance there is for misidentification. Consider the bus

population that produced multiple Oswald sightings. It was estimated there were about 50

passengers, a fraction of the population of Dallas, which in 1963, was about 600,000.

Only a few of the passengers were Anglo though, six including Oswald. Removing

Oswald, 4 of the 5 others stated they had seen Oswald 80% of the Anglos present on

the bus. Interestingly, the one who claimed he did not see Oswald was a thoroughly

unreliable character who had given inconsistent statements to the FBI.17 The accounts of

the McFarlands, Mumford and Winston taken together are powerful. Initially, it seems

one could argue that a couple on a bus in Mexico easily could have been mistaken when

they claimed they had seen Oswald. It becomes more difficult to argue, however, that

other people, who were on the same bus, gave the same descriptions of their fellow

passengers, and provided factual statements about Oswalds life, also produced the exact

same false memories.

A more complex argument is made by some theorists who allow that Oswald was

in Mexico City, but maintain that an Oswald imposter was also there. Prominent

17 Warren Commission Report. http://0-


305.

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conspiracy theorist and author John Newman believes that the CIA impersonated Oswald

over the telephone for intelligence purposes.18 The basis for this scenario is several phone

calls placed to the Cuban and Soviet embassies, the most perplexing of which is believed

to have taken place on Saturday, September 28th

. There are some challenges to this

theory, but before they can be examined it is necessary to present a more detailed

timeline of Oswalds visit to Mexico City.

On Thursday, September 26th 1963, Oswald arrived in Mexico City with a

mission: obtain a transit visa to Cuba. In order to do this, he would have to visit the

Cuban embassy. His first visit there took place on Friday morning, before noon. There he

spoke with Silvia Duran who, realizing the difficulty of his request, felt sorry for him.

She attempted to expedite the application process for him by asking her superior, Eusebio

Azcue to look it over immediately. Azcue did so, but informed them that in order to issue

the transit visa, the embassy would need the permission of the Cuban government which

would take a few weeks. Oswald filled out an application with Durans assistance, but

applicants were required to include photographs, so she directed Oswald to a nearby shop

where he could get his pictures taken.19

Oswald returned shortly with his photographs, which were stapled to his

completed application. Duran told him that he would get a transit visa faster if he had a

Soviet visa already. That, however, could take up to four months to process. Frustrated

and disappointed by this, he argued this point. Azcue explained that if Oswald had a visa

to Russia, then it would not be necessary to contact the Cuban government and a transit

18 John Newman, Oswald and the CIA (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, Inc., 1995), 373.19 Posner, 181.

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visa could be issued immediately. Without the visa to Russia, however, Oswald would

have to wait the few weeks for permission from Cuba.

Thus informed, Oswald walked the short distance to the Soviet embassy where

once again, he was told that the application for a visa would take about four months.

Oswald left the Soviet embassy furious, but, before he gave up all together, he would

visit each embassy once more. His final visit to the Soviet embassy took place on

Saturday, September 28th. The day of Oswalds final visit to the Cuban embassy is

disputed; according to some, Duran, for example, it took place September 27th, Friday

afternoon. Others, such as author Gerald Posner and Azcue, believe his final visit was the

morning of September 28th Regardless of when it occurred the third visit was marked by

peculiar circumstances. Oswald, upset at this point, returned to the Cuban embassy and

demanded a visa. When Azcue repeated the requirements, Oswald became angry and

argued with Azcue, accusing him of being a bureaucrat. Azcue, too, became angered and

ordered Oswald to leave, which he did. After this fight, Duran20 and Azcue21 both said

they did not see or speak to Oswald again.

Newman is convinced an Oswald imposter was the man speaking during the

mysterious phone call that was placed from the Cuban embassy to the Soviet embassy,

which the CIA had tapped. The transcript describes a female employee of the Cuban

embassy calling on behalf of a man who is there with her, believed to be Oswald, and

moments later he comes on the line and speaks to the Soviet employee himself. There are

three possible scenarios this phone call could fit into: it truly is Oswald speaking, it is a

20Testimony of Silvia Duran, HSCA Report, Vol. III. http://0-

www.maryferrell.org.libus.csd.mu.edu/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?docId=954&relPageId=54. 50.21 Testimony of Eusebio Azcue, HSCA Report, Vol. III. http://0-


133.

