JP 4-05.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for ...98).pdf11 November 1998 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization Operations:

11 November 1998

Joint Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures for Manpower

Mobilization and DemobilizationOperations: Reserve Component

(RC) Callup

Joint Pub 4-05.1

PREFACE

i

1. Scope

This publication provides the techniquesand procedures for planning, executing, andmonitoring Reserve Component mobilizationand demobilization. It is the companiondocument to Joint Pub 4-05, “Joint Doctrinefor Mobilization Planning.”

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared underthe direction of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine andselected joint tactics, techniques, andprocedures (JTTP) to govern the jointactivities and performance of the ArmedForces of the United States in joint operationsand provides the doctrinal basis for USmilitary involvement in multinational andinteragency operations. It provides militaryguidance for the exercise of authority bycombatant commanders and other jointforce commanders and prescribes doctrineand selected tactics, techniques, andprocedures for joint operations and training.It provides military guidance for use by theArmed Forces in preparing their appropriateplans. It is not the intent of this publication torestrict the authority of the joint forcecommander (JFC) from organizing the forceand executing the mission in a manner the JFCdeems most appropriate to ensure unity ofeffort in the accomplishment of the overallmission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and selected tactics, techniques,and procedures and guidance established inthis publication apply to the commandersof combatant commands, subunifiedcommands, joint task forces, and subordinatecomponents of these commands. Theseprinciples and guidance also may apply whensignificant forces of one Service are attachedto forces of another Service or whensignificant forces of one Service support forcesof another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP)will be followed except when, in the judgmentof the commander, exceptional circumstancesdictate otherwise. If conflicts arise betweenthe contents of this publication and thecontents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence for theactivities of joint forces unless the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally incoordination with the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, has provided morecurrent and specific guidance. Commandersof forces operating as part of a multinational(alliance or coalition) military commandshould follow multinational doctrine andprocedures ratified by the United States. Fordoctrine and procedures not ratified by theUnited States, commanders should evaluateand follow the multinational command’sdoctrine and procedures, where applicable.

DENNIS C. BLAIRVice Admiral, US NavyDirector, Joint Staff

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................... vii

CHAPTER IINTRODUCTION

• Background............................................................................................................... I-1• Reserve Component Manpower Mobilization Process............................................... I-1• Reserve Component Manpower Mobilization Roles and Responsibilities.................. I-1• Document Organization............................................................................................ I-3

CHAPTER IIPLANNING

• Purpose.................................................................................................................... II-1• Mobilization Planning.............................................................................................. II-2• Deliberate Planning.................................................................................................. II-2• Crisis Action Planning............................................................................................. II-8

CHAPTER IIIRESERVE COMPONENT CALLUP DECISION MAKING

• Purpose.................................................................................................................. III-1• Background............................................................................................................ III-1• Conduct Pre-Mobilization Review and Coordination............................................. III-1• Inform Senior Leadership on Reserve Component Potential................................... III-3• Interpret Policies for Use of Reserve Components.................................................. III-5• Prepare Decision Packages..................................................................................... III-6

CHAPTER IVEXECUTION

• Purpose.................................................................................................................. IV-1• Background............................................................................................................ IV-1• Execution............................................................................................................... IV-2• Functional View..................................................................................................... IV-2

CHAPTER VMONITORING AND REPORTING

• Purpose................................................................................................................... V-1• Background............................................................................................................. V-1• Monitoring.............................................................................................................. V-2• Reporting................................................................................................................ V-6

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CHAPTER VIDEMOBILIZATION

• Purpose.................................................................................................................. VI-1• Background............................................................................................................ VI-1• Preliminary Actions............................................................................................... VI-1• Planning................................................................................................................. VI-3• Execution............................................................................................................... VI-6

APPENDIX

A Mobilization Activity Summaries..................................................................... A-1B Legal Authorities for Mobilization..................................................................... B-1C Levels of Mobilization....................................................................................... C-1D References........................................................................................................ D-1E Administrative Instructions................................................................................ E-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms................................................................... GL-1Part II Terms and Definitions.............................................................................. GL-3

FIGURE

I-1 Subprocesses of the Reserve Component Manpower Mobilization Process...... I-2I-2 The Mobilization Staff Officer...................................................................... I-3I-3 Organizational Roles for Manpower Mobilization........................................ I-4II-1 Accessibility and Use of the Reserve Components....................................... II-1II-2 Deliberate Planning Process........................................................................ II-3II-3 Operation Plan Reserve Component Requirements...................................... II-5II-4 Example: Reserve Components Requirements Summary

(Appendix 5, Annex A) (FDO Execution)................................................. II-6II-5 Example: Reserve Components Requirements Summary

(Appendix 5, Annex A) (Complete Operation Plan Execution)................ II-7II-6 Planning Consequences............................................................................... II-9II-7 Reserve Component Role in Crisis Action Planning.................................. II-10III-1 Mobilization Staff Officer Tasks................................................................ III-2III-2 Service Mobilization Policy....................................................................... III-4III-3 Level of Response..................................................................................... III-5III-4 Reserve Component Decision Making Process.......................................... III-6III-5 Feb 98 Iraq Crisis: Why Reserve Components?........................................ III-7III-6 Documents of a Reserve Component Callup Decision............................... III-8III-7 Reserve Component Decision Making Process (Subsequent Callup

or Transition from Presidential Selected Reserve Callup to PartialMobilization).......................................................................................... III-9

III-8 Feb 98 Iraq Crisis: Presidential Selected Reserve Callup Authority(PSRC) Decision Making Timeline........................................................ III-10

III-9 Feb 98 Iraq Crisis: Lessons Learned........................................................ III-11

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IV-1 Manpower Mobilization Execution Process............................................... IV-3IV-2 Functional View of Mobilization Process................................................... IV-4IV-3 Who Requested Presidential Selected Reserve Callup Authority................ IV-4IV-4 Management of Reserve Component Callup.............................................. IV-5IV-5 Operation Joint Guard Presidential Selected Reserve Callup

Authority Execution Timeline................................................................. IV-6V-1 Monitoring and Reporting.......................................................................... V-2V-2 Inter-Organizational Information Flow....................................................... V-3V-3 Monitored Areas......................................................................................... V-4V-4 Display of Mobilization Data...................................................................... V-5V-5 Mobilization Reporting Information Flows................................................. V-7V-6 Information Required by Congress for Partial Mobilization........................ V-9VI-1 Demobilization Activities.......................................................................... VI-2VI-2 Demobilization Policy Issues..................................................................... VI-3VI-3 Demobilization Planning Functions........................................................... VI-4A-A-1 Chapter II Activity Summary: Planning................................................ A-A-1A-B-1 Chapter III Activity Summary: RC Callup Decision Making................. A-B-1A-C-1 Chapter IV Activity Summary: Execution............................................. A-C-1A-D-1 Chapter V Activity Summary: Monitoring and Reporting.................... A-D-1A-E-1 Chapter VI Activity Summary: Demobilization..................................... A-E-1B-1 Legal Authorities for Mobilization.............................................................. B-2C-1 Levels of Mobilization................................................................................. C-1

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

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•

•

•

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Reserve and National Guard forces are collectively referred toas Reserve Component (RC) forces, and are not only requiredto help fight and win the nation’s wars, but also are integral tothe accomplishment of peacetime missions and conflictprevention. RC manpower mobilization is the process ofaugmenting the active forces with units and individuals fromthe Services’ RC forces. The various organizational levels —Joint Staff, Services, supported and supporting commandersin chief (CINCs) — have a role in the manpower mobilizationprocess either as a provider or receiver of forces or as asupporting player.

Mobilization staff officers (MSOs) and planners play a criticalrole in manpower mobilization. There are also specificmobilization responsibilities assigned to the Joint Staff,Services, and supported and supporting CINCs. United StatesAtlantic Command (USACOM) functions as a joint forceprovider. Its role allows it to look broadly at the supportedCINC and the Service components under its command whoresource the CINC’s requirements, total forces available, andactual or potential missions to ensure optimum use of forces.When requested by the supported CINC, USACOM integratesforce requirements that more than one Service is able to provide,such as engineers, security, and/or medical support. UnitedStates Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is the

The Total Force Policycombines active, Reserve,National Guard, militaryretirees, and civilian forcesinto an integratedimplementation plan.

Many of theseresponsibilities overlapand require closecoordination duringmobilization.

Introduction

Describes Reserve Component (RC) Forces

Describes RC Manpower Mobilization Process

Covers RC Manpower Mobilization Roles andResponsibilities

Lists and Describes the Subprocesses of ManpowerMobilization

Reserve Component Manpower Mobilization Roles andResponsibilities

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The Reserve Componentmanpower mobilizationprocess has five primarysubprocesses: planning;

decision making;

force provider for special operations forces. USSOCOMmobilizes its forces and coordinates with the Services to obtainmobilization support. The US Transportation Commandprovides strategic and theater mobility forces, and the USCoast Guard provides security units and personnel for portoperations.

RC requirements planning formulates a timely, specific, andcomprehensive integration of total RC requirements. Indeliberate planning, the total requirement for RC forces tosupport the operation plan (OPLAN) must be developed. Thefive basic steps of the deliberate planning process includeinitiation, concept development, plan development, planreview, and development of supporting plans. The outputs ofthe deliberate planning process are the RC requirementssummary tables. These tables become Appendix 5, AnnexA, of the OPLAN, and provide the numerical basis forrequesting specific legal authorities and levels of mobilization.Crises frequently occur for which there is no plan; therefore,there is no developed Appendix 5, Annex A. Virtually all ofthese crises require RC support and most will require authorityfor involuntary callup. Action agencies will usually solicitvolunteer RC support prior to requesting involuntary callup,but plans that require RC support must include requests forimplementation of mobilization authorities. Early MSOinvolvement is essential during crisis action planning (CAP)due to the compressed timeframes and the lead times involvedin executing callup. The same information required for adeliberate OPLAN must be determined for RC support of acrisis action plan. The main difference is that the processhappens much more quickly and the estimates for RCrequirements may be broad rather than precise.

The MSO executes a series of responsibilities, chief amongthem being preparation of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff RC Callup Decision Package. Pre-mobilization reviewand coordination occurs during possible crisis andmobilization scenarios when firm facts do not exist. Duringthe situation development and crisis assessment phases of CAP,the MSO should be available and involved, but only to thepoint that the likely questions and requirements are known.Early in the operation, MSOs need to inform the seniorleaders of mobilization options based on requirements.MSOs should provide information on forces available,mobilization requirements, lead times, and the procedures forobtaining a Reserve callup, should one prove necessary. Senior

Subprocesses of Manpower Mobilization

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Executive Summary

leaders need to be briefed on the policies and laws governingRC activation. RC mobilization and deployment policies needto be interpreted and may need modification to satisfy therequirements of a crisis. Decision packages need to beprepared which begin with a request (normally by the supportedCINC, but which may be made by a Service, supporting CINC,or the Joint Staff, to callup RC forces). If the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff agrees that mobilization is required, theChairman tasks the Joint Staff MSO to prepare the RC CallupDecision Support Package.

Execution is decentralized. Once the Services issue orderswithin the Secretary of Defense’s guidance and ceilings, mostmobilization activity takes place at units, mobilizationstations, and transportation centers. The MSOs monitorthe mobilization process, make recommendations forimprovement, and seek to optimize the use of human andmateriel resources. From the MSO perspective, manpowermobilization execution involves two centers of activity. Thefirst is the distribution of executive orders and the delegationof authorities and notification procedures necessary toactually order RC units and individuals to active duty. Thesecond is a group of management activities that respond tothe changing requirements and performance of themobilization. During execution, MSOs provide technicaladvice and assistance to those with functional responsibilities;monitor the implementation of decisions; and make periodicreports to the leadership on the performance of themobilization process.

Monitoring and reporting is an integral part of manpowermobilization. The timely and accurate collection, analysis,and transmission of information is important to ensureeffective and efficient mobilization operations. The JointStaff, the Services, and CINCs comprise thecommunication interfaces for the monitoring and reportingphase. Most of the mobilization information flow supportingoperations is directly between the supported CINC and theServices.

Monitoring involves gathering and analyzing data to determinethe status of forces and of the mobilization operation. Tomanage the mobilization system, the MSO monitors variousfacets of manpower mobilization such as source determinationfor filling requirements, arranging for the mobilized forces’deployment and/or redeployment, and demobilizing the unitsor individuals. MSOs have numerous reports and informationsystems available to monitor operations. Reporting involves

execution;

monitoring and reporting;

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Joint Pub 4-05.1

extracting and compiling information that is obtained frommonitoring activities, then providing the data to appropriateorganizations that are involved with mobilization anddemobilization. The MSO responds to formal and informalreporting requirements.

Although not as time-sensitive as mobilization, demobilizationis a complex operation that requires detailed planning andexecution. Often considered only at the end of an operation,demobilization may occur during an operation for the followingreasons: expiration of authorized service time; changes in theforces required; or political considerations. Mobilization anddemobilization may occur simultaneously. Consequently,each Service must ensure that demobilization plans are flexible,consistent, responsive, and sufficiently comprehensive to meetall contingencies. Poorly planned and executed demobilizationoperations will have two major impacts: degradation tosupported operations and reduced support for the RCprogram.

There are three primary groups of demobilization activities:preliminary actions, planning, and execution. Preliminaryactions set the stage for planning and executing a successfuldemobilization. Primarily, they involve establishing anddisseminating broad guidance that the mobilization communityincorporates into mobilization plans. Demobilization planninginvolves reviewing policies and establishing procedures todemobilize. During this phase, planners determine operationalsupport requirements and identify the forces to demobilizeand those to support the demobilization operations. Theplanning function is divided into two subactivities: planningthe demobilization force and planning the demobilizationsupport. During execution, MSOs constantly tailor thedemobilization operation envisioned in the plan to the evolvingsituation. They staff recommendations and obtain decisionsregarding units and individuals to be demobilized and adaptthe demobilization support structure.

This publication provides the techniques and procedures forplanning, executing, and monitoring RC mobilization anddemobilization.

and demobilization.

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER IINTRODUCTION

I-1

1. Background

The Total Force Policy combines active,Reserve, National Guard, military retirees, andcivilian forces into an integratedimplementation plan. Reserve and NationalGuard forces are collectively referred to asReserve Component (RC) forces, and arenot only required to help fight and win thenation’s wars, but also are integral to theaccomplishment of peacetime missions andconflict prevention. RC manpowermobilization is the process of augmenting theactive forces with units and individuals fromthe Services’ RC forces. The variousorganizational levels — Joint Staff, Services,supported and supporting commanders inchief (CINCs) — have a role in the manpowermobilization process either as a provider orreceiver of forces, or as a supporting player.The integration of mobilization in the planning

THE TOTAL FORCE

“The Total Force requires the unique contributions of each of its Active andReserve Components and its Civilian employees. All elements of the TotalForce must be appropriately organized, modernized, trained, and integrated...

Reserve Components. The Reserve Components, in addition to beingessential participants in the full range of military operations, are an importantlink between the Armed Forces and the public. Mobilization of the ReserveComponents has always been an important indicator of the commitment ofnational will. Guardsmen and reservists are not only integrated into warplans, but also provide critical skills in carrying out contingency operations,as well as augmenting and supporting active units during peacetime. NationalGuard and other Reserve Component elements also provide the NCA with astrategic hedge against uncertainty and with an organized basis to expandour Armed Forces if necessary. Additionally, they also provide a rotationalbase to ease the tempo of unit and individual deployments for the ActiveComponents.”

National Military Strategy of the United States:Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy For A New Era

1997

process will enhance the efficiency andeffectiveness of the deployment process.

2. Reserve ComponentManpower MobilizationProcess

The RC manpower mobilization processhas five primary subprocesses: planning,decision making, execution, monitoringand reporting, and demobilization (SeeFigure I-1). This publication discusses eachsubprocess in subsequent chapters.

