JP 3-01.5 Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense

Joint Pub 3-01.5

22 February 1996

Doctrinefor

Joint TheaterMissile Defense

PREFACE

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1. Scope

This publication provides doctrine for theintegration of theater missile defensecapabilities to support execution of the jointforce commander’s operation order orcampaign plan. The focus is to protect againsttheater missile attack through an appropriateintegrated and coordinated mix of mutuallysupporting measures of passive defense, activedefense, and attack operations with supportingcommand, control, communications,computers, and intelligence.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared underthe direction of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine andselected joint tactics, techniques, andprocedures (JTTP) to govern the jointactivities and performance of the ArmedForces of the United States in joint operationsas well as the doctrinal basis for US militaryinvolvement in multinational and interagencyoperations. It provides military guidance forthe exercise of authority by combatantcommanders and other joint forcecommanders and prescribes doctrine andselected tactics, techniques, and proceduresfor joint operations and training. It providesmilitary guidance for use by the Armed Forcesin preparing their appropriate plans. It is notthe intent of this publication to restrict theauthority of the joint force commander (JFC)from organizing the force and executing themission in a manner the JFC deems mostappropriate to ensure unity of effort in theaccomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and selected tactics, techniques,and procedures and guidance established inthis publication apply to the commandersof combatant commands, subunifiedcommands, joint task forces, and subordinatecomponents of these commands. Theseprinciples and guidance also may apply whensignificant forces of one Service are attachedto forces of another Service or whensignificant forces of one Service supportforces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP)will be followed except when, in the judgmento f t h e c o m m a n d e r, e x c e p t i o n a lcircumstances dictate otherwise. If conflictsarise between the contents of this publicationand the contents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence for theactivities of joint forces unless the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally incoordination with the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, has provided morec u r r e n t a n d s p e c i f i c g u i d a n c e .Commanders of forces operating as part of amultinational (alliance or coalition) militarycommand should follow multinationaldoctrine and procedures ratified by the UnitedStates. For doctrine and procedures notratified by the United States, commandersshould evaluate and follow the multinationalcommand’s doctrine and procedures, whereapplicable.

WALTER KROSSLieutenant General, USAFDirector, Joint Staff

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................... vii

CHAPTER IGENERAL

SECTION A. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................. I-1

• Overview................................................................................................................... I-1• Objectives.................................................................................................................. I-1• Focus......................................................................................................................... I-1• Terminology............................................................................................................... I-2

SECTION B. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT....................................................... I-3

• The Four Operational Elements of JTMD................................................................... I-3• Integration.................................................................................................................. I-3

SECTION C. THREAT................................................................................................ I-5

• General...................................................................................................................... I-5• Undeveloped Theaters................................................................................................ I-5• Developed Theaters.................................................................................................... I-6• Naval Aspects of the TM Threat................................................................................. I-7

CHAPTER IIRESPONSIBILITIES AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

SECTION A. JOINT ORGANIZATION.....................................................................II-1

• Geographic Combatant Commander.........................................................................II-1• Joint Force Level.......................................................................................................II-1• Area Air Defense Commander..................................................................................II-5• Joint Force Air Component.......................................................................................II-6• Component Commanders......................................................................................... II-7

SECTION B. MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS......................................................II-8

• General.....................................................................................................................II-8• Responsibilities.........................................................................................................II-8• Organizational Considerations...................................................................................II-8• Operations.................................................................................................................II-8

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CHAPTER IIIPLANNING AND OPERATIONS

SECTION A. PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR JTMD................................ III-1

• General................................................................................................................... III-1• Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace.............................................................. III-1• Preparation and Training......................................................................................... III-1• Operation Planning................................................................................................. III-2• Logistics................................................................................................................. III-2• Geographic Considerations..................................................................................... III-2

SECTION B. TRANSITION TO JTMD OPERATIONS........................................... III-2

• General................................................................................................................... III-2• Undeveloped Theaters............................................................................................. III-3• Forcible Entry Operations....................................................................................... III-3• Force Protection...................................................................................................... III-4• Launch Detection.................................................................................................... III-4

SECTION C. PASSIVE DEFENSE........................................................................... III-4

• General................................................................................................................... III-4• Measures................................................................................................................. III-4• Command and Control............................................................................................ III-6• Planning.................................................................................................................. III-7• Execution................................................................................................................ III-7

SECTION D. ACTIVE DEFENSE OPERATIONS................................................... III-7

• General................................................................................................................... III-7• Resources and Capabilities...................................................................................... III-7• Command and Control............................................................................................ III-9• Planning.................................................................................................................. III-9• Execution..............................................................................................................III-10

SECTION E. ATTACK OPERATIONS...................................................................III-10

• General.................................................................................................................III-10• Resources............................................................................................................... III-11• Command and Control........................................................................................... III-11• Planning................................................................................................................. III-11• Execution.............................................................................................................. III-13

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SECTION F. COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS,COMPUTERS, AND INTELLIGENCE..................................................................III-14

• General.................................................................................................................III-14• Resources..............................................................................................................III-14• Planning................................................................................................................III-15• Intelligence Support Requirements........................................................................III-16• Execution..............................................................................................................III-16

APPENDIX

A References......................................................................................................... A-1B Administrative Instructions................................................................................. B-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms................................................................... GL-1Part II Terms and Definitions.............................................................................. GL-2

FIGURE

I-1 Joint Theater Missile Defense Objectives........................................................ I-2I-2 The Four Operational Elements of JTMD........................................................ I-4I-3 Military Threats from Theater Missiles............................................................. I-5II-1 Joint Force Commander Joint Theater Missile Defense Guidance................... II-2II-2 Coordination Among Component Commanders for Joint

Theater Missile Defense Operations.............................................................II-7III-1 Planning Considerations for Geographic, Time, and Distance Factors........... III-3III-2 Principal Measures for Passive Defense......................................................... III-4III-3 Principal Contributions to Active Defense Systems....................................... III-9III-4 Examples of Critical Theater Assets............................................................III-10III-5 Requirements for Joint Theater Missile Defense Command,

Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence...........................III-15

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

Addresses the Operational Environment and the Threat

Establishes Responsibilities and Command Relationships

Addresses Multinational Operations Responsibilities andOrganizational Considerations

Provides Planning and Preparation Factors and Considerations

Discusses the Transition to Joint Theater Missile DefenseOperations

Presents and Discusses Four Mutually Supporting OperationalElements for a Successful Defense

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Theater missiles (TMs) are ballistic missiles, cruise missilesand air-to-surface missiles whose targets are within a giventheater of operation. Their proliferation and advances inmissile and associated technologies, coupled with the pursuitof weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities, canprovide adversaries with potentially decisive attackcapabilities. TMs may be as much a political weapon as amilitary weapon.

The precise time, location, and nature of TM employmentis uncertain, thus complicating the determination of friendlyforce composition and method of power projection to overcomespecific threats. The nature and extent of US global interestsrequire that theater missile defense (TMD) forces be rapidlydeployable or employable from the United States, forwardbases, and/or ships.

TMD is inherently a joint mission. During the planning stage,TMD forces, requirements, and capabilities must be integratedinto all phases of the operation and mission areas early on.The TM threat may appear across the range of militaryoperations. Joint theater missile defense (JTMD) systemsand procedures must be adaptable for joint or multinationaloperations in any contingency.

Potential adversariespossess theater missilesthat pose both a militaryand political threat to USsecurity interests andforward-deployed forces.

Overview

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Theater missile defense(TMD) is composed offour operational elements:passive defense, activedefense, attack operations,and command, control,communications,computers, andintelligence (C4I).

Theater missiles (TMs)are weapons that possessboth military threat andpolitical intimidationcharacteristics.

The purpose of TMD is to counter the TM threat bycoordinating and integrating the four operational elements ofTMD into cohesive and coherent combat operations.

Passive defense - measures taken to posture the force toreduce vulnerability and minimize the effects of a TMattack.

Active defense - operations taken to protect against aTM attack by destroying TM airborne launchplatforms and/or destroying TMs in flight.

Attack operations - operations taken to destroy, disrupt,or neutralize TM launch platforms and their supportingstructures and systems.

Command, control, communications, computers, andintelligence (C4I) - systems used to coordinate andintegrate the joint force capabilities to conduct and linkpassive defense, active defense, and attack operations.

TMD systems should build on existing systems and doctrineand, when appropriate, incorporate the newest technologiesand concepts. All TMD systems must integrate with theexisting command and control (C2) architecture. JTMDshould be coordinated with integrated strategic defenseoperations. Strategic defense forces combine the capabilitiesof air defense, ballistic missile defense, and space defense forNorth America.

Military threats from TMs include but are not limited to:attacks on deployed US and multinational forces;interdiction of lines of communications; attacks on logisticfacilities (ports, air bases, and marshalling areas); counter-TMD activity; and countervalue attacks on populationcenters. Political targets for theater missiles include civilianpopulation centers and political, cultural, and religiousstructures (government buildings, historical centers, holy sites).In addition, propaganda value exists in attacking concentrationsof US and multinational military forces.

The proliferation of TMs throughout developing nations(particularly the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles,missile technology, and WMD technology) poses a newchallenge to US military planners. Many developing nationseither possess TMs or are trying to develop or acquire them.

The Threat

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A continuing significant threat to the United States and itsallies is posed by countries possessing large quantities ofqualitatively advanced missiles. Ballistic and air-, land-, andsea-launched cruise missiles could also present a serious threatto maritime operations in joint littoral warfare.

The joint force commander (JFC) establishes guidance andobjectives for JTMD. This guidance should be reflected inappropriate operation plans and their annexes. The JFC mustdefine and implement a methodology for joint TMD activities.The JFC’s concept of operations specifies the objectives tobe met and provides guidance for the employment of command,control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I),attack operations, active defense, and passive defense measures.The component commanders plan and execute JTMDoperations under the guidance and in support of the objectivesof the JFC. The JFC uses the joint force staff to plan, monitor,advise, and coordinate the overall operation.

The JFC must consider those areas peculiar tomultinational operations such as force capabilities anddisparities, information and equipment security levels, andprocedural and organizational differences that may influencethe ability to achieve combined unity of effort. Specialconsiderations and areas of emphasis are needed to ensureunity of effort with other national forces.

When the individual national forces of the multinational forceare not uniformly capable of actively defending against enemyTMs or attacking enemy missile capabilities, provisions shouldbe made to ensure that JTMD assets are provided for missiledefense within multinational force commander-establishedpriorities. Consensus on the enemy TM threat, a clearlydefined chain of command, and a responsive, interoperableC2 structure are crucial to successful multinational JTMDoperations.

The geographic combatantcommander establishestheater guidance andobjectives for joint theatermissile defense (JTMD)and assigns and/orapportions forces andresources.

JTMD operations may berequired within the contextof an alliance, coalition, orother internationalarrangement.

Joint Organization

Multinational Operations

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Successful JTMDoperations are highlydependent on thesimultaneous andsequential execution of awide spectrum of tasks andactivities.

Passive defense isnecessary to provideessential individual andcollective protection forfriendly forces, populationcenters, and critical assets.

The role of active defenseoperations is to protectselected assets and forcesfrom attack by destroyingTM airborne launchplatforms and/or TMs inflight.

The JFC exercises controlof active defense operationsby integration of JTMDsystems and forces into theC4I systems supportingtheater air defense.

Some JTMD tasks and activities occur or begin prior tothe initiation of the use of force. Significant among theseare intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB); JTMDpreparation and training; and operation planning. Additionally,logistic and geographic considerations will impact manyaspects of early JTMD planning.

Detection of TM launch platform preparations may be anindication of an impending act of war. Detection of thesepreparations may allow for the transmission of tacticalwarnings that alert commanders, automated weapon systems,sensors, fusion centers, C2 nodes, and, in some cases, civilauthorities, to prepare for the expected attack.

Passive defense measures should be planned whenever USforces might face a TM threat. Principal measures used toaccomplish passive defense are: tactical warning; reducingtargeting effectiveness; reducing vulnerability; andrecovery and reconstitution. The principal support that C4Iwill provide for passive defense is warning. Planning forpassive defense is conducted at all levels. Executing passivedefense is the responsibility of unit commanders at allechelons.

Active defense must consist of defense in depth against allclasses of TMs. When destruction of the TM launch platformprior to launch is not possible or successful, TMs should beengaged by all means available throughout their entireflight profile. Defense in depth provides multiple opportunitiesto negate the TMs with differing capabilities, increasesprobability of kill, and prohibits the enemy from being able tocounter the defensive system with a single technique. Activedefense also includes those actions which mitigate theeffectiveness of targeting and delivery systems throughelectronic warfare (EW) against remote or onboard guidancesystems.