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CIA impersonator speaking as Oswald, or it is a call completely unrelated to Oswald. As

the transcript below reveals, however, it is quite brief and raises far more questions than

it answers:

SILVIA DURAN: There is an American here who says he has been to the Russianconsulate.

RUSSIAN CONSULATE: Wait a minute.

[Silvia Duran is then heard to speak in English to someone apparently sitting at

her side. This conversation goes as follows:]DURAN: He said wait. Do you speak Russian?

OSWALD: Yes.

DURAN: Why dont you speak with him then?OSWALD: I dont know...

[The person who was at the side of Silvia Duran and who admitted to speaking

some Russian then gets on the line and speaks what is described as terrible,hardly recognizable Russian. This person is later identified as Lee Harvey

Oswald.

OSWALD: I was in your embassy and spoke to your Consul.

RUSSIAN EMBASSY: What else do you want?OSWALD: I was just now at your embassy and they took my address.

RUSSIAN EMBASSY: I know that.

OSWALD: I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for myaddress, because they have it.

RUSSIAN EMBASSY: Why dont you come by and leave it then, were not far.OSWALD: Well, Ill be there right away.]22

Consider the first possibility, that the real Oswald did visit the Cuban embassy

and spoke on the phone. The female and male speakers were each identified after the

transcription took place. The transcriber of the tape that captured this phone call did not

immediately recognize the womans voice as that of Silvia Duran.23 Some might consider

it strange that the transcriber, who would certainly have heard Durans voice before in

other calls, could not identify it right away? But, perhaps it is not as strange as one might

22 NARA, CIA Transcript: Cuban Embassy, Mexico City, September 9, 1963. 104-10422-10143. http://0-


d=227817. 2.23 Newman, 368.

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initially think. The Lopez Report stated that the conversation became incoherent.24

Was

that a reference to the garbled Russian that was being spoken or perhaps the actual

connection the transcriber had was poor, making it difficult to fully grasp what was being

discussed.

Given that the transcriber noted that the caller spoke in terrible, barely

recognizable Russian, is it such a stretch to believe that there may have been some slight

miscommunication in this conversation? Perhaps Oswald was trying to say something

about his address, but struggled to articulate what exactly he meant. Many people have

made much of the fact that Oswald lived in Russia for a time and was married to a

Russian woman, and assume that therefore he must have had a decent, if not strong

command of the language. Several people who encountered Oswald at various points in

his life, however, noticed his weak understanding of Russian, despite his having lived in

Russia for two and a half years when he defected.

Richard Snyder, the embassy consul Oswald met with in Moscow early in his

defection, stated that he did not know very much Russian. I dont think he could have

gotten along on his own in Russian society. I dont think he could have done more than

buy a piece of bread, maybe.25 Although he had been in Moscow only a short time,

Oswald had been independently studying Russian for two years prior. Of course, ones

language skills dramatically improve during immersion, but certainly one should be

beyond food items after two years of diligent study. Correspondent Priscilla Johnson

24 Lopez Report. http://0-


d=68718. 90.25 Testimony of Richard Snyder, Warren Commission, Vol. V. http://0-


301.

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given more credence? Duran, with whom Oswald had more exchanges, or Azcue, the

man he argued with so vehemently that he was ordered to leave the building?

In her testimony, Duran admitted that she felt sorry for Oswald.32 As Posner

points out, she gave Oswald some special treatment, even if minor, in trying to get his

application reviewed that day by Azcue. Is it possible that she allowed Oswald in on

Saturday to help him make one last attempt to get his visa? Considering that she was

working that day, and that Oswald had visited the day before during closed hours, it does

not seem far-fetched to believe he could have gained entrance once more. If that is the

case, though, that would mean Duran either lied about a Saturday visit, perhaps to

distance herself from an assassin, which any person might wish to do, (especially one

with her Communist sympathies), or she could have simply been mistaken about the

visits all occurring on the same day.

Some believe Durans statements suggest there was an imposter scheme.

According to Newman, the CIA, knowing that the real Oswald had visited the Cuban and

Soviet embassies, impersonated both Duran and Oswald on the phone, and had the duo

call the Soviet embassy to garner whatever intelligence they could. The imposters placed

a call to the Soviets, and from there, the man pretending to be Oswald had to improvise.