3. Reserve ComponentManpower MobilizationRoles and Responsibilities

This section briefly defines themobilization staff officers’ (MSOs’) andplanners’ roles. As shown in Figure I-2, the

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Joint Pub 4-05.1

MSO must have a variety of skills. Figure I-3outlines the mobilization responsibilities of theJoint Staff, Services, and supported andsupporting CINCs. Many of theseresponsibilities overlap and require closecoordination during mobilization.

a. United States Atlantic Command(USACOM) functions as a joint forceprovider. Its role allows it to look broadly atthe supported CINC and the Servicecomponents under its command who resourcethe CINC’s requirements, total forcesavailable, and actual or potential missions toensure optimum use of forces. USACOMrecommends sourcing from the followingorganizations: Forces Command for theArmy; Air Combat Command for the AirForce; Atlantic Fleet for the Navy; MarineForces Atlantic for the Marine Corps; and theDepartment of Transportation for the CoastGuard. When requested by the supportedCINC, USACOM integrates forcerequirements that more than one Serviceis able to provide such as engineers, security,

and/or medical support. USACOM assignsresponsibility to its subordinate commands incoordination with the Service(s) and thesupported CINC.

b. United States Special OperationsCommand (USSOCOM) is the forceprovider for special operations forces.USSOCOM mobilizes its forces andcoordinates with the Services to obtainmobilization support.

c. United States TransportationCommand (USTRANSCOM) is the singlemanager within the Department of Defense(DOD) for planning and operations forDOD transportation for other thanService-unique or theater-assignedtransportation assets. USTRANSCOM isresponsible for providing air, sea, and landtransportation for DOD users in times of bothpeace and war. Under DOD Directive(DODD) 5158.4, “United StatesTransportation Command,” USTRANSCOMis directed to exercise combatant command

SUBPROCESSES OF THE RESERVE COMPONENTMANPOWER MOBILIZATION PROCESS

MOBILIZATION

PLANNING

MONITORING ANDREPORTING

DECISIONMAKING

EXECUTION

DEMOBILIZATION

Figure I-1. Subprocesses of the Reserve Component Manpower Mobilization Process

I-3

Introduction

(command authority) of the Military TrafficManagement Command (MTMC), theMilitary Sealift Command (MSC), and the AirMobility Command (AMC). MTMC, MSC,and AMC rely on the RC to meet surge liftrequirements. Early access to the RC duringa developing crisis is necessary to effectivelymeet surge lift requirements.

4. Document Organization

Each of the following chapters cover oneof the five subprocesses of manpowermobilization. Paragraphs within each chapteridentify the subordinate activities and tasksthat make up these subprocesses. Responsibleorganizations are annotated in brackets at theend of the task discussions.

THE MOBILIZATION STAFF OFFICER

Title 10 Expert Service MobilizationExpert

Reserve ComponentAdvisor Joint Operation Planning

and ExecutionSystem/Global Command

and Control SystemOperatorCrisis Action Staffer

War PlannerConsensus Builder

Figure I-2. The Mobilization Staff Officer

The five appendixes contain specificreference material. Appendix A,“Mobilization Activity Summaries,”summarizes the activities and tasks associatedwith the five manpower mobilizationsubprocesses. Appendix B, “LegalAuthorities for Mobilization,” reviews thelegal authorities that may be used to implementmobilization. Appendix C, “Levels ofMobilization,” indicates the number of forcesand the duration of active duty authorized fordifferent requirements such as partial and fullmobilization. Appendix D, “References,” listssome of the documents that may be useful inmanpower mobilization. Appendix E,“Administrative Instructions,” providesdocument distribution and feedback changeinstructions.

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Figure I-3. Organizational Roles for Manpower Mobilization

CHAPTER IIPLANNING

II-1

1. Purpose

This chapter explains RCrequirements planning. As shown inFigure II-1, accessibility to and use of theRC is critical. The timely, specific, andcomprehensive integration of total RCrequirements into plans provides thefollowing benefits.

“Long and careful deliberations promise great safety in war, whereas hastyand impetuous generals usually commit serious blunders.”

Emperor MauriceThe Strategikon

600 AD

a. Early apportionment of RC combat,combat support and/or combat servicesupport forces, and the cross-leveling andredistribution of RC equipment.

b. Increased visibility of RC capabilities(such as logistics enabling capabilities) andspecialty support (such as civil engineering,civil affairs, and medical).

ACCESSIBILITY AND USE OF THERESERVE COMPONENTS

" . . . the Servi ces should ensure thatindividuals and units of the ReserveComponents are fully incorporated intoall relevant operational plans and actuallyused in the execution of those plans. Wehave concluded that accessibility toReserve forces is adequate. There issufficient authority to call on them whenneeded, and the last two Presidents haveused it. Reserve Components shouldparticipate in actual contingencyoperations commensurate with theirtraining, demonstrated readiness, andavailability."

John P. White, ChairmanCommission on Roles and Missionsof the Armed Forces1995

Figure II-1. Accessibility and Use of the Reserve Components

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Joint Pub 4-05.1

c. Improved accessibility to RC forces.

d. Increased efficiencies to the forceproviders (Services and supporting CINCs).

2. Mobilization Planning

The following provisions of law andDefense Department policy ensure thatService mobilization plans are fully integratedwith joint campaign and operation plans(OPLANs).

a. Military Departments. Title 10 UnitedStates Code (USC), “Armed Forces,” clearlyassigns the Secretaries of the MilitaryDepartments the responsibility and authoritynecessary to conduct all affairs of theirdepartments, including the functions ofmobilizing and demobilizing. TheDepartment of Defense and the MilitaryDepartments issue policy and guidance tosupport functional areas of mobilizationplanning at all levels.

b. Combatant Commanders. TheSecretary of Defense (SecDef) in his 6September 1996 memorandum, “Assignmentof Forces,” established as a matter of DODpolicy, the authority that combatant

commanders may exercise over assigned RCforces when not on active duty and when onactive duty for training is Training andReadiness Oversight (TRO). He furtherestablished that TRO includes the authorityto “coordinate and review mobilization plans(including post-mobilization trainingactivities and deployability validationprocedures) developed for assigned RCforces.” The Secretary of Defense directedthat his annual “Forces for UnifiedCommands” memorandum will reflect thispolicy guidance.

3. Deliberate Planning

“Nothing succeeds in war except inconsequence of a well-prepared plan.”

Napoleon1769 - 1821

a. In deliberate planning, the totalrequirement for RC forces to support theOPLAN must be developed. Figure II-2depicts the basic steps of the deliberateplanning process and one of the outputs ofthat process, the RC requirementssummary tables. These tables becomeAppendix 5 to Annex A, of the OPLAN. TheRC requirements summary tables list the

Once TPFDD requirements are determined, component sourcing should becompleted in order to accurately estimate RC units and manpower required.

II-3

Planning

DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCESS

InitiationConcept

Development

StrategicConcept

Supported CINCtotal force

requirements

DraftTPFDD

TPFDD

SupportingPlans

SupportedCINC submits

total forcerequirements

Doctrinalreview

Alternate Sourcing(Supporting CINCs)

Preliminary MTWassessment

(Supporting CINCs)

PlanDevelopment

PlanReview

Supporting CINCsanalyze and task SVCcomponents to define

RC requirements

SVCs report RCrequirements tosupported CINC

Components submitrequirements to SVCs

for consolidation

Supported CINCincorporates RC

requirements into finalApp 5, Annex A

MTW impactassessmentJoint

StrategicCapabilities

Plan

DefensePlanningGuidance

SupportingPlans

Crisis Situation Develops (see Fig. II-7)

Draft PLAN (withdraft App 5,Annex A)

OPLANwith draft App 5,

Annex A

CINCMTWRCSVCTPFDD

Commander in ChiefMajor Theater WarReserve ComponentServiceTime-Phased Force and Deployment Data

Figure II-2. Deliberate Planning Process

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aggregate RC support necessary for theexecution of all phases of the OPLAN, andare used as the numerical justification forrequesting specific legal authorities andlevels of mobilization.

b. The Five Basic Steps of the DeliberatePlanning Process. The basic steps of thedeliberate planning process as depicted inFigure II-2 include the following: initiation,concept development, plan development,plan review, and supporting plans. Eachstep of the RC requirements process (incontext with the deliberate planning process)is described in subsequent subparagraphs.Process stakeholders are identified at the endof each paragraph.

• Initiate Deliberate Planning. The JointStrategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)provides for the apportionment of majorcombat forces and selected specialoperations forces (SOF). These and otherforce requirements are broadly definedby the supported CINC’s strategicconcept and time-phased force anddeployment data (TPFDD) letter ofinstruction (LOI) to guide plandevelopment. During the “InitiateDeliberate Planning” phase, thefollowing steps are accomplished.

•• Consider implications of RC use andprovide input or feedback on RCrequirements and assumptions to thestaffing of high-level guidancedocuments such as the JSCP; Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction(CJCSI) 3110.13, “MobilizationGuidance for the Joint StrategicCapabilities Plan;” and the DefensePlanning Guidance [All].

•• Participate in the planner’sdevelopment of the supported CINC’sTPFDD LOI and related actions toensure that RC mobilization guidance

and taskings are visible and fullyunderstood [All].

•• Review the LOI to ensure that a statedrequirement for production of Appendix5 to Annex A, based on the OPLANTPFDD is included [Supported CINC].

• Concept Development. During thisphase, the MSO becomes familiar withthe CINC’s strategic concept and TPFDDLOI and checks each for consistent RCplanning factors such as unit readiness,equipment on hand, personnel training,assumptions, and feasibility. If there areinconsistencies, the MSO providesimmediate feedback to the supportedCINC. The product of this phase is thesupported CINC’s total force requirement[All].

• Plan Development. During plandevelopment, the process to source theplan TPFDD occurs (See Figure II-2).The Services select units to meet the time-phased requirements of the supportedCINC. When the Services source a planTPFDD, the deliberate planner, with theMSO’s advice, adds an importantdimension to the sourcing process byconsidering where Service capabilitiesreside. These selected units may be activeforces, a combination of active and RC,or even combinations that includecivilian and contractor support. Afterrequirements are determined, there mustbe a concerted effort to identifycomponent sourcing, either active or RC,to increase the accuracy of specifying thetotal RC units and manpower required.At the end of this phase, the draft TPFDDis available. Normally, this provides thebulk of the RC requirement and enablesthe supported CINC MSO to create thedraft RC Requirements Summary Tablesfor Appendix 5 to Annex A, of theassociated plan. At this point, the

II-5

Planning

TPFDD is sourced and considered final.However, the RC requirements summarytables in Appendix 5, Annex A, must stillbe finalized by each Service usingTPFDD data. The Services andsupporting CINCs give the supportedCINC draft data that must be compiledand included in the supporting plans tocomplete the RC requirement (See FigureII-3). Once a plan is completed, theoriginal mobilization assumptions areeither validated or refuted [Services andsupported CINC].

• Review of Operation Plans. In thisphase, the Joint Staff, with theOperational Plans and InteroperabilityDirectorate as the lead, conducts a formalreview of the OPLAN. The LogisticsDirectorate (J-4) MSO reviews the RCrequirements summaries and supportingdata.

• Develop Support Plans. During thisphase, supporting CINCs and Servicesfinalize requirements in several areas:

movement of the force, mobilization anddeployment support, sustainmentoperations, and backfill capabilities.These requirements are reduced toTPFDD data. The TPFDD data is usedto identify specific RC units to bemobilized to support the deployment andsustainment of forces. [SupportingCINCs, Services, supported CINC].

c. RC Requirements Summary Tables.The summary tables identify RC forces andsupport forces required to accomplish thefollowing: deploy to the CINC’s area ofresponsibility (AOR); move the force; assistin mobilization, deployment, and sustainment;and backfill departing Active component(AC) units and individuals. Decision makersneed CINC and Service estimates of totalRC requirements at the beginning of acrisis. Too often, war planners are unawareof the total RC requirement to support theOPLAN under development. The Chairmanof Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM)3122.03, “Joint Operation Planning andExecution System Vol II: (Planning Formats

OPERATION PLANRESERVE COMPONENT REQUIREMENTS

Reserve Components in the area of responsibility

Transportation Enablers

Mobilization/Deployment Supporters

Active Component Backfill

Supported CINC obtains from time-phased force anddeployment data after Services source force list

Supported CINC obtains from US TransportationCommand

Supported CINC obtains from Services

Supported CINC obtains from Services

Figure II-3. Operation Plan Reserve Component Requirements

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Joint Pub 4-05.1

and Guidance),” JSCP; and CJCSI 3110.13,“Mobilization Guidance for the Joint StrategicCapabilities Plan,” require completion ofAppendix 5 to Annex A, to OPLANs. TheRC requirements summary depicts these totalRC requirements. Appendix 5 to Annex Ashould contain the number of RC requirementsummaries necessary to support requests formobilization legal authorities. For instance,if the flexible deterrent option (FDO) phaseof the plan requires Presidential SelectedReserve Callup Authority (PSRC) and asubsequent phase requires partialmobilization, separate RC requirementssummaries must be prepared for each of thesephases to support the requests for PSRC andsubsequently for partial mobilization. It is notnecessary to prepare a separate RCrequirement summary for each FDO in theOPLAN. Mobilization planners analyzeFDOs in the aggregate to determine the pointat which PSRC becomes necessary andprepare one summary to support the request.These summaries provide senior leadershipwith the data required to determine the levelof mobilization necessary to execute variousphases of the plan. Figure II-4 is an exampleof a CINC’s RC requirements summary tosupport an FDO associated with an OPLAN.This summary would be used by the MSO tojustify a recommendation to request a PSRC.Figure II-5 is an example of a CINC’s RC

requirement summary to support theexecution of the entire OPLAN. The totalRC requirement is over 200,000 reservists,indicating that partial mobilization authorityis necessary to execute this OPLAN.

• Flexible Deterrent Option. FDOexecution may require PSRC. ProvideRC requirements summaries as requiredin CJCSM 3122.03, “Joint OperationPlanning and Execution System Vol II:(Planning Formats and Guidance),” forFDO(s) determined most likely to requiresourcing of forces from the RC.

•• FDO Determination. The supportedCINC coordinates with the Services,supporting CINCs, and other agencies todetermine which FDO or combinationsof FDOs within a plan have RCrequirements. Even though the CINC’sconcept for deploying forces as part ofan FDO may include active forces only,RC forces still may be required to supportcontinental United States (CONUS)-based operations such as transportationsupport and lines of communicationsopenings [All].

•• FDO RC Requirements Summary.Based on the FDO(s) selected, the MSOcompiles RC requirements and

YRAMMUSSTNEMERIUQERSTNENOPMOCEVRESER:ELPMAXE)noitucexEODF()AxennA,5xidneppA(

NALPO 4321 X )s(ODF 62CR NOITUCEXENALP

SVC

ROANICREVOM

EHTECROF

/BOMTSISSANIATSUS/YOLPED

LLIFKCAB CRLATOTYBLENNOSREP

ECIVRES

AMI REHTO SUNOC SUNOCO

A 0 002,1 013 009 007 053 064,3

N 0 003 33 002,1 006 022 353,2

FA 0 003,1 041 055,1 099 02 010,4

M 0 52 06 09 072 051 595

GC 0 0 3 51 0 01 82

0SLATOT 528,2 645 557,3 065,2 057 634,01

Figure II-4. Example: Reserve Components Requirements Summary(Appendix 5, Annex A) (FDO Execution)

II-7

Planning

completes the table as is done forcomplete plan execution [All].

• Operation Plans. Appendix 5 to AnnexA of OPLANs will explain theunderlying assumptions of each RCrequirements summary (i.e., RCrequirements for FDO execution areadditive or inclusive).

•• RC in AOR. During the plandevelopment phase (following CINCsubmission of total force requirementsand development of a draft TPFDD), theServices calculate and provide thesupported CINC with two sets of datathat produce the RC manpower numbersin the “RC in AOR” column: (1) RCunit personnel in TPFDD. Self-explanatory [Services, supported CINC];and (2) RC non-unit personnel inTPFDD. This number is calculated toprovide the best estimate of the RCportion of TPFDD non-unit personnel.This includes planned fillers andreplacements, who may not all comefrom the AC, particularly if planning thesecond of two major theater wars(MTWs). For example, if 10,000 fillersand replacements are planned fordeploying units, a planner might estimatethat 2,000 of these would be RC. This

could be based on pre-determinedassumptions such as physical location ofactive or RC forces; time to callup anddeploy RC forces; duration of decisiveforce in plan execution; or requirementsto consider another MTW. Even thoughthe plan and the TPFDD may not specifyactive or RC for fillers and replacements,the MSO provides the planner withassistance to define the RC portion of thisrequirement to complete the table[Services, supported CINC].