The JFC normally assigns overall responsibility for theater/JOA air defense, to include active defense TMD, to theAADC. The AADC assists the JFC in determining missions,communications priorities, and rules of engagement for activedefense forces based on assessment and prioritization of forces,critical assets, and population centers to protect. Active defense

JTMD Planning and Operations

Active Defense Operations

Passive Defense

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Attack operations arecharacterized by offensiveactions intended to destroyand disrupt enemy TMcapabilities before, during,and after launch.

The joint force aircomponent commander(JFACC) plans for thetheater / joint operationsarea-wide attack operationseffort. The JFACC is alsoresponsible for executingattack operations outsideother components' areas ofoperations (AOs).Component commandersare normally designated assupported commanders forattack operations insidetheir AOs.

forces are under the operational control of their componentcommanders, who employ these forces under the weaponscontrol procedures and measures established by the AADCand approved by the JFC.

The objective of attack operations is to prevent the launchof TMs by attacking each element of the overall system,including such actions as destroying launch platforms,reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition platforms,C2 nodes, and missile stocks and infrastructure. Attackoperations also strive to deny or disrupt employment ofadditional TMs that may be available to the enemy. Thepreferred method of countering enemy TM operations isto attack and destroy or disrupt TMs prior to their launch.

Systems used to support attack operations may include rotary-and fixed-wing aircraft in air-to-surface and air-to-airoperations, surface-to-surface fires, naval missile forces, specialoperations forces, antisubmarine forces, EW systems, andmaneuver forces. Attack operations are highly dependentupon predictive and developed intelligence.

The JFC will normally assign responsibility for theplanning and execution of JTMD attack operations outsidethe other component commanders areas of operations(AOs) to the JFACC. Since the location of these AOs maychange with the maneuver of forces or with changes in JFCguidance, the JFACC should also plan for and maintainvisibility on the theater/joint operations area (JOA)-wideattack operations effort. This will ensure the JFACC isprepared to support the other component commanders when,for example, they request JFACC support in conducting JTMDattack operations within their AOs. Inside their AOs,component commanders are normally designated assupported commanders for attack operations.

Conduct of attack operations is reliant on sensor systems, aresponsive near-real-time sensor management andcommunications network, and weapon systems capable ofattacking targets at great ranges as soon as adequate targetinginformation is available. At the tactical level, responsiveintelligence and operations interfaces are required for targetingand countering relocatable enemy TM launchers and supportfacilities.

Attack Operations

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C4I for JTMD missions must be accomplished usingexisting joint and Service C4I systems and resourcesefficiently to ensure integration with other operationalfunctions and to optimize the use of scarce resources. TheC4I system links passive defense, active defense, and attackoperations to provide timely assessment of the threat (to includeIPB); rapid dissemination of tactical warning; and missionassignment, targeting data, and poststrike assessment to theappropriate JTMD element. For each operational element,the C4I system must provide rapid communications amongintelligence assets, the fusion and decisionmaking facilities,warning systems, and weapon systems, to include a capabilityfor rapid coordination with supporting combatant commanders.Space assets are critical to passive defense, active defense,and attack operations because they provide launch warning,launch point prediction, threat type determination, impact pointprediction, weapon systems cuing, communications, andrelated intelligence.

This publication provides doctrine for the integration of theatermissile defense capabilities to support execution of the jointforce commander’s operation order or campaign plan. Thefocus is to protect against theater missile attack through anappropriate integrated and coordinated mix of mutuallysupporting measures of passive defense, active defense, andattack operations with supporting command, control,communications, computers, and intelligence.

Command and control forJTMD operations is theexercise of authority anddirection by commandersover forces assignedJTMD missions.

Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER IGENERAL

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SECTION A. INTRODUCTION

1. Overview

a. Potential adversaries possessing theatermissiles (TMs) pose a threat to US securityinterests and forward-deployed forces. Theproliferation of TMs and advances inmissile and associated technologies,coupled with the pursuit of weapons ofmass destruction (WMD) capabilities, canprovide these adversaries with potentiallydecisive attack capabilities which can includethe use of WMD against critical friendlytargets.

b. TMs may be as much a political weaponas a military weapon. In many cases, theirpolitical impact may outweigh their militarysignificance. Commanders must consider thepolitical as well as the military impact of TMs.The precise time, location, and nature of TMemployment is uncertain, thus complicatingthe determination of friendly forcecomposition and method of power projectionto overcome specific threats. The nature andextent of US global interests require thattheater missile defense (TMD) forces berapidly deployable or employable from theUnited States, forward bases, and/or ships.Furthermore, the intelligence, reconnaissance,surveillance, target acquisition systems,weapon systems, and communicationarchitectures and resources required toconduct TMD operations must be flexibleenough to provide timely and accurate supportthroughout the area of interest. Geographic

combatant commanders should plan for TMDoperations within the theater in support ofcontingencies and national military strategy.

2. Objectives

The objectives of joint theater missiledefense (JTMD) are depicted in Figure I-1.

3. Focus

a. TMD is inherently a joint mission.Therefore, joint force components, supportingcombatant commanders, and multinationalforce TMD capabilities must be integratedtoward the common objective of neutralizingor destroying the enemy’s TM capability. Thismust be integrated into and in support of theJFC’s overall concept of operations andcampaign objectives.

b. During the planning stage, TMD forces,requirements, and capabilities must beintegrated into all phases of the operation andmission areas early on. Assessment of a giventhreat and risk analysis will provide the basisfor integration of the appropriate JTMDcapability into the force package to ensuresynchronization and efficient use of thelimited number of dual-purpose systems.

c. JTMD should be capable of counteringthreats from TMs and their associatedcommand, control, communications,computers, and intelligence (C4I), targeting,and logistic support systems. In addition,JTMD systems should possess the capability

“...we received a report that a Scud fired at Dhahran had struck a US barracks.The explosion killed twenty-eight of our troops and wounded many more. Itwas a terrible tragedy—this terror weapon launched into the sky that bysheer fate happened to fall where we had a concentration of troops—and itbrought home once again to our side the profanity of war. I was sick atheart.”

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf

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JOINT THEATER MISSILEDEFENSE OBJECTIVES

To demonstrate US resolve to deter aggression throughthe establishment of a theater missile defensecapability

To protect US-deployed and multinational forces aswell as critical assets and areas of vital interest orpolitical importance from attack by theater missiles

To detect and target theater missile systems; to detect,warn, and report a theater missile launch; and tocoordinate a multifaceted response to a theater missileattack while integrating that response with othercombat operations

To reduce the probability of and / or minimize theeffects of damage caused by a theater missile attack

To ensure that the joint force commander has thefreedom to conduct joint operations without undue

Figure I-1. Joint Theater Missile Defense Objectives

theater of operation. Short range, nonnuclear,direct fire missiles, bombs, and rockets suchas Maverick or wire-guided missiles are notconsidered “theater missiles” for purposes ofthis publication. Of primary concern are theincreasingly accurate ballistic and cruisemissiles armed with conventional and WMDwarheads.

b. Theater missile defense applies to theidentification, integration, and employmentof forces supported by other theater andnational capabilities to detect, identify,locate, track, minimize the effects of, and/or destroy enemy TMs. This includes thedestruction of TMs on the ground and inflight, their ground-based launchers andsupporting infrastructure; TM-capable ships

for rapid global deployability andintratheater mobility.

d. The TM threat may appear across therange of military operations. JTMD systemsand procedures must be adaptable for joint ormultinational operations in any contingency.For example, in addition to warfightingsituations, humanitarian assistance ornoncombatant evacuation operations may bethreatened by hostile forces that have a TMcapability.

4. Terminology. Key terms include:

a. Theater missile applies to ballisticmissiles, cruise missiles, and air-to-surfacemissiles whose targets are within a given

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and vessels in port or at sea; and enemyaircraft armed with air-to-surface missiles.TMD operations are accomplished byintegrating a mix of mutually supportivepassive defense, active defense, attackoperations, and C4I measures.

c. Joint theater missile defense refersto the integration of joint force capabilitiesto destroy enemy theater missiles in flightor prior to launch or to otherwise disruptthe enemy’s theater missile operationsthrough an appropriate mix of mutuallysupportive passive missile defense, activemissile defense, attack operations, andsupporting command, control,communications, computers, andintelligence measures. Enemy theatermissiles are those that are aimed at targetsoutside the continental United States.

d. Theater missile defense system refersto a system or systems with applicablecapabilities that may be used to supportpassive defense measures, active defensemeasures, attack operations capabilities,

and the C4I and countermeasures requiredto counter the missile threat.

SECTION B. OPERATIONALENVIRONMENT

5. The Four OperationalElements of JTMD

As shown in Figure I-2, JTMD is composedof four operational elements: passive defense,active defense, attack operations, and TMDC4I. Because of the continual advancementand proliferation of TMs, the threat cannotcurrently be countered by any single technicalsolution, nor will it likely be in the future.This threat can only be countered by thesynergistic performance achieved bycoordinating and integrating all fouroperational elements into cohesive andcoherent combat operations.

6. Integration

a. TMD systems should build on existingsystems and doctrine and, when appropriate,

WWII: THE BEGINNING OF MODERN BALLISTIC MISSILES

In 1925, Winston Churchill questioned, “Could not explosives even of theexisting type be guided automatically in flying machines by wireless or otherrays, without human pilot, in ceaseless procession upon a hostile city, arsenal,camp, or dockyard?” On the night of June 12, 1944, soon after the invasion ofNormandy, his question was answered as the first ten V-1 German "flyingbombs" struck England. By the end of the month 2,000 had been counted.Attacks by V-1 weapons on London severely impacted British morale, eventhough about half were shot down by anti-aircraft and fighter defensive action.These V-1 attacks were soon followed by the V-2, the first effective long-rangerocket missile—a missile that could not be intercepted. Approximately 40percent of bomber resources were diverted from support of OperationOVERLORD to attack CROSSBOW missile launch and support site targets withdubious results as the Germans rebuilt new sites as fast as they could belocated and destroyed. Rapid Allied ground advances and intensive airbombardment ultimately prevented Germany's planned massive V (vengeance)weapon assault on England. Active defense and attack operations wereultimately successful, but not before thousands of V-1/V-2 rained down uponEngland and major ground operations occurred with reduced air support.

SOURCE: Unknown

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incorporate the newest technologies andconcepts. All TMD systems must integratewith the existing command and control(C2) architecture. Integration of existingsystems, and those that are well along indevelopment, should be an iterative processthat aggressively exercises and adapts thosesystems in order to optimize theirresponsiveness to the JFC’s needs.

b. JTMD should be coordinated withintegrated strategic defense operations.Strategic defense forces combine thecapabilities of air defense, ballistic missile

defense, and space defense for North America.The Commander in Chief, US SpaceCommand, is the coordinating authority forstrategic defense, and is the combatantcommander (CINC) responsible for ballisticmissile defense of North America, missilewarning support to theaters, and space defensemissions. The Commander in Chief, NorthAmerican Aerospace Defense Command,provides attack assessments of strategicdefense.

c. Strategic defense forces provide directsupport to geographic combatant commanders

Figure I-2. The Four Operational Elements of JTMD

THE FOUR OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS OFJOINT THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE

APPLIES TO PROTECTION BY:

INCLUDES:

Multitiered Defense Indepth viamultiple engagements using land,sea, air, space, and SpecialOperations ForcesActive Electronic Warfare to DisruptRemote or Onboard GuidanceSystems

In-Flight DestructionDestruction of Airborne LaunchPlatforms

ACTIVE DEFENSEAPPLIES TO MEASURES TO:

INCLUDES:

DeceptionNuclear, Biological, and ChemicalProtectionTheater Missile Early WarningElectronic WarfareCountersurveillanceRecovery and ReconstitutionCamouflage and ConcealmentMobility, Dispersal, and Hardening

Reduce VulnerabilityMinimize Damage

PASSIVE DEFENSE

Timely and accurate data andsystems to plan, monitor, direct,control, and report TheaterMissile Defense operationsIntegrated Systems of Doctrine,Organizational Structures,Facilities, Communications,Computers, SupportingIntelligence, and MissileWarning and Cuing by Sensorsand Ground Stations

TMD COMMAND, CONTROL,COMMUNICATIONS,COMPUTERS, AND

INTELLIGENCE

APPLIES TO:

INCLUDES:

Offensive action by land, sea, air,space, and Special OperationsForces

Destruction, Disruption, orNeutralization of Theater MissileLaunch Platforms; SupportingCommand, Control, andCommunications; Logistics; andReconnaissance, Surveillance, andTarget Acquisition Platforms

ATTACK OPERATIONS

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through global surveillance, tactical warningand attack assessment, ballistic missilewarning, and by providing a securemobilization base to support regionalconflicts. During wartime, geographiccombatant commanders continue to receivemissile defense support consistent with boththe degree and nature of the threat of attacksagainst US strategic assets.

d. Combat operations conducted within atheater may contribute to strategic defensethrough detection and/or attrition of hostileaerospace forces in the process of attack onthe United States. These operations includetheater sea control, antisubmarine warfare(ASW), counterair, theater ballistic missiledefense, or special operations.