The imposter figured Oswald had probably given his address during his visit to the Soviet

embassy and uses that as an opener, but it failed. That tactic having backfired, the

imposter simply agreed to come by and ends the conversation.

Newmans theory is creative and logical from a certain perspective, but it has its

weaknesses. To begin with, the broken Russian is, again, an issue. The possibility of

32 Testimony of Silvia Duran, HSCA Report, Vol. III. http://0-

www.maryferrell.org.libus.csd.mu.edu/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?docId=954&relPageId=53. 49.

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Oswald struggling with Russian has already been discussed, but there is no consensus on

Oswalds fluency, however, so consider the phone call with the assumption that Oswald

was proficient. If so, then it certainly would not make sense that Oswald was the caller

who spoke such poor Russian. Does that suggest it was an imposter? If the CIA had

decided to impersonate Oswald, given that they employ linguists, wouldnt it have been

quite easy for them to use an imposter who was fluent in Russian?

If the language matter allows for too much doubt, there is a more concrete

argument to be made against Newmans imposter theory. After the assassination, the CIA

scrambled to retrace Oswalds movements, and the station in Mexico City exchanged

many memos and cables with the CIA headquarters in Washington, D.C. These memos

are extremely valuable as they offer a detailed look at the nature of investigation, and its

inherent features: profuse communication and coordination, errors, speculation, and

confusion to name a few. A cable sent from the Mexico station to the CIA Director office

the day after the assassination is one of many examples of the constant information

sharing, but it also shows how the CIA had to try to make sense of the assassination

puzzle with limited pieces. This cable, regarding any photographic evidence of Oswalds

visits to the Cuban embassy, states that there is no evidence of Oswald visit. Only visit

we know he made was to Cub. Embassy on Sept. 28, Saturday on which day the embassy

was closed and no coverage.33

That sentence creates a problem for Newmans scenario. The cable says that there

is no photographic evidence of Oswalds visit to the Cuban embassy. But it indicates

certainty in saying they know he made a visit to the Cuban embassy on Saturday,

33 Cable: Complete Recheck Photos All Visitors to Cuban Emb., November 23, 1963. 104-10422-10092.

http://0-


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September 28th

. With no cameras having captured this visit how did the CIA know it had

happened? They must have had another means of confirming this visit, something

reliable, such as a phone conversation taped and transcribed by the CIA. If the CIA had

indeed arranged for an imposter to call as Oswald, they obviously would remember their

own ruse. So, if the real Oswald never visited the Cuban embassy on September 28 th, and

the phone call from that day was actually a CIA imposter, what allowed the CIA to say

definitively that they knew he had made a visit on Saturday, September 28 th? One logical

explanation would be that the CIA stated this as fact because they had a recorded phone

call from the Cuban embassy, placed by Oswald (or a man the CIA believed to be

Oswald) on September 28th.

Whether Oswald did visit the Cuban embassy on Saturday has not been proven,

but the CIA certainly appeared to believe he had. In addition to the cable above, there

were several references to this visit in other documents. In a log the CIA compiled of

Oswalds calls and visits to the Cuban embassy, a visit is listed for Saturday, September

28th.34 Also, in a 1964 report, the CIA listed a number of confirmed results its

investigation had produced, one of which was that Silvia Duran was again visited at the

Cuban embassy in Mexico City by the American seeking a Cuban transit visa on

Saturday.35 If the CIA regarded that phone call as evidence of a visit from the real

Oswald, and references it as fact, that would seem to eliminate the possibility of it being a

CIA ploy to gather intelligence.

34Chronology of Oswalds Visits and Calls to Cuban and Soviet Embassies, Mexico City 27 Sept- 4 Oct,

1963, October 4, 1963. 104-10414-10074. http://0-

www.maryferrell.org.libus.csd.mu.edu/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?docId=5824&relPageId=6. 6.35 Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico City, 28 September- 3

October, 1963, January 31, 1964. 104-10150-10141. 8.

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Furthermore, the CIA was baffled by Oswalds reference to his address, as can be

seen in a report from February, 1964.36 They guessed that while moving his family from

New Orleans to Texas, Oswald might have acquired a new Texas forwarding address

which he gave to the Cuban consulate, but then either lost or forgot it, and had to call

them back so he would have it to give to the Soviet consulate. Or, they suggested,

perhaps he was talking about his Mexico City hotel address which might have slipped his

mind while at the Soviet consulate. This bit of conjecture from the CIA seems

inconsistent with an imposter scenario. Again, the CIA would not need to analyze its own

call.