•• Move the Force, AssistMobilization, Deployment, and/orSustainment, and Backfill. During thesupporting plans phase, the Services,supporting CINCs, USTRANSCOM,and other agencies define their non-TPFDD requirements to supportcomplete plan execution. The Servicescoordinate with these organizations toidentify actual RC forces needed to meetthese requirements. (1) Move the Force.Enter the RC units and individualsrequired to support the strategicoperations of MTMC, MSC, AMC, andUSTRANSCOM [All]. (2) AssistMobilization, Deployment, and/orSustainment. (a) Individual MobilizationAugmentees (IMAs). Enter the numberof IMAs required to support the Services,

YRAMMUSSTNEMERIUQERSTNENOPMOCEVRESER:ELPMAXE)noitucexEnalPnoitarepOetelpmoC()AxennA,5xidneppA(

NALPO 4321 )s(ODF X NOITUCEXENALP

SVC

ROANICREVOM

EHTECROF

/BOMTSISSANIATSUS/YOLPED

LLIFKCAB CRLATOTYBLENNOSREP

ECIVRES

AMI REHTO SUNOC SUNOCO

A 003,471 055 053,2 003,5 001,1 053,1 059,481

N 004,12 002,3 38 002,2 002,6 022,1 303,43

FA 003,5 003,13 048 055,1 099 502 581,04

M 006,11 5 021 012 077 051,3 558,51

GC 034,1 081 0 52 0 0 536,1

030,412SLATOT 532,53 393,3 582,9 060,9 529,5 829,672

Figure II-5. Example: Reserve Components Requirements Summary(Appendix 5, Annex A) (Complete Operation Plan Execution)

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DOD agencies, the Joint Staff, and CINCstaffs[All]. (b) Other. Enter the RCunits required to mobilize, deploy, andsustain the force, such as medical, dental,security, and mobilization processing sitestaffs; air and/or sea departure controlgroups; maintenance support activities;and Coast Guard port safety and securityunits forces. Aggregate the estimates ofthe RC portion of any non-unit personnel— fillers and replacements — for the“Move the Force” and “AssistMobilization, Deployment, and/orSustainment” categories required tosupport CONUS organizations[Services]. (3) Backfill. Enter RC unitsand individuals required to replacedeploying units and/or individuals in bothCONUS and outside the continentalUnited States (OCONUS) categories(For example, Army RC medics neededto deploy to Europe to fill unit andindividual billets vacated by active dutymedics sent to an AOR in Asia) [All].

4. Crisis Action Planning

“In military practice one must planquickly and carry on without delay, soas to give the enemy no time to collecthimself.”

“I work in minutes, not in hours.”

Field Marshal PrinceAleksandr V. Suvotov

1729 - 1800

a. Crises frequently occur for whichthere is no plan; therefore, there is nodeveloped Appendix 5, Annex A. Virtuallyall of these crises require at least voluntaryRC support and some may require an RCcallup. Early MSO involvement is essentialduring crisis action planning (CAP) due tothe compressed timeframes and the lead timesinvolved in executing callup. Political eventsmay dictate that the authority to involuntarilyrecall the RC, may not be given before C-Day.CINCs and Services should budget and plan

In order to move the force effectively, decision makers need Serviceestimates of total RC requirements at the beginning of a crisis.

II-9

Planning

to access select RC early deployingindividuals and units via voluntary recallprocedures. The planning consequences offailing to plan RC augmentation are shownin Figure II-6.

b. Figure II-7 depicts the steps of CAP.Once a course of action (COA) is selected,the supported CINC’s total force requirementbegins to take shape. As in deliberateplanning, the Services source the CINC’srequ i rements , de termin ing wh ichrequirements will be sourced with RC assets.

c. The same information required for adeliberate OPLAN must be determined forRC support of CAP. The main difference isthat the process happens much more quicklyand the estimates for RC requirements maybe broad rather than precise. The Servicesuse force requirements developed bysupported and supporting CINCs to source

the RC in the AOR, move the force, providemobilization support, and backfill. Thesupported CINC assembles this data [All].

d. During CAP, C-day and even D-daymay precede the development of final forcerequirements. Requirements may increaseif unforeseen tasks emerge or the civilianleadership assigns additional missions to themilitary. MSOs, planners, and decisionmakers should not define the RC requirementtoo precisely or narrowly in the early stagesof a crisis. Experience has shown that therequirement will grow . A tradeoff existsbetween accuracy and speed. Strategic speedand flexibility demand that the MSO gaintimely approval of the callup request so thatunits and individuals can be alerted,assembled, trained, validated, and deployedto meet the CINC’s operational timelines.Using lessons learned from past experiences,MSOs must be able to make rapid estimates

Failure to plan Reserve Component augmentation in advancedelays mobilization decision making.

Late mobilization decisions delay plan execution.Lines of communication openersStratlift/Tanker supportEarly time-phased force and deployment data deployersMobilization support baseLate deployers with long training lead times

Total Reserve Component augmentation requirement isneeded to justify legal authorities for mobilization.

Presidential Selected Reserve CallupPartial Mobilization

PLANNING CONSEQUENCES

Figure II-6. Planning Consequences

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Join

t Pu

b 4

-05

.1

CRISIS SITUATIONDEVELOPS

RESERVE COMPONENT ROLE IN CRISIS ACTION PLANNING

CrisisAssessment

CRISIS SITUATIONDEVELOPS

SituationDevelopment

COADevelopment

COASelection

Crisis ActionPlanning

Continue Deliberate Planning (Figure II-2)

Notify uponPresidential auth

to mobilize

Auth to notifyCODELs/OversightCommittees/PA of

units id'd for tng and

Supported CINCsubmits total

forcerequirements

ExecutionPlanning

RCRequirement

Draft TPFDDwith draft App

5, Annex A

Final TPFDDwith App 5,

Annex A

Execution

Fig. III-4/Fig. III-7

CINCCOACODELsLAPATPFDD

Commander in ChiefCourse of ActionCongressional DelegationsLegal AdvisorPublic AffairsTime-phased Force and Deployment Data

Issue PA/LAguidance andnotify units

YES

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

YESYESRC

Requirementplan?

RequiresRC Support?

Auth to notifyCODELs/OversightCommittees/PA of

units id'd for tng andpossible deployment

Figure II-7. Reserve Component Role in Crisis Action Planning

II-11

Planning

of requirements in order to make timelydecisions. MSOs must be able to articulatethe strategic costs of spending limited time tofurther refine the requirement numbers [All].

e. Security and MSO Access. MSOsshould be read into and briefed on theoperation at the first consideration of RC

utilization. Utilization of the RC forcerequires the same or greater consideration andplanning as use of active forces. Securityclassification and compartmentation are notreasons to exclude the MSO from planning.The special capabilities resident in the RCmake MSO involvement critical to ensureproper planning [All].

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IIIRESERVE COMPONENT CALLUP DECISION MAKING

III-1

1. Purpose

This chapter describes the activities thatinfluence the decision to call RC forces toactive duty. It discusses the specific actionsrequired to produce and coordinate the RCcallup decision package, and highlights othermobilization-related events where the MSOcan contribute to the decision making process.

2. Background

Joint Pub 5-03.1, “Joint OperationPlanning and Execution System Vol I:(Planning Policies and Procedures),”defines the process for both deliberate andcrisis action planning. This chapter discusses,in general terms, the various responsibilitiesof the MSO, with special emphasis onpreparation of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff (CJCS) RC Callup DecisionPackage. RC callup decision makingactivities are discussed in the sequence in

“Wars are paid for by the possession of reserves.”

ThucydidesPeloponnesian W ars

404 BC

which they may occur during a crisis;however, the potential exists for simultaneousactions. Annex B of Appendix A, “ChapterIII, Activity Summary: RC Callup DecisionMaking,” identifies the key tasks for eachinvolved organization.

3. Conduct Pre-MobilizationReview and Coordination

a. Though a specific request formobilization may not exist, the MSO mustkeep abreast of developments and be awareof potential mobilization scenarios. This is acontinuous, informal process that may or maynot result in a decision to mobilize RC assets.During the situation development and crisisassessment phases of CAP, the MSO shouldbe made available and involved, but only tothe point that the likely questions andrequirements are known. During this period,the MSO confirms the mobilization points ofcontact (POCs) network; evaluates

The MSO obtains information to monitor and report on the RC callup status.

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Joint Pub 4-05.1

assumptions pertaining to use of RC inappropriate plans; reviews lessons learnedfrom similar operations; develops answers to“what if” questions; and reviews projected RCrequirements.

b. The following MSO’s routine tasks areconducted with a sense of urgency due to thepotential crisis (See Figure III-1).

• Understand the Procedural andStatutory Requirements. In preparingto brief leaders on procedural andstatutory requirements for RC callup, theMSO reviews Title 10 USC; the Services’mobilization plans; and lessons learnedfrom previous operations (Appendix D,“References,” also lists useful referencedocuments on manpower mobilization).The statutes applicable to RC callup arecomplex. The review of applicable legalauthorities must be conducted with the

assistance of legal counsel [Joint Staffand/or Services].

• Review and Update Projected RCRequirements. As the planning andoperations communities developinformation on the requirement for RCforces, the supported CINC (along withthe Services) updates the planninginformation in Appendix 5 to Annex A,of the anticipated plan, if available. Arequest for RC callup should contain asa minimum: RC requirements in CJCSM3122.03, “Joint Operation Planning andExecution System Vol II: (PlanningFormats and Guidance),” Appendix 5 toAnnex A format; a recommendation forthe level of force mobilization (i.e., PSRCor full or partial mobilization); and theexpected duration of the proposed callup[Joint Staff, supported CINC, and/orServices].

Understand

Review

Coordinate

Review

Review

Determine

the procedural and statutory requirements

and update projected RC requirements

reporting requirements

SecDef, CJCS, and Service Secretaries'guidance for RC callup

lessons learned and remedial action programs

sources of immediate manpoweraugmentation

MOBILIZATION STAFF OFFICER TASKS

Figure III-1. Mobilization Staff Officer Tasks

III-3

Reserve Component Callup Decision Making

• Coordinate Reporting Requirements.As the crisis escalates, the MSO obtainsinformation to be able to monitor andreport on the RC callup status. MSOsalso coordinate with the Services’ POCsto ensure that accurate information isavailable for senior-level manpowermobilization reports. Chapter V,“Monitoring and Reporting,” covers thedetails on reporting mobilizationactivities [Joint Staff, Services, and/orsupporting CINC].

• Review SecDef, CJCS, and ServiceSecretaries’ Guidance for RC Callup.The MSO coordinates mobilizationguidance [All].

• Review Lessons Learned andRemedial Action Programs. JointUniversal Lessons Learned System fromprevious operations and Service remedialaction programs provide historicalmobilization challenges valuable toMSOs [Joint Staff, Services, and/orCINCs].

• Determine Sources of ImmediateManpower Augmentation. Early in acrisis, many organizations needmanpower augmentation. The MSOcontributes to the augmentation decisionby knowing the authorities for eachalternative and the assets available, andproviding the pros and cons of the variousalternatives. Some manpower alternativesare as follows:

•• Volunteers including voluntary toursof active duty for special work (10 USC12301[d]) [Services];

•• Fifteen-day involuntary callupauthority (includes unit members andIMAs) (10 USC 12301[b]) [Services];

•• Involuntary callup of retirees (10 USC688) [Services]; and

•• PSRC. Recent experience with theuse of PSRC shows that authority wasgranted in a timely manner that allowedfor effective mission accomplishment;however, this occurs only when PSRCrequests could be fully justified andincluded detailed RC requirements [All].NOTE: Section 511, FY98 NationalDefense Authorization Act (NDAA)amends 10 USC 12304 (PresidentialSelected Reserve Call-Up Authority) toallow involuntary activation of up to30,000 members (within the 200,000authority) of a new sub-category ofIndividual Ready Reserve, as defined byFY98 NDAA change to 10 USC 10144.

4. Inform Senior Leadership onReserve ComponentPotential

“When one has a good reserve, onedoes not fear one’s enemies.”

Richard I, King of EnglandHistoire de Guillaume le Marechal

1220

a. Early in the operation, MSOs needto inform the senior leaders on themobilization requirements andprocedures. MSOs should provideinformation on forces available,mobilization requirements, lead times, andthe procedures for obtaining a Reservecallup, should one prove necessary. Seniorleaders need to be briefed on the policiesand laws governing RC activation.

b. The MSO performs the followingactions in preparing the leadership to addressmobilization issues.

• Review Mobilization Plans, Policies,and Procedures. Some usefulmobilization reference publications arelisted in Appendix D, “References.” Asa minimum, the MSO needs to reviewthe following publications [All].

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Joint Pub 4-05.1

•• Joint Pub 4-05, “Joint Doctrine forMobilization Planning.”

•• Joint Pub 5-03.1, “Joint OperationPlanning and Execution System Vol I:(Planning Policies and Procedures).”

•• CJCSI 3110.13, “MobilizationGuidance for the Joint StrategicCapabilities Plan.”

•• Appropriate Service mobilization plans(for example, Army Mobilization andOperation Planning and Execution System,the Navy Capabilities and MobilizationPlan, the Air Force War and Mobilization

Plan, Coast Guard Manpower Mobilizationand Support Plan, and the Marine CorpsMobilization Management Plan). ServiceReserve forces employment preferences areshown in Figure III-2.

•• DODD 1235.10, “Activation,Mobilization, and Demobilization of theReady Reserves.”

•• DOD Instruction (DODI) 1235.12,“Accessing the Ready Reserves.”

•• DODI 1100.19G, “WartimeManpower Mobilization PlanningPolicies and Procedures.”

SERVICE MOBILIZATION POLICY

Army:Heavy reliance on reserves for combat service supportInvoluntary callup to ensure access to units and to maintainunit integrity

Air Force:Extensive peacetime use of reserves (especially strategic lift)Uses volunteers to fill missions

Marine Corps:Uses volunteers to augmentReserves not required for initial operations

Navy:Prefers involuntary callup for unit integrity and visibilityAble to meet requirements with volunteers

Coast GuardExtensive use of peacetime reserves to augment active dutyunits

Port Security Units are reserve units that are required for initial

Army:Heavy reliance on reserves for combat service supportInvoluntary callup to ensure access to units and to maintainunit integrity

Extensive peacetime use of reserves (especially strategic lift)Uses volunteers to fill missions

Uses volunteers to augmentReserves not required for initial operations

Prefers involuntary callup for unit integrity and visibilityAble to meet requirements with volunteers

Extensive use of peacetime reserves to augment active dutyunits

Port Security Units are reserve units that are required for initialoperations

Air Force:

Marine Corps:

Navy:

Coast Guard:

Figure III-2. Service Mobilization Policy

III-5


• Review Legal Authorities. AppendixB, “Legal Authorities for Mobilization,”gives the MSO a ready reference to theappropriate legal authorities that areinvoked to execute mobilization actions.Appendix C, “Levels of Mobilization,”shows the levels of mobilization tosupport various operations. MSOs mustconsult with their Judge Advocate toconfirm the interpretation and applicationof these legal authorities [All].

• Review Civilian Mobilization Plansand Policies. The MSO needs to befamiliar with the legal authorities andprocedures for the mobilization ofcivilians. The following documentsprovide necessary guidance.

•• DODD 1400.31, “DoD Civilian WorkForce Contingency and EmergencyPlanning and Execution” [All].

•• DODD 1400.32, “DoD Civilian WorkForce Contingency and Emergency

Planning Guidelines and Procedures”[Services].

5. Interpret Policies for Use ofReserve Components

As shown in Figure III-3, RCmobilization and deployment policies mayneed modification to satisfy therequirements of a crisis. An available assetmay not be appropriate for the crisis; forexample: (1) individuals assigned to a unitapportioned to an OPLAN TPFDD, or whoare not physically qualified, or who havedocumented personal hardships; (2) onlySelected Reserve and certain IndividualReady Reserve Volunteers are accessibleunder PSRC and only Ready Reserve areaccessible under partial mobilization; ( 3)generally RC personnel assigned to unitsshould be mobilized and demobilized as a unit(see 10 USC 12301 [c]); and (4) Governor’sconsent is required to mobilize NationalGuardsmen volunteering for active duty orordered to active duty for short tour (15 days

LEVEL OF RESPONSE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

GLOBAL

MULTIPLE REGIONALCONTINGENCIES

REGIONALCONTINGENCY

PEACE OPERATIONS

HUMANITARIANASSISTANCE

COUNTERDRUG

CIVIL DISTURBANCENATURAL DISASTER

TOTALMOBILIZATION

FULLMOBILIZATION

PARTIALMOBILIZATION

PRESIDENTIAL SELECTEDRESERVE CALLUP

RESERVE COMPONENTVOLUNTEERS

SELECTIVE MOBILIZATION

LEVEL OF RESPONSE

LEGISLATION AUTHORIZING FURTHERFORCE EXPANSION

CONGRESSIONAL DECLARATIONOF NATIONAL EMERGENCY

PRESIDENTIAL ORCONGRESSIONAL

DECLARATIONOF NATIONAL EMERGENCY

Figure III-3. Level of Response

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or less) (see 10 USC 12301 [b] or [d])[Services].

6. Prepare Decision Packages

a. The formal callup process begins witha request (normally by the supported CINC,but that may be made by a Service, supportingCINC, or the Joint Staff) to callup RC forces.If the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffagrees that mobilization is required, theChairman tasks the Joint Staff MSO toprepare the RC Callup Decision SupportPackage. Figure III-4 depicts the actions.

Figure III-5 shows the reasoning for RCduring the Iraq crisis of Feb 98.

b. The following tasks describe thesequence of events that produce thecompleted package.