SECTION C. THREAT

7. General

TMs are weapons that possess bothmilitary threat and political intimidationcharacteristics. Military threats from TMsinclude but are not limited to those illustratedin Figure I-3. Depending on the sophisticationof the individual TM system involved, the

political intimidation characteristics mayoutweigh the military value and danger of theTM system. Political targets for theatermissiles include civilian population centersand political, cultural, and religiousstructures (government buildings, historicalcenters, holy sites). In addition, propagandavalue exists in attacking concentrations ofUS and multinational military forces,separate and apart from any militarysignificance, in order to show the vulnerabilityof these forces to attack. Rest and recreationareas and rear support areas to which newsmedia have ready access should be consideredpotential target areas for TM attack forpolitical and propaganda reasons.

8. Undeveloped Theaters

a. The proliferation of TMs throughoutdeveloping nations (particularly theproliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles,missile technology, and WMD technology)poses a new challenge to US militaryplanners. Many developing nations eitherpossess TMs or are trying to develop oracquire them. As a result, the number ofcountries with a TM capability willcontinue to increase.

Attacks on deployed US and multinational forces

Interdiction of lines of communications

Attacks on logistic facilities (ports, air bases, marshallingareas)

Counter theater missile defense activity

Countervalue missile attacks on population centers

MILITARY THREATS FROM THEATER MISSILES

Figure I-3. Military Threats from Theater Missiles

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d. Air-, land-, and sea-launched cruisemissiles, including land attack and antishipmissiles, continue to proliferate and grow insophistication. These weapons have beenexported to nations around the world. As withballistic missiles, improvements in the nextgeneration of cruise missiles will exacerbatethe military threat.

9. Developed Theaters

a. A continuing significant threat to theUnited States and its allies is posed bycountries possessing large quantities ofqualitatively advanced missiles. JTMDcapabilities should be structured to meet thisthreat while providing flexibility for rapiddeployment in support of joint operations.

b. In a developed theater, an enemy mayattack with air, surface, and subsurface forces.Initial attacks may employ TMs, inconjunction with air attacks, against avariety of targets such as air defense artillerysites, C2 elements, communications nodes, airfacilities, seaports, logistic centers, keycivilian facilities such as power and waterplants, nuclear delivery systems, storage sites,naval vessels, population centers, andindustrial complexes. TMs provide an

b. Allied nations and deployed US forceswill be vulnerable to missile attack from manydeveloping nations. Missile-equipped nationsmay not need to use large numbers of missilesto cause dramatic political change in a regionbecause the mere threat or subsequent use ofeven a few weapons may be sufficient toachieve a regional goal. The threat to becountered includes but is not limited to:intentional missile attack or the threat ofattack by a nation; limited attack ofpopulation centers or critical assets toachieve political benefits; denying merchantshipping freedom of navigation throughwaters outside internationally recognizedterritorial limits; and unauthorized oraccidental launch of missiles.

c. Another problem associated with theproliferation of ballistic missiles is a trendtoward improved technology. The trend istoward longer range missiles with increasedaccuracy and more lethal warheads (to includechemical, biological, and possibly nuclear).Additionally, the potential for introduction andproliferation of penetration aids cannot bediscounted. Improved systems will pose aneven more challenging and serious militarythreat.

A barracks, which housed joint forces, is severely damaged after a Scud missileattack during the Persian Gulf War.

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Soviet-built Scud B missile on display

PERSIAN GULF WAR: THE COUNTER-SCUD EFFORT

A well recognized and significant planning consideration for Tactical BallisticMissile defense during the Persian Gulf War was that Saddam Hussein waslikely to attack Israel with Scuds in the event of hostilities. Therefore,considerable thought was given to how Israel could be protected from suchattacks without Israel’s own forces entering the war. Although there was neverany doubt about the willingness of Israel’s highly capable forces to take onthis mission, the President realized this was precisely what Saddam Husseinhoped to achieve. At a minimum, this almost certainly would have led to a warbetween Israel and Jordan and allowed Saddam Hussein to change thecomplexion of the war from the liberation of Kuwait to another Arab-lsraeliconflict. It might easily have brought down the government of Jordan andreplaced it with a radical one. The Coalition’s unity would be tested severely,with potentially major repercussions.

Accordingly, the President directed that unprecedented steps be taken topersuade Israel not to exercise its unquestioned right to respond to Iraqiattacks. A special, secure communications link established between theDepartment of Defense (DOD) and the Israeli Ministry of Defense (MOD) beforethe offensive began enabled immediate and frequent contact between seniorUS and Israeli officials. Early warning of Iraqi Scud missile attacks on this link

10. Naval Aspects of the TMThreat

Ballistic and air-, land-, and sea-launchedcruise missiles could also present a seriousthreat to maritime operations in jointlittoral warfare. Naval and other JTMDforces must be prepared to counter this threat.

additional capability for the enemy to strikedeep and can contribute toward achievingstrategic, operational, and tactical objectives.TMs could be used throughout the conflictagainst tactical, operational, and strategictargets to disrupt offenses, defenses and theirsupport, and to reduce friendly militarycapabilities.

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gave the Israeli populace as much as five minutes to take shelter before missileimpact. The President offered and Israel agreed to accept four US Patriotbatteries manned with US troops which deployed from Europe in record time.Delivery of Israeli-manned Patriot batteries was accelerated.

On the second day of Operation DESERT STORM, Iraqi Scud missiles struckTel Aviv and Haifa, Israel. While the damage was limited, (seven people wereslightly injured by broken glass) the political and emotional impact wastremendous. There was concern that if the Scud threat were left unchecked,Israel might be forced to strike back. Accordingly, Scud suppression missionsquickly took up an increasing share of air operations.

The Scud crews had several initial advantages. They fired from pre-surveyedlaunch positions using mobile erector launchers about as large as a medium-sized truck. This enabled crews to set up relatively quickly, fire, and movebefore Coalition forces could respond. The area of western Iraq from whichthe missiles that struck Israel were launched is rugged, a good setting in whichto conceal mobile launchers in ravines, beneath highway underpasses, or inculverts.

In addition to the focus on this threat within the air operation, a considerablesegment of the available intelligence-gathering capability was shifted tocounter-Scud operations, including reconnaissance aircraft (U-2/TR-1s andRF-4Cs). Intelligence originally had estimated Iraq had 36 mobile Scudlaunchers, 33 of which were believed operational. Ad hoc groups were formedto develop options to the seemingly intractable problem of how to find anddestroy Scuds. A special planning cell was set up in the US Embassy in TelAviv, headed by a Joint Staff flag officer, to give the Israelis a chance to analyzethe available intelligence and elicit their ideas. When one Scud hit a residentialsection in Tel Aviv on 22 January, killing three Israelis and injuring dozensmore, the problem took on even greater urgency.

The next week saw an intense effort in western Iraq to eliminate the mobileScud launchers. B-52s bombed suspected Scud hide sites and supportfacilities at airfields in western Iraq during the day and at night. During theday, A-10s and F-16s patrolled the area; at night, LANTlRN-equipped F-16sand F-15Es, and FLIR-equipped A-6Es took up the task. Pilots often receivedtarget coordinates or patrol areas, based on the most up-to-date information,as they headed out to the planes. Using Defense Support Program (DSP) earlywarning information and other indications, CENTCOM directed aircraft to attackthe launchers. JSTARS helped detect and report destruction of several possiblemobile launchers. What came to be called the “Great Scud Hunt” was in fullswing.

By early February, the counter-Scud effort seemed to be having an effect,although no destruction of mobile launchers had been confirmed. The dailyCENTCOM chronology for this period contains numerous entries such as, “oneScud launched towards Israel, no damage,” and “ Patriots destroyed the onlyScud launched at Saudi Arabia.” As more intelligence assets were brought tobear on the problem, specific Scud operating areas (Scud boxes) were moreclearly defined; Coalition striking power was concentrated there. On 19February, Coalition aircraft began dropping CBU-89 area denial mines into

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suspected operating areas, to hamper the launchers’ mobility. A key elementin this effort was small SOF groups on the ground who provided vitalinformation about the Scuds.

SOURCE: DOD Final Report to Congress,Conduct of the Persian Gulf War , April 1992

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CHAPTER IIRESPONSIBILITIES AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

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"Goldwater-Nichols established very, very clear lines of command authorityand responsibility over subordinate commanders, and that meant a muchmore effective fighting force in the Gulf. The lines of authority were clear,and we just did not have any problems in that area—none whatsoever."

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf

SECTION A. JOINTORGANIZATION

1. Geographic CombatantCommander

The geographic combatant commanderestablishes theater guidance and objectivesfor JTMD and assigns and/or apportionsforces and resources. The geographiccombatant commander uses staff elements andcomponent commanders and their staffs toplan, monitor, advise, coordinate, and executeoverall operations, including JTMD. Thegeographic combatant commander isresponsible for ensuring that JTMD plans andoperations of subordinate forces areintegrated at theater level and documentedin the appropriate operation plans andannexes.

2. Joint Force Level

a. Joint Force Commander (JFC). TheJFC establishes guidance and objectives forJTMD. This guidance should be reflected inappropriate operation plans and their annexes.The JFC must define and implement amethodology for joint TMD activities. JFC-level guidance is shown in Figure II-1.

b. The JFC’s concept of operationsspecifies the objectives to be met and providesguidance for the employment of C4I, attackoperations, active defense, and passivedefense measures. The componentcommanders jointly conduct operations under

the guidance and in support of the objectivesof the JFC.

c. Joint Force Staff. The JFC uses thejoint force staff to plan, monitor, advise, andcoordinate the overall operation.

• Concept of Operations. The joint forcestaff develops and issues the JFC-approved concept of operations, whichincludes JTMD. The JFC’s concept ofoperations, issued to componentcommanders, should include but not belimited to the following JTMDconsiderations:

•• Specific joint force offensive ordefensive objectives, or both.

•• Specific joint force guidance andobjectives for JTMD operations, toinclude prioritization of US andmultinational forces; critical assets;and areas of vital interest or politicalimportance that should be protectedwith limited JTMD resources.

•• Requirements to develop, coordinate,and deconflict plans to meet JTMDobjectives.

•• Guidance for planning, employing,and allocating resources for JTMDoperations.

•• Identification of areas of operations(AOs).

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•• Guidance for coordinating withallies and/or civilian authorities inpreparing plans for JTMD operations.

d. The J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, and J-6 are theprimary staff elements responsible for JTMDoperations at the joint force level; theJTCB (if established) and the politicaladviser also support JTMD operations. Theresponsibilities of the elements are determinedby the JFC, but normally encompass thefollowing:

• J-2--Joint Intelligence Staff

•• Maintains a theater- or JointOperations Area (JOA)-wide, all-sourceintelligence collection, analysis,production, and distribution program onthe TM threat.

•• Carries out prioritized intelligencereconnaissance and surveillancerequirements in concert with and asestablished by the J-3.

JOINT FORCE COMMANDER JOINT THEATERMISSILE DEFENSE GUIDANCE

A methodology for joint planning of Joint TheaterMissile Defense (JTMD)

Priority of the JTMD effort; for example, what types oftargets are most important for attack operations andwhat friendly assets must be protected by activedefense

Definition of the areas of operations of components

Apportionment

The capabilities / forces made available to thefunctional components

Guidance on component-to-component coordinationto facilitate deconfliction and timely Theater MissileDefense operations

The role of the joint force commander's staff incoordinating JTMD activities

Degree of joint targeting coordination boardinvolvement in JTMD, if board is established

Joint force commander level guidance may include (but isnot limited to):

Figure II-1. Joint Force Commander Joint Theater Missile Defense Guidance

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Responsibilities and Command Relationships

launch warning information to allcomponents, allies, and host nation (HN)civil authorities.