The identification of the male caller as Oswald is questionable when one

considers how it was made. A couple days after the Saturday call, on Tuesday, October

1st, another call came in to the Soviet embassy during which the caller identified himself

as Oswald. The transcriber noted that it was the same man who had called a few days

earlier on Saturday.37 Presumably, he concluded this because of a similarity in voices.

This method of identification makes it rather difficult to readily accept the Saturday call

as Oswald. It all relies on the opinion of one person who may or may not have had a good

ear and memory for voices. The possibility that it was a man other than Oswald cannot be

eliminated.

There are still a few other points to examine when trying to ascertain the

legitimacy of the September 28th

call. Rather than focus on what the caller says, one

might consider what the caller does not say: he never identifies himself as Lee Harvey

36Info Developed by CIA on Oswald Activity in Mexico City September 28 to October 3, 1963, February

13, 1963. 104-10054-10271. 3.37 Cable: Transcripts of Oswald Calls to Sov Emb 28 Sept and 1 Oct, November 23, 1963. 104-10527-

10279. http://0-


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Oswald. Duran testified that after Oswalds argument with Azcue on September 27th

, she

never spoke to him again, in person or by telephone. She was asked if she recalled any

problem with him not knowing his address, and she said she did not. Oswald mentioned

that he was staying at a hotel, but it was not necessary for her to know his address in

Mexico City so they never discussed it.38 If Duran had indeed had a conversation about

an address with Oswald whether in person or by telephone presumably she would

have acknowledged that during her testimony. Oswald gave his New Orleans address on

his visa application so clearly he did not forget that address.39

Suppose then that the Saturday caller was a completely different man who simply

happened to visit both the Russian and Cuban embassies which were, after all, located

next to each other? Certainly it would be a coincidence, but would it be completely

beyond the realm of possibility for a traveler besides Oswald to have visited both the

embassies? Even if this seems unlikely, the fact of the matter is that one can only reject

this possibility on the grounds that such coincidences seem rare, not because there is any

actual proof to show that it was not the real Oswald calling. Again, the identification of

the Saturday caller was simply based on the transcribers note, from the October 1st call,

that said the caller was the same man who had called a few days earlier on Saturday.

We have addressed many details of the imposter theory, but in order to evaluate

the different scenarios, it would be helpful to examine how they originated-- not by

exploring the reasons of why JFKs assassination could have benefited certain countries

or organizations or understanding the political reasoning behind the various conspiracy

38 Testimony of Silvia Duran, HSCA Report, Vol. III. http://0-

www.maryferrell.org.libus.csd.mu.edu/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?docId=954&relPageId=35. 31.39 Oswald Cuban Visa Application, September 27, 1963.

http://www.maryferrell.org/wiki/images/d/d3/Photo_hsca_ex_407.jpg.

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plots, but rather, by examining the evidence for these claims, putting aside all the theories

and looking at the facts. The difficulty for the conspiracy theorists is that the burden of

proof rests with them. In order to prove their claims, they need to produce actual

evidence that reveals a plot. For those who reject claims of a conspiracy, their case is

built on the absence of evidence since there will never be any positive piece of evidence

that proves there was no conspiracy.

There is, however, evidence that strongly suggests no conspiracy existed, and the

majority of this evidence involves mistakes made by the CIA; the specifics of these

mistakes do much themselves to dispel the idea of a CIA plot, but if one disputes this and

maintains that a plot did exist, he must ask himself whether these CIA errors were real or

intentional. If one believes them to be genuine mistakes, then it makes it rather difficult

to believe that the CIA could pull off a conspiracy cover-up without a single truly

damaging mistake coming to light, while other mistakes continually surface.

Alternatively, if one believes these mistakes were intentional, then the CIA managed an

absolutely brilliant feat in coordinating and planting these red herrings that would

mislead investigators, and withstand intense scrutiny for decades to come.