• Prepare Decision Package. The JointStaff MSO coordinates and integratesService mobilization requirements.Based upon the consolidated requests, theMSO prepares the mobilization decisionpackage for the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff, who recommends a COA

YES

NO

RESERVE COMPONENTDECISION MAKING PROCESS

CJCS Review/Approval Process

SecDefReview

Joint Staffrecommends to

CJCS

Review/revalidateRC requirement

Notify uponPresidential

authorization tomobilize

Issue PA/LAguidance andnotify units

YES

NO

SecDefrecommendation

CJCS letterrequest

Joint Form 136 w/RCcallup

recommendation(coordinate with

SecDef, SECTRANS,CINCs, SVCs)

Fig. III-7

Presidentinvokes legalauthority toorder RC toactive duty

CINCCJCSCODELsLAOPLANPASecDefSECTRANSSVC

Commander in ChiefChairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffCongressional DelegationsLegal AdvisorOperation PlanPublic AffairsSecretary of DefenseSecretary of TransportationService

Auth to notifyCODELs/Oversight

Committees/PA of unitsid'd for training and

possible deployment

Initial calluprequest CINCs,SVCs, request

OPLAN/execution/RC forces

Fig. II-7/Fig. III-7

Figure III-4. Reserve Component Decision Making Process

III-7


to the President through the Secretary ofDefense. Figure III-6 lists thedocuments required in the decisionpackage. The Services apportion RCassets, according to Appendix 5 to AnnexA requirements to the CINC’s OPLAN[Joint Staff and/or Services].

• Staff Decision Package. The Joint StaffMSO sends the decision package to theOffice of the Secretary of Defense(OSD), Joint Staff Directorates,supported and supporting CINCs,USTRANSCOM, USACOM, USSOCOM,the Services, and the Secretary ofTransportation for Coast Guard, forvalidation. This coordination developsconsensus on the level of mobilizationand avoids multiple requests foradditional callup authorities [Joint Staff].

• Forward Coordinated DecisionPackage to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. The MSO forwards thecoordinated decision package, throughthe Director of the Joint Staff, to theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.The Chairman then presents the requestto the Secretary of Defense with therecommendation to forward it to thePresident [Joint Staff].

• Prepare Decision Package forAdditional or Subsequent Callup.After the initial approval of the RCcallup, there may be additional RCrequirements later in the operation. Also,an extended operation which exceeds thelegal limits of 270 days for PSRC or 24months for partial mobilization mayrequire an RC forces’ rotation. The

FEB 98 IRAQ CRISIS: WHY RESERVE COMPONENTS (RC) ?

Total Force Policy Greater dependence upon RCActive component capability committedLimited capability only available in RC

Immediate Callup: (400 Personnel)Biological integrated detection systemCommando Solo aircraftPort securityMobile inshore undersea warfare

Timely response for follow-on requirements:MobilityVolunteer transition/retentionIndividuals (staff augment, backfill, medical)

Figure III-5. Feb 98 Iraq Crisis: Why Reserve Components?

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Joint Pub 4-05.1

callup ceilings may have to be adjustedto accommodate the rotation. If theNational Command Authorities (NCA)places a limit (for example, less than the200,000 maximum in the case of a PSRC)on the callup authority, the NCA mustapprove any requests for increases. Asimilar principle applies to the 1,000,000Service member limit under a partialmobilization. Figure III-7 shows theprogression of a subsequent calluprequest and to move from a PSRC to apartial mobilization. The coordination ofthe decision package for a subsequent callupis the same as the initial one [Joint Staff].

• Prepare Decision Package forTransition from PSRC to PartialMobilization. The PSRC authority, title10 USC 12304, may be used to provide

initial RC support requirements for apotentially larger or longer war,contingency operation, or militaryoperations other than war (MOOTW).PSRC is intended to assist during theperiod in which the situation evolves intoeither a larger operation or is resolved.

•• Figure III-7 shows the decisionpackage progression for execution ofpartial mobilization when PSRC alreadyhas been approved. Partial mobilizationrequ i res a P res iden t ia l o rCongressional declaration of nationalemergency. If a national emergency hasnot been declared by the time of thepartial mobilization request, the MSO —coordinating with the legal advisors —includes the draft declaration in thedecision package.

DOCUMENTS OF A RESERVE COMPONENTCALLUP DECISION PACKAGE

A complete Decision Package includes:

Joint Staff Form 136 cover sheet

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memoto the Secretary of Defense (SecDef)

SecDef memo to the President with fourenclosures:

Letter to Speaker of the HouseLetter to President of SenateDraft Executive Order for callupDraft Executive Order for stop-loss(if appropriate)

Draft SecDef memo to Service Secretaries

Draft SecDef memo to Secretary ofTransportation and/or Coast Guard

Figure III-6. Documents of a Reserve Component Callup Decision

III-9


•• When partial mobilization isdeclared, decision makers need todetermine whether to include PSRC intothe partial mobilization. IncludingPSRC does the following: (1) Limitstotal callup to one million, rather than

RESERVE COMPONENT DECISION MAKING PROCESS(SUBSEQUENT CALLUP OR TRANSITION FROM PRESIDENTIAL

SELECTED RESERVE CALLUP TO PARTIAL MOBILIZATION)

Secretary ofDefense, JS or NSC

requests Pres.declaration of

national emergency

Message request for2nd OPLAN/COA

execution/more RC forces

Sequential calluprequest

CINC requests RCforce for sequential

callup (# or time)

JS aligns requestwith other

CINCs/SVCs req;staffs rec to

Chairman, JointChiefs of Staff for

additionalauthority

NO

YES

NOPartial MobRequest

required?

CINCs/SVCsrequest for partial

mobilization

JS coordinatesrequest

JS Form 136 withpartial mobrecommendation(coord withSecretary ofDefense, CINCs,SVCs)

SecDefrecommendation

SecDefreview

CJCS letterrequest

CJCS Review/ApprovalProcess

Fig. III-4

Fig. IV-1

CINCCJCSCOAJSNSCOPLANRCSecDefSVC

Commander in ChiefChairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffCourse of ActionJoint StaffNational Security CouncilOperation PlanReserve ComponentSecretary of DefenseService

President declaresnational emergency/

authorizes partialmobilization

YES

AdditionalRequest

required?

Fig. II-7

Figure III-7. Reserve Component Decision Making Process (Subsequent Callup orTransition from Presidential Selected Reserve Callup to Partial Mobilization)

1.2 million; (2) Restarts the clock, for24 months, for any members of theSelected and Individual Ready Reserveserving on active duty under PSRC; and(3) Enables worldwide redeployment ofReserves and National Guard, serving

III-10

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Joint Pub 4-05.1

under PSRC, which limits support to aspecific contingency. This is significantif the PSRC is in support of MOOTWand the action requiring partialmobilization occurs in another theater.

•• Figure III-8 shows the timeline forPSRC authority approval during theIraq crisis of February 1998. FigureIII-9 shows the lessons learned fromthe crisis.

FEB 98 IRAQ CRISIS: PRESIDENTIAL SELECTED RESERVECALLUP AUTHORITY (PSRC) DECISION MAKING TIMELINE

Course of action development: 6-10 Feb 98

PSRC staffing: 10-17 Feb 98

PSRC request to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 17 Feb 98

PSRC Package to the Secretary of Defense: 17 Feb 98

Assistant Secretary of Defense/Reserve Affairs brief: 17 Feb 98

National Security Council brief: 18 Feb 98

PSRC to the Secretary of Defense: 19 Feb 98

Executive Order PSRC Authority: 24 Feb 98

Figure III-8. Feb 98 Iraq Crisis: Presidential Selected Reserve CallupAuthority (PSRC) Decision Making Timeline

III-11


FEB 98 IRAQ CRISIS: LESSONS LEARNED

Presidential approval timely when request justifiedRC accessibility no longer an issue

National Command Authorities want Reserve Component (RC)requirements quantified

RC requirements still not being planned in accordance with JointOperation Planning and Execution System Vol II and Joint StrategicCapabilities Plan

Combatant commander's role in mobilizationOperation plan (OPLAN) assumption of mobilization is not enoughRC Appendix in OPLAN critical to timely execution

Fidelity of system improved, BUT:MORE DETAILED INFORMATION DEMANDED!!

Figure III-9. Feb 98 Iraq Crisis: Lessons Learned

III-12

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Joint Pub 4-05.1

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IVEXECUTION

IV-1

1. Purpose

This chapter describes the roles andactivities during execution of manpowermobilization.

2. Background

Execution is the implementation of thebest plans and decisions available to theleadership at the time. Execution isdecentralized. The Services issue orders tounits and/or individuals within the guidanceissued by the Secretary of Defense. Most ofthe actual mobilization activity takes place atunits, mobilizations stations, andtransportation centers. The MSOs monitorthe mobilization process, makerecommendations for improvement, and seekto optimize the use of human and materielresources. From the MSO perspective,

“Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless there issomething to be gained; fight not unless the position is critical.”

Sun TzuThe Art of W ar, 400-320 BC

manpower mobilization execution involvestwo centers of activity. The first includesactions necessary to order RC units andindividuals to active duty, such as distributionof executive orders, delegation of authorities,and notification procedures. Congressionaldelegations and oversight committees mustbe notified of the units to be mobilized andtheir locations. Units and individuals mustbe notified of their mobilization and publicaffairs announcements must be made. Thesequence and timing of these announcementsare of paramount importance to seniorleadership. Close coordination at all levelsis necessary to prevent misinformation andconfusion during execution. The secondgroup represents actions necessary toeffective management of the mobilizationprocess and includes responding tochanging requirements and actualperformance of the mobilization.

DECISION TO ACTIVATE, MOBILIZE, ANDDEPLOY RESERVES — THE GULF WAR

9 August 1990, (7 days after Iraq invaded Kuwait), as RC volunteers weresupporting the initial phases of Operation DESERT SHIELD, the DefenseDepartment began planning for a possible RC callup to support the evolvingstrategy. It quickly became apparent that Reserve forces would be needed fordeployment to the Persian Gulf to meet Commander in Chief, Central Command(CINCCENT) requirements; to backfill positions in the US and other theatersvacated by AC personnel deployed to Saudi Arabia; and for essential CONUS-based missions.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, the Services,Department of Transportation, and the USCG worked together in coordinationwith Central Command (CENTCOM) to ensure various policy and operationalissues during the mobilization process were dealt with as quickly and efficientlyas possible.

IV-2

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 4-05.1

3. Execution

The top portion of Figure IV-1 representsthe first center of activity. It is triggered bythe product of the decision making process,the Decision Support Package. The output inFigure IV-1 is the Services’ execution of OSDguidance in support of the CINC, and representsthe other center of activity for the MSO: themanagement of the mobilization process.

4. Functional View

Figure IV-2 is the MSO’s functional viewof mobilization execution. The mobilizationcommun i t y a l ready has p lanned ,implemented, and adjusted the mobilizationsystem prior to the issuance of the PresidentialExecutive Order to call up the RC. FigureIV-3 shows which commands requestedPSRC and subsequent approval status duringthe last contingencies. During execution,MSOs provide technical advice andassistance to those with functionalresponsibilities; monitor the implementation

of decisions; and make periodic reports tothe leadership on the performance of themobilization process. MSOs alsorecommend further adjustments to RCpolicies as dictated by mobilization events.

a. The uncertainties of plan executionpreclude a detailed list of tasks, butexperience suggests the following.

• Ensure that TPFDD is updated as CINCrequirements change. Under CAP,TPFDDs may not pre-exist [CINC/Services].

• Coordinate with the appropriate publicaffairs officer, legal counsel, andlegislative affairs advisor. Keep theminformed throughout the execution ofmobilization [Joint Staff, CINCs, and/orServices].

• Ensure that theater-unique requirementsare known to the supporting CINCs[CINCs/Services].

. . . The activation and deployment of RC forces and their full integration intothe Active structure were accomplished with no significant problems. In part,this was caused by ensuring the welfare of Reserve members, thereby allowingthem to concentrate on mission assignments. Prompt action by OSD in seekingCongressional support for changes in the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil ReliefAct and the Veterans Reemployment Rights Act was necessary to ensure equaltreatment of Reservists called up under Title 10 US Code 673b. Ultimateamendment of those statutes ensured the welfare of Reservists and theirfamilies. While the Services took steps to mitigate the trauma Reservists feltfrom family separation through a variety of family support activities, employersof activated Reserve members were generally supportive of US goals in thePersian Gulf crisis and their Reserve employees’ absence from the workplace.Finally, the activation of Reservists from all walks of life and every state in theunion, as well as their full integration into the plans to enforce the UnitedNations resolutions against Iraq, helped the American public to understandthe seriousness of the Persian Gulf crisis and to ensure their support for theoperation.

SOURCE: Conduct of the Persian Gulf W ar;Final Report to Congress, Appendixes A - S

April 1992

IV-3

Execution

• Continue to coordinate and refineexecution policies and guidance [JointStaff and/or Services].

• Monitor and adjust the callup proceduresfor units and individuals. The Presidentmay invoke “Stop Loss” during anyperiod reservists are serving on activeduty under title 10 USC 12301, 12302,or 12304. The President may suspendany provision of law relating topromotion, retirement, or separation ofany active or reserve member who is

MANPOWER MOBILIZATIONEXECUTION PROCESS

ReserveComponent

callupExecutive

Order

Ceilings Ceilings

Guidance Guidance

PressRelease

PressRelease

NotifyCongressionalDelegations,

OversightCommitteesand Public

Affairs of unitsid'd for

training/mobilization

Secretary ofDefense

delegates toService

secretaries,and setsceilings

Secretary of Defensedevelops

implementationguidance

Service Secretariesexecute to meetCommander inChief/Servicesrequirements

Secretary ofDefense

coordinateswith Secretary

ofTransportation

for UnitedStates Coast

Guard

Fig. V-5

Secretary ofTransportation

delegates toCommandantUnited StatesCoast Guard

Fig. III-7

Figure IV-1. Manpower Mobilization Execution Process

determined to be essential to nationalsecurity [Services].

• Manage the callup against Serviceceilings [Services].

b. Figure IV-4 shows the number of RCpersonnel called up over time, comparedto the mobilization authority imposed ceiling(the stepped line on the chart). Also, theremay be self-imposed time limitations on thecallup period, less than those authorized. ThePresident, the Secretary of Defense, or Service

IV-4

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Joint Pub 4-05.1

FUNCTIONAL VIEW OF MOBILIZATION PROCESS

ALERT

TRAIN

TRANSPORT

REVISEREQUIREMENTS

NOTIFY

EQUIP

PROCESS

ADJUSTSELECTIONS &

SCHEDULES

Figure IV-2. Functional View of Mobilization Process

WHO REQUESTED PRESIDENTIAL SELECTEDRESERVE CALLUP AUTHORITY?

1989

1990

1992

1994

1994

1995

1998

JUST CAUSE

DESERT SHIELD

PROVIDE HOPE

UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

VIGILANT WARRIOR

JOINT ENDEAVOR

IRAQ

CINCSOUTH

SECDEF/CJCS

CINCSOC

CINCACOM

CINCCENT

CINCEUR/USAF

USA

Approval:

Figure IV-3. Who Requested Presidential Selected Reserve Callup Authority?

IV-5

Execution

Secretaries may impose those limitations tomanage the callup effectively.

MANAGEMENT OF RESERVE COMPONENTCALLUP

# OFPERSONNEL

INTHOUSANDS

C-0 C+30 C+60 C+360

TODAY'S DATE DISPLAYED

# MOBILIZEDLIMIT

# DEPLOYED

PLANNED MOBILIZED

PLANNED DEPLOYED

ACTUAL DEPLOYED

ACTUAL MOBILIZED

SERVICE OR SECRETARYOF DEFENSE CEILING

Figure IV-4. Management of Reserve Component Callup

c. Figure IV-5 shows the Operation JointGuard PSRC execution timeline.

IV-6

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Joint Pub 4-05.1

OPERATION JOINT GUARD PRESIDENTIALSELECTED RESERVE CALLUP AUTHORITY

EXECUTION TIMELINE

ALERT

MOBILIZATION (MOB)

DEMOBILIZATION

# DAYS

1

51

10

17

# DAYS

22.5

323

30.5

# DAYS

3

77

17

# DAYS

2

33

8

# DAYS

1925

197

PURPOSE

TRAVEL TO GE

HOME STATIONTRAVEL TO MOB STAIN PROCESS

TOTAL

PURPOSE

TERMINAL LEAVE

OUTPROCESSINGTRAVEL TO HOME STATIONHOME STATION

TOTAL

PURPOSE

DEPLOY TO ISB/MSN

METT-T TRAINING GTAMETT-T TRAINING HTA

TOTAL

PURPOSE

TRAVEL TO MOB SITE

INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASERECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARDMOVEMENT, IN-PROCESSING

TOTAL

PURPOSE

MISSIONOVERLAP

TOTAL

DEPLOY

REDEPLOY

EMPLOY

30-45 17 17 197

270 DAYS

8 30.5

MOB DEPLOY EMPLOY REDEPLOY DEMOB

Figure IV-5. Operation Joint Guard Presidential Selected ReserveCallup Authority Execution Timeline

CHAPTER VMONITORING AND REPORTING

V-1

1. Purpose

This chapter describes the monitoring andreporting activities in the manpowermobilization process. It discusses the jointcommunity interfaces and the reportsrequired to report on the status of units andindividuals.