•• Supports the J-3 in the conduct ofelectronic warfare (EW).

• J-3--Joint Operations Staff

•• With input from and in coordinationwi th component commanders ,establishes and prioritizes JFC-approved targeting guidance andobjectives; this includes high-priorityand politically sensitive targets for attackoperations and (after JFC approval) rulesof engagement (ROE) for both activemissile defense and attack operations.

•• Maintains coordination withcomponent staffs to ensure compliancewith JFC guidance and objectives forJTMD operations.

•• Assists the J-2 in developing JTMDpriority intelligence requirements.

•• Recommends priorities for EWsupport and assigns EW missions forappropriate components.

•• Monitors the quantity, operationalstatus, and location of active missiledefense and attack operation assets forJTMD operations.

•• Serves as a member of the JointTargeting Coordination Board (JTCB),if established.

•• In coordination with the area airdefense commander (AADC) and theJ-2, ensures the development of plans todisseminate launch warning or cuinginformation from sensor or data sources.This information should go to activemissile defense forces for engagement ofincoming TMs and to forces conducting

•• Generates or validates intelligencecollection requirements on JTMDtargets that cannot be accomplished byJFC resources through the supportingjoint intelligence center. Collectionrequirements that cannot be satisfied withtheater assets will be forwarded toDefense Intelligence Agency/J-2 fornational collection.

•• Collects and fuses data from allsources and makes it available to the JFCand other theater component activities(e.g., aircrews, ground forces, specialoperations forces [SOF]) in a usableformat in near-real-time.

•• Provides assigned and supportingJ T M D f o r c e s w i t h t a r g e t i n ginformation from the intelligencecommunity.

•• Develops procedures for cuingtimely reconnaissance support to assessattacks.

•• Participates as a member of theJTCB, if established.

“When Iraq launched an attack on TelAviv, 19 January 1991, the pressure torespond was intense. An intelligenceofficer assigned the 'Black Hole'identified what he believed to be a Scudlaunch site and recommended thatF-15Es loaded with CBU-89s andCBU-87s, strike the location. After thisstrike by the 4th TFW, which reportedsecondary explosions, there was abreak of 85 hours before the Iraqislaunched a single Scud against Israel,and more than five days before anothermass launch.”

DOD Final Report to CongressConduct of the Persian Gulf War

•• Develops and executes, inconjunction with the J-3 and J-6, plansfor disseminating intelligence-derived

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attack operations that require TMlaunch point estimates.

•• Establishes and maintains, incoordination with the J-2 and J-6,near-real-time C4I for coordinatingJTMD operations and maintaining adata base of JTMD operations.

•• Deconflicts and integratesJTMD and component deceptionactivities.

• J-4--Joint Logistics Staff

•• Integrates all components’JTMD required items into the time-phased force and deployment list(TPFDL).

•• Monitors and supportsdeployment of TMD systems.

•• Establishes priorities forresupply as directed by the J-3. Rapidconsumption of active defense andattack operations missiles, combinedwith the size of the ammunition and

the wide dispersal of fire units, can puta strain on the logistic support systems.

• J-5--Joint Planning Staff

•• Evaluates AADC and componentplans for JTMD operations; ifestablished, participates as appropriatein JTCB deliberations.

•• Plans for required assetsnecessary to support JTMDoperations, including US nationalstrategic collection and intelligenceinformation in coordination with the J-2.

•• Develops plans for JTMDoperations and ensures that JTMDmeasures are included in appropriateoperation order annexes.

•• In conjunction with the J-3 andpolitical adviser, assists HN or alliedgovernment officials in planning forpolitico-military responsibilities,including providing for passive defensemeasures for populace and othergeopolitically sensitive missile targets.

Patriot missile launched during DESERT STORM.

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•• Develops a prioritized list ofassets to be defended from TMattack during various stages ofoperations. Coordinates this list withthe J-3 before approval by the JFC.

• J-6--Joint C4 Systems Staff

•• Maintains a theater- or JOA-wide command, control,communications, and computers (C4)system. Provides responsive, secure,and survivable communications.

•• In coordination with the J-2,assures that C4I for JTMD RSTA isintegrated into the overall theater orJOA C4 network.

•• Assists in providingconnectivity for national capabilitiesto support theater or JOA efforts.

•• Coordinates with component andmult inational commanders toconfirm interoperabil i ty ofcommunications systems.

• Political Adviser. Advises JFCregarding assistance to HN or alliedgovernments in developing passivedefense measures against TM attacks.

• Joint Targeting Coordination Board.The JFC may organize a JTCB tocoordinate target information, providetargeting guidance and priorities, andprepare and refine joint target lists. TheJTCB is tailored by the JFC to eachsituation and consists of appropriatestaff and component representatives.

3. Area Air DefenseCommander

a. The JFC will normally assign overallresponsibility for air defense to an AADC.The successful conduct of theater air defense

requires the integrated operation of allavailable air defense weapon systems of allcomponents. Authority to integrate airdefense forces and operations in overseas landareas will be delegated to the AADC. Airdefense operations should also be coordinatedwith other tactical operations, both on andover land and sea. Representation from theother components involved will be provided,as appropriate, to the AADC’s headquarters.Preferably the AADC will also be theairspace control authority. If the JFCestablishes a joint force air componentcommander (JFACC), then the JFC may alsoassign the responsibilities of the AADC to theJFACC. See Joint Pub 3-52, “Doctrine forJoint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone,”and the Joint Pub 3-01 series for moreguidance on the AADC.

b. Specific responsibilities for the AADCinclude:

• Developing a data base of friendlyactive defense capabilities to facilitateplanning the defense of prioritized assets.

• Developing and executing plans fordissemination of launch warninginformation to all components, allies,and HN civil authorities for populationwarning, as appropriate.

• Developing and executing detailed plans,including weapon control procedures andmeasures, to disseminate launchwarning and cue information by thefastest means available to componentsand active defense forces for engagingincoming TMs by the fastest meansavailable.

• Ensuring, through organization andapplication of appropriate procedureswithin the framework of other JFC airand surface operations, that the optimumeffectiveness is realized from each of thevarious weapon systems used for activedefense and that no unnecessary

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restrictions are placed upon theiremployment.

• Developing and executing plans forJTMD active defense operations andensuring that they are included in thecounterair, air defense, and space annexesfor all operation plans (OPLANs) andoperation plans in concept format, ifnecessary.

4. Joint Force Air ComponentCommander

a. The JFC will normally assignresponsibility for the planning andexecution of JTMD attack operationsoutside the other component commandersAOs to the JFACC. Since the location ofthese AOs may change with the maneuver offorces or with changes in JFC guidance, theJFACC should also plan for and maintainvisibility on the theater/JOA-wide attackoperations effort. This will ensure theJFACC is prepared to support the other

component commanders when, for example,they request JFACC support in conductingJTMD attack operations within their AOs.The JFACC plans and executes attackoperations in the theater/JOA based onJFC guidance. The JFACC does this byintegrating and directing the employment ofthe capabilities/forces made available bythe JFC.

b. Because of the need for the JFACC tomaintain theater/JOA-wide visibility onJTMD attack operations and the integratedrelationship between attack operations, activedefense, and the other operational elementsof JTMD, the JFC may assign theresponsibilities of the AADC to the JFACC.Detailed procedures should be established tofully integrate JFACC and AADC activities,should they be conducted by separateindividuals.

c. To ensure a synchronized effort, JFACCJTMD plans should be fully coordinatedwith the other components and the JFC. This

PATRIOT DEPLOYMENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF

On 12 January 1991, in response to a growing Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM)threat in the Persian Gulf, the Secretary of Defense authorized the deploymentof two USAREUR Patriot batteries to Turkey to provide TBM defense for IncirlikAir Base. By 22 January, six of the eight launchers were in place andoperational, with 43 missiles on hand. The United States and Israeli politicalauthorities also agreed to deploy Patriot units to counter TBM threats (in theform of Soviet-built Scud missiles) to Israel. Shortly after the war began, Iraqattacked Tel Aviv and Haifa, Israel, with an extended range variant of the ScudB missile. A direct Israeli military response to these attacks might haveweakened the commitment of Coalition Arab members to Operation DESERTSTORM. Task Force Patriot Defender, created from 32nd Air Defense Command(USAREUR), deployed to Israel to provide antitactical ballistic missile defenseof priority Israeli assets and to provide training and maintenance support forthe two newly formed IDF Patriot batteries. Patriot units from the 32nd AirDefense Command were ordered to deploy on 18 January, and within 29 hoursfrom verbal notification to deploy, the task force was operational and ready toconduct fire missions. A second deployment of two more batteries to Israelbegan on 23 January and was completed and operational by 26 January.

SOURCE: DOD Final Report to CongressConduct of the Persian Gulf War , April 1992

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will help prevent duplication of effort andminimize the possibility of fratricide.

5. Component Commanders

a. Component commanders plan and executeJTMD operations as directed by the JFC andactive defense in accordance with weapon controlprocedures and measures established by theAADC. Component commanders areresponsible for planning and executingcombat operations and for jointly coordinatingand prioritizing their operations and needs withthe JFC and with other component commanders.Inside their AOs, component commandersare normally designated as supportedcommanders for attack operations. Beyondsurface AOs, the JFACC is normally designatedsupported commander for attack operations.Component commanders are responsible forproviding warning to assigned and attachedforces in sectors vulnerable to attack.

b. Close coordination among componentcommanders, the JFC, and the AADC (ifdesignated) is necessary to employ the mostappropriate resources and measures to executeJTMD operations and to ensure a synergistice f fo r t . Componen t - to -componen tcoordination may be required in somesituations as a result of the compressed timelines and short reaction times inherent inJTMD operations. Coordination amongcomponent commanders for JTMD operationsusually includes the items illustrated inFigure II-2.

“If there is an attitude more dangerousto assume that future wars will be justlike the last one, it is to imagine that itwill be so utterly different that we canafford to ignore all the lessons of thelast one.”

Sir John SlessorRAF Marshal

COORDINATION AMONG COMPONENT COMMANDERS FOR JOINTTHEATER

MISSILE DEFENSE OPERATIONS

Components’ concepts of operations and assigned missions for Joint Theater Missile Defenseoperations

Requests for employment of joint force commander and supporting combatant commandersensors

Targeting and target deconfliction for both attack and active defense operations

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations and capabilities

Employment and placement of air and airspace control measures and procedures, naval andamphibious control measures, and fire support coordinating measures

Joint suppression of enemy air defenses

Area air defense operations

Special operations

Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I)

Command and control warfare

Electronic warfare operations and capabilities

Passive defense measures, including deception operations

C4I protection operations

Figure II-2. Coordination Among Component Commanders forJoint Theater Missile Defense Operations

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SECTION B.MULTINATIONAL

OPERATIONS

6. General

JTMD operations may be required withinthe context of an alliance, coalition, or otherinternational arrangement. Within thiscontext, the JFC may be either subordinateto or may be the multinational CINC. Ineither event, the JFC must consider thoseareas peculiar to multinationaloperations such as force capabilities anddisparities, information and equipmentsecurity levels, and procedural andorganizational differences that mayinfluence the ability to achieve combinedunity of effort. Multinational CINCs andtheir subordinates identify the requirementsand implications of allied and coalitionoperations, organize their forces, train toachieve force effectiveness, and conductmultinational operations as necessary.

7. Responsibilities

Requirements, responsibilities, andorganizational considerations forconducting JTMD in a multinationaloperations environment are similar to thosein joint operations. However, specialconsiderations and areas of emphasis areneeded to ensure unity of effort with othernational forces. Each theater and eachcountry is unique. Even within formalalliances, there are varying nationalinterests that should be identified andconsidered. Differences in doctrine,training, equipment, and organizationshould be identified and considered whendetermining multinational interoperabilityrequirements for employing forces. Themultinational CINC is responsible toboth national and allied leaders. Leadersmust approve command relationshipsamong the elements of the alliance orcoalition.

8. OrganizationalConsiderations

When the individual national forces of themultinational force are not uniformlycapable of actively defending against enemyTMs or attacking enemy missilecapabilities, provisions should be made toensure that JTMD assets are provided formissile defense within multinationalCINC-established priorities. This mayentail introducing JTMD assets fromanother theater. For this reason, JTMD unitsand support organizations should be trained,oriented, and exercised to operate across thefull range of military operations. As inunilateral operations, multinational CINCsmay choose to organize on an area orfunctional basis, or a combination of thetwo. In either case, multinational forcecapability should be considered.