Not surprisingly, the CIA was often forced to work with limited information,

which requires investigators to speculate and guess. It is surprising though when the

guesses somehow become facts. A prime example of this is the discussion of the

September 28th

phone call in a summary of the agencys pre-assassination knowledge of

Oswalds activities in Mexico City. The CIA listed that on Saturday, Oswald went to the

Soviet embassy, but he apparently could not recall his new Texas address so he went to

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the Cuban embassy where he had registered it in his visa application the day before.40

This, however, is not correct because again, the address on Oswalds visa application was

his New Orleans address. The summary continues to say that Oswald secured the

address from Silvia Duran and she called the Soviet Consulate presumably to permit him

to give them the address over the phone.41 The CIA appears to have made several

significant assumptions based on the phone call. Not only did they piece together a

sequence of events without confirmation, but they also assumed the caller was in fact

Oswald.

Aside from the fact that the phone call did not produce the callers identity, there

is another interesting point to note regarding the CIA tapping and transcribing of phone

calls: there was not always meticulous record keeping of what date and times calls had

come in. Even before the JFK assassination, this problem existed. In an exchange

between the CIA Chief of WH Division and the Mexico station regarding coverage of the

Cuban embassy, it was acknowledged that due to occasional lack of logging it was not

always possible to ascertain the exact date a particular conversation took place. Perhaps

that only occurred rarely, but it is difficult to know exactly how occasional the lack of

logging truly was. One wonders whether phone calls were ever mistakenly attributed to

incorrect dates by guessing in the absence of a definitive date.

In reviewing the Saturday phone call, Silvia Durans account, and the subsequent

reporting of it, is very telling. In a CIA report dated January 31st, 1964, it was stated that

on September 27th Oswald visited the Cuban consulate and spoke with Duran. It

40 Summary of Agency Knowledge of Oswalds Activities in Mexico City Before 22 November 1963, May

2, 1975. 104-1042810021. http://0-

www.maryferrell.org.libus.csd.mu.edu/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?docId=6513&relPageId=3. 3.41 Ibid.

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continues to say that the same afternoon, Oswald had come back again.42

Only two

weeks later though, on February 13th, 1964 another CIA report said that from all

evidence on hand we deduce that Oswald visited the Cuban consulate in Mexico City on

the afternoon of 27 September 1963 and again some time on 28 September 1963, but

there is no evidence that he visited more than once on the days mentioned.43

Duran testified that Oswald made three visits to the consulate and that she was

positively sure44 his visits occurred all on the same day. In each of the reports, the CIA

wrote that Duran was visited by Oswald on Saturday, September 28th, but she denied that

there was any chance he was there after Friday. These reports not only contradict what

Duran said, but they also contradict each other. In the January 31 st, report, the CIA listed

several confirmed results its investigation had produced, but clearly the Saturday visit

to the Cuban consulate should have been in question. Duran denied it ever happened and

there was no other witness who claimed it did happen. And, of course, there was no

photographic evidence that confirmed an Oswald visit on Saturday or any day. Again,

from these reports, it seems evident that the CIA was relying on the Saturday phone call

as proof that Oswald had visited the consulate that day.

Obviously, the September 28th phone call was a critical component of the CIAs

investigation of Oswalds time in Mexico City not only for determining what he was

doing there, but also in attempting to establish a chronological order of events. As can be

plainly seen though, the CIA erred in depending so greatly on the phone call as nothing

42 Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico City, 28 September- 3

October, 1963, January 31, 1964. 104-10150-10141. 5.43 Info Developed by CIA on Oswald Activity in Mexico City September 28 to October 3, 1963, February

13, 1963. 104-10054-10271. 2.44 Testimony of Silvia Duran, HSCA Report, Vol. III. http://0-


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about it was concrete; the caller did not claim to be Oswald and there was no

identification, Duran denied a visit from Oswald on Saturday, and the Soviet embassy

confirmed that there were only two visits from Oswald, not three as the CIA believed

there had been (again, a belief that appears to be solely based on what the Saturday caller

shared). Yet information derived from that call is repeatedly referenced and incorporated

as fact following the assassination.

Another major source of confusion in the CIAs investigation of Oswald was the

misidentification of him in several photos. On October 9th, 1963, the Mexico CIA station

sent a cable to the CIA director stating that a man in a certain photo was possibly

Oswald.45 The next day, the Mexico station sent another cable declaring, American male

Sov.Emb. photo identified as Oswald.46

The short span in which the mans identity was

confirmed is perhaps a little surprising, considering the limited technology of the 1960s,

but this identification becomes truly surprising when another cable sent that day contains

a very inaccurate physical description of Oswald. This cable sent from the CIA to the

State Department, explained, reliable CIA source says American visited Sov.Emb. and

identified himself as Oswald. American is described as 35, 6, receding hairline.47 The

real Oswald was 24, 5 9 and did not have a receding hairline. Here, the CIA clearly

identified the wrong man from the Soviet embassy as Oswald, and based on that

inaccurate description they wrongly confirmed the man in the photo as Oswald.