2. Background

a. Monitoring and reporting is an integralpart of manpower mobilization (See FigureV-1). The timely and accurate collection,analysis, and transmission of informationis important to ensure effective and efficientmobilization operations. Accurate and timelyreporting is also necessary because of highlevels of public and political interest in the

“When a nation is without establishments and a military system, it is verydifficult to organize an army.”

NapoleonMaxims of W ar

1831

involuntary order to active duty of Guard andReserve members.

b. The Joint Staff, Services, and CINCscomprise the communication interfaces forthe monitoring and reporting phase. Thischapter discusses some of the informationflow challenges and denotes the organizationsresponsible for working issues. The origin ofinformation flow within any particularorganization is not described in detail.

c. Figure V-2 shows the inter-organizational information flow. Most ofthe mobilization information flow supportingoperations is directly between the supportedCINC and the Services. As the joint forceprovider, USACOM intervenes in the processif joint Service problems arise and need to be

To ensure effective and efficient mobilization operations, the timely andaccurate collection, analysis, and transmittal of information is important.

V-2

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Joint Pub 4-05.1

resolved. For SOF, USSOCOM essentiallyplays the same mobilization role as theServices do for other types of forces.

3. Monitoring

a. Monitoring involves gathering andanalyzing data to determine the status offorces and of the mobilization operation. Tomanage the mobilization system, the MSOmonitors various facets of manpowermobilization, such as source determination,for filling requirements, arranging for themobilized forces’ deployment and/orredeployment and demobilizing the units orindividuals. These monitoring efforts improvethe MSO’s ability to manage the manpowermobilization system.

b. MSOs have numerous reports andinformation systems available to monitoroperations. Some of these are as follows.

• The Services submit the militarymanpower mobilization and accessionstatus report (MOBREP) to the JointStaff, Manpower and Personnel Directorate(J-1). This message format containstabular data on the pre-mobilizationstrength of the armed forces, categoriesof RC personnel who have been notifiedto report, and those who have reportedfor active duty.

• The Services give the Joint Staff MSOinput to prepare the report to Congressas required by title 10 USC, under partial

MONITORING AND REPORTING

...gathering and analyzingdata to determine the statusof forces and of themobilization operation

...extracting information thatis obtained from monitoringactivities; then, providing thedata to appropriateorganizations that areinvolved with mobilization anddemobilization

MONITORING

REPORTINGREPORTING

MONITORING

Figure V-1. Monitoring and Reporting

V-3

Monitoring and Reporting

mobilization. The report covers the unitsmobilized, their location, mission, andperformance, the necessity of such unit(s)mobilized, and such other information asthe President may require. This report isfiled on the first day of the second fiscalyear quarter after the quarter in whichthe first unit is ordered to active dutyunder the partial mobilization, and on thefirst day of each succeeding six-monthperiod thereafter for so long as the unitor units are on active duty.

• The Global Command and ControlSystem (GCCS) is our nation’sconventional, joint, automated commandand control (C2) system. GCCS supportsthe Joint Planning and ExecutionCommunity via the use of an integratedset of analytic tools, flexible data transfer,and robust communications capabilities.

Although developed initially as a C2system and not tailored to the MSO’sneeds as a “planner’s tool”, the JointOperation Planning and ExecutionSystem (JOPES) provides access tovaluable information such as JOPESTPFDDs, the Status of Resources andTraining System (SORTS), and unitstructure data. GCCS has several reportgeneration capabilities, including an adhoc query feature, that the MSO can useto search for specific information needs.The GCCS links C2 from the NCA downto the joint task force and componentcommanders.

• The MSO monitors situation reports(SITREPs) and other message traffic foractions or information with mobilizationimplications. Service MSOs haveinformation systems that they are able to

INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION FLOW

SUPPORTEDCOMMANDS

SUPPORTINGCOMMANDS

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINTCHIEFS OF STAFF

SERVICES

USACOM (and otherforce providers)Capabilities RequirementsCapabilities

Requirements OperationalRequirements

Sourcing

Mobilization Status,MOBREP input, Report

to Congress input

Requirements

Sourcing,Mobilization

Status

Sourcing,Mobilization

Status

Requirements

Report toCongress

MOBREP

USACOM

Military Manpower Mobilization and Accession Status Report

United States Atlantic Command

Figure V-2. Inter-Organizational Information Flow

V-4

Chapter V

Joint Pub 4-05.1

review for the status of forces,mobilization, deployment, redeployment,and demobilization.

c. Areas that are monitored — forcerequirements, sourcing, mobilizationexecution, information and reportingrequirements, and demobilization schedules(See Figure V-3) — are discussed in thefollowing paragraphs.

• Monitor Force Requirements. Sincemanpower requirements changethroughout the operation, force definitionis a dynamic process that impacts themobilization system. The TPFDDtransmits the supported CINC’srequirements; however, the supportingCINC’s requirements go directly to theServices and are not immediately

available to the joint community. Serviceand Joint Staff MSOs monitor changesto assess the impact on mobilization andthe influence on the sourcing process.MSOs coordinate with deliberateplanners in peacetime and withoperations personnel during a crisis tohelp identify requirements [Services,Joint Staff].

• Monitor Sourcing. MSOs monitorforce assignments againstrequirements to look for indications ofmobilization problems such asdifficulties with policies, unitreadiness, and unit structure that mayhamper meeting the required deliverydate. To help identify these situations,MSOs use the GCCS to review unitTPFDD and SORTS data [All].

MONITORED AREAS

FORCE REQUIREMENTS

SOURCING

MOBILIZATION EXECUTION

INFORMATION AND REPORTINGREQUIREMENTS

DEMOBILIZATION SCHEDULES

Figure V-3. Monitored Areas

V-5


• Monitor Mobilization ExecutionStatus. During execution, the MSOmonitors the mobilization process,identifies problems, and participates intheir resolution. Interfacing withmobilization community members, theMSO monitors and manages the flow ofpersonnel through the pipeline. TheMSO compares mobilization activitiesagainst the legal authorities invoked andmonitors the duration of active duty, thesize of the callup, and the RC mix. FigureV-4 depicts a way to display and analyzesome of the data. The MSO worksunresolved problems with USACOM,the requester, or the supporting CINC.The Joint Staff MSO reviews theMOBREP submitted by the Services andSITREPs submitted by the supportedCINC to identify manpower concerns,including mobilization requirements,

shortfalls, and other callup contingencies[All].

• Determine Information Requirementsand Assign Reporting Requirements.To obtain the right information, the JointStaff MSO informs the CINCs, Services,and other Joint Staff sections of theformat and frequency of specialinformation requirements. The MSOcoordinates with the followingorganizations. [All].

•• Joint Staff and/or J-4 for RC logisticsenabling capabilities, engineering support,medical professionals, and the status ofRC uni ts that supportUSTRANSCOM and USACOM.Coordination with the Services may alsobe required to determine the status ofpersonnel mobilization in these skills.

DISPLAY OF MOBILIZATION DATATODAY'S DATE DISPLAYED

# MOBILIZED # DEPLOYED LIMIT

SERVICE OR SECRETARYOF DEFENSE CEILING

ALERTED

MOBILIZED

DEPLOYED

# OFPERSONNEL

INTHOUSANDS

90 DAYS 180

50,050 CEILING

126,250

189,250 CEILING

365,000 PARTIAL MOB

AUG DECSEP JANOCT FEBNOV MAR APR

400

300

200

100

0

Figure V-4. Display of Mobilization Data

V-6

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Joint Pub 4-05.1

Services should also keep CINCs informedas to the status of their identified personnelmobilization requirements.

•• Other Joint Staff directorates such asJ-1 for IMAs; Intelligence Directorate forRC intelligence; Operations Directorate(J-3) for RC special operations, civilaffairs, and psychological operations;Command, Control, Communications,and Computer Systems Directorate forRC communications capabilities.

•• Other governmental agencies withnational security responsibilities such asthe Defense Logistics Agency, DefenseIntelligence Agency, Selective ServiceSystem, and Federal EmergencyManagement Agency.

• Monitor Unit and IndividualDemobilization Schedules. TheServices are primarily responsible forestablishing and tracking the RC forces’demobilization schedules. ServiceMSOs need to provide demobilizationinformation to all affected commands foradequate planning and release of units.At all levels, MSOs should maintain theirown schedules and monitor the Servicesto ensure consistency. The MSOscoordinate with operations personnelto provide adequate support forongoing operations. Chapter VI,“Demobilization,” covers the activitiesinvolved with demobilization [All].

4. Reporting

a. Reporting involves extractinginformation that is obtained from monitoringactivities; then, providing the data toappropriate organizations that are involvedwith mobilization and demobilization. TheMSO responds to formal and informalreporting requirements. The formalrequirements are those specified in statutesor directives such as reporting to Congress,

the Joint Staff, or the Services. The followingthree formal reports are generated: Appendix5 to Annex A, of each OPLAN which liststhe total RC requirements; the MOBREP; andduring partial mobilization, the President’sreport to Congress. Figure V-5 illustrates theinformation flow for these reports. Informalor special case reporting may be required inresponse to Congressional requests andqueries. Future rotation plans, mobilizationcapability or status requests, limitations onreservists, seasonal or personal information,and redeployment and demobilization plansmay be required to fulfill informal or specialcase reporting requirements [All].

b. Once the Services begin to order RCunits and individuals to active duty, the jointreporting process, described in Joint Pub 1-03,“Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) GeneralInstructions,” begins. Joint reporting entailsreporting on people and units. TheMOBREP shows people available and/ormobilized. After direction from the Joint Staff,the Services daily (or as otherwise directed)submit the MOBREP to the Joint Staff, J-1,as described in CJCSM 3150.13, “JointReporting Structure (JRS) Personnel Manual”(formally Joint Pub 1-03.17). Units updatethe SORTS data base which is available forreview through GCCS [Services].

c. The following four areas requirereporting.

• Problems in Providing Forces. TheServices must notify the requester andthe Joint Staff if they are unable toprovide RC forces by the specified dates.Then, the Joint Staff can attempt toresolve the problem. This is not a formalreport, but is required promptly to ensureexpeditious resolution [Services].

• RC Forces No Longer Required. Allorganizations monitor their missions todetermine when RC capabilities are nolonger required or if it is feasible to

V-7


provide other means of support.Organizations with releasable RC forcesinform the appropriate Service; in turn,the Service coordinates with USACOM/USSOCOM to ensure that the forces arenot needed elsewhere [All].

• Mobilization Information to J-3Director of Operations As Required.

The J-4 MSO coordinates with the J-3briefing team to ascertain theinformation needed. The followingtypes of information may be requested.

•• The total number of RC personnelmobilized and deployed for eachoperation order being executed[Services].

MOBILIZATION REPORTING INFORMATION FLOWS

Commander in ChiefMilitary Manpower Mobilization andAccession Status ReportSituation Report

CINCMOBREP

SITREP

SORTSSVCTPFDD

Status of Resourse and Training SystemServiceTime-phased Force and Deployment Data

CINCs, SVCsmonitor

manpowermobilization

Joint Staffconsolidates

unit/individualdata

CINCs, SVCsgeneratereports

Joint Staffprepares

consolidatedreports for

Chairman ofthe Joint

Chiefs of Stafffor Congress

Secretary ofDefense

reports statusto President

and Congress

Ad hocreporting as

required

Secretary ofDefense

reports statusto President

and Congress

TPFDD

SORTS

SITREPs

MOBREP

Reports

Reports anddata to

Congress

Report to Congress: Every six months(Partial Mob only: IAW 10 USC 12302)

Name of Unit, Service, and/or RCStatement of mission for each unitEvaluation of each unit's performanceWhere each unit is deployedNecessity for retaining on active duty

at partialmo b ?

NO

YES

Mob status(incl ceilings

locations,capability)

Joint Stafforders jointreporting

FigureV I-1

Fig. IV-1

Figure V-5. Mobilization Reporting Information Flows

V-8

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Joint Pub 4-05.1

•• The number of RC personnel who aremoving the force, assisting inmobilization, deployment, andsustainment, and those backfillingpositions split out by CONUS and/orOCONUS [Services].

•• A time-phased line graph that showsthe status of RC mobilization, whichincludes the SecDef ceilings and thenumber actually mobilized in relation toan unnamed day on which a deploymentoperation begins (C-Day) [Joint Staff].

• Demobilization Schedules. TheServices are primarily responsible for theexecution of demobilization. Accordingto the supported CINC’s priorities, theServices will notify the organizations,who have RC forces assigned, of theplanned demobilization dates and thetime the forces must be released foroutprocessing and transportation[Services].

d. Presidential Reports to Congress

• PSRC. Whenever the Presidentauthorizes the Secretary of Defense orthe Secretary of the Department of

Transportation to order any units ormembers of the selected and individualready reserve to active duty under PSRC,a written report shall, within 24 hoursafter exercising such authority, besubmitted to Congress setting forth thecircumstances necessitating the actiontaken and describing the anticipated useof these units or members. This reportwill be drafted by the Joint Staff. TheServices and CINCs will provideinformation as requested from the JointStaff to aid in compiling this report.

• Partial Mobilization. 10 USC 12302(d), requires that once the Presidentdeclares a national emergency andauthorizes partial mobilization, thisreport must be submitted to Congress onthe first day of the second fiscal yearquarter in which the first unit is orderedto active duty, and on the first day of each6-month period as long as the unit or unitsare on active duty. Figure V-6 shows theinformation required in the report.

•• Provide Input For Report toCongress. The Joint Staff J-3 tasks theServices to provide input data for thisreport. The tasking specifies the

The MSOs coordinate with operations personnel to provideadequate support for ongoing operations.

V-9


suspense dates, establishes the format,and includes requirements for anyadditional information that the Presidentor Secretary of Defense wants to give toCongress. The Services and otherorganizations submit the information tothe Joint Staff, J-4 MSO, who preparesthe report [Joint Staff].

•• Prepare the President’s Report toCongress. The Joint Staff, J-4 MSOstaffs the report for the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff. If delegated

authority by the Secretary of Defense,the report shall be signed by theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.The report includes the followinginformation: (1) CJCS memo to Secretaryof Defense with enclosures (include copyof title 10 USC 12302 and any SecDefmemo that delegated that authority); (2)Memo for the President; (3) Letter for theSpeaker of the House; (4) Letter for thePresident of the Senate; and (5) CINC,Military Departments and Coast Guardinputs (See Figure V-6).

INFORMATION REQUIRED BY CONGRESS FOR PARTIAL MOBILIZATION

Information Responsible Agency

Necessity to order or retain units on active duty Supporting and supported CINCs and the Servicesfor RC units remaining under their control

A statement of the mission of the unit Support CINC

An evaluation of the unit’s performance of thatmission

CINC and/or Services

Where each such unit is deployed at the time of thereport. List areas to which deployed, such asCONUS or CINC AOR.

CINC and/or Services

Other information the President deems appropriate As specified by the Secretary of Defense orSECTRANS

Figure V-6. Information Required by Congress for Partial Mobilization

V-10

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Joint Pub 4-05.1

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER VIDEMOBILIZATION

VI-1

1. Purpose

This chapter describes the MSO’s role inthe demobilization process. Only themanpower portion of the demobilizationprocess is discussed. Chapter IV of Joint Pub4-05, “Joint Doctrine for MobilizationPlanning,” describes all facets of thedemobilization process.

2. Background

a. RC units and individuals are releasedfrom active duty under the demobilizationprocess. Although not as time-sensitive asmobilization, demobilization is a complexoperation that requires detailed planningand execution.

b. Often considered only at the end of anoperation, demobilization may occur duringan operation for the following reasons —expiration of authorized service time; changesin the forces required; or political emphasisto demobilize forces. Mobilization anddemobilization may occur simultaneously.Consequently, each Service must ensurethat demobilization plans are flexible,consistent, responsive, and sufficientlycomprehensive to meet all contingencies.

c. Poorly planned and executeddemobilization operations will have two majorimpacts: degradation to supportedoperations and reduced support for the RC

“Resolved, that the commanding officer be and he is hereby directed todischarge the troops now in the service of the United States, except twenty-five privates, to guard the stores at Fort Pitt, and fifty-five to guard stores atWest Point and other magazines, with a proportionate number of officers; noofficer to remain in service above the rank of a captain.”