9. Operations

Consensus on the enemy TM threat, aclearly defined chain of command, and aresponsive, interoperable C2 structureare crucial to successful multinationalJTMD operations. Particular care shouldbe taken to ensure that national forces andselected geopolitical assets are providedrequisite protection from the effects ofenemy TMs. Consideration may also begiven to assisting HN or allied civilauthorities in establishing passive defensemeasures for the civilian population and HNassets consistent with the overall mission.The JFC should consider establishingmemorandums of agreement and/or status-of-forces agreements (time permitting) thatwould allow for collateral support (e.g.,security and logistics) for JTMD forcesassigned to protect allied and coalitionforces.

a. The TM threat to the totalmultinational force, including rear areas,should be considered. Consensus on the

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multinational commands will normally besupported by national intelligence systemsto augment their organic intelligencesystems. These should be integrated toensure responsiveness to operational needs.Additionally, issues related toreleasability of intelligence informationand products to multinational partnersmust be resolved early, and if possible, priorto the onset of hostilities or operations. The

sharing of intelligence will be crucial toconducting operations.

e. ROE for JTMD operations shouldbe delineated, published, and disseminatedto and exercised by alliance members forcompliance and as a planning considerationfor future operations. Any national ROEthat differ from the multinational ROEshould be identified, published, andunderstood by all national commands.

f. Planning for and dissemination ofTM launch warning and impact areaprediction to civil authorities should beconsidered by multinational commanders.

The remains of a Scud missile disabled by air defense systems.

threat will facilitate the integration ofnational and alliance intelligence collectionefforts and allocation of collection resourcesand assist in threat evaluation.

b. National forces are assigned JTMDmissions that will produce, in concert withother forces, more significant effects thanif employed alone. Tasks are assigned to

national forces commensurate with theirequipment and capabilities.

c. C4I systems should be sufficientlyinteroperable to respond to the needs ofthe multinational command. Informationcritical to JTMD needs is identified andsystems are established to speed the flowof critical information throughout themultinational chain of command.

d. Intelligence requirements in supportof JTMD operations should be determinedand prioritized in order to plan thecollection, analytical, and targeting effortsand to allocate appropriate resources tothese functions. US forces that are part of

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g. The key to establishing and refiningsound procedures is multinationalexercises with full participation of C4Iassets. Exercises provide an excellentenvironment for the simultaneous practiceof all levels of responsibilities to evaluate and

to sustain the requisite skills and proceduresfor effective JTMD operations. Exercises areparticularly helpful in adapting a unit to a newenvironment subsequent to deployment fromone geographic area to another. Exercises mayalso provide a deterrent effect.

development by showing commanders whenand where they can most effectively engagethe enemy. IPB products contributesignificantly to the process of arealimitation analysis and ultimately toautomated cuing of TMD sensors andweapon systems to threatening targets. IPBincludes updating TM data bases to maintainand provide near-real-time status of selectedenemy TM-related capabilities (e.g., ordersof battle; operating bases; type, range, andemployment techniques of available missilesand warheads; missile launch, load, hide, andsupport sites; potential routes; intelligence andelectronic warfare (IEW) systems; C2 nodes;and enemy defenses).

“No combat commander has ever hadas full and complete a view of hisadversary as did our field commander.Intelligence support to OperationsDESERT SHIELD and DESERTSTORM was a success story.”

General Colin PowellChairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff

3. Preparation and Training

Well-rehearsed TM defense plans andpreparations allow forces in a developedtheater to react swiftly across the range ofmilitary operations. TM defense systemsshould provide timely C4I and targetacquisition before hostilities commence.Preparatory activities include IPB,detection of launch platform preparations,and transmission of timely warnings to

CHAPTER IIIPLANNING AND OPERATIONS

III-1

“The first thing for a commander-in-chief to determine is what he is going todo, to see if he has the means to overcome the obstacles which the enemycan oppose him, and when he has decided, to do all that he can to surmountthem.”

NapoleonMaxim LXXIX

SECTION A. PLANNING ANDPREPARATION FOR JTMD

1. General

Successful JTMD operations are highlydependent on the simultaneous andsequential execution of a wide spectrum oftasks and activities, some of which occur orbegin prior to the initiation of the use of force.Significant among these are intelligencepreparation of the battlespace (IPB);JTMD preparation and training; andoperation planning. Additionally, logisticand geographic considerations will impactmany aspects of early JTMD planning.

2. Intelligence Preparation ofthe Battlespace

Analysis and target development of TMthreats should begin during peacetime. IPBdrives the development of a collection plan,which in turn identifies sensor types,collection windows, and areas of coverage.The allocation of the right mix of sensors,at the right time, against specific areas, insearch of specific targets is critical to thesuccessful conduct of TMD operations.Development and refinement of a data baseon threat TM capability, both indigenous andimported, must be a continuous process. IPBis an analytical methodology employed toreduce uncertainties concerning the enemy,environment, and terrain. IPB products areused to evaluate enemy capabilities,vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action.This process assists in situation and target

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alert responsible commanders. JTMDtraining and preparation should be conductedfor military forces. Consideration should alsobe given to providing training and preparationsupport for the civilian population as feasible.

4. Operation Planning

During this phase, forces are organized,known and suspected enemy TMs and TM-related targets are prioritized and assigned, andROE established to protect assets and providefreedom of maneuver for friendly forces.Passive defense measures, active defense, andattack operations are planned.

5. Logistics

a. Key among the many factors that shouldbe considered when developing sustainmentplans for JTMD operations are deploymentof the weapons to their area of employmentand resupply of ammunition, repair parts andother supporting equipment, fuel, andsupporting personnel to sustain the JTMDeffort.

b. US doctrine requires the Services toprovide their own logistic support; however,the geographic combatant commanders areauthorized to exercise directive authorityover logistics and transportation prioritiesbased on transportation capacity,transportation requirements, and urgency ofneed. The TPFDL should be based on thesepriorities. Transportation assets can be moreefficiently used and transportationrequirements more readily met through earlyassessment of the theater’s logistic requirements.Early planning will permit the geographiccombatant commander to fully exploitmore efficient, but slower, sealift assets.Ground-based TMD systems can also betransported by air into a theater, but this placesan additional burden on the US airlift capacity.A geographic combatant commander mustbalance the increased risk of imminent TM

attack with the cost associated withdiverting airlift assets for the deploymentof JTMD forces. If the geographic combatantcommander alters the TPFDL to meet TMDrequirements, the geographic combatantcommander must assess the cost of doing soin terms of the effects this will have on overalltheater logistic operations.

6. Geographic Considerations

Within a theater of operations, geographicfeatures and time and distance factorsrelative to the threat will affect the balanceof effort required to conduct JTMDoperations. The type of terrain (mountainous,wooded, open, swampy, urban, and othertypes) will influence the employment andsiting of JTMD systems. Climate and weathermay also be factors affecting the conduct ofattack operations. Planning considerations areshown in Figure III-1.

SECTION B. TRANSITION TOJTMD OPERATIONS

7. General

a. Detection of TM launch platformpreparations may be an indication of animpending act of war. Detection of thesepreparations may allow for the transmissionof tactical warnings that alert commanders,automated weapon systems, sensors, fusioncenters, C2 nodes, and in some cases, civilauthorities to prepare for the expected attack.

b. The JFC must evaluate, by fusing allavailable intelligence sources, the potentialenemy TM threat faced in the theater/JOA andensure that the proper JTMD resources areallocated to meet the threat. Units supportingthe JFC’s JTMD plan should also be sequencedin the force deployment and employmentschedules so that a JTMD capability can beestablished in consonance with the overall JFCpriorities and risk assessment.

Planning and Operations

III-3

Figure III-1. Planning Considerations for Geographic, Time, and Distance Factors

Missile range

Neutral country overflight restrictions

Missile debris

Expected attack direction

Missile chemical or biological warhead dispersant

Location of population

Location of units on the ground and ships at sea

Communications systems and connectivity requirements

Availability of host-nation Theater Missile Defense assets

Space-based assets, capabilities, and availability

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FORGEOGRAPHIC, TIME, AND DISTANCE FACTORS

8. Undeveloped Theaters

In an undeveloped theater, forcible entryoperations entailing the introduction ofpersonnel, weapon systems, and vehicles byair or sea limit the opportunity to establish animmediate, robust JTMD capability.Advanced planning is fundamental toestablish a credible JTMD capability on atimely basis. Undeveloped theater JTMDrequirements are very similar to those of adeveloped theater; the principal differencesare the time required to deploy JTMDforces and availability of JTMD resources.

9. Forcible Entry Operations

Forcible entry is seizing and holding amilitary lodgment in the face of armedopposition and may include airborne,amphibious, air assault, or any combinationthereof. Forcible entry is supported by airand space-based systems and specialoperations. Whatever the situation, the TMthreat should be assessed and an appropriatedefense provided to counter the expectedthreat. During initial phases of amphibiousoperations, the Navy component has theprimary role for providing this defense. As

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assault forces deploy ashore, groundcommanders assume responsibility for theirAOs and land-based systems should beemployed and integrated into the TMdefense. Upon agreement, the primaryresponsibilities for JTMD operations maybe passed to forces ashore. During situationsin which the Navy component is in supportof land operations, Navy component and land-based JTMD operations should be coordinatedto ensure unity of effort. Consequently, jointexercises are critical to ensure effectiveinteroperability and communications.

10. Force Protection

Since JTMD assets available to the JFC willgenerally be limited, especially in forcibleentry operations, special focus should beplaced on providing an appropriate levelof physical security for critical JTMDassets against terrorist and similar threats.

11. Launch Detection

Once a launch is observed, launchwarning, impact point/time predictions,and missile type are passed to commands,military units, and civil authorities, allowingpassive defense actions to be triggered.Additionally, trajectory data, launch pointestimates, missile type, impact point and timepredictions, and positions are passed to activemissile defense units, interceptors, intelligenceassets, and attack systems.

“The Scud missiles used by Iraq andIran in the “War of the Cities,” and theIraqi use of Scud missiles againstcoalition forces and Israel in the 1991Gulf War were the first uses of ballisticmissiles since the use of the V-2 inWorld War II. Though relativelyprimitive in nature, these Soviet andIraqi variant Scud missiles had apsychological impact and forcedoperational and tactical changes.”

Unknown

SECTION C. PASSIVEDEFENSE

12. General

Passive defense is necessary to provideessential individual and collective protectionfor friendly forces, population centers, andcritical assets. Passive defense measuresshould be planned whenever US forces mightface a TM threat. By examining variouscombinations of TM warhead accuracy andeffects, numbers of available missiles, and theenemy targeting process, the likelihood andtiming of an attack may be predicted andpassive measures selected for employmentbefore, during, and after a TM attack.

13. Measures

Principal measures used to accomplishpassive defense are depicted in Figure III-2.

a. Tactical Warning. Geographiccombatant commanders are responsible forestablishing theater event reportingsystems to acquire, process, and disseminatewarning information to joint forcecomponents and population centers. They arealso responsible for implementing tacticalevent system architectures into localoperations and intelligence nets. Component

PRINCIPAL MEASURESFOR PASSIVE DEFENSE

Tactical warning

Reducing targetingeffectiveness

Reducing vulnerability

Recovery and reconstitution

Figure III-2. Principal Measures for PassiveDefense


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commanders are responsible for providingwarning to assigned forces. Tactical warningtriggers passive defense actions. Warningsare both general (that missile launches areimminent or have occurred) and specific(that specific units or areas of the battlefieldor theater are in danger of attack). Thegeographic combatant commanders’ tacticalwarning requirements are supported bynational and theater intelligence systems.

b. Reducing Targeting Effectiveness.JFCs and component commanders areresponsible for protecting forces against theeffects of missile attack through:

• Operations Security (OPSEC). Thecommunications security, signaturereduction, and security aspects of OPSECdeny enemy sensor and reconnaissanceassets timely acquisition andidentification of friendly targets.Signature reduction measures includecamouflage, commonality of vehicleappearance, an emission control programfor infrared, electromagnetic, andacoustic emissions, and cover andconcealment. Local unit security is animportant element in denying accuratetargeting data to enemy specialoperations forces or other enemy agents.Frequent movement of units (insidethe enemy’s intelligence cycle) is ofsingular importance. See Joint Pub3-54, “Joint Doctrine for OperationsSecurity,” for additional guidance onOPSEC.