45 Cable Re Photo Taken Mexico City of Unknown Man (Possibly Oswald), October 9, 1963. 104-10005-

10178.46

Cable Re American Male Identified as Oswald at Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, October 10, 1963.

104-10005-10392.47 Cable from CIA to Department of State Re American Male Identified Himself as Oswald, October 10,

1963. 104-10413-10003. http://0-


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The confusion over the photo and physical description could have been a mistake

of short duration. Two days later, October 11th, the Director sent a cable to the Mexico

station with the proper physical description of Oswald.48 Eight days later, however, the

Mexico station sent a cable to the Director using the wrong description again.49

An initial

mistake in the identification of the photo and Soviet embassy visitor could be understood,

but in this case, the CIA Director had corrected the error within a few days, and yet the

Mexico station made the same error again. It appears that it was not until November 23,

the day after the assassination, that the Mexico station realized its error with the photo

identification. They had sent their photos of the misidentified Oswald to the Dallas

authorities, but when the photos of the real Oswald were shown on television, the Mexico

station sent a cable to the Director saying saw photos on T.V., obvious photos sent to

Dallas dont match Oswald held in Dallas.50 This seems like rather poor processing of

information, especially considering the fact that the assassination happened six weeks

after the misidentification had been corrected by the director, and still the photos of the

wrong man were sent.

The day after the assassination the Mexico station said that it had completely re-

checked photos of all visitors to the Cuban embassy and there was no evidence of

Oswald visit.51 Also, it is important to note that they discovered there was a similar

blank against all Soviet embassy from September 1st. A few years later, in 1967, the

48

Cable Re Lee Oswald Who Called SovEmb 1 October, October 11, 1963. 104-10015-10305. http://0-www.maryferrell.org.libus.csd.mu.edu/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?docId=50270&relPageId=3. 3.49 Cable on Oswalds Appearance at USSR Embassy in Mexico City, October 19, 1963. 104-10088-10140.

http://0-

www.maryferrell.org.libus.csd.mu.edu/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?docId=33370&relPageId=2. 2.50

CIA Cable Mexico City to Director Re Dallas Photos, November 23, 1963. 104-10262-10000. http://0-

www.maryferrell.org.libus.csd.mu.edu/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?docId=37976&relPageId=2. 2.51 Cable: Complete Recheck Photos All Visitors to Cuban Emb, November 23, 1963. 104-10422-10092.

http://0-


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Warren Commission Report received photos, one taken in front of the Cuban embassy,

the other taken in front of the Soviet. The CIA knew within twenty four hours of

Kennedys assassination though that they had no photographs of Oswald from either

embassy. But years later, those photographs of a man who looked nothing like Oswald

were still being used. Again, the dissemination of information and the adjustment to the

inaccuracies seems poor, particularly for a matter of misidentification which was

glaringly obvious.

Of course, conflicting information is not surprising in an investigation, but

generally confusion of this significance stems from a lack of information, the leads have

not all been investigated or a critical piece of information is missing. In this case,

however, the information needed for answering the question of photographic coverage

was readily available. The camera log for the Cuban embassy revealed there was no

coverage on weekends, and, again, there was the malfunctioning camera that had to be

repaired. So, it seems a simple answer to obtain either the camera was operating that

day or not yet the incorrect report stating that there was comprehensive coverage was

passed along to another group of investigators. One might point out that the HSCA did

not come along until thirteen years after the assassination and that trying to ascertain

minor details years later is no small task. That certainly is true, but the details in this case,

that is, the history of photographic coverage, were known within a few years of the

assassination. The CIA had a camera operation log for the Cuban embassy in their files