Resolution of the Continental CongressDisbanding the Continental Army,

2 June 1784

program . Demobilization needs to beintegrated into the redeployment. Joint Pub4-05, “Joint Doctrine for MobilizationPlanning,” states that “From a joint militaryperspective, demobilization plans shouldreflect the postconflict missions of supportedcommanders and be synchronized with plansfor battlefield recovery and redeploymentoperations.”

d. Figure VI-1 shows the three primarygroups of demobilization activities —preliminary actions, planning, and execution.Planning is divided further into plandemobilization force and plan demobilizationsupport. The remainder of the chapterdiscusses these three activities.

A summary of these activities and thespecific tasks the MSO accomplishes is foundin Annex E of Appendix A, “Chapter VIActivity Summary: Demobilization.” Thissummary is a reference of the tasks that mustbe accomplished at each organizational levelto avoid poorly planned and executeddemobilization operations.

3. Preliminary Actions

Preliminary actions set the stage forplanning and executing a successfuldemobilization. Primarily, it involvesestablishing and disseminating broadguidance that the mobilization communityincorporates into mobilization plans.

VI-2

Chapter V

I

Join

t Pu

b 4

-05

.1

DEMOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES

RedeploymentTPFDD

RedeploymentTPFDD

Reports

Secretary of Defenseestablishes policiesfor demobilization

Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staffrecommends

termination of RCrecall authority

President revokesexecutive order

LEGEND

SVCs issue demobinstructions

CINC message: recallauthority no longer

needed

SVCs demobilize RCforces

SVC componentrequests SVC demob

instructions

Gaining commandersprocess RC

units/individuals offactive duty

Redeployment

Expiration ofauthorization, forcechanges required,conflict resolution,political decisions

Demobilization plandeveloped or refined

CINC updatesredeployment plan

(incl units andindividuals)

JS 136 to revoke EO(coord with CINCs,SVCs, Secretary of

Defense)

Secretary of Defensecoordinates with

Secretary ofTransportation fortermination of RC

recall

RC released to SVCcomponent forredeployment

Develop messages,lists of

returning/deactivatingunits/individuals

Demobilization

Secretary of Defensewithdraws authority

when lastunits/individuals arereleased from active

duty; notify President CINC

RC

SVC

TPFDD

Commander in Chief

Reserve Component

Service

Time-phased Force andDeployment Data

Joint Staff monitorsstatus; prepares

reports to Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs ofStaff/Secretary of

Defense

Fig. V-5

Figure VI-1. Demobilization Activities

VI-3

Demobilization

a. Establish Demobilization Conceptsand Policies. MSOs assist in selecting unitsfor demobilization, defining the process, andintegrating demobilization into the operationplanning and execution system. DODD1235.10, “Activation, Mobilization, andDemobilization of the Ready Reserves,”establishes demobilization policy. Thisdirective states that “members of the ReadyReserve ordered to active duty without theirconsent shall be retained on active duty nolonger than absolutely necessary. They shallreceive priority for redeployment from thearea of operations over active componentunits, and be released from active duty asexpeditiously as possible, consistent withoperational requirements.” This directiveincludes the following additional policies:

• units activated as a unit should bedemobilized as a unit;

• medically clear personnel should bedemobilized with their unit; and

• to the extent feasible and consistent withoperational requirements, follow-onmissions should be assigned to active

component forces rather than callup ofdemobilized RC units.

Figure VI-2 gives examples ofdemobilization policy issues and AppendixD, “References,” lists other documents thatprovide mobilization guidance [All].

b. Provide Input to the JSCP on RCForces’ Demobilization. MSOs addressissues such as demobilization supportrequirements, assumptions on release offorces, RC support of redeploymentoperations, and times necessary to conductdemobilization. Broad references todemobilization may be appropriate forinclusion in the JSCP while more detailedassumptions and guidance should be includedin CJCSI 3110.13, “Mobilization Guidancefor the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan,”published subsequent to each JSCP [All].

4. Planning

Demobilization planning involvesreviewing policies and establishingprocedures to demobilize. During this phase,planners determine operational support

DEMOBILIZATION POLICY ISSUES

To the extent operationally feasible, redeploy ReserveComponent forces first

Management of partial units (if only part of unit needed)

Use of volunteers, contractors, and host-nation support

Retaining on active duty only those forces necessary

Figure VI-2. Demobilization Policy Issues

VI-4

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Joint Pub 4-05.1

requirements and identify the forces todemobilize and those to support thedemobilization operations. The planningfunction is divided into two subactivities:Plan Demobilization Force and PlanDemobilization Support (See Figure VI-3).

a. Plan Demobilization Force. Thisactivity establishes the criteria for selectingforces for demobilization, selecting units, anddeveloping a time-phased schedule. This isessentially the same thought process followedduring execution. Tasks in planning thedemobilization force include the following.

• Provide Guidance. The supportedCINC, supporting CINCs, and Servicesmake the decision to release units andindividuals for demobilization.Coordinating with the Services, theMSOs develop recommendations andpublish guidance for selecting andapproving units for release. CurrentDOD policy gives priority to RC unitsfor redeployment based upon operationalconstraints. However, each situation isdifferent and decisions must be made toensure equity [All].

• Determine Redeployment andDemobilization Strategy. The Servicesdevelop broad concepts for demobilizationthat are the basis for subsequent detailedplanning. These areas include ports,demobilization stations, equipmentreturn policies, medical processing andfollow-up, personnel supportrequirements, and equipment disposition.

•• MSOs must consider carefully thosefunctional areas where most, if not all,of the capability is in the RC. Ifadditional units must be mobilized,shortages of the capability could exist.For example, units may not be availableto provide a rotational base in thefunctional area; in that case, with theonset of another operation, the RC maynot be able to support both contingencies.

•• Equipment retrograde hasmanpower implications. Equipmentmay be returned from the missionlocation directly to the unit or may besent to a processing center forrefurbishment. Sometimes equipmentmay remain in the theater or be

DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING FUNCTIONS

FORCE

SUPPORT

Determine redeployment supportrequirements

Determine required outprocessing

Determine, source, and approveforces needed to support

demobilization

Provide guidance

Determine redeployment anddemobilization strategy

Develop tentative demobilizationschedule

Figure VI-3. Demobilization Planning Functions

VI-5

Demobilization

transferred to other nations. Theseconsiderations may cause personnel fromdemobilizing units to stay behind toprocess the equipment. The MSOs mustincorporate these decisions intodemobilization plans.

• Develop Tentative DemobilizationSchedule. The Services create a tentativedemobilization schedule based on theassumed level of mobilization. Thisschedule is used to develop more detailedplans and to estimate resourcerequirements. Likewise, the commandswhere the RC forces will be assigneddevelop schedules to determine supportrequirements and to ensure thecontinuation of specific capabilities.MSOs must ascertain if replacement unitsare required; if they are, the MSOs thencoordinate with force planners to

schedule the overlap with thereplacement units [Services, CINCs].

b. Plan Demobilization Support. In thissecond subactivity the MSOs consider thespecific forces, such as medical, logistics, andtransportat ion, needed to supportdemobilization; also, they develop moredetailed demobilization procedures. Duringthis effort, the MSOs must address thefollowing support issues: backfill, ports,demobilization stations, equipment retrograde,processing, and redistribution, outprocessingprocedures, and leave policies. Thedemobilization support tasks are as follows.

• Determine Redeployment SupportRequirements. Having determined theRC forces required to support theredeployment of units and individuals,supported CINCs coordinate with forceplanners to incorporate these additionalrequirements into the TPFDD. Otherorganizations coordinate their requirementswith the Services [CINCs].

• Determine Required Outprocessing.The Service MSOs allot the time andresources necessary for personnel,finance, and medical processingaccomplished at the transportation hubsand demobilization stations. They ensurethat these factors are integrated intoplanned movement schedules and thatorganizations with RC forces are giventhe information. The Service MSOs alsoplan for the homecoming support andceremonies [Services].

• Determine, Source, and ApproveForces Needed to Support Demobilization.The Services and CINCs develop andsource the additional manpower neededto support the redeployment; to backfillfor departing units; and to supporthomecoming activities within CONUS.After the Services approve the additionalrequirements, these must be integrated

Equipment retrograde considerations may causepersonnel from demobilizing units to stay behindto process the equipment.

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with all other mobilization resources toensure that ceilings are not violated[CINCs, Services].

5. Execution

a. Before demobilization is executed,MSOs must ensure that a unit or individualwill not be needed for the operation.Politically, recall of units once demobilizedwill be difficult to justify; therefore, theServices should be conservative in releasingforces, especially if they involve unique unitsor skills. In assessing the continuing need forthe RC forces, the MSOs must consider theentire DOD response, since a RC unit notneeded by one component may be useful toanother organization.

b. During execution, MSOs constantlytailor the demobilization operationenvisioned in the plan to the evolvingsituation. They staff recommendations andobtain decisions regarding units andindividuals to be demobilized and adapt thedemobilization support structure.

c. MSOs participate in the followingexecution tasks.

• Educate the Leadership. Provide thedecision makers with information ondemobilization plans and policies,including the schedule of units to bedemobilized and those alreadydemob i l i zed . When s ta f f i ngdemobilization recommendations, theMSOs ensure that both public andcongressional affairs are included in theactions. The MSOs should alert theirleadership that RC callups may continuethrough all phases of an operation toprovide an evolving logistics operationssupport system which must continue afterthe combat or crisis phase is complete.It is particularly important to ensure thatthe leadership does not prematurelyrecommend to end the emergency whichmay provide the legal basis for themobilization of needed RC forces [All].

• Review and Modify DemobilizationConcepts and Support Plans. TheMSOs need to update the existingdemobilization plan, created in theplanning environment, to ensure that thedemobilization concepts, policies, andsupporting plans are accurate and reflectactual circumstances. They staff the

The Services are primarily responsible for the execution of demobilization.

VI-7

Demobilization

demobilization plans with theappropriate organizations to verify thatthe users understand the demobilizationconcept and to enable them to modifytheir plans and operations [All].

• Monitor Changing Requirements andTheater Backfill Requirements. Sincedemobilization is a fluid situation, theMSOs continue to review changingoperational requirements which mayresult in units being demobilized orextended. The supported CINC mustnotify the Services, Joint Staff, andsupporting CINCs when units orindividuals are no longer required orwhen it is feasible to use alternativemanpower sources. If the requirementcontinues to exist, the appropriateServices, supported CINC, andsupporting CINCs must request authorityto extend the active duty period or obtainrotational units for replacement[Services, CINCs].

• Seek Demobilization Approval. Thesupported CINC identifies units andindividuals no longer required to supportoperations in the redeployment plan.

Based on the redeployment plan, eachService will develop a demobilization listwhich is then disseminated within theService for action. Authority to approvethe demobilization list will depend on theService and the particular operation thatmay be delegated [Services].

• Develop Demobilization Schedule.Working closely with the affectedorganizations and USTRANSCOM, theServices create a demobilizationschedule. The schedule includes forcesto be demobilized, specific demobilizationtimes, and projected release dates fromtheater, ports, and demobilizationstations. When the schedule is complete,the Services ensure that organizationswith RC forces review the schedule andupdate their supporting plans [Services].

• Monitor RC Mobilizations andDemobilizations. The MSOs startmonitoring and reporting on RC unitsfrom the beginning of mobilization andthese activities continue throughdemobilization. This tracking isnecessary to obtain information to keepthe leadership and Congress apprised of

The supported CINC must notify the Services, Joint Staff and supportingCINCs when units or individuals are no longer required.

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RC actions during the operation.Chapter V, “Monitoring and Reporting,”covers this function in detail [Joint Staff,Services].

• Highlight Critical Support Issues inSITREPs and Other Forums. Usingthe SITREPs, other JOPES reports,special functional reports or newsgroups, the MSOs surface conflicts andcritical issues to the leadership and theappropriate organization. The MSOs’early action enables the responsibleindividuals and commands to resolveissues expeditiously before theybecome roadblocks to further activities[All].

• Terminate Legal Authorities. Once RCforces are no longer on active duty insupport of the operation, the Joint Staffinforms the Secretary of Defense thatthere is no longer a need for RC forces insupport of the operation. The Secretaryof Defense may terminate theauthorization to order RC forces to activeduty (if such authorization was granted

or delegated to the Secretary of Defense),direct the Services to terminate the orderto activate RC forces, or inform thePresident so that the Presidentialauthorization may be withdrawn. Thisauthority automatically is terminated ifthe President or Congress retracts theoriginal declaration of nationalemergency. The same legislation thatauthorizes mobilization implementscertain emergency authorities andcapabilities. These depend upon theoriginal mobilization authoritycontinuing for their enforcement.Examples of this legislation include thosewhich suspend certain laws pertainingto the promotion, separation, andretirement of active duty personnel (stoploss) and the suspension of OccupationalSafety and Health Administrationregulations. Until the need for supportingor related authorities is eliminated,planners should urge the Secretary ofDefense, through the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, not to rescind theorder or declaration authorizing thecallup [Joint Staff].

APPENDIX AMOBILIZATION ACTIVITY SUMMARIES

A-1

Annex A Chapter II Activity Summary: PlanningB Chapter III Activity Summary: RC Callup Decision MakingC Chapter IV Activity Summary: ExecutionD Chapter V Activity Summary: Monitoring and ReportingE Chapter VI Activity Summary: Demobilization

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Joint Pub 4-05.1

This appendix contains annexes withactivity summaries corresponding to relatedchapters in the guide. These summaries showsubordinate activities, tasks, and responsibleorganizations for the mobilization subprocessdiscussed in that chapter. Use thesesummaries to review required tasks. Refer tothe specific chapter for details on how toaccomplish the tasks. The annexes are:

• Chapter II Activity Summary: Planning(Annex A);

MOBILIZATION ACTIVITY SUMMARIES

• Chapter III Activity Summary: RCCallup Decision Making (Annex B);

• Chapter IV Activity Summary:Execution (Annex C);

• Chapter V Activity Summary:Monitoring and Reporting (Annex D);and

• Chapter VI Activity Summary:Demobilization (Annex E).

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CHAPTER II ACTIVITY SUMMARY: PLANNING

Mobilization Plannin gCommunity

Develop Concept Develop Plan Develop Supportin g Plan Analyses

Common Activities(For all)

l Provide pre-planninginput

l Determine levels of mobilization necessary tosupport projected RC force requirements

l Provide CINC strategicconcept feedback

l Answer questions on the justification of RCcallups

l Plan participation l Validate or refute defense planning guidance

and/or JSCP planning assumptions

Joint Staff l Confirm tasking for RCrequirements summary

l Review completed Appendix 5, Annex A forcomplete operation plan and most probable FDO

Service l Source specific RC

units

l Requirements for complete operation

plan and most probable FDO:

l RC in AOR

l RC unit personnel in TPFDD

l RC non-unit personnel in TPFDD

l Move the Force, Assist Mobilization,Deployment, and/or Sustainment

l Backfill

Supported Command l Draft, coordinate andissue the TPFDD LOI

l Comply with requirement forcompletion of Appendix 5, Annex Ato operation plan

l FDO determination

Subordinate and/orSupportin g CommandsTRANSCOMComponentsJTF

l Requirements for complete operationplan and most probable FDO:

l Move the Force

l Assist Mobilization, Deployment,and/or Sustainment

l Backfill

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-1 Figure A-B-1. Chapter III Activity Summary: RC Callup Decision Making

CHAPTER III ACTIVITY SUMMARY: RC CALLUP DECISION MAKING

MobilizationPlanning

Community

Pre-MobilizationReview and

Coordination

Educate SeniorLeadership on RC

Potential

Interpret Polic ies forUse of Reserve

Components

Confirm Pre-plannedMobilizationCapabilities

RecommendChanges in

Peacetime Budgeting

Priorities

ModifyDemobilizationPolicy to Suit

Contingency

PrepareDecisionPackages

CommonActivities(For all)

l

l

l

l

l

Identify POCnetworkConvene preliminarymeetings focused

on “what if”questions usingcurrent information

Analyze lessonslearned fromsimilar crisesConsider potential

supportingrequirementsManage mediarelations and

coordinate withpublic affairs officer

l Conduct meetingsand/or briefings onRC mobilizationpolicies:

availability,mobilization anddeployment criteria,

callup procedures,and the differentcategories of RCand their potential

use

l

l

l

l

Review and modifycallup instructionsand proceduresRecommend

modifications andexceptions to policy Coordinate with

legal counselReview JAGpolicies and/orprocedures for

“conscientiousobjectors” andSoldiers and SailorsAct

l

l

Estimate ability ofmobilizationactivities to meetplan schedule

Identify capabilityshortfalls

l

l

Review unfundedmobilizationrequirementsCoordinate with

resource areaproponents foradjustments to

internal fundingpriorities

l Initiate planningfor the return ofRC to civilian status

l Respond toinformation requestsas appropriate

Joint Staff l

l

l

Become familiarwith RC Callup

proceduresReview Appendix5, Annex A, ofoperation plan

Be prepared torecommend levelof callup

l

l

l

Review legalauthorities in

10 USCReview mobilizationplans, policies, andprocedures

Brief leadership oncallup authoritiesand specific qualities

of ReserveComponents

l

l

Identify opportunitiesfor joint use of

Service mobilizationassetsMonitor thedevelopment of

RC deploymentcriteria

l Confirm monitoringand reporting

systems: coordinatereportingrequirements

l Seek opportunitiesfor cross-Service

utilization of RCassets

l Seek opportunitiesfor cross-Service

utilization of RCdemobilizationfacilities and assets

l

l

l

Prepare DraftDecision Package

Staff Draft DecisionPackage withServicesForward Package

to Chairman of theJoint Chiefs ofStaff

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Figure A-B-1. Chapter III Activity Summary: RC Callup Decision Making (cont’d)