• Deception. Deception misleadsenemies by manipulating, distorting,or falsifying friendly actions. This cancause enemies to deplete their TMresources by attacking false targetsthrough the use of decoys, missingintended targets, and denying themaccurate battle damage assessments.D e c e p t i o n i n f l u e n c e s e n e m ydecisionmakers by feeding their

intelligence collectors what appears to becredible information or by denying theenemy the ability to gain tactical,operational, and strategic informationwhen using reconnaissance andsurveillance systems. TM deception isan integral element of the JFC’soverall plan for deception and isincluded in the JFC’s operation plan. Thedeception effort should be specificallytailored to counter or exploit the enemy’scollection capability. See Joint Pub3-58, “Joint Doctrine for MilitaryDeception,” for additional guidanceconcerning joint deception operations.

• Mobility. Mobility reduces vulnerabilityand contributes to survivability of certainsystems by limiting exposure toreconnaissance and targeting.

c. Reducing Vulnerability

• Hardening. Hardening reduces theeffect of attack on systems and facilities(i.e., aircraft, air base support equipmentand facilities, nuclear delivery systems,nuclear storage areas, C2 elements,communications nodes, and theaterlogistic facilities). Hardening should beaccomplished or begun in peacetime.However, political and fiscal constraintsmay preclude certain prehostilityhardening measures, such as constructionof fixed fortifications. Protection formobile ground forces and equipmentmay be best accomplished by careful siteselection, field fortifications, and otherfield-expedient methods.

• Redundancy and Robustness. Aprincipal means of preserving combatpower is duplication of criticalcapabilities that are particularlyvulnerable to TM attack and for whichother passive measures may be lessappropriate. Of primary concern are“soft” targets such as C2 nodes and

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sensors, and fixed sites such as airfieldsand ground stations for airborne sensors.The capabilities provided by thesesystems can be preserved throughredundancy and robustness. That is, byhaving systems capable of backing up orduplicating the roles of other systems andhaving many systems with similar oridentical capabilities.

• Dispersal. Dispersal reduces targetv u l n e r a b i l i t y b y d e c r e a s i n gconcentration and making a target lesslucrative. Combined with mobility anddeception, dispersal increases enemyuncertainty as to whether a particularlocation is occupied and, if so, whetherit will be occupied when the attack isexecuted. It forces the enemy to searchmore locations, which requires moreresources and more time.

• Training Civilian Authorities. Civilianauthorities should be trained to organizeand instruct their populations onactions to take upon warning of missileattack. This training will facilitatecivilian protection efforts and may reducethe political impact of missiles hittingcivilian areas and facilities.

• NBC Defense. The elements of passivedefense against NBC weapons arecontamination avoidance, forceprotection, and decontamination.These form a hierarchy that protects theforce, sustains operational effectiveness,and minimizes casualties. Units employdetection and NBC reconnaissance toavoid contamination, thus minimizing oreliminating NBC casualties, missionperformance degradation, and logisticalintensive decontamination requirements.If units fail to avoid being attacked orcontaminated with NBC weapons, theyuse individual and collective protectionto sustain operations and reduce the

impact on NBC weapons on the unit.Individual protection uses physicalp r o t e c t i o n d e v i c e s , m e d i c a limmunization and prophylaxis, and NBCcasualty medical treatment. Collectiveprotection provides relief from sustainedoperations in full NBC protectiveequipment, shelters sensitive equipmentnot easily decontaminated, and providesclean environments for operationsthat cannot be performed underNBC-contaminated condit ions.Decontamination removes NBC hazardsfrom personnel and equipment.Decontamination also minimizes thehazard and spread of contamination andfacilitates the prompt restoration ofnormal operations. See Joint Pub 3-11,“Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological,and Chemical (NBC) Defense,” for moreguidance on NBC defense.

d. Recovery and Reconstitution.Following a TM attack, units should berestored to a desired level of combateffectiveness commensurate with missionrequirements and available resources.Reconstitution may include reestablishing orreinforcing C2; reallocating or replacingcommunications, personnel, supplies, andequipment; conducting essential training,reestablishing unit cohesion; and repairingbattle damage. In some instances of massdevastation, whole unit replacement may benecessary.

14. Command and Control

The principal support that C4I willprovide for passive defense is warning.Strategic warning is accomplished throughongoing intelligence collection and analysisof the threat. Tactical warning is provided tothe components over the geographiccombatant commander’s early warning netand used to dictate the local readiness posture.The geographic combatant commander’s


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early warning net should link space-, air-, andsurface-based sensors (both national andtheater) that detect missile launches or trackmissiles in flight. Warning data should betransmitted immediately to appropriatecommands and, if known, to targeted unitsand civilian authorities. TM defense reactionplans should be included as part of emergency-action checklists. Warning times associatedwith TM attacks are minimal because ofshort missile flight times and difficulty ofdetection. Regardless of time available,warning is required to allow for the use of allpossible protective measures for exposedpersonnel and equipment. Effectivecommunications are essential to provide theinformation required at each level to support theexecution of passive defense measure plans.

15. Planning

Planning for passive defense is conductedat all levels. It should include warning andmeasures to reduce the effectiveness of enemytargeting, reduce vulnerability to attack, andreconstitute the force. Attack warningimmediate action plans, deception plans, andIPB provide the focus for the passive defenseeffort. TM deception activities should bedeveloped, coordinated, and integrated as anessential part of higher level deceptionoperations. Integration of the planningprocess reduces the effectiveness of thethreat by establishing and communicating thecountermeasures to be taken at each level ofcommand.

16. Execution

Executing passive defense is theresponsibility of unit commanders at allechelons.

SECTION D. ACTIVEDEFENSE OPERATIONS

“I want to make it clear that we welcomethe day when the Soviet Union canshoot down any incoming missile, solong as the United States can shootdown any incoming missile, too.”

Ronald Reagan

17. General

The role of active defense operations is toprotect selected assets and forces fromattack by destroying TM airborne launchplatforms and/or TMs in flight. Activedefense must consist of defense in depthagainst all classes of TMs. When destructionof the TM launch platform prior to launch isnot possible or successful, TMs should beengaged by all means available throughouttheir entire flight profile. Defense in depthprovides multiple opportunities to negatethe TMs with differing capabilities, increasesprobability of kill, and prohibits the enemyfrom being able to counter the defensivesystem with a single technique. Activedefense also includes those actions whichmitigate the effectiveness of targeting anddelivery systems through EW against remoteor onboard guidance systems.

18. Resources and Capabilities

a. Boost Phase. As a result of time anddistance factors, destruction during the earlyphases of the missile trajectory requires near-real-time information concerning a missilelaunch and an immediate delivery ofdestructive capability. The detection andacquisition tasks should be integrally linked

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THE IRAQI TERROR WEAPON

The Scud was a clumsy, obsolete Soviet missile which had been originallydesigned to lob a half-ton warhead 190 miles and be able to hit within a halfmile of its target—close enough for Soviet purposes because the Scuds couldcarry nuclear warheads. The Iraqis had learned to roughly double the missile’srange by welding two Scuds end to end, or adding a section to the originalframework, but in doing so they had to drastically reduce the payload. So inessence what they had was a weapon that could fly 300 miles and miss thetarget by a couple of miles with a warhead of only 160 pounds. Militarily, thatwas the equivalent of a single airplane flying over, haphazardly dropping onesmall bomb, and flying away—terrible for anyone it happened to land on, butin the grand scheme of warfare, a mosquito. However, the Scud was effectiveas a terror weapon against civilian populations: in the Iran-Iraq war, the Iraqishad fired Scuds at Tehran in much the same way the Nazis had showeredLondon with V-2s.

SOURCE: Schwarzkopf, H. NormanIt Doesn’t Take a Hero, Bantam, 1992

with and dedicated to the active defenseweapon systems. Systems participating inactive defense should provide a means fornear-real-time kill assessment and rapiddamage assessment to determine the need forsubsequent engagements. Attack early in thetrajectory offers the greatest potential foreliminating problems associated with thetype of warhead and the intended target.Space-based components should also beintegrated with theater assets for launchwarning, launch point and time determination,threat type determination, impact point andtime prediction, weapon system cuing,communications, and other components.

b. Ascent and Mid-Course Phases.During ascent and mid-course phases, activedefense systems continue to receivewarning and cuing information fromexternal sensors and C2 nodes in order todetermine, based on established ROE,whether incoming TMs are threats thatwarrant engagement. If engagements arenecessary, units begin processing forengagement and selecting fire units or weaponsystems to perform the engagement based onfiring doctrine, ROE, weapons and equipmentstatus, and probability of kill.

c. Terminal Phase. During the terminalphase of a missile’s trajectory, incomingmissiles are destroyed primarily by surface-to-air missiles or gun systems, dependingon TM type. Because it should be expectedthat an enemy attack may integrate aircraftand missiles, terminal phase active defenseoperations should be integrated within thetheater/JOA air defense system.

d. Cruise Missiles. The previous threeparagraphs were primarily related to ballisticmissiles. Cruise missiles present a somewhatdifferent challenge. Cruise missiles can beair-, land-, or sea-launched and normallyfly to their target at low altitude, thuscreating an acquisition problem. Often theyfollow an unpredictable trajectory that makesit difficult to determine their point of launchor to predict their exact impact point. Themobility of cruise missile launch platforms,the small launch signature of the missiles, andtheir reduced radar cross section alsocomplicate TMD operations. Stealthtechnologies can be incorporated into cruisemissiles, making them an even morechallenging target. A robust combination offriendly active defense and attack operationsis required to defeat the cruise missile threat.


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e. The ability to destroy missiles in flightshould be coupled with dynamic andresponsive deployment of active defensesystems to prevent the enemy fromknowing what is defended. Thisredep loymen t capab i l i t y assu resresponsiveness to changing theater priorities,assures protection of the force, and can beemployed as a tactic to prevent the enemyfrom knowing what is defended. In the lattercase, this causes uncertainty and reduces theenemy’s expectation of a successful attack.Active defense operations defend onlywhat is most important or critical due toresource limitations and accept some riskshould the enemy attack lower priorityassets that are not directly defended. Theprincipal contributors to active defensesystems are shown in Figure III-3.


a. The JFC exercises control of activedefense operations by integration of JTMDsystems and forces into the C4I systemssupporting theater/JOA air defense. TheJFC normally assigns overall responsibilityfor theater/JOA air defense, to includeactive defense TMD, to the AADC. TheAADC assists the JFC in determiningmissions, communications priorities, andROE for active defense forces based onassessment and prioritization of forces, criticalassets, and population centers. Active defenseforces are under the operational control oftheir component commanders, who employthese forces under the weapons controlprocedures and measures established by theAADC and approved by the JFC.

b. Effective control of active defenseweapon systems requires a capability toprovide continuous wide-area surveillance ofthe theater/JOA, with emphasis on likelymissile launch areas. A confirmed launchtriggers reactions by a preplanned selectionof appropriate defensive systems, inaccordance with established ROE. Shortmissile flight times require that availableair-, land-, sea-, and space-based sensor andsurveillance assets reports be integrated toprovide a complete and current air and spacepicture. Space-based systems should beresponsive to the joint or multinational forcecommander. The C4I systems supportingtheater air defense should provide forcentralized coordination and decentralizedexecution of active defense operations.

20. Planning

Active defense planning begins with IPB.Upon completing initial analyses, the JFCprovides the concept of operation and missionpriorities. The JFC finalizes decisions onapportionment of JTMD resources afterthe staff completes its comparison and

Figure III-3. Principal Contributors to ActiveDefense Systems

PRINCIPALCONTRIBUTORS TOACTIVE DEFENSE

SYSTEMS

Point, area, and self -defense surface - to - airmissile and gun systems

Aircraft primarily engagingenemy airborne launchplatforms

Electronic warfare systems

Voice warning

Surface, airborne, and spacewarning systems

Voice and data cuing

Command, control,communications, computers,and intelligence

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Forces

Air bases

Seaports

Population centers

Fleet operating areas

EXAMPLES OF CRITICALTHEATER ASSETS

Figure III-4. Examples of Critical TheaterAssets

analyses of the various courses of actionand the component commanders havegiven their input. Intelligence requirementsare identified and collection managementpriorities established for TM detection,acquisition, and identification. Threatpriorities and ROE are established forengaging both enemy aircraft and missiles.Forces are designated to protect critical theaterassets as illustrated in Figure III-4.

self-protection) and area defensivesystems. Depending on data quality,cuing of higher resolution sensor systemsmay be necessary to provide targetengagement data immediately or totemplate the enemy’s TM architecture toprovide information for targetengagement at a later time. Enemylaunch locations and other targetinginformation are passed simultaneously toappropriate units and commands withattack operations missions.