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by 1968. In this log, the dates of Oswalds visits are included, and for September 27th

there is a note that simply reads camera down.52

Clearly, there was some difficulty in establishing the dates of photographic

coverage, not only in learning when the cameras were operating, but also when certain

photographs were taken. We have already noted that Oswald was linked to pictures that

depicted a man who was obviously not him, but he was, additionally, listed as the

possible subject of photographs that were taken on a day when he was not even in

Mexico City. This was not limited to photographs, as a phone call from October 3 rd, the

day after Oswald left Mexico City, was attributed to him. In this call, the caller speaks in

broken Spanish and inquires about a visa to Russia.53 There are two good reasons to

doubt this call was from Oswald. First, he did not speak Spanish and even broken

Spanish would likely have been beyond his capacity he did not understand the menus

he ordered from in Mexico City, and, despite his wish to assist his fellow travelers on the

bus with their luggage, he was unable to because he thought they only spoke Spanish. 54

Secondly, Oswald could have made the call to the Soviet embassy from a bus stop

somewhere along the route back home, but it makes little sense to leave Mexico City, and

continue calling about a visa if he would not be able to be there to obtain it.

After the assassination the CIA was quick to focus on Oswalds trip to Mexico

City and what his purpose there was exactly. In a memo dated November 24 th, 1963,

52Camera Operation Log, Cuban Emb, Mexico City, 27 Sept- 4 Oct 1963, October 4, 1968. 104-10414-

10073. http://0-

www.maryferrell.org.libus.csd.mu.edu/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?docId=5823&relPageId=2. 2.53 Cable: Transcripts of Additional Calls to Soviet Consulate by Oswald, November 23, 1963. 104-10414-

10253. http://0-

www.maryferrell.org.libus.csd.mu.edu/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?docId=6000&relPageId=4. 4.54 Testimony of Pamela Mumford, Warren Commission, Vol. XI. http://0-


229.

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regarding Oswalds visit to Mexico City, the CIA admitted that they were still perplexed

about Oswalds plans for the Soviet Union and Cuba. They stated that although it

appears he was then only thinking about a peaceful change of residence to the Soviet

Union, it is possible he was getting documented to make a quick escape after

assassinating the President.55 Oswalds whole purpose in traveling to Mexico City was

to get a visa to Cuba. He had been quite vocal about his support of Castro to his co-

workers and friends, and his wife certainly knew of his desire and intention to get to

Cuba. He also was proud about his position in the local chapter of the Fair Play for Cuba

Committee, even participating in a radio broadcast debate as Secretary for the New

Orleans chapter. There were also CIA documents from September56 and October57 of

1963 about Oswalds involvement with Communist and Cuban interests. It is puzzling

then how the CIA came to believe Oswalds primary interest was moving to the Soviet

Union rather than a visa to Cuba. Even months later, the CIA appeared to still be

confused, wondering if Oswald was perhaps a Cuban agent.58

Weve examined only portions of the Oswald imposter theories, but, even within

that limited scope, the complexity of the JFK assassination is evident. The specifics of

that particular theory are strongly challenged by the handwriting analysis, eyewitness

accounts, and items such as the tourist card and visa photo. Those factors, along with the

CIA documentation of reports and cables show that this is a puzzle with innumerable

55Cable: Poses a Number of Possibilities as to why Oswald was in Mexico City, November 24, 1963. 104-

10088-10236. http://0-

www.maryferrell.org.libus.csd.mu.edu/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?docId=27742&relPageId=2. 2.56 Report on Lee Harvey Oswald with Background, Connections with Communists and Cuba, September

10, 1963. 104-10055-10078.57 Report on Lee Harvey Oswald with his Background, Arrest, Affiliation with Fair Play for Cuba

Committee, and Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, October 31, 1963. 104-10055-10088.58 Proposed Questions on Oswald Case, May 1, 1964. 104-10052-10065. http://0-


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pieces. Putting aside their value as evidence, those pieces are important because they

raise questions in the rational mind. If there were a conspiracy, how could it have gone

undetected and remained undetected for so long? How many people would a conspiracy

of that magnitude require to succeed? And what are the chances that not a single person

involved ever came forward to share his story and offer the proof? Even a half century

later, when nearly every key player or minor player for that matter has died, no one

has admitted to having knowledge of a cover-up or provided evidence of one.

Supposition, creativity, and possibility, though intriguing and exciting, cannot stand in

place of proof. Conspiracy theorists then must take the approach of historians and work

with the facts as they are and not what they could be, lest their theories remain merely

that.

Documents

JFK Paper2