CHAPTER III ACTIVITY SUMMARY: RC CALLUP DECISION MAKING (cont'd)


Community

Pre-MobilizationReview and

Coordination

Educate SeniorLeadership on RC

Potential

Inter pret Policies forUse of Reserve

Components

Confirm Pre-plannedMobilizationCapabilities

RecommendChanges in

Peacetime BudgetingPriorities

Modif yDemobilizationPolicy to SuitContingency

PrepareDecisionPackages

Service l

l

l

Review monitoringand reportingrequirementsConsider sources of

immediate manpoweraugmentationStart planning fordemobilization

l

l

Review Servicemobilizationdoctrine for unitand individual

callupReview civilianmobilization plans

l

l

l

Develop deploymentcriteria consistentwith the needs ofthe CINC

Review ServiceReadiness Processingpolicies Validate policies

for use of civilians,contractors, andother non-DODagencies

l Validate projectedRC requirements inAppendix 5, AnnexA, of OPLAN within

DOD guidance

l

l

Coordinate withprogram assessmentand budget officeto raise visibility of

unfunded mobilizationrequirementsRecommend changesto eliminate shortages

l

l

Determineredeploymentcriteria for RC unitequipment and

personnelCoordinate withNational Committeefor Employer

Support of theGuard and Reserve

l Coordinate onDraft DecisionPackage

SupportedCommand

l Ensure RCOPLAN support

requirements areprojected

l Ensure theater-unique requirements

are known to forceproviders

l

l

Review mobilizationdoctrine and policy

Brief command onRC capabilities andlimitations to supportplan

l Validate projectedRC requirements in

Appendix 5, AnnexA, of OPLAN

l Support efforts toadjust funding

priorities

l Developredeployment

priorities andschedule

l Coordinate onDraft Decision

Package

Subordinateand/or Supportin gCommandsTRANSCOMComponentsJTF

l Review RC

requirementsprojected by CINC

l

l

Review RC

requirements tomove force, backfilldisplaced units,and assist in themobilization and

deployment processBrief leadership onRC mobilizationdoctrine

l

l

Review mobilization

doctrine and policyBrief command onRC capabilitiesand limitations tosupport plan

l Validate projected

RC requirementsl Support efforts to

adjust fundingpriorities

l

l

Review

demobilizationdoctrineSupportredeploymentand/or

demobilizationoperations

l

l

Coordinate on

Draft DecisionPackageBegin to evaluateneed for subsequentRC augmentation

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Figure A-C-1. Chapter IV Activity Summary: Execution

CHAPTER IV ACTIVITY SUMMARY: EXECUTION

Mobilization PlanningCommunity

Execution


l

l

l

Coordinate with public affairs officerMonitor unit and individual mobilization schedulesReview missions needed to be supported to ensure all requirements have been met

Joint Staff l

l

Monitor force requirementsCoordinate and refine execution policies and guidance

Service l

l

l

l

l

Coordinate and refine execution policies and guidanceMonitor and adjust callup procedures for individualsManage the callup against ceilingsEnsure that TPFDD is updated as CINC requirements changeNotify Congressional Delegations for callup prior to public affairs announcement

Supported Command l

l

Ensure theater-unique requirements that impact upon the RC are known to force providersEnsure that TPFDD is updated as requirements change

Subordinate and/or SupportingCommandsUSTRANSCOMComponentsJTF

l

l

Ensure that TPFDD is updated as requirements changeEnsure unique requirements that impact upon the RC are known to force providers

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-1 Figure A-D-1. Chapter V Activity Summary: Monitoring and Reporting

CHAPTER V ACTIVITY SUMMARY: MONITORING AND REPORTING

Mobilization PlanningCommunity

Monitoring Reporting


l

l

Monitor the status of mobilizationMonitor unit and individual demobilizationschedules

l

l

Gather information to respond to various requestsReport RC forces no longer needed

Joint Staff l

l

Monitor force requirementsDetermine any special informationrequirements and assign reportingrequirements

l

l

l

l

Direct Services provide input for Report to Congress(partial mobilization)Prepare Report to CongressProvide mobilization information as requiredReview MOBREP

Service l

l

Monitor force requirementsMonitor sourcing

l

l

l

l

Enter data into RC Apportionment tablesSubmit MOBREP to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaffReport on problems in providing forcesSubmit input data to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff for Presidential Report to Congress

Supported Command l Enter data into RC Apportionment tables

Subordinate and/orSupporting CommandsUSTRANSCOMComponentsJTF

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Figure A-E-1. Chapter VI Activity Summary: Demobilization

CHAPTER VI ACTIVITY SUMMARY: DEMOBILIZATION


Community

Preliminar y Actions Planning Execution

Plan Demobilization Force Plan Demobilization Support


l

l

Establish demobilizationconcepts and policiesProvide input to the JSCP

l Provide guidance l

l

Educate the leadershipReview and modify demobilization conceptsand support plans

Joint Staff l

l

l

l

Monitor RC mobilizations and demobilizationsValidate support and rotational requirementsResolve any conflicts in resource alignmentPropose that the NCA rescind legal authorities

Service l

l

Determine redeployment anddemobilization strategyDevelop demobilization schedule

l

l

Determine required outprocessingDetermine, source, and approveforces to support demobilization

l

l

l

l

l

l

Monitor RC mobilizations anddemobilizationsMonitor changing requirements and theaterbackfill requirementsExecute demobilization scheduleEstimate and source support and rotationalrequirementsSeek demobilization approvalSolve or adjudicate conflicting resourceclaims

SupportedCommand

l Develop tentative demobilizationschedule

l

l

Determine redeployment supportrequirementsDetermine, source, and approveforces to support demobilization

l

l

l

Offer candidates for demobilizationEstimate and source support and rotationalrequirementsHighlight critical support issues in SITREPs

Subordinate and/orSupportin gCommandsUSTRANSCOMComponentsJTF

l Develop tentative demobilizationschedule

l

l

Determine redeployment supportrequirementsDetermine, source, and approveforces to support demobilization

l

l

l

Offer candidates for demobilizationEstimate and source support and rotationalrequirementsHighlight critical support issues in SITREPs

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APPENDIX BLEGAL AUTHORITIES FOR MOBILIZATION

B-1

Figure B-1 describes the legal authoritiesthat are available for execution of mobilizationactions. Selective mobilization, PresidentialSelected Reserve Callup, partial mobilization,

and full or total mobilization authorities aredescribed, and the actions required to obtainthem, and the authority to obtain them isidentified.

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LEGAL AUTHORITIES FOR MOBILIZATION

LEVEL OF MOBILIZATION DESCRIPTION ACTION REQUIRED AUTHORITY

Selective Mobilization

(Volunteer Callup)

(Service Secretary Callup)

Volunteers from National Guard and Reserves at any time underTitle 10 USC 12301 (d). Units and individuals in an active

status in an RC may be called without consent for not more than15 days a year under 10 USC 12301 (b). Regular Retirees and

Retired Reserve members with 20 years of active service may beordered to active service involuntarily under 10 USC 688.

Consent of State Governors or the Commanding General of theDistrict of Columbia National Guard is required for National

Guard members serving under 10 USC 12301 (b) or (d).

Publish order to active duty. 10 USC 33110 USC 332

10 USC 33310 USC 688

10 USC 1230110 USC 12406

PSRC Units and individuals of Selected and Individual Ready Reserve;

limited to 200,000 (including up to 30,000 IRR) at any one time(all Serv ices) for up to 270 days w ithout consent of the

members.

Presidential Executive Order to invoke

authority. President delegates authority tothe Secretary of Defense and the Secretary

of the Department of Transportation.

10 USC 12304

(Operational mission requiring

augmentation of active force)

President must report to Congress within 24 hours of circumstances

and anticipated use of forces. May not be used to perform anyof the functions authorized by Chapter 15 or 10 USC 12406, or

to provide assistance in time of serious natural or manmadedisaster, accident, or catastrophe.

The Secretary of Defense may exercise stop

loss authority IAW E.O. 12728.

10 USC 12305

Partial Mobilization

(War or national emergency)

Ready Reserve units and individuals (NG and Reserve); limited

to 1,000,000 (all Serv ices) at any one time not more than 24consecutive months.

Presidential executive order declaring a

national emergency. President delegatesauthority to the Secretary of Defense and

the Secretary of the Department of Transportation.

50 USC 1631

10 USC 12302

If not previously ordered, the President will

usually invoke stop loss. The Secretary ofDefense may exercise stop loss authority

IAW E.O. 12728.

10 USC 12305

10 USC 671a10 USC 671b

Full or Total Mobilization

(War or national emergency)

National Guard and Reserve units, members of the Selected,

Ready, and Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve. The periodof active service may be for the duration of the war or

emergency plus 6 months.

Passage of a public law or joint resolution

by the Congress declaring war or nationalemergency. The Secretary of Defense may

exercise stop loss authority IAW E.O.12728.

10 USC 671a

10 USC 671b10 USC 12301

10 USC 1230510 USC 12306

10 USC 12307

Figure B-1. Legal Authorities for Mobilization

APPENDIX CLEVELS OF MOBILIZATION

C-1

1. This appendix addresses the levels ofmobilization available to support operations.Figure C-1 summarizes the levels, the numberof forces authorized for mobilization, theduration of active duty, and the applicablesections of the US Code.

2. The level of mobilization required tosupport an operation depends on a number ofthe following factors:

• Size of the operation;

• Duration of the operation;

• AC and/or RC mix of required forces;

• Quantity of forces required from the RC;and

• Location of forces in the RC.

FORCEEXPANSION

ALL EXISTINGACTIVEAND/ORRESERVEFORCESTRUCTURE

UP TO 1,000,000READYRESERVES

FORCESAND/ORRESOURCES

UP TO 200,000SELECTEDRESERVES(INCLUDINGUP TO 30,000IRR)

FORCE ACTIVATION OPTIONS

LEVELS OF MOBILIZATION

FORCEEXPANSION TOTAL MOBILIZATION

FORCE ACTIVATION OPTIONS

FULL MOBILIZATION

PARTIAL MOBILIZATION

PRESIDENTIAL SELECTEDRESERVE CALLUP



10 USC 12301 (a)

10 USC 12302

10 USC 12304

INVOLUNTARYCALLUP

(NOT TO SCALE)

10 USC 12301 (b)

15 DAYS 270 DAYS 24 MONTHS

DURATION OF AVAILABILITY

CRISIS DURATION +6 MONTHS

ALL EXISTINGACTIVEAND/ORRESERVEFORCE

UP TO 1,000,000READYRESERVES

FORCESAND/ORRESOURCES

UP TO 200,000SELECTEDRESERVES(INCLUDINGUP TO 30,000IRR)

VOLUNTARYCALLUP10 USC 12301 (d)NO TIME LIMIT

Figure C-1. Levels of Mobilization

C-2

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Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX DREFERENCES

D-1

The development of Joint Pub 4-05.1 is based upon the following primary references:

1. Legal Authorities

a. The Constitution of the United States of America.

b. United States Code:

(1) Title 3, “The President.”

(2) Title 10, “Armed Forces.”

(3) Title 14, “Coast Guard.”

(4) Title 32, “National Guard.”

(5) Title 37, “Pay and Allowances of the Uniformed Services.”

(6) Title 50, “War and National Defense.”

2. DOD

a. Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)

b. DOD 3020.36-P, “Master Mobilization Plan.”

c. DODD 1235.10, “Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserves.”

d. DODD 1400.31, “DoD Civilian Work Force Contingency and Emergency Planningand Execution.”

e. DODD 1400.32, “DoD Civilian Work Force Contingency and Emergency PlanningGuidelines and Procedures.”

f. DODD 5158.4, “United States Transportation Command.”

g. DODI 1100.19G, “Wartime Manpower Mobilization Planning Policies and Procedures.”

h. DODI 1235.12, “Accessing the Ready Reserves.”

D-2

Appendix D

Joint Pub 4-05.1

3. Joint

a. Contingency Planning Guidance.

b. CJCSI 3110.03, “Logistics Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.”

c. CJCSI 3110.06, “Special Operations Supplement to Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.”

d. CJCSI 3110.11B, “Mobility Supplement to Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.”

e. CJCSI 3110.12, “Civil Affairs Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.”

f. CJCSI 3110.13, “Mobilization Guidance for the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.”

g. CJSCM 3122.02, “Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Developmentand Deployment Execution.”

h. CJCSM 3122.03, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (PlanningFormats and Guidance).”

i. CJCSM 3150.13, “Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) Personnel Manual,” (formerly JointPub 1-03.17).

j. Joint Pub 1-03, “Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) General Instructions.”

k. Joint Pub 3-05, “Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.”

l. Joint Pub 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.”

m. Joint Pub 4-0, “Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.”

n. Joint Pub 4-01.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airlift Support to JointOperations.”

o. Joint Pub 4-01.2, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Sealift Support to JointOperations.”

p. Joint Pub 4-01.3, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control.”

q. Joint Pub 4-02, “Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations.”

r. Joint Pub 4-05, “Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning.”

s. Joint Pub 5-00.2, “Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.”

D-3

References

t. Joint Pub 5-03.1, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (PlanningPolicies and Procedures).”

u. Joint Military Net Assessment.

v. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

w. National Military Strategy of the United States of America.

4. Service

a. Air Force War and Mobilization Plan.

b. Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System.

c. Army, FM 100-17, “Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization.”

d. Coast Guard Manpower Mobilization and Support Plan.

e. Marine Corps Capabilities Plan.

f. Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan.

g. Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan.

D-4

Appendix D

Joint Pub 4-05.1

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX EADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

E-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to theUnited States Atlantic Command Joint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division,Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000. These comments should addresscontent (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and the Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director forLogistics (J-4).

3. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J4/INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans andInteroperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as anenclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requestedto notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected inthis publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

E-2

Appendix E

Joint Pub 4-05.1

4. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publicationcenters.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreigngovernments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (DefenseAttaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, Room 1A674, Pentagon,Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,“Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.”

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL1655 Woodson RoadAttn: Joint PublicationsSt. Louis, MO 63114-6181

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: Distribution of unclassified new and newly revised jointpublications will be limited to providing to US Navycommands the Joint Electronic Library (JEL) CD-ROM anddownload from the Joint Doctrine Internet Homepage (e.g.,www.dtic.mil/doctrine). (Individual commands will then beable to print copies as needed for training and operations.Hardcopy distribution of classified joint pubs will continue.)

Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics BaseAlbany, GA 31704-5000

Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G-OPD)2100 2nd Street, SWWashington, DC 20593-0001

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified jointpublications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.

GLOSSARYPART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

AC Active componentAMC Air Mobility CommandAOR area of responsibility

C2 command and controlCAP crisis action planningCINC commander in chiefCJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffCJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff InstructionCJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ManualCOA course of actionCONUS continental United States

DOD Department of DefenseDODD Department of Defense DirectiveDODI Department of Defense Instruction

FDO flexible deterrent option

GCCS Global Command and Control System

IMA individual mobilization augmentee

J-1 Manpower and Personnel Directorate of a joint staffJ-3 Operations Directorate of a joint staffJ-4 Logistics Directorate of a joint staffJOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution SystemJSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

LOI letter of instruction

MOBREP military manpower mobilization and accession status reportMOOTW military operations other than warMSC Military Sealift CommandMSO mobilization staff officerMTMC Military Traffic Management CommandMTW major theater war

NCA National Command AuthoritiesNDAA National Defense Authorization Act

OCONUS outside the continental United StatesOPLAN operation planOSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

POC point of contactPSRC Presidential Selected Reserve Callup Authority

RC Reserve Component

SecDef Secretary of DefenseSITREP situation reportSOF special operations forcesSORTS Status of Resources and Training System

TPFDD time-phased force and deployment dataTRO Training and Readiness Oversight

USACOM United States Atlantic CommandUSC United States CodeUSSOCOM United States Special Operations CommandUSTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command

GL-2

Glossary

Joint Pub 4-05.1

active duty for special work. A tour of activeduty for reserve personnel authorized frommi l i t a ry and reserve personne lappropriations for work on active or reservecomponent programs. This includes annualscreening, training camp operations,training ship operations, and unitconversion to new weapon systems whensuch duties are essential. Active duty forspecial work may also be authorized tosupport study groups, training sites andexercises, short-term projects, and doingadministrative or support functions. Bypolicy, active duty for special work toursare normally limited to 179 days or less inone fiscal year. Tours exceeding 180 daysare accountable against active duty endstrength. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of responsibility. 1. The geographicalarea associated with a combatant commandwithin which a combatant commander hasauthority to plan and conduct operations.2. In naval usage, a predefined area ofenemy terrain for which supporting shipsare responsible for covering by fire onknown targets or targets of opportunity andby observation. Also called AOR. (JointPub 1-02)

backfill. RC units and individuals recalledto replace deploying active units and/orindividuals in the continental United Statesand outside the continental United States.(This term and its definition are approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of JointPub 1-02.)

c-day. See times. (Joint Pub 1-02)

command and control. The exercise ofauthority and direction by a properlydesignated commander over assigned andattached forces in the accomplishment ofthe mission. Command and controlfunctions are performed through an

arrangement of personnel, equipment,communications, facilities, and proceduresemployed by a commander in planning,directing, coordinating, and controllingforces and operations in the accomplishmentof the mission. Also called C2. (Joint Pub1-02)

concept plan. An operation plan in conceptformat. Also called CONPLAN. (Joint Pub1-02)

crisis action planning. 1. The JointOperation Planning and Execution Systemprocess involving the time-sensitivedevelopment of joint operation plans andorders in response to an imminent crisis.Crisis action planning follows prescribedcrisis action procedures to formulate andimplement an effective response within thetime frame permitted by the crisis. 2. Thetime-sensitive planning for the deployment,employment, and sustainment of assignedand allocated forces and resources thatoccurs in response to a situation that mayresult in actual military operations. Crisisaction planners base their plan on thecircumstances that exist at the time planningoccurs. Also called CAP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

d-day. See times. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Defense Planning Guidance. Thisdocument, issued by the Secretary ofDefense, provides firm guidance in the formof goals, priorities, and objectives, includingfiscal constraints, for the development ofthe Program Objective Memorandum bythe Military Department and Defenseagencies. Also called DPG. (Joint Pub1-02)

deliberate planning. 1. The Joint OperationPlanning and Execution System processinvolving the development of jointoperation plans for contingencies identified

GL-3

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

GL-4

Glossary

Joint Pub 4-05.1

in joint strategic planning documents.Conducted principally in peacetime,deliberate planning is accomplished inprescribed cycles that complement otherDepartment of Defense planning cycles inaccordance with the formally establishedJoint Strategic Planning System. 2. Aplanning process for the deployment andemployment of apportioned forces andresources that occurs in response to ahypothetical situation. Deliberate plannersrely heavily on assumptions regarding thecircumstances that will exist when the planis executed. (Joint Pub 1-02)

demobilization. The process of transitioninga conflict or wartime military establishmentand defense-based civilian economy to apeacetime configuration while maintainingnational security and economic vitality.(Joint Pub 1-02)

Flexible Deterrent Option. A planningconstruct intended to facilitate earlydecision by laying out a wide range ofinterrelated response paths that begin withdeterrent-oriented options carefully tailoredto send the right signal. The FlexibleDeterrent Option is the means by which thevarious deterrent options available to acommander (such as economic, diplomatic,political and military measures) areimplemented into the planning process.Also called FDO. (This term and itsdefinition are approved for inclusion in thenext edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

full mobilization. See mobilization. (JointPub 1-02)

Global Command and Control System.Highly mobile, deployable command andcontrol system supporting forces for jointand multinational operations across therange of military operations, any time andanywhere in the world with compatible,interoperable, and integrated command,control, communications, computers, and

intelligence systems. Also called GCCS.(Joint Pub 1-02)

individual mobilization augmentee. Anindividual reservist attending drills whoreceives training and is preassigned to anactive component organization, a SelectiveService System, or a Federal EmergencyManagement Agency billet that must befilled on, or shortly after, mobilization.Individual mobilization augmentees trainon a part-time basis with these organizationsto prepare for mobilization. Inactive dutytraining for individual mobilizationaugmentees is decided by component policyand can vary from 0 to 48 drills a year.(Joint Pub 1-02)

Individual Ready Reserve. A manpowerpool consisting of individuals who have hadsome training and who have servedpreviously in the Active Component or inthe Selected Reserve and have some periodof their military service obligationremaining. Members may voluntarilyparticipate in training for retirement pointsand promotion with or without pay. Alsocalled IRR. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force commander. A general termapplied to a combatant commander,subunified commander, or joint task forcecommander authorized to exercisecombatant command (command authority)or operational control over a joint force.Also called JFC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Joint Operation Planning and ExecutionSystem. A continuously evolving systemthat is being developed through theintegration and enhancement of earlierplanning and execution systems: JointOperation Planning System and JointDeployment System. It provides thefoundation for conventional command andcontrol by national- and theater-levelcommanders and their staffs. It is designedto satisfy their information needs in the

GL-5

Glossary

conduct of joint planning and operations.Joint Operation Planning and ExecutionSystem (JOPES) includes joint operationplanning policies, procedures, and reportingstructures supported by communicationsand automated data processing systems.JOPES is used to monitor, plan, and executemobilization, deployment, employment,and sustainment activities associated withjoint operations. Also called JOPES. (JointPub 1-02)

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The JointStrategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) containsguidance to the combatant commanders andService Chiefs for accomplishing militarytasks and missions based on current militarycapabilities. These assignments take intoaccount the capabilities of available forces,intelligence information, and guidanceissued by the Secretary of Defense. TheJSCP directs the development ofcontingency plans to support nationalsecurity objectives by assigning planningtasks and apportioning major combat forcesand strategic lift capability to the combatantcommanders. (This term and its definitionare approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.The actions and methods which implementjoint doctrine and describe how forces willbe employed in joint operations. They willbe promulgated by the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination withthe combatant commands, Services, andJoint Staff. Also called JTTP. (Joint Pub1-02)

mobilization. 1. The act of assembling andorganizing national resources to supportnational objectives in time of war or otheremergencies. See also industrialmobilization. 2. The process by which theArmed Forces or part of them are broughtto a state of readiness for war or other

national emergency. This includesactivating all or part of the ReserveComponents as well as assembling andorganizing personnel, supplies, andmateriel. Mobilization of the Armed Forcesincludes but is not limited to the followingcategories: a. selective mobilization —Expansion of the active Armed Forcesresulting from action by Congress and/orthe President to mobilize ReserveComponent units, individual readyreservists, and the resources needed for theirsupport to meet the requirements of adomestic emergency that is not the resultof an enemy attack. b. partial mobilization— Expansion of the active Armed Forcesresulting from action by Congress (up tofull mobilization) or by the President (notmore than 1,000,000 for not more than 24consecutive months) to mobilize ReadyReserve Component units, individualreservists, and the resources needed for theirsupport to meet the requirements of a waror other national emergency involving anexternal threat to the national security. c.full mobilization — Expansion of the activeArmed Forces resulting from action byCongress and the President to mobilize allReserve Component units in the existingapproved force structure, all individualreservists, retired military personnel, andthe resources needed for their support tomeet the requirements of a war or othernational emergency involving an externalthreat to the national security. Reservepersonnel can be placed on active duty forthe duration of the emergency plus sixmonths. d. total mobilization — Expansionof the active Armed Forces resulting fromaction by Congress and the President toorganize and/or generate additional units orpersonnel, beyond the existing forcestructure, and the resources needed for theirsupport, to meet the total requirements of awar or other national emergency involvingan external threat to the national security.(Joint Pub 1-02)

GL-6

Glossary

Joint Pub 4-05.1

mobilization base. The total of all resourcesavailable, or which can be made available,to meet foreseeable wartime needs. Suchresources include the manpower andmaterial resources and services required forthe support of essential military, civilian,and survival activities, as well as theelements affecting their state of readiness,such as (but not limited to) the following:manning levels, state of training,modernization of equipment, mobilizationmateriel reserves and facilities, continuityof government, civil defense plans andpreparedness measures, psychologicalpreparedness of the people, internationalagreements, planning with industry,dispersion, and standby legislation andcontrols. (Joint Pub 1-02)

mobilization site. The designated locationwhere a Reserve Component unit orindividual mobilizes or moves aftermobilization for further processing,training, and employment. This differsfrom a mobilization station in that it is notnecessarily a military installation. (JointPub 1-02)

mobilization staff officer. The action officerassigned the principle responsibility oradditional duties related to RC mobilizationactions. (This term and its definition areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02.)

mobilization station. The designatedmilitary installation to which a ReserveComponent unit or individual is moved forfurther processing, organizing, equipping,training, and employment and from whichthe unit or individual may move to an aerialport of embarkation or seaport ofembarkation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

national emergency. A condition declaredby the President or the Congress by virtueof powers previously vested in them thatauthorize certain emergency actions to be

undertaken in the national interest. Actionto be taken may include partial, full, or totalmobilization of national resources. (JointPub 1-02)

operation plan. Any plan, except for theSingle Integrated Operation Plan, for theconduct of military operations. Plans areprepared by combatant commanders inresponse to requirements established by theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff andby commanders of subordinate commandsin response to requirements tasked by theestablishing unified commander. Operationplans are prepared in either a completeformat (OPLAN) or as a concept plan(CONPLAN). The CONPLAN can bepublished with or without a time-phasedforce and deployment data (TPFDD) file.a. OPLAN — An operation plan for theconduct of joint operations that can be usedas a basis for development of an operationorder (OPORD). An OPLAN identifies theforces and supplies required to execute theCINC’s Strategic Concept and a movementschedule of these resources to the theaterof operations. The forces and supplies areidentified in TPFDD files. OPLANs willinclude all phases of the tasked operation.The plan is prepared with the appropriateannexes, appendixes, and TPFDD files asdescribed in the Joint Operation Planningand Execution System manuals containingplanning policies, procedures, and formats.Also called OPLAN. b. CONPLAN —An operation plan in an abbreviated formatthat would require considerable expansionor alteration to convert it into an OPLANor OPORD. A CONPLAN contains theCINC’s Strategic Concept and thoseannexes and appendixes deemed necessaryby the combatant commander to completeplanning. Generally, detailed supportrequirements are not calculated and TPFDDfiles are not prepared. Also calledCONPLAN. c. CONPLAN with TPFDD— A CONPLAN with TPFDD is the sameas a CONPLAN except that it requires more

GL-7

Glossary

detailed planning for phased deploymentof forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

partial mobilization. See mobilization.(Joint Pub 1-02)

Presidential Selected Reserve CallupAuthority. Provision of a public law (Title10, US Code Section 12304) that providesthe President a means to activate, without adeclaration of national emergency, not morethan 200,000 members of the SelectedReserve for not more than 270 days to meetthe support requirements of any operationalmission. Members called under thisprovision may not be used for disaster reliefor to suppress insurrection. This authorityhas particular utility when used incircumstances in which the escalatorynational or international signals of partialor full mobilization would be undesirable.Forces available under this authority canprovide a tailored, limited-scope, deterrent,or operational response, or may be used asa precursor to any subsequent mobilization.Also called PSRC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Ready Reserve. The Selected Reserve,Individual Reserve, and Inactive NationalGuard liable for active duty as prescribedby law (US Code, title 10 (DOD), sections10142, 12301, and 12302). (Joint Pub 1-02)

required delivery date. A date, relative toC-day, when a unit must arrive at itsdestination and complete offloading toproperly support the concept of operations.Also called RDD. (Joint Pub 1-02)

reserve. 2. Members of the Military Serviceswho are not in active service but who aresubject to call to active duty. (Joint Pub1-02)

Reserve Components. Reserve Componentsof the Armed Forces of the United Statesare: a. the Army National Guard of theUnited States; b. the Army Reserve; c.

the Naval Reserve; d. the Marine CorpsReserve; e. the Air National Guard of theUnited States; f. the Air Force Reserve;and g. the Coast Guard Reserve. Also calledRC. (This term and its definition modifythe current term and definition and areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02.)

Selected Reserve. Those units andindividuals within the Ready Reservedesignated by their respective Services andapproved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as soessential to initial wartime missions thatthey have priority over all other Reserves.All Selected Reservists are in an activestatus. The Selected Reserve also includespersons performing initial active duty fortraining. (Joint Pub 1-02)

selective mobilization. See mobilization.(Joint Pub 1-02)

time-phased force and deployment data.The Joint Operation Planning andExecution System data base portion of anoperation plan; it contains time-phasedforce data, non-unit-related cargo andpersonnel data, and movement data for theoperation plan, including: a. In-place units.b. Units to be deployed to support theoperation plan with a priority indicating thedesired sequence for their arrival at the portof debarkation. c. Routing of forces to bedeployed. d. Movement data associatedwith deploying forces. e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnelmovements to be conducted concurrentlywith the deployment of forces. f. Estimateof transportation requirements that must befulfilled by common-user lift resources aswell as those requirements that can befulfilled by assigned or attachedtransportation resources. Also calledTPFDD. (Joint Pub 1-02)

times. (C-, D-, M-days end at 2400 hoursUniversal Time (zulu time) and are assumed

GL-8

Glossary

Joint Pub 4-05.1

to be 24 hours long for planning.) TheChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffnormally coordinates the proposed datewith the commanders of the appropriateunified and specified commands, as wellas any recommended changes to C-day.L-hour will be established per plan, crisis,or theater of operations and will apply toboth air and surface movements. Normally,L-hour will be established to allow C-dayto be a 24-hour day. a. C-day. Theunnamed day on which a deploymentoperation commences or is to commence.The deployment may be movement oftroops, cargo, weapon systems, or acombination of these elements using anyor all types of transport. The letter “C” willbe the only one used to denote the above.The highest command or headquartersresponsible for coordinating the planningwill specify the exact meaning of C-daywithin the aforementioned definition. Thecommand or headquarters directlyresponsible for the execution of theoperation, if other than the one coordinatingthe planning, will do so in light of themeaning specified by the highest commandor headquarters coordinating the planning.b. D-day. The unnamed day on which aparticular operation commences or is tocommence. c. F-hour. The effective timeof announcement by the Secretary of

Defense to the Military Departments of adecision to mobilize Reserve units. d.H-hour. The specific hour on D-day atwhich a particular operation commences.e. L-hour. The specific hour on C-day atwhich a deployment operation commencesor is to commence. f. M-day. The termused to designate the unnamed day onwhich full mobilization commences or isdue to commence. g. N-day. The unnamedday an active duty unit is notified fordeployment or redeployment. h. R-day.Redeployment day. The day on whichredeployment of major combat, combatsupport, and combat service supportforces begins in an operation. i. S-day.The day the President authorizesSelective Reserve callup (not more than200,000). j. T-day. The effective daycoincident with Presidential declarationof National Emergency andauthorization of partial mobilization (notmore than 1,000,000 personnel exclusiveof the 200,000 callup). k. W-day.Declared by the National CommandAuthorities, W-day is associated with anadversary decision to prepare for war(unambiguous strategic warning). (JointPub 1-02)

total mobilization. See mobilization. (JointPub 1-02)

Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCS

Includes scope ofproject, references,milestones, and who willdevelop drafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

!

!

!

The CINCS receive the puband begin to assess it duringuse

18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director J-7,will solicit a written report fromthe combatant commands andServices on the utility andquality of each pub and theneed for any urgent changes orearlier-than-scheduledrevisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each pub isrevised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

!

!

!

ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staffto fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

!

!

!

STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy asshown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrine publications. Thediagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Pub 4-05.1 Logistics

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHYJOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT PUB 1-0 JOINT PUB 2-0 JOINT PUB 3-0

PERSONNEL

JOINT PUB 4-0 JOINT PUB 5-0 JOINT PUB 6-0

LOGISTICSINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS C4 SYSTEMSPLANS

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to JointStaff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makesrequired changes and prepares pub forcoordination with Services and CINCS

Joint Staff conducts formalstaffing for approval as a Joint Publication

STEP #4CJCS Approval

!

!

!

Lead Agent selects Primary ReviewAuthority (PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCS,Services, and Joint Staff

!

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!

STEP #3Two Drafts

JOINT PUB 1

JOINTWARFARE

JOINT PUB 0-2

UNAAF