• Area systems, such as some surface-to-air missile systems or interceptors,provide defense in depth by attackingTMs at long ranges. Engaging missilesearly in flight permits multipleengagements by the area and pointdefense systems and minimizes grounddamage to friendly forces andinfrastructure from missile andwarhead debris. Active electroniccountermeasures systems also candeceive TM guidance systems late inflight.

SECTION E. ATTACKOPERATIONS

22. General

a. Attack operations are characterized byoffensive actions intended to destroy anddisrupt enemy TM capabilities before,during, and after launch. The objective ofattack operations is to prevent the launch ofTMs by attacking each element of theoverall system, including such actions asdestroying launch platforms, RSTA platforms,C2 nodes, and missi le stocks andinfrastructure. Attack operations also striveto deny or disrupt employment of additionalTMs that may be available to the enemy. Thepreferred method of countering enemy TMoperations is to attack and destroy ordisrupt TMs prior to their launch.

21. Execution

a. Active defense operations should becentrally coordinated and decentrallyexecuted. Based upon unconfirmed launchindicators, US Space Command may becapable of providing initial warning reports.These reports could be used by the JFC toinitiate certain passive defense measures andprovide initial cuing to active defense forces.

b. An enemy launch observed andidentified through national, theater, or tacticalsurveillance systems triggers active defenseand attack operations, along with initiatingpassive defense measures by military unitsand civilian authorities.

• TM trajectory data are passed tosurface- or air-based point (including


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b. Attack operations is not a mission initself, but a way of characterizing thoseoffensive attacks against launch platforms andtheir supporting infrastructure, includinglogistics. Attack operations can bepreemptive or reactive as part of counterair,strategic attack, interdiction, fire support,maneuver, ASW, antisurface warfare, strikewarfare, amphibious operations, or specialoperations. A sustained effort is required toreduce the enemy’s TM capability andinvolves the execution of mutually supportingtasks. The detect ion, acquisi t ion,identification, tracking, and attack tasks arehighly dependent on a near-real-time C4Iprocess and rapid targeting capability. Attackoperations are challenging because TMsystems are generally hard to detect sincethey will normally be dispersed, mobile,electronically quiet, and redundant. Attackoperations use all-source intelligence to locateand attack enemy TM systems, theircomponents, and supporting nodes.

23. Resources

Systems used to support attackoperations may include rotary- and fixed-wingaircraft in air-to-surface and air-to-airoperations, surface-to-surface fires, navalmissile forces, SOF, antisubmarine forces, EWsystems, and maneuver forces. Attackoperations are highly dependent uponpredictive and developed intelligence.Because it may be difficult to detect highlymobile launch systems, a C4I capabilityshould exist to support near-real-timetargeting and attack. National sensorsystems will normally be required to augmenttheater air- and ground-based systems.National capabilities should provide tacticalinformation to assist in launch pointdetermination. Additionally, intelligenceproducts collected by national systems canenable theater forces to anticipate possible TMoperations and determine enemy TM unitlocations. SOF involvement may be throughattack of TM targets by way of a direct action

mission or through conduct of specialreconnaissance missions that use electronic,mechanical, visual, or other means to facilitatetarget acquisition and countering of an enemyTM threat (i.e., terminal guidance operations).


Designation of engagement areas,assignment of AOs, and coordination ofJTMD attack operations is prescribed bythe JFC. When ground forces have beendeployed and if a JFACC has been designated,the JFC will normally task the JFACC asthe supported commander to plan for andconduct, as apportioned, attack operationsagainst longer range TMs outside the othercomponent commanders’ AOs. The JFACCshould also plan for and maintain visibilityon the theater/JOA-wide attack operationseffort. The JFC will normally taskcomponent commanders for conducto f attack operations against TMswithin their assigned AOs (see ChapterI I , “Responsibil i t ies and CommandRelationships,” paragraphs 4 and 5).Subordinate commanders control attackresources and coordinate and conduct theiroperations according to joint doctrine andprocedures. Effective attack operationsrequire real-time coordination between allcomponent commanders as well as continuouswide-area surveillance over the entire theater/JOA, with emphasis on enemy missile systemsand likely support, fabrication, assembly, andlaunch areas. Coordination of attackoperations involves the detection, acquisition,and identification of enemy TMs and thedissemination of the targeting information tothe designated attack system for execution.These tasks are directed to subordinateelements as missions for execution.

25. Planning

Planning for attack operationsbegins with the IPB process. IPB isconducted, including surveillance of likely

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b. Because of the mobility of TM systems,the time to acquire, target, and attack keyelements may be very short. Thus, anaccelerated execution cycle using the decide-detect-deliver process is required. Thedecision to attack TMs may have alreadybeen made based on the JFC’s prioritiesand facilitated by the ROE. Accuratetargeting data is required for execution. Suchdecisions provide focus and priorities forintelligence collection management and theattack planning process. ROE approvalcriteria for attack or a “trigger event”established during the planning processwill initiate the attack operation. Foraircraft, this decision could well be made bythe aircrew orbiting over or near the targetarea in anticipation of TM activities. Whenimplemented, this provides for quick,efficient, and effective use of limited C4I andattack means.

c. Throughout the planning cycle,commanders and staffs must continuallyreassess friendly dispositions, use all availableintelligence to anticipate enemy attack plansand predict TM system dispositions, and planappropriate attack responses. Trigger events

areas, area limitations, and prediction ofenemy activities. Upon completing the initialanalyses, the JFC issues guidance on theconcept and priorities for JTMD operations.Based on the JFC staff’s analysis of variouscourses of action, and recommendations fromthe component commanders, the JFC assignsmissions to the component commanders andprovides corresponding guidance for JTMDoperations. Component commanders thenplan attack operations based on the assignmentof attack responsibilities, the JFC’s conceptand priorities, and the apportionment decisionof the JFC. Effective JTMD attack operationsrequire the integration of all joint force plans.JFCs may task an organization within theirstaff to integrate component commanders’plans or may delegate this responsibility to asubordinate commander. If established, theJTCB may be an integration center for thiseffort or serve as a JFC-level reviewmechanism.

a. During planning, decisions are madeconcerning targets; conditions for attack; andasset assignment for surveillance, targetacquisition, deconfliction, suppression ofenemy air defenses, and attack.

Successfully attacking theater missiles before launch requires extensivecoordination between component commanders.


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or signatures that might key the decisionto attack, such as TM launch, should beidentified. Observable TM system signaturesand conditions under which they are observedare matched with appropriate surveillance andtarget acquisition systems.

26. Execution

a. General. Conduct of attack operationsis reliant on sensor systems, a responsivenear-real-time sensor management andcommunications network, and weaponsystems capable of attacking targets atgreat ranges as soon as adequate targetinginformation is available. At the tacticallevel, responsive intelligence and operationsinterfaces are required for targeting andcountering relocatable enemy TM launchersand support facilities. Execution of air andground JTMD attack operations iscentrally controlled, decentrally executed,and governed by applicable joint policies,doctrine, and procedures.

• Detection. Detection requiresidentification of prelaunch andpostlaunch signatures and the accuratelocation of the launch system. To supportattack operations in all environments,diminish the effects of enemycountermeasures, and capitalize ondistinctive signatures of TM equipmentand operations, the surveillancecapability should be multispectral, andintegrate national-level intelligenceand other externally furnishedinformation with theater-levelsurveillance. Space-, air-, sea-, andground-based area and point surveillancesensors may all be required. Detectioninvolves the segmentation of thebattlefield to accommodate a systematicsearch of specified areas determined bythe IPB process. After detection,warning or location data should bepassed immediately to the theater jointintelligence center, component

command centers, executing units, andair and ground search equipment forcuing. Simultaneously, tactical warningsshould also be provided to potentialfriendly targeted assets.

• Acquisition. Acquisition and trackingsystems receive cuing from wide-areaand local surveillance systems andwarning data from other intelligencesources. Acquisition supports targetidentification and discrimination andtimely target engagement by accuratelylocating and monitoring targets andtransmitting information relative to targetmovement.

• Identification. Identification of TMlaunch platforms and supporting nodesrequires maintenance of data on targetmovement, determination of the type ofTM system employed, discrimination ofthe launch and support systems fromdecoys, and, through the use of predictiveintelligence, identification of potentialfuture target locations, area limitationanalysis, and automated cuing of sensorsto threatening targets.

b. Attack

• Executing attack operations is theresponsibi l i ty of subordinatecommanders directed to conduct thismission. Observed enemy activitywithin the predetermined context (TMsignatures or characteristic preattackconditions) triggers timely execution,which has been anticipated throughthe decide-detect-deliver process.Concurrently with defensive actions,confirmed missile launch positions andother TM system targets identified in theIPB data base are included in the JFC’splan for preemptive strikes oroperations at the onset of hostilities.Once hostilities are in i t iated, al ltargets acquired are attacked in

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a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e J F C ’sguidance. Attacking TM capabilitiesas early as possible aftercommencement of hostilities mayprevent the launch of a substantialnumber of TMs. This includes suchmethods as reducing enemy TMmobility through the use of scatterablemines in the TM operating area.

• Command and control warfare isemployed against an enemy’scommand, control, and communicationssurveillance and target acquisition todisrupt TM operations. This aspectof attack operations will influence,degrade, or destroy the enemy C2capabilities and is closely linked to thepassive defense measure of deception.The primary goal is to blind the enemyand thereby enhance overall protectionof the force.

• A deliberate program of operationsmay be planned to provide continuousattack of the enemy’s TM systems.Aggressive target acquisition isplanned and conducted so that TMsystems and support organizations aresystematically pursued and destroyedaccording to the JFC’s concept ofoperations and priorities.

SECTION F. COMMAND,CONTROL,

COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS, AND

INTELLIGENCE

27. General

C2 for JTMD operations is the exerciseof authority and direction by commandersover forces assigned JTMD missions. C4Ifor JTMD missions must beaccomplished using existing joint andService C4I systems and resourcesefficiently to ensure integration with other

operational functions and to optimize theuse of scarce resources. The C4I systemlinks passive defense, active defense, andattack operations to provide timelyassessment of the threat (to include IPB);rapid dissemination of tactical warning; andmission assignment, targeting data, andpoststrike assessment to the appropriateJTMD element. For each operationalelement, the C4I system must providerapid communications among intelligenceassets, the fusion and decisionmakingfacilities, warning systems, and weaponsystems, to include a capability for rapidcoordination with supporting combatantcommanders. Space assets are critical topassive defense, active defense, and attackoperations because they provide launchwarning, launch point prediction, threattype determination, impact point prediction,weapon systems cuing, communications,and related intelligence. JTMD C4Icapabilities must support the principles ofcentralized planning, decentralizedexecution, and coordinated efforts by forcesassigned JTMD tasks.

28. Resources

Inherent in effective JTMD operations isan absolute requirement for vertical andhorizontal technical and proceduralinteroperability. This is especially true forthe C4I operational element. JTMD C4Isystems, facil i t ies, procedures, andorganizations are built on existing systems andintegrate applicable joint capabilities. TheJFC should be particularly sensitive to theneed to exercise JTMD C4I interoperabilityamong joint force components duringpeacetime joint and multinational exercises.However, new C4I functions, equipment, andprocedures may be required to accommodatethe changing characteristics and signaturesassociated with the rapidly evolving TMthreat. These new C4I capabilities andprocedures should be integrated with existingand planned C4I systems as requirements are


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developed. JTMD C4I should fulfill therequirements depicted in Figure III-5.

29. Planning

a. C4I planning begins with the JFC’sestimate of the situation, statement ofobjectives, and overall concept of operations.Based on the JFC’s guidance and priorities,JTMD forces and resources are assigned andmissions tasked to appropriate subordinatecommanders. To ensure complementaryefforts and to achieve synergism, C4Iplanning for passive defense, active defense,and attack operations should be continuallycoordinated among all joint forcecomponents.

b. Planning considerations for C4I ofJTMD operations should consider both jointand multinational relationships whenaddressing the need for near-real-timeresponse to the threat, the wide range ofoperations that may be appropriate, the diversenature of the JTMD elements that shouldcomplement each other, and the possibleimpact of JTMD on other missions and tasks.

c. Coordination of C4I in JTMD planswith allies and civilian authorities shouldbe considered throughout JTMDoperations. Civilian populations will be amajor target of TM attacks, since they offer aterror and intimidation value that may surpassthe military value of TM attacks. Without

REQUIREMENTS FOR JOINT THEATERMISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND, CONTROL,

COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS, ANDINTELLIGENCE

PASSIVE DEFENSE MEASURESPassive defense measures require providing threatidentification (conventional or nuclear, biological, andchemical), detecting a launch, predicting the impactpoints, and providing timely warning.

