Julius Caesar and the transformation of the Roman Republic

“An excellent introduction to the life of Julius Caesar against the background ofthe late Republic. It covers the issues normally raised in teaching the subject, intro-duces the reader to the evidence and the positions taken by modern historians, andpoints out the misunderstandings to which one-sided interpretations may lead. Itis admirable for the swift and sure way it covers difficult ground.”

Andrew Lintott, University of Oxford, UK

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JULIUS CAESAR AND THETRANSFORMATION OF THEROMAN REPUBLIC

Julius Caesar and theTransformation of the Roman Republic provides an accessible intro-duction to Caesar’s life and public career. It outlines the main phases of his careerwith reference to prominent social and political concepts of the time.This approachhelps to explain his aims, ideals, and motives as rooted in tradition, and demon-strates that Caesar’s rise to power owed much to broad historical processes of thelate Republican period, a view that contrasts with the long-held idea that hesought to become Rome’s king from an early age.This is an essential undergraduateintroduction to this fascinating figure, and to his role in the transformation ofRome from republic to empire.

Tom Stevenson is a Senior Lecturer in Classics and Ancient History at theUniversity of Queensland,Australia


JULIUS CAESAR ANDTHE TRANSFORMATIONOF THE ROMANREPUBLIC

Tom Stevenson

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CONTENTS

Acknowledgements xiList of figures xii

1 Caesar: The influence of Julius Caesar inWestern Culture 1

2 Imperium: Empire, society and politics in 100 BCE 15

3 Nobilis:Caesar as a young noble, 100–70 BCE 35

4 Ambitio: The ambition of Caesar, 69–64 BCE 51

5 Pietas: The piety of Caesar, 63–59 BCE 63

6 Gloria –The pursuit of military glory in Gaul, 58–56 BCE 79

7 Victoria:Victory over the Gauls, 55–52 BCE 95

8 Dignitas: Pompey, Caesar and relative rank, 52–49 BCE 109

9 Fortuna: Fortune and the civil war, 49–45 BCE 123

10 Clementia:Caesar’s dictatorship as paternal rule, 49–44 BCE 139

11 Libertas:Caesar’s dictatorship as tyranny, 49–44 BCE 153

x Contents

12 Res Publica:Caesar’s role in the transformation of theRoman Republic 167

Table of Events, 100–44 BCE 181Bibliography 187Indexes 199

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A book accumulates many debts.This one has derived great benefit from the inputof my teachers and my students. Among the former I am particularly grateful toMartin Stone, Peter Brennan and Léonie Hayne. From the cohorts of the latter Iowe most to Tim Hamlyn, who read the manuscript from beginning to end andsaved me from many errors. My thanks also to Andrew Lintott, who offered sageadvice after reading the manuscript at a late stage.The biggest debt is easily to theperson to whom the book is dedicated.

LIST OF FIGURES

1 A Contemporary portrait of Caesar.The portrait comes fromTusculumand is now in the Castello d’Algie,Turin, Italy. If this portrait is indeedthe only surviving representation from Caesar’s lifetime, as somescholars believe, it might be the most accurate likeness we possess. 4

2 Map of the MediterraneanWorld in the age of Caesar. 163 A silver denarius, minted c. 47 BCE, advertising the Trojan ancestry

of the Julii (Crawford 1974, no. 458/1). 674 Map of Gaul in the age of Caesar. 835 Plan of the battle of Pharsalus (48 BCE). 1296 A silver denarius of February–March 44 BCE, minted by

Publius Sepullius Macer, advertising Caesar as Dictator Perpetuo(Crawford 1974, no. 480/13). 155

7 A silver denarius of 54 (?) BCE, advertising Lucius Junius Brutusand Libertas (Crawford 1974, no. 433/1). 162

8 A silver denarius of 54 (?) BCE, advertising Lucius Junius Brutusand Gaius Servilius Ahala (Crawford 1974, no. 433/2). 162

9 A silver denarius of 44 BCE, minted by Lucius Plaetorius Cestianus,advertising Brutus in conjunction with symbols justifying Caesar’sassassination as a tyrant (Crawford 1974, no. 508/3; CassiusDio 47.25.1). 164

1CAESAR

The influence of Julius Caesar in Western Culture

The idea of Caesar

It is hard to imagine a more important subject for a biography.The life and achieve-ments of Gaius Julius Caesar (100–44 BCE) have exercised a huge influence onwestern history and culture. Moreover, he helped to set a pattern for interactionsbetween West and East that have arguably persisted to the present day. His nameregularly evokes a kind of awe, an impression of greatness, a sense of superiority,and even the idea of someone more than simply human. An internet search for‘Caesar’ results in millions of hits.A search for images produces an array of impo-sing stone portraits and coin types, along with scenes from plays and films, in whichCaesar is played by actors of the highest caliber. His name is instantly recognizableand he is widely known as a great Roman, even by people who have never readabout him. He has become a leading symbol of the grandeur of Rome.Yet at onetime he was not the greatest name in Roman history, let alone an awesome idea.He was a man with real human strengths and weaknesses who became involved inthe conflicts and struggles for power of his age. His actions eventually saw himbecome dictator, and even perpetual dictator, at Rome.This book will concentrateon his behavior in an age of conflict, along with his motives for doing what he did.He has been interpreted as a phenomenon, but this often means that he isexamined out of context, so that he becomes superhuman rather than human. Hisactions and motives, however, may be understood better if he is studied in relationto the processes and values of his age. In many ways he was an extraordinary man,but a man of his time nonetheless.

In this opening chapter, the major aims are to survey Caesar’s influence and tocontemplate the ongoing construction of his image.The discussion is divided intothree parts:

2 The influence of Julius Caesar in Western Culture

1 some remarks about Caesar’s enigmatic personality and profound influence;2 a survey of the attitudes of ancient and modern writers to him; and3 a concluding section about the approach that will be taken by this book,which

will question the deeply rooted theme that he sought kingship at Rome froman early age and will instead discuss major stages of his career in the light ofimportant social and political ideas of the time. Such ideas demonstrate thetraditional background to Caesar’s motives and actions.

It will quickly become obvious that Caesar has been loved and hated. He has beenadmired by some writers, and damned by others.Nevertheless, it is remarkable howoften a romantic image of Caesar has been accepted, even among academic writers.This view is increasingly questioned today,with some scholars seeing him as a fairlytypical representative of his class and others emphasizing that a range of socio-economic and other factors underpinned Caesar’s achievements. For such scholarsCaesar was not responsible for all the successes and failures he experienced.Yet thiskind of attitude is troubling in its implications, and it is ultimately not helpful todeny Caesar’s genius or to undermine the impression that he was a charismaticleader and master motivator. Some kind of balance needs to be achieved betweenpersonal and impersonal factors. It will not be argued here that Caesar was an idealmodel for contemporary leaders, but his personal responsibility for the things heachieved – and the damage he caused – ought to be emphasized in conjunctionwith the historical processes that prevailed in his day. He shaped his times just as,undoubtedly, he was shaped by them.

Caesar’s personality and influence

The biographer Suetonius has this to say about Caesar’s appearance and health (Lifeof the Divine Julius 45.1–2, Dillon and Garland 13.56):

Caesar is said to have been tall,with a fair complexion, shapely limbs, a ratherfull face, and keen black eyes, and to have had sound health, except thattowards the end of his life he was subject to sudden fainting fits as well asnightmares. He also had two attacks of epilepsy while on campaign. He wasfastidious in the care of his person, and so not only kept his hair carefullytrimmed and shaved, but even had his body hair plucked – some accuse himof that at any rate – while he was extremely vexed by the disfiguring effectof his baldness, since he found it exposed him to the ridicule of hisopponents. As a result he used to comb his receding hair forward from thecrown of his head and, of all the honors voted him by the senate and people,there was none that pleased him more or that he made use of more gladlythan the privilege of wearing a laurel wreath on all occasions.

Suetonius, who wrote around one hundred and fifty years after Caesar’s death,paints his subject as a handsome, strong, but vain man in this passage.The alleged

The influence of Julius Caesar in Western Culture 3

obsession with his hair might derive from hostile interpretations of some ofCaesar’s statues (figure 1). Certainly friends and enemies tried hard to ensure thatpeople thought of Caesar in contrasting ways. As a result it is often difficult todisentangle fact from fiction, or to generalize about his personality. In some writersCaesar emerges as a restless, flashy personality, a man of notable personal idiosyn-crasies, vanity, and boundless, unshakeable ambition. His personal traits were muchcommented upon: his clothing was eye-catching (e.g. his toga, normally a plain andrestrictive sort of garment, he glamorized with fringed sleeves), he took obsessivemeasures with his personal appearance, he could hate with a passion, as his intensefeud with Cato theYounger shows, and he was a noted seducer of women.He wasa man capable of massive violence: his governorships, his consulship in 59 BCE, andthe civil war prove this.As a result, the hatred felt for him by Cato and others wasprofound. Alongside his ambition and ruthlessness, his sexual appetite drew sharpcomment (Suetonius, Life of the Divine Julius 49–52).The Romans certainly madea link between lust for political power and sexual lust, so that stories about hissexual activities should perhaps be treated with caution.They form, however, toostrong an element to be treated with total skepticism.

Other reactions to his personality and achievements were overwhelminglypositive. Many people absolutely loved him. He was deified and received worshipas a god of the state cult. Some scholars think this was a formal reaction to hismonarchic power, rather than a truly ‘religious’ phenomenon, but it seems likelythat there were many contemporaries who were convinced of his divine spirit anddescent.At times he was spontaneously worshipped with sacrifices and prayers forhis achievements, so truly incredible did they appear.The name ‘Caesar’ came toacquire huge charisma, especially with the soldiers. It was the name they chantedin victory and triumph, it was the single name that Octavian (the later emperorAugustus) used as his own upon learning of his adoption in Caesar’s will, it becamethe imperial name, so that Rome’s emperors were all ‘Caesars’, and it became apassionate idea for the Roman Empire. In Roman terms Caesar possessed positiveand negative traits, and he was looked upon with both admiration and loathing bycontemporaries – truly a man who polarized public opinion.

His name and image remained powerful in later ages. One of our monthscontinues to be known as ‘July’.The use of the ‘Caesarian section’ in the case ofdifficult births perpetuates a highly unlikely story about Caesar’s own birth. Dante,the famous Italian poet of the thirteenth century CE, lived in a world of Kings andPopes. Consequently, he placed Caesar’s assassins Brutus and Cassius in the deepestcircle of Hell, in the company of Judas Iscariot, who betrayed Jesus Christ. In theeighteenth century CE, however, leading lights of the American and FrenchRevolutions saw Brutus as a hero and Caesar as a tyrant. It was Caesar, they said,who destroyed the Roman Republic, under which the state was governed byelected magistrates, and helped to found the Empire, under which power wasconcentrated in the hands of a monarchic emperor. Famous generals like Napoleonpored over accounts of Caesar’s exploits for clues to his military success. Emperors,monarchs, and rulers were known as ‘Caesar’ from the time of Augustus until the

FIGURE 1 A Contemporary portrait of Caesar.The portrait comes from Tusculum andis now in the Castello d’Algie,Turin, Italy. If this portrait is indeed the onlysurviving representation from Caesar’s lifetime, as some scholars believe, itmight be the most accurate likeness we possess.

Photo: Kopperman. Neg. D-DAI-ROM-65.1111.



twentieth century CE. It is less than a century since a ‘Tsar’ or ‘Czar’ ruled Russiaand a ‘Kaiser’ ruled Germany, these being modern renderings of Caesar’s name.TheItalian fascists of the 1930s used Caesar as one of their prime models of superiority,along with Augustus.They claimed territory in North Africa and elsewhere withthe argument that these places had once belonged to Rome through the conquestsof such outstanding Romans as Caesar. Modern regimes like these, making coreclaims based on the image and conquests of Caesar, were understandably not verygood at assessing him in a critical manner, preferring instead to use him as a positivesymbol for their rulers or states. Caesar has appeared in literature of all kinds forcenturies. Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar remains one of the bard’s most popular plays,though Brutus is the character presented with the tragic dilemma. It is little wonderthat famous actors vie to play Caesar in drama and film, and little wonder thatproducers continue to see him as a bankable figure, so that plans to make filmsabout him are quite regularly discussed.Whatever might be said about him in anegative vein, many people tend to hold the positive view as their default positionand evoke the greatness of an almost mythical figure in employing his name socommonly. ‘Julio’ rivals ‘Jesus’ as a personal name in large parts of the world. Menand women named ‘Julius’, ‘Julian’, ‘Julia’, and ‘Julie’ are not hard to find. ‘Cézar’,‘Cesario’, ‘Cesare’, and ‘di Cesare’ are very common too.

Attitudes of ancient and modern writers to Caesar

It is gratifying that biographies remain popular because they are concerned withthe lives of individual human beings. As such, they stand for the principle thatindividuals can make a difference and that their lives are therefore worthy ofinterest. Biographies, however, form a genre of literature that is beset by funda-mental difficulties.Writers have at times hoped to discover the real human beingbeneath the evidence, but it is the evidence that is the only ‘real’ thing left to us. Inthe case of Caesar, it is not possible to reconstruct a fundamental reality, whichwould be acceptable to all readers. It is possible, however, to read some of hiswritings, to read some writings about him, and to analyze archaeological and docu-mentary sources, such as inscriptions and coins.The task becomes one of engagingwith the evidence for Caesar’s life, and of dealing sensitively with some of themajor themes and biases of the source material.

It should come as no surprise to learn that ancient writers are divided in theirattitudes to Caesar. After all, he was adored by some of his contemporaries andabsolutely loathed by others. The struggle to establish an authoritative interpre-tation of his career and personality began during his lifetime, and it has persisteddown to the present day.The evidence for his life, therefore, is a mix of positive andnegative attitudes and portrayals. His own campaign commentaries, the BellumGallicum (GallicWar) and the Bellum Civile (CivilWar), are works of persuasion thatmust be treated with the utmost caution.They appear on the surface to be matter-of-fact accounts marked by clarity and detached objectivity, but of course they arewritten from Caesar’s point of view and their bias is strong. He wrote other works


too, and was clearly a man of literary talent and intellectual curiosity, as emphasizedby Pliny the Elder (Natural History 7.91–4), a writer of the first century CE.Fragments of Caesar’s speeches survive, along with a few lines of poetry, whichcomment unfavorably on the playwright Terence. Along with a tragedy entitledOedipus, written in his youth, he wrote many letters and political pamphlets, inclu-ding a vicious attack on his enemy Cato called the Anticato. The author of atwo–volume work on the use of analogy in oratory, Caesar was also interested inastronomy. In 45 BCE he commissioned the great scholar MarcusTerentiusVarro toorganize Rome’s first public library. His jokes were published, though the publi-cation was suppressed as being unseemly when Augustus, his adopted son, becameemperor (Suetonius, Life of the Divine Julius 55–6).

The major contemporary source, however, is Cicero, and in fact the period ofCicero and his contemporaries is the best known in all Roman history because somuch of Cicero’s work has survived. There are sixteen books of letters to hisfriends, sixteen books of letters to the wealthy entrepreneur Atticus, and collectionsof letters to his brother Quintus, and to Brutus, Caesar’s assassin. Of the manyspeeches delivered by Cicero during his colorful career, fifty-eight survive.Thereare, in addition, substantial treatises on rhetorical and philosophical subjects, as wellas fragments of poetry.The result is a more intimate impression of Roman life thanis available for any other time. Cicero and Caesar were not friends in a close,emotional sense.They were in fact political competitors, though at times they co-operated closely, and they certainly knew one another very well. After somehesitation, Cicero joined Pompey in the civil war against Caesar, but there weretimes when he expressed admiration for Caesar’s achievements. His evidence,therefore, needs to be read in context and with a critical eye. His personal lettersand speeches are extremely valuable, as are a number of his rhetorical andphilosophical works, especially those written in the mid 40s BCE, in which Caesarfeatures prominently.The works of other contemporaries form a mixed bag. GaiusOppius and Lucius Cornelius Balbus, close advisors of Caesar, wrote appreciativelyof him.There are, however, unflattering references in the poetry of Catullus (e.g.Poem 93) and the fragmentary writings of enemies such as Cato and Bibulus.Thehistorian Tanusius Geminus, who may have been a contemporary senator, took ananti-Caesarian line.The biographers Plutarch (Life of Caesar 22.3) and Suetonius(Life of the Divine Julius 9.2) later used his work.

Caesar is given prominent treatment in Sallust’s historical monograph, TheConspiracy of Catiline, written c. 42 BCE.The standard view is that Sallust depictedCaesar and Cato as contrasting figures of moral excellence, and left Cicero to sufferby comparison. Recent scholars are inclined to emphasize the complexity ofSallust’s account, so that all his characters have faults, which are products of theunderlying moral decline he is concerned to highlight. A couple of interestingsuasoriae (‘persuasive works’) have survived.They are written in the form of letterspurportedly sent by Sallust to Caesar in the latter’s final years.Many historians nowbelieve they were written as literary exercises under the early Empire. Anothercontemporary of Caesar, the biographer Cornelius Nepos, wrote comparative

biographies of outstanding Greeks and Romans.A correspondent of Cicero and afriend of Atticus, Nepos wrote sixteen books On Famous Men. Although some ofthe men he wrote about are relevant to the study of Caesar’s career, his work wasnot pitched for a scholarly audience and thus tends to appear superficial andblandly moralistic in comparison to other literary sources.

It is a particular shame that the monumental history of Rome written by Livydoes not survive in its entirety for the period of Caesar’s life. Livy, who worked inRome during the reign of Augustus, wrote (in section 10 of his Preface) that historyprovided moral examples to emulate and to avoid. It is often said that Livy wouldhave had to choose his words carefully, but Augustus once called him a Pompeian,and it seems that Livy was uncertain whether Caesar’s birth was a greater blessingor curse for Rome (Seneca, Natural Questions 5.18.4). Caesar may have been anexample to avoid, as far as the indications go. Several later writers depend heavilyon Livy. Among them may be numbered Valerius Maximus, who wrote aboutfamous deeds and sayings under a series of moral headings, and the summarizinghistorianVelleius Paterculus, a man of considerable military experience. Both thesemen were active under Augustus’ successor, the emperorTiberius.The poet Lucan,writing in the reign of Nero, around a century after Caesar’s death, offers a subtle,devastating treatment of Caesar in his brilliant poem, the Pharsalia, which isconcerned with the civil war between Caesar and Pompey.

The most important ancient biographies of Caesar were written in the earlysecond century CE, around a century and a half after Caesar’s death.Their authorswere Plutarch, a Greek aristocrat, and Suetonius, a Roman of the ‘equestrian’ class(the non-senatorial elite) who once served as imperial secretary to the emperorHadrian.Although these works preserve valuable contemporary material, they mustbe treated as biographies in the ancient tradition, with primary emphasis uponpersonal characteristics and moral qualities. Plutarch is famous for his twenty-threepairs of Parallel Lives, in which he paired Caesar with Alexander the Great – twoconquerors of unnatural ambition.He employs anecdotal stories to reveal charactermore fully.As he says at the opening of his Life of Alexander (1.1–2, Loeb trans.):

[I]t is not Histories that I am writing, but Lives; and in the most illustriousdeeds there is not always a manifestation of virtue or vice … [rather], a slightthing like a phrase or a jest often makes a greater revelation of character thanbattles where thousands fall, or the greatest armaments, or sieges of cities.

Plutarch saw character as an unchanging constant, and thought that the actions ofoutstanding men were determined by their basic virtue or vice, which would inturn indicate whether the biographer’s subjects were models for emulation oravoidance.As presented by Plutarch, Caesar is remarkable for his easy-going nature,his generosity to his friends, his willingness to praise, his relentless energy, and hiscapacity to inspire devotion in his troops. The idea of unchanging character,however, means that events from the full maturity of a career often determine thetreatment of earlier incidents and motives. Consequently, Plutarch’s Caesar is a man


of unnatural ambition who aimed for monarchy all his life. He was not, as manybelieve today, a man driven to monarchic power by the implacable opposition ofCato and the ultra-conservative optimates (‘best men’). In one famous passage,Plutarch relates a story from Caesar’s journey to Spain following his service aspraetor in Rome in 62 BCE (Life of Caesar 11.3–6, Loeb trans.):

We are told that, as he was crossing theAlps and passing by a barbarian villagewhich had very few inhabitants and was a sorry sight, his companions askedwith mirth and laughter, ‘Can it be that here too there are ambitious strifesfor office, struggles for primacy, and mutual jealousies of powerful men’?Whereupon Caesar said to them in all seriousness, ‘I would rather be firsthere than second at Rome’. In like manner we are told again that, in Spain,when he was at leisure and was reading from the history of Alexander, he waslost in thought for a long time, and then burst into tears. His friends wereastonished, and asked the reason for his tears. ‘Do you think’, said he, ‘it ismatter for sorrow that while Alexander, at my age, was already king of somany peoples, I have as yet achieved no brilliant success’?

It is obvious that this Caesar is heading inexorably towards monarchic power. In asimilar way, the civil war between Pompey and Caesar does not develop graduallyand erupt in the midst of options. It was instead planned long beforehand, inevi-table, and motivated by Caesar’s fundamental desire for monarchic power. As thelong campaign in Gaul comes to its end, Plutarch explains that (Life of Caesar 28.1,6, Loeb trans.):

Caesar had long ago decided to put down Pompey, just as, of course, Pompeyalso had decided to put Caesar down. For now that Crassus, who was onlywaiting for the issue of their struggle to engage the victor, had perishedamong the Parthians, it remained for him who would be greatest to putdown him who was, and for him who was greatest, if he would not be putdown, to take off in time the man he feared. …[T]here were many whoactually dared to say in public that nothing but monarchy could now curethe diseases of the state, and that this remedy ought to be adopted whenoffered by the gentlest of physicians, hinting at Pompey.

Eventually, his envious fellow citizens cut down Caesar, so that all the striving aftermonarchic power comes to nothing with his death. Plutarch emphasizes thehollowness of such lifelong ambition (Life of Caesar 69.1, Loeb trans.):

At the time of his death Caesar was fully fifty-six years old, but he hadsurvived Pompey not much more than four years, while of the power anddominion which he had sought all his life at so great risks, and barelyachieved at last, of this he had reaped no fruit but the name of it only, and aglory which had awakened envy on the part of his fellow citizens.


Suetonius saw Caesar as the first Roman emperor, and his biography of Caesar wasthus the first of Suetonius’Lives of theTwelve Caesars.Although the first few chaptersof the biography are missing, it is one of the longest of the Lives, incorporating afair amount of archival material, such as excerpts from letters. Suetonius shows littleconcern for chronology but instead treats his subjects according to categories, suchas lifestyle, military and administrative skills, attitude to the gods, and sexual habits.He shows a great fondness for scandalous anecdotes, which are often highlydubious. Like the Caesar of Plutarch, Suetonius’ Caesar is again highly ambitious,again depressed by comparisons with Alexander the Great (Life of the Divine Julius7.1), and again in search of absolute power from a young age (30.5). His moder-ation and clemency, in both administration and as victor in the civil war, areadmirable.Yet Suetonius seems more interested in Caesar’s character failings thanPlutarch. He shows great interest, for instance, in Caesar’s sex-life, partly for itstitillating appeal but also because it points to a basic weakness of character whicheventually undermines Caesar’s grip on monarchic power.

Appian and Cassius Dio offer extended histories of Rome, whose narratives ofthe age of Caesar are highly valuable, though it is often difficult to discern the con-temporary sources on which their accounts are ultimately based and, therefore, themanner in which these sources have been employed. Both men were Greeks,Appian from Alexandria in Egypt, and Dio from Nicomedia in Bithynia, which ispart of modern Turkey.Appian wrote in the mid second century CE, around twocenturies after Caesar’s death. He covers the events of Caesar’s lifetime in the partof his work appropriately called CivilWars and states (at 1.6) that his account willprove ‘valuable for those who wish to see men’s immeasurable ambition, theirterrible love of power, their untiring perseverance, and the forms taken byinnumerable evils’. Dio held a consulship at Rome in the early third century CE,around two and a half centuries after Caesar’s assassination. As a committed sup-porter of government by emperors, he thought that Caesar’s murder was a wickedthing (Roman History 44.1–2). He also thought that all the generals involved in thecivil wars of the first century BCE were inevitably aiming at monarchy – but ofcourse he would think this, given his hindsight knowledge that autocratic emperorswere the result of these civil wars.

Ancient writers, therefore, tended to locate Caesar between extremes: either asa great man with extraordinary gifts who overwhelmed a corrupt noble faction andpaved the way for the reign of Augustus, or as an unscrupulous man, motivated byambition for kingship from the first.The middle ground is not seriously canvassed,e.g. that autocracy might have been forced upon him by the behavior of others orthat his ambition for pre-eminence might have produced a result he did notnecessarily intend.

When faced with this evidence, the extraordinary point about modern academictreatments of Caesar is that they incline distinctly towards a positive, even heroicand romantic image.They have often been appreciative of the man of action whoattained supreme power, brought down the corrupt Roman nobility, and extendedthe empire. This approach has a long and impressive pedigree, though it applies


more to book-length studies than to articles in learned journals, and in recent yearsit has come under increasing attack.

The scholar who is frequently called the father of modern Roman history, evenahead of the Englishman Edward Gibbon, is a German professor of the nineteenthcentury CE namedTheodor Mommsen,who worked mostly at Leipzig and BerlinUniversities in an age of intellectual optimism and scientific rationalism. He was aman of political conviction who sought both the unification of Germany and thepromotion of a liberal program. Germany did indeed become unified but themonarchy remained and oppressive Prussian generals thwarted the ambitions ofmen like Mommsen for meaningful social change. Mommsen’s disappointment atthis outcome clearly influenced the passionate portrayal of Caesar which appearedin the third volume of his monumental Römische Geschichte (Roman History, 1854–6). Caesar emerges as a man who would have been Mommsen’s ideal statesman forcontemporary Germany: a man who worked for the unification of Italy, a man wholiberated Rome from the oppression of a landed nobility which noticeablyresembles the Prussian Junkers, a man who refused to be honored as a god, and aman ultimately eulogized by Mommsen not only as ‘the sole creative geniusproduced by Rome’ but as ‘the entire and perfect man’.Mommsen could not bringhimself to describe Caesar’s assassination. His History stops before the day ofCaesar’s death, the famous Ides of March. Such a portrayal is obviously a productof its times, but it has been extraordinarily influential, especially the argument thatCaesar saw from an early point in his life that there was one remedy for the illsaffecting Rome – the establishment of absolute power with himself as the soleruler. In other words,Caesar foresaw the Empire, considered it a political and socialnecessity, and worked as a statesman towards achieving it.The combined literaryand academic qualities of Mommsen’s colossal History soon saw it translated intoEnglish and other languages, and it became well known throughout Europe,Britain, and North America. A further nineteenth-century treatment of Caesar,entitled Caesar: A Sketch, by the Englishman J.A. Froude, is less well known thanthat of Mommsen, but a serious rival as eulogy. In fact, the final paragraph of thefirst edition, published in 1879, compared Caesar with Jesus Christ, since both werefounders of monarchies, both were accused of wanting kingship, both werecriticized for their friendships with publicans and sinners, both were killed, andboth were believed to have risen from the dead. Even by the standards of the day,this comparison was deemed excessive, and so it was omitted from later editions.

Eduard Meyer, another important German historian of Roman history,challenged Mommsen’s views in a book called Caesars Monarchie und das Prinzipatdes Pompeius (Caesar’s Monarchy and the Principate of Pompeius, 1918). He argued thatserious thought about monarchy only became topical at Rome during the civilwar. Pompey, given his alliance with the conservative optimates, wanted a constitu-tional monarchy that would have been the forerunner of Augustus’ regime orprincipate. Caesar, by contrast, began to think about founding a divine monarchyon the model of Ptolemaic kingship, with which he had become familiar throughCleopatra, and began to contemplate moving the capital away from Rome in order


to create a ‘world empire’.Those who pointed out that Ptolemaic kingship was indecline in the first century BCE were not impressed by Meyer’s new approach,though it was supported by Jerome Carcopino, a leading French historian ofancient Rome. British writers rejected Meyer’s ideas strongly. Sir Frank Adcock, inthe first edition of The Cambridge Ancient History (vol. ix, 1932), and Sir RonaldSyme, in The Roman Revolution (1939), found it hard to accept Meyer’s theory thatCaesar succumbed to the twin lures of monarchy and divinity, and became amegalomaniac in his later years. Syme in particular did not think that Caesarwanted a monarchy but instead found himself unexpectedly in a position where hecould not avoid absolute power because he had no competitors left and ‘hadwrecked the playground’, i.e. he had destroyed the traditional republican politicalsystem based on vigorous competition.Matthias Gelzer wrote what many regard asthe standard political biography of Caesar, first published in 1921.This sober butessentially favorable work has been translated from the original German intoEnglish (Caesar: Politician and Statesman, 1968). Gelzer doubts the tradition thatCaesar consistently sought a monarchy but envisages a man who reacts in states-manlike spirit when given the chance to reform the state (282):

…as a result of [Caesar’s] victory the Empire had at last passed into the handsof a man of genuine political ability, who no longer followed selfish party orclass interests, but who intended to shape the Empire as a whole in the waythat circumstances required.

Contributions of the past three decades are far less appreciative of the view thatCaesar was a political visionary.The important, though largely undocumented bio-graphy by Christian Meier (Caesar: A Biography, 1995, German edn. 1982) agreeswith Mommsen that the Republic could not withstand the pressures of hergrowing empire, but follows Syme in arguing that Caesar never had a plan to dealwith the problem. He did not foresee the results of his victory over his enemies.Moreover, he lacked the ability to compromise and the patience needed toconstruct a new order.WolfgangWill offers ‘eine bilanz’ (‘a revaluation’) of Caesar’scareer in terms of finances and sources of income (Julius Caesar: Eine Bilanz, 1992).He too describes Caesar as a victor who had no policies to offer in the final yearsof his life.The most comprehensive biography of recent years, written by AdrianGoldsworthy, is notably strong on military matters (Caesar: Life of a Colossus, 2006).Jeffrey Tatum’s Always I am Caesar (2008) and Richard Billows’ Julius Caesar:TheColossus of Rome (2009) are probably the pick of introductory books for seriousstudents. Tatum is excellent on political matters and exploits archaeological anddocumentary evidence with flair. The latter stages of his narrative have beencriticized for laying undue stress on the relatively advanced ages (in Roman terms)of Pompey and Caesar as a reason for their impatience with one another andinability to compromise. Billows’ book is thorough and insightful, though it adoptsa fairly straightforward view of Roman politics as an arena dominated by twofundamental movements, one aristocratic and conservative (the optimates); the other


popular and progressive (the populares).There is great debate about the true natureof Roman politics, but it appears that the reality was somewhat more complicated.The recurring description of Caesar as a ‘Colossus’ in modern books, even whenallusive or intentionally provocative, tends to imply the ongoing influence of theheroic and romantic tradition. Any lingering doubts, however, that Caesar leftbehind a chaotic and unfocused mess should be dispelled by Josiah Osgood’s finenarrative of the disastrous period that followed his death (Caesar’s Legacy: CivilWarand the Emergence of the Roman Empire, 2006).

The Man who would be King?

We are left, then, with a mixed ancient tradition but a frequently positive modernreception, which in many ways stands at odds with contemporary attitudes. Ourpresent age is quite unusual in the degree and openness of its political criticism andcynicism. Indeed, modern students are encouraged to be critical. From a personalperspective there seem to be qualities to admire and to despise in the evidencerelating to Julius Caesar.He was a fine public speaker, a man of influence over bothmen and women, a driven character, a self-assured man, an outstanding intellectual,and a mightily successful military figure, though perhaps not an outstandingstrategist. If some of this is admirable, certainly there are other considerations. Hewas ultimately responsible for death and mayhem in the Mediterranean world ona huge scale, and his motivation was very largely selfish, propelled by concern forhis dignitas, or personal standing, in Roman society. Furthermore, while he mayhave gained power personally, he only increased the insecurity and depression ofhis world, becoming a figure of repression, and managing to provoke assassination.

It seems hard, therefore, to react in a simple or unambiguous way to such anoutstanding and complex man.There are, however, a couple of points on which afirm stand might be taken. First, he was hardly a model leader for present worldtensions. His way was a way of violence, death, and repression that did nothing toprovide security for the inhabitants of Rome’s empire. In fact, it condemned all ofthem to ongoing civil and foreign war. Second, it is ultimately not helpful toabsolve Caesar from blame for the civil war, for instance by arguing that he was aproduct of a highly competitive social system, so that if he had not started the civilwar by crossing the famous Rubicon River, another member of his class probablywould have found another Rubicon to cross somewhere.There is an element oftruth in this, but such arguments tend to remove the element of personal respon-sibility, and shroud the fact that individuals were constantly making decisions. It isjustifiable to hold Caesar largely responsible for what he did and to think thatpersonal responsibility is a cornerstone of a civilized society. If individual personscan evade responsibility, so too should they be denied credit for what they do, andthis is not the general preference. As mentioned above, some kind of balancebetween the personal and the impersonal, and between the positive and thenegative, needs to be aimed at. Someone may write a trenchantly critical biographyof Caesar in coming years, but that will not occur here. Nor will he be described


as little better than his peers, if somewhat more fortunate and successful.There willnot be a concern with traits such as goodness or likeability, which depend onsubjective judgments that are highly unstable. People in power frequently provokereactions that are poles apart, depending on an individual’s point of view. Theunderlying aim instead is to read the evidence with a focus on the recurrent themethat Caesar sought monarchy from a young age, and hence shaped his career in thedirection of this goal. The idea is not so much to recover his real motives orcharacter, but to argue that Caesar is probably one of the most obvious and import-ant examples of a famous historical figure whose career has been retold regularlyfrom a fairly uncritical hindsight: everybody knows that he became dictator andheld absolute power, so these must have been his consistent aims. Positive andnegative portrayals have argued this point of view. How should the evidenceactually be read? It seems wrong to see the ultimate result as the consistent aim ateach stage, and thereby to miss the unpredictability and uncertainty of the piece-meal development of events. Apart from anything else, a reconstruction thatemphasizes the uncertainty of the outcome at each stage provides a more com-pelling and thought-provoking experience for the reader.The Greeks and Romansstarted the tendentious hindsight interpretations, and they were accustomed tostress personal responsibility for events that modern scholars point out were alsoheavily influenced by wider and deeper, more impersonal processes. A morebalanced and sensitive treatment of various incidents and stages of Caesar’s careerseems possible.

Conclusion

When so many reputable treatments are available, the approach adopted by a newbook on Caesar becomes important. The choice made here has been governedlargely by the attempt to provide an accessible introduction to Caesar’s career,primarily for general readers and for undergraduate students taking courses inancient history. Accordingly, this book will proceed in two ways. The first is tooutline the main phases of Caesar’s public career.The second is to describe thesephases with reference to some prominent social and political concepts of the time– concepts that were associated with Caesar and his use of power. They help toexplain his motives in a more traditional way, which contrasts with the old viewthat he sought to become Rome’s king from an early age.The intention is not tojudge his moral worth but to gain some idea of arguments that were employedboth to justify and to condemn the things he did.The evidence, after all, is often afrustrating composite of praise and blame, difficult to disentangle.The point, then,is not so much about Caesar the man but about the ideas used to describe him.Roman leaders knew the concepts that were important to Roman society, and theynegotiated these concepts continually during their careers. Caesar must be under-stood as a Roman, not as a superhuman figure who would have been outstandingin any age or society.

It might be difficult in what follows to react consistently in an objective manner


to the levels of self–interest, lust for power, and greed that seem apparent in theevidence for Caesar’s career. Equally, it will be hard to react positively to a man whowas responsible for so much death and mayhem.Yet it should be easier to maintaina focus on distinctive concepts associated with Caesar. These concepts wereimportant to Romans (including Caesar himself) when they were assessing Caesar’scareer.They tell us something about Roman society as well as about Caesar.

Recommended reading

There are various reputable translations of the ancient authors available, especiallyin the Loeb Classical Library, Penguin, and Oxford World Classics series. Inaddition, useful collections of translated sources for Caesar’s career, including docu-mentary materials, have been published widely and remain readily available. Anexcellent basic compilation, including but not limited to Caesar’s career, is that ofDillon and Garland 2005.

On the attitudes of ancient writers to Caesar, see the fine, up-to-date treatments inGriffin 2009, chs. 1, 16–20; cf. ch. 21 on statues and portraits.This excellent ‘com-panion’ book also includes essays on the reception of Caesar’s image by variousleaders and thinkers throughout western history (chs. 22–30). Other good intro-ductions to the reception of Caesar’s image through the ages includeYavetz 1983, esp.ch. 1; Syme 1985a and 1985b; Hayne 1989; Garland 2003, chs. 12–14;Wyke 2006;andWyke 2008. On the complexity of Sallust’s attitude to Caesar, see Stone 1999.

For Mommsen’s view that Caesar was ‘the sole creative genius produced by Rome’and ‘the entire and perfect man’, see Mommsen 1884, 305, 315, respectively.Caesar’s personality is dealt with by Paterson 2009. His intellectual achievementsare rated highly by Rawson 1985, whereas Fantham 2009 confines herself to fewerintellectual disciplines and emphasizes the practical side of Caesar’s learning.Tatum’s emphasis on Caesar’s age is criticized by Billows 2009, xii. In turn, Billows2009 is well reviewed byWestall 2009.

For ways in which the Roman Republic has been employed in support of theFrench and American Revolutions, see Sellers 2004;Malamud 2009, 9–33.Refere-nces to Caesar and the Roman Empire in American political discourse, especiallyunder the Bush administration, are analyzed by Wyke (2006, ch. 17; reprinted inGriffin 2009, ch. 30), who identifies both pride and condemnation as motives (cf.Malamud 2009, 253–60).


2IMPERIUM

Empire, society and politics in 100 BCE

Imperium

When Caesar was born on 12 July 100 BCE, the Romans were an imperial people,who controlled an extensive empire around the eastern and western Mediterranean(figure 2). In fact, the Romans were vitally conscious of being an imperial people.The primary meaning of the Latin word imperium is ‘military command’, though itoften refers to the territory over which Roman generals exercised militarycommand and thus provides our English word ‘empire’. The power of imperium wasvested in Rome’s highest magistrates, normally the consuls and praetors, but alsodictators. These were the magistrates who could command Roman troops, andwhose imperium required obedience from Romans and provincials alike. Imperiumderived ultimately from the god Jupiter, who bestowed it upon the Roman peoplein return for recognition and worship. In turn, the people conferred imperium upontheir consuls, who employed it when they commanded Rome’s armies. Romansoldiers wanted to see imperium exercised over others, notably defeated enemies.This would demonstrate that Rome was placed above other nations in the pyramidof importance. Although some Romans saw that they had responsibilities to theprovincials, others thought in terms of the privileges and wealth which could begained from the empire.This attitude lay at the heart of a series of tensions thatbeset Roman society and politics in the age of Caesar.

An early focus upon imperium should serve to emphasize not only the strugglesfor military command,which were a normal part of Roman elite behavior, but alsothe effects of conquering the empire. Competitive struggles for command didmuch to forge the empire, but the effects of empire in turn did much to underminethe Roman Republic.The empire was a product, and a prime source, of tensionswithin Roman society.These tensions between individuals and groups, in combin-ation with the resources of the empire, were eventually enough to generate civil

16 Empire, society and politics in 100 BCE

FIGURE 2 Map of the MediterraneanWorld in the age of Caesar.FromW. J.Tatum,Always I am Caesar (Blackwell, 2008), p. xii.

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war, even a series of civil wars, on a monumental scale. In this chapter, therefore, anattempt will be made to describe the relationship between Roman society and thegrowing empire, with particular emphasis on tensions which had developed by thetime of Caesar’s birth.The discussion will be arranged into three parts:

1 a short description of the growth of Rome’s empire in the second century BCE;2 an account of the relationship between Roman society and the growing

empire; and3 an outline of some of the political consequences of Rome’s acquisition of an

empire.

The processes discussed in this chapter will provide background for the events oflater chapters.

Empire: Rome’s wars of expansion in the second century BCE

In the eastern Mediterranean,Roman legions fought with great success during thesecond century BCE.They conquered Greece and humbled the Hellenistic king-doms, whose culture and achievements they had revered for so long.The kingdomsof Macedon and Syria were defeated and humiliated. Egypt was taken into allianceand dominated. Major cities and peoples were conquered or otherwise controlledby Rome – cities such as Athens, Sparta, Corinth, Ephesus, and Halicarnassus;peoples as diverse as Greeks,Macedonians, Syrians, and Galatians.When the oppor-tunity presented itself, the great North African city of Carthage was destroyed too.There is even a story that Scipio Aemilianus, the general who captured Carthagein 146 BCE, ordered its total destruction and the sowing of salt into the ground sothat nothing could grow thereafter.

The one open sore was Spain. Roman armies occupied Spain in the earlysecond century BCE but encountered fierce resistance from that time down to theage of Augustus. In contrast to warfare in the East, the wars in Spain were neitherlucrative nor particularly successful. It was seldom difficult to find recruits forRome’s eastern wars.Victories were regular in the East, and much plunder wasavailable from the rich cities and kingdoms.The Spanish, on the other hand, usedguerrilla tactics, which proved extremely difficult to counter in the rugged terrain.Morale and discipline among the Roman forces in Spain suffered accordingly.Roman governors proved inept and corrupt, interested primarily in mercilessextortion of money and minerals from the peninsula.

The Celtiberian city of Numantia became the centre of Spanish resistance toRome in the 140s and 130s BCE.As a result, Scipio Aemilianus was sent to Spainin 134 BCE with orders to destroy Numantia once and for all. Scipio had anawesome military pedigree. He was the adopted grandson of Scipio Africanus, theconqueror of Hannibal, and the son of Aemilius Paullus, the conqueror ofMacedon. Scipio himself had recently destroyed Carthage at the end of the ThirdPunicWar (146 BCE).Numantia fell and was completely razed to the ground in 133

Empire, society and politics in 100 BCE 17

BCE.The blow to Spanish resistance was severe, though it did not produce lastingpeace. Guerrilla warfare and banditry persisted until the campaigns of MarcusAgrippa, the great friend and ally of Augustus.

In the year that Numantia fell,Rome also took control ofAsia Minor when KingAttalus III bequeathed his kingdom of Pergamum to the Roman people in his will.A political realist,Attalus was trying to save his people from the savagery of conquestby Rome. His kingdom, which roughly equates with the western part of modernTurkey, became the province of Asia, a land of great wealth and culture.Thus, by 133BCE, the year in which the determined young noble Tiberius Gracchus took officeas tribune of the plebs, Rome was in charge of the Mediterranean world.Variousongoing problems with the military became increasingly obvious, however, so thatRoman campaigns in Africa and elsewhere dragged on painfully during thefollowing decades.Then there were the Germans! Towards the end of the secondcentury BCE, a huge migration of Germanic tribes took place, led by the Cimbri andtheTeutones.These tribes terrified and overwhelmed the peoples with whom theycame into contact and posed a real threat to Italy itself. In 105 BCE, at Arausio(modern Orange in southern France), the Germans inflicted on the Romans theirgreatest military disaster since Cannae in 216 BCE, when Hannibal had out-maneuvered Rome’s legions, encircling and destroying them.The defeat in 105 BCE

tends to attract much less attention, but it was equally as demoralizing andcatastrophic. Italy lay open to the Germans. Rome was gripped by fear.

At this point the popular hero Gaius Marius (consul in 107, 104–100, 86 BCE)was given command of the legions, and he set about improving their performanceas a matter of urgency.There is considerable debate about the timing and nature ofthe army reforms that have been assigned to Marius, but even if he was not asinnovative as was once thought, he does seem to have introduced a new profes-sional spirit into the legions,whose basic units were no longer maniples (‘handfuls’)but cohorts of about 480 men, and whose weaponry and armor were standardizedand upgraded. He forced the soldiers to drill relentlessly and to carry an unprece-dented amount of their own gear, instead of relying on pack mules. In consequence,the soldiers became known as, and proudly took the name of,‘Marius’ mules’.Thesilver eagle was adopted as the symbol of the legion, and legionary morale wasrevitalized.The legionaries excelled at constructing camps, entrenching themselves,and at building roads – all measures designed to prevent another catastrophe. In twomighty battles, at Aquae Sextiae (in southern France) and Vercellae (in northernItaly), the Germans were cut to pieces. Italy was saved, and Marius became the heroof all Rome, returning to the city in triumph and being elected to a sixthconsulship (his fifth in a row) in 100 BCE, the year of Caesar’s birth.

Society I: Militarism, hierarchy, and intense competition at Rome

Roman imperialism has been a subject of fundamental importance for centuries,though from a contemporary standpoint much of the scholarship seemsdisappointing.The Romans, unsurprisingly, claimed that they acquired their empire


via a series of defensive campaigns against aggressive, unjust neighbors. Instead ofthinking that this might have been a self-serving explanation, however, generationsof modern scholars,working in countries that had imperial ambitions of their own,actually supported the Roman point of view. Not only did this mean that theyaccepted a simple, formulaic theory of the motivation for Rome’s imperial expan-sion, it also meant that they saw Rome’s empire as a huge, honorable accident.Moreover, their scholarship helped to uphold imperial thinking and expansion inthe modern world. Only in fairly recent decades have scholars begun to questionthe Roman rhetoric about ‘just wars’, ‘dangerous neighbors’, and a constantlydefensive mindset. Erich Gruen (The HellenisticWorld and the Coming of Rome, 1984)has shown that Rome dealt with the Hellenistic kingdoms in a halting, piecemeal,and variable way, hardly the result of a consistent approach to foreign affairs.Othershave emphasized the combinations of defensive and aggressive attitudes that wereemployed. Rome was attacked on occasion, for instance by Hannibal, and at othertimes she seems to have launched wars from motives of revenge and profit.ArthurEckstein has demonstrated convincingly that Rome operated in a world of interna-tional anarchy, untrustworthiness, and vicious military expansionism. When herbehavior is discussed in this light, it becomes clear that Rome was not unique inher imperial endeavors, only more successful.

The Romans and their neighbors knew about terror. In fact, ancient com-munities lived constantly with the frightening threat of war, which resultedregularly in massacre or enslavement.The majority of people thought more aboutpower and protection than about fairness and justice. Rome may have boasted thatshe fought only ‘just’ wars in defense of her allies, but many contemporaries wereunconvinced.The Greek historian Polybius, a hostage at Rome in the mid secondcentury BCE, goes to lengths to impress upon his fellow Greeks the ruthlessness andpersistence of Roman imperialism. The concept of ‘justice’ in Roman war hadmore to do with religion and certain ritualized preliminaries than with right orwrong in an ethical or legal sense.Victory was the clear sign that the gods approvedof the Roman action, and that this action must therefore have been ‘just’. It isprobably the case that modern scholars have worried far more about justifyingRoman empire-building than did the Romans themselves.

In the late 1970s, at a time of disillusionment with military expansionismfollowing the Vietnam War,William Harris described a mutually reinforcing linkbetween Roman imperialism and the competitive nature of Roman society. Heprobably went too far in arguing that the result was constant aggressiveness, but hedid show successfully that the intense hierarchy of the social system forcedgenerations of Roman nobles to compete for military command and militaryhonors. These men strove constantly to assert their virtus, the Roman quality ofbeing a vir (‘man’), a quality so intimately connected with the experience of battlethat virtus is best translated as ‘courage’ or ‘bravery’ in the age of Caesar. Thesecondary translation of this crucial term as ‘virtue’ is a product of philosophicaldebate during Caesar’s lifetime and beyond.Above all, Rome’s nobles wanted gloria(‘military glory’) at a level sufficient to justify the award of a triumph by the senate.


The noble families, and others who were gradually admitted to their ranks overtime, competed fiercely to supply one of the two annual consuls, who were thearmy commanders and prime beneficiaries of successful war-making. Thesefamilies drove the engine of a Roman state that was thoroughly militarized fromtop to bottom. Certainly, the nobles did not have everything their own way.TheRoman people had means to pressure and resist the nobles, though in generalRome’s citizens were deeply respectful of birth, appreciative of ancestral achieve-ments, and impressed by strong aristocratic behavior. Consequently, a focus uponthe Roman nobilitas (‘nobility’) is one important way to show interdependencebetween Rome’s external and internal relations.

It is probably wise to start with the distinction between patrician and plebeianfamilies at Rome. It was thought that the patricians descended from the patres(‘fathers’) who had served in the early Roman senate, an advisory council of senesor ‘old men’. They had once formed the ruling class of Rome in the periodfollowing the expulsion of Rome’s kings.The plebeian families,who had originallyformed the remainder of Roman society (they were ‘the fillers’ or ‘the mob’, plebs)challenged for power over time.The patriciate was a nobility of birth, composed ofthose born into a select group of famous families, whose names were known to allRomans. Gradually, as various plebeian families rose to prominence, ‘nobility’ wasdefined according to office-holding rather than birth. It was not your family as suchthat mattered, but whether a member of your family had held the consulship. Byabout the end of the fourth century BCE, the old distinction between patricians andplebeians became less important in Roman politics than the distinction betweennobiles (‘nobles’), whose families included at least one ancestor who had been aconsul, and non-nobles, who lacked consular ancestors. Then there were novihomines (‘new men’), whose families had never provided a magistrate (and hence asenator) at Rome before. Roman voters did not know the ‘new’ men, exceptthrough their own exploits. It was consequently harder for them to reach thehallowed realms of the consulship.

Roman nobles sought pre-eminence to a quite amazing degree.This was not justa hierarchical society, with individuals grouped in classes on a descending verticalscale. It was a society in which people were ranked individually, one under the other,in a very strict sense. Roman nobles wanted to be first in the state. It is enlighteningto contemplate that the roll of the senate, drawn up every five years by the censors,wasa rank order of the top 300 men in Rome, and subsequently the top 600 and 900men as a result of reforms passed by Sulla and Caesar respectively.The point is thatpeople knew where they ranked in relation to their peers. People in a Roman roomcould number themselves in the sharply defined pecking order.They knew wherethey stood in both social and physical terms.The Latin word nobilis means, in onesense, ‘well known’ or ‘famous’.This begs the question: How did one become ‘wellknown’? As has been mentioned, descent from a consul seems to have become a vitalprerequisite, but it was not the end of the story. Polybius describes a noble funeral ina famous passage of his Histories (6.53.1–3, Dillon and Garland 3.74):


Whenever one of their distinguished men dies, as part of his funeralprocession he is carried with all honor into the Forum to the so-calledRostra [speakers’ platform], sometimes conspicuous in an upright position,or, more rarely, reclining.With the whole people standing around, his son, ifhe has one of adult age to follow him …, or, if not, some other relative,mounts the Rostra and discourses on the virtues of the deceased and hissuccessful achievements during his lifetime. As a result, the populace, whensuch facts are recalled to their minds and brought before their eyes – not onlythose who played a part in these achievements, but also those who did not –feel such deep sympathy that the loss seems not to be confined to themourners, but to be a public one which affects the whole people.

The nobles were clearly masters of self-presentation,who based their claims to pre-eminence on ancestral service to the state, especially in war and office-holding. Itwas in the military arena that they won gloria for their exploits and strove to begranted a triumph, through which their glory could be displayed to all. Anotherwell-known passage shows these preoccupations clearly. It derives from Pliny theElder’s Natural History (7.139–40, Dillon and Garland 2.29):

Quintus Metellus, in the oration which he gave at the final eulogy of hisfather the pontiff Lucius Metellus, twice consul, dictator, Master of theHorse, and land-commissioner, who was the first to lead elephants in histriumph from the First Punic War [in the mid third century BCE, againstCarthage], left it in writing that his father had achieved the ten greatest andmost glorious objects in the pursuit of which wise men pass their lives: forhe had aimed at being a first-class warrior, an outstanding orator, a brave andcourageous general, at taking charge of events of the highest importance,enjoying the greatest honor, possessing exceptional wisdom, being con-sidered the chief of all the senators, acquiring great wealth in a respectableway, leaving many children, and being the most distinguished person in thestate; and stated that these had befallen his father and none other since thefoundation of Rome.

Note the extraordinary string of superlatives and the explicit statement of pre-eminence (‘the most distinguished person … since the foundation of Rome’).Thecompetition underlying such claims was absolutely fierce.War and supremacy areintimately linked.The offices mentioned (twice consul, dictator, etc.) are all officeswith imperium. It is virtually impossible to overstate how strongly the nobles wantedto reach the consulship, to achieve fame and glory, to surpass their ancestors, andactually to become the leading man in the state.

The nobles exercised power and influence far beyond their relatively smallnumbers. Of course, they were not always at war or contemplating war, butconventional thinking was that Roman citizens were either domi (‘at home’) ormilitiae (‘on campaign’).When at home, which in practice meant that they were


within the pomerium or sacred boundary of Rome, the authority of the nobles insociety and politics was not a product of imperium, but of two related concepts,auctoritas and dignitas. Auctoritas may be translated as ‘moral influence’, the kind ofinfluence that a great man possesses over and above any official appointment hemight be holding. It is partly a matter of the respect due to him for his achieve-ments and ancestry, and partly a positive response to his special aura of wisdom.Dignitas is a vital concept for a biography of Caesar. It is the ‘ranking’ or ‘rank’ thata man holds in Roman society, and it was governed by the sharpest of sensitivitiesabout an individual’s place in a strictly hierarchical society. In addition, there werethe ideas of patrocinium and clientela, ‘patronage’ and ‘clientship’. This was not aworld in which a man could go to the police or a government bureau when he raninto trouble. There were no such agencies. Instead, those who were weaker tiedthemselves formally to those who were stronger, and received favors and protectionin return for loyalty and support, including political support when the patron stoodfor office. This was patrocinium when conceived from above and clientela whenconceived from below.

Yet these social concepts and institutions should not distract modern studentsfrom the fundamentally military character of much of Caesar’s world at Rome. Itis true that the advent of permanent courts of law in the second century BCE, thegrowth of the city’s population (which stood at around one million by the middleof the first century BCE), and the increasingly complicated administrative burdeninvolved in governing so vast a city and empire, saw the rise of men who might bethought of as specialist advocates or politicians – men such as Cicero.They were anew breed, but they were never a match for the likes of Pompey and Caesar, whowere cut from a more traditional, warlike cloth. Cicero (Letters to his Friends 15.4–5) rather pathetically hoped for a triumph after a relatively minor campaign asgovernor of Cilicia in 51 BCE, but in doing so he showed his awareness that fightingwas the basic job of Roman males.The primacy and constancy of war for a Romanmale stand in stark contrast to the experience of many males in modern westernsocieties.

Even when examining the civilian offices and assemblies of the developed polit-ical system of Caesar’s day, the outlines of a primitive warrior state are stronglyapparent. Much ‘political’ activity was ultimately inspired by, or aimed at, war.Candidates for public office had to show fearlessness and courage in taking on theircompetitors, just as they would be expected to do when commanding troops onthe battlefield.The cursus honorum (‘sequence of offices’ or ‘run of magistracies’) atRome has a distinctly military character.Typically, a Roman male would commencemilitary service in his late teens.A noble youth would probably be attached to thecontubernium (‘tent’ or ‘staff ’) of a consul or other commander, in order to learn theropes through experience and observation.After ten or so campaigns, males of thefirst century BCE, aged around 29 to 30, might stand for the office of quaestor andmanage accounts for a higher magistrate, most prestigiously the consul. In theirearly 30s they might become one of the ten tribunes of the plebs or, at around age35 to 36, they might present themselves for election as an aedile.The tribunes really


ought to be considered separately because, as their name (tribune of the plebs)implies, they were special representatives of the plebeians, and their office arose outof the civil conflict that had once existed between the patricians and plebeians.Their most famous power was the veto (a Latin word meaning ‘I forbid’), whichenabled them to call a halt to public business or to prevent a magistrate from usingviolence against a plebeian. Aediles were essentially city magistrates, originallyresponsible for the upkeep of temples, but later of markets, festivals, roads, and otherpublic amenities. Praetors, aged around 39, were legal officers and judges, thoughthey possessed imperium and so could command armies and govern provinces.Theyseem to have commanded Rome’s armies in the early days, until they weresuperseded by the advent of two consuls, who were the prime commanders of theRoman legions until the rise of warlords such as Marius, Sulla, Pompey, and thenCaesar himself. Men who became consuls in suo anno (‘in his due year’, i.e. at theearliest opportunity, a mark of distinction) were aged around 42.At times of severeemergency, whether military or civil, a dictator might be elected. Before the highlyirregular use of this office by Sulla and Caesar, a dictator held unrestricted imperiumonly for the period of the emergency, or for a maximum of six months. In general,Romans were wary of investing supreme power in a single individual.They prefer-red two consuls, who consulted and presided over the senate, a venerable advisorycouncil of elected magistrates and ex-magistrates.The consuls managed debates inthe senate in alternate months, and their terms of office lasted for one year only.Such sharing and limiting of power was designed to prevent the re-emergence ofkingship at Rome.Memories of Rome’s last king, the tyrannicalTarquin the Proud,lingered long after his overthrow by the nobles,which was traditionally dated to theyear 510 BCE (a famous but highly suspect date, apparently chosen to match theoverthrow of the tyrants of Athens in that very same year).

Military origins and imperatives help to explain the operation of the ‘political’assemblies too, especially the comitia centuriata (‘assembly by centuries’), which wasonce the assembly of the army. Apart from its arrangement in ‘centuries’, whichbetrays its military background, the comitia centuriata met in the Campus Martius(‘Field of Mars’,Mars being the god of war), beyond the sacred pomerium and hence‘on campaign’ rather than ‘at home’. In the later second and first centuries BCE, theconcilium plebis (‘council of the plebs’) was used for passing laws and for electing theplebeian magistrates (i.e. the plebeian aediles and the tribunes of the plebs). Lawspassed in this assembly were binding not just on the plebeians but on the entirecitizen community, known as the populus Romanus (‘Roman people’), encom-passing the patricians as well as the plebeians.The main assembly of the Romanpeople was the comitia tributa (‘assembly by tribes’), which was also used for passinglaws and electing magistrates (the majority of the lower magistrates were electedhere).Yet votes on going to war and the election of army commanders, especiallyconsuls and praetors (possessors of imperium), were always reserved for the comitiacenturiata. Finally, in conformity with attitudes and practice throughout the ancientworld, war does much to explain the roles and status assigned to Roman womenand children, who were non-combatants, and to slaves, who were frequently


captives of war.Each of these groups was deemed unsuitable for service in the army,and consequently for public office, which followed military service and could leadon to military command (imperium).

The reasons for noble dominance at Rome are not really complicated when onecontemplates the fearsome prospect of war in ancient times, but such conditionsmean that a modern western readership must be prepared to think differently aboutfundamental ideas such as egalitarianism and democracy, and about the distinctionbetween ‘civilian’ and ‘military’ spheres. Roman citizen males were not born equal,for some were born into better families than others (you would know from theirfamily names).All male citizens could vote, partly because of their military potent-ial, but votes of the rich carried more weight than those of the poor, especially inthe comitia centuriata.This was thought justified, because the rich contributed moreto the army, with, for example, horses, arms, armor, supplies, and leadership ofclients.The res publica – one of the main names for the Roman state – was ‘publicbusiness’ or the ‘public concern’ because it was a shared responsibility of all thecitizens, but it was in particular based on a tacit agreement between the nobles thatthey would share power, especially military command.This agreement governedthe fierce competition in which they engaged, and by the age of Caesar it hadserved as the basis of the republican state for centuries.

Society II: Socio-economic consequences of empire

If, then, the society shaped the acquisition of the empire, the reverse is also true.There are, however, very different views about the effects of the empire on theRoman state.The traditional view is that the republican assemblies and magistrateswere struggling to deal with the pressures of the empire. According to this view,wealth from the provinces flooded into Italy, massive economic inequalities deve-loped, the rich acquired huge estates known as latifundia (‘wide lands’) by fairmeans and foul, captive slaves replaced free workers as cheap labor in the country-side, cash crops (e.g. wine) began to supersede staples (e.g. wheat) so that Romebecame dependent on foreign grain for bread, small landowners succumbed to thedepredations of the rich and the demands of constant military service, the declineof small landowners meant fewer recruits for the legions, displaced rural dwellersdrifted to the cities in search of employment, corruption increased, overcrowdingand poverty in Rome saw the rise of mob violence, patrons employed mobs inpolitical settings, Italians and provincials chafed under various abuses, extendedcampaigns meant that Rome’s soldiers became full-time professionals, and thelegions were forced to recruit the poor, who sought rewards from their generalsand effectively formed private armies, which were eventually prepared to marchagainst the state itself. This is a view of dramatic and unsettling change. A morerecent view is that the organs of the republican state were not struggling in the waythat an older generation of scholars believed. Military challenges were great butwere being handled determinedly, elections were disrupted from time to time buton the whole the business of government rumbled on as before, the picture of


transformation and decline in the countryside has been greatly exaggerated, as hasthe rise of professional armies, and although the great generals were self-promoters,they were also respectful of Roman institutions and customs. This is a view offundamental continuity. It is important to analyze the operation of the Roman statein the face of imperial pressures because the topic affects the degree to whichCaesar and other warlords should be held responsible for the ‘fall’ of the RomanRepublic and ‘rise’ of the Roman Empire (the terms most often used by modernwriters). If the state was in serious decline, the degree to which Caesar wasresponsible for its ‘fall’ is accordingly limited. If the state was rising to its imperialchallenges, Caesar’s responsibility for bringing it down is commensurately greater.Did the Roman Republic ‘fall’ as a result of imperial processes or was it ‘pushed’over by unscrupulous generals like Caesar?

There is, of course, a third alternative, according to which processes and person-alities operated together, and continuity accompanied change, some of which wasslow and some rapid, so that overall a ‘transformation’ took place.This is the viewthat seems best, though the resulting picture is difficult to describe accurately, forit entails a fluid and unstable mix of forces, which makes for a complicatedexplanation of the transformation of the Roman Republic and of the role playedby Caesar. It is quite ironic that the problems that beset the republican state can belinked directly with Rome’s acquisition of an empire. Many of the tensions thatarose during the second and first centuries BCE arose precisely because of Rome’simperial expansion.The empire was not unequivocally a good thing. It resulted insocial, economic, and political tensions, and eventually in political murder and civilwar. Nevertheless, the old picture of rapid, profound, and unsettling change shouldbe modified.The effects of the empire were more complicated and less obviouslyunsettling in the absence of decisive input from powerful individuals.

The plunder from foreign campaigns, especially in the East, was sometimes ofstaggering proportions.Aemilius Paullus, the conqueror of Macedon and father ofScipio Aemilianus, celebrated a fabulous triumph, in which he displayed awe-inspiring spoils, including huge quantities of Greek statues, coins, and gold plate(Plutarch, Life of Aemilius Paullus 32–4). In the wake of such conquests, Italyreceived injections of Greek art, architecture, literature, slaves, teachers, ambassadors,merchants, tradesmen, skills, and ideas of various kinds. In the words of theAugustan poet Horace (Epistles 2.1.156–7): ‘captive Greece took captive her fierceconqueror’.The modern world tends to take change for granted, especially techno-logical change, but it was not so in the ancient world, where change was not ingeneral looked upon as a good thing.Tradition was prized, for it had worked in thepast.The Romans thought of tradition as mos maiorum (‘custom of the ancestors’,‘ancestral custom’).As is regularly pointed out, they did not even have a word for‘revolution’ or ‘rebellion’. Instead, they employed the phrase novae res, ‘new things’,which tends to imply that something ‘new’was deemed to be subversive.Concernswere certainly expressed about Greek cultural influence in the second century BCE.Cato the Elder, for instance, famed for his strict censorship in 184 BCE, is knownfor his intemperate language on this subject.Yet Cato’s attacks on Greeks and Greek


culture have probably been over-emphasized.Rome had always been influenced byGreek culture and was quite comfortable with it.When examined in context, theattacks are generally products of Cato’s desire to defend the Roman imperial image.He was not so much ‘anti-Greek’ as ‘pro-Roman’.Cato was not opposed in generalto ‘philhellenism’, the term that normally denotes a positive attitude towards Greekculture and its merits. He targeted impressive Greeks and ‘philhellenes’ among hiscontemporaries at Rome only where they posed a threat to Roman pre-eminence.Of course, it was Cato who decided when this was the case, and he was undoubt-edly a difficult customer.The point is that he was no mere reactionary or opponentof all things Greek.He knew Greek and employed Greek genres and techniques inhis writing.Yet he was careful to address Greeks in Latin and to write the first majorhistory of Rome and Italy in Latin,whereas previous histories of Rome written byRomans had employed the Greek language.When educating his son, he went tolengths to promote the superiority of Roman tradition over Greek culture.

A similar nuanced interpretation applies to the famous Bacchanalian pogroms orcrackdowns, which began in 186 BCE when the senate forcibly suppressed theworship of Bacchus (equated with Dionysus, the Greek god of wine) throughoutItaly.Many of the devotees of this cult were women and the ritual involved a headymix of secrecy, evening gatherings, wine, and ecstatic dance. The senate acteddecisively to outlaw the cult for its supposed immorality and seditious nature.Roman commissioners, on guard against signs of resurgence in Bacchus worship,apparently stayed in southern Italy for some years after the initial suppression.Yetthere are signs that Italian authorities participated in the crackdown.Errant women,for instance, were handed over to their fathers for punishment. So it seems that theproblem with the cult was not so much its Greek origin or secret ceremonies butthe perception that it represented a threat to public order because devotees whowere not under the control of Italian municipal councils or the Roman senateorganized it. Once again, this hardly looks like an attack on changes brought aboutby too much contact with Greek culture.

There is considerable evidence for extortion and corrupt enrichment. Thequestion is how to assess this evidence. Roman troops stole priceless works of artand religious offerings, and huge sums were paid as war indemnities. The gapbetween the rich and the poor in Italy began to widen considerably. Provincialgovernors and moneylenders were capable of outrageous behavior. There wassignificant collusion between senators and equites (the ‘knights’ or ‘equestrian class’,whose name alludes to ancestral service as mounted warriors in the early Romanarmy but whose members had never become senators at Rome). Senators wantedto become governors, whereas equites wanted to win contracts for public works inthe provinces, such as supplying equipment and food to the army, and collectingthe state’s revenues in the form of taxes, harbor dues, and so on.The operatives ofequestrian companies formed for public purposes were known as publicani – thehated ‘publicans’ or tax collectors of the NewTestament. Deals were done betweensenators and equites. Friction developed when competitors from both classes reactedagainst the corruption. Attempts were made to emphasize the old ideal of the


senator as a gentleman farmer, who left commercial ventures, which were activitiesof low social esteem, to the eques (‘knight, equestrian’). In the long run, suchattempts did not work. It was not really feasible to keep the two groups apart.Senators wanted a piece of the commercial pie, and in any case the two classesmixed socially and intermarried freely. By Caesar’s day, equestrian creditors, whohoped to make a profit when the senator won for himself a lucrative provincialcommand, supported many rising senators. Senators, for their part, borrowedheavily from equites as one way of ensuring their support.

Roman governors did not receive a salary.They normally served in their provincesfor a year, and in that time they were virtual kings.They knew that they had onlyone year in which to make their mark and to enrich themselves for competition withtheir peers back in Rome. Naturally, corruption occurred. GaiusVerres, a governorof Sicily who was prosecuted by Cicero in 70 BCE, is a famous example. He issupposed to have said that a provincial governor needed to extort three fortunesduring his term: one for himself, one for his creditors, and one with which to bribethe (senatorial) jurors of the extortion court back at Rome (Cicero, Against Verres1.40). Such behavior of course produced resentment in the provinces, but under thecircumstances one should probably bear in mind traditions of extortion under earlierrulers,Roman use of existing tax formulae, the effectiveness of Roman contacts withthe provincial elites, and the coercive power of the Roman army in maintainingorder. Corruption was not the whole story and continuity accompanied change.

Captive slaves were regularly transported to Italy in the wake of Rome’s wars.Many were put to work on the great estates. Cato’s DeAgri Cultura (OnAgriculture)contains advice about how to treat such slaves, much of it appearing remarkablycallous to a modern mind, though it was probably sound from the point of viewof economic efficiency. Conditions were physically less taxing for those who werepurchased as personal or household slaves. There were no guarantees abouttreatment, of course, and some female slaves were used regularly for the sexualgratification of their masters. Other slaves were unlucky enough to be assigned toone of the gladiatorial schools for training as a gladiator. These men fought toentertain Roman audiences, though they were too valuable to be allowed to fightto the death on every occasion. Slaves condemned to the mines in places like Spainsuffered most. There is considerable debate about the effect of slave labor onseasonal employment patterns in Italy. Nathan Rosenstein argues that largenumbers of slaves had already been put to work on relatively small Italian farms inthe third century BCE, and he thinks that the slave population did not grow asquickly as has been thought in the second century BCE. Continuity, in his view,should be emphasized over change. Even so, a perception of large numbers of slavesseems to have existed at the time and caused consternation.This is hard to quantify,but it appears that Romans were well aware of the potential for revolt and terrorthat substantial numbers of slaves represented.When a large rebellion broke outamong agricultural slaves in Sicily in the 130s BCE, it dragged on for years, a factwhich indicates the determination of the slaves to throw off the Roman yoke. Itmight also support the theory of a decline in Roman military performance in the


latter decades of the second century BCE, along with evidence that force was usedto press conscripts into military service.While slave wars were neither lucrative norglorious, and while it is unlikely that there was a manpower shortage as such inItaly, the impression of a fundamental problem with the Roman military hastroubled scholars for many years.

The standard explanation has been that problems over land and agriculture inItaly produced a decline in the number of free landholders, who formed the poolof recruits eligible for legionary service.Tradition required that each legionary hadto own a minimum amount of land.The reasoning was that this land representedthe man’s tangible stake in the state and his motive for fighting. It seems increasinglylikely, however, that conditions in the Italian countryside have been significantlymisunderstood. Archaeological evidence, inter-disciplinary theorizing, and demo-graphic calculations have caused Nathan Rosenstein in particular to challenge thelong-standing belief that lengthy military service overseas meant the failure of farmsin Italy for want of labor.He argues that farms in ancient Italy typically had an over-supply of labor, so that Rome’s practice of conscripting young, unmarried men,along with the custom of men marrying and establishing separate farms in their latetwenties or early thirties at the end of their period of military service, meant thatneighbors, brothers, and women (who normally married in their late teens) werestill available to work on farms.The absence of conscripts, and the drift of other mento the cities, actually created opportunities for employment in the countryside andproduced not a decline but a growth in population.The overall result was not thatfamilies lost farms and became impoverished in absolute terms, but rather that theirfortunes began to decline through excessive subdividing of family farms as theeffects of population growth were felt, along with the end of colonization andlucrative wars in the latter half of the second century BCE. Even where casualtiesfrom difficult campaigns were high, the impact on Italian land ownership andagriculture, and hence on Roman and Italian society, turns out not to have been asdamaging as earlier scholars believed. Once more, the continuities outweighed thechanges. Rosenstein admits that his calculations are insecure in places, and that hisconclusions do not match the opinions expressed in the works of, for example,Sallust, Plutarch (esp.Life ofTiberius Gracchus 8.1–3) and Appian (CivilWars 1.7–11).Yet his work provides a serious challenge to the traditional reconstruction of theeffects of the empire on Roman and Italian society in the second and first centuriesBCE.Moreover, it is only right to highlight the biases of our sources.The perceptionsof elite writers need not accord with reality, though of course perceptions can oftenbe as influential as reality (and sometimes even more so).

Politics: Political consequences of Empire

The land question also affects our understanding of politics at Rome. In particular,it is vital for reconstructing the crisis which arose in connection with the reformactivities of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, two brothers known conventionally asthe Gracchi. In 133 BCE, the young noble Tiberius Gracchus, as a tribune of the


plebs, proposed a land reform bill, according to which ager publicus (‘public land’) inItaly would be resumed and redistributed to the poor.The bill was voted into lawby the concilium plebis. In the process, however, Tiberius insulted the senators byfailing initially to present his bill to the senate for debate, caused a fellow tribuneto be deposed, asserted the authority of the Roman people over the senate inmatters of state finance, and finally (in highly irregular fashion) stood for re-election as tribune in order to protect the land reform process.The combination ofthese challenges was more than some senators could bear. Tiberius and threehundred of his followers were bashed to death and their bodies thrown into theTiber River. The land reform process was at first permitted to continue – anindication of its value to Rome’s poor – but was eventually stalled because of upsetscaused in Italy by the resumption activities of the land commissioners.

In 123 BCE, Gaius Gracchus,Tiberius’ brother, restarted the land reform processwhen he also won election as tribune of the plebs. In contrast to his brother,however,Gaius attempted a far more comprehensive program of reform, taking aimat various abuses and employing both the equites and the Roman people in waysthat proved threatening yet again to elements in the senate.Aside from land reform,Gaius proposed a series of laws dealing with magisterial corruption, the member-ship of juries, and the provision of grain to the Roman people. He emphasized thesovereignty of the Roman people in their assemblies – affirming that whereas thesenate gave advice in a senatus consultum (‘decree of the senate’), only votes of theRoman people made a lex (‘law’). Gaius even won re-election to the tribunate in122 BCE. Finally, the senate began to think in terms of outbidding him rather thanconfronting him, and a series of measures proposed by a rival tribune, MarcusLivius Drusus, resulted in a decline in Gracchan support. Matters came to a headin 121 BCE. Small-scale clashes between the Gracchans and their opponents event-ually erupted into a more substantial riot.Three thousand Gracchans were killedon this occasion, and once more the Tiber was filled with bodies of the dead.

The advent of political murder at Rome in 133 BCE signaled the start of the ‘late’Republic, an era marked by political violence and civil war.The murders of theGracchi provided a chilling lesson that would not be unlearnt – force could be usedto resolve political crises (‘might makes right’).Yet the nature of the Gracchan crisisis still controversial. It seems that Romans were less upset by the land question thanby the attitudes of the Gracchi towards aristocratic power-sharing and the tradi-tional prestige of the senate. In the eyes of their opponents, they were trying to gainundue influence with the Roman people, at the expense of their fellow nobles andin contravention of the traditional agreement to share power.This tends to implythat the Roman elite were acutely sensitive to the possibility that a single, charis-matic individual might break ranks, win the support of the Roman people, andseek autocratic power. Italians were certainly upset by the activities of the landcommissioners, but instead of fighting for their very subsistence, as was oncethought, it now seems likely that they were searching for security and prosperity indifficult times, with their aspirations having been shaped by the imperial richesthey had witnessed for many years. Rosenstein thinks that the Gracchi might have


misunderstood the circumstances in Italy. In his view, their solution of distributingsurplus land was doomed to fail because in fact there was no surplus land, and therewas over-population rather than under-population.The dreadful solution arrived atin the first century BCE involved massive population losses through civil war andoverseas migration.

New studies of public land in Italy are providing important insights.This wasland that had originally been acquired by Rome at the end of successful campaignsagainst the peoples of Italy. Saskia Roselaar suggests that the Romans normallyclaimed more land for themselves from conquered Italian peoples than theyactually needed. She thinks the Italians were permitted to continue exploiting thisland, though they had no legal title over it.The practice was a way of keeping theItalians under control via the implied threat that rights to this land could be with-drawn at any time. She also emphasizes the location as well as the amount of publicland available. Land that was close to markets in Rome and the Italian cities wasparticularly valuable and vulnerable to resumption. Such ideas help to explain whyItalian resistance to the activities of the Gracchan land commissioners was so strong– it involved a wider cross-section of Italian society than has been thought and wasprobably amplified by fears about future resumptions of valuable land for thebenefit of Romans. Italian indignation need not have been at dangerous levels priorto this.The Gracchan reforms, therefore, loom larger than they have done beforeas causes of the bloody ‘Social’War, i.e. the rebellion of the Italian socii (‘allies’),which lasted from 91 to 89 BCE.

Such ideas about the Gracchan crisis in turn affect scholarly understanding oflater Roman politics.The tendency has been to emphasize dramatic change to atraditional formula. It has been thought, for instance, that a strong ideologicaldivide emerged at Rome in the wake of the Gracchi. Some citizens thought thatthe ‘best men’ (i.e. the noble leaders of the senate) should dominate the politicalprocess. Their opponents maintained that the Roman people were sovereign(whether the full people in the comitia tributa or the plebeians in the concilium plebis),that the Roman people elected magistrates, and that only the Roman people couldvote a proposal into law, backed by the full judicial and coercive power of the state.Citizens of the former persuasion were known as optimates, whose slogan was ‘Letthe best men rule’! Their opponents were populares (‘the people’s men’), whoseslogan was ‘Let the people rule’! It does seem that orators and others used sucharguments to justify their political positions, but the theory that late republicanpolitics was divided in any formal way along such lines is highly contentious. SirRonald Syme and Erich Gruen, for instance, believe that politics was a matter ofpractical expediency rather than philosophical preference, and they stress thatsenators were not normally held to account for the consistency of their advice orassociates.There was nothing at Rome similar to the operation of modern politicalparties. The topic is controversial, and the example of the Gracchi undoubtedlyengendered strong reactions. It seems best, however, to think in terms of richermotives for political groupings, including individual and family considerations, andthe forming of ad hoc associations on particular issues.


Another formulaic conception of Roman politics has been criticized in recentyears. According to the ‘frozen waste’ model of Roman politics, developed byscholars such as Matthias Gelzer, the nobles,whose clients voted for them regardlessof the issue, dominated political matters. The system was held to be self-perpet-uating, since it was hard for outsiders (the ‘new men’) to gain entry, and thenobility perpetually controlled the ordinary citizens of Rome. Rather than asystem determined essentially by patronage, however, it is now argued that thepeople were by no means dominated, that ‘democracy’ existed to a far greaterdegree than has been thought, that there were always uncommitted voters whowere open to persuasion on particular issues, that the nobles spent large sums onbenefactions aimed at garnering votes, that they commonly sponsored ‘new’ men,and that this should be seen as a normal method for extending and perpetuatingnoble influence from generation to generation.The operation of politics at Romeonce more becomes a more complicated phenomenon, in which there is consid-erable room for individuals to make a difference.

Similar thinking has been applied to the operation of the city mobs. Thetraditional theory is that these men were desperate, having lost their farms andancestral ties in Italy. Manumitted slaves or libertini (‘freedmen’), ex-slaves set freeby their masters as a reward for loyal service, swelled their numbers.They were allmen who had to support themselves and their families from meager resources amidthe squalid, multi-storey, overcrowded tenement blocks – wooden structures thatalmost touched each other across the narrow, twisting, unplanned streets.They livedwith the ever-present fear of fire, and the stench of open drains and seethinghumanity, along with hardships brought on by disease and vermin. Rome’s hotsummers were particularly oppressive and deadly in the circumstances. For theirpart, the nobles sought to exploit the muscle and discontent of these desperate men.Electoral bribery was employed on a large scale. Handouts and entertainmentsanticipated the ‘bread and circuses’ of Rome’s emperors.The nobles formed gangsof thugs and used them to intimidate competitors. Political violence resulted andpolitical stability at Rome was inevitably compromised. Yet this reconstructionrelies heavily on the notion that there were hordes of desperate men in Rome,whowould not have needed much convincing or reward to support a patron – anypatron – in the spirit described. If, on the other hand, the men who drifted to thecities were not desperate in this way, or to this degree, or if there were various typesof men migrating to the cities from the countryside, the picture suddenly becomesless simple, and the role played by important individuals becomes far less formulaic.

Certainly there were significant tensions – as the political murder of a Romannoble in 133 BCE demonstrates clearly. Yet the picture of widespread, festeringdiscontent in Italy prior to the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus seems less and lessconvincing as scholarship on the late Republic develops.One part of the legislativeprogram of Gaius Gracchus is highly relevant: he proposed the extension ofRoman citizenship to the Latins (Rome’s close neighbors and relatives), and Latincitizenship to the Italians more generally. The legal rights and social status ofRoman citizenship were considerable, however, and the Roman people therefore


refused to extend it to their brothers-in-arms.This Gracchan innovation might notdemonstrate a deep-seated desire for Roman citizenship on the part of the Italians.Recent scholarship is inclined to see the idea originating among Romans, whosought their own advantage. Italian aspirations were by no means unified. It nowappears, at any rate, that this slight to the Italians should be placed nearer thebeginning than the end of the decline in relations which eventually gave rise to theSocialWar.

Conclusion

Scholars are divided over the question of whether the Roman Republic wasinexorably crumbling towards a moment of final collapse, or whether it was experi-encing significant change but responding strongly over a prolonged period of time.The tensions outlined in this chapter predisposed many men to follow the warlordsof the first century BCE and seek a better life – hopefully one free from poverty,oppression, and lack of rank.Yet it seems that the Rome into which Caesar wasborn was probably not as damaged by imperial processes as traditional scholarshiphas held.There was change, often of a dramatic and eye-catching kind, but therewas significant continuity as well. Political activity, for instance, was more compli-cated and resilient than traditional reconstructions have described. The idea of atransformation, sometimes rapid and painful, sometimes slower and more difficultto perceive, thus seems appropriate, and by no means inevitable in the absence ofdecisive action by outstanding individuals. Caesar’s career was neither predictablenor predestined. It was not conditioned by general failure all round. He must havebeen a more substantial figure than one who simply lit a fuse to the massivedesperation and discontent described by traditional scholarship.

Recommended reading

Rome’s wars of imperial expansion in the second century BCE are best describedby Polybius and Livy. Narratives of a rather traditional type include Scullard 1980,chs. xi–xiv; and The Cambridge Ancient History2 vol. viii. Gruen 1984 and Harris1985 are excellent studies, which come from very different points of view butjointly explode many myths about the nature of Roman imperialism in this period.Motivations for Roman expansion are discussed in Champion 2004, ch. 1. Theview of Mediterranean anarchy is well developed by Eckstein 2006. On the topicof hellenization or Greek cultural influence, see Gruen 1990; Gruen 1992; andBeard and Crawford 1999, ch. 2.

The traditional view of socio-economic and political processes of the second andfirst centuries BCE is stated authoritatively by Toynbee 1969; cf. Brunt 1971a;Scullard 1982, ch. 1. For critical comment, see Hopkins 1978; Crawford 1992, chs.vii–x; Lintott 1994a; Lintott 1994b; and Beard and Crawford 1999.The best recentdiscussion of problems related to land and the army is Rosenstein 2004. On the


army, see also Keaveney 2007. Roselaar 2010 is an acute study of the evidence forpublic land, whereas Mouritsen 1998 is valuable on the complexities of Italianaspirations and perspectives. On the number of slaves in Italy, Scheidel 2005reinforces Rosenstein 2004 on limits to numbers and growth. Syme 1939 andGruen 1974 are fundamental on the operation of Roman politics, thoughMorstein-Marx 2004 is excellent on the significance of political speeches, andWiseman 2009 is a brilliant statement of the case for groupings of optimates versuspopulares. Gruen 1974 is the classic narrative of continuities rather than changes inRoman politics in the first century BCE.

Earl 1967 is a good study of some of the major ideas and ideals which inspiredRome’s nobles. Flower 1996 evocatively handles noble culture and presentation.For ‘new men’ at Rome, the best treatment remains that ofWiseman 1971.On theGracchi, Stockton 1979 is the most reliable account in English. There has beenmuch scholarly debate on the relative political importance of the nobility incomparison to the Roman people in their sovereign assemblies (often referred toas the ‘democracy’ question). For the traditional view of noble dominance, basedlargely on clientela, see Münzer 1999 and Gelzer 1969. Serious doubts were airedby Brunt 1971b, ch. 4; and Brunt 1988, chs. 8–9. Millar (1984, 1986, 1989, 1995,and 1998) turned the debate on its head by arguing systematically and cumulativelyfor the dominance of the Roman people. North (1990a, 1990b, and 1994) offers ameasured reassertion of the view of noble dominance. Other reactions to Millarinclude Lintott 1987; Lintott 1999; Harris 1990; Mouritsen 2001; Brennan 2004;andWiseman 2009.



3NOBILIS

Caesar as a young noble, 100–70 BCE

Nobilis

As a young noble, Caesar’s career was governed by a number of imperatives. It washis duty to attempt to surpass the achievements of his ancestors, forge a distinguishedpublic career, display bravery and leadership in war, and ultimately gain gloria(‘military glory’) and the vote of a triumph from the senate.Yet each of these stepswas obviously a challenge of huge proportions.Although nobles were meant to strivefor pre-eminence, with the consulship as a kind of golden prize, any thoughts abouta consulship on the young Caesar’s part would hardly have been realistic, since hisfamily had not recently held the office. He was by no means a novus homo (‘newman’) in the eyes of the Roman people, but his early career and training as a nobletend to imply that he was operating under several disadvantages. These make itunlikely that he was thinking much beyond the next difficult stage in any serious way.

In this chapter the primary aim is to examine the evidence for Caesar’s earlycareer, prior to his first public office, the quaestorship, in 69 BCE. It seems plain ata number of points that the evidence has been shaped by favorable and unfavorableperspectives. Caesar emerges at times as a highly talented youth destined naturallyfor pre-eminence. At other times he appears to be a youth driven by dangerousambition for monarchy. Such interpretations are governed by hindsight knowledgeof the autocratic position he held at his death in 44 BCE. It seems preferable,however, to attempt to place Caesar’s career in context and to emphasize that therewere absolutely no guarantees of public success for the young man, let alone aconsulship or (more outrageously) monarchic power at the end of his life.

Birth and family

Gaius Julius Caesar was born on 12 July 100 BCE. His family was patrician,

descended from the oldest group of aristocratic families at Rome, and noble,descended from men who had held the consulship.Yet Caesar’s family had notsupplied a consul in recent generations and this would have been a severe handicapin the highly status-conscious world of his day. In fact, the Julii seem to have sensedtheir weakness some generations earlier and set about claiming an impressive pedi-gree in compensation.As is well known, the Julii claimed descent from the goddessVenus and her son, the Trojan prince Aeneas, who fled Troy in company with hisfather Anchises, his wife Creusa (who soon became separated and lost), and hisyoung son Ascanius.Ascanius went on to found the Latin city of Alba Longa, fromwhose dynasty Romulus the founder of Rome and his brother Remus wereeventually born. Ascanius took the name Iulus following the foundation of AlbaLonga, and thus his descendants were ‘Julian’ (‘of Iulus’).This tale of Julian ancestryreached its developed form in the second century, and was given definitive treat-ment by Vergil, the great Augustan poet, in his brilliant epic about Aeneas calledthe Aeneid. Livy (1.3.2–3),Vergil’s contemporary, was perturbed by the identity ofAscanius/Iulus, uncertain about the historicity of the Trojan claims and the namechange.

A relative of Caesar reached the consulship in 157 BCE, about the time when theJulii began to advertise their links toVenus,Aeneas, and Ascanius/Iulus in earnest,but he was the first Julian consul for 110 years, and the cupboard remained baredown to the end of the second century BCE.The public career of Caesar’s grand-father has left no trace, though he negotiated impressive marriages for his son anddaughter. His son, Caesar’s father, married a girl named Aurelia of the AureliusCotta family, which could boast one of the most impressive ancestries among theplebeian nobility. His daughter married the wealthy ‘new man’, Gaius Marius.When Marius subsequently reached the consulship and went on to become thedarling of the Roman people for his victories over the Cimbri and the Teutones,the choice of Caesar’s grandfather was fully vindicated. Marius, the first of hisfamily to hold public office at Rome, eventually held an unprecedented sevenconsulships, five of them in succession. His marriage to Caesar’s aunt Julia broughtwealth to the Caesars and social respectability to Marius. Eventually, two of Julia’scousins reached the consulship: Lucius Julius Caesar in 91 BCE and Gaius JuliusCaesar StraboVopiscus in 90 BCE. Caesar’s father, on the other hand, never made itto the consulship, though he did become praetor and then governor of the richprovince of Asia for at least two years. Little is known about him, except that hedied at Pisa in 85 BCE, away from Rome at a time of civil conflict.

Caesar’s female relatives

One point about Caesar’s family ought to be emphasized: he was the product of afemale household. He lost his father in his mid-teens, and knew no brother, nouncle, no grandfather, and no other leading male from within his own patricianfamily. His father’s death thrust considerable responsibility upon him at about thesame time that he became (in Roman terms) an adult. From this point he would

36 Caesar as a young noble, 100–70 BCE

have adopted a leadership role and made important family decisions.Aside from hisfather, his mother’s male relatives and the great Marius (before his death in 86 BCE)would have provided models for such leadership. Nonetheless it seems right tocontemplate for a moment the women of Caesar’s family who surrounded him inhis formative years.What influence might they have had upon him?

Roman women, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, were non-combatants,and so were excluded from politics and the military.They have often been seen assubordinate to men. Names such as ‘Julia’ and ‘Claudia’, for instance, say muchabout the status of women at Rome.‘Julia’ is in fact an adjective as much as a propernoun. It denotes that she is ‘a singular feminine member of the Julian family’. Asecond sister would be Julia secunda, a third sister would be Julia tertia, and so on.Women, in other words, did not warrant a praenomen (‘forename’), such as ‘Gaius’or ‘Lucius’, in the way that men did (e.g. Gaius Julius Caesar).Their individuality,it would seem, was one grade less than that of their men.Their primary identifi-cation was with their families.Yet their social, cultural, and religious influence wasgreat, and there were certainly formidable personalities among the leading womenof the elite families of Rome and Italy.Their world was not so much subordinatedas parallel to the world of men.Their spheres tended to operate alongside, ratherthan necessarily beneath, those in which men held sway.What kind of women wereCaesar’s relatives? What is known about his relationships with them? Thesequestions are difficult to answer because, as is often the case, we simply do not havea lot of evidence. It seems likely, however, that they were all well aware of therealities of power and that their hopes and aspirations for Caesar were of the highestorder.

The great historianTacitus,who wrote around a century and a half after Caesar’sdeath, was convinced that Caesar’s mother Aurelia was one of the great ladies ofthe Republic (Dialogue on Oratory 28.5).A member of the plebeian nobility, she wasthe daughter of a consul, grand-daughter of a consul, and cousin to three brotherswho were destined to become consuls (in 75, 74, and 65 BCE). Given that Romanboys assumed the toga virilis (‘toga of manhood’) at age 15, her son was on the cuspof adulthood when his father died. Surely she proved an influential advisor as heembarked on public life. Caesar’s aunt Julia, who married Marius around six toseven years before his first consulship in 107 BCE, was by all accounts anotherwoman of substance. As her husband’s star rose to the heights, she managedimportant occasions at her home and mixed with Rome’s most powerful people,not forgetting Italian notables and foreign ambassadors. One of Caesar’s two sistersmarried Marcus Atius Balbus, who hailed from a good senatorial family of Aricia.The couple had a daughter, Atia, who in turn became the mother of Augustus.Caesar’s second sister married twice, into the Pinarius and Pedius families, succes-sively. Little is known of the precise families involved, though there are Pediiamong the names of Italian businessmen associated with Delos, center of the slavetrade and other lucrative activities in the East, so that wealth seems one likelymotive for these marriages. Patrician social status was the hook that snaggedequestrian wealth, as the Julii sought to increase their political power.The strategy

Caesar as a young noble, 100–70 BCE 37

of marrying into a wealthy equestrian family was activated for Caesar too. At aremarkably young age, given that most elite males were married at the close of theirmilitary service rather than before it had begun, Caesar was betrothed to a girlnamed Cossutia, from a powerful equestrian family, which appears to have beeninvolved in the production of art and architecture in Greece. It is not certain thatCossutia became Caesar’s wife, but in any case the match did not endure when abetter offer came along in the form of a patrician girl named Cornelia.Divorce wasa relatively easy matter in republican Rome, if it was needed, and in any case therewere important reasons for marrying Cornelia, as will be shown presently.

It is clear that relationships between men and women at this social level wereprofoundly affected by considerations of family power, with marriages beingdetermined by a mix of social, political, and economic factors.This is not to denythat Caesar could have developed deep personal attachments to the women in hislife.There is, however, an aura of power and respectability surrounding the Julianwomen. It can be imagined that he felt a need to live up to their expectations, andvice versa, and perhaps his own expectations about other women were governedby the formidable example of his female relatives.

Civil war between Marius and Sulla

In 91 BCE, elements at Rome failed once again to pass a bill for the extension ofcitizenship to the Italians. This time the allies responded by launching a massiverevolt, led by the Marsi and the Samnites. Some ancient authors refer to this war asthe MarsicWar, but modern students know it better as the ‘Social’War (from socii,‘allies’). Rome was immediately put on the defensive, as is obvious from the factthat the senate quickly offered Roman citizenship to any Italians who would laydown their arms. Ultimately, at the end of the war, citizenship was extendeduniversally throughout Italy. Many communities took up the initial offer, but theMarsi and the Samnites in particular had resolved to fight to the death on behalfof a new political entity,‘Italia’. Roman citizenship was plainly of little relevance totheir aspirations.The war was in effect a civil war, since Romans and Italians wereheavily intermarried and strongly associated in commercial and other ventures.Italian units had fought in the Roman army for centuries. Each side knew preciselyhow the other fought.The result was great carnage and great psychological upset.Romans and Italians learned how to kill each other, even though they had beenclose associates for centuries, not unlike brothers.The outcome remained uncertainfor a long time. Finally, Marius helped younger generals to quell Italian resistancein the north of Italy. His former deputy, Lucius Cornelius Sulla, led Roman forcesto victory in the south. Sulla’s reward was the consulship for 88 BCE, a trulymomentous year in the history of Rome. It was not long before conflict developedbetween Marius and Sulla, followed by (undoubted) civil war.

The senate awarded Sulla the military campaign against King MithridatesVI ofPontus, who had invaded the province of Asia while the Italians distracted Rome.Marius wanted this command, since success would make him a conqueror on three


continents (Africa, Europe, and Asia) – a feat to rival Alexander the Great. Thetribune Publius Sulpicius Rufus saw an opportunity to exploit the situation for hisown ends. Sulpicius sought Marius’ help for a bill to distribute the new Italiancitizens throughout all 35 voting tribes of the comitia tributa (rather than restrictthem to eight tribes as had been initially proposed). Italian influence in the tribalassembly would thereby be heightened, and of course Sulpicius would gain manygrateful clients. In return for Marius’ help, Sulpicius promised to promote a billdesigned to take the Mithridatic command away from Sulla and give it to Marius.Conservative senators were shocked and angered.This was another challenge to thesenate’s leadership, organized by a tribune of the plebs in the name of popularsovereignty but clearly of personal benefit to the proposer. In order to buy time,Sulla called a suspension of public business in his capacity as consul. Sulpicius’followers, however, commenced a riot and did not shrink from assaulting theconsul. For the moment, they controlled the streets.A meeting evidently took placebetween Marius and his former deputy, who must have made his responsescarefully. If Marius subsequently thought that he held the upper hand or that a dealhad been struck, he was soon in for the rudest of shocks. Sulla departed from thecity and went straight to his troops, who were engaged in a minor action againstthe last Italian rebels and were looking forward to the Mithridatic campaign. Heappealed to his men for assistance and they followed him readily.Thus a Romanarmy marched on Rome for the first time, overpowered the citizens who opposedthem, and even set fire to a part of the city in order to gain entry. The armyintervened in politics for the first time on behalf of its general. It would not be thelast time.Why did this happen? Did the soldiers place their loyalty to their generalahead of their loyalty to the state?

The soldiers’ response to Sulla’s plea has often been traced back to a measuretaken by Marius in 107 BCE, and more generally to conditions of the secondcentury BCE described in the preceding chapter. According to the traditionalexplanation, Marius was sorely in need of recruits, and so he formally enrolled inhis legions men who lacked the property qualification. These men were calledproletarii (‘children-producers’) or capite censi (‘men counted by their head’), becausethe censors counted them as individuals rather than as contributors of property. Forsuch men, desperate and struggling,military service was a much better option thantheir current lives.They enlisted in the hope of earning plunder and rewards fromtheir generals, upon whose generosity they depended and with whom theyconsequently formed a strong personal bond. The client army was born. Sulla’ssoldiers, it follows,were acting in the interests of their patron-general against a statefrom which they felt alienated.

It now seems clear that this reconstruction is seriously flawed. For a start, theidea that Sulla’s army was a different social unit from before is not persuasive.Theproletarii had been admitted into Rome’s legions in increasing numbers during thesecond century BCE.Their enlistment in 107 BCE, therefore, was hardly a dramaticinnovation, and it seems that there was no opening of floodgates, only officialacknowledgement of an existing custom. The preference for land ownership


among recruits remained constant and thus the property qualification continued inexistence, though it was periodically lowered during the second century BCE.Perhaps there was some concern among Sulla’s troops that Marius might raise freshlegions for the East, in which case they would miss out on the plunder that wouldbe won from Mithridates.There is no need to deny selfish thoughts about materialrewards completely. It might also be the case that they had already lost a certainamount of faith in the political process at Rome, amid perceptions of change inItaly, ongoing tensions of various kinds, and the political atmosphere of post-Gracchan Rome. Such thoughts might have been common at this time among therural peasants who seem to have formed the backbone of Rome’s legions through-out the second and first centuries BCE.They are not sufficient, however, to explainthe march on Rome. More is needed.

It appears that a potent cocktail of arguments, which seemed compelling underthe particular circumstances, convinced the troops. Sulla’s speech was passionate,and it urged a new role for the army in respect of political violence in the city.Thetroops were apparently convinced that Sulpicius’ supporters had used violenceagainst a consul, the executive head of the Roman state for that month, in a waythat was illegal, unjustified, and contrary to ancestral custom. Law, justice, tradition,and patriotism were powerful influences. A certain rural antipathy for the urbanpoor probably featured too. The urban poor, whose influence at the popularassemblies was considerable, given the fact that they lived in and around Rome,were heavily involved in the rioting, which had resulted in Sulla’s departure fromRome. It might have seemed like time for them to receive their comeuppance. Inaddition, Sulpicius’ actions on behalf of the Italians must have seemed outrageousto Roman troops who were still at that time fighting Italians. Whose side wasSulpicius on? Indeed, the psychological effects of the Social War were probablycrucial for convincing the troops to march on Rome.They had already been killingtheir fellow Italians. The conceptual leap to killing fellow Romans, especially inlight of the dramatic extension of citizenship,was not so great after the horrors andpassions of the Social War. Old barriers had been broken down in devastatingfashion. Beneath the rational decision-making, the Social War could well haveintroduced an irrational dimension of considerable significance.

Sulla’s legions, then, were not acting simply as self-interested clients of theirgeneral when they broke into the city, causing Marius to flee for his life. Sulpiciusand many of his supporters were killed in subsequent fighting.The Roman peoplein general were furious at this unanticipated development.When Sulla permittedthe assemblies to meet for elections, they proceeded to elect his opponent LuciusCornelius Cinna to the consulship for 87 BCE. Sulla feigned pleasure that thepeople were once again able to exercise their free will.

Not long afterwards, Sulla left for the East as he was legally obliged to do.Mithridates was a formidable threat to Rome’s hold on the East. Moreover, it wasimperative that he win gloria from a successful campaign and reward his men fortheir loyalty.Marius joined forces with Cinna in 87 BCE and marched on Rome inimitation of what had happened the previous year. An orgy of violence followed,


with friends of Sulla and conservatives of various shades falling prey to the swordsof Marius’ troops. Marius collapsed and died early in 86 BCE, but Cinna remainedin power down to 84 BCE, when he lost his life to a mutiny among his troops. Itwas a time of confused loyalties and doubtful legalities.

When Sulla returned to Italy in 83 BCE, the Marians were led by Marius’ son,Gaius Marius the Younger, and a noble named Gnaeus Papirius Carbo. Youngnobles named Marcus Licinius Crassus, Gnaeus Pompeius (better known asPompey), and Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius joined Sulla, though most of thesenators in fact remained on the other side. When Sulla’s forces prevailed, heaccepted nomination as dictator and unleashed a reign of terror rememberedchiefly for its proscriptions and confiscations of property. The posting ofproscription lists around the city was a chilling innovation.These lists contained thenames of men marked for death and confiscation of their properties (some wereenemies of Sulla and some were simply the owners of great estates). Bountyhunters killed rich men and added their names in different handwriting at thebottom of the proscription lists. The confiscations of property provided land forSulla’s veterans and supporters. He then passed a series of measures aimed atbuttressing the power of his friends in the senate, and set about destroying thepower of enemies who had attacked him in 88 BCE.Among a range of restrictions,the tribunes of the plebs were prevented from holding a higher office, in a movedesigned to make the tribunate unattractive to ambitious men, and their power ofveto was curtailed. Sulla became a hated and feared figure, except among his men,and his name continued to evoke memories of terrible horrors in the yearsfollowing his death in 78 BCE.His preference for emphasizing senatorial leadershipover popular sovereignty was probably governed as much by the circumstances ofhis friends and enemies as by any deeply held philosophical attachment.

Caesar and Sulla

Caesar’s introduction to the public arena came in difficult circumstances. In hisseventeenth year (84 BCE), the consul Cinna designated him for the post of flamenDialis, a highly sacred priesthood of Jupiter.The activities of the flamen Dialis werehedged around by a series of restrictive taboos, which are clear signs of thesacredness of his person.According to Aulus Gellius, an intellectual of the secondcentury CE (Attic Nights 10.15.3–25, Dillon and Garland 3.19):

It is unlawful for the flamen Dialis to ride a horse; it is likewise unlawful forhim to see the ‘classes arrayed’ outside the pomerium, that is, the army in battleorder; for this reason the flamen Dialis is rarely made a consul, since wars wereentrusted to the consuls … He must have no knot in his cap or girdle or anyother part of his clothes; if anyone is being led away to be flogged and fallsat his feet as a suppliant, it is unlawful for him to be flogged that day.The hairof the Dialis may not be cut except by a free man. It is customary for theflamen neither to touch nor even to name a female goat, or uncooked meat,


ivy or beans …The feet of the bed on which he lies must have a thin coatingof clay, and he must not be away from the bed for three nights in a row, noris it lawful for anyone else to sleep in that bed.At the foot of his bed theremust be a box containing a little pile of sacrificial cakes and offering-cakes.The clippings of the nails and hair of the Dialis must be buried in the groundbeneath a fruitful tree. Every day is a holy day for the Dialis … If he loses hiswife he resigns from the flaminate.The marriage of the flamen may not bedissolved except by death. He never enters a place where bodies are buried,and he never touches a corpse; however, he is not forbidden to attend afuneral.

It may not seem like much of a life, and there has been some comment about theinability to ride a horse, which would of course stop a military career in its tracks.Yet there is little doubt that Cinna, a close associate of the recently deceasedMarius, meant to honor Caesar rather than to inhibit or control the young man.The flamen Dialis held a position of great social and religious distinction. Jupiterwas the supreme god of the Roman state. Cinna even gave Caesar his daughterCornelia to marry for the purpose, since the job required both man and wife to bepatrician. It would confer a lifelong position of honor on the two of them.Therewere many advantages in social and religious terms. On the other hand, a militarycareer would be out of the question.What could this indicate?

One point that should not be overlooked is that Caesar’s betrothal to Cossutiawas broken off.Her family’s wealth could not compensate for the new opportunity.Instead of thinking in terms of restriction and inhibition, therefore, it is probablybetter to think in terms of elevation and honor – for life. Cinna and the Julianfamily evidently thought that this post might be the best the young man could do.They were not overly confident about his political prospects.An economic strategy(through Cossutia’s family) was apparently superseded by a religious strategy(through the post of flamen Dialis), which emphasized the young man’s patricianstatus. Both strategies imply a certain weakness about Caesar’s position at this time.His claims to high political office were by no means outstanding.The post of flamenDialis was a bird in the hand for a young man in such circumstances.

Sulla’s victory placed the Julian family in a potentially dangerous position. Notonly were they associated closely with Marius, but they were tied intimately toCinna as well. Upon taking office as dictator, Sulla moved to annul Cinna’s acts ofgovernment, including Caesar’s marriage to Cornelia and designation as flamenDialis. It is not clear whether Caesar was actually inaugurated at this time, but inany case he and his family seem to have resisted Sulla’s order.There was probablya serious religious dimension to this resistance: Jupiter was involved, and thesacredness of the flaminate had required an archaic form of marriage ceremony,which was not susceptible to easy divorce in the contemporary fashion. It wouldbe no easy matter to part the couple in a way that would skirt powerful religioussensitivities. Suetonius (Life of the Divine Julius 1.2–3) says that Aurelia’s malerelatives from the Aurelius Cotta family, together with theVestalVirgins, intervened


on Caesar’s behalf. The Cottae were associates of Sulla, whereas the Vestals arenormally thought to have been motivated by the sacred importance of Caesar’spriesthood. Ernst Badian (2009, 17) emphasizes that Sulla never executed a fellowpatrician, and perhaps this fact played a more important role than has beenunderstood to date.

Yet surely Sulla would have seen politics and family standing in the Julian resist-ance too.Their ties to Marius and Cinna were obvious to all, and the dictator issupposed to have said of Caesar (Plutarch,Life of Caesar 1):‘there are many Mariusesin that young man’. Sulla was a frightening figure at a time of proscriptions andconfiscations, and while the remark might well be a product of hindsightreconstruction, it appears quite likely that Caesar showed something of the greatpersonal courage he was later to demonstrate on numerous occasions. If his familyhad placed high hopes in this priesthood, and if they did so because Caesar’spolitical prospects were less than brilliant, disappointment and anger in Caesar canreadily be understood. In the end, Caesar did not become flamen Dialis, and thepriesthood was not filled until the reign of Augustus. It perhaps became taintedthrough its association with civil war and terror. Cornelia, however, was notdivorced. Sulla might have been indifferent to this fact, but in any case it made sensefor Caesar to leave Rome and seek to build his reputation in the provinces, as wascustomary for young nobles. He is supposed to have been pursued by Sulla’shenchmen and caught while escaping. Only a desperate resort to bribery securedhis release.The story overlooks Caesar’s ‘Sullan’ relatives and is in general doubtful,with the idea of pursuit relying heavily on the image of Sulla as a capricious tyrant,and the theme of bribery probably being injected prematurely. Nevertheless, therun-in with Sulla and loss of a golden opportunity at elevated dignitas undoubtedlycaused resentment. Caesar would be acutely conscious of how divisive Sulla’smeasures could be in the future.

Service in the East

Caesar travelled to the East, serving in his first military campaign in Asia in 81 BCE.The location is significant, given that Caesar’s father had once served as governorof Asia.The young man would undoubtedly have had clients with whom he couldmake contact as a result. His service in the East can be looked upon as a kind ofapprenticeship for a young noble of traditional aspirations. He served in thecontubernium of the proconsul, Marcus Minucius Thermus, who seems to have hadno close connection with Sulla.

Badian (2009, 17) emphasizes the importance of contubernium service, for it wasin this environment that the sons of senators met and worked closely with the sonsof equites and forged bonds which could last a lifetime. Service in the cavalry forten campaigns had once been a strict requirement for equestrian youths. It was notso in the late Republic, but a respectable military and administrative ‘workexperience block’ in a contubernium was nonetheless important for a young manwith political aspirations. Even Cicero, who was far from traditional in military


terms, served in the contubernium of Gnaeus Pompeius Strabo, the father of Pompey,during the SocialWar.The young equites with whom Caesar would have served arecertainly worth contemplating because they hailed from some of the mostimpressive families of Rome and Italy. Hence they were vital for ensuring supportfor a Roman political leader in Italy in the wake of the SocialWar, following whichRoman citizenship had been extended throughout the peninsula. More than this,the great senatorial families were always on the lookout for talented young menwhom they could sponsor as ‘new men’ into the senate. Conversely, Italy had theopportunity to flex its muscle through the bonds forged on contubernium servicewith leading Roman families.

It might have been Caesar’s paternal connections that motivated Thermus tosend the young man on a famous diplomatic mission.He went to the court of KingNicomedes IV of Bithynia to collect a fleet for the second war against Mithridates.Nicomedes was a Roman ally who owed his throne to Sulla’s campaigns. Scurril-ous rumor attached itself to Caesar as a result of his protracted stay withNicomedes, implying in particular that a sexual relationship had developedbetween the two, with Caesar as the ‘Ganymede’ or boy partner. In Roman termsthis sexual slur would have been humiliating, especially since the ‘Zeus’ was aneastern potentate thought of as being weak and effeminate. It seems highly likelythat the rumors were a product of hostile innuendo emanating from Caesar’senemies at a later period.

The city of Mytilene had been holding out against Rome since it joinedMithridates as far back as 88 BCE.When the city fell in 80 BCE,Caesar won distinct-ion as a warrior in outstanding fashion. He earned a coveted corona civica (‘civiccrown’, ‘crown of oak leaves’) for saving the life of a fellow citizen in battle.Thisaward acknowledged an extreme act of heroism, like the Medal of Honor forUnited States forces or theVictoria Cross for British forces, and it reinforces otherindications that Caesar was a warrior of conspicuous personal courage, whoseexploits may have spread around army campfires. Pliny the Elder (Natural History16.5) writes that the recipient of a corona civica was entitled to wear it for the restof his life and, when he wore it at the games, even members of the senate wererequired to stand. The effect of such an honor on a man as status-conscious asCaesar may have been profound.The only reason for doubt might be that this featwas supposedly won under a commander named Minucius. Commanders of thisname had a reputation for being rescued in Roman history: the fifth-centurydictator Cincinnatus rescued his master of horse, a Minucius, in the early days ofRoman expansion against neighboring tribes, and the most famous rescue of aMinucius occurred in 217 BCE, during the HannibalicWar, when Quintus FabiusMaximus, the famous ‘Delayer’, managed to rescue another Minucius who hadbecome trapped while fighting the Carthaginians. Still, the evidence for Caesar’scorona civica has not been seriously doubted, and it tallies well with other instancesof his personal courage.

Caesar decided to stay in the East after the fall of Mytilene. In 78 BCE he joinedthe staff of Publius ServiliusVatia, who was about to campaign in Cilicia, a haven


for pirates and a tempestuous region. Such a posting afforded useful opportunitiesfor further military distinctions.

Caesar returns to Rome

When news of Sulla’s death reached him, Caesar returned to Rome. The coin-cidence says a great deal about Caesar’s fraught relationship with the formerdictator. His stay in the East was probably not just about gaining experience for hissubsequent career. He returned to a tense Rome.Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, one ofthe consuls of 78 BCE, had responded to Sulla’s death by raising a revolt against theSullan government. Caesar may well have had sympathy for Lepidus’ stance but heevidently doubted the leadership qualities of the consul, who was subsequentlycrushed by forces led by Quintus Lutatius Catulus and the young Pompey. Catuluswas the other consul of 78 BCE. He had great influence in the post-Sullan senateand his family is usually described as heavily conservative. Pompey was theopportunist of the two, and greatly feared for his activities as a general on Sulla’sside during the civil war. It is well to see him as a strong man in the midst ofanother civil conflict. Such a perspective enables the best appreciation of hischaracter.

Sir Ronald Syme (1985b, 121) has emphasized the way in which aggressivepolitical behavior on the part of rising young Romans connects with both theirprior military service and the fearlessness they would later hope to display as ageneral. Caesar, accordingly, launched a series of prosecutions against high-profilenobles, all of whom were beneficiaries of Sulla’s power. His first target (in 77 BCE)was a prominent former governor of Macedonia, Gnaeus Cornelius Dolabella,closely associated with Sulla and hated by a number of Greek cities for his treat-ment of them. Caesar must have offered himself as patron to these cities, perhapsan extension of his ties with Greeks in Asia.The action did not, however, succeed.Caesar lost the case. It tends to be said that the Sullani were too powerful at thistime, and that might be so. On the other hand, Caesar’s public oratory was quiteuntried and he was not from a front-rank noble family. Although his speech waslater judged to be impressive, it may be that he was simply not good (or important)enough – yet.

In 76 BCE he evidently performed better against the notorious Gaius Antonius,who had been a cavalry commander for Sulla in the East and was much despisedfor his profiteering during the proscriptions.Antonius would later be expelled fromthe senate in 70 BCE, though he would rehabilitate himself to become Cicero’scolleague as consul in 63 BCE. He polarized public opinion at Rome like fewothers.The praetor MarcusVarro Lucullus, who was judging the case, ruled againstAntonius on preliminary matters – not a good sign for the defendant – and inconsequence Antonius appealed to the tribunes to interpose their vetoes on hisbehalf. In a move that reeks of collusion, this unprecedented appeal was successful,apparently provoking loud opposition.Antonius’ expulsion from the senate by thecensors of 70 BCE was in part a response to these events.


Further activity in the East

Caesar’s next move may in part have been related to these activities as orator andadvocate.He was in no doubt that persuasive public speaking was vital for buildinginfluence and winning clients. Consequently, in 74 BCE, or perhaps during thewinter of 74–73 BCE according to a recent study, he left for the island of Rhodes,in order to study rhetoric with the famed Molon of Rhodes, one of the teachersof Cicero.The importance of advanced rhetorical training for success in Romanpolitics could hardly be clearer.This move shows the variety of skills needed fornoble advancement.

On the way to Rhodes, Caesar was intercepted by pirates. Such incidents werebecoming common. The pirates were making a mint from the ransoms paid torecover the notables who were taken prisoner. Caesar’s ransom, apparently set atfifty talents, was paid by neighboring cities of Asia, who may have included clientsof the Julii or communities wanting to demonstrate their loyalty to Rome in thewake of earlier defections to Mithridates. Caesar – so the story goes – proceededto demand a fleet from these cities and use it to hunt for his captors.The pirates,trusting in the impossible geography that protected them from detection, underes-timated his determination to track them down. His desire for vengeance andjustice, however, saw him overwhelm and capture them in good time. Subsequently,he crucified them, though he had no official power to do anything that he wasdoing, given that he was a mere citizen and not a Roman magistrate.The messageconveyed by the punishment lacks nothing in clarity and brutality. The story aspresented, however, is open to question for several reasons. In the first place, Caesarhimself must have been the original source and he was obviously interested inpresenting himself as a decisive figure in dealing with the pirate menace. Further-more, there is a strong element of contrast with Pompey.Whereas Caesar executedhis pirates out of hand, Pompey later allowed captured pirates to remain alive andsettled them inland, turning them from sea-going pirates into farmers (Plutarch,Life of Pompey 28.3–4).There are also traces of civil war rhetoric because Caesar’sseverity offers a stark contrast to his later policy of clemency. Suetonius (Life of theDivine Julius 74.1), noting that he ordered the pirates’ throats cut first, actuallyinterprets Caesar’s action as an example of his merciful character, so strong was thetheme of Caesar’s clemency by the imperial age. Be that as it may, piracy was agrowing scourge, nobles were certainly being captured and ransomed, the youngCaesar dealing with pirates is hardly comparable to the mature Caesar dealing withhis Roman enemies, and the severity on display here is quite consistent withCaesar’s attitude at numerous points during the Gallic War. There is nothingundeniably fictional about the evidence for Caesar’s encounter with the pirates,though it does connect suspiciously with a series of basic themes in his life andwould have recalled these themes to the minds of ancient readers.

At this point Caesar was free to go on to Rhodes, though studies in rhetoricwere soon overtaken by a military emergency.Mithridates sent a cavalry force intoAsia to open theThird MithridaticWar against Rome (spring 73 BCE).Caesar is said


to have gathered a military force, checked the Pontic invaders, and turned themaway from the province, thereby ensuring the loyalty of wavering cities. As pre-sented, the incident is yet again suspect.Aside from the fact that some cities actuallydid join Mithridates, Caesar had no official capacity and minimal experience ofcommand.He was a noble but not a magistrate. If we believe, however, that he hadgathered forces to punish the pirates, we should believe that he acquired forces tomeet Mithridates’ cavalry. Such forces would have come from the same source:Greek cities of Asia Minor.Yet Mithridates’ troops were certainly more numerousand more dangerous in military terms than the pirates. Could Caesar really havedefeated them? Badian (2009, 19) is understandably skeptical and emphasizes theawful plight of the Greek cities, which have so far been forced to bend to Caesar’swill on three occasions: for his ransom, his vendetta against the pirates, and now hisadventure against the Pontic cavalry.No wonder some of these cities were ready forMithridates to drive the Romans out of their lands. Perhaps some small successagainst Pontic forces is not out of the question, but the real point is that theincidents of the pirates and of the Pontic cavalry have been shaped with an eye onlater events and themes.As a result, a healthy skepticism is warranted.

Second return to Rome

At some point in 73 BCE, following the death of his relative Gaius Aurelius Cotta,Caesar was co-opted as a pontifex. In other words the other pontifices chose him asan acceptable member of their priestly college. Given the inherent conservatism ofsuch colleges, the choice of Caesar to replace his deceased relative would not havebeen surprising, and it was probably an advantage to have a patrician replace aplebeian, given the concern for patrician numbers and participation in Romangovernment that emerges in our evidence on a number of occasions in this period.This success owed a great deal to Caesar’s family connections, and perhaps Caesar’sexploits in the East had won attention in the capital. It was remarkable to beselected in his absence.The time was right for him to return.

Probably in 72 or 71 BCE, Caesar was elected to the post of tribunus militum(‘tribune of the soldiers’) in one of the first four legions enrolled.These were thelegions assigned to the consuls, so the elections carried prestige.Yet even thoughthe famous revolt of Spartacus was in progress in Italy, Caesar seems not to haveserved in a military capacity. These ‘military’ tribunates had apparently becomepolitical offices, with service conducted in the capital. Suetonius (Life of the DivineJulius 5) says that Caesar supported the moves which were gathering momentumto overturn some of Sulla’s most controversial reforms, especially the restrictions onthe tribunes of the plebs, notably on their use of the veto.

The first Consulship of Crassus and Pompey in 70 BCE

The consuls of 70 BCE were Crassus and Pompey, two of the great names of thelate Republic, both of them former Sullan generals, as has been mentioned.Crassus


was the richest and probably the best-connected man in Rome. Pompey earned awide following for his military brilliance and capacity for intimidation.As consulsthey presided over a series of reforms to the Sullan state.The reaction against Sulla’slaws had reached the point where it was time for the rights of the tribunes to befully restored. Caesar’s relative Gaius Aurelius Cotta, the man whom he replaced aspontifex, had repealed Sulla’s ban on higher offices for tribunes in 75 BCE. Now itwas time for other restrictions to go too. Pompey spoke in public on behalf of thetribunes, and it is normally presumed that Caesar supported him.Badian (2009, 20)is right to point out that no Caesarian speech on the subject survives, but this mayhave been because it was not the place of a patrician to speak on behalf of restoringthe veto to tribunes of the plebs. It would not mean that he lacked sympathy for thecause, just that a leading role needed to be taken by plebeians.

Around this time, Caesar also supported the proposal of a tribune namedPlautius for an amnesty to be extended to the associates of Marcus AemiliusLepidus, the consul of 78 BCE who had launched a coup at Sulla’s death.Amnestywould permit these men to return to Rome from Spain, where they had takenrefuge with Marius’ nephew Sertorius and other leaders of the resistance to Sulla’sgovernment. The measure was designed to promote stability and even heal riftsfrom the time of the civil war. Caesar’s support should not surprise us because heseems to have stood up to Sulla and was related by marriage to Marius. In addition,his brother-in-law Lucius Cinna was among those who would benefit from theamnesty. Family and state concerns were served by Caesar’s stance.

Conclusion

By 70 BCE, Caesar was ready for his first office of the cursus honorum. He had risenno more quickly than other peers, and there had been significant setbacks. Hisfamily circumstances and economic resources were not quite as strong as theymight have been. Pompey’s unconventional rise was far quicker, based on massiveviolence. Caesar was not the man who would be king. He could not have beenthinking about monarchy, for even the consulship must have seemed a possibilityonly. Nothing was assured for him. He had not led armies like Pompey. He couldnot raise armies from his own resources like the two consuls of 70 BCE. He wastheir inferior by a long way, though he was still a noble of determination, personalcourage, and self-confidence.These traits would not, however, be enough for himto rise to pre-eminence, and Caesar undoubtedly knew it.What did he do in thenext phase of his career to bring about further success in his rise to the top?

Recommended reading

Plutarch’s Lives of Marius, Sulla,Crassus, and Pompey are the best places to start forthe careers of these dominant men. Among modern writers, a useful study ofMarius’ political career is Evans 1994, while Keaveney 2005 treats Sulla favorably.Accessible narratives of the civil war between Marius and Sulla may be found in


Scullard 1982, ch. iv; and Seager 1994.The enigmatic MithridatesVI is well servedby McGing 1986.Crassus has proved a notoriously difficult subject for biographers,though Marshall 1976 and Ward 1977 do reasonably well with difficult material.Seager 2002 remains the best political biography of Pompey. On the notion of‘client armies’, see Keaveney 2007.

Caesar’s early career has recently received up-to-date treatment by Badian 2009.Other important studies in English include Gelzer 1968, ch. 2;Meier 1995, chs. 3–7;Garland 2003, ch. 3;Goldsworthy 2006, chs. 1–4; Kamm 2006, ch. 2; and Billows2009, chs. i–iii. Osgood 2010 analyzes the story of Caesar and the pirates with flair,and in the process makes valuable points about other aspects of Caesar’s earlycareer.

More attention should be given to the women in Caesar’s life.A fine introductionto the Roman family is available in Dixon 1992.Various aspects of the lives ofRoman women are covered by Gardner 1986; Dixon 1988; Bauman 1992; Dixon2001; and D’Ambra 2007. Hemelrijk 1999 is very good on the intellectual attain-ments of Roman women in the age of Caesar. The women in Caesar’s life arestudied at chapter-length by Tatum 2008, ch. 5; Steel 2009; and Paterson 2009.



4AMBITIO

The ambition of Caesar, 69–64 BCE

Ambitio

Ambitio (‘ambition’) was an attitude governing the pursuit of public office at Rome.It tends to mean the acceptable attitude towards canvassing for votes at electiontime. In this sense, it was a good thing to be a man of ambition in Roman societyand politics. In fact, such ambition was expected and encouraged in a highlycompetitive and individualistic society.There were limits, of course, and the crimeof electoral bribery in Roman politics went by the related name of ambitus (a‘going round’), which denotes the illegal, unacceptable way of ‘going round’ forpublic office, normally through the dissemination of cash bribes, gifts, or favors ofother kinds.There has been a tendency to describe Caesar’s ambition as obsessiveand aimed at monarchic power from the beginning.He was accused of using lavishbribery in service of this ultimate aim. Some scholars now doubt his use of bribery,but this probably goes too far, for it was a common feature of Roman politics atthis time and would have been entirely in line with aims that were more limitedthan monarchy. Caesar’s ambition in the period covered by this chapter seems tohave been more traditional than subversive. He progressed steadily and legitimatelythrough the cursus honorum. He did not try to bypass any of the expected offices.Indeed, he was not able to do so, for he was no Pompey and there were inherentweaknesses in his background to overcome.The impressions that emerge are of raretalent and fierce struggle rather than inevitability. Caesar went to lengths tomaximize the advantages and minimize the limitations imposed by his family,wealth, political connections, and early success. Special attention should be devotedto his successful election as pontifex maximus (‘chief pontifex’) in 63 BCE. It was thisoffice, and not (say) the laying of foundations for the consulship or anything higher,which was the main outcome of his activities between 69–64 BCE.Caesar’s electionas pontifex maximus stands out as the first big jump in dignitas, the first extraordinary

(rather than conventional) jump in prominence to be detected in the pattern of hisoffice-holding. How did he manage it?

Caesar’s political career began in 69 BCE, and between 69 and 64 BCE he pro-gressed through the cursus honorum in a conventional, though strong andeye-catching way. Then, in 63 BCE, a spectacular success was achieved: Caesargained election to the office of pontifex maximus over the heads of more senior andexperienced opponents. The groundwork for this success was laid in the periodfrom 69–64 BCE. His ambition was strong, but it was directed towards traditionalrepublican outcomes for a man of his class and age. There is no sign of dissatis-faction with the cursus honorum or of a preference for monarchy. Caesar workedhard to build a broad-based political support.The major aim of this chapter is tooutline the steps by which he achieved this. In the process,Caesar will be describedas driven, energetic, and talented, but not a rebel or dissident who harbored adangerous monarchic ambition.

Caesar and the Roman people

Caesar’s personal style, confidence, and charm must form part of the explanationfor his rise. He was a commanding figure – tall and handsome with dark, piercingeyes, as Suetonius relates. He and his family had received a series of checks whenSulla forced the flight of Marius, won the civil war, and then prevented the youngCaesar from becoming flamen Dialis. Yet his bravery as a soldier shows hisfearlessness and implies an indomitable character. Setbacks and deficiencies in hiscircumstances seem to have energized him. His exploits in the East were evidentlytalked about in Rome. He followed them up with strong performances as a youngadvocate and political orator, though the results of his work were mixed. He wasentitled to wear his oak crown on public occasions. When he did so, there isevidence that even senators would have had to stand for him (Pliny the Elder,Natural History 16.5).The impact this might have had on his aspirations is worthcontemplating. Self-assurance and an easy superiority tend to characterize him as amature man, but so too do flashes of great anger and emotion, as though under-neath the surface he was still struggling with insecurities about (say) his family’ssocial standing and economic resources in the eyes of other members of the elite.Yet personal attributes would only take him so far. Other candidates used briberyand it appears that he did too, in spite of recent doubts (e.g. Gruen 2009, 24).Themoney was obtained from creditors, who were showing their faith in the youngman’s potential for a lucrative provincial post. Even this would not be enough forelectoral success. More fundamental political factors, such as his methods and hisassociates, need to be taken into account.

In descriptions of Roman politics during this period that assume a fundamentalcontest between optimates and populares, or between groups emphasizing aristocraticleadership and popular sovereignty respectively, Caesar is normally described as apopularis, who sought to empower the Roman people and use their support for hisown political gain. Sometimes there is a suggestion that this preference was more

52 The ambition of Caesar, 69–64 BCE

a matter of expediency than deep conviction, though his sincerity is really a matterof speculation.Without denigrating the influence of ‘optimate’ and ‘popular’ argu-ments, and the ongoing potential for their use in post-Gracchan Rome, it seemsbetter to think that Caesar sought to forge broad connections throughout Romansociety, among both the elite and the Roman people. There would be nothinguntoward, of course, about a patrician noble choosing to emphasize popularsovereignty, if it would bring an advantage. In similar fashion, elements among theRoman people could favor an optimate position or candidate at times. Thesechoices were about political judgment rather than social class, and they weresubject to change. It would not really make sense for Caesar to follow one politicalline inflexibly, and he seems not to have done so. At times during his career, forinstance, tribunes supported him, and at times he was opposed by tribunes, andbehaved controversially in dealing with them. Moreover, there were manymembers of the enlarged senate who owed their positions to Sulla, and many moreveterans throughout Italy who owed their farms and social standing to Sulla’sproscriptions, confiscations, and subsequent laws. If Caesar was to be successful, itwould be better to adopt a moderate tone and attempt to win over groups of suchmen, along with their networks of clients and relatives. Even Cato theYounger andhis friends – the group most easily described as optimates – were capable of workingwith tribunes and advocating changes to traditional practice at times. Caesar’spersonality, methods, and success seem to have upset these men, not a consistentpolitical philosophy. It would be well to discard (modern) ideas about party politicsand the need to maintain a consistent party line. Political activity was more flexiblein Caesar’s Rome.

Crassus, Pompey, and the conservatives

The bar for pre-eminence must have seemed extraordinarily high to Caesar at theoutset of his career.The most powerful men were undoubtedly the consuls of 70BCE, Crassus and Pompey, both of whom were way ahead of Caesar. Pompey’scareer was notable for civil war, the use of violence, irregularity of office-holding,and power wielded from a young age. Each of these features stands in stark contrastto the early political career of Caesar. In fact, they throw the regularity andordinariness of Caesar’s rise into high relief. He was hardly the man who would beking in this period, when compared with the likes of Crassus and Pompey.No oneat the time could have thought of him as a match for such imposing figures, letalone as their superior in talent or potential.

Marcus Licinius Crassus, one of Sulla’s leading commanders, gained enormouswealth through the proscriptions and confiscations. Plutarch emphasizes the appal-ling manner in which he acquired his wealth (Life of Crassus 2.4–6, Dillon andGarland 2.21):

Most of his money, if the truth, though scandalous,must be told, he collectedthrough fire and war,making his greatest profits from public misfortunes. For,

The ambition of Caesar, 69–64 BCE 53

when Sulla took over Rome and sold the property of the men he hadproscribed, considering it and calling it the spoils of war, he wanted to sharethe guilt with as many of the most influential men as possible, while Crassusrefused neither to take nor to buy it from him. In addition, when he sawwhat familiar and normal disasters at Rome fires were, and the collapse ofbuildings because of their weight and contiguity, he started buying slaveswho were architects and builders.When he had more than 500 of these, heused to purchase houses that were on fire and ones next to those on fire, sincebecause of their fear and uncertainty the owners would sell at a low price,and, as a result, the greater part of Rome came into his possession.

Crassus is often described in shorthand fashion as the richest man in Rome, even(incorrectly) after Pompey’s return from the East in 62 BCE, but such a descriptiondoes his capacities as warlord and power-broker little justice. He once claimed thatno man should be called rich at Rome unless he could sustain an army from hisprivate resources (Plutarch, Life of Crassus 2.7). Crassus could do this in the yearsfollowing Sulla’s death. He was not just a man of wealth. He was a man of wealthand war, and enormously powerful as a result.When the famous slave revolt led bySpartacus broke out in Italy (73–71 BCE), the slaves crushed successive Romanarmies before Crassus was called upon in 72 BCE. It took him some time to gainthe upper hand, but finally he smashed the slaves in southern Italy and forced theremnants of Spartacus’ army to flee northwards towards the Alps. There thesurvivors had the great misfortune to run into Pompey’s army,which was returningfrom service in Spain.The wretched slaves were cut to pieces, and those left alivewere crucified. Pompey duly claimed credit for ending the revolt, and therebyinfuriated Crassus, who had done the lion’s share. Crassus was nothing if notsensible about the acquisition of power, however, and he saw that an alliance withPompey at this point would prevent them cancelling each other out.Accordingly,the two men combined their resources, became consuls for 70 BCE, and presidedover some important reforms to Sulla’s constitution, especially restoration of thetribunes’ power of veto. Crassus is regularly described as a man capable of placingpower ahead of principle.

Gnaeus Pompeius (Pompey) was born in the same year as Cicero, 106 BCE, andthe two men first came to public notice in 89 BCE, during the war against theItalians, as junior members of the war council of Pompey’s father,Gnaeus PompeiusStrabo. Pompey’s exploits on Sulla’s behalf are well known and almost the stuff oflegend. In 83 BCE, in his early twenties, Pompey raised three legions from amonghis family’s clients in Picenum and brought them to Sulla’s aid. His extraordinaryyouth was no bar to military success. After victories in Italy, Sulla sent the younggeneral and his forces to Sicily and Africa, where they emerged triumphant overseasoned opponents. Pompey’s exploits earned him the nickname of adulescentuluscarnifex (‘teenage butcher’), which says much about the character of his victoriesand his fearsome reputation. In fact, Sulla himself was apparently forced to yield toPompey.When the young man returned to Italy, in spite of the fact that he had


never held public office, he demanded a triumph from Sulla.‘More people worshipthe rising than the setting sun’ (Plutarch, Life of Pompey 14) is what Sulla wasevidently told.The dictator, against his natural inclinations, decided that it wouldbe better to give his consent. In other words, the young man, whose troops werecalling him ‘Magnus’ (‘Great’) in emulation of Alexander the Great, was toopowerful and too unpredictable. Pompey celebrated his first triumph (as anequestrian rather than a senator) on 12 March 81 BCE.

He remained an awkward proposition for the senate through the 70s BCE, sincehe was not a member.Yet he needed the support of the senate in order to receiveprestigious assignments, and the senators realized that they needed him too.Trustwas fragile on both sides but relations were respectful. In 78 BCE Pompey assistedQuintus Lutatius Catulus to crush the abortive uprising of MarcusAemilius Lepidus,which broke out following Sulla’s death. Subsequently, Pompey was sent to Spainagainst Sertorius and his Marian army.The campaign proved far more difficult thanPompey had contemplated.When men and supplies began to dwindle, the senatedragged its heels, not entirely unhappy to see him in difficulties and fearing theprospect of a rejuvenated army at his back. Pompey wrote a famous letter to thesenate at this point (Sallust,Histories 2.98),making it clear that his army could decide– against his will, of course – to return to Italy! The senate caved in to his thinlyveiled threat and resupplied him. Pompey eventually overcame the Marians, thoughhis victory owed much to treachery and disunity among Sertorius’ men rather thanto Pompeian military superiority. His return to Italy in 71 BCE coincided with thefinal stages of the Spartacus revolt, as mentioned above.The presence of both Crassusand Pompey in Italy at the head of veteran armies must have been disconcerting, inlight of their experience with Sulla, though both men had undeniably earned thestate’s gratitude. Crassus and Pompey thus became consuls in 70 BCE. Pompey, as isoften noted, had never even taken a seat in the senate before, so extraordinary hadbeen his career. He had to ask his friend Varro to write a handbook of senatorialprocedure for him so that he would know how to conduct a meeting of the senateas consul, whom to call upon in debate, and how to conduct himself in variousrelated settings (Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights 14.7.2–3). The underlying realities ofpower at Rome were obvious during Pompey’s consulship.

Caesar’s links with Crassus and Pompey, who were by no means close friends,through the 60s BCE have been debated fiercely. It is probably best to remember thatCaesar was an aspiring political figure in this decade. He went to great lengths, andtook considerable risks, in his pursuit of power, but was always a secondary figure tothe likes of Crassus and Pompey, and also to a number of the senatorial leaders, suchas Quintus Lutatius Catulus (consul 78 BCE) and Lucius Licinius Lucullus (consul74 BCE).These two men were influential through the 70s and 60s BCE.

Catulus joined Sulla when the latter returned to Italy and took on the Marians.Like Crassus and Pompey, however, he was no mere creature of Sulla. In fact, heopposed lawless murders in the wake of Sulla’s victory. As consul in 78 BCE, hesuppressed the uprising of his colleague Lepidus and became an acknowledgedleader of the senate. He was a staunch defender of the Sullan system, and hence


conservative in outlook, during the 70s BCE and was given the prestigious job ofrestoring the Temple of Jupiter on the Capitol. His influence was not enough toprevent the re-empowerment of the tribunes, nor to prevent the overturning ofother Sullan measures, though he remained a formidable figure down to his death,around 61 BCE. Lucullus, as quaestor, was the only officer who accompanied Sullain the march on Rome in 88 BCE. He then proved to be Sulla’s most loyal officerin the East.As consul in 74 BCE, he received a fresh command against Mithridatesof Pontus, who had started a second war against the Romans. Successful campaignsfollowed in Pontus, Cappadocia, and Armenia, but Lucullus’ momentum slowedwhen Mithridates and his allies regrouped. Dissent grew among Lucullus’ troops,partly incited on the spot by his brother-in-law, Publius Clodius Pulcher, but partlytoo the result of a reaction against him in Rome.His standing among conservativesenators was always high, but this worked both for him and against him in termsof public honor and military glory.

Caesar’s Quaestorship (69 BCE)

In 70 BCE, amid the hoopla that surrounded the restoration of the tribunes’ powers,Caesar won election to the junior post of quaestor and took up office in Decemberof that year. His job was to manage the accounts of a higher magistrate and thusdemonstrate his suitability for public office. He was now entitled to a seat in thesenate for life and could wear the senatorial toga (with a purple border), along withthe red senatorial shoes.

During his year as quaestor, Caesar had to conduct two family funerals in rapidsuccession, one for his aunt Julia, the wife of Marius, and soon after another for hisfirst wife Cornelia, the daughter of Cinna and mother of one daughter, Julia, whowould remain forever Caesar’s only legitimate child. Caesar took the decision toconduct both funerals in the grand public manner outlined by Polybius (Histories6.53) for males of noble families, and he delivered long-remembered eulogies oneach occasion. It was by no means common to conduct the funerals of noblewomen from the Rostra, and there is a chance that Caesar was the first to do so.Quintus Lutatius Catulus (consul 102 BCE), father of Catulus the consul of 78 BCE,is said to have delivered a funeral eulogy over his mother Popilia, but there is noindication that this occurred at the Rostra. The Roman people must haveembraced Caesar’s innovation for him to repeat the dose with Cornelia, a womanin her early thirties. Plutarch (Life of Caesar 5.4) believes that this was the first publiceulogy delivered over a young woman, as distinct from a venerable matron likeJulia. These innovations surely enhanced the impressive public reputation of thewomen of Caesar’s household. They might also have won Caesar a followingamong the women of Rome, and thus contributed to his reputation for impressiveseductions (Suetonius, Life of the Divine Julius 50).

Aside from family and personal considerations, the political motivation forCaesar’s behavior seems obvious. Suetonius (Life of the Divine Julius 6) preserves theopening lines of Caesar’s eulogy for Julia. He began by emphasizing his aunt’s


descent from King Ancus Marcius, given that Julia’s mother came from the MarciusRex family.This deserves comment, both because it places the maternal line first,and because it finds royal descent impressive. It is valuable to note that kingship wasnot unequivocally a bad thing at Rome. Rather, it was tyranny (selfish and violentautocratic rule) that was the real problem for the Romans, though kingship wastainted by the tradition about Rome’s last king, the tyrannical Tarquin the Proud.As for foregrounding the maternal line, Badian (2009, 21) believes that this was away of setting the scene for the more impressive paternal descent, fromVenus andAeneas, which Caesar went on to emphasize in all its glory.The most memorablefeature of the funeral, however, was that for the first time since Sulla’s demise themilitary trophies and funeral imago (‘mask’) of Marius were displayed in public. Itseems that ‘Marius’ appeared at his wife’s funeral in the form of an actor wearing aspecial wax mask (imago) with Marius’ features. There can be little doubt thatCaesar displayed Cinna’s distinctions at Cornelia’s funeral too, though here directevidence is lacking.The political character of this gesture may have been vital injustifying the public eulogy for a relatively young woman. In any case, Caesar’ssocial and political inheritance was clear for all to see. These two instances ofpersonal and family misfortune occurred at a critical time for Caesar’s political rise,and he used them to maximum advantage. Caesar was underlining his links toMarius, and subsequently to Cinna, the two leaders of the previous generation whohad unsuccessfully opposed Sulla. He was appealing to the clients of the twoformer leaders. His aim was not to insult the beneficiaries of Sulla’s reforms but tosay that the time had come for reconciliation and acceptance.The Roman peopleresponded enthusiastically to Marius’ reappearance, following suppression of hismemory by Sulla.

Following his year of service as quaestor in Rome in 69 BCE, Caesar wasassigned to the staff of the governor of Hispania Ulterior (‘Further Spain’, i.e.southern Spain, which was further from Rome by an overland route). In 68 BCE,therefore, he served as proquaestor (‘extended quaestor’) in Spain, learning aboutprovincial administration and managing the varied business of a territory knownfor its mines, agricultural produce, and trade. On his return to Italy, Caesarencouraged the Latin colonies north of the Po (Padus) River, who were agitatingfor full Roman citizenship. This was hardly, as asserted by Suetonius (Life of theDivine Julius 8), an incitement to rebellion.The communities in this region, one ofthe most fertile in all Italy,were populous and highly civilized. Italians further southtended to look down on them, however, because of their proximity to Gaul.Thuswhen full citizenship was granted to all free Italians as a result of the SocialWar of91–89 BCE, the Padus River was taken as the northern boundary for extension ofthe Roman franchise.Those who lived in the Latin colonies north of the Po werewell acquainted with Roman culture, and in fact resembled other communities inthe PoValley closely.Undoubtedly they had cause for resentment and a worthwhilecase to present to the government at Rome. Caesar was partly acting as an aristo-cratic patron, with an eye on gaining clients, whose votes and other support wouldbe politically advantageous in future.Yet his message once more seems to be about


inclusion rather than exclusion of groups and individuals who had suffered as aresult of the SocialWar and the civil war. He sought reconciliation and the healingof rifts.

Support for Pompey (67–66 BCE)

In 67 BCE Caesar married a lady named Pompeia, who happened to be the grand-daughter of Sulla.Two points can be made about this marriage. First, Pompeia hadmany other relatives among the nobility besides Sulla. Second, her age, wealth, andsocial standing were particularly attractive. Noble marriages were governed bymore than ancestral politics, especially when political combinations changed soregularly at Rome. Caesar had no legitimate male heir, and this must have been apriority for his family. If Pompeia’s link with Sulla must be emphasized, it shouldbe remembered that the family of Caesar’s mother, the Cottae, were known forstrong ties to Sulla.The marriage might even show that Caesar was promoting suchlinks in support of his platform of reconciliation after the civil war.

He maintained his support for Pompey,when in 67 BCE he spoke in favor of thecontroversial bill proposed by the tribune Aulus Gabinius to give Pompey anextraordinary command to crush the pirate menace throughout the entire Medi-terranean. When the Roman people voted the bill into law (the lex Gabinia),Pompey received a military command (imperium) greater than that of any otherRoman commander and of course there was consternation among his contempo-raries. Plutarch says that Caesar was the only senator to support the bill (Life ofPompey 25.7–8, Dillon and Garland 12.9):

...the most important and influential members of the senate thought thisundefined and limitless power too great for envy, but still something to befeared.They therefore opposed the law, except for Caesar; he supported thelaw, not in the least because of any concern he felt for Pompey, but becausefrom the beginning he was trying to gain the favor of the people and wintheir support.

This is surely an exaggeration, trading on the stock theme of Caesar’s all-consuming drive towards a popular monarchy. Nonetheless, Caesar’s credentials forspeaking about the pirates were well known, so an element of self-promotion seemshighly likely. At any rate, Caesar’s inferior standing at this stage of his career isunderlined by his support for Pompey’s extraordinary command, which justifiablyworried conservatives because of its autocratic implications.

In the following year, a similar command was proposed for Pompey, who haddefeated the pirates in a breathtakingly short period of time.The lex Manilia of 66BCE, proposed by the tribune Gaius Manilius, gave Pompey control of the waragainst Mithridates, who had been a thorn in Rome’s side for more than twodecades. Once again, Pompey’s imperium was made greater than that of otherRoman commanders in the East, including and most notably Lucullus, who had


taken Mithridates to the brink of defeat before dissension set in among the Romantroops as Lucullus’ support from home declined. Caesar gave notable support toPompey once again. He was only a junior senator at this point, so that popularenthusiasm and the influence of more senior senators were undoubtedly decisivein gaining Pompey the command. Even so, Pompey must have appreciated Caesar’sefforts.

Caesar and Crassus (65–64 BCE)

It is often said that Caesar worked closely with Crassus around this time, thoughthe direct evidence is decidedly weak, so that the theory tends to rely heavily onCaesar’s great expenditure during these years.The assumption, as so often, is thatwealth equals Crassus, but there were obviously other creditors willing to extendsupport to a man of Caesar’s potential. Certainly, it is not hard to believe thatCrassus could have seen Caesar as a talented star on the rise, and equally that Caesarcould have approached Crassus as a powerful ally, extending his net for support aswidely as possible. The point is that the evidence for joint political plans andmaneuvers at this time is difficult to substantiate and care should be taken beforeinferring an important relationship that might not yet have existed.

In 65 BCE, Caesar was elected to the post of curule aedile, a magistrate whosupervised the operation of temples, markets, festivals, and roads, among otherduties connected with the day-to-day running of the city. The people expected theaediles to fund handouts, entertainments, games, and shows. Caesar did not dis-appoint them, even including funeral games for his long-dead father among thespectacles. His colleague in the aedileship,Marcus Calpurnius Bibulus, complainedthat Caesar took all the credit – a complaint which seems to indicate that Bibuluscontributed significantly but that Caesar’s standing with the Roman people sawhim reap the lion’s share of the benefits (Suetonius, Life of the Divine Julius 10.1–2,Dillon and Garland 2.71):

He put on wild-beast hunts and spectacles, sometimes with his colleague andsometimes on his own, the result being that he claimed all the credit for theshared expenditure too, so that his colleague, Marcus Bibulus, openlyremarked,‘The same has happened to me as to Pollux: for just as the templeof the twin brothers in the Forum is simply called Castor’s, the joint liberalityof myself and Caesar is just said to be Caesar’s’. Caesar also put on a gladia-torial show, but with far fewer pairs than he had intended; for the vast troophe had collected terrified his enemies, who passed legislation restricting thenumber of gladiators that anyone might keep in Rome.

Despite this restriction, the level of Caesar’s spending seems to have been extra-ordinary, as was his expenditure as curator of the via Appia (‘Appian Way’) aboutthe same time. Certainly, he won great popular gratitude by these means. He alsoput himself deeply into debt.Yet it was a calculated debt, run up in confidence that


the expenditure would result in his election to a higher office, from which hewould be assigned a lucrative provincial command, which in turn would bringplunder and the means to repay his creditors.

Another notable move with political overtones came when Caesar restored topublic view the military trophies that Marius had won for his victories over KingJugurtha of Numidia (modern Algeria), and the Cimbri and the Teutones.Thesehad been taken down or destroyed under Sulla. Once again the themes ofrestoration, inclusion, and reconciliation are apparent. Catulus led a conservativeresistance but the people seem to have joined with large numbers of senators inresponding positively to the campaign spoils of Marius, to which Caesar addedimages of the great man himself. The move has been seen as provocative anddivisive rather than integrative and aimed at reconciliation, but this tends to rest onthe idea that Caesar adopted a consistently anti-Sullan line in these years. Such aline would not have been realistic. There were too many senators, veterans, andclients who owed their positions to Sulla – not to mention Crassus and Pompey.Caesar understood hard political realities.

In 64 BCE, either as judge or accuser in the murder court, Caesar launchedprosecutions of men who had killed citizens or enriched themselves during Sulla’sproscriptions. Furthermore, Caesar pushed for the reinstatement of rights tochildren of those proscribed by Sulla. In this latter case he was not immediatelysuccessful, but it is clear that Caesar was determined that those who had perpe-trated the horrific murders and confiscations of the Sullan years were not to profitwhile the innocent were suffering. It is worth commenting that Crassus, much ofwhose wealth was accumulated in the wake of the proscriptions, does not appearto have been concerned.

Conclusion

Caesar had, therefore, begun his political career in regular, though decidedlyenergetic fashion. He had moved through the junior offices as tradition demandedbut had still managed to stake a claim to the legacy of Marius while promoting apolicy emphasizing civil harmony after the horrors of the Sullan era.The conser-vatives would have hated the implication that the state needed to be settleddifferently from the way that Sulla had settled it. They seem to have doubtedCaesar’s motives and painted him as a dangerous popularis, intent on personaldominance in spite of his conciliatory moves. Caesar undoubtedly expected such areaction.He had, however, acquired broad support among the people of Rome, andhad established links with Pompey, and perhaps with Crassus.The foundations foreven greater political success in the future had been laid.

But what of the office of pontifex maximus, which was soon to come Caesar’sway? One striking point about the period covered by this chapter is that there isvirtually nothing that stands out as ‘religious’ preparation in a modern sense.Theassets gathered by Caesar are more ‘political’ in character. It would not beappropriate to conclude too hastily that Caesar was cynical about religious ritual


or the gods. Instead, as will soon be shown, the modern divide between ‘religion’and ‘politics’ did not exist in ancient Rome, nor did a sharp dichotomy between apious man and a practical one.

Recommended reading

Ancient sources for this period, aside from the biographies of Plutarch andSuetonius, include surviving parts of the histories of Livy,Appian, and Cassius Dio.In addition, the speeches and letters of Cicero begin to come into their own.Cicero’s speech Pro Lege Manilia (On Behalf of the Manilian Law), for instance, showshis strong support for Pompey’s extraordinary command against Mithridates. OnCicero’s developing relationship with Pompey, see Rawson 1978, chs. iii–iv.Lucullus’ campaign against Mithridates is covered in Appian’s Mithridatic Wars.Keaveney 1992 provides a solid account of Lucullus’ career. Greenhalgh 1980 andSherwin-White 1994 furnish solid narratives of Pompey’s campaigns from 67–62BCE, during which time he defeated the pirates and Mithridates, brought an end tothe Seleucid kingdom, and went on to conquer Judea, among other achievements.

Gruen 2009 gives an excellent, up-to-date account of Caesar’s early offices, thoughhe is inclined to doubt that Caesar engaged in bribery on a large scale and may gotoo far in denying the relevance of optimate versus popularis groupings. Other treat-ments include Gelzer 1968, ch. 2;Wiseman 1994a;Meier 1995, ch. 8;Garland 2003,ch. 4; Goldsworthy 2006, ch. 5; Kamm 2006, ch. 3; and Billows 2009, chs. iii–iv.



5PIETAS

The piety of Caesar, 63–59 BCE

Pietas

Pietas was a multi-faceted idea in Roman culture. Its basic meaning is ‘dutifulness’towards one’s family, state, and the gods.The English derivative word ‘piety’, in con-trast, now tends to refer more particularly to an attitude towards the divine. Caesarhad already shown considerable dutifulness towards his family in his attitudes toMarius, Julia his aunt, and Cornelia his first wife. In fact, it could be said that hehad behaved as a remarkably pius (‘dutiful’) man in his career to this point, and thatthis attitude would have been noticed. In the period covered by this chapter, thequality of Caesar’s pietas comes to the fore, especially near the beginning and endof the period, and this time it is pietas towards the gods that tends to commandattention. In 63 BCE Caesar was elected pontifex maximus, while in 59 BCE he seemsto have disregarded a number of religious objections to his conduct as consul.Whatare the implications of this?

It will be argued in this chapter that ambition for power along traditional linesremained Caesar’s guiding principle, but that his election as pontifex maximus showshim returning to a religious strategy for power and social standing, an extension ofhis attempt to become flamen Dialis in his youth.Yet the intransigence and unwill-ingness of the optimates to compromise in 59 BCE found Caesar ready to employviolence and thwart religion in a way that might not have been his preference.

The trial of Gaius Rabirius for Perduellio

As outlined in Chapter 2 above, the famous tribunes Tiberius and Gaius Gracchuswere killed (in 133 and 121 BCE, respectively) because they were held to be aimingat a kind of tyranny in the state.Their murderers did not want a single aristocratdominating the assemblies and disregarding the senate, whose members were

entitled by tradition to debate a proposal for a law and give a joint opinion on it.The senate’s opinion took the form of a senatus consultum (‘decree of the senate’),which accompanied the proposal when it was presented to the Roman people(either comitia tributa or concilium plebis) for a vote. By the mid first century BCE ithad been accepted for more than two centuries that only the Roman people couldmake a lex (‘law’) and so legally the people could disregard the senate’s decree.Thisvery rarely happened, given the Romans’ commitment to consensus and com-promise, but the principle of popular sovereignty was widely cherishednonetheless.The practice of seeking a senatorial decree on a particular matter wascrucially designed to show respect for the auctoritas (‘moral influence’) of the senatein view of its successful leadership in the past.When men loyal to Gaius Gracchusmounted an armed challenge to their opponents in 121 BCE, the senate passed itsmost famous decree, the senatus consultum ultimum (‘ultimate decree of the senate’),which empowered the magistrates to use force against the Gracchans. For similarreasons, the senatus consultum ultimum, or SCU as it is widely known,was employedin 100 BCE against followers of another assertive tribune of the plebs, LuciusAppuleius Saturninus.The SCU had absolutely no legal force. It expressed insteadthe combined weight of senatorial auctoritas and relied on traditional respect forsenatorial leadership. As such, when that leadership was contested, the SCU wassimilarly questioned.

An important point should be made here: the senators were by no means unitedon the question of how far they should go in meeting popular demands andacknowledging popular sovereignty. Plus, their opinion on this question could alterfrom issue to issue. This is why it becomes difficult to think of optimates andpopulares as though they were modern political parties in opposition to one another.Those inclined to resist the popular mood on a subject took an optimate leaning,and those inclined to support it took a popularis leaning. There were, however,numerous senators whose sympathies were not in favor of reactionary brutalityagainst reforming tribunes such as the Gracchi and Sulpicius, and they found Sulla’scruel attempt to make his friends in the senate dominant over the people distasteful.Caesar was one of these senators and he was well aware that the SCU had proveditself a potent weapon in the past when strong popular elements had tried to backa reforming tribune whose proposals were not to the liking of the reactionaries.

Caesar, therefore, became involved in a kind of mock trial, which was designedto make the point that there was absolutely no legal basis to the SCU, and that itdid not justify the use of force.The senate should think very carefully about everusing it again in situations of popular challenge that could be dealt with throughmore conventional political mechanisms and the foregrounding of consensus.Accordingly, an old and undistinguished senator named Gaius Rabirius was placedon trial for his part 37 years previously in the murders that attended the suppressionof Saturninus and his followers. Rabirius was a minor senator, and his part in theevents of 100 BCE may have been exaggerated or embroidered. Caesar wasappointed one of two judges in an archaic court setting.The charge of perduellio (aform of ‘treason’) that was brought against Rabirius harked back to the distant past.

64 The piety of Caesar, 63–59 BCE

When it was noticed that a flag had been raised on the Janiculum Hill, an ancientsignal that the city was about to be attacked, everyone went home. No onesubsequently showed any interest in resuming the farce.The point had been made.There was no need to carry it through to an absurd conclusion.The arch-conser-vatives in the senate had been warned about abusing the senate’s power and aboutthe senate’s relative standing in relation to the sovereign Roman people.Caesar hadyet again taken a stand for consensus politics.

Caesar’s election as Pontifex Maximus

Two notable electoral successes followed.The first was brought about by the deathof the pontifex maximus, Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius (consul 80 BCE). Hispriesthood was definitely prestigious, the most important post among the branchof priests called pontifices, who had wide supervisory powers over rituals andfestivals of the Roman state cult.There were other priestly colleges at Rome, suchas the augurs, who determined the will of the gods from various types of ominoussigns – most notably, the eating habits of the sacred chickens.The pontifex maximushad no authority over them. This post was not, therefore, an office of overallcontrol like the Papacy in the Catholic Church. It was the attitude of Caesar andhis heirs that would see it transformed into Rome’s chief priesthood in succeedinggenerations.

Even so, it was an office normally held at this time by eminent ex-consuls, andtwo prominent consulares did indeed seek the chief pontificate in 63 BCE.The firstwas Publius Servilius Vatia Isauricus (consul 79), who had been Caesar’scommander in Cilicia.The bond between governor and junior officer was at timeslikened to that between a father and a son. Some contemporaries probably saw itas impudent and even presumptuous for Caesar to stand against Servilius. Thesecond noble was Catulus, a leader among the conservatives, as mentioned pre-viously. Caesar was far inferior to these two in state service and public standing.Hehad only been an aedile. Nevertheless, he announced his candidacy and won theelection handsomely, amid charges of lavish bribery.

It is common to interpret this success as both politically motivated and achievedby fundamentally political means. In other words, it is thought that Caesar wantedthe chief pontificate to enhance his political standing and used his broadconnections throughout Rome and Italy to bring about a stunning result (Gruen2009, 22–3, 28).This is a reasonable view but it might not tell the full story. Sullahad determined that his fellow pontifices should choose the pontifex maximus.Under these circumstances, Catulus would probably have won. Just prior to theelection, however, Sulla’s decision was overturned in a law proposed by the tribuneTitus Labienus, who had been prominent in the mock trial of Gaius Rabirius.TheRoman people would now elect the pontifex maximus. It seems obvious that thiswas Caesar’s wish. He was subsequently elected by 17 of Rome’s 35 voting tribes,chosen by lot. It is unlikely that he simply marshaled his clients better than hiscompetitors, and all sides resorted to bribery.The evidence for heavy bribery has

The piety of Caesar, 63–59 BCE 65

been questioned, as being an element lifted from negative portrayals of Caesar, butit is by no means out of place for the times.According to a famous anecdote,Caesartold his mother Aurelia on the morning of the election that he would either returnto her as pontifex maximus or not at all, meaning that in the event of failure hewould be forced to flee his creditors by going into exile (Suetonius, Life of theDivine Julius 13).The extraordinary air surrounding many aspects of the electionimplies that he wanted the post very much and went to great lengths to achieve hisgoal.This is why it is difficult to credit the idea that Servilius and Catulus endedup splitting the conservative vote, so that Caesar won by default. It is moreconvincing to believe that he won through his own efforts.

What might he have said to the uncommitted voters in order to win their votes?Could he have had a compelling religious argument to make to them? Could therebe an overlooked religious background to this election, and might Aurelia havebeen an important advisor, in view of family disappointment over the post of flamenDialis many years ago? Two lines of thought might support this theory. First, thetraditional ‘political’ interpretation of Roman religion seems quite inadequate now.‘Politics’ and ‘religion’were not separate in Caesar’s day as they tend to be now.Thegods were thought to be present at Roman political gatherings, which thereforeincorporated sacrifices and prayers because politics and religion were bothconcerned with the community’s power. It is the modern western world which isunusual in tending to separate the two spheres so firmly.A ‘political’ interpretationof a Roman religious office, therefore, is bound to be partial at best.

The second line of thought on this question relates to the standing and aspi-rations of Caesar himself.Roman religion was complex and it should come as littlesurprise that Caesar’s attitude to religion seems to have been complex too. He hadsome superstitions, such as reciting a brief magic formula three times before takinghis seat in a vehicle, in order to ensure a safe journey (Pliny the Elder, NaturalHistory 28.21). He had some favorite deities and ideas, such as Fortuna (‘Fortune’).Yet theTrojan ancestry of the Julii,with both divine and mythical elements, appearsto have meant a lot to him (figure 3). As mentioned previously, Caesar’s familyclaimed descent fromVenus through Aeneas, prince ofTroy, and his son Ascanius orIulus.Aeneas had supposedly brought to Italy several sacra (‘sacred objects’), whichwere revered by the entire Roman community. These included the woodenstatuette of Athena in warrior pose known as the Palladium, figurines of the penatesor household gods of the Trojan royal house, and the fascinum or erect phallus,which averted evil.The Vestal Virgins, who tended the sacred fire of Vesta, whichguarded and promoted the community of Rome, employed these sacred objectsabove all.TheVestals, as was well known, were freed from the legal control of theirfathers for the period of their state service.Their ties were instead with the pontifexmaximus, like a father with his daughters in the family home, and in this fairly loosesense the pontifex maximus was something like the state’s father. With Caesar aspontifex maximus, however, the state cult which employed Julian sacra (i.e. the sacredobjects of Aeneas) was quite explicitly the Julian family cult, and vice versa, so thatall members of the state became part of the Julian ‘family’ under Caesar’s headship


in respect of this vital worship. State and family cult became fused, with Caesarsupervising as both pontifex maximus and head of the Julian family. He would haveseemed a primary figure of pietas for the state.

Such ancestral claims might have enhanced Caesar’s religious aura with thevoters. It is difficult to estimate the charismatic power such ideas might have givenhim, but the underlying point is that it was a power deriving from what moderneyes would see as religion rather than politics, and it would have been underlinedwhen Caesar moved his house to the official residence of the pontifex maximus, theDomus Publica (‘Public House’), adjacent to theTemple of Vesta in the Forum. Inimaginative fashion, he was aligning himself and his family with ancient andrevered ideas extending back to the time of the kings at Rome, surroundinghimself with an aura that would have enhanced his status and improved his chancesof further political success. Hence the lengths to which he went. The claims tocharisma and a paternal role in the state must have offended conservative sensibi-lities, not to mention the personal feelings of Servilius and Catulus.

Caesar and the Catilinarian conspiracy (63–62 BCE)

The second electoral success of 63 BCE, surely aided by the first, occurred whenCaesar’s brilliance, energy, and broad support base won him a praetorship for 62BCE in suo anno (‘in his due year’ or ‘in the earliest year of his eligibility’). Thepraetors, who were in charge of legal affairs in the city, held an office that was onerung below the consulship. In addition, they held imperium and were normally


FIGURE 3 A silver denarius, minted c. 47 BCE, advertising the Trojan ancestry of theJulii (Crawford 1974, no. 458/1).Obverse: Bust of Venus facing right, wearing a diadem.Reverse: Aeneas, in flight fromTroy, holding the Palladium and carrying hisfather Anchises on his shoulder.Anchises andVenus were the parents ofAeneas, legendary founder of the Julian family.

made governors of provinces after their year of service.Caesar undoubtedly lookedahead to this opportunity with relish. It would be his chance to make the moneyhe would need to repay his creditors.

Caesar’s response to the notorious ‘Conspiracy of Catiline’,which was uncoveredin November to December 63 BCE, should be understood in light of his successesearlier in the year. Lucius Sergius Catilina (often called ‘Catiline’ in modern text-books) was a patrician who sought popular favor via a series of proposals to alleviatethe problems facing the poor. He even proposed the abolition of all debts, whichwas of course a move welcome to the indebted, many of whom seem to have beeneither failed Sullan veterans or men whose families had suffered in consequence ofthe Sullan settlement in Italy. Indebtedness was a serious problem, but of courseconservatives and creditors alike opposed the measure. Indeed, it would have turnedthe Roman economy on its ear in one hit. In consequence, Catilina’s bid for theconsulship of 63 BCE was resisted strongly.Cicero was elected instead, along with thedisreputable noble Gaius Antonius, whom Caesar had attempted to prosecute in 76BCE.The achievement of Cicero, a new man, was undeniably impressive, though inthe eyes of many he was simply a lesser evil than Catilina.When Catilina failed tosecure a consulship in the elections for 62 BCE, the hurt was too much to bear,especially in view of Cicero’s prominence at the time.

Catilina turned to conspiracy against the state, but Cicero as consul showed greatenergy and awareness. He had spies in various locations, launched a series ofstinging, accusatory speeches against Catilina, and eventually found the proof thathe needed when associates of Catilina attempted to gain the help of a Gallic tribecalled the Allobroges, who at that time had an embassy of their leading men in thecity. Letters given to the Gauls made it plain what was being planned. Catilina hadleft the city in the wake of Cicero’s verbal onslaughts, but there was now no doubtabout the existence of a plot to make war on the government, and so Ciceroarrested five senators who were assisting Catilina, one of whom was the ex-consulPublius Cornelius Lentulus Sura (consul 71 BCE). Cicero suspected theinvolvement of both Crassus and Caesar. He was almost certainly wrong to do so,though the two may well have associated with Catilina in earlier times. Both menwent to lengths to show support for the consul’s activities, and although Ciceroclaimed later that he continued to suspect Caesar’s involvement in the conspiracy,he eventually proclaimed the younger man’s innocence on Crassus’ intervention.

A famous debate took place in the senate about what to do with the five con-spirators who were in custody.At first the senators adopted the position advocatedby Decimus Junius Silanus, the consul-elect for 62 BCE, who said that the conspir-ators should be executed. Caesar waited his turn in the hierarchy of speakers untilas praetor-elect he rose to give his opinion in opposition to that of his superiorSilanus. His position was constrained and difficult, for he knew that Cicero wassuspicious of him, given his popularity among the people, though he had alreadysignaled his support for Cicero’s handling of the unmasked conspiracy. It was clearthat Cicero was predisposed towards execution.Yet through his role in the mocktrial of Rabirius, Caesar had recently underlined the point that only the sovereign


Roman people could order the execution of citizens. The version of Caesar’sspeech given by Sallust is a plausible substitute for the genuine article, whichunfortunately does not survive. It left a lasting impact. After denouncing theconspirators, Caesar revived memories of the hatreds which had ensued from theSullan proscriptions, argued eloquently for restraint, and emphasized the dangers ofemploying military force on the basis of a senatorial decree. His solution in thecircumstances was a novel one: imprisonment in Italian towns and confiscation ofthe conspirators’ property.Caesar’s speech turned the senate.He must have thoughtthat he had acquitted himself brilliantly in a very difficult situation. Other senatorsfollowed his lead in the descending hierarchy until one of the tribunes-elect roseto his feet. The man was Marcus Porcius Cato, usually referred to in modernhistories as Cato the Younger. Cato was known already at that early point in hiscareer as an arch-conservative, who revered and tried to emulate the stern exampleof his great-grandfather Cato the Elder. He was destined to become Caesar’s mostbitter foe. Cato proceeded to clear the field with a savage, withering speech thatforced the case in favor of execution. Caesar must have felt humiliated.After all, hewas praetor-elect and had recently won two notable elections. Cato was merely atribune-elect.When Cicero as consul led Lentulus away to execution, it must havebeen a bitter pill for Caesar. From this point Caesar and Cato seem to have hatedone another with rare passion – polar opposites in looks, personal charm, andattitude to the proper distribution of power in the Roman state, but similar perhapsin sensitivity over the standing and traditions of their respective families.

Caesar’s Praetorship (62 BCE)

Caesar’s praetorship in 62 BCE was overshadowed by the looming specter ofPompey, who was on the verge of returning to Rome after successful campaignsagainst Mithridates and a string of eastern states.What attitude would Pompey taketowards affairs in Rome?Would he be content to take a seat among the ex-consulsafter holding supreme command for so long? Widespread uncertainty developed,and it was remembered that Sulla had also returned from the East. Caesar wantedrevenge for his recent humiliation in the senate. He wanted also to strengthenearlier ties to Pompey.His upset about the recent executions, exacerbated by Cato’svictory in the senatorial debate, was great. Before the year was out, he would beforced to acknowledge that he had gone too far in displaying his fury.

Caesar supported the vigorous attacks on Cicero launched by the tribuneQuintus Caecilius Metellus Nepos, an ally of Pompey. Nepos resented the exe-cution of the Catilinarians by the upstart Cicero and advocated that Pompeyshould be recalled immediately and given command against Catilina’s ragtag army.This proposal was quickly resisted by those in the senate who were concerned bythe prospect of Pompeian legions under arms in the vicinity of Rome. Catosupported Cicero against his fellow-tribune Nepos.When the two tribunes becameinvolved in a violent confrontation,Nepos was blamed. Suspended from his tribun-ate, Nepos fled to Pompey.The latter took no action. Cicero wrote to Pompey to


enlist his support, but was rebuffed. Foolishly, Cicero had written a boastful letterto Pompey about his suppression of the Catilinarians. Pompeius Magnus (‘theGreat’), who had just emulated Alexander the Great’s feat of conquering on threecontinents, spurned him coldly.Among other things, Pompey thought that Cicerowas trying to steal the glory that was due to him as conqueror of the East. More-over, some of Pompey’s enemies seem to have stepped up their praise of Cicero atthis time in order to irk the great man on the eve of his return.

As for Catilina, his hastily gathered forces were overwhelmed by an army underthe nominal command of Gaius Antonius,Cicero’s consular colleague in the preced-ing year. Catilina is said to have died at the head of his men, all of whom foughtvaliantly to the end (Sallust,Conspiracy of Catiline 61.1–4,Dillon and Garland 12.23):

Once the battle was over, you could clearly perceive the audacity andresolution possessed by Catiline’s army. For almost every man covered withhis lifeless body the position he had taken when alive at the start of thefighting.True, a few in the center,whom the praetorian cohort had dispersed,were lying a little way away from the rest, but all their wounds were in front.Catiline, indeed, was found far in advance of his men among the corpses ofhis enemies, still breathing slightly and retaining on his face the ferocity ofspirit he had possessed in his lifetime.

Such resolution speaks volumes for the desperation to which these disaffected menhad been driven.

Caesar’s support for the attacks on Cicero was of course consistent with his stanceon the execution of citizens and the senatus consultum ultimum. Also consistent, butat the same time more personal, were his attacks on Catulus and Cato. Catulus hadhelped to undermine Caesar’s Catilinarian speech and tried hard to implicate Caesarin the conspiracy. In response, Caesar embarrassed Catulus over the amount of timethe latter was taking to rebuild the Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus, a prime focus ofRoman religion.He proceeded to suggest a more appropriate candidate for the job:Pompey.The cut was twofold: one to embarrass Catulus; the other to flatter Pompey,who would in any case have more money for the expensive job, in the wake of hiseastern successes.

The temper of Caesar’s attacks on Catulus and Cato was upsetting to his con-temporaries, who appear to have seen both injustice and a personal weakness. LikeNepos, he was suspended from office. His reaction, however, was quite unlike thatof Nepos. It was not the senate as a whole that was his target, only a reactionaryminority. Instead of maintaining his defiance, therefore, he made a great show ofhumility and submitted to the senate’s authority. The senators, pleased by thisdisplay from a man of such obvious personal pride, reinstated him to their orderand thanked him.Why did he do it?Why did he lower himself in this completelyuncharacteristic way? There seems to have been a moment of self-realization: hehad let his passion get the better of him. Undeniably, too, he was politicallyvulnerable. He had run up huge debts, and he would need support if he was to


reach his next goal, the consulship. It made no sense to spurn the men of influenceen masse at this juncture.The display of compromise and consensus, he could havesaid, was consistent with his stance on earlier matters. Moreover, it was a claim tothe moral high ground.

In December of 62 BCE, Caesar’s wife Pompeia was in charge of the rites of theBona Dea (the ‘Good Goddess’) at the Domus Publica.Men were strictly excludedfrom these rites, but the young patrician Publius Clodius Pulcher took the guise ofa woman and gained access with the help of a female slave. All hell broke loosewhen his deception was discovered and he was chased from the premises.There wasa rumor, of uncertain foundation, that Clodius was trying to approach Pompeia inher husband’s absence.Whatever the truth of this, Caesar asserted in public that hedid not believe the rumor and suspected neither Pompeia nor Clodius. Of courseit would not have suited him to be seen as a cuckold or rejected husband. Never-theless, he proceeded to divorce Pompeia because, ‘I thought that my wife shouldnot even be suspected’ (Plutarch, Life of Caesar 10).This sounds dreadfully unfair,and once again a political explanation has been favored: Caesar was now free tonegotiate a marriage match more relevant to his next goal of securing the consul-ship. Yet he was both Caesar and pontifex maximus at this time. A fundamentallyreligious concern for the sanctity of his office would not be surprising – and itwould yet again underline his pietas.

Pompey’s return to Rome. Opposition from the Conservatives (62 BCE)

As Pompey’s return drew near, anticipation and uncertainty gripped the city.Everyone knew what had happened in 88 BCE (Sulla’s march on Rome), 83 BCE

(Sulla’s return from the East), and even 81 BCE (Pompey’s demand for a triumphfrom Sulla). Pompey could be cordial but difficult to read, and for some contem-poraries he would always be the teenage butcher. Would such a powerful andcharismatic figure want his supremacy recognized in some overwhelming way?Would his peers still be his peers?

To the relief of everyone, Pompey returned to Italy in 62 BCE and immediatelysignaled his peaceful intentions by disbanding his army at the port of Brundisium.Many in the senate were prepared to receive him with congratulations. Somesenators, on the other hand, decided that the time had come to take the bit betweentheir teeth.There was no dignity in acting like sycophantic clients of Pompey.Thisgroup of arch-conservatives is normally known as the optimates (‘best men’) inmodern textbooks, and if the term is used in a way that emphasizes with slight ironytheir reactionary attitude, persistent intransigence, and inability to compromiserather than any guiding political principle, then it can be employed from now on.At this time, then, the optimates were led by Lucullus (extremely wealthy after hisservice in the East against Mithridates) and the redoubtable Cato.While Pompeywas showing respect for traditional sensibilities, this reactionary opposition was bothprovocative and short-sighted. It offered no possibility of compromise or consensus,and no way forward. It was hardly the ‘best’ way to go about things.


Pompey celebrated a third triumph, more magnificent than any that had pre-ceded it. He was now a match for Alexander the Great, and the darling of theRoman people. He made two requests of the senate when he returned:

1 land for his veterans (it was very important for the general to provide land andmaterial rewards for his men); and

2 acceptance (ratification) of the arrangements he had made in the East, e.g.boundaries of conquered lands, alliances with client kings, amounts of tributeimposed, men left in charge, and so on.

Lucullus and Cato insisted that each separate arrangement should be debated fullyin the senate. They were assisted by the Metelli, now angry that Pompey haddivorced his wife Mucia, their relative, allegedly for adultery with Caesar, whomight have been named for being ‘a likely type’, unless simply from politicalmotives.This determined obstruction both surprised and infuriated Pompey.How-ever, he maintained his composure and bided his time, even as months dragged byand the veterans called for their promised rewards.What would he do?

Caesar in Further Spain (61–60 BCE)

After serving in Rome as praetor in 62 BCE, Caesar was posted to Further Spain asgovernor in 61 BCE. Before leaving the city, however, his career was almost broughtto a grinding halt.Caesar’s creditors,worried about his ability to repay and the lengthof time it was taking, applied to the senate for an injunction to prevent him fromleaving.This was an unprecedented situation and it speaks volumes for the huge debtsthat Caesar had incurred. He was saved from ignominy and humiliation whenCrassus stepped in to guarantee a portion of these debts.The remainder, as all partiesunderstood,had to be repaid out of provincial plunder.As a result,Caesar spent muchof his time as governor of Spain attacking independent tribes in Lusitania (modernPortugal) and collecting spoils.The general outline of what happened forms an eerieforeshadowing of what would subsequently take place in Gaul. In the end, his effortswere so thorough that he was able both to clear his debts and pay large sums into thetreasury at Rome.Was Crassus’ intervention due to pre-existing political ties andfinancial obligations, or was it the result of a new understanding between the twomen, brought on by the extreme difficulties faced by Caesar before his departure forSpain? Most scholars favor the former scenario.The latter might be possible.

Caesar returned from Spain about the middle of 60 BCE and assessed the politicalsituation with characteristic clarity. His initial desire was for a triumph in honor ofhis Spanish victories.This normally required a senatorial decree, signifying that thegeneral’s conquests were appropriately impressive and that he was permitted toretain his imperium within the pomerium for the period of his triumphal processionand sacrifice.The senate, impressed by his conquests and perhaps still mindful of hisearlier show of humility, duly voted him a triumph.This was a huge honor, thegreatest military honor possible. It would help his campaign for the consulship


immensely because the memory of his triumphal procession through the streets ofRome would still be fresh in the minds of the voters. There was, however, atechnical obstacle to be negotiated: in order to announce his candidacy for theconsulship he had to enter Rome long before the triumph could be arranged. Ifhe crossed the pomerium, he would have to lay down his imperium as an armycommander and hence give up his right to triumph.The senate was prepared togive him a special dispensation to cover the problem until, inevitably, Cato theYounger, whose influence far exceeded his junior status as an ex-tribune, inter-vened to stall the process.Once again, the hatred that existed between the two mencan be seen. Senate meetings broke up at sundown and there were no time limitson speeches. Filibusters, therefore, or speeches intended to drag on and take up allthe available time, were theoretically possible. Cato delivered such a speech on thisoccasion and the matter was allowed to drop. Caesar decided to put the power ofthe consulship before the glory of the triumph.Hence he withdrew his applicationfor a triumph, laid down his imperium, dismissed his troops, and entered the city tocanvass for the consulship in earnest. Caesar now had experience as a general,though his exploits were as yet no match for those of Pompey or Crassus. Hewould become a figure of their pre-eminence in the next decade.

The ‘First Triumvirate’ and Caesar’s first Consulship (60–59 BCE)

Caesar’s solution to the obstruction of his enemies was characteristically brilliant,though dangerous in many ways. It involved approaches to Pompey and Crassus,whose interests had not coincided for a long time and who were deeply suspiciousof one another.

In 60 BCE, Pompey was seething with frustration. He had been unable to gainratification for his eastern acts or land for his loyal veterans. Furthermore, he andCrassus were feuding, so that Crassus blocked Pompey’s interests and Pompeyblocked those of Crassus, especially the latter’s desire to help some of his clientsamong the publicani (tax collectors) who had bid too much for collecting the taxin Asia.The war-torn province was unable to pay at the rate determined. Crassuswas the natural patron of these publicani but when they asked him to intercede withthe senate to achieve a lowering of their obligation to the treasury, he too wasfrustrated by the optimates. It seems not to have occurred to their opponents that itmight have been unwise to insult both Pompey and Crassus at the same time.Theoptimates apparently felt that an alliance between the two men was unlikely. Caesar,however, had worked in Pompey’s interest in the past and was close to Crassus.Aninformal alliance, known among modern commentators as the ‘First Triumvirate’,was negotiated between the three men for the benefit of each.The two senior menwould support Caesar’s activities as consul and help him gain a lucrative militarycommand. In turn he promised to work for what they wanted.The three men alsoapproached Cicero.This is not often emphasized in modern textbooks, but Cicerorefused to join the triumvirs.The level of dominance to which they aspired wasnot to his liking.


Sometimes the First Triumvirate is cited as an example of amicitia, whoseprimary meaning is ‘friendship’. Personal closeness, however, need not be assumedand an equally good translation is ‘pact’ or something similar. There were otherinfluential senators who opposed the three men. Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar didnot call themselves triumvirs, nor did anyone else at the time call them a ‘trium-virate’ (from the Latin for ‘a commission of three men’). They were notall-powerful but they were overwhelmingly powerful, and the alliance was laterseen as a critical development on the road to renewed civil war (Velleius Paterculus,Compendium of History 2.44.1, Dillon and Garland 12.39):

It was in Caesar’s consulship that the partnership in political control betweenhim and Gnaeus Pompey and Marcus Crassus was formed, which was to beso destructive to the city, the world, and no less, at different periods, to themen themselves.

Nevertheless, the three allies did not have it all their own way. The consularelections were distinguished by outrageous bribery. Pompey had persuaded his richfriend Lucius Lucceius to stand in conjunction with Caesar, hoping to have twofriendly consuls.The plan did not work, for the optimates, led by Cato, collected amassive bribery fund of their own, and used it to support the candidacy of Cato’sson-in-law, Marcus Calpurnius Bibulus, who had been Caesar’s disgruntledcolleague as aedile.When the consular elections were held, Caesar topped the poll,but Bibulus came in second ahead of Lucceius.There would consequently be noharmonious working relationship with his fellow consul, no chance for Caesar tosavor the sweet taste of success or contemplate the enormity of what he had justachieved. He needed to maintain his competitive edge because Bibulus was deter-mined to undermine him.

Two major questions linger around Caesar’s consulship. The first pondersresponsibility for the violence that attended the passing of Caesar’s laws.The secondconcerns Caesar’s disregard for Bibulus’ religious objections and asks how thismight have been justified or understood at the time.

Once in office Caesar moved a momentous land reform bill. Gruen (2009, 32)emphasizes that the bill went far beyond the settlement of Pompey’s veterans andaimed at substantial relief for the urban poor. It seems obvious that beyond theirimmediate aims, Pompey and Crassus were looking forward to the massive oppor-tunities for patronage that such a law would have afforded.The bill was respectfullypresented and wisely drafted so as to cause as little affront to entrenched interestsas possible.When all was said and done, such a bill was necessary.The poor weretoo numerous to continue to ignore safely. Caesar’s demeanor was conciliatory andgentle.He was good at claiming the high moral ground,while simultaneously gain-ing personal advantage.The vast majority of people saw the value of his bill andappreciated it. Cato, of course, tended to see only the value to Caesar and hisbackers and thus led the resistance.The optimates showed that they were determinednot to stop their obstruction, under any circumstances.They had maintained this


obdurate attitude for more than two years and must, therefore, bear a large amountof blame for the violence that followed.There was no possibility of consensus orcompromise in such continuing, intemperate, personal ferocity. Caesar would notbe thwarted. He proceeded to bypass the senate and take his bill to the people,calling upon Pompey and Crassus to speak on its behalf.The Roman people votedthe bill into law. Naked force – supplied by Pompey’s veterans – and friendlytribunes, especially Publius Vatinius, then proved unanswerable. Pompey’s easternacts were finally ratified and Crassus’ clients among the publicani received favorableterms on their tax contracts forAsia.The use of force should not be underestimated,nor its effect on political behavior in succeeding years. Caesar, as consul, wasprimarily responsible for directing it against the optimates, and above all against hisfellow consul Bibulus. Yet the question of blame is perhaps better expressed interms of who was more willing to compromise, and the answer can hardly favorthe optimates. Caesar was a strong and confident politician. He was not simplydetermined to destroy the optimates come what may, though he would not permitany further obstruction of measures which the majority of Romans and Italiansseem to have wanted or at least thought supportable.

Bibulus nonetheless proved persistent and courageous in his cause.At one pointhe suffered the indignity of having a bucket of manure poured over his head. Notlong after, he took himself to his house and advertised a religious strategy, sayingthat he intended to keep a watch on the heavens for omens. He remained in hishome for the rest of the year.Two points should perhaps be made here.One is thatreligious objections to political proceedings were taken seriously.The second is thatprocedure was vital. If Bibulus or another man (an augur would be the ideal person)claimed that he had seen a sign from the heavens, or heard an adverse noise, whichindicated to him that the proceedings were hateful to the gods, he would have toaccomplish two steps before the assembly would be stopped.The first was to see ordetect the omen (spectio).The second was to announce it formally and audibly infront of the assembly (obnuntiatio).Caesar’s men never gave Bibulus the opportunityto accomplish the second step and so, technically, the omens lacked force. DoesCaesar’s attitude conflict with his basic stance of pietas? Modern sensibilities mightthink so, but in terms of ancient thought Caesar was able to prevent Bibulus fromannouncing his objections because the gods wanted it so and were indeed onCaesar’s side. There was an interpretation available according to which Caesar’sclaim to pietas remained unimpaired.

Caesar knew that his measures were theoretically subject to religious objectionin the future. He also knew that Bibulus’ behavior was not regular and was itself ofdoubtful legality. Caesar passed further laws, including a comprehensive law againstextortion and another calling for the publication of political deliberations in thesenate and assemblies. Magistrates were to be held to account in a transparentmanner. Midway through the year, the alliance, which had made everythingpossible, was made manifest to all. Pompey married Caesar’s daughter Julia. Caesarhimself married a girl named Calpurnia, whose father, Lucius Calpurnius PisoCaesoninus, was elected consul for 58 BCE with Caesar’s help. Piso’s fellow consul


was Aulus Gabinius, author of the lex Gabinia that had given Pompey commandagainst the pirates in 67 BCE and an officer in Pompey’s eastern campaigns.Thesemen would protect Caesar’s measures. One further move, which took place inMarch, must have seemed extraordinary. Clodius, who in 62 BCE had received thesupport of Caesar over the Bona Dea scandal, sought adoption out of his patricianClaudius family into a plebeian family.He wanted to become a tribune of the plebs– something no other patrician ever thought of doing – and was duly elected for58 BCE. Such an extraordinary transition from patrician to plebeian status (transitioad plebem) required the consent of the pontifex maximus and also a special law of theancient comitia curiata (‘assembly in units known as curiae’). Caesar ensured that theconditions were met. Pompey attended the ceremony in his capacity as an augur.The political consequences of this move will be detailed in the next chapter.

Caesar had achieved his aims, though his attitudes and actions provoked muchhatred, and some humor (Suetonius, Life of the Divine Julius 20.2, Dillon andGarland 12.41):

[Following Bibulus’ withdrawal], Caesar handled all matters of state on hisown and on his own judgment, so that some humorists, when they wereacting as witnesses to documents, wrote as a joke not ‘done in the consulshipof Caesar and Bibulus’, but ‘in the consulship of Julius and Caesar’, puttingthe same man down twice by name and surname, while the following verseswere soon widely circulated:

‘A deed took place recently, not in Bibulus’ year but Caesar’s –

For I don’t remember anything happening in Bibulus’ consulship’!

In due course, a law proposed byVatinius rewarded Caesar with the governorshipof Cisalpine Gaul (northern Italy) and Illyricum (Dalmatia) for a period of fiveyears. Transalpine Gaul (southern France) was added shortly after. Caesar mighthave been content with the usual one province at more modest rates, if the oppo-sition had been less threatening during his year of office. The unrelentingobstructionism of the optimates caused him to raise the price for his services, partlybecause he needed to protect himself. Pompey and Crassus complied. It is ironicthat the means by which Caesar rose to autocratic power were a product of theattitudes of his opposition.The optimates swore revenge but knew that they wouldhave to wait until Caesar’s imperium lapsed at the end of his period as governor.Then, as a privatus (‘private citizen’), he would be open to prosecution.

Conclusion

These were years of brilliant political achievement for Caesar, completely in accordwith the cursus honorum. He employed his personal charm, his imagination, hisincreasingly powerful associates, and – it should not be overlooked – violence toachieve his ends. Each new move involved a chance to make new connections with


new groups in Rome, Italy, and the provinces. He also employed religion. Theevents of the period underline the close connection, even symbiosis, betweenreligion and politics in ancient Rome. Older scholarly interpretations, whichemphasize political considerations over religion, seem inadequate now. Caesar’sreasons for pursuing the office of pontifex maximus, and his attitude to Bibulus’religious tactics as consul, may well have been more pius and less exploitative thanhas often been assumed.

Recommended reading

Important studies of Caesar’s career during this period include Gelzer 1968, ch. 3;Wiseman 1994a; Wiseman 1994b; Meier 1995, chs. 8–10; Garland 2003, ch. 4;Goldsworthy 2006, chs. 6–8; Kamm 2006, ch. 4; Tatum 2008, ch. 3; and Billows2009, chs. iv–v. Gruen 2009 is a strong, recent account, though it tends to white-wash Caesar’s motives and behavior as consul. In doing so, it understandablyremains true to Gruen 1974, which expresses stimulating, if controversial views onfundamental continuities of the Roman Republic. Crawford 1976 is a worthyreview of Gruen 1974.

The study of Roman religion has developed in leaps and bounds over the pastcouple of decades as classicists have embraced approaches learned from anthropol-ogists, sociologists, and psychologists, along with scholars of religious systems.Good introductions may be found in Dowden 1992; North 2000; and Warrior2006. The best textbook is undoubtedly Beard, North and Price 1998. Caesar’sattitude to religion remains a difficult topic, but Gradel 2002, ch. 3;Tatum 2008, ch.4; andWardle 2009 are all enlightening.

Cicero’s speeches Against Catiline and Sallust’s Conspiracy of Catiline have destroyedtheir subject’s posthumous reputation as thoroughly as the weapons ultimatelybrought to bear against him. Plutarch’s Life of Cato theYounger is mandatory readingfor anyone interested in the life and character of this enigmatic man.The signif-icance of the ‘First Triumvirate’ is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that Syme1939 chose to follow the Roman writer Asinius Pollio by beginning his famousaccount of the ‘Roman Revolution’ with the year (60 BCE) in which Pompey,Crassus, and Caesar forged their association.



6GLORIA

The pursuit of military glory in Gaul, 58–56 BCE

Gloria

Caesar’s desire for a military command, through which he could win glory andplunder, was the natural consequence of the socialization of noble Romans. Suchmen wanted fama (‘renown, fame’), honor (‘political office’), and dignitas (‘rank’ or‘standing’) at home, and imperium on campaign. A successful military campaignwould ideally bring gloria (‘military glory’), a triumph, and retirement to a seat inthe senate among the revered consulares (‘ex-consuls’, ‘men of consular rank’), whowere customarily asked to speak first in debates in recognition of their superiorauctoritas (‘moral influence’). Pompey was the pinnacle of what could be achievedat this time, but in a number of ways his position was extraordinary. For a start, hehad begun compiling gloria at a remarkably young age.The longer he stayed around,and the more he sought or accepted fresh commands, the higher moved the bar foranyone propelled by birth and training to attempt to surpass him as the first manin Rome. It would take a lot to do this. Glory, plunder, and a magnificent armywould be Caesar’s primary tools. Pompey seems to have underestimated theyounger man, confident that he was untouchable and able to control Caesar.

This chapter will attempt to analyze events in both Gaul and Rome, as Caesarhimself had to do. His normal pattern was to begin campaigning in spring, andthen to winter towards the close of the year in Cisalpine Gaul in order to catch upwith news from Rome and survey the state of his alliance with Pompey andCrassus. As far as Caesar’s generalship goes, it is important to distinguish between‘strategy’, the conduct of a campaign, and ‘tactics’, the conduct of a battle. Caesarwas relatively conventional as a strategist, since he followed the standard Romanprinciple of attack. He was, however, a superb tactician, as will be emphasizedthroughout the coming chapters.Two qualities stand out in particular: speed andboldness. It would be wrong to overlook the ferocious aggression, professional

fighting style, construction expertise, and supreme spirit of his legionaries. Suchqualities may be detected in earlier periods, especially under the likes of Marius andSulla, but the extraordinary spirit of Caesar’s army owed a great deal to his personalcharisma and skills of man-management.As far as events in Rome are concerned,the alliance between Pompey and Crassus slowly dissolved through 58 and 57 BCE,until Caesar’s intervention at Luca in 56 BCE renewed the ‘triumvirate’.

The Tribunate of Publius Clodius Pulcher (58 BCE)

In 58 BCE,Aulus Gabinius, a ‘new man’ whose political sympathies lay with his oldcommander Pompey, and Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, Caesar’s father-in-law, took office as consuls.Their brief was to safeguard the interests of those whohad secured their election.Attempts to prosecute Caesar were averted early in theyear, and moderates in the senate attempted conciliation by offering to have hislegislation re-enacted in uncontroversial form. Caesar refused, for this would haverepresented an admission of guilt and a slight against his dignitas. It could hardly behelped, but it was unfortunate that Caesar felt compelled to rebuff the moderates.Caesar tarried around Rome for a while, keeping an eye on developments beforeleaving for his provinces. He wanted to muzzle those who might prove a thorn inthe side of the triumvirs during the next few years, especially Cicero and Cato.

Of crucial importance to the plans of the triumvirs was the tribunate of Clodius.Yet Clodius was a man of independent aspirations. He hailed from one of the trulygreat families of Rome – the patrician Claudius Pulcher family.His father,who hadsupported Sulla during the civil war, served as consul in 79 BCE. Clodius wouldnaturally have ambitions of the highest order for himself.The Bona Dea scandal in62 BCE had caused him damage. He received help from Caesar, but Cicero let himdown by ruining his alibi. He was almost condemned in court for trespass on thesacred rites, but was narrowly acquitted through liberal bribery. Cicero became ahated enemy.

Clodius sponsored a raft of laws during his tribunate. In general they show himattempting to curry favor with elements of the Roman people, and sometimesindeed with the triumvirs. His popular orientation and easy familiarity withordinary plebeians caused him to be known as ‘Clodius’, which was the plebeianpronunciation of ‘Claudius’. His measures included free grain for the poor, andrestoration of the ‘clubs’ or ‘associations’ known as collegia, which had previouslybeen banned for their participation in organized violence. The provision of freegrain won him a massive following, especially among the urban poor, but it provedruinously expensive in succeeding years. Restoration of the collegia helped to fuelrising violence,which once again became centered on the clubs, organized by clubmembers.This was not necessarily Clodius’ aim, nor even inevitable, for the clubswere often organized at first instance as trade guilds or funeral associations or forother innocuous purposes.

Other measures arose from his personal interests, along with those of thetriumvirs. He ensured the grant of provinces to the consuls Gabinius (Syria) and

80 The pursuit of military glory in Gaul, 58–56 BCE

Piso (Macedonia), and then promoted laws, which were aimed at Cicero andCato. The latter was removed from Rome on a special commission to annexCyprus and organize its revenues. Cicero was removed in far more spectacularfashion, in line with the hatred Clodius felt for him. Clodius caused Cicero to beexiled on the basis of two laws. One called for the exile of any Roman who hadcaused the death of a citizen without trial before the people. It was plain thatCicero was the target and that the execution of the Catilinarian conspirators wasthe evidence.The second law, passed soon after Cicero’s departure from the cityin late March, specifically called for the great orator’s exile on the grounds laiddown in the first law. Although he was offered vigorous support in Rome andItaly, Cicero shied away from armed conflict with his enemies and decided toleave. Clodius’ thugs destroyed his house on the Palatine Hill, and part of its sitewas consecrated as a shrine to Libertas (‘Freedom’). The symbolism said thatClodius had overthrown a tyrant, who had unjustly killed Roman citizens.Thesentence of exile against Cicero was subsequently modified to allow him to livewithin the Roman world, as long as it was 500 miles from Italy. He chose to takerefuge in Macedonia.

Cicero’s refusal to join the triumvirs meant that he had to be silenced. He hadopted for independence and so had to be prevented from using it, in order toprotect Caesar’s laws. Clodius was the perfect man to bring on Cicero’s demise,though there were certainly others who resented his actions in 63 and 62 BCE andwho found his personality distasteful (Cassius Dio,Roman History 38.12.5–7,Dillonand Garland 12.52):

Cicero irritated numerous people with his speeches, and those whom hehelped were not so much won over to his side as those who were injuredwere alienated … he also made himself some very bitter enemies by alwaystrying to get the better of even the most powerful men and by alwaysemploying an uncontrolled and excessive freedom of speech towards every-one alike in his pursuit of a reputation for intellect and eloquence aboveanyone else’s, even in preference to being thought a worthy citizen. As aresult of this, and because he was the greatest boaster alive and considered noone his equal, but in speeches and life alike despised everyone and thoughtno one on the same footing as himself, he was a trial and a burden to othersand was accordingly envied and hated even by those who were otherwise insympathy with him.

Cicero bitterly resented the consuls’ failure to support him, and especially thefailure of Piso, who was a relative by marriage, since Cicero’s son-in-law, marriedto his daughter Tullia, was a Piso. Of course, Piso’s son-in-law was Caesar.

Clodius was far from being anyone’s pawn. In fact, with Pompey underpressure in the senate, Caesar on campaign in Gaul, and many among the Romanpeople grateful to him for free grain, he saw an opportunity for real assertion. Hefell out seriously with Pompey when he helped a prince of Armenia named

The pursuit of military glory in Gaul, 58–56 BCE 81

Tigranes escape from Rome, thus upsetting Pompey’s arrangements in thatregion. Attacks on Pompey escalated rapidly. Pompey’s life was threatened andClodius’ thugs attacked his house vigorously.The great conqueror was forced towithstand a siege in his home. Clodius even turned on Caesar, suggesting thatBibulus’ religious obstruction had invalidated Caesar’s laws in 59 BCE. The‘patrician tribune’ was asserting his independence and causing damage across awide spectrum.

Cato knew that his Cypriote commission would be closely scrutinized, and thathis measures might become grounds for prosecution if he were not careful,especially since he had threatened to prosecute Caesar for the latter’s conduct asconsul in 59 BCE. Cato thus took the precaution of having two copies of hisaccounts made. His despair must have been huge at what happened next. He sentone copy ahead separately by sea, but it was lost when the ship sank.Then the copythat he was bringing with him was destroyed by a fire that ravaged his camp onenight (Plutarch, Life of Cato theYounger 38.2). He was forced to proceed with greatcare when he arrived home. However, he was not impeached, and the ancientsources claim that his settlement was just and honorable. If so, it is a disturbing factthat when Cicero governed Cilicia, in 51–50 BCE, the principal moneylender inCyprus, demanding interest at 48%, was none other than Cato’s relative, MarcusJunius Brutus, later the assassin of Caesar.

Caesar in Gaul

From 58–51 BCE, Caesar waged war in Gaul, whose conquest was a spectacularachievement from a military point of view (figure 4). In human terms it was ahorrifying episode. Romans tended to think of the Gauls as savage barbarians,aggressive in spirit, and constantly threatening to Rome.There is some truth in thisstereotype but much distortion too, for the Celtic culture of Gaul was in manyways highly refined. Above all, the conventional Roman picture tends todehumanize the Gauls, so that they become bloodthirsty warriors, rather than men,women, and children capable of the full range of human experience. Put bluntly,Caesar crossed into Gaul under legally questionable circumstances, attacked theGauls without direct provocation, and went on to exterminate and enslave hugenumbers of men, women, and children. His enemies, led by Cato, threatened atvarious times to prosecute him for the illegalities of his consulship and procon-sulship as soon as he laid down his imperium.

Caesar’s Bellum Gallicum (Gallic War)

Caesar’s campaigns in Gaul, devastating in the extreme, are described in his famousCommentarii de Bello Gallico (Commentaries on the Gallic War) or simply the BellumGallicum (GallicWar). Scholars have often given thanks for the survival of Caesar’sGallic War in seven books; Caesar’s legate, Aulus Hirtius, added an eighth later. Itssurvival means, however, that Caesar’s bias has survived too.To call the campaign a



FIGURE 4 Map of Gaul in the age of Caesar.Cambridge Ancient History, vol. IX, 2nd edn. (CUP, 1994), p. 382.

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Gallic War, for a start, tends to enlist the audience on the Roman side, with theGauls as enemies for the audience as well as the Romans.Caesar’s bias is not blatantin the midst of his matter-of-fact prose. It resides instead in his attitudes to, dealingswith, and descriptions of Gauls and Germans, which were always determined bydeep-rooted cultural prejudices, immediate political needs, and often by anexpedient combination of such factors. It is frequently claimed that Caesar justifiedhis actions in the GallicWar, but really he just narrates them.The work must be readwith caution, though it normally avoids outright falsification of details in favor ofsubtle manipulation of them.The effect of this can at times be transforming, butmany men in Rome and Italy knew the truth through having been there too.Caesar could not risk their derision.A perennial question is whether the work waspublished in one unit, in 51–50 BCE, or whether it was published serially, year byyear. The question is certainly hard to answer but it seems likely that serialpublication would have served to keep Caesar’s name and achievements in theminds of his supporters in Rome and Italy while he was away. One can imaginecrowds of the Roman people gathering on street corners as the newest installmentin the Gallic saga was read out for their appreciation.

The Gauls

The Gauls were a Celtic people, and the Romans habitually described them asrough, filthy, and uncouth, lacking civilized customs. Central Gaul was knowndisparagingly as Gallia Comata (‘Long-haired Gaul’) and it was especially peculiarto classical writers that Gauls wore trousers! Yet the Gauls were technologicallyadvanced, especially in the manufacture of chain-mail armor, weapons, and a widerange of metal products.They had a religious hierarchy, directed by the Druids, anda social hierarchy that was dominated by noble clans.They engaged in profitabletrade, especially along the Rhine and across the English Channel with Britain.Although rudimentary towns, called oppida (singular, oppidum) by the Romans, didexist, the Gauls were primarily an agricultural people who worked and lived onscattered farmsteads. One point that is frequently commented upon by Romansources is the impressive physical size of the Gauls.Where this does not merelyserve to increase Roman glory for defeating them, it perhaps shows that the Gaulshad more protein in their diet (e.g. from meat consumption) than did peoples inthe Mediterranean world.

Warfare between the various Gallic tribes was seasonal, concentrated in springand early summer, before it grew too hot for the wearing of armor.This was thenormal Mediterranean pattern too. When neighboring armies appeared, it wascommon practice for the inhabitants of an area to retreat to a fortified hill-fort.Some of these forts were sophisticated military structures, capable of withstandingferocious sieges. If a battle occurred, it usually took the form of a short, sharpengagement that was marked by free-for-all fighting around individual championswho swung mighty broadswords.The greatest damage was caused by cavalry groups,which were of very high quality.However,Gallic warfare seems to have been largely


a matter of plundering the crops and animals and possessions of a neighboring tribe.It was not common for Gallic armies to remain long in the field because they didnot have the means to supply themselves for extended periods of time and the menneeded to get back to their own farms in order to keep them going.

Caesar’s legions

In contrast to the Gallic militia forces, a Roman army of this period was theproduct of the Marian reforms (or of developments brought to a peak underMarius): professional, well-drilled, and supplied via sophisticated networks. Siegewarfare had become a specialty. Furthermore, Caesar’s Gallic legions comprisedmany men from the PoValley, whose inhabitants had either just received Romancitizenship in consequence of the SocialWar or (in the case of those north of thePo) had been given Latin rights, a kind of secondary citizenship.All these inhabit-ants had long dealt with prejudice against their supposed ‘Gallic’ and uncouthways, even though many were the descendants of Roman and Latin colonists.They were grateful to Caesar for his attitude to them, and for his interest inextending Roman citizenship in the region.This gratitude ought to be remem-bered when contemplating the incredible loyalty shown to Caesar by his men atvarious critical points.

A Roman general of this period, the holder of imperium, was assisted by sixmilitary tribunes (young men of the elite). At full strength, a legion consisted of10 cohorts of roughly 480 men each. Cohorts were divided into six ‘centuries’ ofabout 80 men, with each ‘century’ under the command of a junior officer calleda centurion.A legion, therefore, comprised around 4,800 men.A typical legion-ary of Caesar’s time wore a sleeveless coat of iron mail over a woolen tunic. Aniron helmet protected his head and face, and a large oval-shaped, wooden shield(the scutum), which was covered with leather and bound with iron, protected hisbody. Sturdy leather sandals called caligae, with hobnailed soles over a centimeterthick, supported his feet on the prodigious marches he would be ordered toundertake.The legionary’s most formidable weapon was the pilum (plural, pila), aweighted throwing spear with a point sharp enough to penetrate armor. In closecombat he employed a short sword based on Spanish prototypes, the famousgladius.

Centurions were the backbone of Caesar’s army. They were the officers whoactually commanded the troops, while the still amateur and youthful tribunes,nominally superior to them, tended to hold staff appointments. Caesar’s respect forhis centurions is revealed by the number of times he describes tales of their courageand leadership. They wore distinctive items of uniform and equipment, such astransverse crests on their helmets, greaves on their legs, chest amulets, and belts.Aswas particularly well known in Roman times, they often carried a vine rod, withwhich they beat the soldiers for disciplinary purposes. In contrast to a legionary, acenturion carried his gladius on the left side, though in battle he carried shield andpila like his men.


The Helvetii and Ariovistus (58 BCE)

The conquest of Gaul was probably unpremeditated. It seems, from the originallocation of his legions (three at Aquileia and only one in Gallia Narbonensis), thatCaesar was planning an expedition out of Illyricum (modern Croatia), probablyagainst the Dacians of modern Romania. He was diverted by an unexpectedopportunity to the west.This ‘opportunity’ was unwittingly provided by a migratorymovement of the Helvetii in the direction of Transalpine Gaul.The Helvetii, whohailed from the area of modern Switzerland, were trying to escape various pressuresin their homeland, especially attacks by a German tribe called the Suebi.

According to Caesar, pleas for assistance against the Helvetii were received froma number of Gallic tribes that were friendly to Rome. In particular, he mentionsan appeal from the Aedui, who lived in the area of modern Burgundy.This tribesubsequently lent valuable support to Caesar. The Aedui, probably the leadingtribe of Gaul, wanted to use the Romans against their enemies. It is sobering toconsider the degree to which, by such means, Gauls (rather than Romans)conquered Gaul. Caesar also recalled the damage inflicted on Roman arms by theHelvetii at an earlier period, including the defeat of one of his relatives at the timeof the Cimbric threat. He was, therefore, attacking the Helvetii because theywould have been dangerous neighbors, because he was defending Roman allies,and because he was avenging wrongs done to the Roman state and to his family(GallicWar 1–12). Roman public opinion would have been supportive.Yet certainfeatures of the account are perturbing to modern sensibilities. For instance, Caesartells us that a Helvetian embassy came to him, asking for his permission to passthrough part of the Roman province of Gallia Narbonensis on their waywestwards in search of new land upon which to settle.This hardly looks aggressive,though the Helvetii were certainly numerous – reputedly around 300,000 strong– and by no means lacking in military power, as their warriors were subsequentlyto prove.There were, however, many women and children among their numberand they seem to have been in genuine need of new land. Caesar stalled theHelvetian ambassadors in order to buy time for his legions to gather.The legionalready with him was subsequently reinforced by the three from Aquileia and bytwo more which had been recruited hastily among the men of Cisalpine Gaul, notall of whom would have been full citizens but who were accepted as such for thepurpose. It appears that Caesar had no intention of granting the Helvetian requestand had determined to attack them from the first. By the time his troops arrived,the Helvetii had moved off, showing care not to enter Roman territory. Unper-turbed, Caesar chased them, crossed the border of the Roman province anddefeated the Helvetii in an engagement just south of the Aeduan fort of Bibracte(modern Autun in Burgundy). It was a fierce battle that lasted all day. Thediscipline and flexibility of his legionaries enabled Caesar to meet a serious flankattack at a critical juncture by detaching the third line from each of his fourveteran legions and moving them to the danger zone, where they prevailed indifficult circumstances. When the Romans captured their wagons, the Helvetii


were deprived of supplies. Some days later, the unfortunate survivors surrenderedand were sent home.

This episode relates rather well to the established scholarly view that Romanimperialism at this time was dictated more by personal whims of Rome’s leadinggenerals than by issues of state policy or security. Caesar’s invasion of Gaul looks tohave been launched without official sanction, motivated significantly by Caesar’sdesire (unacknowledged in his account) to win military glory, which would allowhim to emulate, or even surpass, Pompey. It is often pointed out that a law of Sullaforbade generals to take their armies beyond provincial borders without senatorialpermission. The intent of the law, however, probably applied more to generalsmarching towards Rome than away from it. Caesar explains that the circumstanceswere dangerous and extraordinary.Thus, he was not guilty of having ‘diminishedthe majesty of the Roman people’, one of the formulae for expressing the conceptof treason at Rome.The word maiestas, translated in this formula as ‘majesty’, canalso mean ‘greaterness’, and in this latter, comparative sense Rome’s assumption ofsuperiority as a matter of course is probably more obvious. Caesar behaved inaccordance with this fundamental assumption and was supported for doing so.

Next Caesar moved against a German named Ariovistus, king of the Suebi.Ariovistus had been moving more and more of his people across the Rhine intoGaul in recent years and had defied all attempts to dislodge him. He was aparticular enemy of Caesar’s new allies, theAedui,mostly because he was intriguingwith their rivals, the Arverni and the Sequani. In consequence, the chief of theAedui,Diviciacus,made a personal appeal to Caesar for help.Caesar had significantreason for pause at this point because during his consulship he had persuaded thesenate to give formal recognition to Ariovistus as a ‘friend of the Roman people’.An attack on him should have been unthinkable. Yet if the objection enteredCaesar’s mind, it was overcome by the appeals of his new Gallic allies, and so hepicked a quarrel with Ariovistus, ordering him back across the Rhine. WhenAriovistus defied the order, Caesar described him as arrogant and moved toconfront him at Vesontio, the chief town of the Sequani. The Germans did notengage for several days, but at last they drew up battle lines against all six of Caesar’slegions in what is today the plain of Alsace. Caesar led the Roman right wingagainst the German left, where he perceived a weakness.After a sharp engagement,the Germans fell back to the Rhine, where many were cut down and many othersdrowned.Ariovistus escaped. His army was virtually wiped out.

A number of grateful Gallic tribes sought friendly relations with Rome after thedefeat of Ariovistus. However, their gratitude must have cooled when, at the endof 58 BCE, Caesar marched his legions to winter quarters in the north-east of Gaul,adjacent to territory of the powerful Belgae, an act which evidently presupposedfurther campaigns. The Belgae were a confederacy of different tribes who livedroughly where Belgium is today. There can be little doubt that Caesar had nowtaken the decision to attempt further conquests in Gaul.This march to the northwas a daring move because it relied heavily on Gallic support in Caesar’s rear.TheAedui, for instance, were compelled to furnish supplies and troops, especially


cavalry, and to hold captured Gauls for sale as slaves.The legionaries accordinglyjourneyed north, far from Roman territory, past many unconquered tribes, to anundoubtedly hostile area where they would have to rely heavily on allied tribeswhose loyalty was by no means complete. A Roman shadow was notionally castover the unconquered center of Gaul and the central tribes were compelledimplicitly to acknowledge Caesar’s mastery. It was an amazingly audacious thing todo.His supply and communication lines were terribly vulnerable and he was livingwith the constant threat of ambush, surrounded by enemies, and sustained bynotoriously fickle allies. If the move had failed and the Romans had been defeated,Caesar’s audacity would now be described as simple foolhardiness.Upon his returnto Cisalpine Gaul for the winter, he ordered his recruiting officers to raise twomore legions, though he had no mandate from the senate to do so.

Battles against the Belgae (57 BCE)

In 57 BCE, therefore, when Caesar returned to Gaul, he had two newly raisedlegions to add to the six already under arms. Labienus, now his most trusted legate,informed him that the Belgae were preparing to resist further incursions.Describedby the geographer Strabo (Geography 4.196) as the fiercest inhabitants of Gaul, theBelgae boasted of their German blood and appear to have established a sizeablepresence in Britain.The most vigorous of the Belgic tribes was the Nervii, occu-pying parts of Hainault and Flanders. Characteristically, Caesar chose to invade.Inadequate reconnaissance and the speed of their march meant that Caesar’sadvance legions were closer to the enemy than they suspected.While the legion-aries prepared their camp for the night by the river Sabis (Sambre), the Nervii,aided by the Atrebates and the Viromandui, fell upon them in fearsome fashion.Critically, Roman discipline and training came to the fore.The legionaries curbedtheir panic and drew up their lines as best as they could.The Ninth and the Tenthlegions drove back the Atrebates who faced them.The Eighth and the Eleventhlegions were likewise successful against the Viromandui, but the Seventh and theTwelfth ran into severe difficulties on the right against the Nervii.Things lookedblack as more and more legionaries began to turn and flee.The entire Roman linewas in danger of collapsing. Caesar took up a shield and rushed in personally tohearten his men – a brave and very dangerous thing to do. He was quite exposedfor a time before his men regrouped around him. The day was only saved bysoldiers of the Tenth legion, who abandoned their pursuit of the Atrebates andsuddenly fell upon the enemy rear.Their arrival may have saved Caesar’s life.Then,the Thirteenth and Fourteenth legions, which had formed the rear of Caesar’scolumn, made it to the battle. A massacre ensued, in spite of Gallic valor (Caesar,GallicWar 2.27.3–5, Dillon and Garland 12.66):

The enemy, even when all hope of safety was lost, displayed immensecourage; when their first ranks had fallen, the next stood on them as they laythere and fought from their bodies; when these were thrown down and the


corpses heaped up, the remainder, as if from a mound, threw their missiles atour men and intercepted and returned our javelins. It was clear, therefore,that they were to be judged men of immense courage, who had dared tocross a very broad river, climb huge banks, and advance over very unfavorableterrain; the greatness of their spirit made such immense difficulties easy.

According to Caesar, only the old men, women and children of the Nerviiremained. Subsequent events show that this was an exaggeration, but the loss of lifemust nonetheless have been prodigious.

Caesar penetrated further into the north-east, where the Atuatuci were forcedto surrender after a bloody battle.He is quite matter-of-fact about the enslavementof the survivors, no doubt for a large sum (Caesar,GallicWar 2.33.6–7, Dillon andGarland 6.10):

On the next day, the gates were smashed open, for there were now no moredefenders, and, after our soldiers had been sent in, Caesar sold the wholetown as one lot at auction.The purchasers informed him that the number ofpersons was 53,000.

Misery was the normal fate of the conquered. The passage betrays no humanefeeling, no empathy, and no self-doubt. Indeed, Badian (1990, 30) sees such a figureas a claim to glory, and there are numerous such figures in the Bellum Gallicum.

Publius Crassus, son of Crassus the triumvir, was given command of one legionand sent into the north-west, where his sudden appearance cowed the inhabitantsinto submission.The result was stunning. A mere two campaigns had establishedRoman control in all Gaul between the Rhine in the south and theAtlantic Oceanin the north. The campaigns of 57 BCE added northern France and Belgium toRome’s empire. Rapturous applause greeted the news in Rome and the senatevoted enthusiastically for a fifteen-day thanksgiving to the gods in Caesar’s name.The length of days is highly significant. Pompey’s victories, by comparison, hadonly earned a ten-day thanksgiving.What Caesar had done was extraordinary, butthe senate surely intended a slight to Pompey. After ensuring that his men wereadequately quartered for the winter in Belgic territory, Caesar journeyed south tothe PoValley in order to keep an eye on events in Rome.

Cicero and the Triumvirs (57–56 BCE)

Meanwhile,Clodius’ attacks on Pompey grew steadily stronger through 57 and intothe early part of 56 BCE, when Clodius held office as aedile.As a result, Pompey’sattitude to Cicero’s exile changed. He decided that he now wanted Cicero inRome, so that Cicero could engage Clodius and divert the latter’s attention awayfrom Pompey. Ultimately, on 4 August 57 BCE, Cicero’s recall was secured by thejoint efforts of Pompey, Publius Lentulus Spinther,who was one of the consuls, andeight of the ten tribunes of 57 BCE.Two of these tribunes, Publius Sestius andTitus


Annius Milo, recruited gangs for use against Clodius’ thugs. Sestius visited Caesarto consult about the plan to recall Cicero. Caesar offered no objection, though hemust have had reservations, given Cicero’s attitude to the events of 59 BCE. Milo’sgangs continued to ensure Cicero’s safety when he arrived back in Rome on 4September.Cicero described his reception in typical manner (Letters toAtticus 4.1.5,Dillon and Garland 12.59):

My arrival at Rome was such that there was no man of any rank known tomy nomenclator who did not come to meet me, except for enemies whowere unable to conceal or deny that they were my enemies.When I arrivedat the Porta Capena [the Capena Gate], the temples’ steps were crowded withordinary citizens, and their welcome was marked by immense applause,whilesimilar crowds and applause accompanied me right up to the Capitol – in theForum and on the Capitol itself the number of people was astonishing.

Cicero’s euphoria was soon tempered by unpleasant political realities.The situationhe faced was one of violence and duplicity. Clodius, of course, was assertive,unpredictable, and dangerous. Cicero was not afraid of him and proceeded to causehim discomfort whenever possible. Cicero had hopes of dissociating Pompey fromCaesar.As usual, however, he over-estimated his influence with Pompey, who hadsupported Cicero’s recall for reasons every bit as pragmatic as those that caused himto support the orator’s exile in the first place. Still, Pompey had reason to begrateful when Cicero helped to convince the senate to give him control of thegrain supply for five years. This special commission did not entail any militarypower but it carried considerable prestige. It was more important than ever, ofcourse, to ensure a stable supply of grain for bread when so many people wereeligible to receive it at no charge.A hungry populace would be a potential threatto the government. Pompey’s commission would also take the focus away fromClodius as the man responsible for the free grain.

Trouble soon developed between Pompey and Crassus over the possibility of arich campaign in Egypt to restore King Ptolemy XII Auletes to his throne. Theking had been expelled by the people of Alexandria in 58 BCE and subsequentlysought help from Rome.The thought of either Pompey or Crassus in control ofEgypt, a land rich in grain and gold, and the perfect base for armed revolt againstthe state, was more than senators like Cato could bear. In addition, Ptolemy was amurderous, disreputable character, and there was widespread reluctance in thesenate to support him. Pompey and Crassus may have shared this reluctance them-selves, though neither trusted the intentions of the other.The senate became stalledon the issue. Relations between the two triumvirs broke down as Crassus blockedPompey, and was in turn blocked, while Clodius and the optimates saw an oppor-tunity to increase their pressure. Lucullus had withdrawn from public life afterCaesar’s consulship, lapsing into insanity before his death in 57 or 56 BCE. Bibulusand others more than made up for his absence, and they were ably supported byLucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, an ancestor of the emperor Nero who proved


himself a formidable gang leader. Ahenobarbus made a special point of attackingCaesar’s activities as consul and proconsul.

At the beginning of 56 BCE, Caesar proposed meetings with Crassus andPompey. He had been kept fully informed about the deteriorating situation inRome, and knew in addition that Domitius Ahenobarbus intended to stand for theconsulship of 55 BCE and to push for Caesar’s recall in the event of his election.Thus Caesar met with Crassus at Ravenna and with Pompey in April at the townof Luca, the southernmost town of his province of Cisalpine Gaul, which he wasforbidden as proconsul to leave in accordance with the law of Sulla that aimed toprevent governors leaving their provinces without senatorial permission. Caesarmade Pompey and Crassus see that there was nothing to be gained from the twoof them canceling each other out, and in consequence the three decided to renewfull-scale co-operation for their mutual benefit. It was decided that Pompey andCrassus would stand as consuls for 55 BCE, helped by Caesarian troops sent homeon furlough in time for the elections. Caesar’s command in Gaul would then beextended for a further five years. Crassus, in turn, would receive Syria, and Pompeywould receive Spain for the same period of time.Everything turned out as planned.

As part of these maneuvers, Pompey was delegated to speak to Quintus Cicero,Cicero’s brother, about bringing the orator to heel. Pompey emphasized thepersonal debt that Cicero owed to him for his recall from exile, and made it clearthat there would be serious consequences if he should reject the interests of thetriumvirs this time. Pompey wanted Cicero to back Caesar’s consular legislation inthe face of mounting attacks, and he wanted other support besides. Cicero wasshaken. In his famous speech De Provinciis Consularibus (On the Consular Provinces)of 56 BCE, Cicero spoke in favor of the extension of Caesar’s command in Gaul. Infact, Caesar asked in addition for ten legates – an abnormally large number – andfor money to pay the four extra legions he had recruited.As everyone knew,Cicerowas speaking on behalf of a man who had been largely responsible for his exile. Itlooked hypocritical and Cicero was criticized heavily as a turncoat. He laterclaimed that political realism and his basic commitment to the good of Romemotivated him.He was acting as a sapiens (‘wise man’) in accepting the indisputablesuperiority of the triumvirs. In conversation and private letters, however, herevealed his shame. His dignitas had been profoundly undermined.

Destruction of the Veneti (56 BCE)

At this point, Caesar apparently conceived of Gaul as essentially pacified. He evenbegan to plan once more for a campaign out of Illyricum. Such thoughts, however,were swiftly forgotten when the peoples of north-west Gaul, along the Atlanticseaboard, rose in revolt, protesting the behavior of Roman administrators. Caesarmoved angrily to bring about their submission in 56 BCE.The most important tribein this region was theVeneti, who were renowned seafarers. Caesar ordered a fleetto be sailed to him from the Mediterranean, and he ordered as well theconstruction of new vessels at Atlantic ports. With these boats the Veneti were


defeated by Decimus Junius Brutus Albinus (later one of Caesar’s assassins) in anaval battle.TheVeneti had better boats under sail but they lacked both rowers andarchers.This enabled the Roman fleet to come alongside them and cut down theirsails. A famous example of Caesar’s ruthlessness followed: having classed them asrebels, he put all the Venetic elders to the sword and sold the rest into slavery(Caesar,GallicWar 3.16).

Also conquered were the Aquitani. By the end of this campaign Caesar hadtaken by force the country which is now Brittany and Normandy. Many friendlyGauls were alarmed by Caesar’s harsh treatment of the Veneti. It is uncertainwhether the tribes of central Gaul now decided to come to terms formally withhim. At any rate, they were completely surrounded by territories under Romancontrol.With characteristic self-confidence,Caesar announced that the pacificationof Gaul was complete. Subsequent events would prove that it was temporarily quietrather than pacified completely.

Conclusion

Caesar’s military record in Gaul was nothing short of stunning to this point.Centuries of warfare between Romans and Gauls had made ongoing conflict seeminevitable in the minds of most Romans.News that Caesar had conquered Gaul insuch a short space of time must have seemed genuinely incredible. Even hisenemies had to be impressed. A fifteen-day thanksgiving was voted in genuinespirit, whatever its obvious meaning for Pompey too. Roman politics was enteringa very difficult period, but even in this arena Caesar had won through.The ascend-ancy of the triumvirs was re-established in the wake of Luca. It is worth noting,when considering the nature of Caesar’s ambition or the topic of his future plans,that he brokered an agreement that established a five-year military parity betweenhimself, Pompey, and Crassus. All three would hold coterminous commands. Ithardly seems that Caesar was intent on monopolizing the benefits of imperialismor attempting to steal a march on his associates in search of ultimate power. Hemust have felt mightily satisfied, as though his former superiors had acknowledgedthe gloria of his achievements to date. Little does he appear to have suspected thefirestorm that lay ahead in Gaul.

Recommended reading

The ‘propaganda’ and literary aspects of Caesar’s war commentaries from Gaul arediscussed by Collins 1972; Seager 2003; Riggsby 2006; and Kraus 2009. All thepapers in Welch and Powell 1998 are enlightening on Caesar’s aims and methodsin writing his Bellum Gallicum. A persuasive argument for serial publication isprovided byWiseman 1998.

Reputable accounts of Caesar’s career during these years include Gelzer 1968, ch.4;Wiseman 1994b;Meier 1995, ch. 11;Garland 2003, ch. 5;Goldsworthy 2006, chs.


9–12; Kamm 2006, ch. 5; Tatum 2008, ch. 2; and Billows 2009, chs. vi–vii. Anaccessible and very well illustrated account of Caesar’s campaigns in Gaul, includingjudicious discussion of archaeological evidence, is that of Gilliver 2002. On theRoman army at war in this period, including Caesar’s legions, see Goldsworthy1996.The perennial question about the quality of Caesar’s generalship is answered(quite differently) by Fuller 1965 and Rosenstein 2009.

Politics in Rome from 58–56 BCE are well discussed by Wiseman 1994b; andRamsey 2009.The best study of Clodius’ career is that of Tatum 1999. Cicero iswell served by a number of good biographers, such as Habicht 1990, but the bestanalysis of his speeches, letters, and other works may be found in Lintott 2008. Onthe significance of Luca, see Marshall 1976, ch. vi;Wiseman 1994b; and Seager2002, ch. x.



7VICTORIA

Victory over the Gauls, 55–52 BCE

Victoria

Military victory was a fundamental concept in Roman society. Spoils taken fromconquered enemies, such as distinctive arms and armor, were displayed around thecity in prominent locations, especially along the route normally taken by triumphsfrom the Campus Martius into the Forum and up to the Temple of Jupiter on theCapitol. Statues of victorious generals, together with symbols of their victories,were likewise common in both public and private spaces. In fact, the homes ofRoman nobles were copiously stocked with reminders of famous victories downthe generations. Pliny the Elder (Natural History 35.2) described such houses as per-petually triumphant, and no doubt the trophies – many of great antiquity showingthe effects of age – left a lasting impression on crowds of visitors.A noble boy, theheir to a great name,would have been in no doubt about the military achievementsof his ancestors or about the expectations thereby placed upon him.Victory wasthe vital prerequisite for a triumph, and it entitled the victorious general to wear alaurel wreath. It was a concept influenced by the gods, especially Jupiter and (ofcourse)Victoria herself, so that the victorious general was connected closely to thedivine.Yet part of the reason for the importance of military victory in Romanculture was not because the Romans won so often but because they lost so often.They knew about the horrors of defeat and the varying fortunes of war. Caesar’sconfidence in his abilities and in those of his men was extremely high, but victorycould not be taken for granted. It is unlikely that he saw his campaigns in Gaul assome kind of necessary formality, a mere stepping-stone to monarchic power in thefuture. Pompey and Crassus could not be discounted so easily, and neither couldthe Gauls. As will be shown in this chapter, there was nothing assured aboutCaesar’s ultimate victory in Gaul.When the Gallic tribes united their strength, rosein revolt, and followed a strong commander inVercingetorix, the Romans suffered

a number of serious reverses and stared crushing defeat in the face at Alesia.Theresult could have been completely different.

The main aims of this chapter are to describe the serious revolts faced by Caesarin Gaul, to emphasize his tactical and inspirational qualities, and to argue that therewas nothing easy or predetermined about Caesar’s conquest of Gaul. It did notmean that he would go on to seek monarchic power at Rome. There were noformalities.Victory could have gone to the Gauls, especially at Alesia. Gallic unitycame too late, and ultimately proved no match for the Roman legions.The con-sequences for Gaul, and indeed for Europe in later generations, were absolutelyprofound.

Events in Rome (55–54 BCE)

Politics in Rome continued to be undermined by violence and bribery. Pompeyand Crassus were resisted stoutly, but with the backing of Caesarian soldiers theysucceeded in becoming consuls for 55 BCE, and in preventing Cato’s election to thepraetorship of that year.Under a lexTrebonia, proposed by a friendly tribune namedGaius Trebonius, the new consuls obtained proconsular imperium as governors forfive years. Crassus received the province of Syria and looked forward to a lucrativewar against the great kingdom of Parthia. Pompey was given control of Spain, buthe made the momentous decision to govern his new province through legateswhile he himself remained near Rome – an unprecedented move that was lateremulated by Augustus and the emperors of Rome. Next, the two triumvirssponsored a law, which secured the renewal of Caesar’s command in Gaul for afurther five years. By these means, parity was established between the triumvirs,each of whom now possessed proconsular imperium and an army.Pompey’s position,which permitted him to continue his supervision of the grain supply, was trulyextraordinary. Once his year as consul was over, he could not stay within thepomerium because he was now a proconsul with proconsular imperium, but he stayedclose enough to the city to be able to monitor developments.This proximity to thecity was undoubtedly agreed upon, as a way to safeguard triumviral interests.Ultimately, however, it allowed the optimates to draw Pompey into their intriguesagainst Caesar.

Other notable laws of 55 BCE included various ineffective measures againstjudicial corruption and the collegia.These affected a broad range of citizens and asa result they were very unpopular. Pompey hoped to regain popular favor at theopening in September of the magnificent stone theatre which bore his name.TheTheatre of Pompey, under construction since the great man’s third triumph in 61BCE,was Rome’s first permanent theatre complex. In its huge portico stood a statueof Pompey, triumphant, surrounded by the fourteen nations he had conquered onhis eastern campaigns. It was surmounted by a shrine toVenusVictrix (‘Venus theBringer of Victory’, ‘Venus the Victorious’). Lavish games marked the opening ofthe complex, including a beast hunt featuring five hundred lions, and a similar fightinvolving elephants. Instead of the expected adulation, however, Pompey was

96 Victory over the Gauls, 55–52 BCE

plunged into despair when the hunted elephants dissolved into pitiful wailing andthe common people sympathized with them. The Elder Pliny describes whathappened (Natural History 8.21, Loeb trans.):

Pompey’s elephants, when they had lost all hope of escape, tried to gain thecompassion of the crowd by indescribable gestures of entreaty, deploringtheir fate with a sort of wailing, so much to the distress of the public thatthey forgot the general [Pompey] and his munificence carefully devised fortheir honor, and bursting into tears rose in a body and invoked curses on thehead of Pompey for which he soon afterwards paid the penalty.

Curses – apparently chanted in unison – rather than applause would have beenespecially devastating to a man like Pompey, who never handled criticism well.

The shrine toVenusVictrix deserves special consideration, for it is obvious thatPompey was staking an ideological claim. Both Marius and Sulla had advertisedVenus, and sometimes Aphrodite, her Greek counterpart, as their special patroness.They tended to associate her with Fortuna or some other evocation of goodfortune or divine blessing, such as Felicitas. Sulla was known as ‘Felix’, and henamed his son and daughter ‘Faustus’ and ‘Fausta’ respectively, all names whichconjure meanings like ‘fortunate’, ‘auspicious’, or ‘lucky’. Pompey was claimingVenus for her capacity to bring military victory – not so difficult an idea tounderstand, given that her lover Mars was the god of war. In doing so, he was evi-dently usurping or surpassing the claims of the previous generation. The trulysignificant point is that Caesar was probably doing the same thing at this time. Hehad advertised victory in Gaul in 56 BCE – prematurely as it turned out, though noone was yet to know. It must have been around this time that he was planning themagnificent Forum of Caesar (also called the Julian Forum), for which he askedCicero and his friend Oppius to buy land in 54 BCE (Cicero, Letters to Atticus4.16.8).This forum or public square, replete with trophies from Gaul, would be aneverlasting tribute to his stunning victory.The land alone cost a hundred millionsesterces, which was an astounding sum (Suetonius, Life of the Divine Julius 26.2).The first of the great imperial fora of Rome, the Forum of Caesar was dominatedby a Temple to Venus Genetrix (‘Venus the Ancestress’).Venus, therefore, is onceagain associated with military victory, though this time it is Venus in the guise ofJulian ancestress, the mother of Aeneas and divine progenitor of the Julian house.Caesar used Venus Victrix as his watchword at the Battle of Pharsalus againstPompey in 48 BCE (Appian, Civil Wars 2.76). It seems unlikely, however, that thetwo men were usingVenus in a competitive way in the mid-50s BCE. Pompey andCaesar were united by Julia, Caesar’s daughter, who was married to Pompey. Juliawas pregnant in 55 BCE and the two men must have contemplated the union oftheir families into a new Roman dynasty.Unfortunately, Julia miscarried, promptedby shock and fear when slaves returned home bearing Pompey’s toga spattered inblood after violence at an assembly meeting. For the moment, the idea of a dynastydissolved. Both families, however, seem to have been describingVenus as a bringer

Victory over the Gauls, 55–52 BCE 97

of military victory – a shared inheritance for the hoped-for son of Julia andPompey.

If unpopularity and misfortune attended Pompey in 55 BCE, Crassus was by nomeans immune.When he departed the city for Syria in November 55 BCE, he leftto the curses of the tribune Gaius Ateius Capito ringing in his ears. Ciceroreconciled formally with Crassus, entertained him to dinner the night before heleft Rome, and spoke on his behalf in the senate early in 54 BCE.He published thisspeech, though it is lost, and so he obviously wanted it to be on record. He alsowrote a letter to Crassus in which he professed friendship and a willingness to servehim, though in his heart he was in no doubt that Crassus was a wicked rascal(Cicero, Letters to Atticus 4.13.2).

With the triumvirs gone at the end of 55 BCE, gang violence broke out againand the senate was powerless to stop it.Many political aspirants simply adopted theprinciple,‘If you can’t beat ’em, join ’em’.Gangs funded by the optimate DomitiusAhenobarbus helped him win election to the consulship of 54 BCE.All the consulsof 54 and 53 BCE, as it happened, were blue-blood aristocrats, who reduced publiclife to a state of anarchy by promoting violence and bribery for their own ends.The triumvirs had unleashed the devil, but their opponents behaved no better.

Other prominent events of 54 BCE included the return of Piso Caesoninus fromMacedonia. Piso, Caesar’s father-in-law, had been consul in 58 BCE and had notlifted a finger to prevent Cicero being exiled.When Piso attacked Cicero in thesenate, the latter responded with a mighty verbal onslaught, the In Pisonem (AgainstPiso),whose published version today stands as one of his most undignified speeches.Also in 54 BCE,Cicero’s brother Quintus went to serve with Caesar in Gaul.Caesarexpressed delight at the news he was coming. For the moment,Cicero was on goodterms with each of the triumvirs, though of course this was really a sign that hehad lost his independence.

Julia must have quickly become pregnant again after her first miscarriage, but in54 BCE, tragically, she died in childbirth.The child itself, a boy, died a few days later.Pompey declined another marriage alliance with Caesar. He was for the momentkeeping his options open. Caesar would have felt rebuffed, but of course he knewthat noble families were trained to contemplate marriage at length. There areseveral indications of touching love between Pompey and Julia, so perhaps Pompeycould have pleaded that he needed time for his grief. Her father appears to haveloved her no less, though Quintus Cicero reported to his brother that Caesarconducted himself with courage and dignity in his immense sorrow.

Invasions of Germany and Britain (55–54 BCE)

After the incredible successes of 58–56 BCE, the events of 55 BCE brought Caesarlittle credit and indicate a slowing of the Roman juggernaut. In fact, the campaignsof 55 and 54 BCE were unrewarding in various respects. In 55 BCE, Caesar sentexpeditions into Germany and Britain, advertising dubious ‘surrenders’ in bothcountries. His first Rhine crossing was launched in reply to a German incursion


across the river by two tribes named the Usipetes and the Tencteri.These peoples,like the Helvetii before them, had entered Gaul under pressure from the Suebi.They asked Caesar for land upon which to settle and were clearly intent uponproviding for their women, children, and elderly. Caesar, however, was determinedto resist such crossings of the Rhine – for the protection of his Gallic allies and forthe sake of his own authority.At first he gave a considerate answer to the Germans,indicating that he would not permit them to remain west of the Rhine but wouldhelp them to settle on land east of the Rhine which currently belonged to theUbii, whose representatives were at that time in his camp. Next he marched hislegions into a threatening position. When cavalry of the Usipetes and Tencterifought an engagement against Gallic cavalry allied to Caesar, the German chiefs,under solemn cover of a truce, came personally to the Roman camp in order toapologize. Plainly, they were fearful of the legions and respectful of Caesar’sauthority. Caesar arrested them and marched immediately against their leaderlessfollowers, slaughtering the men and driving the women and children into theRhine, where they drowned. The chiefs were subsequently released. Caesarfurnishes an impossible figure for the number of Germans killed in the action:430,000 (Gallic War 4.15). Such an outlandish total must have been calculated toimpress his Roman audience, who apparently accepted the stereotypical view thatbarbarians were always encountered in hordes. One final event was calculated tostrike fear into the hearts of those living on the east bank: Caesar’s engineers tooka mere 10 days to construct a mighty trestle bridge across the Rhine, a wide, fast-flowing, and deep river.The Germans melted away as the legions crossed and setabout devastating the land.No pitched battle took place.After 18 days, the Romansoldiers returned and the bridge was destroyed.This was a demonstration of currentpower and future potential to awesome effect, designed to impress both theGermans and the people of Rome. Cato protested in the senate that Caesar hadbroken a truce and that he should be handed over to the Germans in atonement.His protests were not strongly supported – a fact worth bearing in mind whenassessing the danger represented by future threats of legal action against Caesar.

A three-week reconnaissance mission to Britain, late in the campaigning season,followed next. Given its timing, this voyage beyond the limit of Ocean itself couldonly have been another demonstration or the prelude to something more sub-stantial in the future. Caesar claimed that the Britons had been assisting the Gauls,but he was probably motivated more by rumors of pearls and mineral wealth,exaggerated in both cases, and by a desire to create an awesome impression inRome, where Britain was seen as a mysterious outpost at the end of the world. Inspite of some success, the invasion almost ended in disaster.The Seventh andTenthlegions were attacked vigorously while landing and began to hesitate. Caesardescribes what happened next (GallicWar 4.25, Loeb trans.):

…while our troops still hung back, chiefly on account of the depth of thesea, the eagle-bearer of theTenth legion, after a prayer to heaven to bless thelegion by his act, cried: ‘Leap down, soldiers, unless you wish to betray your


eagle to the enemy; it shall be told that I at any rate did my duty to mycountry and my general’.When he had said this with a loud voice, he casthimself forth from the ship, and began to bear the eagle against the enemy.Then our troops exhorted one another not to allow so dire a disgrace, andleapt down from the ship with one accord.

It is worth noting that Caesar does not name the standard-bearer, though he wouldcertainly have known the man’s name and elsewhere he is generous in praisingheroism shown by named soldiers and centurions.These men apparently representedno social threat. His upper-class legates, however, with the intermittent exception ofLabienus, are normally not shown the same generosity of treatment.They were tooclose to Caesar in social standing and were potential rivals in the future.The GallicWar is careful to advance Caesar’s standing in the competitive hierarchy.

After a fierce battle, the prowess of the legionaries prevailed.The Britons suedfor peace but were saved for the time being when a storm struck the Roman fleet,which had not been properly beached – a sign of the expedition’s limited aims, ofunfamiliarity with the coast, and of the volatile weather of the English Channel.The legions were momentarily trapped and vulnerable. Caesar, having achievedlittle, was forced to return to Gaul in the remaining ships. By the time the news ofBritain reached Rome, however, Caesar’s achievement had reached astonishingproportions.A second thanksgiving was decreed in his honor, this time for 20 days.

There can have been little doubt that he would return, for the first invasion hadnot ended as he would have liked, and Caesar’s association with victory had to becrystal clear. In 54 BCE, then,Caesar returned to Britain with five legions and 2,000Gallic cavalry.The legions landed unopposed this time and set out after the Britons,who had fled from the site of the Roman landing. Once more the Roman shipswere not adequately beached and once more a storm inflicted great damage.Thisseems unforgivable, given the experience of 55 BCE, but the problem was really oneof finding a sheltered harbor.Caesar had to send for repair crews from Gaul.Mean-while, his men were again in a vulnerable position with few supplies and limitedmeans of escape. Characteristically, Caesar went on the offensive, disregarding thedanger. His legions fought their way across the Thames and compelled the formalsubmission of British tribes united under King Cassivellaunus. The British hademployed guerrilla tactics with some success, so that the legionaries were keen forrevenge. Caesar restrained his men on this occasion and tried a conciliatoryapproach, which proved successful. His judgment in the circumstances deservescredit. It would have been easy to unleash his soldiers in all their fury, as he wasinclined to do on other occasions. He decided that the desired result could beachieved by alternative means, and he was right.

Even so, the invasion was hardly an unqualified success.There is no evidence thatCassivellaunus provided the tribute and hostages agreed upon, and Caesar was soonforced to return to the Continent.He described the invasion as a glorious triumph,but in material terms, once again, it brought him nothing. Furthermore, he did notleave at his leisure.


The ‘Northern Revolt’ in Gaul and the death of Crassus (54–53 BCE)

Things had begun to unravel behind his back in Gaul, beginning in the north,where rebellion was inspired by Ambiorix, a chieftain of the Eburones, who livedbetween the Meuse and Rhine Rivers. First,Ambiorix attacked the Roman wintercamp at Atuatuca.Then, he offered the legionaries, commanded by Caesar’s legatesSabinus and Cotta, safe passage out of his territory. Unwisely, the Romans trustedhim and were consequently slaughtered. Fifteen cohorts – one and a half legions,possibly around 7,000 men – were lost.This resounding success induced the Nerviito besiege the winter camp in their territory, which was commanded by QuintusCicero.Reduced to desperate straits, the camp was relieved only by Caesar’s timelyarrival on the scene. The situation was so serious that Caesar raised two newlegions, and borrowed one from Pompey, thereby taking his total force to tenlegions. Moreover, he decided to spend the winter of 54/3 BCE in northern Gauland not journey south to Ravenna, as was his usual practice. Labienus campaignedagainst the Treveri, a tribe in the Moselle region who had assisted the Romans in57 BCE. They proved very difficult to defeat but subsequently furnished theRomans with magnificent cavalry.

Throughout 53 BCE the Roman army suppressed a string of uncoordinatedrevolts by various tribes, including the Senones, Carnutes, and Menapii. A secondcrossing of the Rhine was undertaken.The aim was to dissuade the Germans fromthinking that there might be an opportunity for them to interfere in Gaul. Themessage was conveyed by slaughter, devastation, and fear. Ambiorix continued hisresistance down to 51 BCE, and though the land of the Eburones was laid waste andhis people virtually exterminated, Ambiorix himself managed to evade capture.Caesar’s response to the northern uprising was ruthless and brutal.Those who wererebels in his eyes were consistently treated to the iron fist rather than the velvetglove. If he hoped that the tribes of central Gaul would be intimidated intoremaining loyal by such behavior, he was wrong.The policy of cruelty pushed fearinto hatred, and hatred into the planning of rebellion.

Meanwhile, in Rome, violence, bribery, and corruption of various kinds meantthat traditional government was breaking down. Elections, legislative assemblies,and law courts were repeatedly disrupted by gangs, who forced the proceedings tocome to a halt. In the end the consuls of 53 BCE were not elected until July of thatyear, which was about the time when the consuls of 52 BCE would normally havebeen elected.

After Julia’s death in 54 BCE, a further blow to Pompey and Caesar, and the endof the triumvirate as such, came with the defeat and death of Crassus at Carrhae in53 BCE.The famous mounted archers of the Parthians lured Crassus’ infantry onand on into the waterless desert. Parthian heavy cavalry overwhelmed PubliusCrassus and his Gallic cavalry. When the time was judged right, the Parthianspoured torrents of arrows down upon the hapless Romans, who succumbed indreadful circumstances. The standards of Crassus’ legions were taken, a greatdisgrace to Roman arms, and Crassus was subjected to humiliation before being


killed.This left Pompey and Caesar as the leading men of Rome.The Three hadbecomeTwo. For the moment their co-operation held firm.

The ‘Great Revolt’ of 52 BCE under Vercingetorix of the Arverni:Avaricum and Gergovia

In 52 BCE the tribes of central Gaul were ready to evict the occupier. Under theleadership of the youthful chieftain Vercingetorix of the Arverni, a formidablecoalition of tribes began to attack Roman supply bases and outposts. Caesarreceived the alarming news at Ravenna and immediately grasped the seriousness ofhis plight. His legions were in winter camp far to the north. He was in CisalpineGaul, separated from his men by snowbound Alps and rebel tribes, and accom-panied only by a bodyguard of cavalry and two untrained legions recruited in ahurry. There was only one thing to do: attack! He thus marched straight forArvernian territory. His men accomplished the herculean feat of digging throughthe deep snows of the Cevennes Mountains, which ordinarily made them impass-able at this time of year, and so appeared unexpectedly and terrifyingly in the midstof the rebels. Caesar’s cavalry was sent far and wide to spread fire and mayhem, andthereby announce his arrival.The boldness of this march was extreme, and so toounder the circumstances was its speed. In fact, the whole episode shows brilliantlythe audacia (‘boldness’) and celeritas (‘speed’) that were defining traits of Caesar’sgeneralship.Vercingetorix was camped around 100 miles to the north with his mainarmy.He moved quickly to the rescue of his homeland, but did not realize that theRoman action was a feint.After a couple of days Caesar set out eastwards and thenquickly northwards towards the Seine River, confusing the Gauls and collectingpockets of Roman soldiers along the way. He did not want a confrontation untilhe could concentrate his forces. Finally, he reached Agedincum in the territory ofthe Senones, where Labienus and the rest of his legions subsequently joined him.His men were exhilarated by his presence among them.

The Romans, however, were by no means in control. Supplies were a particularproblem. Vercingetorix persuaded his allies, against their natural inclinations, toadopt a guerrilla strategy. He hoped to exhaust the legionaries by attacking supplytrains, harassing foragers, striking small detachments of soldiers, hitting at night, andeven burning Gallic fields. Caesar was under great pressure. His one hope lay incapturing the fortress of Avaricum, where supplies for the Gallic army had beentransported.Vercingetorix could not quite convince his allies to destroy the fortress,which was the capital of the Bituriges.This failure proved disastrous.The ill-fatedsiege that followed gave notice of things to come. The Romans were facing afortress surrounded by a sophisticated type of stone wall, which Caesar describes asbeing constructed around a frame of timbers that were fastened together with nails.The comparative flexibility of the timbers allowed them to absorb the shock oframs and missiles. Caesar responded by building great siege works – a broad terraceand two ramps – against the massive, heavily defended wall.Then his legionariesrolled two assault towers up the ramps and fought their way across the wall. Most


of the construction was done under hastily built sheds erected to protect thesoldiers from the barrage of arrows, javelins, stones, logs, and firebrands hurled bythe defenders.Avaricum was taken.

Although the immediate supply problem had been solved, Vercingetorixremained at large, and his army grew by the day. Caesar divided his forces, sendingfour legions north under Labienus with orders to attack the Senones and Parisii.Caesar himself led four legions south into lands of the Arverni. Both expeditionsultimately failed, with Labienus managing to extricate himself from impendingdisaster on the River Seine, and Caesar suffering a serious defeat at the fortress ofGergovia. According to Caesar’s account, which is less than convincing, his mengave in to their most reckless urges, and charged an apparent weak spot withoutorders. The resulting losses were devastating: 46 centurions fell, along with 700legionaries.The number of centurions in particular indicates a huge loss of tacticalexperience and command capability. Caesar had no choice but to lift the siege ofGergovia ignominiously. By epic forced marches and the crossing of deep rivers, hemanaged to link up with Labienus and return to Agedincum. Nearly all of Gaulnow joined the revolt. Even the Aedui, who had been Roman allies for years,joined the rebels.This was a massive blow, for tribesmen of the Aedui had formedthe best part of Caesar’s cavalry. Undaunted, he enlisted a contingent of Germancavalry for the toughest episode of the entire campaign.

The siege of Alesia (52 BCE)

The marvelous outcome of Gergovia inspiredVercingetorix to risk a pitched battlein the neighborhood of Dijon.A heavy defeat followed, and it was now the Gauls’turn to flee the field.With the Romans hard on their heels,Vercingetorix and hismen sought refuge in the hill fortress of Alesia, a town of the Mandubii, who wereclients of the Aedui.This was to be the site of the decisive duel between the twosides, the most critical confrontation of the entire conquest. Caesar began to placethe town under siege. Gallic cavalry escaped before the fortress could be com-pletely ringed, so Caesar knew that a relief army would eventually arrive. His men,around 50,000 in total, would be heavily outnumbered.There were approximately80,000 Gauls in Alesia.The relief army, when it finally appeared, numbered around240,000 men from all over Gaul. The siege works, therefore, had to withstandassault from within and without. Nothing was left to chance: an unexpectedconstruction, the bi-circumvallation, a double ring of earthworks topped bywatchtowers and palisades, appeared gradually before the eyes of the horrifiedGauls in Alesia.The inner ring covered a distance of 17 kilometers (10.6 miles); theouter ring, which would confront the relief army, measured 22 kilometers (13.75miles).The legionaries added lines of trenches and even diverted a nearby river inorder to construct a moat around the beleaguered defenders.The ground beforeAlesia was sown with a fiendish array of hazards, covered by brush and othercamouflage.There were rows of buried logs from which iron barbs protruded, sharpstakes in sunken pits, and thickets with branches sharpened at differing angles.


Attackers who escaped these hazards still had to cross the moat, scale the steep wall,and survive the barrage of missiles rained down constantly upon them from thetowers placed at equal intervals around the fortifications.

The size of the relief army must have shocked the Romans, who were soonattacked in the rear as they simultaneously tried to withstand frontal assaults fromAlesia itself.Warriors on both sides fought with incredible bravery.Masses of Gaulsthrew themselves against the siege works, only to be driven back or stopped by thehideous spikes and barbs that had been positioned strategically by the Romanengineers. Gallic warriors were forced to climb over the bodies of friends andcomrades who had become impaled, often exacerbating their dying agonies.Timeand again the Gauls launched themselves at the Romans; time and again they werethrown back. A breaking point was reached when relieving Gauls discovered aweakness in the line of Roman fortifications, at a point where rough terrain andone of the rivers of the area prevented absolute continuity in the outer wall.Vercingetorix saw his opportunity and attacked that part of the inner wall whichwas adjacent to the break in the outer wall.The fortifications were in great dangerof collapsing. Here was the climactic moment. Caesar ordered Labienus to supportthe outer breach with his cavalry, while Caesar himself repelled the latest attackfrom within. As he began to gain the upper hand, he realized that Labienus’ menwere on the verge of exhaustion.The answer, as usual, had to be attack, and it wasdone as conspicuously as possible, so that his men could see him and redouble theirefforts in response.Thus it happened, and there is little reason for doubt. Caesar,with his scarlet paludamentum (general’s cloak) flying and insignia plainly in view,led a charge of 13 cavalry cohorts, about 6,000 men, against a Gallic force almostten times their number (GallicWar 7.88).The sheer audacity stunned all those whosaw it, but it inspired the Romans and deflated the Gauls, who were sooncompelled to withdraw.The survivors of the relief army could not maintain them-selves in the field for long, especially given the massive loss of life, the numerouswounds, and the level of Roman resistance. They soon melted away. Romancourage, discipline, and morale, the special spirit forged and maintained by theoutstanding qualities of Caesar, had won the day.When those within Alesia wit-nessed the loss of their great opportunity for victory, all hope faded.Vercingetorixsurrendered with dignity, but his treatment was appalling. He was kept alive forabout six years as a prisoner until 46 BCE, when he was paraded through the streetsof Rome in Caesar’s triumph, and then executed perfunctorily.

Roman vengeance was cruel and inexorable.The final vestiges of forces fromthe Great Revolt were annihilated, and any signs of insolence were crushedthoroughly. Huge numbers were executed or enslaved.The last noteworthy con-frontation occurred at Uxellodunum, a fortress of the Cadurci,which fell in 51 BCE

after Caesar’s troops diverted a spring that supplied it with water. Caesar cut off thehands of all those who had carried weapons – ‘the penalty of evildoers’ (GallicWar8.44). Subsequently, he showed favor to the Aedui and the Arverni, thereby gainingtheir support in holding down the country.


A modern assessment of Caesar’s conquest of Gaul

By 50 BCE Caesar was the undisputed ruler of all Gaul.Victory had come at last.The consequences were truly world-changing. For a start, Caesar now had amagnificent army and more than enough gloria for a stupendous triumph. He alsogained treasure in vast quantities and used it to fund brilliant constructions inRome and Italian cities. Eminent men were bought as freely as goods. Bribes andloans sometimes differed in name only.Young nobles flocked to him to make theirfortunes. Provincial leaders and client princes were rewarded for their support. Bycontrast, the state treasury received none of the profits. In his triumphs of 46 BCE

he displayed 63,000 talents of silver and spent a further 20,000 talents of his ownmoney on making the processions as memorable as possible. The ‘talent’ was afabulous measure, notoriously difficult to define in modern terms because it some-times referred to weight and sometimes to value, though it was perhaps around 30kilogrammes (66 lbs) in weight. Much of this money came to Caesar as plunderfrom Gaul.

Estimates are very hard to come by, but the conquest of Gaul was accomplishedby Caesar at a surprisingly low cost in men. The exceedingly brave, though ill-disciplined and disunited Gauls were no match for Roman legions organized andtrained in accordance with Marius’ reforms and led by a general as charismatic asCaesar. Loss of life among the Gauls was prodigious, and so too were the numberstransported and sold as slaves. Plutarch (Life of Caesar 15), on the basis of figuresbroadcast at Caesar’s Gallic triumph, reports that a million Gauls were killed andanother million were enslaved. This seems exaggerated, based on the commonperception of the time that barbarians should be numbered in hordes, but even sothe loss of life must have been massive. It may be true that one-third of thepopulation of Gaul was killed and another third enslaved. Land devastation, puni-tive levies of various types, and forced requisitions of food and other suppliescombined to create a human, economic, and ecological disaster perhaps unequalledbefore the conquest of the Americas.When Caesar finally set the level of tributefor Gaul it was remarkably light, but it had to be. Gaul had neither the men northe money to pay more.

Roman government and taxation replaced the Celtic institutions and customsof the previous generation. Scullard (1982, 133–4) is inclined to think that the lossof self-determination to Rome was offset by the fact that most inhabitants of CelticGaul lived in a state of serfdom, so that ‘freedom’ in fact meant little to them.Thisis surely an opinion too friendly to Roman conquest, though it does underline thecrucial fact that Gaul became a part of the classical world, and duly passed thisinheritance on to modern France.

As for Caesar’s personal contribution to the victory, there are reasons to resistthe conclusion that he was a military genius on the strength of his achievements inGaul. He made no dramatic reforms in either the organization or the fighting styleof his legions. His strategy was reasonably conventional, based on boldness, speed,and attack, with the intention of striking fear deep into the hearts of his enemies


and causing disarray.The construction feats of his men, likewise, may be glimpsedin earlier generations, particularly in the armies of Scipio Aemilianus, Marius, andSulla. Caesar had a lot of good fortune (as he himself admits). It has been said thathe could have made better use of his cavalry and was over-reliant on the courageof his infantry.Yet Caesar was a fine tactician, who deployed his forces brilliantlyon the field of battle and chose the right moment to strike with uncanny skill.Furthermore, he surpassed all others in leading from the front at crucial times, andin performing amazing feats of physical prowess (Rosenstein 2009, 94, 98). Inaddition, he was victorious against considerable odds. If victory against the odds isthe measure, he deserves credit.

Why was he victorious? Boldness and speed rather than genius seem the key.Decisions came quickly to Caesar’s mind and he seems rarely to have been hesitant.He attacked at every opportunity and aimed constantly to seize the initiative. Attimes this left him dreadfully open to counter-attack or ambush. Some movesappear quite foolhardy and even irrational. Much of his success can be explainedby Gallic disunity. A firm, united Gallic resistance could have prevailed. Caesaremployed the right mix of cruelty and diplomacy to secure his ends, though theimpression of cruelty in Gaul abides.The levels of massacre, enslavement, torture,and mutilation do much to explain Caesar’s success, though they are hardlyappealing to a modern commentator, and they do not speak of genius, military orotherwise. The Roman armies of this period possessed several advantages overGallic armies.Their discipline, training, and organization were superior, and so toowere their siege engines and siege tactics.The pilum, or javelin, in combination withthe short sword, was probably a better combination than the available Gallicweapons, especially the long and heavy swords that many Gallic soldiers used.Chain mail armor was available to both sides, though it was standard equipment forRome’s legionaries, whereas many Gauls could not afford it.The Gauls probablyhad superior cavalry, if only they had made better use of it.

Conclusion

Victory was crucial to Caesar’s aspirations, but it was by no means assured. Theresult might have gone the other way. We are compelled ultimately to look atCaesar’s personal qualities and relationship with his men. In these areas there wassomething special.The men from the PoValley absolutely adored him. His men ingeneral loved him, trusted him, and died for him. He created an incrediblepersonality cult and employed his personal charisma and the successes of thecampaign to build an extraordinary level of morale within his Gallic legions. If nota military genius, then there is personal genius in what was accomplished in Gaulbetween 58–51 BCE.

With the conquest of Gaul complete, Caesar could contemplate his return toRome.What would happen when he was due to lay down his imperium, in 50 or49 BCE?The optimates had vowed to prosecute him.Would Pompey support him orside with the optimates at the risk of civil war?


Recommended reading

Aside from Books 4–8 of his GallicWar, the best accounts of Caesar’s campaigns inGaul, Germany, and Britain in this period are those of Gelzer 1968, ch. 4;Wiseman1994b; Meier 1995, ch. 11; Garland 2003, ch. 5; Goldsworthy 2006, chs. 13–16;Kamm 2006, ch. 6;Tatum 2008, ch. 2; and Billows 2009 chs. vi–vii. For politics inRome, seeWiseman 1994b; and Ramsey 2009.Welch’s paper inWelch and Powell1998, 85–110, analyzes Caesar’s treatment of his legates in the GallicWar.

Assessments of Caesar’s generalship in Gaul are many and varied. Fuller 1965 is anaccount written by a renowned military theorist and advocate of mechanizedwarfare.An expert in tank deployment, Fuller thought that Caesar could have madebetter use of his cavalry, though of course Roman concentration on the legions wasas much traditional as it was tactical.Two reliable treatments by ancient historiansare those of Gilliver 2002; and Goldsworthy 2006, chs. 13–16. Rosenstein 2009 isan excellent, up-to-date discussion of Caesar’s strengths as a general. It emphasizesthe foundations laid by Marius and Sulla – especially in organization, discipline, andconstruction – but also gives due credit to the unique tactical brilliance and inspira-tional skills provided by Caesar himself.



8DIGNITAS

Pompey, Caesar and relative rank, 52–49 BCE

Dignitas

Dignitas was a highly personal concept at Rome. It referred to a man’s relative rankin society, i.e. his place on the social ladder in relation to his peers.As mentioned inChapter 2, this concept was one of the most cherished ideas for assessing a Romannoble’s importance. He had a duty to attempt to surpass both his ancestors and hiscontemporaries. In effect, all Roman nobles were striving for pre-eminence, whichmeant striving to become number one in Roman society.The highly personal andhierarchical nature of power in ancient Rome should be borne in mind throughoutthis chapter because state power and individual power were sometimes not easy todistinguish in so far as governors and generals were concerned. In comparison tomodern ideas about humility,Romans felt little reticence about self-assertion or self-aggrandizement. Caesar said at different times that he started the civil war againstPompey for a number of reasons: because the res publica (‘public business’ or ‘com-monwealth’) was being oppressed by a tyrannical faction (the optimates), because theplebeian tribunes Antony and Cassius had appealed to him for help, and because hisdignitas had been impugned constantly, in spite of his undeniably magnificentachievements.The optimates, in other words, aside from oppressing the state, simplywould not grant the respect owed to his achievements. They were refusing, inCaesar’s view, to compromise for the sake of consensus, as Romans had traditionallydone, and permit his return to Rome at the appropriate level of pre-eminence.Theyhad a personal grudge against Caesar,which entitled him to emphasize the attack onhis dignitas.The extraordinary point in comparison to modern ideas is that Caesarclearly expected his personal damage to resonate with his contemporaries as areasonable justification for launching his legions into Italy in January 49 BCE.

Ernst Badian wrote in the Oxford Classical Dictionary, one of the most heavilyused reference works for students of ancient history, that it was in Gaul that Caesar

acquired the taste and the resources for monarchy (OCD 3 1996, 781). Certainly, itwas in Gaul that he forged the legions that could ‘storm the heavens’, as one of hisfollowers put it ([Caesar],SpanishWar 42.7), and the experience must have lifted (notmerely confirmed) his conception of his own worth.The view that he ‘acquired thetaste’ for monarchy, however, should be questioned. It represents a slight modifi-cation of the view found in ancient sources that Caesar sought monarchy all his life,it implies that he did not see a future for politics along traditional lines, and it alsotends to mean that he must have been bargaining in bad faith when proposingcompromises and seeking ways to return to Rome that were based on the magnif-icence of his achievements.The main aim of this chapter, then, is to assess the reasonswhy the relationship between Pompey and Caesar degenerated into civil war. Inparticular, the motives of Caesar will be examined. It remains most likely that he didnot invade Italy as a result of some long-maturing plan or even of some morerecently acquired taste for monarchy. Instead, the particular developments of thetime, in their political and cultural contexts, require examination.When this is done,it becomes obvious that the optimates must bear a significant amount of the blame.A game of brinkmanship seems to have gone further than either Caesar or Pompeycontemplated because of optimate intransigence.

Caesar’s motives

The most famous assessment of Caesar’s motives for starting the civil war isprobably that of Suetonius, which concludes with an important direct quote fromCaesar (Life of the Divine Julius 30.1–4, Dillon and Garland 13.28):

But when the senate would not interfere and his enemies declared that theywould come to no compromise over matters affecting the state, he crossedinto Cisalpine Gaul, held the assizes, and stopped at Ravenna, intending toresort to war should the senate take more serious action against the tribunesof the plebs who used their vetoes on his behalf.This was his excuse for civilwar, but it is thought that he had other reasons.Gnaeus Pompey used to statethat, because Caesar’s private wealth was not sufficient to finish the works hehad undertaken, or to fulfill on his return the expectations he had raised inthe populace, he wanted general mayhem and anarchy.Others say that he wasafraid of being called to account for what he had done in his first consulshipcontrary to the auspices, laws, and vetoes, for Marcus Cato habitually pro-claimed, and on oath, that he would prosecute Caesar the instant hedismissed his army. It was also publicly said that, if he returned as a privatecitizen, he would have to defend his case before jurors surrounded by armedmen, as Milo did. Asinius Pollio renders this more probable, when he statesthat Caesar at Pharsalus looked on his enemies as they lay dead on thebattlefield or fled, with these actual words, ‘They wanted it like this; with allmy great achievements, I Gaius Caesar would have been condemned, if I hadnot looked to my army for help’.

110 Pompey, Caesar and relative rank, 52–49 BCE

Pollio served with Caesar, so there is little reason to doubt that Caesar blamed theoptimates and emphasized their legal threats in the aftermath of the Battle ofPharsalus in 48 BCE.This, in turn, has given rise to a great deal of scholarship aboutthe precise laws which may have been broken during his consulship and procon-sulship, and about the fundamental fear of prosecution that is supposed to havegripped Caesar. Modern writers, taking their cue from Suetonius, conventionallyargue that Caesar wanted to pass directly from his Gallic proconsulship to a secondconsulship at Rome because then he would retain imperium throughout the processand so be immune from prosecution.Two points might, however, be made. First,the threats of legal prosecution were partly intended as attacks on Caesar’s dignitas.Second, there is no guarantee that Caesar would have been convicted. Caesar wasa highly energetic political operator, well connected at this time among the upperclasses, very popular among the Roman people, an accomplished orator, and theleader of an extremely powerful army, whose soldiers would not take kindly toprosecution of their general, especially if soldiers of Pompey were ordered tosurround the law court to prevent disruption, as happened during Milo’s trial in 52BCE (see below), where conviction was vital to Pompey’s interests. Caesar’s soldiers,at the end of their campaign, needed their general to secure land and other rewardsfor them. Caesar might even have hoped that Pompey and Cicero, among others,would speak for him.The ‘fear of prosecution’ theme has probably been overplayed.It would have suited Caesar, for instance, to blame the optimates in disgust afterPharsalus, portraying himself as the victim, rather than admitting personal respon-sibility for the scene of death before his eyes. It is important, then, to look furtherat dignitas and at Caesar’s attempts to secure a glorious return to Rome at the endof his governorship – a return in keeping with what he took to be the scale of hisachievements and the relative rank to which they entitled him.

In Book 1 of his civil war commentaries, the Commentarii de Bello Civili (Com-mentaries on the CivilWar) or simply Bellum Civile (CivilWar), Caesar emphasized hisdignitas repeatedly. Pompey, says Caesar, did not want anyone to equal him indignitas (CivilWar 1.4).When Caesar addressed the men of the Thirteenth legion,he appealed to them to defend his dignitas (1.7), which was dearer to him than lifeitself (1.9). Later, he claimed that he had left his province to defend himself fromthe slanders of his enemies, to restore to their rightful position the tribunes of theplebs who had been expelled from the state on his behalf, and to reclaim for himselfand the Roman people freedom (libertas) from the domination of a small faction(factio) (1.22). Some years later, in 46 BCE, Cicero addressed Caesar with the wordsthat ‘your army fought to preserve its own rights and your dignitas’ (On Behalf ofLigarius 18).The first point to make about dignitas is that it was a relative rather thanan absolute concept. It was an aristocratic notion, which implied competition withone’s peers. It was highly personal, but also traditional. It is not the kind of qualitywhich comes to mind for a monarch, who has no peers. It hardly implies theelimination of other aristocratic competitors, nor does it imply the unimportanceof the Roman people or the res publica because it derives its significance from thesame ancestral tradition that underlies their importance.Admittedly, Caesar’s power

Pompey, Caesar and relative rank, 52–49 BCE 111

in Gaul was something like that of a king in his domain, not forgetting thesovereignty of the Roman people and the influence of the senate. Does this mean,however, that he could not have been prepared to give up this power and return tolife among his noble peers, to a position rivaling that of Pompey the Great, perhapswith the prospect of further great commands?

It seems possible to read the evidence as though Caesar was aiming neither atmonarchy nor at civil war. Pompey (the Great) was, it should be remembered, boththe governor of Spain and the conqueror of the East. He was owed loyaltythroughout the Mediterranean, including Italy. At one point he said that he onlyneeded to stamp his foot and legions would spring forth from the soil of Italy tohis side (Plutarch, Life of Pompey 57.5; Life of Caesar 33.5). Pompey and Romanlegionaries would be very different opponents from the Gauls.When examininghow the civil war broke out, it should be asked what both sides wanted, and thenwho refused to compromise.When this is done, it emerges that Caesar wanted aglorious return, including a triumph and a second consulship, in keeping with hisposition as victor over the Gauls, the Germans, and the Britons – victories forwhich the senate and people had voted unprecedented thanksgivings. His state-ment at Pharsalus implies that his enemies forced him into civil war, although hehad shown himself willing to compromise and willing to remain on a par withPompey, as had been the case after Luca.The optimates were the ones who refusedto compromise.They wanted Caesar’s humiliation, nothing less. It is less easy to pindown Pompey’s position during the negotiations of 52–49 BCE, but he intended itthis way, for he was playing both sides off against the middle, always trying tomaintain his pre-eminence. In the game of brinkmanship that ensued, Pompey’sduplicity surely added to the insecurities on both sides, with disastrous results. Inthe end, jealous of Caesar’s spectacular successes, he was not prepared to accept theyounger man as an equal. He was not working for war as such but for being firstin dignitas whether Caesar or the optimates came out on top. Thus he was moreprepared than the optimates to compromise, and did not reject Caesar until he feltthat it was his superior ranking that had become the primary concern. Perhapswithout the optimates Caesar might have talked him round.

Pompey’s sole Consulship (52 BCE)

The origins of the civil war are normally traced back to the year 52 BCE. FollowingCrassus’ death in 53 BCE, there were now two leading men at Rome, and the twowere no longer related by marriage. Pompey, in fact, declined a new marriagealliance with Caesar, and in 52 BCE he married the daughter (Cornelia) of thenoble who could boast the most impressive name in Rome: Quintus CaeciliusMetellus Pius Scipio, heir to the legacies of two of Rome’s greatest noble houses,the Metelli and the Scipios. It is often written that this marriage signaled a movecloser to the optimates on Pompey’s part. There is some truth in this, given thatMetellus Scipio opposed Caesar strongly in the next few years, and in doing sooften co-operated with the likes of Cato and Bibulus. Yet Scipio was an


independent operator too, and he took seriously the names and responsibilities hehad inherited. Pompey would have been attracted to the unequaled social pre-eminence of the Metelli and the Scipios. His family members might havesupported the match primarily in these terms. Nonetheless, the dynamics betweenCaesar and Pompey began to change in a potentially dangerous way. In order toachieve a glorious return, Caesar knew that much depended upon the attitude ofPompey. Some scholars have traced the breakdown in the relationship betweenPompey and Caesar to 52 BCE. Certainly there were new and ongoing pressuresfrom this time, and insecurities must have played their part, exacerbated by thedistance between the two men.Yet without denying that 52 BCE was a pivotal yearin their relationship, it seems better to support Erich Gruen’s view (1974, ch. xi)that the two men maintained their co-operation until fairly late in 50 BCE.

Gang violence had grown so great that once again the year opened withoutconsuls, for the elections had been persistently disrupted. Clodius was one of thecandidates for the praetorship, and his followers were determined to secure hiselection. His major rival as a gang leader at this time was Titus Annius Milo, theformer tribune of 57 BCE who had helped to secure Cicero’s recall from exile. On18 January Milo’s men encountered Clodius outside Rome and killed him. Inresponse, Clodius’ men carried his body into the Forum and stirred the mob intoa fury with claims that senatorial conservatives had once again slain a leader of thepeople. The body was then cremated, and whether by design or accident thesenate-house burnt down in the ensuing conflagration.The angry mob ran amok.Anarchy prevailed in the streets of Rome. Rioting and looting were everywhere.Houses were stormed, the inhabitants attacked, and fires were started in variousdistricts.There was no arm of the government available to restore order.Rome hadno police force along modern lines.The praetors had men available to them, butthese men were not numerous or strong enough to take on the gangs.They werecertainly not like the Praetorian Guard of imperial times. Under normal circum-stances, much wrongdoing was kept in check and punished by those who wereresponsible for different regions as patrons.

The senate passed its ultimate decree, the senatus consultum ultimum, and naturallyplaced Pompey, as proconsul, in charge of troops who were levied specially for thepurpose of quelling the lawlessness.The city was soon brought to order. Bibulusnow proceeded to propose a bill, which Cato supported, that Pompey shouldbecome sole consul.This was an unprecedented contradiction in terms if ever therewas one! The point about having consuls, of course, was that there were to be twoof them each year, so that one could act as a check against any excesses by the other.This collegiality, coupled with limited tenure of office (one year), was designed toguard against the specter of one-man rule.There were to be no kings at Rome.Theproposal of such a measure by optimates like Bibulus and Cato makes it absolutelyclear that their conservatism was susceptible to expediency and that the senate waseffectively powerless to deal with the gang violence. It is also clear that the extraor-dinary creation of a sole consul involved a calculated rejection of the one office thathad been designed specifically to deal with emergencies, whether military or civil


in nature.This office, obviously, was the dictatorship. It looks as though the senate,mindful of the precedent set by Sulla as dictator, wanted to avoid the hateddictatorship at all costs. Perhaps it was thought that consuls consulted, whereasdictators dictated.Thus even a sole consulship might have seemed more palatable,though in reality there was no difference in the power wielded by the magistrateconcerned (Plutarch, Life of Pompey 54. 5–6, Dillon and Garland 13.4):

When, later on, Rome was again without consuls and more people nowbrought up more vigorously the question of a dictatorship,Cato and his partywere afraid that they would be forced to give way and so decided to letPompey have some sort of legal magistracy to prevent his holding theabsolute authority of a dictatorship. In fact Bibulus, Pompey’s enemy,was thefirst to propose in the senate that Pompey should be elected sole consul,arguing that in this way Rome would either be saved from its current chaosor at least be enslaved to its best citizen.

After restoring order, Pompey’s first task was to punish the instigators of the rioting.A nervous quiet, protected by Pompey’s troops, descended upon the city.Milo hadto be convicted of Clodius’ murder, for everyone knew that he was guilty and thiswas the act that had lit the fuse. Cicero tried to defend his friend, but Pompey letit be known that he would stand for nothing short of Milo’s conviction. For once,Cicero delivered an ineffective speech in a court ringed menacingly by Pompey’stroops.Milo was exiled to Massilia (Marseilles). Cicero later sent him a revised andfar more persuasive version of the speech delivered at his trial.The orator hoped,in his normal way, for an appreciative comment on this version, which survivestoday as the Pro Milone (On Behalf of Milo). Milo faked happiness that Cicero hadnot in fact delivered the revised version at his trial: for in that event he might notnow be enjoying the delicious red mullets of Massilia (Cassius Dio,Roman History40.54.3)! Cicero’s humiliation was complete.

Pompey next carried a series of laws on violence, bribery, and the rulesgoverning magistracies. He showed that he was mindful of how Caesar mightinterpret his new office. It was arranged that the entire college of ten tribunes ofthe plebs, including Cicero’s maverick friend Caelius, should support a bill thatpermitted Caesar to stand for his second consulship in absentia, i.e. he could standfor the office while absent from Rome. Pompey’s diplomatic and coercive powerswere decisive in achieving this extraordinary result, and of course the Romanpeople voted the measure into law. Caesar must have been pleased to hear aboutthis conspicuous display of concord on the part of the plebeian tribunes and thepeople of Rome. The measure is often described in terms of protection for achampion of the people, who was in fear of prosecution. Indeed, it must now haveseemed possible for Caesar to retain his imperium, and thus immunity fromprosecution, throughout the election period. If he had been forced to return to thecity to announce his candidature in person, he would have had to lay down hisimperium at the pomerium.As a privatus (‘private citizen’) he would then have been


vulnerable to legal charges. This way, he might hold his imperium as proconsulduring the elections, and then swap it for consular imperium when elected consul,probably for 48 BCE, though there was no certainty at this stage about when Caesarwould contest the consular elections.There may, however, be other ways to look atthe ‘law of the ten tribunes’, as it is usually called. For a start, it meant that Caesarcould not be put in the position he had been in when he returned from hispropraetorship in Spain. On that occasion he had been forced to choose betweena triumph already voted to him and the consulship. Second, the law might havebeen meant as compensation for the extended provincial command which wouldsoon follow Pompey’s consulship (see below), since at this time Caesar wanted tobecome consul rather than have his provincial command extended again. Finally, interms of dignitas, rather than protection or fear, it was a clear honor for Caesar, acheck for those who were threatening legal action against him when he became aprivate citizen, and an indication that the Roman people were strongly of the viewthat such action was not in the best interests of the state. This should haveundermined the potency of the threats that had already been made.

Among Pompey’s laws governing magistracies, however, was a law that requiredthose standing for office to announce their candidature in person at Rome.Whatdid this mean for the ‘law of the ten tribunes’, which permitted Caesar to stand forhis consulship in absentia?When the possible contradiction was pointed out to him,Pompey added a note to the law in his own hand-writing that emphasized Caesar’sspecific exemption. Strictly speaking, this was an exercise of personal auctoritasrather than a legally enforceable provision, so a degree of uncertainty remained,even though Pompey was apparently operating in good faith.A second law dictatedthat there had to be a five-year gap between serving as a magistrate and as a pro-magistrate.This allowed plenty of time for the prosecution of a corrupt magistrate.The aim was to break the link between electoral bribery and provincial corruption.Once again, of course, the law could have implied a limitation on Caesar, as thoughhe might not have received a new imperium immediately following his secondconsulship. Yet these laws and dispensations were designed to restore order inRome, not to injure Caesar. In fact, Caesar wrote approvingly of Pompey’smeasures in 52 BCE (GallicWar 7.6, Loeb trans.: ‘[they brought] affairs in Rome …into a more satisfactory state’), and he planned to use friendly tribunes to veto anyoptimate attempts to recall him before he could stand for his second consulship.Nevertheless, the balance of power between the two men was altered when thesenate decreed that Pompey’s imperium in Spain should be prolonged for five yearsafter his consulship.This meant that Pompey’s imperium would expire some threeyears after the expiration of Caesar’s in 49 BCE. It was a disturbing development, instark contrast to the parity principle that operated at Luca, but Caesar probablythought it was inevitable and that his second consulship would create newopportunities in any case.

When matters were finally settled to his satisfaction, Pompey sponsored hisfather-in-law Metellus Scipio as his consular colleague for the remainder of theyear, simultaneously displaying respect for traditional constitutional norms but


showing too that in practice he was in charge. The optimates had reason to bepleased with him.There were reasons for Caesar to be both pleased and concerned.It is going too far to say that the relationship between Pompey and Caesar brokedown in 52 BCE.Appian emphasizes Pompey’s enhanced standing in the followingyears (CivilWars 2.95, Dillon and Garland 13.6):

Pompey, as if he had corrected all the problems which had necessitated one-man rule,made Scipio his consular colleague for the rest of the year.But evenafter this, when others had been appointed to the office, Pompey none theless remained the overseer and ruler and main power in Rome; for hepossessed the senate’s goodwill, particularly due to their jealousy of Caesar,who had not consulted them at all during his consulship, and becausePompey had swiftly helped the state recover from its illness and not annoyedor offended any of them during his magistracy.

Caesar’s standing in the senate was higher than Appian allows: when news of thegreat victory at Alesia reached Rome, the senate voted a third public thanksgivingin Caesar’s honor – once again of twenty days.

The consulship of Marcus Claudius Marcellus (51 BCE)

Caesar poured money into Rome in support of his hopes for a glorious return.Much of this money came from plundered Gallic shrines and proceeds of the saleof captives as slaves. His Julian Forum was beginning to take shape, and he helpedconsiderably with the building of other prominent monuments around the city.Numerous nobles were grateful for contributions. Caesar gave Lucius AemiliusPaullus the huge sum of 1,500 talents (9 million denarii) to complete the BasilicaAemilia in the Forum. Cicero, too, received a hefty loan. Caesar was investing inhis future.

Some scholars think that the first seven books of the GallicWar were publishedas a unit in 51 BCE to highlight the essential end of the war. It seems better to agreewith Peter Wiseman (1998, 1–9) that serial publication had been occurring.Certainly Book 7 would have appealed greatly to the voters of Rome and Italy,with its emphasis on the ‘majesty of the Roman people’, and its many tales of hero-ism and exciting maneuvers. Caesar is the ultimate hero at the climactic momentof the Battle of Alesia, and his greatest support comes from Labienus, who wasperhaps being groomed to become his colleague as consul. The Gallic War is ahighly polished product of the competition for dignitas, which underlies much ofCaesar’s intellectual activity.

The consuls of 51 BCE were Marcus Claudius Marcellus, who hated Caesar, andServius Sulpicius Rufus, a political moderate and legal expert.Marcellus tried hardto have Caesar recalled, but Pompey and others resisted him. He proved a doggedopponent, however, and kept the Caesarians on edge throughout his consulship.His provocation extended as far as the flogging of a city councilor from


Transpadane Gaul, north of the Po River, a man from the colony founded byCaesar at Novum Comum (Como). Since it was illegal to flog a Roman citizen,this act denied that the man could have been a citizen as a result of Caesar’s reformsin the region since 59 BCE. It was a denial of the legality of Caesar’s work and acalculated insult to all involved.Appian emphasizes the level of the insult (CivilWars2.98, Dillon and Garland 13.9):

Caesar founded the town of Novum Comum at the foot of the Alps andgranted it Latin rights, one of which was that whoever held the magistracieseach year should become Roman citizens; for this is a condition of Latinstatus. Marcellus had one of the men of Novum Comum, who had been amagistrate and who was accordingly considered a Roman, beaten with rodsfor some reason, in defiance of Caesar, something which does not happen toRomans. Marcellus in his anger revealed his true purpose that the blowsshould be the mark of the alien – he instructed the man to carry them toCaesar and show them to him.

The optimates maintained the pressure with varying success afterwards. Both Caesarand Pompey were in their sights: the former to undermine his plans for the mostglorious return possible; the latter to pry him away from Caesar by working on hisvanity and latent paranoia. Cato, it should be noted, failed to gain election to theconsulship for 51 BCE and accepted the result with resignation.He said that the willof the Roman people had been expressed, and he would not contest the officeagain – a very popularis thing to say, and deliberately calculated to advertise hisrespect for popular sovereignty.Cicero was away from Rome during the 18 monthspreceding the outbreak of the civil war in January 49 BCE because Pompey’s law of52 BCE that required the five-year gap between serving as a magistrate and as a pro-magistrate also dictated that ex-consuls should serve in the provinces if they hadnot yet done so. Cicero was thus compelled to become the governor of Cilicia, acommission that lasted from July 51 to July 50 BCE. He was a just governor, whobehaved well in face of the serious threat from Parthia, but he regarded hisappointment with horror as a second relegation from Rome.

Pompey spent much of 51 BCE journeying around Italy, inspecting troops andsupervising facilities related to Rome’s grain supply.This proved an effective checkon Marcellus’ desire to debate the end of Caesar’s governorship, for Pompey’spresence was obviously necessary for any kind of meaningful outcome. Finally, ameeting of the senate was held in September 51 BCE in the Temple of Apollo,outside the pomerium so that Pompey could attend.The senators decided againstany immediate moves but agreed that the consuls of 50 BCE should again presentthe matter for debate on 1 March. They might have been thinking that a newproconsul could be appointed to replace Caesar the following spring and thatCaesar could give up his command before the consular elections of the followingsummer (50 BCE). Pompey was asked what he would do if Caesar decided to standfor the consulship and keep his army. ‘What if my son should strike me with a


stick’? were the great man’s words in reply, as Caelius recorded them (Cicero,Lettersto his Friends 8.8.9).The idea, in other words, was unthinkable. Caesar would notdo this because he would not affront Pompey by doing so. On one level Pompeywas trying to reassure nervous members of the senate. On a second level hiscomment describes his relationship with Caesar in relative terms. He wascontinuing to think of himself as Caesar’s superior, like a father to a son.

The Tribunate of Gaius Scribonius Curio (50 BCE)

Clearly, Caesar wanted control over the conditions governing his return, given themagnitude of his achievements.The optimates wanted to upset Caesar’s control, forthey meant to limit his gloria and even to humiliate him if possible. They wereundoubtedly mindful of what had been achieved in the years following 62 BCE,when Pompey had laid down his command and dismissed his soldiers in deferenceto traditional norms. Caesar, too, as mentioned above, had been forced to forego atriumph in 60 BCE in order to stand for his consulship.Yet Caesar was plainly awareof these precedents. How would he prevent a repeat?

Caesar needed a strong advocate in the capital. Gaius Scribonius Curio was asurprising choice, though he turned out to be highly effective.Tribune of the plebsin 50 BCE, Curio was by this time married to Clodius’ widow Fulvia. He had beenan opponent of Caesar and the other triumvirs as long ago as 59 BCE, and manycontemporaries reasonably assumed that he would be a thorn in Caesar’s side.When it became obvious that he was actually working on behalf of the conquerorof Gaul, there was widespread shock. His indebtedness, however, was commonknowledge. A massive bribe had secured his support, though he retained politicalaims of his own as well.The consuls of 50 BCE were Gaius Claudius Marcellus, acousin of Caesar’s enemy from 51 BCE, and Lucius Aemilius Paullus, descendant ofone of the greatest patrician families and recipient of the huge gift mentionedabove in connection with the Basilica Aemilia. Paullus remained true to hisoptimate leanings, in spite of this outstanding favor, but he was content to allowMarcellus to take the lead against Caesar’s men.

On 1 March, although matters are not quite clear, it seems that the presidingconsul Paullus sought to open debate in the senate on a successor to Caesar butencountered Curio’s veto. Marcellus took up the cudgels as chair of the senateduring the following month.A decree was passed that Caesar should step down onor before 13 November, a date that under ordinary circumstances would see thelegions preparing to move into winter quarters.This was normally the beginningof a dormant period in military routine before fresh activity in the following spring.The senate, then, envisaged a new general for Caesar’s legions by the spring of 49BCE. Caesar made no move to respond but later said that his enemies had tried torob him of six months of imperium.When news arrived of an imminent Parthianattack on Syria, the senate asked Pompey and Caesar each to relinquish a legion forduty in the East. Pompey nominated the legion he had loaned previously to Caesar,so that the latter ended up losing two legions. Caesar made sure the men were


handsomely rewarded and praised before they left him. As events turned out, theParthian threat eased and these legions were not needed in the East. Accordingly,they remained in Italy.

A series of tense and angry exchanges took place after this. Marcellus roundedon Curio but could not induce him to withdraw his veto. Curio argued that thefocus on Caesar was misleading, because both Pompey and Caesar were potentialthreats to the res publica. During the summer, Pompey fell gravely ill while visitingCampania. The reaction of the Italian towns was absolutely supportive: withoutprompting, they joined in offering prayers and sacrifices to the gods for hisrecovery.When he regained his health, he felt profoundly encouraged that Italy wasbehind him.There must have been great fear in the air.Rumors were flying aroundirresponsibly. Some held that Caesar’s legions were disaffected after so many hardcampaigns.The idea seemed possible, even credible to those who were predisposedto believe it.The two legions that had come from Gaul were placed into camp inCampania and seemed ready to do Pompey’s bidding in spite of their previousservice.

The deadline of 13 November passed, the days dragging by in agonizing fashion.Cicero returned to Italy from his governorship of Cilicia on 24 November. Hefound a tense situation and was profoundly uncertain about giving his support toeither side. In the end, he told Atticus that he would support Pompey, but in hisheart he wanted peace above all. On 1 December Curio proposed that bothPompey and Caesar should lay down their imperium simultaneously. Curio had notspecified when the two generals should lay down their commands.That was nothis aim. On one level, Caesar was talking directly to Pompey. He was making theissue a personal matter between them. Pompey would have been well aware thatCaesar had theThirteenth legion with him in Cisalpine Gaul.The double-strengthFifth legion of 22 cohorts was not too far away inTransalpine Gaul. Pompey’s twolegions in Italy meant a rough parity. Caesar, however, probably began to mobilizeother legions, and Pompey’s sources of information in Caesar’s camp were verygood.The stakes were being raised to dangerous new highs.Who would crack first?

Curio’s bill implied that in Caesar’s view the two men were now equals indignitas, and so should lay down their commands simultaneously. Pompey wasaffronted.He did not see an attempt to compromise but a move to coerce him andundermine his pre-eminence. Nevertheless, Curio’s bill was carried overwhelm-ingly: 370 votes in favor, only 22 against.The 22 were the optimates. One of theaims of the bill was to demonstrate the small number of men who were unwillingto compromise at any price.The vote was also a signal to these reactionaries fromthe other senators that the time had come for compromise in traditional fashionfor the sake of peace.This did not imply support for Caesar’s bullying diplomacy,nor was it meant as criticism of Pompey. It was a plea for peace to both sides, andin many ways it represents the critical point of the conflict. Caesar had maneuveredhis enemies into a situation where they were being asked by their peers to desist.If they would do so, he would be satisfied. If they would not, he was in position tostrike. He had judged the mood in the senate correctly, and might have thought


that their peers would persuade his enemies. He was not, for instance, assertingsuperiority over Pompey.

There was no capitulation. Indeed, Marcellus responded furiously to thesenators, saying that they had voted Caesar to be their master. He, however, wouldnot wait for ten legions to march south against them.On the following day, on hispersonal authority as consul, he led the optimates to Pompey’s house outside thepomerium.There he asked Pompey to defend the res publica, to take command of allforces in Italy, including the two legions in Campania, and to raise all other forcesthat he considered necessary.This was Pompey’s moment. In his eyes, the state hadcalled upon him, though really it was not even a majority in the senate. Heaccepted the charge with a show of reluctance.

Negotiations continued, though in the wake of Pompey’s acceptance of com-mand their chances of success were small.Curio left Rome on 10 December,whenhis year of office formally expired, and made his way to Caesar at Ravenna.MarcusAntonius (Mark Antony) and Quintus Cassius Longinus, two of the new tribunes,took his place as advocates for Caesar.

The crossing of the Rubicon (11 January 49 BCE)

The consuls of 49 BCE were Lucius Cornelius Lentulus Crus and Gaius ClaudiusMarcellus. The latter was the brother of Marcus, the consul of 51 BCE who hadproven himself Caesar’s implacable enemy. The success of the three Marcelli inbecoming consuls from 51–49 BCE, in spite of the recent lack of prominence oftheir family, shows that the opponents of Caesar had pooled their resources andobsessively made him the primary object of their politics. Curio returned with aletter from Caesar. On 1 January 49 BCE it was read in the senate. After a longaccount of his achievements on behalf of the state, Caesar once again proposedjoint disarmament. This time the senators voted that he should lay down hiscommand or be declared a public enemy. Antony and Cassius duly vetoed thedecree.Caesar had come up with no additional compromise and Pompey’s decisionto accept the command against Caesar meant that preparations for war had begun.The senators were thus forced to choose sides.Their vote shows that they chosePompey, probably for having the better chance of victory as well as the betterattitude to them. It is worth emphasizing that most senators from this point eithersupported Pompey actively or chose to remain aloof from the conflict. In particular,almost no ex-consuls backed Caesar, whose senatorial followers were described byCicero and others as being either young or in trouble through debt or vice. Caesar,it seems, appealed to those who were dissatisfied for various reasons with thecurrent order of society.The optimates in particular were polarizing figures. Howcould ambitious Italian notables, struggling provincials in places like the PoValley,or poor, indebted Romans, especially the urban poor, expect anything from suchreactionary men? The behavior of optimate consuls from 51–49 BCE shows thekind of divisive government they favored.Caesar had been right that most senatorswanted peace. Perhaps he realized simultaneously that, if forced to decide, they


would choose Pompey over him. It really did not matter. It was about respect ratherthan popularity with the senators. It was about dignitas, and he trusted the prowessof his legions.

On 4 January Cicero supported a compromise suggestion that Caesar should bepermitted to keep Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum with two legions until his secondconsulship. Pompey was outwardly willing to consider such suggestions, whichcame to nothing through the efforts of the optimates.The threatening talk and blindintransigence of those who refused to compromise out of pride or jealousy ofCaesar’s success appalled Cicero. On 7 January, the senate passed the senatus con-sultum ultimum, calling on the consuls and proconsuls (effectively meaning Pompey)to ‘see to it that the state suffers no harm’. Given that preparations were already intrain, the senate decided to give its formal approval to the command of Pompey,which to this point rested on nothing more than consular authority and the angrypresumption of the optimates.Antony and Cassius were told that their safety couldnot be guaranteed if they remained in the city. In company with Curio, theypromptly fled to Caesar, disguised as slaves.

Pompey and the optimates probably thought that there would be no militaryaction before spring.They should have paid closer attention to Caesar’s emphasisin his war commentaries on daring, speed, and the unexpected.The civil war beganon 11 January 49 BCE when Caesar, accompanied by theThirteenth legion, crossedthe Rubicon River, which formed the border between his province of CisalpineGaul and Italy.Thus he signaled that he was in revolt and intended to march onRome. Suetonius (Life of the Divine Julius 33) says that while crossing the Rubiconhe uttered the words of one who had hurled dice into the air: iacta alea est (‘Thedie has been cast’!)

Conclusion

There was wrong on all sides.Caesar,who sought the most glorious return possible,was trying to dictate to his peers in a plainly threatening way, with his army at hisback. Pompey was posturing in support of institutions and customs that he aboveall others had flouted in his earlier career.The optimates pressed for confrontationrather than compromise.They were determined not to allow Caesar to dictate theterms of his return to Rome.Their attitude towards compromise seems to set themapart from the two generals. They refused to listen to their fellow senators, andthreatened tribunes of the plebs with bodily harm.Even so, the civil war owes muchto the personal pride of the two leading men. In the poet Lucan’s famous words(Pharsalia 1.125-6), ‘Caesar could brook no superior, Pompey no equal’. Caesarwanted recognition as Pompey’s equal in dignitas. Pompey wanted recognition asCaesar’s superior in dignitas. If Caesar had set aside his command and beenprosecuted, it is quite possible that Pompey would have stood up for him.Yet thiswould have demonstrated inferior dignitas on Caesar’s part.The civil war, therefore,was generated to a large degree by a difference of opinion over relative rank inRoman society.


Recommended reading

Scholarship on the outbreak of the civil war is rich and varied in opinion. Thetraditional view tends to emphasize the danger represented by optimate threats oflegal action against Caesar. Some scholars highlight the personal contest betweenPompey and Caesar.There are divergent views on whether these two men wantedcivil war or whether they were prepared to compromise well into 50 BCE, if onlythe optimates could have been removed from the picture. Gruen 1974, ch. xi, argueseloquently that the relationship between Pompey and Caesar did not break downuntil late in 50 BCE and that both men were hoping to avert civil war. Ehrhardt1995 is highly skeptical of the view that Caesar was worried about condemnationon charges connected with his behavior as consul in 59 BCE and as proconsul inGaul afterwards. Instead, Ehrhardt argues that Caesar launched the civil war at atime to suit him, when his legions were all within close reach of Italy.The readeris left to conclude that Caesar may not have been bargaining in good faith and thathe had decided upon civil war quite early in 50 BCE, long before the crossing ofthe Rubicon. Stanton 2003 offers a detailed reassertion of the traditional view thatCaesar considered the threats of legal action to be highly potent and likely to resultin his condemnation.

Among the many other learned treatments of the outbreak of the civil war, thefollowing may be recommended: Gelzer 1968, chs. 4–5;Wylie 1992; Hayne 1994;Wiseman 1994b;Meier 1995, chs. 11–12; Seager 2002, ch. xii; Garland 2003, ch. 6;Goldsworthy 2006, ch. 17; Kamm 2006, ch. 6;Tatum 2008, ch. 6; Billows 2009, ch.vii; and Ramsey 2009. Lintott 2008, chs. xv and xvi, demonstrates persuasively howfar, in the eyes of onlookers like Cicero and Caelius, the agenda was being con-trolled by Pompey, not Caesar.


9FORTUNA

Fortune and the civil war, 49–45 BCE

Fortuna

Roman generals were quick to take credit for military victories, but they were wellaware of the capricious operation of fortuna (‘good fortune’ or ‘luck’) too. In thelast century of the Republic, a succession of generals advertised close links withfortuna as both deity (Fortuna) and general phenomenon (fortuna). Some evenclaimed fortuna as a personal quality or attribute. Plutarch (Life of Caesar 38.4), forinstance, recounts an unlikely story that is set immediately after Caesar’s dangeroussea crossing in January 48 BCE from Brundisium in Italy to Dyrrachium in north-west Greece (see further below).According to Plutarch, Caesar decided to returnto Brundisium in a small boat, in order to hurry along his remaining legions, forthe advance force was not sufficiently numerous to confront Pompey. He wascompelled to turn back to Greece, however, when the small boat succumbed tohigh winds and rough seas and began taking on water. Caesar tried to reassure thehelmsman by telling him to be bold and unafraid, since he had ‘Caesar and Caesar’sfortune’ with him in the boat. The story trades on the idea that Caesar had areputation for good fortune. He could not always depend on it: he himself stressesthat the eventual defeat he suffered at Dyrrachium happened because of theunforeseeable operation of Fortuna (CivilWar 3.68).Yet it generally inclined in hisfavor, so that he could think of having a particular (good) fortune of his own.Thisseems to have been widely recognized. Lucan’s Caesar, for example, claims fortunaas his guiding principle (Pharsalia 1.226). On the other hand, Plutarch’s story hasboth positive and negative interpretive possibilities, since Caesar survives the stormbut fails in his mission. It is the kind of story that might have been used by bothsupporters and opponents. Indeed, Kathryn Welch (2008) has shown that theCaesarians and Pompeians competed vigorously over claims to divine assistance.These claims involved not just fortuna, but felicitas (‘divine blessing’ or ‘luck’) and

Venus as well (see Chapter 7 above onVenusVictrix).They show that the civil warwas not just a political and military struggle. It was fought and justified on anideological plain as well.The persuasive power of such claims under the circum-stances should not be underestimated. Given the extremely close contest, thiselement might have been just enough to shore up wavering morale or convincethe uncertain that one or the other side was worth supporting.

The basic aim of this chapter is to describe the campaigns of the civil warbetween the armies of Caesar and those of Pompey and the optimates.At a distance,Caesar put together an imposing string of military victories.A closer look, however,indicates that he was right to emphasize the operation of fortuna. In modern terms,he was very lucky on several occasions. He suffered defeats, and could certainlyhave been defeated overall. His ultimate victory was by no means inevitable or aforegone conclusion. In fact, the more the scale of his difficulties is emphasized, theless likely becomes the idea that he wanted the civil war.

In addition, an attempt will be made to suggest reasons for Caesar’s ultimatesuccess in the civil war, in particular his inspirational qualities, the extraordinarymorale of his troops, the impact made at crucial times by his veteran soldiers, anda number of shortcomings in the leadership of Pompey and the optimates. Caesarhad an extraordinary run of success, but the evidence also shows periodic failure,poor judgment, dissent in the ranks, disobedience in battle, and unwelcomemassacres of the enemy.Caesar was under great pressure all the way and his fortuneebbed and flowed.

Caesar’s descent on Italy (49 BCE)

Once Caesar crossed into Italy, he was the aggressor, descending upon Italy likeHannibal, but also (and worse!) following the hated example of Sulla. Panic spreadthroughout Italy. Sulla was known for his cruelty. He had brought fire and swordto his native land and had ordered proscriptions and confiscations.There was greatfear that Caesar too would see proscriptions as the way to remove his enemies andconfiscations as the way to acquire land for his soldiers. He was certainly capableof cruelty, as he showed at times in Gaul, but now he began to advertise a crucialpolicy of clementia (‘mercifulness’). Caesar wanted to make it clear that he had nointention of emulating Sulla.There would be no wholesale slaughter and no confis-cations. He would be merciful rather than cruel. He would be the exact oppositeof Sulla.The policy was wise, for many reasons. Caesar needed a peaceful Italy inorder to concentrate on his enemies elsewhere. Clementia gave him a significantadvantage over the optimates. Caesar’s message to the people of Rome and Italy wasthat if they did not join him, he would not automatically assume that they wereagainst him.The optimates had threatened to assume the very opposite.As a result,Italian sentiment inclined steadily towards Caesar. There could be no easyforgiveness for invading Italy, but clementia was a good start.The moderates and thepropertied classes, who wanted to stay out of the conflict in order to maintain theirestates and go about their business, were accommodated nicely.

124 Fortune and the civil war, 49–45 BCE

Caesar’s military strategy depended on the quick kill.He would try to decapitatehis foe by overwhelming Pompey in Italy and forcing a submission. Pompey wasalive to these plans and did the one thing that was not seriously expected: he aban-doned his native land to the Gallic legions. In terms of strategy, this was probablythe right thing to do, in view of the massive resources of men and money availableto Pompey throughout the Mediterranean. He would gather troops and suppliesfrom the many client kings and communities of the East who owed him allegiance.He would train these men in northern Greece and in time launch a sea-borneinvasion of Italy in concert with the legions he commanded as the governor ofSpain. Caesar would be trapped between Pompey’s eastern and western armies.Italy would be retaken from the sea and Pompey would be hailed as the savior ofhis country.

News of Pompey’s reluctance to stand against him came as a great blow toCaesar, who appreciated the danger immediately.The damage was compounded bythe fact that Labienus, Caesar’s most outstanding officer in Gaul, had deserted himsoon after the invasion began, taking a detachment of cavalry with him to Pompey.Labienus’ motives are not completely clear, but personal rivalry with Caesar hasbeen surmised. In addition, his family appears to have come from Picenum innorthern Italy, the region from which Pompey also hailed. Social ties withPompey’s family seem a reasonable assumption. Moreover, Labienus probablydecided that Pompey was the more likely winner and that his cause was the betterone.This kind of decision was being made all over Italy. Some wealthy families sentsons to Caesar and to Pompey, so that they could maximize their chances ofretaining their ancestral estates regardless of the victor.

The optimates seem to have been taken by surprise by Pompey’s decision toabandon Italy. In fact, Domitius Ahenobarbus, the consul of 54 BCE, tried topressure him into staying by mounting a concerted defense of the stronghold ofCorfinium.Pompey left him to it.Ahenobarbus raised a large number of new leviesbut when the Gallic legions arrived and began to build siege works around thetown, he thought it prudent to plan for his escape.The raw recruits understandablysaw this as treachery and forcedAhenobarbus to capitulate.Aside from their leader’sduplicity and Caesar’s promises of clemency, it is probable that the reputation of theGallic legions was frightening to Italians who had always feared Gauls and who hadperhaps read, or listened intently to a recitation of, Caesar’s Gallic War. This dulybecomes an early sign that veteran troops would prove more valuable than inexpe-rienced recruits in the civil war. The days of the citizen militia were long gone.Ahenobarbus and several captured senators became the first outstanding examplesof Caesar’s clementia. In conspicuous fashion, Ahenobarbus was sent awayunharmed, but he soon made his way to Massilia, where he organized resistance toCaesar. His men were promptly enrolled in Caesar’s forces – an early sign ofCaesar’s relative popularity in Italy, especially compared with the optimates. Some-what ironically, the main results of Ahenobarbus’ stand were that Caesar was delayedand Pompey was given more time in which to organize an orderly evacuation ofhis forces, along with supplies and valuables. In the end, Caesar failed to catch up

Fortune and the civil war, 49–45 BCE 125

with Pompey, who made good his escape from Brundisium across the Adriatic Seato Macedonia,where he spent the rest of the year mobilizing a large force recruitedfrom among his many eastern clients.

Caesar returned to Rome, but although there were no proscriptions, levels offear and indignation meant that he was not greeted warmly – so much for hisglorious return. He was in desperate need of public funds stored in the treasury,which quite amazingly had not been cleaned out by Pompey.When he attemptedto access these funds, however, his way was barred by one of the tribunes of theplebs,who was manhandled out of the way. In public relations terms,Caesar’s returnwas a disaster.This was highly regrettable, but he had more pressing and dangerousmatters on his mind.

Ilerda (49 BCE)

There were no transports to hand for Caesar to chase Pompey immediately. In anycase, Pompey’s eastern forces would not be a threat for some time, given the needto marshal and train them.The Spanish legions, on the other hand,were a clear andpresent danger. If they were not neutralized, they could invade Italy, either insupport of a Pompeian invasion or at any time that an opportunity arose. After afortnight in Rome, Caesar acted decisively and quickly, as always, to extricatehimself.The answer, of course,was to attack! Caesar thus decided to march to Spainand take on the Pompeian legions there. On the way to Spain, he was forced tobesiege Massilia, which had closed its gates to him upon admitting DomitiusAhenobarbus.There was no time to waste, so Caesar left three legions to press thesiege and proceeded with six legions to Spain as quickly as possible.

Pompey’s main forces in Spain were formidable, comprising five legions, andthey were led by experienced commanders in Lucius Afranius (the consul of 60BCE) and Marcus Petreius. Legions from Spain had a reputation for toughness, giventhe harsh terrain and dangerous fighting which occurred in the peninsula.Againstsix of the Gallic legions, however, the men of Afranius and Petreius were shown tobe second-rate. Caesar wanted, if possible, to preserve his own legions and to spareas many enemy soldiers as possible, in order to promote surrenders in the future.Thus the campaign was marked by a complicated series of maneuvers for position,in which the fitness and confidence of Caesar’s men proved decisive. In particular,they gained the upper hand after a brilliant forced march one night.At one pointthey even crossed a strong river, with water up to their necks, carrying their arms,armor, clothing, and other equipment on their shields held above their heads.ThePompeians eventually found themselves surrounded and cut off from supplies nearthe town of Ilerda.The campaign was over (2 August).

On his way back to Italy, Caesar accepted the surrender of Massilia. He wasspared the necessity of dealing with Ahenobarbus, who had managed to slip awayto Greece, where he would be ready in a few months for the next round.A quickvisit to Rome followed.The rump of the senate, hardly an impressive group, hadappointed Caesar dictator in anticipation of his return from Spain. He soon


resigned this office and accepted the consulship for 48 BCE – his second consulship,which had been the cause of so much trouble in recent years.

One significant failure of arms on Caesar’s side was to have important con-sequences for the future. Curio was sent to Africa to secure its rich grain reservesfor Caesar.He did not, however, distinguish himself as a commander,marching intoa trap. Moreover, he lacked veteran troops, and his inexperienced recruits provedno match for the highly mobile cavalry of King Juba I of Numidia. Africa, then,was available for exploitation by the optimates.

Dyrrachium and Pharsalus (48 BCE)

It was winter now. Pompey,who had been joined by Cicero,Cato, and many of theleading optimates, had had around nine months to prepare his forces – some 50,000men and 300 ships. Caesar wanted to steal the initiative and put them underpressure. Once again, therefore, he took a bold and unexpected step by making aJanuary crossing of the Adriatic Sea to Epirus. Since he did not have enough shipsto transport his entire army, he decided to transport the legions in stages. He wastaking an enormous gamble. Pompey’s fleet was under the command of Bibulus,whose job it was to sink any transports that approached the coast. Caesar took himby surprise and managed to slip past the Pompeian blockade, though his advanceforce of seven depleted legions was clearly inadequate for a head-on confrontationwith the Pompeian army. It was vital that Antony should follow with his legions asquickly as possible. Caesar’s advance force of about 15,000 men and 500 cavalrywas in a highly vulnerable position – severely outnumbered, pinned in hostileterritory, and reliant on the sea for reinforcements and supplies.

Matters soon grew worse.With the element of surprise lost, Caesar’s transportswere intercepted on their return journey and destroyed by Bibulus’ ships. Antonywas left high and dry in Brundisium, and it took much precious time to gathertransports from elsewhere. Caesar was fortunate that Pompey did not attack him,preferring instead to limit his access to supplies.He was also fortunate that Bibulus’ships failed to prevent the crossing of Antony’s transports, carrying four legions, inthe spring.As it happened, Bibulus had died in the meantime of natural causes.

Pompey had taken possession of the port city of Dyrrachium.This gave him atremendous advantage because the port was crucial for obtaining supplies. Insubsequent maneuvering, however, as each side responded to Antony’s landing,Caesar managed to interpose his legions between Pompey’s army and the port.There were soon supply problems facing both sides, especially the large cavalrycontingents fighting for Pompey.The horses were steadily running out of fodder.Caesar characteristically devised a daring plan to force the matter.While his cavalryand other mobile units prevented the landing of men and supplies from the sea, hislegions began to construct massive siege works in order to hem Pompey’s soldiersagainst the coast to the south of Dyrrachium. The aim was to trap and exhaustthem. Eventually the plan proved too bold. Caesar had insufficient men for the job,and the terrain made the work difficult, especially towards the southern beaches.


When Pompey came to appreciate these difficulties, he ordered an attack. Aftersharp fighting, he broke through the siege lines and in the process inflicted heavycasualties on Caesar’s men, who were forced to withdraw. Pompey chose, at thispoint, not to regroup and launch a follow-up assault.According to Plutarch (Life ofCaesar 39.8, Penguin trans.), Caesar commented that ‘Today the enemy would havewon, if they had a commander who was a winner’.

A question is regularly asked about the impact of Pompey’s strategy on theminds of his men.He had held them back from an attack on Caesar’s advance forceand now he did so again. Caesar tells a story that implies that Pompey’s confidencein his men was shaky. Due to lack of supplies, the Caesarian soldiers had beendriven to make and eat a disgusting type of ‘bread’ made from roots. Some of thisbread had actually been tossed into the Pompeian camp, as a statement of Caesariantoughness.When Pompey was shown some examples, he ordered them destroyed,so that his men would not learn what beasts they were fighting (Caesar,CivilWar3.48; Plutarch,Life of Caesar 39.1–3).The Caesarian propaganda message was beingspread through the attitude of Pompey himself.

Yet so far Pompey had not put a foot wrong with inexperienced forces. Perhapshe had been ultra-cautious about attacking Caesar’s advance force when it wasvulnerable, but he controlled the vital port, prevented supplies from reachingCaesar, and then broke out with relatively few casualties, while inflicting heavylosses on his enemy. Hindsight should not prevent us from noting Caesar’s diffi-culties. He was far from being invincible and Pompey was far from beingover-rated.The picture of a bold and decisive Caesar versus a cautious and hesitantPompey owes much to the final outcome of the campaign. If Pompey had won, hewould no doubt have been praised for his wisdom, whereas Caesar would havebeen condemned for his rashness.

Caesar withdrew toThessaly, glad to link up with 15 cohorts of reinforcementsunder Gnaeus Domitius Calvinus. Pompey shadowed him and linked up withreinforcements of his own, brought by Metellus Scipio from the East. Caesar tookthe town of Gomphi and says that he was thereby able to resupply his troops.Yethe wants to imply that Pompey was reluctant to fight a healthy army, rather thanadmit that Pompey was quite properly exhausting a weak one. It seems possible thatCaesar’s men were still in dreadful straits, many of them weak from wounds, andfacing severe problems of supply.They needed to fight, but Pompey refused them,avoiding battle, harrying foragers, intent on his strategy of attrition, even thoughhis army was more than twice as large as that of Caesar – about 47,000 to 22,000in infantry, and about 7,000 to 1,500 in cavalry.

Gradually, the optimates in his camp grew impatient and pressed him to force theissue.They had become over-confident after the success at Dyrrachium, talking ill-advisedly about which one of them would become pontifex maximus, and in generalfailing to appreciate their opponent’s inspirational qualities and the unsurpassedspirit of his men. Caesar needed a battle badly and began daily to draw up hislegions in their lines, hoping to induce Pompey to confront him. Eventually, andbefore he really wanted to do so, Pompey drew up his lines on high ground in the


neighborhood of Pharsalus (figure 5). His strategy had been the right one, but hehad reached the point where he could no longer ignore the complaints of theoptimates or the rumblings among his men. Caesar would not have put up withcomplaints from such subordinates (Caesar, Civil War 3.82, Dillon and Garland13.44):

…whenever Pompey acted with some slowness or deliberation, [theoptimates] proclaimed that…he was making the most of his command andbehaving to men of consular and praetorian rank as though they were slaves.They were already openly fighting over rewards and priesthoods and allo-cating the consulship for years ahead, while others were demanding thehouses and other property of those who were in Caesar’s camp.

The battle of Pharsalus (9 August) represents another high point for Caesar’s tacti-cal deployment of his men, but his tactics would not have been enough withoutthe discipline and ferocious bravery of his legionaries. At the start of the battle,Pompey held all the aces. His troops had control of the high ground, and heordered them to maintain their positions in the event of a Caesarian infantryadvance. A Caesarian charge would, he hoped, both exhaust the Caesarians andcause them to fight uphill.The right flank of Pompey’s infantry was drawn up hardon the river Enipeus, a position that prevented them from being outflanked on thatside. On the left of the infantry he stationed his cavalry, in whom his hopes


Enipeus River

Pharsalus

Caesar’s Camp

Pompey’sCamp

MOUNTDOGAN

MOUNTKOUTOURI

Pompey

Caesar

FIGURE 5 Plan of the battle of Pharsalus (48 BCE)

primarily rested. Labienus, whose excellence as a cavalry officer had been provenin Gaul,was their commander. Pompey’s legionaries may have been inexperienced,but they were fresh from a morale-boosting victory at Dyrrachium. He had lightinfantry forces too, sent to him by his many eastern allies, but in general he hadasked his allies for cavalry.As a result, his cavalry forces were large and generally ofgood quality, though the different units were unused to fighting together and quiteunprepared for what they were about to face.

In answer to Pompey’s dispositions, Caesar drew up his troops in three lines, aswas usual, with the most experienced men in the rear. He placed the left flank ofhis infantry against the Enipeus. The units stationed here were probably thoseweakened most by wounds and starvation. Their participation says much abouttheir spirit and the leadership of their general. In the center were the mostexperienced legionaries in the Mediterranean world. On the right flank, in com-bination with assorted light forces, Caesar drew up his cavalry in opposition to thePompeian cavalry. Caesar’s cavalry, including numerous Gallic contingents, was ofexcellent quality and very experienced, but they were hopelessly outnumbered. Itwas on the right of Caesar’s line that the battle would be won or lost.

Pompey’s tactics were simple, but time-honored.When the infantry lines clashed,he would unleash his cavalry,who would attack and overwhelm the Caesarian cavalryby sheer weight of numbers. Labienus and his men would subsequently attack theright flank and rear of the Caesarian troops,who would inevitably succumb.The planwas conventionally known as ‘hammer and anvil’, with the infantry representing thestationary anvil and the cavalry coming in as the swinging hammer. The onlyproblem with these tactics was that they were predictable. The real question forCaesar was not what Pompey would do, but what could be done in reply.

His solution was brilliant, though by no means foolproof. Caesar removed menfrom among his infantry lines in a way which was not noticeable to the Pompeians,who continued to see what they thought was a solid mass. By this means he wasable to deploy six cohorts at an oblique angle in a special line behind his right wing.These men had the job of supporting their own cavalry and of meeting front-onany sweeping movements by Pompeian cavalry, which were intended to take theCaesarians in the rear.They were screened from view by Caesar’s cavalry and lightforces.When the infantry battle began, the Pompeian cavalry swept in on Caesar’sright flank.They braved a shower of missiles and forced Caesar’s cavalry to give waya little. Then they were confronted by a highly disconcerting sight. Caesar hadordered his special line of six cohorts to lift their spears and aim at the faces of theoncoming cavalry, presenting a fearsome concentration of spear points. This washighly unorthodox.The cavalry could have expected spears to be directed at theirhorses’ faces or bellies in an attempt to make them rear or bring them down andhence unseat the rider. In effect, the legionaries were daring the horsemen to rideover them,which would surely happen with spears held in this way – but the riderswould lose their faces in the process! Next, the cohorts gave a shout and charged.Shocked by these tactics, the Pompeian cavalry was brought to a halt and brokenup. Caesar’s cavalry and infantry began to gain the upper hand. The Pompeian


cavalry turned and fled in increasing numbers, chased by Caesar’s horsemen.Pompey’s attitude to the failure of his cavalry was eloquent – he left the field,intending to escape and fight another day. Perhaps he also intended to lift thepressure on his legionaries to fight to the death (Leach 1978, 206–7).

Meanwhile, the infantry fight raged. Caesar’s legionaries had opened proceed-ings by charging across the open field towards the Pompeian lines.When it becameobvious that the Pompeian recruits were holding fast to their positions, theCaesarians did something that only highly disciplined, experienced veterans coulddo.They slowed down, regrouped, took a breather, and continued in step until theywere at close range.Then they launched themselves in pure savagery at their oppo-nents. Caesar is generous in his account of the fight put up by Pompey’s men.Theywithstood heavy volleys of javelins and fought bravely for a considerable period,until the six Caesarian cohorts who had fought the cavalry joined in from thePompeian left and Caesar committed his reserves. Resistance crumbled, with some6,000 dead, including Domitius Ahenobarbus. Caesar is careful to describe how hespared around 24,000 Pompeians who surrendered.

In explaining his victory, Caesar emphasizes his brilliant tactics and the contri-bution made by the six cohorts (Civil War 3.94). Commentators have criticizedPompey’s strategy of attrition and apparent lack of faith in his men, but although itseems certain that Caesar would have commanded Pompey’s troops with greaterpreparedness to attack, and in spite of the good effort put up by them at Pharsalus,it does seem that Pompey was right to be cautious about committing his men tobattle against the Gallic legions. In the end, after all, Caesar’s legionaries won con-vincingly, despite being heavily outnumbered and perhaps close to exhaustion.Pompey’s defeat is better explained by his inability to withstand the optimates andfailure to have a back-up plan in case his cavalry charge was unsuccessful.

Alexandria (48–47 BCE)

At any rate, Pompey sailed quickly for Egypt, a move that made good strategicsense, even though loyal armies awaited him in Africa. Egypt was rich in agri-cultural produce and manpower.The Ptolemies had a fine fleet, a strong army, andexcellent trade networks. More importantly, the royal dynasty owed Pompey fornumerous favors.Unfortunately, at this time there was great unrest in the kingdom.Two claimants to the throne were involved in a fierce dynastic struggle, 21-year-old CleopatraVII and her 14-year-old brother Ptolemy XIII.When Pompey askedfor asylum at Alexandria, advisors to the young Ptolemy, who controlled the city,calculated that his death would please Caesar. Accordingly, a former soldier ofPompey was sent to welcome him, put him at his ease, and stab him to death (28September 48 BCE). Cicero’s reaction, upon learning the dreadful news, is oftenquoted (Letters to Atticus 11.6.5, Dillon and Garland 13.47):

I never had any doubt regarding Pompey’s fate.The hopelessness of his situ-ation was such that all rulers and peoples were totally convinced of it, so that,


wherever he went, I thought this would happen. I cannot help grieving overhis wretched fate; I knew him to be a man of integrity, clean living, and goodcharacter.

Caesar arrived at Alexandria three days later with a comparatively small force oftwo legions. He was horrified by the news, and there is little reason to doubt hisreaction. He would have been upset at the treachery of the act, at the presumptionof the Egyptians, and perhaps at the impossibility of now making a grand gestureof clementia, although there can be little doubt that it would have been rejected.Egypt was heavily in his debt because Ptolemy XII Auletes, father of the rivalclaimants, had made various undertakings to the triumvirs in the period prior toLuca in 56 BCE, when he wanted their help in an earlier bout of dynastic conflict(see Chapter 6 above).As a result,Caesar felt entitled to extract money and suppliesfrom the kingdom, and he also thought it within his rights to support the claimsof Cleopatra over those of her brother. In doing so, he commenced one of the greatpersonal relationships of human history. He also gained the enmity of the youngPtolemy and of the Alexandrians.

It was not long before the Alexandrians launched an attack on Caesar’s troops,besieging them in the royal quarter. The siege extended throughout the winterand was very difficult. Once more, Caesar found himself fighting against the odds,relying heavily on the renowned qualities of his legionaries. At one point, whiledirecting operations on the harbor, Caesar was forced to swim for his life withmissiles piercing the water all round him. Plutarch (Life of Caesar 49) records thathe is supposed to have held some papers above his head to keep them dry. Relieffinally arrived in the form of eastern troops led by adventurers named Mithridatesof Pergamum and Antipater of Judea. The young Ptolemy was killed in thefighting.

Many writers have found it difficult to explain what happened next, for Caesarchose to remain for a further three months in Alexandria at a time when Italy wasin turmoil, struck by a new wave of indebtedness and civil dissent, and Africa wasthe scene of frantic recruitment and training as the optimates who had fled Pharsalusset about creating several formidable armies. It might seem very unlike Caesar notto respond decisively and quickly to these emergencies. Inevitably, the spotlight fallson Cleopatra and on the romantic view that Caesar, now in his early 50s, fell inlove with the young queen.This view is questioned fairly regularly by scholars whoemphasize Caesar’s need for Egyptian supplies and finance, and his consequentneed to ensure that Cleopatra was settled firmly on the throne after a prolongedperiod of dynastic struggle and civil war. In a similar vein, doubts have beenexpressed over the paternity of the boy named Ptolemy Caesar, known widely asCaesarion. Certainly, the boy was born to Cleopatra following Caesar’s departure,and his name might simply demonstrate political allegiance or personal goodwill(Paterson 2009).Yet it is profoundly disappointing to see the case for passion soregularly under-estimated. Caesar was powerful, charismatic, and charming, exceptto his most dangerous political enemies. He could not constantly be the rational


politician or dynamic man of action, consumed by weighty matters. Sometimes hewas more basically a man, just as Cleopatra was a woman.The sources refer to theboy as Caesarion and generally look upon him as Caesar’s son, as his name mostnaturally tends to imply.

Zela and Italy (47 BCE)

FromAlexandria,Caesar marched toAsia Minor against Pharnaces II of Pontus, sonof Pompey’s old enemy Mithridates VI. Pharnaces, a Pompeian client king, hadrefused to acknowledge Caesar’s authority and had inflicted a defeat on DomitiusCalvinus. Caesar defeated him easily at Zela (2 August), and made his report to thesenate in the famous three-word dispatch, Veni, vidi, vici (‘I came, I saw, I con-quered’). How different in character and detail to the war commentaries thatsurvive from Caesar’s hand and that are linked so often with campaign reports sentto the senate!The brevity, alliteration, syllabic parity, and rhyme of the message havebeen taken for wit and arrogance. Caesar was commenting, as ever, on the speed ofhis operations (Suetonius, Life of the Divine Julius 37). He was also undoubtedlyimplying that Pompey’s eastern victories over such pitiful opponents were hardlyon a par with his own.As such, he had earned the right to be freed from traditionalnorms, which would have seen a more detailed and respectful dispatch sent to thesenate.

When Caesar finally returned to Italy in September, he was confronted byserious unrest among troops and citizens alike.The uncertainties of the civil warhad caused men to hoard their money.High interest rates and harsh terms for loansreflected the resultant scarcity.Caelius and Milo had attempted an uprising with thehelp of debt-ridden and desperate followers among the Roman plebs.The move-ment was suppressed and the leaders were killed. If anything, however, tensionsincreased and disaffection spread to soldiers and veterans, hungry for land andrewards. Caesar’s troops had not been paid for some time, and they were notsatisfied by his repeated assurances. Even the Tenth legion, often said to be hisfavorite, was close to mutiny at the prospect of a looming campaign in Africawithout any guarantee of pay until it was over. In a famous incident, Caesar con-fronted the men of the Tenth and began his speech by addressing them as Quiritesor ‘Civilians’ (Suetonius, Life of the Divine Julius 70).The soldiers were immediatelychastened, fearing he had severed the special relationship that existed betweenhimself as their general and themselves as his soldiers.This was a relationship withmaterial benefits, given that the soldiers relied upon their general for land andrewards, but it also had an important psychological and charismatic dimension, andthis was probably vital when Caesar implied its expiry. He and his men had beenthrough an enormous amount together.Their experience was simply extraordinary.If they had thought it impossible for him to deny this, they were sharply rebukedto learn that they were wrong. Like the soldiers of Alexander the Great, his menbroke down and begged the forgiveness of their general.


Thapsus (46 BCE)

The invasion of Africa began in line with Caesar’s script for daring and unexpect-edness. He crossed from Italy during winter, when sea voyages were at their mostperilous, arriving on the continent with a relatively small force in December 47BCE. A dreadful thing happened when he slipped face-first onto the sand whileclimbing out of his landing craft. Contemplate the potential horror of the momentand the negative way that most people would react. Caesar, by contrast, saved themoment with a turn of theatrical brilliance. He raised himself to his knees, fullyaware that his soldiers were terrified at what seemed like a dreadful omen.Dramatically lifting his fists, and allowing sand to begin falling through his fingers,he cried, teneo te, Africa (‘I have you, Africa’). A potential crisis was turned toadvantage in scintillating fashion (Suetonius, Life of the Divine Julius 59). Hisinterpretation of what had happened was perfectly permissible in terms of Romanreligion.Yet this was just the first of many tests in Africa.

His enemies had been gifted a whole year to prepare and they had prepared well– ten Roman legions, four Numidian ‘legions’ on the Roman model, and 15,000cavalry. One advantage was that the optimates had alienated the native populationwith their high-handed arrogance and violent exactions of supplies.An even biggeradvantage was the fact that the optimate leadership was still fractious. MetellusScipio had been given overall command, but his indecision and weakness ofcharacter meant that his orders were rubbery, and such a situation never inspiresconfidence among line troops. Juba I of Numidia assisted the optimates. He had apersonal grudge against Caesar, who many years before, while Juba was on a diplo-matic mission to Rome, had tugged the Numidian’s beard in the heat of acourtroom quarrel (Suetonius, Life of the Divine Julius 71). Still, only half of theeight legions that fought for Caesar in Africa were composed of veterans. He hadlost many men in battle, of course, and had faced the necessity of discharging othersand giving them their long overdue lands and rewards. Some of his legions wereparticularly inexperienced.

It was not long before Caesar’s advance force was assaulted vigorously. Labienusand the Numidian cavalry caused severe damage through the use of guerrilla tactics.Caesar’s supplies were regularly cut and his legionaries were badly mauled on severaloccasions by these magnificent light cavalry. The slow-moving infantry could notmatch the speed of the horsemen, who struck and then rapidly disappeared. TheCaesarians were brought close to a ruinous defeat.The daring that placed them inthis situation began to resemble sheer recklessness in these early days.

Finally, reinforcements and supplies began to arrive in significant quantities, sothat Caesar’s army reached its full campaign strength. When he threatened theimportant town of Thapsus, the optimates had to make a stand on terrain that wasnot particularly favorable for cavalry. The dispositions on each side were notunusual in one respect – both placed infantry in the center and cavalry on thewings – but Scipio had elephants, which he placed ahead of his infantry. Theyproved useless in the main event, for Caesar’s archers and slingers disrupted their


charge and frightened them so much that they turned and trampled their own men– a reasonably common occurrence in elephant warfare. Then some of Caesar’smen disobeyed their orders and charged. The sight must have been particularlyupsetting for the conqueror of Gaul and victor at Pharsalus against the odds. In theend, however, Caesar’s veterans decided the contest and Scipio’s army was routed.A massacre ensued. Caesar apparently attempted to intervene and bring a halt tothe slaughter, as he had been able to do successfully in the past.This time, however,he was powerless and 10,000 men were killed (6 April). Unless the evidencecontains an excuse for the death toll among Roman citizens, Caesar was no longerin command of forces as disciplined as his Gallic legions had been. Moreover,Labienus escaped, much to Caesar’s chagrin.

Caesar’s victory led to the death of most of the optimates, including Scipio andCato.The latter was determined not to live as an example of clementia, which heregarded as a royal prerogative extended to inferiors. He would not permit hisenemy to say that he had saved him. Cato therefore committed suicide at Utica bystabbing and disemboweling himself – a fate he evidently considered preferable tofalling into the hands of the man he despised above all others who lived. Cicerocommemorated his life by writing a laudatory pamphlet called Cato, which irkedCaesar so much that he wrote an Anticato in reply.Yet the latter was so vicious andnakedly hostile that it actually proved distasteful to many people, so that the processof turning Cato into a political martyr was given an enormous boost by none otherthan Caesar himself! This in turn gave some respectability to the losing side.

Quadruple triumph (46 BCE)

At last the civil war seemed over, and Caesar was determined to mark his return tothe capital in as glorious a fashion as possible.Accordingly, he celebrated four hugetriumphs over foreign enemies: Gallic, Alexandrian, Pontic, and African. Eachtriumph was separated by a few days (20 September – 1 October). Like Pompey,Caesar too could claim to have emulated Alexander the Great as the conqueror ofthree continents (Europe, Africa, Asia).Vercingetorix, who had surrendered afterAlesia in 52 BCE,was paraded and then perfunctorily executed.Caesar’s troops wererewarded handsomely, and every citizen received 100 denarii, in conjunction withother distributions and shows. Although continuing stress was laid on the foreignenemies conquered by Caesar (Gauls, Egyptians, Asiatics, and Numidians), thepeople of Rome were mindful of the reality: Caesar was the victor in a civil war,and many of his recent victories had been won over Roman armies. Indeed, thegrandness and number of these triumphs caused distress in some quarters, as beingtoo great a departure from tradition to be respectful. It became controversial thatCaesar presented numerous pairs of gladiators in the arena, and in a highly unusual,ostentatious move, ordered that many of them should fight to the death. It cost somuch to train a gladiator that death was not usually a part of the show.There wasnegative comment, too, when Cleopatra and Caesarion were installed in a houseon the Janiculum Hill.


Munda (45 BCE)

Hopes for an end to civil war were soon dashed. Caesar’s governor of Spain,Cassius, had made himself hated by all and sundry for his corrupt and violent ways.This was the man who, as tribune of the plebs, had fled to Caesar in January 49 BCE

in association with Antony. His behavior caused many provincials to rally to thebanners of revolt raised by Pompey’s sons, Gnaeus and Sextus Pompeius, who wereassisted by Labienus. Cassius drowned while returning to Italy. His ship sank as aresult of being laden too heavily with stolen treasure.

In November 46 BCE, Caesar left Rome for Spain. The Pompeian army wasformidable, consisting of 13 legions and sizeable provincial levies. Caesar was incommand of eight legions, half of them veteran, but he was determined to bringan end to opposition once and for all.The final battle took place at the fortress cityof Munda, between Seville and Malaga, and it turned out to be the toughest andbloodiest of Caesar’s career (17 March).This is an amazing statement to make, giventhe extent of Caesar’s military record, but it seems incontestable. Caesar wasbrought very close to defeat, and although the details of the battle are far from clear,it appears that Labienus attempted a complicated infantry maneuver, which failed.Even then, the Caesarian army was only saved when King Bogud of Mauretanialed his Moorish cavalry in an attack on the Pompeian rear. About 30,000 troopsdied on the Pompeian side, including Gnaeus Pompeius, Pompey’s elder son, andLabienus, whose departure from Caesar and subsequent antagonism continues toengender many questions. Sextus Pompeius managed to escape. Caesar had littlechance of restraining his men from slaughter, and in this case he did not try hardto do so, for he wanted the civil wars to end and desired therefore to make anexample of those who had almost brought him low at this battle. One Pompeianlamented that even when fortuna was on the side of the Pompeians, they found nosuccess ([Caesar], SpanishWar 17).

Spain was reorganized and a huge program of veteran colonization was begun.Caesar celebrated an unpopular triumph over ‘Spain’ upon his return to Rome,claiming once more that his victory had been won over foreign foes. Few wereconvinced, but Caesar seems to have disregarded the traditional sensibilities. It isworth mentioning that he brought back to Rome with him a boy named GaiusOctavius, the grandson of his sister Julia,whom he would subsequently adopt as hisheir. The grand-nephew and later son of Caesar is, of course, better known tohistory as Rome’s first emperor,Augustus.

Conclusion

The costs involved in this ongoing civil war were of staggering dimensions in men,resources, and mental commitment. At different points Caesar found his legionstrapped, starving, debilitated by wounds, besieged, mutinous, harassed, disobedient,vulnerable, and ultimately victorious. His generalship was alternately magnificentand verging on reckless. He was brought close to complete defeat several times.


There was nothing inexorable about the way he achieved his victories. He wasfortunate, he knew it, and so did others.Yet he does not seem to have becomeexhausted, for he was about to embark on a huge expedition against the Parthiansat the time of his death in the following year.War, of course, was the business of aRoman man, but even so Caesar’s continuing energy and desire for war seemremarkable. Depending on the operation of Fortuna, it could all end in disaster atany moment. Incredibly, in the wake of Caesar’s death, civil war would start upagain, and many men would enlist for a share of the opportunities that were there-by created.Caesar did not bring peace, therefore, through fighting the civil war.Heonly brought personal power to himself.The next two chapters will survey someof the positive and negative reactions to that power.

Recommended reading

For associations between Caesar and Fortuna/fortuna, see Weinstock 1971, ch. vi;and Clark 2007, ch. 6.Welch 2008 is very good on competing claims to felicitas, aconcept that relates strongly to fortuna and Venus. An even-handed assessment ofPompey’s generalship at Pharsalus is provided by Leach 1978, ch. 9. Cleopatra issurely one of the most fascinating figures of ancient history. Competent treatmentsof her life and reputation, from a number of different angles,may be found in Grant1972; Hughes-Hallett 1990;Whitehorne 1994; Flamarion 1997; Southern 1999;Chaveau 2002; Kleiner 2005; and Ashton 2007.

A good introduction to the civil war, written by a highly competent militaryhistorian, is Goldsworthy 2002. In addition, the period of the civil war is wellcovered by Gelzer 1968, ch. 5; Rawson 1994; Meier 1995, chs. 13–14; Garland2003, ch. 6; Holland 2003; Goldsworthy 2006, chs. 18–22; Kamm 2006, chs. 7–9;Billows 2009, ch. ix; and Rosenstein 2009.



10CLEMENTIA

Caesar’s dictatorship as paternal rule, 49–44 BCE

Clementia

Caesar showed remarkable leniency and mildness in dealing with his citizenenemies after crossing the Rubicon. In extraordinary and unexpected fashion, heeven gave permission for an inveterate foe like Marcus Claudius Marcellus, theconsul of 51 BCE, to return to public life at Rome. Cicero called this policyclementia (‘mercifulness’ or ‘clemency’), and although the name was probably notCaesar’s choice, it nevertheless stuck (Griffin 2003, 162–3). Clementia was not atraditional attitude governing relations between Roman nobles because it implieda superior and an inferior.This is partly why Cicero used the term, for it underlinedthe fact of Caesar’s autocratic power.Yet it also described the conciliatory tone thatCaesar had adopted, and this was welcome in the circumstances. How can Caesar’sclementia be understood? Three points should be made in explanation. First, it wasinitially the term used when Roman generals spared defeated enemies after battle,but here it is a product of civil war and used primarily in relation to Romancitizens. Second, because the opposite of clementia was crudelitas (‘cruelty’), it is clearthat a direct contrast was intended with Sulla, whose name had become synon-ymous with cruelty in the minds of many, above all for his proscriptions andconfiscations. Caesar was trying to reassure the inhabitants of Rome and Italy thathe had no intention of following in Sulla’s footsteps in terms of wholesale murdersand theft of property for the benefit of his troops and other followers.There wouldbe no terror under Caesar.Third, clementia was rather double-edged in its operation.The language of cruelty, murder, and confiscation was generally associated withtyrants in Greek and Roman thought and literature, so that in one sense Caesar wasclaiming to be the opposite of a tyrant, i.e. a merciful savior of the lives of his fellowcitizens, or a fatherly figure rather than a tyrannical one. Indeed, he was honoredwith the title Parens Patriae (‘Parent/Father of the Fatherland’) in 44 BCE. The

problem with this image, however, is that it is nevertheless the image of an autocrat,a single ruler, even if a merciful rather than a cruel one. Caesar’s contemporaries,therefore, were supposed to be grateful for his clementia, while at the same timeoverlooking or accommodating his autocratic power.Was the former enough tocompensate for the latter? The traditional republican political system was based onnoble competition and designed to limit autocracy.Was it strengthened or weak-ened by Caesar’s rule? It seems that both positive and negative answers wereavailable at the time, as the next two chapters will respectively show.

Caesar’s power was based on his command of the legions and retired veterans,but he held offices of republican type from 49 to his death in 44 BCE.The mainoffice was the dictatorship,which was granted to him several times, and for varyinglengths of time, over the period. Early in 44 BCE, he actually received thedictatorship ‘for life’ or ‘perpetually’ (dictator perpetuo). It is clear from the evidencerelating to these final years of Caesar’s life that his rule was understood bothpositively and negatively. On one hand, he was empowered to make reforms andgiven extraordinary honors. On the other, he was criticized as a tyrant andmurdered.This chapter will examine Caesar’s reforms in light of the conciliatoryattitude described above. It seems that the reforms were neither as revolutionarynor as destructive as some scholars have thought. In addition, the extravaganthonors voted to Caesar during his time as dictator will be described as responsesto both his autocratic power and his perceived mercifulness.

Concepts of monarchy at Rome

First, however, it is important to make a few points about different concepts ofmonarchy in Caesar’s day. Kings dominated the Mediterranean world after thedeath of Alexander the Great. Gradually, the grand monarchies of the Antigonidsin Macedon, the Seleucids in Syria and Asia, and the Ptolemies in Egypt fell underRoman control.Rome’s attitude to the Hellenistic kings was full of contradictions.At times the power and wealth of the kings, along with their links to Alexanderand the ancient cultures of the East, seemed worthy of great admiration.Yet Romanarmies had smashed the kings’ forces repeatedly, and Romans had learned not totrust the kings, whom they often described as effeminate or degenerate substitutesfor the great names of the past. They were all show, and no substance. Romanstended to think that their Republic was a superior system of government to amonarchy. It gave them greater strength and greater freedom than those who livedunder the rule of Hellenistic kings.

There were also models of kingship at Rome, where the people were certainlyfamiliar with autocratic or king-like figures, such as fathers, the masters of slaves,and generals on campaign. In the political arena, however, the idea of monarchy wasdistasteful. According to tradition, Rome had once been ruled by kings, most ofwhom were strong and good.Yet the last king was the notoriousTarquin the Proud,who had ruled with such violence and corruption that nobles led by Lucius JuniusBrutus rose in rebellion and expelled him from the state. As a reaction against

140 Caesar’s dictatorship as paternal rule, 49–44 BCE

Tarquin, the nobles then devised a political system which carefully limited auto-cratic power. Consuls, for instance, were limited by the annual term of their officeand by each other. Dictators were appointed for specific crises and in traditionalunderstanding they resigned immediately the crisis was at an end, or at most aftersix months. Romans, therefore, especially upper-class Romans, were generallyhostile to the idea of a king for Rome.The image of Tarquin the Proud was hardto shake, though they knew that not all kings ruled oppressively and they acceptedthe fact that there were monarchies aplenty in the Mediterranean world. A con-ceptual problem arose when the Romans borrowed from Greek thought andliterature in relation to kings. Greeks by this time thought in terms of a conven-tional distinction between the ‘good’ king, who ruled gently, for the benefit of hispeople, like a father with his children, and the ‘bad’ tyrant, who seized power byforce, and ruled violently, for his own benefit, denying the freedom of his peoplelike a master with his slaves. Consequently, when a Roman political figure becametoo powerful, too violent, or too repressive, he could be called a ‘tyrant’, as wasCicero for executing the Catilinarians.The opposite of such an unpopular figure,however, could not be called a ‘king’, as Greeks might have permitted. Caesar, asnoted above, received the title Parens Patriae in 44 BCE.This seems to have been theRoman version of the good king in Greek thought. In other words, Caesar washonored as a ‘father’ in a situation where the Greek idea of the good king wouldhave been relevant.A royal name was apparently avoided in favor of Parens Patriae.This surely undermines the idea that he sought a monarchy at Rome.Why, forinstance, would he want to be acknowledged as a king when he already hadautocratic power, i.e. the power of a king? Second, why would he want to beacknowledged as a king when kings were thought of so badly in traditional Romanpolitical thought?

The point can be reinforced by looking briefly at Caesar’s management of hispublic image into the 40s BCE.He emerges not as a Hellenistic king but as a Romannoble with extraordinary power. Hellenistic kings had fostered intellectual activityas a means of self-promotion.They funded art and architecture for a similar reason.The result was a range of impressive libraries, museums, artworks, and buildingsthroughout the Mediterranean.All such works served to increase the social standingof their royal patrons. It is sobering to think that the magnificent Library atAlexandria, for instance, was largely built because the Ptolemies wanted politicalpower and social esteem.Roman nobles sought intellectual excellence from similarmotives.The greater their learning, and the sharper their brains, the more was theesteem in which they were held among their peers. Caesar, by all accounts, wasextraordinarily gifted in intellectual terms. His rhetorical and literary skills havebeen commented upon in earlier chapters.Yet they were acquired for competitionwith fellow nobles rather than for becoming another Hellenistic king. His warcommentaries were innovative in their length,detail, and polish,but they were writ-ten in a style that was described by contemporaries as simple, bare, andquintessentially Roman. It was a style thought to derive from traditional normsrather than from the more florid approach of Asianic models. Caesar’s brilliance

Caesar’s dictatorship as paternal rule, 49–44 BCE 141

attracted talented poets and writers to his entourage, but it seems that such menwrote with Caesar rather than for him.Their output was evidently as varied as his,with all of them competing for the prize of enhanced social esteem (Suetonius,Lifeof the Divine Julius 55–6). Among his construction projects should be listed theBasilica Aemilia, a multi-purpose public building that bordered the Roman Forum,though strictly speaking he merely loaned the necessary funds to Aemilius Paullus,consul in 50 BCE.The outstanding project was of course the Forum of Caesar,whichfeatured the magnificent Temple of Venus Genetrix (‘Venus the Ancestress’), anenormous marble temple supported by ornate Corinthian columns, which wasfinally dedicated at the end of his great series of triumphs in 46 BCE. As wasexplained in Chapter 7, however, the new forum was conceived as a response toPompey’sTheatre,with its shrine toVenusVictrix (‘Venus theVictorious’).Althoughit subsequently took on associations derived from the civil war, Caesar’s forumconformed fundamentally to the republican phenomenon of noble competitionand to the traditional idea that nobles had a duty to provide for their fellow-citizens.It was not a statement of monarchic entitlement or a signal of regal aims any morethan Caesar’s ancestral claims to the office of pontifex maximus had been. Suetoniuslists other intellectual and construction ventures (Life of the Divine Julius 44.2–3,Loeb trans.):

[He planned] to open to the public the greatest possible libraries of Greekand Latin books, assigning to Marcus Varro the charge of procuring andclassifying them; to drain the Pomptine marshes; to let out the water fromLake Fucinus; to make a highway from the Adriatic across the summit of theApennines as far as the Tiber; [and] to cut a canal through the Isthmus [ofCorinth].

The scale of such activities in an eastern context would normally have requiredinput from a Hellenistic king. Caesar, however, was behaving like a Roman noblewho wanted to dwarf the families of powerful competitors. He was still a noble,even if his power gradually came to match that of a king. It seems that the chargeof aiming at kingship from a young age was first applied to Caesar as a criticism,and that he had to combat it as best he could during the years of his rule from 49–44 BCE. The main problem was that he decided in the end not to give up hisautocratic power.

Caesar’s reforms

Many questions have been asked about Caesar’s reforms. Do they amount to arevolution? In other words, do they represent the creation of a Caesarian monarchyin place of the traditional republican state? Do they support the view that Caesarhad long cherished a desire to achieve autocratic power so that he could supplantthe corrupt nobility and establish a new, more just form of Roman state? Or, dothey seem instead to be a chain of separate measures, hardly unprecedented, which


in fact imply little structural change to the state and mean that Caesar was onlyattempting to deal with specific abuses as he saw them, i.e. a contemporary fixalong traditional lines? Were they accepted for how far they went or for theirrestraint in the circumstances? It seems that Caesar’s reforms were more traditional,restrained, and aimed at specific abuses or problems than has been allowed byscholars who favor the idea that he had long set his heart on monarchy in order tocreate a new type of state.

The major change was that Caesar attached himself at the top of the state.Asidefrom this, it is difficult to see that he did much to alter traditional conceptions of theRoman state, or that he set out to create a fundamentally different political system.Sulla had passed a raft of reforms during his time as dictator. Although Caesarthought that Sulla’s overall package was too reactionary, some of his own adminis-trative reforms are actually reminiscent of measures taken by Sulla. For example, heenlarged the senate,which had been depleted by the civil war, from 600 (the numberestablished by Sulla) to 900 members, many of whom were Italians, and some ofwhom came from outside Italy. Jokes were made about Gauls in trousers having toask directions to the senate-house, but such men were very few, and in any case theirfamilies were of equestrian rank and Italian origin. In order to replenish this enlargedsenate and provide for more administrative roles, he lifted the number of quaestorselected annually from 20 to 40, and the number of praetors from eight to 16.Therewas, therefore, no attempt to remove the senate but instead an attempt to make itrepresent Rome’s citizens more accurately, especially those of Italy and the westernprovinces. Many of the new senators, of course, had been supporters of Caesarduring the civil war. Certainly, the senate could not operate in the way it had donebefore Caesar’s birth, for it was now much bigger and its size changed the dynamicsof consultation, but it remained the supreme advisory body for the magistrates andso permitted the inference that Rome was still a partnership between SenatusPopulusque Romanus (the ‘senate and Roman people’, or SPQR, the famous lettersemployed on many inscriptions and signs around the city and empire).

New patrician families were created for the first time since the days of the earlyRepublic. This was partly a matter of keeping up with the increased number ofmagistracies, but it was also a move based on respect for the traditional roles playedby patrician families in Roman society.The aim, therefore,was to preserve ancestralbalances rather than to create a new system. Caesar was criticized by reactionariesfor generous extensions of Roman citizenship, especially to communities ofCisalpine Gaul (via a lex Roscia of 49 BCE), Sicily, and Spain.These communitieswere being rewarded for loyal military service and other support, but the grants ofcitizenship also recognized the growing importance of these regions for the powerand stability of the empire. Such grants were completely in line with citizenshiptrends which had been developing since the time of the SocialWar.

Caesar revised debt levels, especially at Rome, but his revision was moderate.The extent of the relief did not please creditors (unsurprisingly), but there was nowidespread abolition of debts, as many of his supporters apparently wanted.Therewould be no major redistribution of economic resources through the social classes


of Rome and Italy under Caesar. Caelius and Milo saw an opportunity to start anuprising, which resulted in the deaths of both men.The real point of this uprisingis that it showed the impossibility of pleasing everyone in respect of the debtproblem. A reform of Rome’s coinage was designed not for the majority but forthe convenience of Caesar and the government: he introduced a gold coin (theaureus) to facilitate large payments, e.g. to his soldiers or to contractors.

Several measures curtailed the size and political influence of the city mob, thoughthey had additional aims too. For instance, Caesar reduced the number of recipientsof Clodius’ grain dole,which was very costly and had given rise to a variety of abuses.He also abolished the collegia, in a move which revived the approach adopted in the60s BCE but which had an unfortunate side. Certainly there was a gain in the field ofpublic order, but there was also a social loss in that these clubs or private associationsoften had innocuous aims at heart, e.g. funerary associations to ensure that membersreceived a decent burial.Caesar’s public works would have provided employment forlaborers in Rome and Italy, and thus would have helped to offset the effects oflimiting the grain dole and abolishing the collegia. Benefits in terms of patronage andself-promotion were completely in line with tradition.

A number of ‘sumptuary’ laws were passed against ostentatious displays ofwealth, which implied immoral extravagance. Such measures had been adopted inearlier periods as a way to reinforce solidarity between elite families at times ofstress.They were partly designed to advertise the idea that the civil war had beenthe result of widespread moral failure rather than the fault of any particularindividual or family. Once again, therefore, they were measures to reaffirm thetraditional social order rather than to overturn it. Even the introduction of theJulian calendar on 1 January 45 BCE (= 709 Ab Urbe Condita/From the Foundationof the City) was a reform intended to realign the traditional round of festivals andceremonies with the seasons in which they were supposed to occur, such as spring.It was no good holding harvest festivals in (say) high summer, and so on. Theemployment of a solar calendar was a definite innovation, but it was employedbecause it served the traditional purpose better than the old system of inserting‘intercalary’ months at unscientific points when the old lunar calendar beganinevitably to fall behind the solar progress of the seasons.The old system was tooprone to human error and manipulation, as recent years had proved only too well.Caesar’s calendar, incidentally, is essentially the one still in use, save for minorcorrections made subsequently by Pope Gregory XIII in 1582 CE.

The practice of tax farming, which had caused so much hardship, was abolishedin the province of Asia and perhaps elsewhere. Yet other aspects of provincialadministration remained largely untouched.The establishment of veteran coloniesin Italy and beyond certainly meant significant change for the regions involved, butthere were precedents under Marius and Sulla, and the idea of establishing overseascolonies for the release of domestic pressures could be traced back to the days ofthe Gracchi.Moreover, it is difficult to assess the precise number of ‘Julian’ coloniesestablished by Caesar, since Augustus could have established settlements that appearin our record with ‘Julian’ in their name subsequently. Foundations at places like


Tarraco (in Spain), Corinth, and Carthage obviously had commercial spin-offs andshould therefore have had a different character and impact on their hinterland thanother foundations of the time.

Further measures affecting Italy turn out to be far less than revolutionary.Caesarcurtailed indiscriminate emigration overseas from Italy and declared that at leastone-third of Italian herdsmen had to be free men.The conservative element is verystrong in both laws.The latter was designed partly to limit the number of slavesworking in agriculture in Italy, partly to restore free men to the countryside inorder to advertise renewal of the ‘Italian’ nature of the population, and partly tolimit brigandage. Caesar also seems to have prepared some regulations for Italianmunicipal constitutions. These fell short of standardization, but they reinforcedtraditional ideas about the membership of town councils: undesirables such asgladiators and bankrupts were excluded, though it seems that freedmen (formerslaves who had been given their freedom) were admissible. Once again this wouldhave largely preserved the social classes in their relative positions according totraditional criteria. Change was balanced by continuity in such measures.

It is difficult, therefore, in spite of the hindsight interpretations of ancient andmodern writers, to see in Caesar’s reforms a passionate desire to sweep asideeverything associated with the corrupt nobility, and change the state from anaristocratic republic to a new, fairer system based upon a single ruler. It is likewisedifficult to see a coherent program, although Caesar told Metellus Scipio by letterin 48 BCE that ending the war would mean ‘repose for Italy, peace for the provinces,[and] the health of the empire’ (CivilWar 3.57.4).Against this very general formula,his reforms seem to amount to a series of particularized and unsurprising measures,mostly of a kind previously employed, which do not in the end amount to arevolutionary program but to a reasonably traditional – and even unimaginative –series. Caesar seems to have been basically comfortable with the republican system,or at least with the traditional republican system in which all participants were pre-pared to compromise and behave with due respect for dignitas. His reforms, then,were basically conceived in response to particular needs and governed by tradi-tional ideas of what to do in relation to the problems in hand.

This certainly does not mean that the surviving nobles must have been pleasedwith Caesar.He had overwhelming power, he was monopolizing the opportunitiesfor acquiring clients, and he was the prime recipient of gratia from those whobenefited from his reforms, i.e. ‘influence’ in the form of widespread ‘gratitude’.Furthermore, his easy manner with his friends and his claims to the moral highground were probably infuriating.Violent tyrants are hated, but so too are person-able rulers who display a conciliatory attitude, advertising their concern for theinterests of everyone, while simultaneously bolstering their own power.

Extraordinary (especially Divine) honors

There have been numerous interpretations of the rich variety of honors that wereawarded to Caesar in the final years of his life.One theory is that the honors indicate


a growing megalomania on Caesar’s part.Another idea is that they show him plottinga path to divine monarchy on an eastern model – perhaps an Egyptian model, inview of his time with Cleopatra.Was he overwhelmed by vanity at the end of hislife? Did he want to become a god so that he could become a king? It seemspreferable to think that the honors were fundamentally responses to a new type ofpower at Rome – autocratic power – and were governed by a desire to see Caesar’smercifulness and mildness continue. The divine honors in particular may lookextraordinary to a modern western audience, but the rituals of Roman religion weresystematic ways of responding to power. It is not really surprising, then, that Caesar’sautocratic power was met with religious honors. In any case, it is unlikely that thehonors were as surprising to contemporaries as they have seemed to moderncommentators. For contemporaries, the most important considerations were Caesar’sautocratic power and the ultimate realization that he did not intend to relinquish it.

Suetonius lists some of the extraordinary honors awarded to Caesar, and makesa distinction between those which were ‘excessive’ and those which were ‘too greatfor the mortal condition’ (Life of the Divine Julius 76.1, Dillon and Garland 13.55):

Not only did he accept excessive honors: a continuous consulship, a per-petual dictatorship, the censorship of morals, as well as the praenomen [firstname] ‘Imperator’ and the cognomen [last name] ‘Father of his Country’, astatue among those of the kings, and a raised seat in the orchestra, but he alsoallowed honors too great for the mortal condition to be bestowed on him: agolden seat in the senate-house and on the tribunal, a chariot [for carryingdivine images] and litter in the circus procession, temples, altars, statues nextto those of the gods, a couch, a flamen, a college of the Luperci [priests ofFaunus or Pan], and the naming of a month after him; indeed, there were nohonors that he did not receive or grant at will.

Suetonius’ list of Caesar’s honors is by no means detailed, and the distinction hemakes is probably misleading. Far more comprehensive lists are available, especiallyin the history of Cassius Dio. They include some novel privileges, such as apraefectura morum (‘commission to supervise public morals’), the right to stamp hisportrait on coins (the first portrait of a living Roman to appear on Romancoinage), a grant of tribunicia sacrosanctitas (‘the sacred inviolability of a tribune’),statues on the Capitol and elsewhere, the right to wear the triumphal robe andlaurel crown of a triumphator (‘triumphant general’) in public, a golden chair ratherthan the ivory stool of a Roman magistrate, the month of ‘July’ named after him,and a temple to Clementia Caesaris (‘the Clemency of Caesar’).Of his many statues,one was placed in the temple of Quirinus (the name given to Romulus as a deity),another stood near those of the kings of Rome, and another showed him with aglobe beneath his feet as the conqueror of the world.His triumphal chariot was setup opposite the temple of Jupiter. He was being associated with founders, kings,triumphal conquerors, and gods. It is hard to separate the ‘excessive’ from the ‘toogreat for the mortal condition’ among so rich an array of awards.


Most attention, nevertheless, has been paid to honors thought by moderncommentators to be divine in character. In general, scholars have adopted askeptical, even dismissive attitude to them.They have been seen as products of basepolitics, pathetic flattery, and a decline in Caesar’s character. Flattery was being usedfor political gain. In other words, the Romans did not believe that Caesar wasdivine, but they were prepared to behave as though he was in order to gain hisfavor. His enemies sometimes proposed honors from malicious motives, trying toembarrass him with unprecedented and unrestrained symbols of his dominance.

This traditional scholarly interpretation rests heavily upon the assumption thatRoman religion was in decline. Scholars from a predominantly Judeo-Christianbackground have tended to be unimpressed by a pagan religion that was poly-theistic, group-oriented, ungoverned by dogmatic beliefs, and apparentlyover-populated by old-fashioned agricultural deities who meant little to theinhabitants of Caesar’s cosmopolitan Rome. This religion was open (so theargument goes) to all manner of strange rituals, entailed no emotional or spiritualattachment to the remote and sometimes preposterous deities, and had nothing fora worshipper actually to ‘believe’ in.The traditional conclusion has been that theRoman religious system in Caesar’s day was in decline from a primitive and morespiritual age in the archaic past and was now being manipulated by contemporarypoliticians for purposes of power. Caesar’s honors, therefore, were designed toappeal to his increasingly inflated opinion of himself.

An opposing view argues that the Judeo-Christian religious system is by nomeans standard and Roman religion was not in decline. Instead, in certain respectsRoman religion was merely different. Roman gods, for instance, were not gentleand loving by nature. They were unstable and often angry, and needed to beconstantly appeased.Roman worship, therefore,was not based on a loving, personalrelationship with a single deity but on a contractual relationship between theRomans and their gods to maintain the pax deorum (‘agreement with the gods’)through reciprocal gifts. Romans made offerings to their gods to ensure divinesupport for the community as a whole. Belief or faith was not the basic element.Ritual was the basic element because the main idea was to appease the godsthrough appropriate sacrifices and ceremonies so that the gods would in turnmaintain their support of the community: do ut des (‘I give so that you may give’)is the way the Romans expressed it.The contract was governed by the principle ofreciprocity,with each side bound to uphold their end of the bargain. If the Romansgave appropriate gifts, they expected a positive return from their gods. It did notmatter so much what you believed as what you did in the way of ritual.As long asyou spoke the correct prayer in the correct form, poured the appropriate liquidlibation into the earth, or sacrificed the appropriate animal in the appropriatemanner, the god was bound to respond in kind.According to this contractual view,then, Roman religion was not in decline. It merely operated differently. Further tothis, scholars in fields such as sociology and political science argue strongly thatpraise is always a matter of relationship negotiation and constraint. In other words,honors such as those under discussion continually define and refine a relationship,


and describe roles in connection with it.They are not merely pathetic flattery onsuch a view. In a similar way, sociologists and anthropologists tend to describe thegeneral phenomenon of religion as a matter of relationship negotiation.

The downside of this interpretation is that it tends to give the impression thatRoman religion was conducted in a cold, clinical, commercial environment.Understandably, scholars have reacted by demonstrating that there were indeedopportunities for enthusiasm and emotion in various ceremonies and festivals, therewere some basic thoughts about the gods which might well be described as ‘beliefs’,and it often seems that the Roman upper classes were just as constrained byreligious measures as the common people. Why, for instance, would omens orportents continue to be used against political enemies, if those enemies felt com-pletely safe in rejecting them? It seems true that distasteful elements of flattery,sycophancy, and pride were present in respect of Caesar’s honors, but there was amore traditional and fundamentally ‘religious’ side to them too. Caesar’s autocraticpower was overwhelming like that of the gods. It was quite different fromrepublican norms. It needed to be defined and negotiated to advantage by bothparties.The extraordinary honors, therefore, represent an attempt to recognize andaccommodate the autocratic power of Caesar after his victory over Pompey andthe optimates. It is worth bearing in mind that the honors were sometimes proposedby his enemies to embarrass him.This indicates that Caesar was not controlling thehonors process. In general, the honors were invented and proposed by members ofthe senate. He was, however, monitoring, responding, and at times moderating orrefusing. The idea that Caesar’s unprecedented autocratic power was beingnegotiated in an uncertain environment is a helpful one for understanding the flowand nature of the honors.

Sulla had not received honors like these – a fact rarely given emphasis but surelyimportant. Both Sulla and Caesar exercised autocratic power, but Sulla ruled byterror and eventually stood down, whereas Caesar advertised clementia and resistedthe idea of standing down.The honors received by Caesar apparently respond tohis generous clementia.They usually imply gratitude, and it is noticeable that theygathered momentum as it became more and more obvious that Caesar’s pre-eminence was unchallenged and permanent. In fact, the major votes of honors maybe assigned to the periods immediately following his victories atThapsus in 46 BCE,at Munda in 45 BCE, and in early 44 BCE before his departure for the projectedcampaign against the Parthians.The Parens Patriae title, for instance,was one of thesehonors of early 44 BCE.

In one sense, clementia represents the ultimate gift of life, but how could such agift be repaid according to the Roman convention of reciprocal giving? Divinehonors existed as one option because the gods were also saviors and protectors and,like Caesar, their power was both beyond the norm and yet vitally relevant to thecommunity. In the ancient world, there was not so much an unbridgeable gapbetween ‘man’ and ‘deity’ as a continuum between them. There were grades ofsuperior mortals and grades of inferior gods below the plane occupied byOlympians such as Jupiter. Caesar might stand anywhere along this continuum.


Divinity, in other words, was a relative rather than an absolute concept and mencould be relatively more divine than others quite easily.Thus Caesar’s power, ratherthan belief in his divine nature, is now seen as the key to understanding the divinehonors.The senate and Roman people were trying to match Caesar’s extraordinarypower with extraordinary honors.

It now seems that the honors process developed to the point where legislation waspassed to make Caesar a god of the Roman state during his lifetime.This legislationwas not completely acted upon, however, because Caesar was assassinated beforepreliminary arrangements were finished.Cicero, in his Second Philippic speech againstAntony (section 110),which was composed in the months following Caesar’s assassi-nation, asks Antony sarcastically why he has not yet been inaugurated as the flamenof Divus Julius (The Divine Julius or The God Julius). It appears that Caesar’s cult namewas to be Divus Julius and that the priest of his cult, who would perform sacrificesand other duties,was to be Antony with the rank of a flamen no less – like the priestsof Jupiter, Mars, and Quirinus.The name ‘Divus’, by the way, appears at this time tohave denoted one of the most ancient and revered classes of god, so that Divus Juliuscould well mean ‘The God Julius’ in the sense not just of ‘god’ but of a particularlysacred class of ‘god’ (Wardle 2009, 106).There is no need for shock at such conclu-sions because, once again, the conditions and assumptions of ancient pagan religionwere very different from those of the Judeo-Christian tradition. It is true that Cicerowas unimpressed, and that mixed motives are apparent, but this should be expectedbecause attitudes to divinity in the ancient world were complicated, as they are today.There must have been room for debate about precisely where Caesar stood along themortal-to-divine continuum. Caesar was at times cautious about the incessantadulation, even though he evidently accepted the majority of honors offered to him.He became aware that some honors were intended to embarrass him and reduce hispopularity. Nevertheless, it does seem that he would have been deified during hislifetime, if he had not been murdered beforehand.

It is becoming increasingly obvious, however, that the question of Caesar’sdivinity did not mean as much to the Romans as it has meant to modern scholars,even though deification while alive was not a strong feature of the worship ofHellenistic kings.The topic receives comparatively little comment in our sources,and Caesar was not killed, as far as anyone asserts, for receiving divine honors. Inthe words of Ittai Gradel (2002, 72), these honors ‘expressed his new status farabove the position of any other man, past or present, in the Roman Republic’. Inaddition, they recognized his autocracy for what it was, not for what it mightbecome. Thus, in contrast to an old idea, the divine honors were not signs ofprogression towards a divine monarchy, in which recognition as a god would be thevital prerequisite for recognition as a king.

Yet the interpretation based on power rather than belief has limits of its own.For instance, the issue of Caesar’s divinity did not simply go away with his assassi-nation. The appearance of a comet in July 44 BCE appeared to confirm the ascentof Caesar to the heavens, and in 42 BCE Divus Julius was officially consecrated.Moresignificantly, an informal cult of Caesar as Parens Patriae was set up in the Forum on


the spot where he was cremated. Devotees among the Roman people, who seemto have been profoundly distressed by Caesar’s death and emotionally committedto the view that he had possessed a divine nature, conducted sacrifices, prayers, andoaths in his name. Such behavior tends to imply that older and newer scholarlyinterpretations each have something to contribute after all.

Caesar did refuse a small number of honors (see the next chapter), but on thewhole he seems to have been in a mood to accept. In earlier times, he sought toserve the gods.Now he permitted his contemporaries to make him one. It was notthat he had long sought to become a god, or that he had grown dismissive ofreligion. His religious aspirations had merely ‘changed over time, as the opportu-nities available to him increased’ (Wardle 2009, 100). Like most people, he hadsome idiosyncratic superstitions, though he was far from being superstitious. Asmentioned briefly in Chapter 5 above, Pliny the Elder (Natural History 28.21)reports that he habitually recited a brief magic formula three times before sittingdown in a vehicle, in order to ensure a safe journey. It seems likely that he did thesame on boarding a ship, since sea voyages tended to be far more hazardous thanland journeys.This custom may have underwritten the confidence he showed inhis fortuna in the story related at the start of the previous chapter. His pietas (to hisfamily, his family gods, and to the state gods) was evidently serious and traditionalin tone, if the period up to 63 BCE is used as a guide.The offices of flamen Dialisand pontifex maximus were both highly valuable in terms of traditional ambitio, andin the case of the chief pontificate he evidently sought to exploit its particularsignificance for the Julian family. Many have wanted to see him as a cynic or arationalist, but instead of skeptical or dismissive behavior, it seems that he wasscrupulously attentive to the performance of religious rituals as pontifex maximusand as general. He would have blessed his armies regularly before battle, and wouldhave taken the auspices just as regularly, although very little evidence survives forthese regular happenings. It is probably the case that little evidence survives becausenothing controversial was happening. He was behaving with appropriate respect.His divorce of Pompeia, following the Bona Dea scandal,may have been motivated(at least in part) by a concern for his religious office, and his behavior in 59 BCE inrelation to Bibulus’ omens was perhaps not without a certain religious foundation,depending in particular on one’s views about obnuntiatio (the formal, audibleannouncement of an omen in front of an assembly).The matter was probably ascloudy to most contemporaries as it remains today.

In the 40s BCE, especially following the victory atThapsus and afterwards, he wasin a position to receive religious honors of a completely different degree, given thefacts of his autocratic power and policy of clementia.Accordingly, his aspirations inrespect of religion changed.Yet it should be emphasized that he responded to thehonors.He was not their architect in the way that scholars such as StefanWeinstock(1971) have assumed. DavidWardle (2009, 107) sees:

…a tentative, uncertain groping by the senate for appropriate forms of honorby which to celebrate the achievements of Caesar, rather than a carefully


planned or thought-out progression towards a politically inspired deification,skillfully orchestrated by Caesar himself.

It appears that Caesar was more than willing to negotiate over his divine honors,and was pleased by them on the whole. There has been some discussion as towhether he was opposed to the idea of deification during his lifetime in contrastto posthumous deification (Wardle 2009, 107), but the debate remains inconclusive,turning (e.g.) on theories about why Antony had not been inaugurated as Caesar’sflamen at the time of Caesar’s death. In any case, divinity was of far less seriousnessthan kingship. In many ways, Caesar’s pietas, knowledge of the rules of ritualperformance, and conscientious conduct as a religious office-holder conform tothe Roman republican ideal. His aspirations naturally changed in the religioussphere, as elsewhere,when his autocratic power meant that new opportunities wereopened up to him. His thinking about religion at Rome grew richer under thesecircumstances, not more dismissive.

Conclusion

This chapter has been concerned to interpret Caesar’s reforms and extraordinaryhonors in light of his policy of clementia, which implies a conciliatory attitude.Twobasic arguments have been put forward. The first is that Caesar’s attitude to thetraditional social order was more respectful than has been thought, and so itbecomes less attractive to accept older theories that he wanted to sweep away thecorrupt government of the nobility. Second, the extraordinary honors heaped uponhim in his final years should be seen as reactions to his autocratic power, and asencouragement to maintain his conciliatory attitude. He was not orchestrating thehonors like a megalomaniac. Others were reacting to his power. By and large theywere doing so in a positive way, working to maintain the image of Caesar as apaternal ruler who employed clementia.The negative reaction, which looked uponCaesar’s claims to clementia as illusory and based on a tyrannical seizure of power,will be discussed in the next chapter. It resulted in the plot to assassinate Caesar.

Recommended reading

On clementia, see Dowling 2000; Griffin 2003; and Dowling 2006. Griffin (2003,162–3) argues that it was Cicero rather than Caesar who used this term for Caesar’spolicy of leniency. Cicero, writing in the circumstances of civil war, wanted toemphasize clementia in contrast to its opposite, crudelitas, which had featured heavilyin the previous civil war. Rawson 1975 provides an excellent survey of attitudes tokings in Caesar’s Rome.Rawson 1985 is without peer as a study of intellectual lifein the late Republic. Caesar’s Forum is studied in detail by Ulrich 1993.

For varying interpretations of Caesar’s administrative reforms, see Hoyos 1979;Rawson 1994; and Gardner 2009. Elizabeth Rawson is open to the idea that


Caesar’s reforms were part of a general program of reform, motivated by certainbasic ideas about the importance of the empire. In the end, however, she believesthat a ‘firm conclusion is unattainable’ (1994, 448). The significance of Caesar’sreform of the calendar is discussed by Michels 1967; and Hannah 2005, ch. 5.

Caesar’s divine honors have been discussed by many scholars, including Ehrenberg1964;Gelzer 1968, ch. 6;Kagan 1975, sect. viii;Rawson 1975; and Meier 1995, chs.13–14.Weinstock 1971 provides the most detailed and erudite analysis, but he isheavily influenced by the idea that Caesar sought a divine monarchy. North 1975shows thatWeinstock is rather too trusting of the evidence of Cassius Dio. Beard,North and Price 1998.1, ch. 3; and Gradel 2002, ch. 3, give excellent accounts,which employ sociological insights instructively. On Caesar’s comet (the sidusIulium), see Ramsey and Licht 1997. Wardle 2009 is a fine survey of Caesar’sreligious attitudes and policies through the various phases of his career. Stevenson1998 examines the title Parens Patriae in particular.

Other accounts of the period which examine events covered in this chapterinclude Garland 2003, ch. 7; Goldsworthy 2006, chs. 18–22; Kamm 2006, chs. 7–9;and Billows 2009, ch. x.


11LIBERTAS

Caesar’s dictatorship as tyranny, 49–44 BCE

Libertas

Libertas (‘freedom’or ‘liberty’) was perhaps the foremost quality of a Roman citizenunder the Republic. It denoted the citizen’s freedom to engage in political lifealong the lines established after the expulsion of Tarquin. It was a defining charac-teristic of the Republic and cherished greatly in contrast to the dominatio(‘oppression’) or regnum (‘kingly power’ or ‘tyranny’) associated with a tyrannicalgovernment.When Caesar crossed the Rubicon, he claimed to be a defender oflibertas and the rights of the people’s tribunes.Yet he soon allowed the claim to fadeinto the background, and ultimately became dictator perpetuo. It is significant to note,given the norms of Caesar scholarship, that Caesar was not the most importantpromoter of either clementia or libertas in relation to himself. Cicero emphasized theformer, and Caesar’s assassins advertised the latter in support of their cause. Libertasseems to have been a sensitive matter for Caesar, and one that in the end he failedto handle adequately. It became a fundamental reason for his assassination, and wasopenly circulated as the prime motive for his murder. Caesar had gone from beingthe champion of libertas to its tyrannical oppressor, and some Romans saw it as theirduty to remove him in consequence. How did this happen? Why was Caesarassassinated and what was the role of libertas in justifying Caesar’s murder?

Following his victory at Thapsus in 46 BCE, Caesar’s unchallenged position ofpower made him Rome’s de facto ruler.A series of extraordinary honors struggledto define his autocratic power. Beyond the temples and statues and wreaths andtitles, however, Caesar accepted the dictatorship for life. His honors in this periodare by no means understandable as a progression from earlier honors in his career,and his position of pre-eminence is likewise not the obvious outcome of earliermagistracies and attitudes. Civil war made the difference.Why did Caesar go so faras to accept the dictatorship for life? Why, moreover, if he was a champion of

clementia and libertas, was he killed? Whereas the previous chapter emphasizedpositive assessments of Caesar’s dictatorship, this chapter emphasizes negative assess-ments. There are, then, two major aims in what follows. The first is to outlineCaesar’s attitude to the supreme magistracies, especially his reliance on the dictator-ship and his appointment of consuls for years in advance. The second aim is toanalyze the major reasons for Caesar’s assassination, and the means by which thiswas accomplished on 15 March (the Ides of March) 44 BCE.

Caesar’s attitude to the supreme magistracies (49–44 BCE)

Caesar’s attitude to the supreme magistracies, especially his reliance on the dictator-ship and his cavalier treatment of the consulship, provoked resentment.At first, hewas careful to promote the impression of legality.He secured his second consulshipfor 48 BCE, and emphasized that in doing so he had observed the Sullan law whichmandated a ten-year interval between consulships. In 47 BCE, however, the consulswere elected only after Caesar’s return from Alexandria and Asia in September. In46 BCE, Caesar held a nine-month consulship, together with his legate MarcusAemilius Lepidus.This was only the second time since the fourth century BCE thattwo patricians had served together as consuls – the former being in 86 BCE, againat a time of civil war, when LuciusValerius Flaccus joined Cinna in the consulshipfollowing Marius’ premature death early in the year. A symbol of consensusbetween patricians and plebeians was thereby subverted. Caesar once again servedas consul for nine months in 45 BCE, this time without a colleague. Two of hislegates were appointed consuls for the rest of the year. One of them, QuintusFabius Maximus, died on the last day of the year. Caesar promptly appointed GaiusCaninius Rebilus as replacement for the last few hours, thereby cheapening thehonor for all other recipients. Cicero’s joke (Letters to his Friends 7.30) was that inthe consulship of Caninius no one ate lunch. It was a sad comment on the utterdebasement of the supreme magistracy. During Caesar’s absence in Spain, affairs inRome were managed by Lepidus, as master of the cavalry (deputy) to the dictator,with the assistance of eight prefects. Finally, in 44 BCE, Caesar was consul again (forthe fifth time), and his partner was Antony. He designated Publius CorneliusDolabella, Cicero’s former son-in-law, to take over from him while he was away inParthia. One problem with this was that Dolabella was only 25 years old, wellbelow the republican norm of early 40s. In provision for his absence against theParthians, Caesar nominated pairs of consuls for years in advance. Plainly, theseconsulships were the gift of Caesar rather than the Roman people, and the repe-titions and truncations were cheapening the honor for other, highly competitivemen, who in any case had to be his close associates. He also removed tribunes ofthe plebs from office in 44 BCE for an incident involving the placement of a diademon one of his statues (see below). His attitude had been quite different at the startof the civil war, when he proclaimed his desire to protect Antony and Cassius, thetribunes who had sought refuge with him. A great deal of friction was therebygenerated.

154 Caesar’s dictatorship as tyranny, 49–44 BCE

It was the dictatorship, however, the magistracy that placed him above the vetoof a tribune and the imperium of all other magistrates, which caused most disquiet.The way in which this office was handled shows developing aloofness on Caesar’spart and obvious helplessness on the part of the senate. It was probably short-sighted, even if partly justified by tradition, to activate the dictatorship in the waythat Caesar did. Sulla had ruined the reputation of this emergency magistracy inthe minds of most citizens. It did not matter that it had once served a legitimatepurpose. Now, following Sulla, it was the office for a tyrant, and no amount ofclementia could erase memories of the proscriptions and confiscations. Caesaraccepted a string of dictatorships, in a limited way at first. On his return to Romefrom Ilerda in 49 BCE, he was made dictator to hold the consular elections for 48BCE.When he secured election as one of the consuls for that year, he relinquishedthe dictatorship. In October 48 BCE, following his victory at Pharsalus, the senateagain nominated him dictator, this time for a year, the majority of which he spentaway from the city. Upon his return to Rome in September 47 BCE, he wasappointed dictator for a third time, though again he spent little time as dictator inthe city. Following his return from Thapsus in 46 BCE, the stakes were raised: thesenate nominated Caesar for a dictatorship lasting ten years (Cassius Dio, RomanHistory 43.14.3). He accepted the appointment without demur. It may have beenthought that such a period of time was necessary to set the state on an even keel,with eventual retirement or natural death as the next step. Perhaps no one yet

Caesar’s dictatorship as tyranny, 49–44 BCE 155

FIGURE 6 A silver denarius of February–March 44 BCE, minted by Publius SepulliusMacer, advertising Caesar as Dictator Perpetuo (Crawford 1974, no. 480/13).Obverse: Head of Caesar facing right, with laurel wreath as imperator, andveil as pontifex maximus; before, CAESAR downwards; behind,DICT[ator].PERPETVO upwards. Border of dots.Reverse:Venus stands facing left, holding a scepter in her left hand andVictory the goddess in the palm of her right hand; at the bottom of thescepter is a shield; behind, P.SEPVLLIVS downwards, before, MACERdownwards. Border of dots.

foresaw what was to come.Then, in 44 BCE, he was made dictator perpetuo and coinswere minted with this legend (figure 6). It was by now plain that Caesar had nointention of abandoning his dictatorship, as Sulla had done. There had been noperpetual dictator before. A dictator was appointed to deal with a short-termemergency, whether military or civil, or for a maximum of six months.The pointis that the traditional office served to limit autocracy, whereas Caesar’s perpetualdictatorship served to enshrine it. This was starkly at odds with older ideas. Itbecame obvious that Caesar’s autocracy was not limited, except by his ownattitudes.He felt himself able to guarantee and plan office-holding with little regardfor popular opinion or noble aspirations.Consuls were designated for years into thefuture, for the period he expected to be in Parthia and Dacia.The appointment ofmagistrates at his whim illustrated a fundamental shift of sovereign authority fromthe Roman people to Caesar himself.This change cut deep into the pride of thenobles around him.They were not being given a chance to compete for popularfavor or rise in the traditional manner.Tensions and resentments naturally rose.

Clementia, Libertas, and charges of Regnum

It is time to focus on clementia once more in order to understand further aspects ofCaesar’s assassination. Under conditions of civil war, clementia was a welcome alter-native to proscriptions and confiscations.AfterThapsus, and even more after Munda,however, it was obviously the attitude of an autocrat, it meant that Caesar was vitalfor state harmony, and it gave rise to the view that he must maintain his power. Inlight of the reciprocal nature of Roman giving, clementia placed Caesar at the centerof a vast array of personal obligations. He became the guarantor of life andprosperity for his fellow citizens, both his friends and those former enemies whomhe had pardoned in ostentatious displays. Roman friendship often had more to dowith reciprocity than emotional closeness or ‘friendly’ feeling in a modern sense.Thus, in Roman terms even his former enemies became his friends, in the sense thatthey were now under obligation to return his gift.Their loyalty would bring forthfresh gifts from Caesar in turn, and so the process would continue. Cato committedsuicide rather than experience this obligation, which could only have been createdby an enemy who dominated the entire state. Caesar’s autocratic power had set upa vicious circle for traditionally-minded nobles. This was not the environment inwhich traditional noble competition for offices and honors could take place.

Caesar’s clementia reached its climax with the recall of Marcus Claudius Marcel-lus, the consul of 51 BCE who had flogged the town councilor from TranspadaneGaul out of hatred for Caesar.Marcellus was apparently reluctant to accept Caesar’spardon, but was convinced to return by his friends.As it happened, he did not sufferthe full humiliation of coming into Caesar’s presence because he was murdered inwhat seems to have been an unrelated incident at Athens on his return journey. Inthe Pro Marcello (Speech on Behalf of Marcellus) of September 46 BCE, Cicero praisesCaesar for recalling Marcellus, urges him to restore the traditional state, and notesthat the state has only lost men in battle, not inside the city. It does seem that


Cicero had hopes for the restoration of traditional government. Permanent auto-cracy was evidently not inevitable at this date (Dyer 1990). Caesar (says Cicero) hassaved many and chooses to believe that his enemies fought him out of ignorance(Speech on Behalf of Marcellus 13, Dillon and Garland 13.51):

Note, conscript fathers, the far-reaching effects of Caesar’s decision: all of uswho went to war impelled by some wretched and calamitous fate whichattends the state, though we can be charged with culpability on the groundsof human error, have assuredly been acquitted of criminality.When Caesarpreserved Marcus Marcellus for the state at your intercession, and when herestored me both to myself and to the state without any intercession, and allthese other renowned men too, to themselves and to their country, whosenumber and eminence you can see at this very meeting, he did not bringenemies into the senate, but decided that most people had been induced byignorance and false and groundless fears to go to war, not by greed orbloodthirstiness.

Surely he did not desire war under these circumstances (Cicero, Speech on Behalf ofMarcellus 15, Dillon and Garland 13.51):

No critic of events will be so unjust as to question Caesar’s wishes withregard to war, since he has without loss of time decided on the restitution ofthose who advocated peace, though showing more resentment to the rest.That was perhaps less to be wondered at when the outcome and fortune ofwar was undecided and doubtful, but when a victor treats the advocates ofpeace with respect, he is surely proclaiming that he would have preferred notto fight at all rather than to win.

Cicero saw the implications for state harmony and for the maintenance of Caesar’spower. In a state populated by ‘friends’ composed of former supporters and formerenemies, it was Caesar who kept the peace between them after the bitterness ofcivil war. Thapsus and Munda resulted in great slaughter, and at Munda Caesarseems to have been less inclined than previously to bring the bloodshed to an end.He wanted an end to the civil war and was prepared to show that there were limitsto his clementia. If anything, this probably exacerbated the factional bitterness.Caesar alone stood in the way of civil war breaking out all over again. He had aresponsibility to maintain concord in the state he had created.

The problem for those who hated his treatment of the supreme offices and theobligations created through clementia, however, is precisely that they were now underobligation to him as friends. Furthermore, in spite of his political toughness, his useof violence in 59 BCE, and his bullying from Gaul, Caesar was proving an amiablefriend in this period – personally charming, kind in nature, and socially expansive.Gelzer stresses that the nobles still did not trust him.There was something sinisterabout him (Gelzer 1968, 348). Cicero was wary, but at the same time impressed


(Letters to his Friends 6.6.8–10). Caesar was supporting grants of clementia withsolicitous and attractive personal behavior (Paterson 2009; Steel 2009). He was thedouble threat: politically lenient and personally decent.To break the bonds therebycreated would surely have been an impious thing. If Caesar was such a good man,how could good men kill him? Cicero (Philippics 2.116), in the wake of Caesar’sassassination, justified the murder by saying that Caesar had for many years aimed atregnum (‘royal power’ or ‘tyranny’) and that he had eventually achieved his object.Hehad enslaved his fellow citizens, partly through liberality and partly through fear.Thiswas the view of Caesar as a tyrant, but it was not a view of the post-murder periodonly. In fact, it had been available throughout the 40s. Libertas, it seems, was the keyto overcoming clementia, and it is largely responsible for the themes of kingship andtyranny in subsequent generations of Caesar scholarship. It was obviously a powerfulconcept. Under what circumstances was it deployed?

Discontent seems to have increased after the victory atThapsus, in step with thechange in Caesar’s aspirations and attitudes. It was apparent that he had nocompetitors on the traditional model, for he had outstripped them all. He mightwell have preferred a situation in which he had true peers (though lesser in dignitas)and not lone responsibility. Yet his victory in the civil war put paid to that, and hewas being honored and described as the guarantor of the safety of the citizens.There was a strong subtext that he should maintain his power for this purpose. Noone wanted another civil war. As he tried to manage the developing situation,however, he inevitably made mistakes, for there was no blueprint nor precedent forthe position he now held. Charges of regnum gathered strength and he foundhimself fending off allegations of being a tyrant, who had seized power for himselfand was oppressing the libertas of his fellow citizens.

In the wake of Munda,Caesar’s frustration with ongoing opposition seems to havepeaked.A series of incidents in early 44 BCE proved particularly damaging.As he wasreturning to Rome from the Latin Festival on 26 January, two tribunes, CaesetiusFlavus and Epidius Marullus, removed a diadem or white ribbon (one of the primesymbols of kingship) from a statue of Caesar and ordered the man responsible forplacing it there to be hauled off to prison.The man’s motives are uncertain, thoughthe evidence uniformly implies that his action was spontaneous.The dictator, how-ever, deposed the tribunes from office in high-handed fashion. Suetonius offers twopossible motives (Life of the Divine Julius 79.1, Dillon and Garland 13.55):

…[He was] grieved either that the suggestion of monarchy had been sounenthusiastically received, or, as he stated, because he had been deprived ofthe prestige of refusing it.

The first motive accords with the mindset of his enemies.The incident might havebeen an attempt to embarrass him.The second motive,which he expressed himself,is that he wanted to be seen to refuse this honor, implying that he had no interestin kingship.The diadem and the name rex were the two most unmistakable symbolsof kingship.When some of the crowd began to chant the name ‘Rex’ (‘King’),


Caesar replied with the joke,‘I am not Rex but Caesar’, which depends on the factthat ‘Rex’ was a contemporary Roman cognomen, just as ‘King’ functions today as asurname.

In February 44 BCE the senate decided to offer Caesar the role of dictator perpetuoin the apparent hope that he would continue to meet his obligations as the guaran-tor of concord in the state.This honor was offered to him in combination withother honors, among which was the Parens Patriae title, as though he was clearly thepaternal rather than the tyrannical kind of autocrat. In what spirit would he decideto accept the award of permanent autocracy? It seems clear that his decision gavegreat offence (Suetonius, Life of the Divine Julius 78.1, Dillon and Garland 13.55):

However, the incident that particularly aroused deadly hatred against him waswhen all the conscript fathers [senators] approached him with numeroushigh honors that they had voted him, and he received them before theTemple of Venus Genetrix,without rising from his seat. Some people believethat he was held back by Cornelius Balbus, when he attempted to rise;others, that he made no such attempt at all, but instead glared at GaiusTrebatius when he advised him to stand up.

Caesar must have been frustrated at the response. Certainly, he was aware thatenemies were looking for chances to embarrass him, but he misunderstood thatsenators who were installing him as perpetual dictator also wanted him to stand forthem.On one hand they were signaling his clear superiority to them.On the otherthey were offended at not being treated like peers.The long history of noble com-petition meant that the brand of autocracy required at Rome would prove difficultto negotiate.

Very soon afterwards (15 February), the final incident took place, at the Festivalof the Lupercalia. Suetonius’ version of what happened runs thus (Life of the DivineJulius 79.2, Dillon and Garland 13.55):

…when, at the Lupercalia, the consul Antony attempted a number of times toplace a diadem on his head, he refused to accept it and sent it to the Capitolas an offering to Jupiter Optimus Maximus [‘Jupiter Best and Greatest’].

As usual, this incident has been variously interpreted: either Caesar wanted thediadem and was put off by the negative reaction of the crowd, or he did not wantthe diadem and was trying to make a definitive statement to that effect.The latterconclusion seems appropriate if the Lupercalia incident was an attempt to regainground lost recently at the Temple of Venus Genetrix. Furthermore, Caesar’sresponse seems a complete one: he wanted the diadem taken to the Temple ofJupiter on the Capitol, there to be dedicated to the only true king of Rome, andan entry made in the official records that he had declined kingship (Cicero,Philippics 2.87).Yet the rumors and insinuations did not cease (Suetonius, Life of theDivine Julius 79.3–80.1, Dillon and Garland 13.55):


[There was a rumor that] at the next meeting of the senate Lucius Cotta wasgoing to announce the view of the Fifteen [priests] in charge of the SibyllineBooks, that, since it was written in the books of fate that the Parthians couldonly be conquered by a king, Caesar should be given the title of king. It wasfor this reason that the conspirators hurried on their plans, to avoid havingto assent to this.

Cicero (On Divination 2.110) knew of the rumor but dismissed the idea that Cottawas about to propose any such thing.

Caesar was in a bind. He did not want to be described as a tyrant, and did notwant his power described as regnum, for he had not aimed at this and had beenlumbered by others with sole responsibility for state harmony. His mistakes inbehavior and attitude were not what brought about his death.The real problem washis autocratic power, which was now to be permanent.This was intolerable evento many of his followers.One of the great ironies of Caesar’s death,which indicatesa certain lack of self-awareness, is that a man who was consumed by competitivedesire could not recognize its hold over so many of his contemporaries, though herecognized only too well their potential for destructive factionalism. He disbandedhis personal bodyguard in a move that stressed his sole reliance on the powerfulmoral bonds created by his clemency. In the end these bonds would not be enough,and his imminent departure for Parthia hastened plans, which had been developingfor some time.

Conspiracy and assassination

Perpetual autocracy meant the suppression of noble competition and popular deter-mination. This was the end of libertas, and it was this fact, rather than any specificpolitical or religious affront, which fueled the conspiracy. More than 60 senatorseventually joined.Gaius Cassius Longinus was its initiator, and Marcus Junius Brutuswas its figurehead. Both had been pardoned after Pharsalus, both were appointedpraetors for 44 BCE, and both were probably designated consuls for 41 BCE.They hadclear reason to be grateful to Caesar. Cassius had served in the East with Crassus,survived the massacre at Carrhae, and organized the defense of Syria afterwards. Hejoined Pompey at the start of the civil war, commanded a fleet near Sicily, butsurrendered to Caesar after Pharsalus. Cassius was with Caesar as a legate at Zela in47 BCE. Other conspirators included Decimus Junius Brutus Albinus, who hadserved with Caesar in Gaul and was appointed governor of Transalpine Gaul afterCaesar’s departure. Caesar designated him consul for 42 BCE and named him in hiswill among his heirs in the second degree. Gaius Trebonius also served with Caesarin Gaul, and in 49 BCE was placed in charge of the siege of Massilia. He wasappointed consul for the final three months of 45 BCE, but it seems likely that hewas plotting against Caesar even then.These were all prominent men, and all underobligation to Caesar for past and future gifts.Their cause went beyond individualinterests to the wider suppression of libertas by an autocratic ruler.They wanted the


return of the traditional aristocratic state, free from regnum. In the end, of course,they were all undone by the return of civil war, the thought of which had largelymotivated Caesar to become dictator perpetuo in the first place. In spite of what isoften said, they do seem to have made arrangements in the provinces for theresumption of civil war after Caesar’s death, but these turned out to be insufficient.

In strict terms, Cicero should not be numbered among the conspirators, but hewas an influential spirit. His dignitas declined steadily through the years of Caesar’sdictatorship. He returned to Rome in 47 BCE after Pharsalus but first spoke in thesenate in September 46 BCE, the Speech On Behalf of Marcellus. It seems that he losthope in Caesar’s good intentions soon afterwards. In one letter (Letters to his Friends4.5) he complains that his name was added without his knowledge to a list ofwitnesses to a senatorial decree. He had not even been present at the meeting.Thesenate, in other words, was being treated as a rubber stamp and degraded. LuciusCornelius Balbus and Gaius Oppius, Caesar’s equestrian friends, were apparentlyexpediting much of the business of government on his behalf. In his disappointment,Cicero withdrew from public life and devoted himself to philosophical works, someof which were dedicated pointedly to Brutus.He lamented (Letters to his Friends 4.14)that he lacked the freedom of speech to defend the state. In his treatise De Officiis (OnDuties),written around the time of the conspiracy,Cicero openly praises tyrannicide.

Brutus remains the most fascinating of the conspirators.A man of great contra-dictions, he was hardly an admirable character.The son of Caesar’s sometime loverServilia, Brutus is often described as a man of principle, who was opposed to theperpetual dictatorship rather than to Caesar.Yet an overview of his career hardlyindicates that principle was his long suit. After being pardoned by Caesar atPharsalus, he served as the governor of Cisalpine Gaul from 46–45 BCE, and thenbecame praetor in 44 BCE with Cassius. He was probably consul-designate for 41BCE. Brutus told Caesar where Pompey had gone after Pharsalus and did nothingto help his uncle Cato in Africa. Nevertheless, Brutus asked Cicero to write aeulogy for Cato, and it was this work that provoked Caesar’s vitriolic and undig-nified Anticato in response. In 45 BCE, Brutus married Cato’s daughter Porcia, thewidow of Bibulus. The new match annoyed his mother Servilia, perhaps for itspolitical implications in the circumstances. Plutarch emphasizes his nobility – ‘thenoblest Roman of them all’ (Shakespeare, Julius Caesar 5.5.68) – but Plutarch’ssources were highly favorable to Brutus and it should not be forgotten that in the50s BCE there were communities on Cyprus that owed large amounts to him at aninterest rate of 48 per cent per annum.

Brutus, however, had the historical and ideological standing to attract others tothe conspiracy. He was descended on his father’s side from the first consul LuciusJunius Brutus, leader of the rebellion against Tarquin. As moneyer, perhaps in 54BCE, he issued coins bearing the legend ‘Libertas’ and a depiction of the first Brutus(figure 7 ). Another famous ancestor, Gaius Servilius Ahala, who killed the would-be tyrant Spurius Maelius in the fifth century BCE, hailed from his mother’s side ofthe family. Brutus commemorated both these tyrannicides on a second issue ofcoins (figure 8 ).The family’s links with tyrannicide and libertas were widely known.



FIGURE 7 A silver denarius of 54 (?) BCE, advertising Lucius Junius Brutus and Libertas(Crawford 1974, no. 433/1).Obverse: Head of Libertas facing right; behind, LIBERTAS downwards.Border of dots.Reverse: Lucius Junius Brutus (consul 509 BCE) walking left, between twolictors (attendants who carry his rods of office), and preceded by an aide; inthe exergue beneath the ground line, BRVTVS. Border of dots.

FIGURE 8 A silver denarius of 54 (?) BCE, advertising Lucius Junius Brutus and GaiusServilius Ahala (Crawford 1974, no. 433/2).Obverse: Head of Lucius Junius Brutus (consul 509 BCE) facing right;behind, BRVTVS downwards. Border of dots.Reverse:Head of Gaius Servilius Ahala (master of the cavalry 439 BCE)facing right; behind,AHALA downwards. Border of dots.

People expected Brutus to act. Numerous anonymous messages were scrawled onmonuments around Rome inciting Brutus to live up to the achievements of hisancestors. Not surprisingly, Brutus agreed to take a leading role in the conspiracy.Roman history demanded action against a tyrant, and this applied especially to theheir of Lucius Junius Brutus.Yet Caesar was not at all like Tarquin. He was nomurderer and no thief, since there had been neither proscriptions nor confiscations.This is where Greek philosophy, or its influence among the nobility, made thecrucial difference. Through discussions of Greek philosophy in various socialsettings, Brutus was able to establish who was philosophically or theoretically opento the idea that a tyrant, in the sense of a ruler who suppressed citizen freedom,should be killed.As a follower of Plato’s Academy, Brutus had legitimate reason todiscuss the subject without necessarily raising suspicion, given Plato’s preoccu-pation with tyrannical oppression and legitimate responses to it.This opened thedoor to recruitment to the conspiracy (Sedley 1997).

The next question was when to do the deed. It proved a difficult decisionbecause of the huge support Caesar enjoyed among the common people, andamong many of the senators. Mutual suspicion among the conspirators proved amajor hindrance as well. Finally, the decision was taken to strike a couple of daysbefore Caesar left for the Parthian campaign.The scene would be a meeting of thesenate on 15 March 44 BCE (the Ides of March) at the Theatre of Pompey, whichwas being used because the senate-house had burnt down in 52 BCE as a result ofClodius’ cremation.The other senators would be unarmed and taken by surprise.Trebonius was given the job of detaining Antony in conversation outside, so thatthe latter could not attempt to impede Caesar’s murderers.The act itself was clumsyand nervous, but Caesar duly fell – ironically, at the foot of Pompey’s statue – undera hail of dagger blows (Plutarch,Life of Caesar 66.12–14,Dillon and Garland 13.61):

And some say that Caesar fought back against all the others, darting this wayand that and crying out, but, when he saw that Brutus had drawn his dagger,he covered his head with his toga and sank down, either by chance orbecause he had been pushed there by his murderers, against the pedestal onwhich the statue of Pompey stood.The pedestal was drenched with blood, soas to appear that Pompey himself was presiding over this vengeance on hisenemy, lying at his feet and struggling convulsively under numerous wounds.He is said to have received twenty-three, and many of the conspirators werewounded by each other as they tried to direct so many blows into one body.

Shakespeare’s famous line,‘Et tu, Brute’? (‘You too, Brutus’?), is inaccurately repro-duced. Suetonius is the ultimate source (Life of the Divine Julius 82.2, Dillon andGarland 13.62):

Like this he was stabbed with twenty-three blows, without uttering a word,except for a groan at the first stroke, though some have recorded that whenMarcus Brutus came at him he said (in Greek), ‘You, too, my child’?


Pompeians and Caesarians, therefore, killed Caesar on account of his power tothwart their pretensions.The soldiers and the common people were furious.Thepeople even tore to death one of their tribunes, a gifted poet named Gaius HelviusCinna,who was mistaken for the assassin Lucius Cornelius Cinna.One of the othertribunes, Gaius Casca, put out a statement that he was not to be mistaken for twobrothers with the name Casca who had participated in the murder.

By a will dated 13 September 45 BCE Caesar adopted his great-nephew GaiusOctavius (later Augustus) as his heir, and to every citizen he left 300 sesterces,repeating an earlier gift. He had rewarded his soldiers well, though their loyalty tohim rested as much on personal foundations as it did on material ones. Brutus wasresponsible for preventing the killing of Antony, which in the end proved a fatalmistake.Among others with a close personal bond to Caesar, it is right to mentionCalpurnia, his wife since 59 BCE, Servilia, the most famous of his mistresses besidesbeing the mother of Brutus, and Cleopatra, who soon evacuated Rome incompany with Caesarion. All these people, in different ways, would ensure thatCaesar would be avenged.Augustus, of course, emerged as the victor from the nextround of civil wars against (successively) Brutus and Cassius, Sextus Pompey, andfinally Antony and Cleopatra.

The death of Caesar ended the temporary stability. Brutus and Cassius advertisedlibertas as their motivation and were called ‘liberators’ or ‘tyrannicides’ by their sup-porters. A famous coin type promotes the message that they had restored libertas to


FIGURE 9 A silver denarius of 44 BCE, minted by Lucius Plaetorius Cestianus,advertising Brutus in conjunction with symbols justifying Caesar’sassassination as a tyrant (Crawford 1974, no. 508/3; Cassius Dio 47.25.1).Obverse:Head of Brutus facing right, bearded; around,BRVT(us).IMP(erator) [‘General Brutus’]; around, L(ucius).PLAET(orius).CEST(ianus) [the moneyer] left to right. Border of dots.Reverse: A pileus [the cap worn by a freed slave] between two daggers;below, EID(ibus).MAR(tiis) [‘for the Ides of March’]. Border of dots.

enslaved fellow citizens on the Ides of March ( figure 9 ).Yet their ideas were notrealistic.The traditional state based on noble competition and popular sovereigntywas irretrievably lost. A restoration would only have resulted once more in com-peting generals, fractured loyalties, and civil war.Certainly the idea of the traditionalstate governed by senate and people remained powerful under Augustus.This wasbecause the social hierarchy (senators – equites – people) remained the same. Onegeneral at the head of one army, however, guaranteed internal concord and externalpeace.

Conclusion

Libertas was the crucial idea that brought about Caesar’s assassination. It overcamethe powerful bonds created by clementia and permitted the characterization ofCaesar as a tyrant.Yet the ideal was aristocratic. Libertas did not have the sameconnotations for the soldiers, the Roman people, the inhabitants of Italy, or thosein the provinces. It was also unrealistic, as the speedy renewal of civil war demon-strated clearly. In the end, Caesar misjudged the nobles’ attachment to competitionand privilege. He simultaneously over-estimated the influence of his clementia, hisaffable personality, his moderate reforms, and his undeniably magnificent achieve-ments. It would have helped if he could have seen that in certain fundamentalrespects Brutus and Cassius and their co-conspirators were just like him. Theywanted to compete for the kinds of opportunities he had received.

Recommended reading

Good general treatments of the main events and issues surrounding Caesar’s assassi-nation are provided by Gelzer 1968, ch. 6; Hoyos 1979; Scullard 1982, chs. vi–vii;Meier 1995, chs. 13–14; Garland 2003, ch. 9; Goldsworthy 2006, ch. 23; Kamm2006, ch. 10;Tatum 2008, ch. 7; Billows 2009, ch. x; Gardner 2009; andWiseman2009, 211–34.

The significance of Cicero’s speech On Behalf of Marcellus is analyzed in detail byDyer 1990. Excellent scholarly investigations of the operation of clementia, libertas,and tyranny in Caesar’s latter years may be found in Morgan 1997; Griffin 2003;and Raaflaub 2003.

A number of specific studies of Caesar’s assassination have appeared in recent years.Among the most interesting are Parenti 2003;Woolf 2006; and Canfora 2007, chs.29–42.The chapter-length study by Lintott 2009 is particularly recommended asan authoritative statement. For the role played by Greek philosophy in motivatingthe conspiracy and in identifying potential conspirators, see Sedley 1997.

Macquarie University has a fine site devoted to ‘The Coinage of Julius Caesar’:www.humanities.mq.edu.au/acans/caesar/Portraits_Coins.htm


www.humanities.mq.edu.au/acans/caesar/Portraits_Coins.htm


12RES PUBLICA

Caesar’s role in the transformationof the Roman Republic

Res Publica

Roman citizens always cherished the idea that their state was a public possessionand a co-operative venture. Res publica was ‘the public business’ or ‘the publicconcern’, and it implied that the government was based on an agreement to sharepower. Notions of co-operation and sharing were also prominent when the statewas alternatively described as a partnership between ‘the senate and the Romanpeople’ (senatus populusque Romanus). Even the advent of emperors, and Caesar wasof course their forerunner, never completely extinguished the idea that Rome wasa state owned and operated by its citizens, i.e. by its populus (‘people, public’).Mostemperors treated this deep-seated idea with respect, though of course the era ofemperors was sharply different from the days when the senate gave its advice inthe form of decrees and the Roman people elected magistrates and voted laws intheir various assemblies. The republican form of state – where executive powerrested with the senate and people rather than an emperor who commanded theloyalty of the legions – was no doubt eclipsed by Caesar and his successors.Whatrole did Caesar play in this fundamental change in political form and power atRome?

There are two primary aims in this chapter.The first is to recapitulate some ofthe main points made in previous chapters against the long-held view that Caesarsought monarchy from an early age and intended to change the state because of hissupposed dissatisfaction with the way in which it was operating under the corruptand inept nobility.The second aim is to survey some of the main theories aboutCaesar’s role in the transformation of the Roman Republic and to argue thatindividuals and processes operated together to produce gradual transformationrather than dramatic collapse. It will not do to blame either individuals (as ancientwriters tended to do) or processes (as modern writers are inclined to do).Although

he did not deliberately set out to bring down the republican political system,Caesar should not be absolved of responsibility altogether.Historical processes werevitally important, but Caesar should bear a significant amount of responsibility, asshould other individuals of his age.

Caesar: An assessment

Caesar commands attention as a man of action, a soldier, and a competitive indivi-dual driven to succeed (thoroughly Roman traits to be sure).His personality seemsthat of a man normally at ease with his superiority, the result of obvious gifts andpositive reinforcement from his youngest days. This Caesar could be the mostaffable, charming, and generous of friends and lovers.When his superiority was notacknowledged, or his charm did not work, however, he found it difficult to concealpassionate anger, as though underneath the surface he was dealing constantly withinsecurity.This personality trait might reflect his social status as a patrician from arelatively weak family among the nobility. At any rate, his political enemies,especially Cato, were aware of the problem and evidently worked hard to makeCaesar reveal it in public. His politics was marked by similar contradiction. Hecould pursue a conciliatory line, perhaps in genuine spirit, but when oppositionarose, he was capable of anger and violence, though he seems to have preferredrational argument and assertion of the moral high ground. Such a man – alternatelyin the right and then in the wrong – tends to infuriate political opponents at eitherjuncture. His generalship, unsurpassed in antiquity and studied to this day bymilitary theorists, officer trainees, and enthusiasts, rested firmly on principles ofattack, speed, and clever deployment. Military command came naturally and com-fortably to him. At his death he was making grand preparations for war againstParthia and Dacia. He was an impressive orator and a master of self-presentation tothe people of Rome. If he showed impatience and lack of restraint in his final years,this was partly because competition with his peers had changed in ways notentirely congenial to him.His intellectual interests and achievements underline theastonishing versatility that makes him one of the most impressive characters ofancient Rome.Yet Caesar was no statesman, no great legislator.There were limitsto his political vision and commitment as dictator. His legislative activity was fairlyuninspired. It contains no real surprises, and embodies no particular conviction thatfundamental reform was vital.The man who by 46 BCE could say,‘I have lived longenough whether measured by nature or by glory’ (Cicero, On Behalf of Marcellus25),was ambitious for personal position rather than far-reaching political and socialreform.The civil war was fought largely to defend his dignitas.

In contrast to traditional views, there has been little sign in this book of theman who would be king from his earliest days. Plutarch, Suetonius, and moderninterpretations influenced by Mommsen have fostered the impression that Caesarwas obsessed by the idea of sole rule. For Mommsen he was a romantic hero, whorose inevitably and made decisions infallibly. He supposedly saw that an emperorwas needed to remove the corrupt nobility and alleviate the suffering of the

168 Caesar’s role in the transformation of the Roman Republic

common people. In reality this picture owes much to hindsight, and the evidencefor monarchy turns out to derive largely from negative assessments of Caesar’smotivation and actions (Chapter 1). Caesar was a member of the nobility, drivento compete for power with his peers in a world shaped by various socio-economicand other processes, which generated complex tensions between the inhabitantsof Rome and her empire (Chapter 2). His early career was unsurprising for anoble, marked by faltering steps, setbacks, and giving the impression of a youngman dealing with weaknesses in his background in the best ways he could throughever-changing circumstances (Chapter 3). Caesar had ambition sure enough, butit was ambition of a traditional type, directed towards traditional ends, even whenhe secured election as pontifex maximus in 63 BCE and was able to emphasize Julianassociations with some of the most sacred ideas, objects, and ceremonies of theRoman state religion (Chapter 4). His consulship saw dramatic developments,above all the political pact with Pompey and Crassus misleadingly called ‘the FirstTriumvirate’, as though it had a formal or legal basis, and then his resort toviolence in order to quash the opposition of his colleague Bibulus and theoptimates.Yet the alliance with Pompey and Crassus was for particular aims at thetime, rather than for long-range Julian monarchy, and the resort to violence,though wrong on a number of levels, was largely prompted by the unnecessaryintransigence of the optimates, who refused to compromise or permit consensusalong traditional lines, as many contemporaries seem to have expected them to do(Chapter 5). Caesar’s search for (military) gloria in Gaul is another stage to beassessed in traditional rather than revolutionary terms. Roman nobles wereencouraged to surpass their peers in warfare, if they could, and above all to aimfor a triumph. Pompey, who by this time had celebrated an unprecedented threetriumphs, set the standard for military achievement in contemporary Rome.Caesar could hardly have planned to surpass Pompey from the outset. It seems thatGaul was not even his first target: the migration of the Helvetii diverted him froma planned invasion of Illyricum (Chapter 6). Moreover, final victory in Gaul wasno certainty. It only came about after some large defeats, a couple of mightyrebellions, and desperate, backs-to-the-wall action at Alesia, where Caesar and hismen stared total defeat directly in the face. There was nothing inevitable orpredetermined about Caesar’s struggle against Vercingetorix and the Gauls(Chapter 7).

Certainly, civil war did ensue against Pompey and the optimates. But was Caesarlooking for ways to launch a long-contemplated grab for monarchic power or washe forced into it? It is no surprise to learn that he is supposed to have said atPharsalus that he was forced into the conflict, though in his own account of thecivil war he admits that he was largely motivated by attacks on his personaldignitas.Motivation is a complex matter, and difficult to describe in singular terms.Perhaps headway can be made by asking several pertinent questions. For example,how many senators wanted war and how many wanted peace? It is apparent thatthe overwhelming majority wanted peace and expected the relatively smallnumber of optimates, who had suborned Pompey to their side, to seek a

Caesar’s role in the transformation of the Roman Republic 169

compromise with Caesar, as traditional ideas about sharing power and seekingconsensus demanded.Was war inevitable because of Caesar’s attitude or because ofthat of the optimates? The majority of senators, who voted overwhelmingly forpeace, seem to have thought that the attitude of the optimates was (more) at fault– at least until Caesar crossed the Rubicon.The intransigence of the reactionaryconservatives, who clung desperately to the prerogatives enshrined in Sulla’sreforms, ruined the various chances for compromise (Chapter 8). The civil waritself was marked first of all by Caesar’s policy of clementia, the opposite of Sulla’scruelty, and by desperate attempts to catch up with Pompey in Italy. WhenPompey escaped, Caesar was left with the most dangerous of campaigns. Hisendless difficulties, setbacks, victories against the odds, and acknowledgements ofgood fortune must imply that he was far from assured of victory when he invadedItaly in January 49 BCE. It becomes increasingly likely that he felt he had littlechoice (Chapter 9). His victory brought monarchic power in all but name andafforded the opportunity to pass a series of reforms.On inspection, however, thesereforms look to be traditional, unsurprising, ad hoc, and limited in character.Thereis little sign of the fundamental state reform for the benefit of the suffering massesthat has long been described. In a conciliatory spirit, as befits the man of clementia,he seems to have done what was superficially necessary, or what was imposed bythe particular circumstances, rather than what he had desired to do in passionatemanner from his early youth. Continuity rather than change was served byCaesar’s reforms. His monarchic power earned reactions both positive andnegative. On one hand, it brought a long string of extraordinary and divinehonors.These appear once more to have been far less momentous for the Romansthan modern writers have taken them to be. Above all, they were not part of adeveloping, grand plan aimed at installing Caesar formally as Rome’s king(Chapter 10).The negative reaction to Caesar’s monarchic power arose because ofthe limits that were placed on the aspirations and opportunities available toRome’s remaining nobles. Competition for pre-eminence along traditional lineswas denied them.Yet the crucial question was whether Caesar’s behavior was thatof a tyrant or a paternal autocrat. His clementia imposed powerful obligations of apaternal type. In the end, these were overcome by obligations created by philo-sophy and history for Roman aristocrats to rise up against a tyrant who suppressedthe libertas of Roman citizens. Support for the ‘tyrannicides’ or ‘liberators’,however, was not as widespread as Brutus and his associates would have hoped.Support for Caesar, perhaps as the option for stability rather than necessarily forpreference, seems to have been far greater than they thought (Chapter 11). If, then,monarchic power came to him through force of circumstances rather than lifelongdesire, to what degree should he be held responsible for the transformation of theRoman Republic? If monarchic power was largely forced upon him, what levelof responsibility should be assigned to Caesar for the advent of the RomanEmpire under his heir Augustus, who emulated his adoptive father by acquiringpower through civil war?


Ancient explanations for the transformation of the Roman Republic:Individuals and processes

A modern commentator might well think that the political institutions of theRepublic were simply inadequate for the difficult business of governing a far-flungempire.The magistracies of the cursus honorum, and the various popular assemblies,had been developed for the government of a city-state rather than an empire.Themeasures adopted to cope with imperial government were frequently ad hoc andcumulative, rather than comprehensive and systematic. Service in the provincestypically lasted for one year only (hardly enough time to develop real expertise),extra magistrates were added at intervals, the imperium of governors was extendedin potentially dangerous ways, and extraordinary military commands became nece-ssary to deal with critical threats that crossed provincial borders. On top of this, arange of socio-economic processes gave rise to complex tensions (as outlined inChapter 2).

Ancient writers, however, tended not to analyze political change in such institu-tional terms, though political theorists believed that monarchies, aristocracies, anddemocracies were inherently unstable political forms, and some writers did have arudimentary understanding of the role played by impersonal processes in bringingabout historical change. Instead, ancient commentators preferred to assign respon-sibility to individuals, especially where the result was violent upheaval for the state.Romans living under Augustus did not explain the civil wars by saying that therewas something wrong with the form of the Roman state or with the traditions ofRoman government. No political explanation was offered for the horrors of thecivil wars. In fact, Romans thought that they had a unique talent for governmentand were extremely proud of their state. It remains remarkable that while the civilwars were going on there were no major provincial revolts. In his philosophicalwork entitled De Re Publica (On the State 5.5–9), Cicero’s ideal state was theexisting Roman constitution, if only it were led by a man who would guide it asa moderator or director. In Vergil’s Aeneid (6.851), Jupiter declares that Rome’smission is to rule the world.The Romans did not see anything wrong with theirmixed constitution, which contained elements of monarchy (the consuls), aristo-cracy (the senate), and democracy (the people).

The crucial ingredient was each citizen’s attitude to the state. This is whereCaesar was found wanting. He is supposed to have said near the end of his life thatthe res publica was but a name without any substance (Suetonius, Life of the DivineJulius 77).Augustus never made such a comment.His attitude was always respectful.In his Res Gestae (Achievements 34.3),Augustus claimed that he exceeded others inauctoritas (‘moral influence’) rather than potestas (‘magisterial power’). He stressedmos maiorum (‘ancestral custom’ or ‘tradition’) and his receipt of offices and honorsfrom the senate and Roman people.All the republican offices were maintained inthe Augustan age. There were still consuls, praetors, aediles, tribunes, and so on.Octavian had employed the magical name ‘Caesar’ on his way to the top, but whenhe became ‘Augustus’ the name and memory of Caesar presented difficulties.


‘Caesar the dictator’, in the eyes of the nobles, had behaved like a tyrant, taking theoffice of dictator for life, and therefore had been assassinated.These memories hadthe potential to doAugustus harm, so references to Caesar had to be made carefully.The poet Horace (Odes 1.12.46), for instance, mentions Caesar as a star rather thanas a man. Horace’s contemporaryVergil, in Book 6 of the Aeneid (6.826–35), doesnot mention Caesar or Pompey by name, but alludes to them as the sole authors ofthe civil war. Caesar is called upon to be first to bury the hatchet, to stop the civilwar. Of course, he did not do so. Livy was unsure whether Caesar’s birth was ablessing or a curse for Rome (Seneca, Natural Questions 5.18.4).The memory ofCaesar the dictator was quietly pushed under the carpet, except under verycontrolled circumstances. By contrast, Cicero and Cato could be openly praisedunder the Augustan regime. Even Augustus said that Cicero was a great writer andpatriot (Plutarch, Life of Cicero 49.5) – in spite of the fact that he had conspired toproscribe the ‘great writer and patriot’.The historianVelleius Paterculus, a supporterof the emperor Tiberius, also admired Cicero and Cato. Cato became the personi-fication of virtue. Caesar became a tyrant for overthrowing such virtuous figures.

The Romans, therefore, did not blame political problems for the decline of theRoman Republic.They wrote instead about moral problems, and they tended tothink of such problems as the failings of individuals.The Republic went throughits decline and fall because of a decline in the Roman character. The pursuit ofvices like avaritia (‘greed’) and luxuria (‘luxurious living’) became more importantin men’s minds than service to the state. Selfish pursuits and personal aggran-dizement outweighed state service.This explanation is reminiscent of the warningsof Cato the Elder about what would happen if eastern decadence took hold atRome. It is also reminiscent of Cicero’s criticism (Letters to Atticus 1.19, 1.20, 2.9)of those nobles and upper-class Romans who preferred not to take part in politicsbut to stay on their luxurious estates and breed fish.These men were called piscinarii(‘fish-fanciers’). The opulence of their lifestyle can hardly be imagined now.Lucullus needed water for his vast fishponds. He obtained it by commissioningengineers to tunnel under a mountain so that water from the lake on the other sidecould be conveyed to his estate.Vedius Pollio, an associate of Augustus, owned avilla on the Bay of Naples which was large enough to provoke comparison with acity – an exaggerated comparison, to be sure, but instructive just the same. Anyslaves who displeased him were reportedly thrown alive into a tank of moray eels(Pliny,Natural History 9.39). Men likeVedius Pollio, it was thought, were too busythinking of sensual pleasures to consider the good of the state as a whole.

When writers such as Sallust and Livy looked back at the civil wars, they arguedthat Romans had been corrupted by the wealth and luxurious ways which hadflooded into Italy from the Greek East.Decline was above all the fault of prominentmen who had fallen prey to vice and had forgotten the virtuous ways of theirancestors. Romans of the first century BCE, it was said or implied, were inferior tothose who had fought and overcome the Latins and Samnites and Carthaginians.The standard Roman explanation for the political decline of the Roman Republicwas couched in terms of moral decline from a pristine age in which virtue


dominated over vice, in which men placed the interests of the state before self-interest, and in which good was sovereign over evil.

The fullest statement of this explanation for the troubles of the last century BCE

may be found in the works of Sallust, who was writing after the death of Caesar. Inhis Conspiracy of Catiline, Sallust paints a picture of Roman greatness, which beganto decline when Carthage was destroyed in 146 BCE. Fortune grew cruel, whereasavarice, lust, and other vices rose to ascendancy. In his War against Jugurtha, Sallustargues that discipline declined after Rome destroyed Carthage, her last greatexternal enemy.As a result, factions and parties arose in Roman politics in the ageof leisure and luxury that followed.Wantonness, avarice, and noble dignitas wereranged in opposition to the libertas of the Roman people. Livy wrote in the Prefaceto his monumental history that Rome had acquired her empire because of thecharacter of the men of olden times.He declared that his aim would be to trace theprocess of moral decline down to his own day. His comment (Preface 9) on his owntimes is significant:‘Now’,he wrote,‘we can endure neither our vices nor their cure’.Things were not looking up underAugustus!This kind of sentiment is probably onereason whyAugustus called Livy a ‘good Republican’ and even a ‘Pompeian’, thoughit did not impair the friendship between the two men (Tacitus,Annals 4.34).

The moral explanation for the decline of the Republic was thoroughly endorsedby Augustus, who passed laws against adultery and other vices, stressed theimportance of the family as Rome’s basic social unit, and rehabilitated numerousaspects of the traditional religion. It seems that he was trying to expiate a very realsense of sin, a general community feeling that Romans had been morally deficient.The question is, ‘Should we accept this ancient explanation for the decline of theRoman Republic’? It is, for instance, quite possible to undermine the picture ofmoral decline by emphasizing continuity rather than change when analyzing theimpact of Caesar and Augustus on Roman government. The res publica (‘publicbusiness’) remained a powerful idea, largely because both men preserved therepublican social order based on classes of senators, equestrians, and citizens. Noblehouses had vied with one another for pre-eminence for centuries. Was theascendancy of Caesar and Augustus merely a period of Julian dominance accordingto a traditional pattern? Could contemporaries have thought this might be the case?

The point which tells against this idea is that nobles like Sulla, Pompey, andCaesar were dominant for a quite untraditional reason – civil war – and it is theirrespective examples, rather than that of (say) Scipio Africanus, the conqueror ofHannibal, which opened the way for the rule of Augustus, if not perhaps for itsstability or the truly significant establishment of a dynasty. Tacitus (Annals 1.1)thought of the Roman Republic as an interval between two monarchic dynasties– that of the kings of early Rome and that of Augustus. In many ways this interpre-tation has stood the test of time, so that it is still conventional to write about the‘Republic’, marked by meaningful senatorial debate and popular vote, giving wayto the ‘Empire’, ruled by ‘emperors’. Caesar was murdered for being a tyrannicalautocrat, but autocracy was not quashed and republican rule was not rehabilitated.Cicero, the great republican,was proscribed and murdered in 43 BCE because of his


outspoken opposition to Antony. His head and right hand were cut off and nailedon the Rostra.Antony and Octavian played out the last, tragic act off the waters ofActium in north-western Greece in 31 BCE.With the reign of Augustus, or perhapswith the start of the reign ofTiberius, the decline of the Republic became plain. Itis certainly fair, therefore, to stress this transformation and consider Caesar’s respon-sibility for it. Should we agree with the ancient view that the Roman Republicdeclined because of the moral failings of individual Romans, especially leaders likeCaesar?

Modern explanations for the transformation of the Roman Republic

Modern scholars offer sharply different answers to this question, though at thepresent time processes are blamed rather more than individuals. In this respect, theancient and the modern worlds are very different. Little sympathy exists these daysfor historical explanations that focus upon the ‘great man in history’ and argue thatgreat men shape their times. Certainly such an argument would be an overstate-ment, but it introduces a series of fundamental questions. Do human beings rise togreatness or do they have greatness thrust upon them? Can both these thingshappen simultaneously? There should be no doubt that historical processes andconditions are very important in shaping the men and women of any age. If Caesarhad not been born in 100 BCE as a male into a patrician, noble, Roman family,would he have been so outstanding? It seems unlikely, though certainty is impossi-ble, and human potential should not be dismissed lightly. How have modernscholars handled this topic?

Predictably, given the fact that much of our evidence emanates from the elite,there has been a heavy concentration on the role of the Roman nobility. Sir RonaldSyme’s classic treatment of the rise of Augustus (The Roman Revolution, 1939)commences around the time of Caesar’s first consulship in 59 BCE. Syme focused onthe major players, their supporters, and the relationships and conflicts between them.Consequently, the main outcome of the civil wars was the transformation of theruling oligarchy under Augustus. R.E. Smith (The Failure of the Roman Republic,1955) thought that the oligarchs would have dealt successfully with the problems ofthe day, if only the Gracchi had not stirred the people against them and provokedthe use of violence.The sympathies of this treatment tend to lie with the conser-vative oligarchs, who had to deal with the lowering of moral standards introducedby the Gracchi.The German scholar Christian Meier (Res Publica Amissa, 1966, 2ndedn. 1980) acknowledges the tensions that had been developing as a result ofRome’s acquisition of an empire.Yet these were not sufficient, in his view, to bringdown the traditional state because all Romans were united in exploiting theprovincials.The factor that apparently made the difference was the decline in moralstandards among Rome’s generals,who found themselves in charge of mighty clientarmies during the age of Caesar.The threat represented by these men was not metbecause the political classes were reluctant to change the organs of a state which hadserved their interests for so long.They were not the ones suffering most from the


problems brought on by acquisition of the empire. In short, members of the eliteplaced their own interests first, and the Republic fell as a result.

Peter Brunt, Syme’s successor as Camden Professor of Roman History atOxford, adopted a broader perspective (The Fall of the Roman Republic and OtherEssays, 1988), trying to move beyond the role of individuals and political factions.While acknowledging the influence of individuals in certain situations, he discussespolitical and socio-economic processes as reasons for the decline of the Republic,especially processes connected to violence, land, and debt. He emphasizes constantland hunger among the poor as a major spur to recruitment in the armies of thecompeting warlords.The urban plebs and the rural plebs came to see violence as alegitimate response to the way they were being treated. Moreover, Brunt arguesthat the senate must bear much of the responsibility for the decline of the RomanRepublic because it failed to deal with the serious socio-economic problems thatwere being experienced throughout Italy. He does not agree with Syme’s pictureof a revolution promoted largely from above and transforming the oligarchy.Instead, he argues that problems affecting the common people were so severe thatthere were ongoing stimuli for revolution coming from below. Whereas eliteindividuals appear prominently in Syme, processes stemming from the land-hungryand indebted poor are prominent in Brunt.This does not mean that the Romanshad a class struggle in the Marxist sense. Brunt is very concerned to emphasize this.Marx describes a horizontal division between the rich and the poor, between thosewho own or control the means of production and those who do not. Rome wassplit in a more vertical fashion,with dynasts and their followers of all classes rangedin opposition to one another, and leaders susceptible to pressure from below.

It seems probable, however, that the situation was more complicated than Bruntallows. For a start, the precise nature of the land hunger and distress in Italy is nowunder question.As was outlined in Chapter 2, recent scholarship is inclined to stresscontinuity rather than change in the countryside. Furthermore, the soldiers of thecivil wars had various motives for fighting. Some were related to the personalstanding of their generals and to the soldiers’ hopes for material rewards.Yet it isclear that they were also moved by arguments about threats to the res publica,tyrannical individuals and factions in the senate, the sacrosanctity of tribunes, therights of citizens, and the use of violence for political ends. They were hardlyrejecting the traditional state. Contributors to Volume 9 of the Cambridge AncientHistory (2nd edn. 1994) tried to convey the impressions of change, continuity, andcollapse in a novel way by describing a society not in decay or decline but, on thecontrary, growing up so fast in international leadership and material prosperity, incosmopolitanism of population and hellenization of ideas, that it finally tumbledover its own feet. It could only be rescued through political transformation.

The renewed stress on continuity inevitably recalls the analysis of Erich Gruen(The Last Generation of the Roman Republic, 1974), who is troubled by the generalscholarly consensus that the decline of the Republic was a long, slow process,generated over time by a protracted series of dramatic and damaging events. Hebelieves instead that the leadership of the senatorial oligarchy was more stable than


is generally assumed and that the civil war between Pompey and Caesar was hardlyanticipated by contemporaries. The breakdown of normal politics was fast andsudden rather than slow and gradual. Few theories have provoked as much interestand controversy as this one, with critics saying that it underestimates the legacy ofdamage and bitterness inherited from many previous incidents.Caesar’s behavior asconsul, for instance, was perhaps less conciliatory and statesmanlike in spirit thanGruen believes. Nonetheless, the tide of recent scholarship is in favor of greatercontinuity, and it suggests several factors that might have acted as a social ‘glue’,which are very different from Meier’s idea that all Romans were united by theirongoing desire to exploit the provincials. For example,Romans of all classes partic-ipated together in civic rituals, such as those conducted at religious festivals. Sitessuch as the Capitol, which embodied sacred relevance, patriotic pride, and a moralcode for all citizens,marked the physical space of Rome. Statues placed strategicallyaround the city implied the presence of the individual depicted and an enduringclaim to recognition. Assemblies for elections or trials or military training meantimmediacy, intimacy, and even shared emotion for Romans. Patronage is no longerthought about in formulaic terms, but its effects were nonetheless very real, and itoperated through a round of daily rituals, such as the morning salutatio, wherebyclients gathered together at the house of their patron to greet him and considerbusiness for that day.These and other symbols and behaviors gave resilience to theres publica. They constituted a political culture that could withstand episodes ofdivisive politics.

Where does this leave Caesar? For one thing, if there was more continuity thanhas at times been allowed, he probably played a more decisive role as an individualin bringing about the transformation of the Republic. When Ernst Badianreviewed Christian Meier’s biography of Caesar, he expressed dissatisfaction withthe mechanistic, shallow way in which Caesar’s motivation was handled – makinghim merely a representative Roman general of the time (1990, 37):

[Meier’s Caesar] is not really history because it denies human choice.Whatseems most troubling about it – even apart from the preference for processesover persons – is the constant flirtation with … historical mechanism: theview that human beings move within a machine beyond human control.

This criticism transcends the field of Caesar scholarship, as Badian undoubtedlyintended.There are many powerful historians who believe that individuals makeonly a limited impact. Fernand Braudel, perhaps the most important French histor-ian of the post-war era, writes (1972, 2.1243–4):

[W]hen I think of the individual, I am always inclined to see him imprisonedwithin a destiny in which he himself has little hand, fixed in a landscape inwhich the infinite perspectives of the long term stretch into the distanceboth behind him and before. In historical analysis as I see it, rightly orwrongly, the long run always wins in the end. Annihilating innumerable


events – all those which cannot be accommodated in the main ongoingcurrent and which are therefore ruthlessly swept to one side – it indubitablylimits both the freedom of the individual and even the role of chance.

If impersonal processes are emphasized, Caesar seems less responsible for themayhem that resulted from his attitudes and behavior. If personalities are empha-sized, he becomes commensurately more responsible. It might be that thedestructive nature of the SocialWar has yet to be fully appreciated, for although itresulted in a huge extension of citizenship throughout Italy, it also swept away theold system of alliances which had bound Italian communities to Rome.Then thereare the psychological effects of killing fellow Italians, whose communities wereafterwards accepted as Roman. Another important ingredient seems to be theMediterranean-wide contacts enjoyed by both Caesar and Pompey, along withsome of their peers. Armed conflict between Sulla and the Marians took placelargely in Italy, whereas the civil war between Caesar and the Pompeians wasfought on a much grander scale, throughout the Mediterranean. The res publicashowed far less resilience after the second civil war.Yet the transformation of theRepublic was not a great accident, and one reason to re-emphasize the role ofindividuals is that the powerful Romans of the time do seem to have made indivi-dual decisions.They did not all hold the same attitude to the traditional form ofthe state, or to the influence of the nobles, or to hallowed values such as compro-mise and consensus. Consider, for instance, the tribunes, special representatives ofthe plebs and possessors of the power of veto, a power that always carried thepotential for anarchy.Tiberius Gracchus caused the deposition of a colleague, andhis tribunate in 133 BCE illustrated the potential for popular sovereignty as aconceivable alternative to senatorial leadership. Scipio Nasica reacted to this brandof politics by leading a lynch mob against the Gracchans. In doing so,Nasica clearlyperceived a credible threat to senatorial leadership.The Gracchi brothers, however,were by no means typical in their use of the tribunate. The senate was hardlybothered by the majority of tribunes in the age of Caesar.

The great generals were likewise far from uniform in their attitudes andbehavior. In 88 BCE,Marius and the tribune Sulpicius Rufus clearly did not expectSulla to march on Rome, but of course he did.This act is often seen as openingthe floodgates. Marius and Cinna certainly copied Sulla’s lead when his back wasturned, and Marius in 87 BCE proved himself more violent than Sulla had been theyear before. The rogue consul of 78 BCE, Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, failed in hisattempt to stage a coup. Pompey, however, did not march on Rome in 62 BCE,though many in the capital expected him to do so.Would Pompey have crossed theRubicon had he been in Caesar’s shoes?

It is hardly cogent to think that the Greek East corrupted Rome.The numberof vices at Rome did not increase.What did expand were the resources that couldbe deployed in pursuit of these vices as wealth and influence increased throughconquest.By 100 BCE,Rome dominated a world stage, nobles could think seriouslyabout emulating Alexander the Great, dignitas became a matter of rising concern


because some men were outstripping their contemporaries in unprecedentedfashion, and competition intensified. Tiberius Gracchus had to succeed. GaiusGracchus had to avenge his brother. Catilina had to become consul. Caesar had tobecome consul for the second time.The stakes were higher, and failure was there-fore greater too.Cicero saw the problem when writing On the State, in the mid-50sBCE, but thought that order could be maintained by an outstanding man who couldact as moderator or director. In his De Officiis (On Duties), however, written afterCaesar’s murder, Cicero discussed how a Roman gentleman should behave in thepresent circumstances. His tone was pessimistic. He despaired that there could be amoderator or director for the state because all men of sufficient prominence wouldbe subject to self-will and love of power.Tyranny would be the inevitable result.

Cicero was writing, of course, in Caesar’s wake and with Caesar very much inmind. Caesar’s way was not, however, inevitable. In 184/3 BCE, jealous enemiesunder threat of prosecution forced Scipio Africanus out of Rome. He was seen asa threat to the traditional form of the Roman state, to the dominance of the senate,and to the pre-eminence of the Roman nobility. Africanus went into exile afterreminding the citizens of his many services to the state, especially during theSecond Punic War when he defeated Hannibal. Like Cicero, he did not resort toviolence but succumbed to the attacks of his enemies, which undermined hisdignitas. Caesar, on the other hand, started a civil war in defense of his dignitas. ForAfricanus, the state came first, the individual second.Africanus abided by the law.Caesar did not.

It does seem that continuity accompanied change, and that both impersonalprocesses and personal traits have explanatory power when contemplating thetransformation of the Roman Republic, as they do for a wide range of historicalquestions. Individuals were influenced, and they exerted influence. However, thereare two points that might be stressed in this connection:

1 Rome endured a devastating series of civil wars precisely because she becamea successful imperial power.The problems that afflicted Rome during the lateRepublic were a direct result of her acquisition of an empire.The same acqui-sitive spirit, which compelled the state to expand, also compelled individualswithin the state to monopolize the benefits of empire, rather than share themequally. It is plain that the benefits of the empire were at every stage mono-polized by a select group, whether by the nobles in the senate against thepeople, by the rich against the poor, by Roman citizens against Italians, or evenby the inhabitants of Italy against those of the provinces. Rome gained thewhole world but collapsed into civil war because her people could not findsatisfaction even in gaining everything; and

2 The subordination of individual responsibility is a worrying phenomenon inthe work of some historians, and it is very much a part of today’s world –experts in various fields explain individual behavior in terms of factors beyondindividual choice, such as family or gender or nationality or peer group ormental state, and so on. Belief is widespread that if Caesar had not crossed the


Rubicon, another man of similar background would have found a Rubicon tocross somewhere else. The power of processes is unquestionable, but theemphasis upon them is worrying. If individuals fail to accept responsibility forthe things they do, how can they ever claim credit for their actions? If eachindividual chooses not to cross the Rubicon, then nobody crosses the Rubi-con. Certainly there are pressures, often hidden or unknown pressures, but nodecision is inevitable.We risk anarchy if we undermine the concept of individ-ual responsibility too strongly. I cling to the idea that an individual can makea difference, and I certainly feel that lots of single individuals in combinationcan make a difference. For these kinds of reasons a large degree of responsi-bility for the horrors of the age should be placed at the door of Romans likeCaesar, Pompey, and the optimates who goaded Caesar with unforgivableintransigence. I have been concerned to emphasize, through the conceptswhich have guided the narrative in each chapter, that Caesar shared a moralcode with others of his society, especially the nobles. I have also beenconcerned to argue that enemies who were not playing according to tradi-tional rules, even when their contemporaries signaled that it was time for themto do so, pressured Caesar.This does not mean that I would absolve Caesar ofhaving played a large part in the transformation of the Roman Republic. Heresponded to his enemies in kind. He did not set out to promote the transfor-mation of the Republic, but this was what he helped to do.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this book has had two major aims in studying the life of Gaius JuliusCaesar. One has been to criticize a fundamental theme of the source tradition thatholds that Caesar sought monarchy obsessively from an early age and intended tosupplant the corrupt Roman nobility, especially the optimate oligarchy whosemembers shaped so much of the senate’s agenda in the wake of Sulla’s reforms.Second, there has been an attempt to demonstrate that Caesar operated accordingto a traditional moral code, which governed competition between himself andother members of the elite. In this final chapter, the element of sharing has beenemphasized through a particular focus on the concept of the Roman state as respublica (‘public business’,‘the public matter’).The idea that all citizens shared in thestate according to their dignitas or rank remained strong under the Empire.Thusemperors were not incompatible with the idea of res publica, given Roman notionsof hierarchy, and res publica cannot mean ‘Republic’ as distinct from ‘Empire’ in linewith modern conventions. It must mean ‘state’ or ‘commonwealth’ and the idea ofpublic sharing should be stressed. Consensus and compromise preserved thiselement of sharing and co-operation, particularly among the political elite. Inattempting to explain the breakdown of this fundamental commitment to sharingand compromise, emphasis has been placed on both individuals and processes,though relative responsibility is difficult to apportion with any precision. In the


end,what is certain is that there was a momentous transformation for the Republic,and Caesar was a momentous part of it.

Recommended reading

For good accounts of the theme of moral decline in the final two centuries BCE,see Earl 1967; Lintott 1972; Levick 1982; and Edwards 1993.

The ‘fall’ of the Roman Republic is one of the great topics of Roman history (andindeed of modern historiography). In addition to the works mentioned above,readers might like to consult Momigliano 1940, who sees the ‘Roman Revolution’as the ‘Italian Revolution’ and urges the consideration of historical problems andprocesses over individuals. ‘History’, he says, ‘is the history of problems, not ofindividuals, or of groups’ (7). Other important contributions include Syme 1950;Brunt 1968 (a powerful review of Meier’s Res Publica Amissa); Brunt 1971a and1971b; North 1989 (an excellent review of Brunt 1988); Crawford 1992; Shotter1994; Stevenson 2000; Griffin 2009. Crook, Lintott and Rawson 1994, 769 n. 2,point out that ‘[t]here are examples enough in history of wealth and materialismaccompanying not decline but advance of a society’. On the subject of ‘politicalculture’ and rituals promoting the resilience of the res publica, the papers inHölkeskamp 2009 are stimulating.

Scholarly reviews of important biographies of Caesar can sometimes be as import-ant as the original works:Gelzer 1968 should be read with Syme 1944;Meier 1995should be accompanied by Badian 1990.


TABLE OF EVENTS, 100–44 BCE

100 Gaius Julius Caesar is born (12 July).

88 Lucius Cornelius Sulla marches on Rome at the head of his legions.

87 Gaius Marius and Lucius Cornelius Cinna take power in Rome.

84 Caesar is designated to become the flamen Dialis, a high honor.He marriesCornelia, the daughter of Cinna.

81 In the wake of Sulla’s victory over the Marians, Caesar does not serve asflamen Dialis, though he remains married to Cornelia.

80 Caesar commences military service with the governor of Asia. At thecapture of Mytilene he wins a corona civica (‘civic crown’, an oak crownawarded for saving the life of a fellow citizen in battle).

78 Caesar serves in the army of Publius Servilius Isauricus, governor ofCilicia. He returns to Rome after the death of the dictator Sulla.

77 Caesar prosecutes the consular (ex-consul) Gnaeus Cornelius Dolabella.

76 Caesar prosecutes Gaius Antonius ‘Hybrida’ (‘half-beast’).

74 Caesar journeys to Rhodes for advanced study in rhetoric. He is capturedand held for ransom by Cilician pirates.

73 MithridatesVI of Pontus invades the province of Asia. Caesar fights Ponticforces in the province, and is co-opted as a pontifex (one of the priestlycolleges at Rome).

72 Caesar is elected military tribune.

70 Gnaeus Pompeius (Pompey) and Marcus Licinius Crassus serve togetheras consuls for the first time.

69 Caesar serves as quaestor in Rome. He gives famous eulogies at thefunerals of his aunt Julia, the widow of Marius, and his wife Cornelia, thedaughter of Cinna.

68 Caesar serves as proquaestor in Hispania Ulterior (Further Spain).

67 Caesar marries Pompeia and speaks in favour of the lex Gabinia, i.e. thelaw proposed by the tribune Gabinius, which gave Pompey an extraor-dinary command against pirates throughout the Mediterranean.

66 Caesar supports the lex Manilia (proposed by the tribune Manilius), whichgives Pompey command against Mithridates.

65 Caesar holds the office of curule aedile, and wins great popularity bygiving handouts, staging lavish games, and restoring the trophies of hisaunt’s husband, Marius.

64 Caesar serves as a judge in the murder court.

63 The great orator Marcus Tullius Cicero serves as consul. Caesar is electedpontifex maximus, and is also elected praetor for the following year. On 5December, in the famous debate in the senate on the fate of the Catilin-arian conspirators, Caesar speaks against the death penalty. After beingoutvoted, he tries to have the command against Catilina conferred onPompey, but is thwarted by Marcus Porcius Cato (Cato theYounger) andthe optimates.

62 Caesar serves as praetor in Rome. In December, Publius Clodius profanesthe Festival of Bona Dea (‘the Good Goddess’). Pompey returns to Italyfrom his campaigns in the East.

61 Caesar serves as propraetorian governor of Further Spain and conductsvictorious campaigns against the Lusitani.

60 Caesar returns from Spain and gives up the opportunity of a triumph inorder to campaign for the consulship. He engineers a political alliancewith Pompey and Crassus. This alliance is known conventionally bymodern commentators as ‘the First Triumvirate’.

59 Caesar serves as consul for the first time (cos. I). His legislation is finallypassed by violence.He provides land for the poor and for Pompey’s troops;he sponsors a tribunician bill (through Publius Vatinius), which ratifiesPompey’s settlement in the East; the Asian tax contract is lowered by one-third. Pompey marries Julia, Caesar’s daughter. Caesar marries Calpurnia,daughter of Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, who is elected consul forthe following year. The people vote a lex Vatinia, which gives Caesar

182 Table of Events, 100–44 BCE

proconsular command of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum.The senate lateradds Transalpine Gaul. Caesar’s consular colleague, Marcus CalpurniusBibulus, in response to the violence, retires to his house to watch the skyfor omens. Caesar, as pontifex maximus, sponsors the transition of Clodiusfrom patrician to plebeian class so that he could become tribune in thefollowing year.

58–50 Caesar campaigns in Gaul.

58 Among a raft of measures, Clodius as tribune of the plebs helps to bringabout the exile of Cicero for having presided over the executions of theCatilinarians as consul in 63 BCE. Some Gallic tribes appeal to Caesar inMarch. In response, Caesar defeats the Helvetii, a migrating Swiss tribe,and Ariovistus, a German chief.

57 Clodius’ increasingly bold attacks on Pompey cause a chain of events,which result in Cicero’s recall to Rome. Gang violence becomes morecommon and dangerous, Pompey receives an extraordinary commissionto supervise the city’s grain supply, and friction develops between Pompeyand Crassus. Caesar defeats the Belgae in northern Gaul.

56 Cicero secures the acquittal of Publius Sestius, a gang leader, andannounces his intention of attacking Caesar’s land law. The triumvirsrenew their alliance at Luca in April. Pompey compels Cicero to help thetriumvirs. Caesar campaigns against theVeneti and Morini on the Atlanticcoast of Gaul (Brittany and Normandy), and also moves against theAquitani. By executing all the elders of theVeneti and selling the wholepopulation into slavery, he alarms many friendly Gauls.

55 Pompey and Crassus serve as consuls for the second time, and the threetriumvirs receive fresh commands. Caesar’s command in Gaul is renewed,Pompey is given Spain (but governs through legates), and Crassus obtainsSyria, all for five years. Caesar massacres German settlers in Gaul, theUsipetes and theTencteri.Then he bridges the Rhine, and invades Britainfor the first time, a reconnaissance in strength. He returns to Gaul afterthree weeks, having lost many ships to a storm in the English Channel.

54 Caesar’s daughter Julia dies in childbirth. Pompey resists Caesar’s offer ofanother marriage alliance. Caesar launches his second expedition toBritain and compels tribes in the south-east of the country to surrenderand pay tribute. A revolt breaks out in north-eastern Gaul during thewinter.Ambiorix of the Eburones destroys 15 cohorts of Roman soldiers.Quintus Cicero’s camp is besieged and relieved with difficulty by Caesar.The situation is so unsettled that Caesar spends the winter in Gaul, incontrast to his usual practice of wintering at Ravenna in the Po Valley.Titus Labienus, Caesar’s most trusted legate, is sent against the Treveri.

Table of Events, 100–44 BCE 183

53 Rioting in Rome prevents the election of consuls until July/August.Crassus is defeated and killed by the Parthians at Carrhae (9 June). Caesarsuppresses rebellion in northern Gaul in ruthless fashion, and crosses theRhine into Germany for the second time. The Eburones are virtuallywiped out, thoughAmbiorix manages to escape.The tribes of central Gaulare frightened and furious.They plan their own revolt on a massive scale.

52 Rome descends into chaos following the murder of Clodius by his enemyMilo (18 January). The senate calls upon Pompey to restore order andserve as sole consul (25 February). He passes a series of laws against vio-lence and disorder.Then, by the famous ‘law of the ten tribunes’, Caesaris permitted to stand for a second consulship in 48 in absentia (‘in hisabsence’), i.e. Caesar does not have to canvass at Rome as a privatus(‘private citizen’) during 49 BCE.The ‘Great Gallic Revolt’ breaks out incentral Gaul, led byVercingetorix of the Arverni. Caesar takes Avaricumby means of massive siege-works and the sheer courage and doggeddetermination of his men.At Gergovia, however, he has to break off thesiege after suffering severe losses,which he blames on the over-enthusiasmof his men.After shadowing and out-maneuveringVercingetorix, he layssiege to the fortress of Alesia.A huge Gallic relief army is beaten off andthe defenders of Alesia are finally forced to surrender. Vercingetorix istaken prisoner.

51 The optimates begin a campaign to replace Caesar in Gaul during 50 BCE.Caesar gains the support of Gaius Scribonius Curio, who is electedtribune of the plebs for 50 BCE. In a final act of defiance in Gaul, theBellovaci revolt, and the siege of Uxellodunum ensues.The last vestiges ofresistance are inexorably stamped out.

50 Curio, as tribune, vetoes debate on the question of a successor to Caesarin Gaul. Pompey falls gravely ill in summer, but recovers amid widespreadexpressions of joy. Curio proposes that both Pompey and Caesar disarmsimultaneously.This proposal is favored by the majority of the senate butrejected by the optimates. Caesar spends the year organizing his newprovince.

49 On 1 January the senate decrees that Caesar should lay down his com-mand.The tribunes Cassius and Antony interpose their vetoes on Caesar’sbehalf. They are threatened with violence and so flee from Rome toCaesar. Pompey is called upon to save the state. On 11 January, Caesarcrosses the tiny Rubicon River into Italy. Civil war begins. Corfinium issurrounded and forced to surrender on 21 February. Pompey leavesBrundisium for Greece on 17 March. Caesar is appointed dictator (dict.I). He holds the office for 11 days and passes emergency legislation. Hethen marches to Nearer Spain and secures the submission of armies com-manded by Pompey’s legates at Ilerda (2 August). Massilia surrenders to


Caesar after enduring a siege of six months. Curio leads an army intoAfrica on Caesar’s behalf but is defeated and killed by optimate forcesaided by King Juba I of Numidia.

48 Caesar is consul for the second time (cos. II). Milo is killed, followingdisturbances in Italy over indebtedness and famine. Caesar crosses toGreece and besieges Pompey near the port city of Dyrrachium (April).Pompey manages to break out, inflicting serious losses on Caesar’s armyin the process (July). Caesar is victorious at Pharsalus in Thessaly (9August). Pompey flees to Egypt, but is murdered at Alexandria by agentsof the young pharaoh, Ptolemy XIII (28 September). Caesar is besiegedin Alexandria by forces loyal to Ptolemy, whose sister, Cleopatra VII,becomes Caesar’s nominee. In Rome, upon receipt of the news aboutPharsalus, Caesar is voted dictator for a year (dict. II).The optimates beginto gather troops in Africa.

47 When Caesar is joined by reinforcements from Asia Minor, he wins avictory on the Nile (27 March). Ptolemy is drowned. Cleopatra is madequeen of all Egypt.At the beginning of June, Caesar leaves Egypt, defeatsPharnaces of Pontus at Zela, and settles the East. He returns to Rome atthe beginning of October, quells a mutiny of his favoriteTenth legion, andpasses legislation dealing with various social and economic ills. On 28December he sails against Pompeian forces in Africa. Marcus Antonius(Mark Antony), his magister equitum (‘master of horse’, deputy to adictator), attempts to maintain order in Italy. Marcus Aemilius Lepidusmanages affairs in Rome for Caesar.

46 Caesar’s army is victorious at Thapsus (6 April). Cato commits suicide atUtica. The province of Africa Nova is formed in the wake of Thapsus.Caesar returns to Rome on 25 July and celebrates a set of magnificenttriumphs. He is elected consul for the third time (cos. III) and appointeddictator for the third time (dict. III). His dictatorship is for ten years.Further legislation follows, notably an important reform of the calendar.The sons of Pompey, Gnaeus and Sextus Pompeius, renew the war inSpain and raise formidable armies against Caesar, who is forced to leaveRome at the beginning of November.

45 Caesar is elected consul for the fourth time (cos. IV), and defeats thePompeians at Munda in the most difficult battle of his career (17 March).He returns to Rome in October, and receives exceptional honors,including divine worship and a perpetual dictatorship (dict. IV).

44 Caesar is elected consul for the fifth time (cos.V).On 15 February Caesarappears at the Lupercalia festival dressed in kingly robes and wearing agolden wreath.When, however, Antony offers him a diadem, the primesymbol of kingship, he refuses it ostentatiously, as though he has no desire

Table of Events, 100–44 BCE 185

to be acknowledged as a king at Rome.His monarchic power neverthelessprompts around 60 republicans to join a conspiracy led by Marcus JuniusBrutus. On 15 March (the Ides of March) Caesar is murdered whileentering a meeting of the senate held in the Theatre of Pompey.


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Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, consul in 78BCE, tried to stage a coup in the wakeof Sulla’s death 45, 48, 55, 177

Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, consul in 46BCE, son of the consul in 78 BCE ofthe same name, legate of Caesar 154

Lucius Aemilius Paullus, conqueror ofMacedon at the Battle of Pydna in 168BCE, natural father of ScipioAemilianus before the latter’s adoptioninto the Scipio family 17, 25

Lucius Aemilius Paullus, consul in 50BCE, received a huge loan from Caesarin order to build/restore the BasilicaAemilia in the Roman Forum 116,118, 142

Aeneas, prince of Troy, son of Venus,ancestor of the Julii, founding figure ofRome 36, 57, 66, 97

Lucius Afranius, consul in 61 BCE, legateof Pompey in the civil war 126

MarcusVipsanius Agrippa, friend andassociate of Augustus 18

Alexander the Great,Alexander III(356-323 BCE), king of Macedon,conqueror of the Persian Empire 7,39, 55, 70, 72, 133, 135, 140, 177

Ambiorix, a chieftain of the Eburones, atribe of northern Gaul, organized arevolt against Caesar in 54 BCE 101

Anchises, father of Aeneas 36Ancus Marcius, legendary fourth king of

Rome 57Antipater of Judea, an adventurer who

came to Caesar’s aid when Caesar wasbesieged in Alexandria 132

Gaius Antonius ‘Hybrida’ (half-beast),prosecuted by Caesar in 76 BCE,consul in 63 BCE in association withCicero 45, 68, 70

Marcus Antonius, ‘Mark Antony’,tribune of the plebs in 49 BCE, legateof Caesar in Gaul and during the civilwar against the Pompeians, partner ofCleopatra 109, 120, 121, 127, 136,148, 151, 154, 158, 163, 164, 174

Ariovistus, king of the Suebi, a Germantribe, defeated by Caesar in 58 BCE86, 87

Ascanius/Iulus, son of Aeneas, founder ofAlba Longa, ancestor of the Julii 36,66

Gaius Ateius Capito, tribune of the plebsin 55 BCE 98

Atia, mother of Augustus, her father wasMarcus Atius Balbus, her mother wasJulia, one of Caesar’s two sisters 37

Marcus Atius Balbus, brother-in-law ofCaesar, married to one of Caesar’s twosisters 37

INDEXES

Ancient Historical and Mythological Figures (in bold as the formfavored in this book)

Attalus III, king of Pergamum (c. 170-133BCE) 18

Titus Pomponius Atticus, equestrianbanker, friend and correspondent ofCicero, associate of many leadingpolitical figures 6, 119

Augustus, born Gaius Octavius, grandsonof Caesar’s sister Julia, adopted son andheir of Caesar, first emperor of Rome3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 17, 18, 37, 43, 96, 136,144, 164, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174

Aurelia, Caesar’s mother, from theAurelius Cotta family, impressive amongthe plebeian nobility 36, 37, 42, 66

Bacchus (Greek Dionysus), god of wine26

Lucius Cornelius Balbus, equestrian friendand advisor of Caesar 6, 159, 161

Marcus Calpurnius Bibulus, consul of 59BCE in association with Caesar,opponent of Caesar, son-in-law of CatotheYounger 6, 59, 74, 75, 76, 77, 82,90, 112, 113, 114, 127, 150, 161, 169

Bogud, king of Mauretania, ally of Caesarduring the civil war 136

Bona Dea (‘the Good Goddess’), agoddess whose name indicates acapricious temperament, her festival wasa women-only matter 71, 76, 80, 150

Decimus Junius Brutus Albinus, legate ofCaesar in Gaul, later one of Caesar’sassassins 92, 160

Lucius Junius Brutus, noble who led therebellion against Tarquin the Proudwhich resulted in the foundation of theRoman Republic 140, 161, 163

Marcus Junius Brutus, assassin of Caesar,figurehead, leader of the conspiracy withCassius 3, 5, 6, 82, 160, 161, 163, 164

Marcus Caelius Rufus, promising youngorator of the middle of the first centuryBCE, correspondent of Cicero 114,118, 133, 144

Gaius Julius Caesar, 100-44 BCE(ancient writers on) 5-9; (appearance)2-4; (birth) 15, 35; (‘Caesarian section’)3; (calendar) 6, 144; (charisma) 2, 3, 168;(coinage) 144, 146; (constructionprojects) 142; (consul in 59 BCE) 3, 71,73-6, 154, 174, 176; (corona civica, oakwreath) 44, 52; (curule aedile) 59;(diadem) 154, 158, 159; (dictator) 1, 13,

139-52, 153-65, 168, 172; (dictatorperpetuo) 1, 172; (dignitas) 109-22, 168;(disbands bodyguard) 160; (divinehonours) 3, 170; (entourage) 142;(epilepsy) 2; (fortune) 60, 150, 170;(Forum cult, posthumous) 149;(generalship) 168; (globe) 146; (goldenchair) 146; (honours) 140, 145-51, 153;(intellectual interests) 6, 141, 168; (ivorystool) 146; (jokes) 6; (‘July’) 3, 146;(laurel wreath) 2, 95, 146; (legislativeactivity) 168; (modern writers on) 9-12;(monarchy) 169; (motives) 169; (noble)36; (patrician) 35-6, 37, 42; (personality)2-3, 9, 168; (pirates) 46; (poetry) 6;(pontifex) 47; (praetor) 67, 69-73;(proquaestor) 57; (quaestor) 35, 56-7;(reforms) 140, 142-5, 170; (sexualappetite) 3; (speeches) 6; (storm in smallboat) 123; (strategy) 79; (superstitions)66, 150; (tactics) 79; (triumphs) 35, 79,135, 169; (triumphal chariot) 146;(triumphal robe) 146; (Trojan ancestry)36, 66, 67; (trophies from Gaul) 97;(tyrant) 3, 140, 141, 153-65, 170, 172,178; (will) 164

Gaius Julius Caesar StraboVopiscus, consulin 90 BCE 36

Lucius Julius Caesar, consul in 91 BCE36

Caesarion, see Ptolemy Caesar, below.Caesetius Flavus, tribune of the plebs in

44 BCE 158Calpurnia, Caesar’s third wife, daughter of

Piso, consul in 58 BCE 75, 164Gaius Caninius Rebilus, consul in 45 BC

for the last few hours of the year 154Gnaeus Papirius Carbo, a noble who

opposed Sulla in association withMarius theYounger when Sullareturned to Italy in 83 BCE 41

Gaius Casca, tribune of the plebs in 44BCE 164

Gaius Cassius Longinus, assassin of Caesar,initiator, leader of the conspiracy withBrutus 3, 160, 161

Quintus Cassius Longinus, tribune of theplebs in 49 BCE, fled to Caesar incompany with Antony after beingthreatened with physical harm,rapacious governor in Spain 109, 120,121, 136, 154, 164

Cassivellaunus, king of combined Britishtribes of south-east Britain 100

200 Index of ancient figures

Castor (and Pollux), the Dioscuri, whohad a temple (called ‘Castor’s’) in theForum 59

Lucius Sergius Catilina, ‘Catiline’ towriters in English, raised a revolt againstthe state in 63-62 BCE 68, 69, 70, 178

Marcus Porcius Cato the Elder, strictcensor in 184 BCE, symbol of old-fashioned moral uprightness 25, 26,69, 172

Marcus Porcius Cato the Younger, bitterpersonal enemy of Caesar 3, 6, 8, 53,69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 77, 80, 81, 82, 90,96, 99, 110, 112, 113, 117, 127, 135,156, 161, 168, 172

Quintus Lutatius Catulus, consul in 102BCE, father of Catulus (consul in 78BCE) 56

Quintus Lutatius Catulus, consul in 78BCE, a leader of the conservatives inthe senate following Sulla’s death,opponent of Caesar in 63 BCE for thepost of pontifex maximus 55, 56, 60, 65,66, 67, 70

Marcus Tullius Cicero, consul in 63 BCE,Rome’s greatest orator 6, 22, 27, 43,46, 54, 61, 68, 69, 70, 73, 77, 80, 81, 89,91, 97, 98, 111, 113, 114, 116, 117, 119,120, 121, 127, 131, 135, 139, 148, 149,153, 156, 158, 161, 172, 173, 178

Quintus Tullius Cicero, brother of Cicero,legate of Caesar in Gaul 6, 91, 98, 101

Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus, consul in460 BCE, dictator in 458 and 439 BCE,hero of early Rome 44

Lucius Cornelius Cinna, consul in 87-84BCE, ally of Marius, opponent of Sulla40, 41, 42, 43, 56, 57, 154, 177

Lucius Cornelius Cinna, brother-in-law ofCaesar, praetor in 44 BCE, expressedapproval of Caesar’s murder 48, 164

Gaius Helvius Cinna, tribune of the plebsin 44 BCE 164

Clementia (‘Mercifulness’), goddessinspiring the merciful behavior of asuperior 139-52

Clementia Caesaris (‘the Clemency ofCaesar’) 146

Cleopatra VII, queen of Egypt, installedby Caesar in 48 BCE, daughter ofPtolemy XII Auletes 10, 131, 132,135, 146, 164

Publius Clodius Pulcher, tribune of theplebs in 58 BCE, murdered by

henchmen of Milo in 52 BCE 56, 71,76, 80, 81, 82, 89, 90, 93, 113, 114, 118,144, 163

Cornelia, Caesar’s first wife, daughter ofthe patrician Lucius Cornelius Cinna38, 42, 43, 56, 57, 63

Cornelia, fifth and last wife of Pompey,daughter of Metellus Scipio 112

Cossutia, a girl from a rich equestrianfamily to whom Caesar was betrothedas a young man 38, 42

Gaius Aurelius Cotta, consul in 75 BCE,his post as pontifex after his death wentto Caesar 47, 48

Lucius Aurelius Cotta, consul in 65 BCE38, 42, 160

Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta, legate ofCaesar in Gaul 101

Marcus Licinius Crassus, ally of Sulla,famous general, victor over Spartacus,associate of Caesar and Pompey in the‘First Triumvirate’ 8, 41, 47-8, 53, 54,55, 59, 60, 68, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79,90, 91, 92, 95, 96, 98, 101, 112, 160, 169

Publius Licinius Crassus, son of Crassusthe triumvir, legate of Caesar in Gaul89, 101

Creusa, wife of Aeneas, went missingduring the flight fromTroy 36

Gaius Scribonius Curio, tribune of theplebs in 50 BCE, legate of Caesarduring the civil war 118, 119, 121,127

Diviciacus, chief of the Aedui 87Divus Julius/the Divine Julius/the

God Julius, the cult name for Caesar asa god 149

Gnaeus Cornelius Dolabella, consul in 81BCE, was prosecuted unsuccessfully byCaesar in 77 BCE 45

Publius Cornelius Dolabella, consul in 44BCE, took the place of Caesar as consulafter the latter was murdered, one-timeson-in-law of Cicero 154

Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, consulin 54 BCE, opponent of Caesar, died atPharsalus in 48 BCE 90, 91, 98, 125,126, 131

Gnaeus Domitius Calvinus, legate ofCaesar during the civil war 128, 133

Epidius Marullus, tribune of the plebs in44 BCE 158

Index of ancient figures 201

Quintus Fabius Maximus, the famous‘Delayer’, helped to bring Hannibal to astandstill during the Second PunicWar(218-202 BCE) 44

Quintus Fabius Maximus, consul in 45BCE, died on the last day of hisconsular year 154

Faunus/Pan, a woodland god with thehorns and lower body of a goat 146

Felicitas (‘Luck’), goddess of divinely-inspired luck 97, 123

Fortuna (‘Fortune’), goddess of goodfortune 60, 97, 123-37

Fulvia, married successively to Clodius,Curio, and Antony 118

Aulus Gabinius, tribune of the plebs in 67BCE, consul in 58 BCE, ally ofPompey 58, 76, 80

Ganymede, mythical boy companion ofZeus 44

Gaius Sempronius Gracchus, tribune ofthe plebs in 123 and 122 BC, brother ofTiberius Gracchus, hence one of ‘theGracchi’, whose followers were‘Gracchans’ 28-33, 63, 64, 174, 177,178

Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, tribune ofthe plebs in 133 BCE, brother of GaiusGracchus, hence one of ‘the Gracchi’,whose followers were ‘Gracchans’28–33, 63, 174, 177, 178

Hannibal, famous Carthaginian general17, 18, 19, 124, 173, 178

Aulus Hirtius, legate of Caesar during thecivil war 82

Iulus/Ascanius, son of Aeneas, founderof Alba Longa, ancestor of the Julii 36,66

Jesus Christ, founder of Christianity 3,10

Juba I, king of Numidia (modern Algeria),ally of the Pompeians during the civilwar 127, 134

Judas Iscariot, betrayed Jesus Christ for30 pieces of silver 3

Jugurtha, king of Numidia (modernAlgeria), opponent of Marius 60

Julia, aunt of Caesar, wife of Gaius Marius36, 37, 56, 63

Julia, sister of Caesar 37, 136

Julia, daughter of Caesar and Cornelia,fourth wife of Pompey 56, 75, 97, 98,101

Jupiter (Greek Zeus), god of the sky andthunder, father and ruler of theOlympian gods 15, 41, 42, 95, 148,171

Jupiter Optimus Maximus (‘JupiterGreatest and Best’), whose temple onthe Capitol was the symbolic seat oftraditional Roman religion 146, 159

Titus Labienus, tribune of the plebs in 63BCE, Caesar’s leading legate in Gaulbefore defecting to the Pompeians atthe outbreak of civil war in 49 BCE65, 88, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 116,125, 130, 134, 135, 136

Lucius Cornelius Lentulus Crus, consulin 49 BCE 120

Publius Cornelius Lentulus Spinther,consul in 57 BCE, organized the recallof Cicero from exile 89

Publius Cornelius Lentulus Sura, consulin 71 BCE, joined the conspiracy ofCatiline, was executed at Cicero’s orderin 63 BCE 68, 69

Libertas (‘Freedom’), goddess of freedomor liberty 81, 153-65

Marcus Livius Drusus, tribune of theplebs in 122 BC, rival of Gaius Gracchus29

Lucius Lucceius, rich friend of Pompey,failed in bid for the consulship of 59BCE 74

Lucius Licinius Lucullus, consul in 74BCE, Sulla’s quaestor in 88 BCE andthe only officer to accompany Sulla inhis march on Rome 55, 56, 58, 59, 61,71, 72, 90, 172

Marcus TerentiusVarro Lucullus, youngerbrother of Lucullus (consul of 74 BCE),adopted by aVarro, presided as praetorin 76 BCE over the trial of GaiusAntonius ‘Hybrida’ 45

Spurius Maelius, in legend aspired totyranny, but was killed by GaiusServilius Ahala 161

Gaius Manilius, tribune of the plebs in 66BCE, proposer of the lex Manilia 58

Gaius Claudius Marcellus, consul in 50BCE, cousin to Marcellus (consul of 51BCE) 118


Gaius Claudius Marcellus, consul in 49BCE, brother to Marcellus (consul of51 BCE) 120

Marcus Claudius Marcellus, consul in 51BCE, passionate enemy of Caesar,flogged a town councilor ofTranspadane Gaul to make the pointthat he did not acknowledge thelegality of Caesar’s measures in thisregion 116, 139, 156, 157

Gaius Marius, consul in 107, 104-100, 86BCE,‘new man’ husband of Caesar’saunt Julia, great general, opponent ofSulla 18, 23, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43,48, 52, 56, 57, 60, 63, 85, 80, 97, 105,106, 107, 144, 154, 177

Gaius Marius the Younger, son of Mariusand Caesar’s aunt Julia, opponent ofSulla in the civil war following Sulla’sreturn to Italy in 83 BCE 41

Mars, god of war, lover ofVenus 23, 97,149

Lucius Caecilius Metellus, consul in 251BCE, pontifex maximus from 243-221BCE 21

Quintus Caecilius Metellus, son of Lucius(consul of 251 BCE), consul in 206BCE 21

Quintus Caecilius Metellus Nepos,tribune of the plebs in 62 BCE, ally ofPompey 69, 70

Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius, consulin 80 BCE, noble who joined Sullawhen the latter returned to Italy tofight the civil war in 83 BCE againstthe Marians 41, 65

Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio,consul in 52 BCE with Pompey, father-in-law of Pompey, opponent of Caesarduring the civil war 112, 115, 116,128, 134, 135, 145

Titus Annius Milo, tribune of the plebs in57 BCE, supporter of Cicero, gangleader who engineered the murder ofClodius in 52 BCE 89, 90, 110, 111,113, 114, 133, 144

Marcus Minucius Thermus, proconsul ofAsia in 81 BCE, Caesar’s firstcommander 43, 44

MithridatesVI, king of Pontus, a richkingdom on the southern coast of theBlack Sea, in the north-eastern part ofmodern Turkey 46, 38, 39, 40, 44, 46,47, 49, 56, 58, 59, 61, 69, 71, 133

Mithridates of Pergamum, an ally whocame to Caesar’s aid when he wasbesieged in Alexandria in 47 BCE132

Molon of Rhodes, famous teacher ofrhetoric, teacher of (among others)Cicero and Caesar 46

Mucia, third wife of Pompey 72

Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821),emperor of France, famed militaryconqueror 3

Nero, Roman emperor 54-68 CE 7, 90Nicomedes IV, king of Bithynia, a rich

kingdom in the north-western part ofAsia Minor 44

Oceanus (Ocean), personification of theAtlantic Ocean 99

Octavian (see Augustus above) 3, 174,178

Gaius Oppius, equestrian friend andadvisor of Caesar 6, 97, 161

Pan/Faunus, a woodland god with thehorns and lower body of a goat 146

Marcus Petreius, legate of Pompey in thecivil war 126

Pharnaces II, king of Pontus, son of theredoubtable MithridatesVI 133

Pietas, goddess of ‘duty’, ‘dutifulness’ 63-78

Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, consulin 58 BCE, father-in-law of Caesar,father of Caesar’s third wife Calpurnia75, 80, 81, 98

Plautius, tribune of uncertain family whoproposed (in 70 BCE?) an amnesty forfollowers of Marcus Aemilius Lepidus(consul of 78 BCE) 48

Gaius Asinius Pollio, legate of Caesar inGaul and during the civil war 77, 110,111

Pollux (and Castor), the Dioscuri, whohad a temple (called ‘Castor’s’) in theForum 59

Pompeia, Caesar’s second wife 58, 71,150

Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (106-48BCE), ‘Pompey the Great’, outstandinggeneral, associate of Caesar and Crassusin the ‘First Triumvirate’, son-in-lawand finally opponent of Caesar 6, 7, 8,10, 22, 23, 41, 45, 46, 47-8, 49, 53, 54,

Index of ancient figures 203

55, 58, 59, 60, 61, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74,75, 76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 87, 89, 90, 91,92, 95, 96, 97, 98, 101, 106, 109-22,123, 125, 126, 127, 128, 131, 132, 133,135, 148, 160, 161, 163, 169, 170, 172,173, 177, 179

Gnaeus Pompeius Strabo, consul in 89BCE, commander in the ‘Social’War,father of Pompey 44, 54

Gnaeus Pompeius, elder son ofPompey, killed at Munda in 45 BCE136

Sextus Pompeius, ‘Sextus Pompey’,younger son of Pompey, escapedMunda, fought on against theCaesarians and Augustus 136, 164

Popilia, mother of Catulus (consul of 102BCE) 56

Porcia, daughter of Cato theYounger,married Brutus in 45 BCE 161

Ptolemy XII Auletes, king of Egypt,father of Cleopatra 90, 132

Ptolemy XIII, son of Ptolemy Auletes,brother of Cleopatra 131, 132

Ptolemy Caesar, known widely asCaesarion, reputed son of Caesar andCleopatra 132, 135, 164

Quirinus, the name given to Romulus asa god 146, 149

Gaius Rabirius, aged senator prosecutedin 63 BCE in connection with thesenatus consultum ultimum passed in 100BCE against followers of the tribuneSaturninus 63, 64, 65, 68

Romulus and Remus, brothers,descendants of Ascanius/Iulus, foundingfigures of Rome 36, 146

Quintus Titurius Sabinus, legate of Caesarin Gaul 101

Lucius Appuleius Saturninus, tribune ofthe plebs in 103 and 100 BCE 64

Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus,conqueror of Carthage in 146 BCE,conqueror of Numantia in 133 BCE17, 25, 106

Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus,conqueror of Hannibal at Zama in 202BCE 17, 173, 178

Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio,opponent of the Gracchi 177

Sertorius, nephew of Marius, organizer of

Marian resistance in Spain against theSullan regime 48, 55

Servilia, lover of Caesar, mother of Brutuswho led the conspiracy against Caesar161, 164

Gaius Servilius Ahala, in legend savedRome from tyranny by killing SpuriusMaelius in 439 BCE 161

Publius Servilius Vatia Isauricus, consul in79 BCE, Caesar’s commander in 78BCE, opponent of Caesar in 63 BCEfor the post of pontifex maximus 44, 65,66, 67

Publius Sestius, tribune of the plebs in57 BCE, gang leader who helped tosecure the recall of Cicero from exile89, 90

Decimus Junius Silanus, consul in 62 BC68

Spartacus, leader of the great slave revoltin Italy from 73-71 BCE 47, 54, 55

Lucius Cornelius Sulla, dictator in 82/1BCE, victor in the civil war againstMarius and his allies 20, 23, 38, 39, 40,41, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56,57, 58, 60, 64, 65, 68, 69, 71, 80, 87, 91,97, 106, 107, 114, 124, 139, 143, 144,148, 154, 156, 173, 177

Publius Sulpicius Rufus, tribune of theplebs in 88 BCE, enemy of Sulla 39,40, 64, 177

Servius Sulpicius Rufus, consul in 51BCE, a political moderate and legalexpert 116

Tarquin the Proud, tyrannical last(seventh) king of Rome, expelled in510 BCE 23, 57, 140, 141, 161,163

Tiberius, Roman emperor 14-37 CE,successor of Augustus 7, 174

Tigranes, prince of Armenia 82Gaius TrebatiusTesta, advisor of Caesar,

and later of Augustus 159Gaius Trebonius, consul for the final three

months of 45 BCE, legate of Caesar inthe civil war, commanded the siege ofMassilia, conspirator against Caesar 96,160, 163

Tullia, daughter of Cicero 81

Lucius Valerius Flaccus, consul in 87 BCfollowing the death in office of GaiusMarius 154


Marcus TerentiusVarro, intellectual, friendof Pompey, appointed by Caesar toorganize Rome’s first public library 6,55, 142

Publius Vatinius, tribune of the plebs in 59BCE 75, 76

Publius Vedius Pollio, owner of asumptuous villa on the Bay of Naples,friend of Augustus 172

Venus (Greek Aphrodite), goddess ofbeauty, love, and war, mother of theTrojan prince Aeneas 36, 57, 66, 97,124

Venus Genetrix (‘Venus the Ancestress’),ancestress of the Julian family, and ofthe Romans in general 142

Venus Victrix (‘Venus the Bringer ofVictory’, ‘Venus theVictorious’) 96,97, 124, 142

Vercingetorix, chieftain of the Arvernitribe, greatest opponent of Caesar inGaul 95, 102, 103, 104, 135, 169

Gaius Verres, a notorious governor ofSicily who was prosecuted by Cicero in70 BCE 27

Vesta, goddess of the hearth or fire-placein a Roman home 66

Victoria, goddess of military victory95–107

Zeus (cf. Jupiter), god of the sky andthunder, father and ruler of theOlympian gods 44

Index of Latin terms 205

Latin words and phrases

ad hoc: ‘for this (particular purpose)’,signifying something designed for aspecific episode or issue 30

adulescentulus carnifex: ‘teenage butcher’,the nickname given to Pompey forhis exploits as a general of Sulladuring the civil war against the Marians54

aedilis: ‘aedile’, at first divided into ‘curuleaediles’ and ‘plebeian aediles’, forpatricians and plebeians respectively;originally the aediles were citymagistrates, responsible for the upkeepof temples; later they were responsiblefor markets, festivals, roads, and otherpublic amenities 22, 23, 59, 65

ager publicus: ‘public land’ acquired throughconquest in Italy 29

ambitio: ‘ambition’, the acceptable attitudegoverning the pursuit of public office atRome 51-61, 150

ambitus: the word for electoral bribery, a‘going round’, which denotes the illegal,unacceptable way of ‘going round’ forpublic office 51

amicitia: ‘friendship’, often in the sense of a‘political pact’ 74, 156, 157

auctoritas: ‘moral influence’, often in

contrast to potestas or ‘magisterial/legalpower’ 22, 64, 79, 115, 171

audacia: ‘boldness’ 102augur: one of the types of priest at Rome,

interpreted the will of the gods by‘taking the auspices’, i.e. observing theflight or other behavior of birds 65,75, 76

aureus: a gold coin 144avaritia: ‘greed’ 172

Bellum Civile: ‘CivilWar’, Caesar’s campaigncommentaries 5

Bellum Gallicum: ‘GallicWar’, Caesar’scampaign commentaries 5, 82-4, 89,92, 100

caligae: sturdy leather sandals worn bylegionaries 85

capite censi: ‘men counted by their head’, orproletarii (‘children-producers’), menwho lacked the property qualificationfor enlistment in the legions 39

celeritas: ‘speed’ 102censor: magistrates who assessed Roman

citizens and their property, assignedmen into classes, and drew up the list ofthe senate 20

centuria: ‘century’, (in Caesar’s day) a unit ofroughly 80 men 85

clementia: ‘mercifulness’, ‘clemency’,‘mildness’ 9, 46, 124, 125, 135, 139-52, 153, 155, 156, 157, 158, 160, 165,170

clientela: ‘clientship’ 22, 33, 176cognomen: ‘last name’, a distinctive,

additional name for a noble family, as inGaius Julius Caesar 159

cohors: ‘cohort’, a unit of around 480soldiers (six ‘centuries’) 18, 85

collegium (sing.)/collegia (plur.): ‘clubs’ or‘associations’ 80, 96, 144

comitia centuriata: ‘assembly by centuries’23, 24

comitia curiata: ‘assembly by ancient unitsknown as curiae’ 76

comitia tributa: ‘assembly by tribes’ 23, 30,39, 64

concilium plebis: ‘council of the plebs’ 23,29, 30, 64

consul: one of the two leading magistratesof Rome, elected annually, foremostcommanders of the Roman legions15, 20, 23, 113, 114, 141

consulares: ‘ex-consuls’, ‘men of consularrank’ 65, 79

contubernium: ‘tent’ or ‘staff ’ of a seniormagistrate or commander 22, 43

corona civica: ‘civic crown’, ‘crown of oakleaves’, ‘oak wreath’, a prestigiousmilitary award for saving the life of afellow citizen in battle, earned byCaesar at Mytilene in 80 BCE 44

crudelitas: ‘cruelty’ 124, 139, 170cursus honorum: ‘sequence of offices’, ‘run of

magistracies’ at Rome 22, 48, 51, 52,76, 171

de facto: ‘concerning fact’, ‘in practice’ 153dictator: before the highly irregular use of

this office by Sulla and Caesar, adictator held unrestricted imperium onlyfor the period of a military or civilemergency, or for a maximum of sixmonths 1, 13, 15, 23, 114, 126, 141

dictator perpetuo: ‘dictator forever’, ‘dictatorfor life’, ‘dictator perpetually’ 1, 140,153, 154, 156, 159, 161

dignitas: ‘ranking’, ‘standing’, or ‘rank insociety’, a man’s personal standing inRoman society 12, 22, 43, 51, 79, 80,91, 109-22, 145, 158, 161, 177, 178, 179

do ut des: ‘I give so that you may give’147

domi: ‘at home’ 21dominatio: ‘oppression’ 153

eques (sing.)/equites (plur.): ‘equestrian’,‘knight’, ‘member of the equestrianclass’, the non-senatorial elite, whosename alludes to ancestral service asmounted warriors in the early Romanarmy but whose families had neverfurnished a senator at Rome 26, 27,29, 43, 44

factio: ‘faction’, usually employed in anegative sense 111, 165

fama: ‘renown’, ‘fame’ 79fascinum: the erect phallus which was used

in several rituals conducted by theVestalVirgins, priestesses ofVesta 66

Faustus (m.)/Fausta (f.): ‘lucky’, ‘fortunate’97

felicitas: ‘divine blessing’, ‘luck’ 123Felix/felix: ‘divinely blessed’, ‘lucky’ 97flamen: a distinguished class of priest at

Rome, the priests of Jupiter, Mars,Quirinus, and of Caesar as a god 148

flamen Dialis: a highly sacred priesthood ofJupiter 41, 42, 43, 52, 63, 66, 150

fortuna: ‘good fortune’ or ‘luck’ 123-37,170

forum (sing.)/fora (plur.): a public square ormarketplace in a Roman town 97, 142

gladius: the legionary’s short sword, basedon Spanish prototypes 85

gloria: ‘military glory’ 19, 21, 35, 40, 70,73, 79-93, 105, 118, 169

gratia: ‘influence’ in the form of widespread‘gratitude’ for a benefaction orbenefactions 145

honor: ‘political office’, an honor bestowedby vote of the Roman people 79

imago: ‘wax mask’ of a Roman noble 57imperium: ‘military command’, ‘empire’

15-33, 58, 67, 72, 73, 76, 79, 82, 85, 96,106, 111, 114, 115, 118, 119, 155, 171

in absentia: ‘in his absence’ 114in suo anno: ‘in his due year’, i.e. being

elected to office in the earliest year of aman’s eligibility, a mark of distinction23, 67

206 Index of Latin terms

latifundia: ‘wide lands’, huge estates in Italy24

legio: ‘legion’, composed of ten cohorts,roughly 4800 men 85

lex: ‘law’, the result of an affirmative voteon a proposal by the Roman people inassembly 29, 64

lex Gabinia: ‘law proposed by Gabinius’,passed in 67 BCE, awarding Pompeyextraordinary imperium for a campaignagainst the pirates 58, 76

lex Manilia: ‘law proposed by Manilius’,passed in 66 BCE, awarding Pompeyextraordinary imperium for a campaignagainst MithridatesVI 58

lex Roscia: ‘law proposed by Roscius’,passed in 49 BCE, giving fullcitizenship to Latin colonies north ofthe Po River, i.e. in Transpadane Gaul143

lexTrebonia: ‘law proposed by Trebonius’,passed in 55 BCE, awarding Spain andSyria (respectively) to Pompey andCrassus 96

libertas: ‘freedom’ or ‘liberty’ 111, 153-65,170, 173

libertini: ‘freedmen’, ex-slaves set free bytheir masters as a reward for loyalservice 31, 145

luxuria: ‘luxurious living’ 172

magister equitum: ‘master of the horse’,deputy to a dictator 154

maiestas: a concept of ‘treason’, implying alowering of Roman ‘majesty’ or‘greaterness’ 87

militiae: ‘on campaign’ 21mos maiorum: ‘custom of the ancestors’,

‘ancestral custom’, ‘tradition’ 25, 171

nobilis (sing.)/nobiles (plur.): ‘noble/nobles’,‘men whose families were well known’,(in the age of Caesar) descendants ofconsuls 9, 20, 35-49, 179

nobilitas: ‘nobility’, (in the age of Caesar)descendants of consuls 9, 20, 33,35-49, 174, 178

novae res: ‘new things’, ‘revolution’,‘rebellion’ 25

novus homo (sing.)/novi homines (plur.): ‘newman/new men’, men lacking senatorialancestors, men whose families hadnever supplied a magistrate at Rome20, 33, 35

obnuntiatio: the formal, audibleannouncement of an omen in front ofan assembly 75, 150

oppidum (sing.)/oppida (plur.): towns,townships, such as existed in CelticGaul 84

optimates: ‘best men’, those who advocatedaristocratic leadership of the state 8,10, 11, 30, 52, 53, 61, 63, 64, 71, 73, 74,75, 76, 90, 96, 106, 109-22, 124, 125,127, 128, 129, 132, 134, 135, 148, 169,170, 179

paludamentum: the distinctive scarlet cloakof a Roman general 104

Parens Patriae: ‘Parent/Father of theFatherland’ 139, 141, 148, 149, 159

patres: ‘fathers’, an honorific term oftenapplied to senators at Rome 20

patrocinium: ‘patronage’ 22, 176pax deorum: (literally) ‘peace of the gods’,

better rendered as ‘pact with the gods’,‘agreement with the gods’ 147

penates: household gods of the store-cupboard 66

perduellio: an archaic concept of ‘treason’63, 64

pietas: ‘dutifulness’, ‘piety’ 63-78, 150, 151pilum (sing.)/pila (plur.): a weighted

throwing spear used by legionaries,with a point sharp enough to penetrateshields and armor 85, 106

piscinarii: ‘fish-fanciers’, ‘fishpond fanciers’172,

pius: ‘dutiful’, ‘pious’ 63, 77plebs: ‘fillers’, ‘the mob’, usually referring to

the non-noble, common citizens ofRome 18, 20, 23, 29, 39, 41, 47, 48,64, 133, 154, 175, 177

pomerium: normally understood as thesacred boundary of the city of Rome22, 23, 41, 72, 73, 96, 114, 117

pontifex maximus: ‘chief pontifex’, leader ofthe college of priests known aspontifices, the religious post to whichCaesar was elected in 63 BCE 51, 52,60, 63, 65-7, 76, 77, 128, 142, 150, 169

popularis (sing.)/populares (plur.): ‘thepeople’s man/men’, those who stressedpopular sovereignty at Rome 12, 30,52, 60, 61, 64

populus: ‘people’, ‘public’ 52populus Romanus: ‘Roman people’ 15, 18,

23, 29, 33, 52, 167

Index of Latin terms 207

potestas: ‘magisterial/legal power’ 171praefectura morum: ‘commission to supervise

public morals’ 146praetor: praetors, aged around 39, were legal

officers and judges, though theypossessed imperium and so couldcommand armies and govern provinces8, 15, 23, 67, 143, 160

privatus: ‘private citizen’ 76, 114proconsul, propraetor, proquaestor: ‘extended

consul’, etc., whose term of office wasextended for service in the provinces57

proletarii (‘children-producers’) or capitecensi (‘men counted by their head’),men who lacked the property qualifi-cation for enlistment in the legions 39

publicanus/publicani: ‘publican/publicans’,operatives of equestrian companiesformed for public purposes, especiallythe hated ‘publicans’ or tax collectors ofthe eastern provinces, such as appear inthe NewTestament 10, 26, 73, 75

quaestor: assistant to a higher magistrate,especially a consul 22, 143

Quirites: ‘Citizens’, an archaic term foraddressing the citizens of Rome 133

regnum: ‘kingly power’, ‘royal power’,‘tyranny’ 153, 156, 158, 160, 161

res publica: ‘public business’, ‘publicconcern’, ‘public matter’, one of themain names for the Roman state 24,109, 167-80

rex: ‘king’ 158, 159

sacra: ‘sacred objects’ 66salutatio: ‘greeting’, ‘salutation’, especially

the morning ritual whereby clientsgathered together at the house of theirpatron to greet him and considerbusiness for that day 176,

sapiens: ‘wise man’ 91scutum: the wooden shield of the

legionaries, covered with leather, andbound with iron 85

senatus: ‘senate’, the venerable advisorycouncil of elected magistrates andex-magistrates 20, 23, 29, 63-4, 73, 98,110, 112, 113, 114, 117, 118, 119, 121,125, 126, 143, 155, 160, 175, 177, 178

senatus consultum: ‘decree of the senate’29, 64

senatus consultum ultimum: ‘ultimate decreeof the senate’, which gave the senate’sapproval for magistrates to raise troopsin order to ensure that the state comesto no harm 64, 70, 113, 121

Senatus Populusque Romanus: ‘the senate andRoman people’, SPQR, oneconception of the Roman state 143,167

senex (sing.)/senes (plur.): ‘old man/oldmen’ 20

sidus Iulium: ‘the Julian star’, ‘the Juliancomet’, which appeared in the sky inJuly 44 BCE and seemed to confirmCaesar’s ascent to the heavens 149,152

socii: ‘allies’, a term applied especially to theItalians before the SocialWar 30, 38

spectio: the sighting or detection of anomen 75

suasoria (sing.)/suasoriae (plur.): ‘persuasivework/works’, usually a literary work 6

Sullani: followers of Sulla 45

toga virilis: the ‘toga of manhood’, assumedby Roman males at age 15 37

transitio ad plebem: a ritual enablingtransition from patrician status toplebeian status 76

tribunicia sacrosanctitas: ‘the sacred inviola-bility of a tribune’ 146

tribunus militum: ‘tribune of the soldiers’,ostensibly a junior command positionin the military, but which might insteadcarry administrative responsibilities atRome 47, 85

tribunus plebis: ‘tribune of the plebs’, (inCaesar’s day) a college of ten specialrepresentatives of the plebs, who (amongother powers) had the right to vetopublic business or the oppressivebehavior of a magistrate 22, 23, 110,126, 153, 154, 155, 158, 164, 175, 177

triumphator: ‘triumphant general’ 146‘triumvirate’: from triumviri, the Latin for ‘a

commission of three men’ 169

veni, vidi, vici: ‘I came, I saw, I conquered’,Caesar’s three-word report of the Battleof Zela in 47 BCE 133

veto: ‘I forbid’, referring especially to thepower of a tribune of the plebs to call ahalt to public business or to prevent amagistrate from using violence against a

208 Index of Latin terms

Index 209

General index

Actium 174Adcock, Sir Frank 11Adriatic Sea 126, 127Aedui 86, 87, 103, 104Africa 5, 18, 54, 127, 131, 132, 133, 134,

135, 161Agedincum 102, 103agriculture, in Italy 145Alba Longa 36Alesia 96, 103, 104, 116, 135Alexandria 9, 90, 131, 132, 133, 141, 154Allobroges 68Alps 102Alsace 87Anticato, written by Caesar 6, 135, 161Antigonids, Hellenistic dynasty 140Aquae Sextiae 18Aquileia 86Aquitani 92Arausio (modern Orange, southern

France) 18Aricia 37Armenia 56, 81Arverni 87, 102, 103, 104Asia (province) 18, 36, 38, 43, 45, 46, 47,

73, 75, 144, 154Asia Minor 18Athens 17, 23, 156Atlantic Ocean 89, 91, 99Atrebates 88Atuatuca/Atuatuci 89, 101Aurelius Cotta family, the Cottae 36, 42,

58auspices 150Autun 86Avaricum 102, 103

Bacchanalian pogroms 26Badian, Ernst 109, 176Basilica Aemilia 116, 118, 142Bay of Naples 172Belgae 87, 88Belgium 87, 89‘beliefs’, religious 148

Berlin 10Bibracte 86Billows, Richard 11Bithynia 9, 44Bituriges 102Braudel, Fernand 176bribery, especially electoral bribery, at

Rome 31brigandage 145Britain/Britons 84, 88, 98, 99, 100, 107,

112Brittany 92Brundisium 71, 123 126, 127Brunt, Peter 175Burgundy 86

Cadurci 104Campania 119, 120Campus Martius (Field of Mars) 23, 95Cannae 18Capitol (Capitoline Hill) 90, 95, 146,

159, 176Cappadocia 56Carcopino, Jérôme 11Carnutes 101Carrhae 101, 160Carthage/Carthaginians 44, 145, 172,

173Catholic Church 65Catilinarian conspiracy/Catilinarians/

Catilinarian conspirators 67-70, 81Cato, written by Cicero 135Celtiberians 17centurions 85Cevennes Mountains 102chain mail 106children, Roman 23Cilicia 22, 44, 65, 82, 119Cimbri 18, 36, 60, 86Cisalpine Gaul 76, 79, 86, 88, 91, 102,

110, 119, 121, 143, 161citizenship, Roman and Latin 31, 38, 44,

85, 143city mobs, of Rome 31

plebeian 23, 41, 45, 47, 48, 54, 115,118, 119, 155, 177

victoria: ‘military victory’ 19, 95-107

vir: ‘man’ 19virtus: quality of being a ‘man’, thus

‘courage’, ‘bravery’ 19

civil war, between Caesar and Pompey,49–45 BCE 111, 123-37

clients 24client army 39, 49client kings 125cohort/cohorts (cf. cohors) 18, 85‘Colossus’ 12concord 114, 165consensus 64, 71, 75, 109, 154, 157, 159,

179Corfinium 125Corinth 17, 145Croatia 86Cyprus 81, 82, 161Czar/Tsar, name for Russian monarchs 5

Dacia 86, 156, 168Dalmatia 76Dante (Dante Alighieri), Italian poet of the

Middle Ages 3debt 133, 143, 145, 175Delos 37‘democracy’ at Rome 31, 33Dijon 103Domus Publica 67, 71Druids 84Dyrrachium 123, 127, 128, 130

Eburones 101Egypt 17, 90, 131, 132elephants 97, 134, 135English Channel 84Ephesus 17Epirus 127extortion court, the standing court for

charges of extortion by provincialgovernors 27

family, Roman 49fascists, of Italy 5‘First Triumvirate’ 73-6, 169Flanders 88Forum/Roman Forum 21, 67, 90, 95,

113, 116, 142Forum of Caesar/Julian Forum 97, 116,

142France 76, 105Froude, James Anthony 10‘frozen waste’ model of Roman politics

31, 33

Galatia/Galatians 17Gallia Comata 84Gallia Narbonensis 86

Gaul/Gauls 8, 79-93, 95-107, 109, 112,130, 135, 143, 160, 169

Gelzer, Matthias 11, 31Gergovia 102, 103Germans/Germany 18, 84, 86, 87, 88, 98,

99, 101, 107, 112Gibbon, Edward 10gladiators 27, 145Goldsworthy,Adrian 11Gomphi 128Gradel, Ittai 149grain dole 144‘Great’ Revolt, in Gaul 102, 104Greeks 17Gruen, Erich 30, 175

Hainault 88Halicarnassus 17HannibalicWar (Second PunicWar) 44Harris,William 19Hellenistic kings (cf.Antigonids, Ptolemies,

Seleucids) 17, 19, 140, 141, 149hellenization 32, 175Helvetii 86, 99hill forts 84Hispania Ulterior (Further Spain, southern

Spain) 57

Ides of March (44 BCE) 10, 163Ilerda 126, 155Illyricum 76, 86, 91, 121imperialism, Roman 18, 32, 87, 92Isthmus of Corinth 142Italia 38

Janiculum Hill 65, 135Judea 61Judeo-Christian religion 147Junker, a 19th and early 20th Century

term for the landed aristocracy ofPrussia and eastern Germany 10

justice 19

Kaiser, name for German monarchs 5kings of Rome 146kingship 140-2Lake Fucinus 142

land 175Latin Festival 158Latins 172‘law of the ten tribunes’ 114, 115legions 85; (Eighth legion) 88; (Eleventh

legion) 88; (Fifth legion) 119;

210 Index

(Fourteenth legion) 88; (Gallic legions)125, 126, 131, 135; (Ninth legion) 88;(Seventh legion) 88, 99; (Tenth legion)88, 99, 133; (Twelfth legion) 88;(Thirteenth legion) 88, 111, 119, 121

Leipzig 10liberators 170Luca 80, 91, 92, 93, 112, 132Lupercalia 159Lusitania 72

Macedon/Macedonia/Macedonians 17,25, 45, 81, 98, 126

Mandubii 103maniple/maniples 18Marcius Rex family, the Marcii Reges 57‘Marius’ mules’ 18Marsi 38‘Marsic’War (cf. SocialWar) 38Massilia (Marseilles) 114, 125, 126, 160Meier, Christian 11, 174Menapii 101Metellus family, the Metelli 72Meuse River 101Meyer, Eduard 10militarism, at Rome 18Mommsen,Theodor 10monarchy 158moral decline 172-4Moselle River 101Munda 136, 148, 156, 157, 158Mytilene 44

Nervii 88, 89, 101‘new man’/‘new men’ (cf. novus homo/novi

homines) 33NewTestament, Christian scripture of the

first century CE 26Nicomedia 9noble competition, at Rome 111, 140,

141, 142, 159, 160, 163, 165Normandy 92‘Northern’ Revolt, in Gaul 101Novum Comum 117Numantia 17Numidia (modern Algeria) 60Numidian cavalry 134

omens 148, 150Osgood, Josiah 12

Palatine Hill 81Palladium, statuette of Pallas Athena 66Papacy 65

Parisii 103Parthia/Parthians 8, 96, 117, 118, 119,

137, 148, 154, 156, 160, 163, 168patrician families 20, 23, 143Pedius family, the Pedii 37Pergamum 18Pharsalus 97, 110, 111, 112, 127, 129-31,

132, 135, 155, 160, 161philhellenes/philhellenism 26Picenum 54, 125Pinarius family, the Pinarii 37pirates 45, 46, 49, 58, 61Pisa 36Plato 163plebeian families 20, 23Po (Padus) River/Po (Padus)Valley 57,

85, 89, 106, 117Pomptine Marshes 142Pontus 38, 47, 56popular sovereignty 29, 30, 41, 64Porta Capena (Capena Gate) 90Portugal 72Praetorian Guard 113principate (‘leadership’) 10processes, socio-economic and political, at

Rome 15-33, 167-80property qualification, for service as a

legionary 28proscriptions 41, 45, 53, 60, 69, 124, 126,

139, 155, 156, 163provinces 27Prussian generals 10Ptolemies, Hellenistic dynasty 10, 131,

140PunicWars (Second) 178; (Third) 17

Ravenna 91, 101, 102, 110, 120Republic, ‘late’ 29Republic, Roman 25, 167-80Rhine River 84, 87, 89, 98, 99, 101Rhodes 46Romania 86Roman people (cf. populus Romanus) 29,

33Roselaar, Saskia 30Rosenstein, Nathan 27, 28, 29Rostra 21, 56, 174Rubicon River 12, 120, 121, 139, 177,

179

Sabis (Sambre) River 88sacred chickens 65Samnites 38, 172Seine River 102, 103

Index 211

Seleucids, Hellenistic dynasty 61, 140senate (cf. senatus) 20, 29senate-house 113senatorial toga and shoes 56Senones 101, 102, 103Sequani 87Shakespeare,William 5Sibylline Books 160Sicily 27, 54, 143, 160silver eagle, symbol of a legion 18slaves, Roman 23-4, 27SocialWar 30, 32, 38, 40, 44, 57, 58, 85,

143, 177socio-economic processes 169, 171, 175Spain 8, 17, 27, 54, 55, 57, 72, 91, 96,

112, 115, 125, 126, 136, 143, 154Sparta 17Suebi 86, 87, 99sumptuary laws, against extravagance 144Switzerland 86Syme, Sir Ronald 11, 30, 45, 174Syria/Syrians 17, 80, 91, 96, 118, 160

Tarraco 145Tatum,W. Jeffrey 11tax farming 144Temple of Apollo 117Temple of Clementia Caesaris 146Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus 56, 70, 95,

146Temple of Quirinus 146Temple of Venus Genetrix 97, 142Temple of Vesta 67Tencteri 99Teutones 18, 36, 60Thames River 100thanksgiving 89, 92Thapsus 134, 148, 150, 153, 155, 156,

157, 158

Theatre of Pompey 96, 142, 163Thessaly 128Tiber River 29town councils, in Italy 145Transalpine Gaul 76, 86, 119, 156, 160Transpadane Gaul 117Treveri 101triumph 19, 21, 35Troy 36, 66, 67Turkey 9, 18tyrannicides 161, 164, 170tyrant/tyranny 23, 57, 63, 81, 139Tsar/Czar, name for Russian monarchs 5

Ubii 99urban poor, of Rome 40Usipetes 99Utica 135Uxellodunum 104

Veneti 91, 92VenusVictrix, shrine of 142Vercellae 18Vesontio 87VestalVirgins 42, 66veteran colonies 136, 144via Appia (‘AppianWay’) 59VietnamWar 19violence, political 113, 141, 157, 174, 175Viromandui 88voting tribes 65

Wardle, David 150-1Weinstock, Stefan 150Will,Wolfgang 11Wiseman, Peter 115women, Roman 23, 37, 49

Zela 133, 160

212 Index

Documents

Julius Caesar and the transformation of the Roman Republic