ACTIVE DEFENSEActive defense requires early detection of airbornelaunch platforms and missiles in flight to permit cuing,acquisition, tracking, identification, and destruction inflight.

ATTACK OPERATIONSAttack operations require accurate location of launchplatforms and support systems, timely transmission oftargeting data to attack systems, and accurate combatassessment.

Figure III-5. Requirements for Joint Theater Missile Defense Command, Control,Communications, Computers, and Intelligence

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required by conditions. Componentorganizations conducting JTMD operationsshould attempt to maintain interface andcentral control authority.

a. Some theaters may have offensiveconstraint limitations, requiring a reactiveJTMD C4I process. A reactive modedemands extensive preparation andpreplanning using continuous IPB toprovide critical targeting data. Thepreparation and planning process within theC4I framework focuses sensor, surveillance,and intelligence management to allow targetacquisition and tracking of the enemy TMsystems and their supporting operations.Intelligence should be able to provide near-real-time data on enemy TMs; operatingbases; missile launch, load, and hide sites; EWsystems; C4 facilities; surveillance and controlsystems; and logistic and infrastructuresupport. The C4I process should be able todetect and disseminate prelaunchsignatures that indicate enemy missile launchpreparations and pass the prelaunch, launch,and postlaunch warning to friendly units.

b. Prelaunch and launch warnings providefor the alert and increased readiness of friendlydefensive assets and preplanned offensive andpassive countermeasures employment.Increasing the readiness posture includesperforming the vital operating functions thatprepare weapon systems, RSTA assets, andC2 nodes for the level of enemy activityanticipated. Once a launch is observed, thepreparation and planning measures provide acapability for concurrent and simultaneousdefensive and offensive responses.

c. An enemy missile launch observedand identified through sensor andsurveillance systems (national, theater, andtactical) keys the C4I process that usescommunications interfaces to provide near-real-time defensive and offensive attackresponse.

adequate coordination with allies and civilianauthorities, JTMD operations can behampered.

30. Intelligence SupportRequirements

a. The intelligence requirements dictate awide-area surveillance of the area ofresponsibility/JOA to provide current,integrated, accurate, and timely all-sourceinformation of enemy capabilities andactivities. JTMD intelligence requiresinterface with existing national and theatersensor and surveillance networks. The systemshould accommodate a variety of Service,n a t i o n a l , a n d a l l i e d o r c o a l i t i o ncommunications systems. The intelligencesystem is vital to the decisionmaking cycle andmust support the status, assessment, planning,warning, and IPB functions, as well as targetprioritization and engagement decisions.

b. The intelligence function is carried outthrough a geographically dispersednetwork in which national and Servicesystems are interconnected to form adisciplined and responsive informationgathering and dissemination structure.Though the functional systems (sensors,decision support or fusion centers, and firingunits) may be dissimilar, interoperablecommunications and software must beprovided to allow them to operate mosteffectively.

31. Execution

During operations, the C4I system shouldrapidly disseminate intelligence to thecomponents and support attack operationswith a rapid targeting capability. C4I forJTMD actions should be integrated into theoverall theater communications network anddesigned to avoid duplicative operations andfratricide, without precluding decentralizedindependent and/or autonomous control, if


III-17

• Enemy missile trajectory data is madeavailable in near-real-time to C4I centers,systems, and forces supporting activedefense and attack operations.

• Simultaneously, while enemy missilesare in flight, updated enemy launchlocations and target data baseinformation are passed to theappropriate command and control andattack systems and launch warnings areprovided to all units or commandswithin the theater.

• Depending on the capabilities of thesensor and surveillance systems, and thesource and quality of the intelligence,cuing of additional systems may benecessary to provide more refined enemymissile launch point data to ensureaccurate targeting. National or theatersensor and surveillance assets may beable to detect, footprint, or search areasthat will then require more refined RSTAactivities by theater and tactical assets.Friendly aerial reconnaissance, groundsurveillance systems, and otherintelligence assets requiring cuing arefocused rapidly to achieve the necessaryaccuracies for IPB targeting objectives.

I I I - 1 8

Chapter III

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APPENDIX AREFERENCES

A-1

The development of Joint Pub 3-01.5 is based upon the following sources:

1. Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces.”

2. Joint Pub 1-01, “Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures Development Program.”

3. Joint Pub 1-02, “DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.”

4. Joint Pub 2-0, “Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations.”

5. Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations.”

6. Joint Pub 3-01.1, “Aerospace Defense of North America.” (In development)

7. Joint Pub 3-01.2, “Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations.”

8. Joint Pub 3-03, “Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations.” (In development)

9. Joint Pub 3-05, “Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.”

10. Joint Pub 3-09, “Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.” (In development)

11. Joint Pub 3-10, “Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations.”

12. Joint Pub 3-11, “Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense.”

13. Joint Pub 3-52, “Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone.”

14. Joint Pub 3-54, “Joint Doctrine for Operations Security.”

15. Joint Pub 3-55, “Doctrine for Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target AcquisitionSupport for Joint Operations (RSTA).”

16. Joint Pub 3-56.1 “Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.”

17. Joint Pub 3-56.24, “Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance and Proceduresfor Joint Operations, Joint Interface Operational Procedures, Message Text Formats.”

18. Joint Pub 3-58, “Joint Doctrine for Military Deception.” (In development)

19. Air Force Theater Missile Defense (AFTMD) Concepts of Operations.

20. US Army Field Manual 100-5, “Operations.”

A-2

Appendix A

Joint Pub 3-01.5

21. Naval Warfare Publication 10-1, “Composite Warfare Commander’s Manual.”

22. Naval Warfare Publication 10-1-21, “Antiair Warfare Commanders Manual.”

23. Naval Warfare Publication 11, “Naval Operational Planning.”

24. Naval Warfare Publication 32, “Antiair Warfare.”

25. Air Force Manual 1-1, “Basic Aerospace Doctrine.”

26. Fleet Marine Force Manual 5-60, “Control of Aircraft and Missiles.”

27. Chief of Staff, Army Publication, Joint Tactical Missile Defense Master Plan, 20 July1989.

APPENDIX BADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

B-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to theJoint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe,VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness,consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for thispublication is the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability, J-7.

3. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: CSA WASHINGTON DC//DAMO-FDQ//INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans andInteroperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as anenclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requestedto notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected inthis publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

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Appendix B

Joint Pub 3-01.5

4. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publicationcenters.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any joint publication to foreign governments orforeign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attache Office)to DIA Foreign Liaison Branch, C-AS1, Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington D.C.20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,“Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.”

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2898

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Navy Aviation Supply OfficeDistribution Division (Code 03443)5801 Tabor AvenuePhiladelphia, PA 19120-5000

Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics BaseAlbany, GA 31704-5000

Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G-REP)2100 2nd Street, SWWashington, D.C. 20593-0001

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified jointpublications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.

GLOSSARYPART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

AADC area air defense commanderAO area of operationASW antisubmarine warfare

C2 command and controlC4 command, control, communications, and computersC4I command, control, communications, computers, and intelligenceCINC combatant commander; commander in chief

EW electronic warfare

HN host nation

IEW intelligence and electronic warfareIPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace

J-2 joint intelligence staffJ-3 joint operations staffJ-4 joint logistics staffJ-5 joint planning staffJ-6 joint C4I systems staffJFACC joint force air component commanderJFC joint force commanderJOA joint operations areaJTCB Joint Targeting Coordination BoardJTMD joint theater missile defense

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical

OPSEC operations security

RSTA reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisitionROE rules of engagement

SOF special operations forces

TM theater missileTMD theater missile defenseTPFDL time-phased force deployment list

WMD weapons of mass destruction

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

apportionment. In the general sense,distribution for planning of limitedresources among competing requirements.Specific apportionments (e.g., air sortiesand forces for planning) are described asapportionment of air sorties and forces forplanning, etc.) (Joint Pub 1-02)

area air defense commander. Within aunified command, subordinate unifiedcommand, or joint task force, thecommander will assign overallresponsibility for air defense to a singlecommander. Normally, this will be thecomponent commander with thepreponderance of air defense capability andthe command, control, and communicationscapability to plan and execute integrated airdefense operations. Representation fromthe other components involved will beprovided, as appropriate, to the area airdefense commander’s headquarters. Alsocalled AADC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of responsibility. 1. The geographicalarea associated with a combatant commandwithin which a combatant commander hasauthority to plan and conduct operations.2. In naval usage, a predefined area ofenemy terrain for which supporting shipsare responsible for covering by fire onknown targets or targets of opportunity andby observation. Also called AOR. (JointPub 1-02)

combatant commander. A commander inchief of one of the unified or specifiedcombatant commands established by thePresident. Also called CINC. (JointPub 1-02)

fusion. 1. The process whereby the nuclei oflight elements combine to form the nucleusof a heavier element, with the release oftremendous amounts of energy. 2. Inintelligence usage, the process of examining

GL-2 Joint Pub 3-01.5

all sources of intelligence and informationto derive a complete assessment of activity.(Joint Pub 1-02)

fusion center. In intelligence usage, aphysical location to accomplish fusion. Itnormally has sufficient intelligenceautomated data processing capability toassist in the process. (Joint Pub 1-02)

intelligence preparation of the battlespace.An analytical methodology employed toreduce uncertainties concerning the enemy,environment, and terrain for all types ofoperations. Intelligence preparation of thebattlespace builds an extensive data basefor each potential area in which a unit maybe required to operate. The data base isthen analyzed in detail to determine theimpact of the enemy, environment, andterrain on operations and presents it ingraphic form. Intelligence preparation ofthe battlespace is a continuing process. Alsocalled IPB. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force commander. A general termapplied to a combatant commander,subunified commander, or joint task forcecommander authorized to exercisecombatant command (command authority)or operational control over a joint force.Also called JFC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint theater missile defense. The integrationof joint force capabilities to destroy enemytheater missiles in flight or prior to launchor otherwise disrupt the enemy’s theatermissile operations through an appropriatemix of mutually supportive passive missiledefense; active missile defense; attackoperations; and supporting command,control, communications, computers, andintelligence measures. Enemy theatermissiles are those which are aimed at targetsoutside the continental United States. Alsocalled JTMD. (Joint Pub 1-02)

rules of engagement. Directives issued bycompetent military authority whichdelineate the circumstances and limitationsunder which United States forces willinitiate and/or continue combat engagementwith other forces encountered. Also calledROE. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical warning. 1. A warning afterinitiation of a threatening or hostile actbased on an evaluation of information fromall available sources. 2. In satellite andmissile surveillance, a notification tooperational command centers that a specificthreat event is occurring. The componentelements that describe threat events are:Country of origin--country or countriesinitiating hostilities. Event type and size--

GL-3

Glossary

identification of the type of event anddetermination of the size or number ofweapons. Country under attack--determined by observing trajectory of anobject and predicting its impact point.Event time--time the hostile event occurred.Also called integrated tactical warning.(Joint Pub 1-02)

theater missile. A missile, which may be aballistic missile, a cruise missile, or an air-to-surface missile (not including short-range, non-nuclear, direct fire missiles,bombs, or rockets such as Maverick or wire-guided missiles), whose target is within agiven theater of operation. (Joint Pub1-02)

GL-4

Glossary

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Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCS

Includes scope of project,references, milestones,and who will developdrafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

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The CINCS receive the pub andbegin to assess it during use

18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director J-7, willsolicit a written report from thecombatant commands andServices on the utility and qualityof each pub and the need for anyurgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each pub is revised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

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Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staffto fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

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STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchyas shown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrine publications.The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Pub 3-01.5 Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT PUB 1-0

PERSONNELand

ADMINISTRATION

JOINT PUB 4-0 JOINT PUB 5-0 JOINT PUB 6-0

LOGISTICS C4 SYSTEMSPLANS

JOINT PUB 0-2

JOINT PUB 1

UNAAF

JOINTWARFARE

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makesrequired changes and prepares pub forcoordination with Services and CINCS

Joint Staff conducts formalstaffing for approval as a Joint Publication

STEP #4CJCS Approval

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Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority(PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCS, Services,and Joint Staff

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STEP #3Two Drafts

ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

INTELLIGENCE

JOINT PUB 2-0

OPERATIONS

JOINT PUB 3-0

Documents

JP 3-01.5 Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense