Kant Anthropology 7-27

8/15/2019 Kant Anthropology 7-27

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CAMBRIDGE TEXTS I N THE HISTORYOF PHILOSOPHY

Serits edrtorrKARL AMERIKS

Professor ofPhilorophy at rke U ~i v e nt ij f Notre DameDESMOND M. CLARKE

P~of irsor f Phtlosophy nr Univerrirj College CorkTh e main objective of Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy is to expand therange, variety and quality of texts in the history of philosophy which are available inEnglish: The series includes texts by familiar names (such as Descartes and Kant) andalso by less well-known authors. W herever possible, texts are published in complete andunabridged form , and translations are specially commissioned for the series. Each volumecontains a critical introduction together with a guide to further reading and any necessaryglossaries and textual apparatus. Th e volumes are designed for student use at under-graduate and postgraduate level and will be ofinterest nor only tostud ents ofphilosophy,but also to a wider audience of readers in the history of science, the history of theologyand th e history of ideas.

For a list of tiilespublished m the reria, pleare seemd of book.

IMMANUEL K A N T

Anthropology froma Pragmatic Pointof View

TRANSLATED AND EDITED BYR O B E R T B . LOUDEN

Uniwrriryo SouthernM d n r

WI TH A N INTRODUCTION BYMANFRED K U E H N

Boston Uniumrty

CAMBRIDGEUNIVERSITYPRESS


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Anthropological DidacticHowever, th e art, or rather the facility, of speaking in a sociable tone

and in general of appearing fashionable is falsely named popularity -particularly w hen it concerns science. It sho uld rather be called polishedsuperficiality, because it frequently cloaks the paltriness of a limitedmind. But only children can be misled by it. As the Quaker with Addisonsaid to the chattering officer sitting next to him in the carriage, "Yourdru m is a sym bol of yourself: it resoun ds because it is empty.""In order to judge human beings according to their cognitive faculty(understanding in general), we divide them into those who must begranted common sense (sensus communis), which certainly is not common(sensus vulgaris), and pe ople of science. Th e form er are kn owled geable inthe application of rules to cases (in concrete); the latter, in the rulesthemselves before their application (in abstracto). - Th e understandingthat belongs to the first cognitive faculty is called sound human under-standing (ban sens); that belonging to the second, a clear mind (ingeniumperspicax). - It is strange that sound human understanding, which isusually regarded only as a practical cognitive faculty, is not only pre-sented as something that can manage without culture, b ut also somethingfor which culture is even disadvantageous, if it is not pursued enough.Some praise it highly to the point of enthusiasm and represent it as a richsource of treasure lying hidden in the mind, and sometimes its pro-nouncement as an oracle (Socrates' genius) is said to be more reliablethan a nything academ ic science offers for sale. - Th is mu ch is certain,that if the solution to a problem is based on general and innate rules ofunderstanding (possession of which is called mother wit), it is moredangerous to look around for academic and artificially drawn-up princi-(+o] ples (school wit) and thereafter to com e to their conclusion than to take achance on the outburst from the determining grounds of masses ofjudgment that lie in the obscurity of the m ind. O ne could call this logicaltact, where reflection on the object is presented from m any different sidesand comes out w ith a correct result, without being conscious of the actsthat are going on inside the mind during this process.

But sound understanding can demonstrate its superiority only inregard to an object of experience, which consists not on ly in increasingknowledge through experience but also in enlarging experience itself; not,-- oseph Addison (1672-1719).English esrayisr, poet, and statesman. See The Specrotor 13 2(.\ugust 1, 1711). . 198.

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On the cognitive facultyhowever, in a speculative, but merely in an empirical-practical respect. Forin the speculative employment of the understanding, scientific principlesa priori are required; however, in the empirical-practical employmentof understanding there can also be experiences, that is, judgments whichare continually confirmed by trial and outcome.

On sensibility in contrast to understanding

In regard to the state of its representations, my m ind is either active andexhibits a faculty (facultas), or it is passive and consists in receptivity(receptzvitas). A cognition conta ins both joined together, and the possibil-ity of having s uch a cog nition bears t he nam e of cognittve faculty - romthe mo st distinguished pa rt of this faculty, namely the activity of mind incombining or separating representations from one another.Representations in regard to which the mind behaves passively, andby me ans of which t he sub ject is therefore affected (w heth er it affects itselfor is affected by an object), belong to the sensuous (sinnliche) cognitivefaculty. But ideas that comprise a sheer activity (thinking) belong to theintellectual cognitive faculty. T h e form er is also called the lower; th e latter,the higher cognitive faculty.d T he lower cognitive faculty has the character [ ~ . + r ]ofpassivity of the inn er sense of sensations; the higher, of spontaneity ofapperception, that is, of pure consciousness of the activity that constitutesthinking. It belongs to logic (a system of rules of the understanding), as

T o posit rmibi lig merely in the indistincmess of representations, and inrcllenu uli~~y compar-ison in the dis tincr nss o f representations, and thereby in r merely fimal (logical) distinction ofconsciousness insread ofa ma1 (psycholog ical)one, which concerns not merely the form but alsoi the contenr of thoughr, war a great errorof the Leibniz-Wolffian school. Their error was, namely,roposit sensibility n a lack (of clarity in our parrial ideas), and consequentl y n indistincm ess, andro posit the character of ideas of understanding in d isrincmess ; whereas in fact sensibility issomethin g very positive and an indispensable addition to ideasofunderstanding, in order to bringforth a cognition. -Bur Leibniz was actually to blame. For he, adhering to the Platonic school,assumed innate, pure intellenual intuitions, called ideas, which are encountered in the humanmind, though now only obscurely; and to whose analysis and illumination bymeansof attentionalone we owe the cognirion of objects,as they are in rhemselves. [Margmal nore inK ] ensibilityis a subject's faculty of representation, in$0 fir is t is affected.

As lack and is supplementary stare for cognition.A representation recollectedormade abstract.


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Anthropological D idacticd ll experience (empirical cognition), inner n o less than o uter, is only* w i t i o n o f o bj ec ts a s t he y appear to us, not as they are (considerediz dxmselves alone). For what kind of sensible intuition there will beW d s ot merely on the constitution of the object of the representation,';ar also on the co nstitution of the subject and its receptivity, after which& d i n g (the concept of the object) follows. -N ow the formal constitu-600of this receptivity cannot in turn be borrowed from the senses, butd e r must (as intuition) be given a prior< that is, it must be a sensiblemtuition which remains even after everything empirical (comprisingmnse experience) is omitted, and in inner experiences this formal elementof intuition is time.Experience is empirical cognition, but cognition (since it rests onjudgments) requires reflection (reflexio) and consequently conscious-ness of activity in combining th e manifold of ideas according to a rule ofthe unity of the manifold; that is, it requires concepts and thought ingeneral (as distinct from intuition). Thus consciousness is divided intodiscursive consciousness (which as logical consciousness must lead theway, since it gives the rule), and intuitive consciousness. Discursiveconscio usness (pure appercep tion of one's menta l activity) is simple.T he "I" of reflection contains no manifold in itself and is always oneand th e same in every judgment, because it is merely the formal elementof consciousness. O n the other han d, inner experience contains the mate-

['*] ial of consciousness and a manifold of empirical inner intuition, th e "I"of apprehension (consequently an empirical apperception).

! f ~ m o ~4 (continued)kings, or then it would be a representation of the understanding). Rather, it is merely amnsciousness of the way thar the human being appears to himsel fin his inner observation.Cornition of onerelfaccordinaro the constiturion ofwhar one is in oncselfcannat be acquired-ugh inner experienctand dw s not spring from knowledge of the natureof the human being,ba is simply and solely rhe consciousnessof one's freedom, which is kn own to him rhrough the--rial imperative of duty, therefore only through the highest practical rearon.B(Xk ield of sensibiliry in relation to the field of understanding3mipa,

-mmd (untmur) of the hurn~n enng, a\ rhc sum toul of all rcpru,r.nutmnr thar ha\c a platse \ a i lum~in , p h ~ ? r ~ )hnch ;oniernr thrcc party rhc fi c~ lr ! f cognlrlon, thc fcclmng

i and dirolearure.and the frculr\ of dcrlre t:ach ofthere h,s r w ~ v ~ $ ~ u n r .he field of- --md the field of i n f r l l enua l i ~ .the field of sensible or intellectual cognition, pleasureor-and desire or abhorrence).CM be considered as a weaknessoralso as a strength.]

On the cognitive facultyIt is true th at I as a thinking being am one and the same subject withmyself as a sensing being. However, as the object of inner empiricalintuition; that is, in so far as I am affected inwardly by experiences in time,simultaneous as well as successive, I nevertheless cognize myself only as

I appear to m yself, not as a thing in itself. Fo r this cognition still dependson the temporal condition, which is not a concept of the understanding(conseque ntly not mere spontaneity); as a result it depend s on a conditionwith regard to which my faculty of ideas is passive (and belongs toreceptivity). - Therefore I always cognize myself only through innerexperience, as I appear to myself; which proposition is then often somaliciously twisted as if it said: it only seems to me (mihi v idm ) thatI have certain ideas and sensations, indeed it only seems that I exist atall. - The semblancez5 s the ground for an erroneous judgment fromsubjectiv e causes, which are falsely regarded as objective; however, appea r-ance is not a judgment at all, but merely an empirical intuition which,through reflection and the concept of understanding arising from it,becomes inner experience and consequently truth.Th e cause of these errors is that the terms inner sense an d apperceptionare normally taken by psychologists to be synonymous, despite the factthat t he first alone sho uld indicate a psychological (applied) conscious-ness, and the second merely a logical (pure) consciousness. However, th atwe only cognize ourselves through inn er sense as we appear to ourselves isclear from this: apprehension (apprehemio) of the impressions of innersense presupposes a formal condition of inner intuition of the subject,namely time, which is not a concept of understanding and is thereforevalid merely as a subjective condition according to which inner sensationsare given to us by virtue of the constitution of the hu man soul. Therefore,apprehen sion does not give us cognition of how the object is in itself.

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This note does not really belong to anthropology. In anthropology,experiences are appearances united according to laws of understanding,and in taking into consideration our way of representing things, thequestion of how they are apart from their relation to the senses (conse-quently as they are in themselves) is not pursued at all; for this belongs to [ I ~ Imetaphysics, which has to do with the possibility of a priori cognition.


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Anthropological Didacti~L asnevertheless necessary to go back so far simply in order to sto p*d en se s of the speculative mind in regard to this question. As for theknowledge of the human being throu gh inner experience, because tor q e xtent one also judges others according to it, is more importanth n orrect judgment of others, but nevertheless at the same timep-haps more difficult. For he who investigates his interior easily carriesi p m y hings into self-consciousness instead of merely observing. So it6 dyisable and even necessary to begin with observed appearances in-If, and then to progTess above all to the assertion of certa in proposi-&us that concern human nature; that is, to inner experience.

Apology for sensibility

Ex-eryone shows the greatest respect for understanding, as is alreadyindicated by the very name higher cognitive faculty. Anyone who wantedto praise it would be dismissed with the same scorn earned by an oratorexalting virtue (stulte! qnis unguam vit~ per avi t). '~ensibility, on the o therhand, is in bad reput e. Many evil things are said about it: e.g., I ) that itconfuses the power of representation, 2) that it m onopolizes conversationand is like an autocrat, stubborn and hard to restrain, when it should bemerely the servant of the understanding, 3) that it even deceives us, andthat we cannot be sufficiently on p a r d where it is concerned. - On theother ha nd sensibility is not at a loss for eulogists, especially among poetsand people of taste, who not only extol the merits of sensualizing th econcepts of the understanding, but also assign the fertility (wealth ofideas) and emphasis (vigor) of language and the evidence of ideas (theirlucidity in consciousness) directly to this sensualizing of concepts and tothe view tha t concepts must not be analyzed into their constituent partsm t h meticulous care. T he bareness" of the understanding, however,the?- declare to be sheer poverty.' We d o not need any panegyrists here,bu t only an advocate against the accuser.

--- T m . : oo l! W ho has ever criticized virtue? " Nockrhrir.' Size re are speaking here only of the cognit ive faculty and rherefore ofrepresenrarionr(norof

feelin. ofpleasure or displeasure), ensorion =,ill mean nothing m ore rhan sense representariontmpirical inruirion) in distinction from conceprs (thoughts) as well as from pure intuition

On the cognitive facultyT h e passive element in sensibility, which we after all cannot get rid of, [144]is actually the cause of all the evil said about it. T he inner perfection ofthe human being consists in having in his power the use of all of hisfaculties, in orde r to subject them to his ree choice. For th is, it is requiredthat understanding should rule without weakening sensibility (which initself is like a mob, because it does not think), for w ithout sensibility therewould be no material that could be processed for the use of legislative

understanding.

Defense of sensibility against the first accusation

The senses do not conf ue . He who has grasped a given manifold, but notyetordered it, cannot be said to have c o n k e d it. Sense perceptions (empiricalrepresentations accom panied by consciousness) can only be called inne rappearances. Th e understanding, which comes in and connects appear-ances unde r a rule of thought (bring s order into the manifold), first makesempirical cognition out of them; th at is, experience. T h e understanding istherefore neglecting its obligation if it judges rashly witho ut firs t havingordered the sense representations according to concepts, and then latercomplains about their confusion, which it blames on the particular sensualnature of the human being. This reproach applies to the ungroundedcomplaint over the confusion of outer as well as inner representationst hr ou g h s e n s i b i ~ i t ~ . ' ~Certainly, sense representations come before those of th e understandingand present themselves en masse. But th e fruits are all the more plentiful

(representations of space and rime). [Marginal nore in H. Consciousness of oneself is eitherdiscursive n eoneepr or intuitive in rhe inner inruirion of time. -T h e I ofapperception is simpleand binding; however, the I ofapprehension is a matter of a manifold with representations joinedto one another in the I as objecr of intuition. This manifold in one's intuition is given . .[smudged] an a priori form in which it can be ordered . . .]''Marginal norr in H. Perception (empirical inruition with consciousness) could be called merelyappearance of inner sense.However, in order for it to bemme inner experience the law must beknown which determines the form of this connecrion in a consciousness of the objecr.The human being cannot observe himself internally if he is not led by means of a rule, underwhich perceptions lonemusr be united, if they aret o furnish him with anexperience. Thereforethey are rogcrher only appearances of himself. To cognize himself from them he must take aprinciple ofappearan ce (in space and rime)as a basis, in order to know what the human being is.Sensibilityas strength or weakness.


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Anthropological Didacticunderstanding comes in with its order and intellectual form and

L u g nto con sciousnes s, e.g., concise expressio ns for the co ncept,&tic expression s for the feeling, and interesting ideas for dete rmin ingrbed l . W hen the riches that the mind produces in rhetoric and poetry

-- ae placed before the understanding all at once (en masse), the under--ding is often embarrassed on account of its rational employment.Irof ten falls into confusion, when it ought to make clear and set forth allrhe acts of reflection that it actually employs, although obscurely. Butsensibility is not at fault here, rathe r it is much m ore to its credit tha t ithas presented abundant material to understagding, whereas the abstractconcepts of understanding are often only glittering poverty.

Defense of sensibility against the second accusation$10

The senses do not have command over understanding. Rather, they offerthemselves to understanding m erely in order to be a t its disposal. Th atthe senses do not wish to have their importance misjudged, an impor-tance that is du e to them especially in what is called common sense (sensuscommunis), cannot be credited to them because of the presumption ofwanting to rule over understanding. It is true that there are judgmentswhich one does not bringformally before the tribunal of understanding inorder to pronounce sentence on them, and which therefore seem to bedirectly dictated by sense. Th ey are embod ied in so-called a phorisms ororacular outbursts (such as those to whose utterance Socrates attributedhis genius). Tha t is to say, it is thereby assumed that the first judgmentabout the r ight and wise thing to do in a given case is normally also thecorrect one, and tha t ponde ring over it will only spoil it. But in fact thesejudgments do not come from the senses; they come from real, thoughobscure. reflections of understan dine. -T h e senses make no claim in this1 matter; they are like the common people who, if they are not a mob(i:nobile vulgzrs), gladly sub mi t to their supe rior unde rstan ding , bu t stillvanr to be heard. But if certain judgments and insights are assumed tospring directly from inner sense (without the help of understanding), andif dw!- are further assumed to command themselves, so that sensationsaunt as judgments, then this is sheer enthusiasm, which stands in closerehEion to derangement of the senses.

On the cognitive faculty

Defense of sensibility against the third accusation [146]

The senses do not deceive. This proposition is the rejection of the mostimpo rtant but also, on careful consideration, the emp tiest reproach madeagainst the senses; not because they always judge correctly, but ratherbecause they do nor judge at all. Error is thus a burden only to theunderstanding. - Still, sensoy appearances (species, apparentia) serve toexcuse, if not exactly to justify, understanding. Thus the human beingoften mistakes wha t is subjective in his way of representation for o bjective(the distant tower, on w hich he sees no corners, seems to be round; thesea, whose distant p art strikes his eyes throu gh higher ligh t rays, seems tobe higher than the shore (altum mare); the full moon, which he seesascending near the horizon th rough a hazy air, seems to be further away,and also larger, than when it is high in the heavens, although he catchessight of it from the same visual angle). And so one takes appearance forexperience; thereby falling into error, but it is an error of the under-standing, not of the senses.A reproach which logic throws against sensibility is that in so far ascognition is p romoted by sensibility, one reproaches it with superficiality(individuality, limitation to the particular), whereas understanding,which goes up to the universal and for that reason has to trouble itselfwith abstractions, encounters the reproach of dyness. However, aesthetictreatment, whose first requirement is popularity, adopts a method bywhich both errors can be avoided.On ability with regard to the cognitive faculty in general

srzT h e preceding paragraph, which dealt with the faculty of appearance,which no human being can control, leads us to a discussion of thecon cepts of the easy and the dfic ult ([eve et grave), which literally inGerman signify only physical conditions and powers. But in Latin,according to a certain analogy, they should signify thepracticable (facile) [147]and the comparatively impracticable (difficile); for th e barely p racticable is


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Anthropological Didacticq a r d e d as subjectively impracticable by a subject who is doubtful of thede ge e of his requisite capacity in certain situations and conditions.Facility in doing something (promptitude) must not be confused withsk ll in such actions (habitus). Th e former signifies a certain degree ofmechanical capacity: "I can if I want to," and designate s subjective possi-bility. Th e latter signifies subjective-practical necessity, that is, habit, andso designates a certain degree of will, acquired through the frequentlyrepeated use of one's faculty: "I choose this, because duty commands it."The refor e one canno t explain virtue as skill in free lawful actions, for thenit would be a me re mechanism of applyin2 power. Rather, virtue is moralstrength in adherence to one's duty, which never should become habitbut should always emerge entirely new and original from one's way ofthinking.Th e easy is contrasted to the difficult, but often it is contrasted to theonerous as well. A subject reg ards so me thing as easy when ever he enco un-ters a large surplus in his capacity for applying the requisite power toan action. What is easier than observing the formalities of visits, con-gratulations, and condolences? But what is also more a rduous for a busyman? Th ey are friendship's vexations (drudgeries), from which everyoneheartily wishes to be free, and yet still carries scruples about offendingagainst custom.

What vexations there are in external customs that are attributed toreligion but which actually collect aroun d ecclesiastical form! Th e meritof piety is set up exactly in such a way that it serves no purpose other thanthe me re submission of believers to let themselves patiently be torm entedby ceremonies and observances, atonements and mortifications of theflesh (th e more the be tter). T o be sure, this compulsory service ismechanically easy (because no vicious inclination need be sacrificed as aresult), but to th e reasonable person it mu st come as morally v e y arduousand onerous. - So when th e great moral teacher of the people said, "Mycommands are not dif fi~ ult, "'~ e did not m ean by this that they requireonly a limited expen diture of power in order to be fulfilled; for in fact ascommands that require pure dispositions of the heart they are the most

[rg] ifficult ones of all that can be comm anded. Bu t for a reasonable personthey are still infinitely easier than commands of busy inactivity (gratis

'' John j:;. See also Kant's Retixion With in rhr Boundaries of Mere Reason 6: r7gn

On the cognitive facultyanhelare , multa agendo, nihil agere)? such as those which Judaism estab-lished. Fo r to a reasonable man the m echanically easy feels like a heavyburden, when he sees that all the effort connected to it still serves nopurpose.T o make some thing difficult easy is meritorious; to depict it to som eoneas easy, even though one is n ot able to accom plish it oneself, is deception.T o do that which is easy is meritless. Method s and machines, and amongthese the division of labor among different craftsmen (manufacturedgoods), make many things easy which would be difficult to do withone's own hands without other tools.T o point out difficulties before one gives instruction for an under-taking(as, e.g., in metaphysical investigations) may admittedly discourageothers, but this is still better than concealing difficulties from th em. H ewho regards everything tha t he undertakes as easy is thoughtless. He whoperforms everything that he does with ease is adept; just as he whoseactions reveal effort is awkward.- Social entertainment (conversation) ismerely a game in which every thing must b e easy and must allow easiness.Thus ceremony (stiffness) in conversation, e.g., the solemn good-byeafter a banquet, has been gotten rid of as somethin g outmod ed.People's state of mind in a business undertaking varies according to thedifference of temperaments. Some begin with difficulties and concerns(the melancholic temperament), with o thers (the sanguine) hope and thepresumed easiness of carrying out the undertaking are the first thoughtsthat come into their minds.But how to regard the vainglorious claim of powerful men, which isnot based on mere temperament: "What the human being wills, he cando"? It is nothing more than a high-sounding tautology: namely what hewills at the order o his morally commanding reason, he ought to do andconsequently can also do (for the impossible is not comm anded to him byreason). However, some years ago there were fools like this who alsoprided themselves on taking the dictum in a physical sense, announ cingthemselves as world-assailants; but their breed has long since vanished.Finally, becomzng accustomed (consuetudo) in fact m akes the end ura nceof misfortune easy (which is then falsely honored with the name of avirtue, namely patience), for when sensations of exactly the same kind" Trans.: gasping in vain; occupied with many things, bur accomplishing nothing. Phaedrur,

Fabulor 2.5.


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Anthropological Didacticpersist for a long time without change and draw one's attention away

:-A: rom he senses, one is barely conscious of them a ny more. Bu t this alsomakes consciousness and mem ory of the good that on e has received moredfficult, which then usually leads to ingratitude (a real vice).Habit (assuetudo), however, is a physical inner necessitation to proceedin the same manner that one has proceeded until now. It deprives evengood actions of their moral worth because it impairs the freedom ofthe mind and, moreover, leads to thoughtless repetition of the verysame act (monotony), and so becomes ridiculous. - Habitual fillers3'(phrases used for the mere filling up of the emptiness of thoughts)make the listener constantly worried that he will have to hear the littlesayings yet again, and they t urn the speaker into a talking machine. Th ereason why the ha bits of another stimu late the arousal of disgust in us isthat here the animal in the human being jumps out far too much, and thathere one is led instinctively by t he rule of habituation, exactly like another

(non-human) nature, and so runs the risk of falling into one and the sameclass with the beast. -Nevertheles s, certain habits can be started inten-tionally and put in order when nature refuses free choice her help; forexample, accustoming oneself in old age to eating and drinking times,to the quality and quantity of food and drin k, or also with sleep, and sogradually becoming mechanical. But this holds only as an exception andin cases of necessity. As a rule all habits are reprehensible.

On a r t i fi c i a l p l a y w i t h sensory illusion3'

Delusion, which is produced in the understanding by means of senserepresentations (praestigiae), can be either natural or artificial, and iseither illusion" (illusio) or deception (frau s). - T h e delusion by which one:z Flickmirit,.'' inncnrrhein. Throughour chis section and che next, rhe word Srhrin is used a great deal. 1havetranslated ir consisrenrlyas "illusion," in part because Kant uses other rerms such a k h u n gand Illurionas stand-ins for ir rhar ranslate unambiguous ly into ccillusion," nd also becauseothermnslarors in the Cambridge Kanr Edition render the term this way. However, Srhcin can alsomean "semblance, appeaance, pretense, show." These multiple meanings should be kept inmind, particularly in $74, where Kant dircurss moral Srhrin. His point there is char alrhoughmoral Srhern rhould not bc confused with rrue virrue, it is an external semblance of ir rhar will

evenrually become rhe real thing." Tiu


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r Anthropologzcal Dzdactzcwhat I say to you." - Crud er, or at least more harmful, was the deceptionpracticed by ventriloquists, Gassnerists, me~ m eri sts ,3 ~nd other allegednecromancers. In former times poor ignorant women who imagined thatthey could do something supernatural were called wztches, and even inthis century belief in witches has not been rooted out completely.' It

[ r j r ] seems that th e feeling of wonder over something outrageous has in itselfmuch that is alluring for the weak man: not m erely because new prospectsare suddenly opened to him, but also because he is thereby absolved fromthe burdensome use of reason, while others are induced to make them-selves equal to h im in ignorance.

O n permissible moral illusion

On the whole, the more civilized human beings are, the more they areactors. They adopt the illusion of affection, of respect for others, ofmodesty, and of unselfishness without deceiving anyone at all, becauseit is understood by everyone that nothing is meant sincerely by this. Andit is also very good that this happens in the world. For when humanbeings play the se roles, eventually the virtues, whose illusion they havemerely affected for a considerable length of time, will gradually really bearoused and merge into the disposition. -Bu t to deceive the deceiver in

" Th e Gassnerirts were followers of Johann J. Gassner (riz7-1779), a Catholic priest inS~ v i a e r l a ndwho allegedly healed diseases by exorcism of rhe deril. The mesmerists werenamed after Franz Mesmer (1734-1815). an Austrian physician who sought to treat diseaser h r o u ~ h nimal magnetism, an early therapeutic applicarion of hypnotism.Even in rhis century a Protestant clergyman in Scotland serving as a witnessat a trial about such acase said LO he judge: "Your Honor, I asswe you an my honor as a minister char rhis woman is amilrl8 (Hexr)"; to which the judge replied: "And I assure you on my honor as a judge that you ar eno sorcerer Hc.renmeisrcrln Th e word H a . hich has no n becomea G erman word. comes from~~ ~ .the fir\, w or ds o f t hu l o , m ~ I ~ a i t h r . r nz r ised i t thc(;,n.~r.;rlr~on olinc Klr!. % h ~ c hhc iurhfulre, u ~ t h h o l r l ) ! e s ~ s ~r n ~ l l d ~ s i o f l ~ r u r dur xh ah ,afi rr rh;formuli har hr.cnprunounccd.thr.!~ r r .hln:cd ro qcc s i r h p.rs,r.,l c!c. 15 the b,d! of J human hemg Fur rhr words n,,. r d sereinirially added to the word corpus, and in speaking hor en corplrr was changed ro hocrrspocrrr,presumably from pious timidiry at saying and profaning the correcr phrase. Th is is what super-sritiaus people are in the habit of doing with unnatural objects, in ordcr not to profane them.l b n r ' s etvmalocv is incorrect. At oresent i t is believed rhar Hexr derives frar nHap ( he ds , grove.. ". ~.lirrle forest); a Hexe being a demonic woman inhabiring such an area. Kanr's interpretanon isbared on Christoph Adelung's Venuch sines aollst!irindigm gram marr rrh-kri li~che~ trterbuch derHorhdrsrrhm Mundan, 2nd ed. (Leipzig, ,793) -Ed.].

- -On the cognitivefaculty

ourselves, the inclinations, is a return again to obedience under th e law ofvirtue and is not a deception, but rather an innoc ent illusion of ourselves.An example of this is the disgust with one's ow n existence, which ariseswhen the mind is empty of the sensations toward which it incessantlystrives. Th is is boredom, in which one nevertheless at the same time feels aweight of inertia, that is, of weariness with regard to all occupation th atcould be called work and could drive away disgust because it is associatedwith hardships, and it is a highly contrary feeling whose cause is noneother than the natural inclination toward ease (toward rest, before weari-ness even precedes). -Bu t this inclination is deceptive, even with regardto the ends that reason makes into a law for the huma n being,'9 it makes st]him content with himself when he is doing nothing at all (vegetatingaimlessly), because he at least is not doing anything bad. T o deceive it inreturn (which can be done by playing with the fine arts, but most of allthroug h social conversation) is called passing time (tempus fallere ), wherethe expression already indicates the intention, namely to deceive even theinclination toward idle rest. W e are passing time when we keep the mindat play by the fine arts, and even in a game that is aimless in itselfw ithin apeaceful rivalry at least the culture of the mind is brought about -otherwise it would be called killing time. - - Nothing is accomplishedby using force against sensibility in the inclinations; one must outwitthem an d, as Swift says? surrend er a barrel for the whale to play with, inorder to save the ship.In ord er to save virtue, or at least lead the hum an being to it, na ture haswisely implanted in him the tendency to allow himself willingly to bedeceived. Good, honorable decorum is an external illusion that instillsrespect in oth ers (so that they do not behave over familiarly with others).It is true that woman4' would not be content if the male sex did notappear to pay homage to her charms. But modesty (pudicitia), a self-constraint that conceals passion, is nevertheless very beneficial as anj9 Gregor suggests that Kan t has in mind here the d uty to cultivateone's natural talents. See, eg.,Thc Melaphjorrr ofMorab 6: 4 4 l f f . where Kanr discusses "A human being's duty to himself todevelop and increase his naruralper/rcrion, rhar is, for a pragmatic pu rpose."'' onathan S wift (1667-171j), Eng lish writer, ruthor of Gu ll iw i Travels (1726). See hi sA Tole

o e Tub (1704). ed. A.C. Guthkelch and D. Nichol Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958).Preface. o. LO.. . .'' I l u r p v u ~ r,.l?mH Ofa pair nho r e c c i % d uccri who hd ut prc, ~ourl!mnounrcd rhemrcl \urQual8tic=tmn afrhciln8m ofrcnrtl~l~r!nd ofrhu 1 3 ~ ~ 1 1 )1 O ~ ~ I O O ~NH IImuit ul~om~tel !come before the title of the undersranding.


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Anthropological Didacticillusion that b ~ sbout distance between one sex and the other, whichis necessary in order that one is not degraded into a mere tool for theother's enjoymat. -In general, everything that is called propriety (dec-orum) is of this same so n -name ly nothin g but beautful iI1usion.Politeness (poli tme) is an illusion of affability that inspires lov e. Bowing(compliments) and all courtly gallantry together with the warmest verbalassurances of friendship are to be sure no t exactly always truthful ("Mydear friends: there is no such thing as a friend." A ri ~ to tl e) ;~ut this isprecisely why they do not deceive, because everyone knows how theyshould be taken, and especially because these signs of benevolence an drespect, though empty at first, gradually lead to real dispositions ofthis sort.All human virtue in circulation is small change -it is a child who takesit for real gold. -B ut it is still better to have small change in circulationthan no funds at all, and eventually they can be converted into genuine

::%I gold, though at considerable loss. It is committing high treason againsthuman ity to pass them off as mere tokens that have no w orth at all, to saywith the sarcastic "Honor is a pair of shoes that have been worn- out in the manure," etc., or with the preacher Hofstede* in his attack on.Marmontel's Belisar to slander even a Socrates, in o rder to p reventanyone from believing in virtue. Even the illusion of good in othersmust have worth for us, for out of this play with pretenses, whichacquires respect without perhaps earning it, something quite seriouscan finally develop. - t is only the illusion of good in ourselves thatmust be wiped out without exemption, and the veil by which self-loveconceals our moral defects m ust be torn away. For illusion does decelve,if one delude s oneself that one's debt is cancelled or even thrown awayby that which is without any moral content, or persuades oneself that one

Sr r . . \ : om . r ~ kd~ nL h> ai ro , 1 7 1 a 1 -r7and EuLnrt~nL,hscc I, 1 2 ~ l j b m ( ' H ehu hz ma n)k m d s has "$2 fr iend) See also l)a8gr.nc


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.Anthropological Didactic

seizes the hum an being himself at the representation of th e sublime, andh e horror with which nurses' tales drive children to bed late at night,klong to organic sensation; they penetrate the body as far as there isMe in it.T he organ ic senses, however, in so far as they refer to external sensa-tion, can rightly be enu merated as not more or less than five.Three of them a re more objective than subjective, tha t is, as empiricalintuitions they contribute more to the cognition of the external object thanhe!- stir up th e consciousness of the affected organ. Two, however, aremore subjective than objective, that is t he id ea ob ta in ed f ro m th e m ismore a representation of enjoyment than of cognition of the externalobject. Therefore one can easily come to an agreement with others-ding the objective senses; but with respect to the subjective sense,aith one and the same external empirical intuition and name of theobject, the way that the subject feels affected by it can be entirelydifferent.48T he senses of the first class are I ) touch (tactu s),2 )sight (vi m) , 3) hearing(auditus).- Of the latter class are a) taste (gustus), b) smell (olfactus); takenrogether they are no thing b ut senses of organic sensation, as it were likeu, many external entrances prepared by nature so that the animal candbtinguish objects.

On the sense of touch

T h e sense of touch lies in the fingertips and th eir nerve papillae, so thatrhrough touching the surface of a solid body one can inquire after itsshape. - Nature appears to have allotted this organ only to the humanbeiig, so that he could form a concept from the shape of a body byr~;.. touching it on all sides; for the antenna e of insects seem merely to havethe intention of inquiring after the presence of a body, not its shape. -

This sense is also the only one of immediate external perception; and for

'' Cmrwdour in H:that is [they prompt more the subject'smere feeling of life (an rgan affecred toLmrl &an rhevconrribure somerhina ro thecoenirion ofthe iffectine abiect and its constitution.\ \ . i r h ' m d toihe Srst human bein ache" couid therefore verv well%h aereemenr .~ ~ ~ .. .hut rhc! arc usuall) rcr! fir apart from caeh athcr regrd l n g thc scnia . . ,n of rhc hrrcr]

*> I bq ,no lno t r in H On hr.rcnle ofrlghr uilhoul color 2nd of rhu ensc ofhearmy utthaur mustc

On the cognitive facultythis very reason it is also the most important and most reliably instruc-tive, but nevertheless it is the coarsest, because the ma tter whose surfaceis to inform us about the shape of the object through touching must besolid. (As concerns vital sensation, whether th e surface is soft or rough,much less whethe r it feels warm or cold, this is not in question here.) -With out this sense organ we would be unable to form any concept at all ofa bodily shape, and so the two other senses of the first class mustoriginally be referred to its perception in order to provide cognition ofexperience.

On hearing

T h e sense of hearing is one of the senses of merely mediate perception. -Throu gh an d by means of the air that surround s us a distant object to alarge extent is cognized. And it is by means of just this medium , whichis set in motion by the vocal organ, the mouth, that human beings areable most easily and completely to share thoughts and feelings withothers, especially when the sounds which each allows the other to hearare articulated and, in their lawful combination by means of the under-standing, form a language. - The shape of the object is not giventhrough hearing, and the sounds of language do not lead immediatelyto the idea of it, bu t just because of this, and because they are n othing inthemselves or at least not objects, but at mo st signify only inner feelings,they are the best means of designating concepts. And people born deaf,who for this very reason must remain mute (without speech), can neverarrive at anything m ore than an analogue of reason.But with regard to vital sense, music, which is a regular play of auralsensations, not only moves sense in a way th at is indescribably vivaciousand varied, but also strengthens it; for music is as it were a language ofsheer sensations (without any concepts). Sounds here are tones, andthey are for hearing what colors are for seeing; a communication offeelings at a distance to all present within the surrounding space, anda social pleasure that is not diminished by the fact that many partici-pate inI9 a r ~ ~ n o lorr in H. OD he feeling of themusdesof the mouth at the voice

T


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Anthropological Didactic

[1561 On the sense of sight5"

Sight is also a sense of mediate sensation, appearing only to a certain organ(the eyes) that is sensitive to moving matter; a nd it takes place by m eansof light, which is not, like sound, merely a wave-like motion of a fluidelement that spreads itself through space in all directions, but rather aradiation that determines a point for the object in space. By means ofsight the cosmos becomes known to us to an extent so immeasurable that,especially with th e self-luminous celestial bodies, when we check theirdistance with our measures here on earth, we become fatigued over thelong number sequence. And this almost gives us more reason to beastonished at the delicate sensitivity of this organ in respect to itsperception of such weakened impressions than at the magnitude of theobject (the cosmos), especially when we take in the world in detail, aspresented to our eyes through the mediation of the microscope, e.g.,infusoria. - T h e sense of sight, even if it is not more indispensable thanthat of hearing, is still the noblest, because among all the senses, it isfurthest removed fro m the sense of touch, the mo st limited condition ofperception: it not only has the widest sphere of perception in space, butalso its organ feels least affected (because otherwise it would not bemerely sight). Thus sight comes nearer to being a pure zntuition (theimmediate representation of the given object, without admixture ofnoticeable sensation)

rThe se three outer senses lead the subject through reflection to cognitionof the object as a thing outside ourselves. -Bu t if the sensation becomesso strong that the consciousness of the movement of the organ becomes

~stronger than the consciousness of the relation to an external object, thenexternal representations are changed into internal ones. - T o noticesmoothness or roughness in what can be touched is something entirelydifferent from inquiring about the figure of th e external body throu ghtouching. So too, when t he speech of another is so loud that, as we say,the ears hurt from it, or when someone who steps from a dark room into

[157] bright sunshine blinks his eyes. The latter will he blind for a fewI:~ j" Sehm. Gmkhr, also tanslated as "sighr," is rhe next ward

On the cognitive facultymom ents because of the too stron g or too sudden light, the forme r will bedeaf for a few moments because of the shrieking voice. That is, bothpersons are unab le to find a concept of the object because of the intensityof the sensations; their attention is fixed merely on th e subjective repre-sentation, namely the change of the orgam5'

On the senses o f taste and smell

T he senses of taste and smell are both m ore subjective than objective. Inthe former, the organs of the tongue, th e throat, and the palate come intocontact with th e external object; in the latter, we inhale air that is mixedwith foreign vapors, and the body itself from which they stream forth canbe far away from the organ. Both senses are closely related to each other,and he who lacks a sense of smell always has only a dull sense of taste. -One can say that b oth senses are affected by salts (stable and volatile), oneof which must be dissolved by fluid in the mouth, th e other by air, whichhas to pen etrate th e organ in ord er to have its specific sensation sent to it.

General remark about the outer senses

One can divide the outer senses into those of mechanical and chemicalinfluence. Th e three highest senses belong to the mechanical, the twolower to the chemical. Th e three highest senses are senses of perception(of the surface), the latter two are senses ofpleasure (of the most intimatetaking into ourselves). -T hu s it happens that nausea, an impulse to freeoneself of food through t he shortest way out of the esophagus (to vomit),has been allotted to the hum an being as such a stron g vital sensation, forthis intimate taking in can be dangerous to the animal.

j' Marginal nolr bH:Thoughtless, he who establishes something without investigating. Gullible,he who trusts on rhe basis of another witness without investigation.Skeprical, he who places faith in no witness.A creditor (fleditor), he who places trust in the promise of another. The faithfulare those whotrust an actual or purarive promise o f a being that cannot deceive.Superstitious (ruprmritior.)he wh o keeps char which he mistakes for the gift [?I of another.


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II Anthropological Didactic

However, there is also a mentalpleasure, which consists in the commu-nication of thoughts. But if it is forced on us and still as mental nutritionis not beneficial to us, th e mind finds it repulsive (as in, e.g., the constantrepetition of would-be flashes of wit or hum or, whose sameness can be[ ~ j s ] nwholesome to us), and thus the natural instinct to be free of it is alsocalled nausea by analogy, although it belongs to inner sense.Smell is taste at a distance, so to speak, and o thers are forced to s harethe pleasure of it, whether they want to or not. A nd thu s smell is contraryto freedom and less sociable than taste, where among many dishes orbottles a guest can choose one according to his liking, without othersbeing forced to share the pleasure of it.- ilth seem s to arouse nausea notso much through what is repugnant to the eyes and tongue as through thestench that we presume it has. For taking something in through smell(in the lungs) is even more intimate than taking something in throughthe absorptive vessels of the mouth or throat.

Given the same degree of influence taking place on them, the sensesteach less the mor e strongly the y feel themselves be ing affected. Inversely,if they are expected to teach a great deal, they mu st be affected moder-i ately. In the stro ngest light we see (distinguish) nothing, and a stentorian,ji! strained voice stuns us (stifles though t).T he m ore susceptible to impressions the vital sense is (the more tend erand sensitive), he mo re unfortunate the human being is; on the other hand,I! the m ore susceptible hei s toward the organic sense (sensitive)and the more:: inured to the vital sense, the more fortunate he is- I say more fortunate, notexactly morally better - or he has the feeling of his own w ell-being moreunder his control. One can call the capacity for sensation that comes from

strength de licat e sensitivity (sensibilitas sthenica); that coming from the sub-ject's weakness - his inability to withstand satisfactorily the penetration ofinfluences on the senses into consciousness, that is, attending to themagains t his will, can b e called tender sensitivity (senribilitasasthenica).I Questions

Which organic sense is the most un grateful and also seems to be the mostdispensable? Th e sense of smell. It d oes not pay to cultivate it or refine itat all in order to enjoy; for there are more disgu sting objects than pleasant

On the cognitivefacultyones (especially in crowded places), and even when we come acrosssomething fragrant, the pleasure com ing from the sense of smell is alwaysfleeting and transient. - But as a negative condition of well-being, thissense is not unim portant, in order not to breathe in bad air (oven fumes, the [1j9]stench of swam ps and animal carcasses), or also not to need rotten thingsfor nourishment.jZ - T he second sense of pleasure, namely the sense oftaste, has exactly the same importance, though it also has the specificadvantage of promoting sociability in eating and drinking, something thesense of smell does not do. M oreover, taste is superior because it judges thewholesom eness of food beforehand, at the gate of entrance to the intestina lcanal; for as long as luxury and indulgence have not over-refined the sense,the agreeableness of the sense of taste is connected to the wholesomenessof food, as a fairly certain predic tion of it.- n th e case of people who are illthe appe tite, which usually takes care of them and is of benefit to them likea medicine, fails. - The smell of food is so to speak a foretaste, and bymeans of the smell of his favorite food the hungry person is invited topleasure, just as the satiated person is repelled by the sam e sme1l.j'Can th e senses be used vicariously, that is, can one sense be used as asubstitu te for anoth er? Th rou gh g estures one can coax the usual speechfrom a deaf person, granted th at he has once been able to hear, thus bymeans of his eyes. Observing the movement of one's lips also belongshere; indeed, exactly the same thing can take place by means of thefeeling of touching moving lips in the dark. However, if the person ishorn deaf, the sense of seeing the movement of the speech organs mustconvert the sounds, which have been coaxed from him by instruction,into a feeling of the movement of his own speech muscles. But he neverarrives at real concepts in this way, because the signs that h e needs are notjQ~nr~;aul nore in H: Smell does nor allow itself to be described, but only compared rhroughsimilarity with another sense like music with the play ofcolors), for example, of taste, tocompare,e.g., rhat which smells sour, weet, rotten- aint odor of slate.

Mor@nl norc inH:Division - Anthropological Doctrine ofElemenrs. Exposition and Doctr ineo fMerhod. Characteristic. Element. Doctrine. On the Facultv of Comir ion.. the FeelineofPleasureand I)lrplca.urc,anll th e Fdcult! ofUcsmre - I 1 ofth lr is;cnsnhlcynr inrc~ biru al0n;nc Scnr~l,lcFa:ult! dC


14/18

Anthropological Didacticcapable of un iversality. - The lack of a musical ear, although the merephysical organ is uninjured, since it can hear sounds b ut not tones, and sucha human being can speak but not sing, is a deformity difficult to explain.So oo there are people who see well bu t cannot disting uish any colors, andto whom all objects seem as though they are in a copper engav ing.

Which lack or loss of a sense is more serious, tha t of hearing or sight?-When it is inborn, the first is the least replaceable of all the senses;however, if it occurs later after the use of the eyes has been cultivated,whether by observation of gestures or more indirectly by means of read-

:IW ing of a text, then such a loss can be compensated by sight, especially inone who is well-tc-d0,5~ though not satisfactorily. But a person whobecomes deaf in old age misses this means of social intercourse verymuch, and w hile one sees many blind people who are talkative, sociable,and cheerful at th e dinne r table, it is difficult to find someone who haslost his hearing and who is not annoyed, distrustful, an d dissatisfied in asocial gathering. In the faces of his table companions he sees all kinds ofexpressions of affect, or at least of interest, but he wears himself out invain guessing at their meaning, and th us in th e mid st of a social gatheringhe is condemn ed to solitude. +**

In addition, a receptivity for certain objects of external sensation of aspecial kind belongs to both of the last two senses (which are moresubjective than objective). This receptivity is merely subjective, andacts upon the organs of smell and taste by means of a stimulus that isneither odo r nor flavor but is felt like the effect of certain stable salts thatincite the organs to specificevacuations. Th at is why these objects are notreally enjoyed and taken intimately into the organs, but merely come intomnta ct with them in order to be promptly eliminated. But just because ofthis they can be used th rough out the day without satiation (except duringmealtime and sleep). - T h e most common substance for this sensation isrobacco,be it in snuffing, or in placing it in the mo uth between th e cheekand the gums to stimulate the flow of saliva, or in smoking it through

G s r d rrr in H: well-to-do [Very much replaceable. tolerable to replace. A person who is bornb h d or who in the course of rime h s t last become blind does not particularly regrer his loss,].

On the cognitive facultypipes, just as the Spanish women of Lim a smoke a lighted cigar.55 nsteadof tobacco the Malayans, as a last resort, make use of the areca nut rolledup in a betel leaf (betel nut), which has exactly the same effect. - Thiscraving (Pica) , part from the m edical benefit or harm that may result fromthe secretion of fluids in both organs, is, as a mere excitation of sensuousfeeling in general, so to speak a frequently repeated impulse recollectingattention to the state of one's own though ts, which would otherwise besoporific or boring owing to uniformity and monotony. Instead, thesemeans of stimulation always jerk o ur attention awake again. This kind ofconversation of the hum an being with himself takes the place of a social [16r]gathering, because in place of conversation it fills the emptiness of tim ewith continuous newly excited sensations and with stimuli that arequickly passing, but always renewed.

On nner sense

Inner sense is not pu re apperception, a consciousness of what the hum anbeing does, since this belongs to the faculty of thinking. Rather, it is aconsciousness of what he undergoes, in so far as he is affected by the playof his own thoughts. I t rests on inner intuition, and consequently on therelations of ideas in time (w hether they are sim ultaneous or successive).Its perceptions and the inner experience (true o r illusory) composed bymeans of their connections are not merely anthropological, where weabstract from the question of whether the human being has a soul ornot (as a special incorporeal substance); but psychological, where webelieve that we perceive such a thing within ourselves, and the mind,which is represented as a mere faculty of feeling and thinking, is regardedas a special substance dwelling in the hum an being. -T he re is then onlyone inner sense, because the human being does not have different organsfor sensing himself inwardly, and one could say tha t the sou l is the organof inner sense. It is said that inner sense is subject to illusions, which

" Tobacco smoking was only mildly popular in Kant's day. The firsr German cigar facrory wasfounded in Hamburg in ,788, but it had only modest sales at first (Vorlinder). However, Kanrhimself smoked a daily pipe of tobaccowith h is breakfast tea, and "ir is reporred that the bowlsof his pipes increased considerably in size as rhe years wenr on" [Manfred Kuehn, Kanr:A Biography (New York: Cambridge Universiry Press, zoo^), p. za z ] .


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Anthropological Didacticconsist either in taking the appearances of inner sense for external appear-ances, that is, taking imaginings for sensations, or in regarding them asinspirations caused by another being that is not an object of external sense.So the illusion here is either enthusitism or spiritualism, and both aredeceptions of inner sense. In both cases it is mental illness: the tendency toaccept the play of ideas of inner sense as experiential cognition, althoughit is only a fiction; and also the tendency to keep oneself in an artificialframe of mind, perhaps because one considers it beneficial and superior tothe vulgarity of ideas of sense, and accordingly to trick oneself with theintuitions thus formed (dreaming when awake).- For gradually the hum anbeing comes to regard that w hich he has intentionally put in his m ind as

:< something that already must have been there, and he believes that he hasmerely discovered in the d epths of his soul w hat in reality he has forcedon himself.This is how it was with the fanatically exciting inner sensations of aBourignon, or the fanatically frightening ones of a Pascal. This mentaldepression cannot be conveniently cleared away by rational ideas (forn-hat are they able to do against supposed in tuitions?). Th e tendency toretire into oneself, together with the re sulting illusions of inner sense, canonl!- be set right when the hum an being is led back into the external worldand by means of this to the order of things present to the ou ter senses.s6

On the causes that increase or decrease senseimpressions according to degree925

Sense impressions are increased according to degree by means of( I ) contrast, (2 ) novelty, (3 ) change, (4) intensification.2 Contrasth i m i l a r i t y (contrast) is the juxtaposition, arousing our attention, ofmumally contrary sense represen tations under one and the same concept." I l z ~ ~ n a lote in ff NB Above the onimur rui rompor, who has all mental changes in his power.

Ondull, weak, delicate senses - eeling of exhaustion and srrengh rognriraer, of dogs on theS o u r . The old one believes he will be fine. while the zital feeline becorner weak. -The blind&p ish the colors of feeling. Srrong senses for perceiving, delicate ones for distinguishing.

On the cognitivefacultyIt is different from contradiction, which consists in the linking of mutuallyantagonistic concepts. A well-cultivated piece of land in a sandy desert,like the alleged paradisaical region in the area of Damascus in Syria,elevates the idea of the cultivation by means of mere contrast. - T h ebustle and glitter of an estate or even of a great city near the quiet, simple,and yet contented life of the farmer; or a house with a thatched roof inwhich one finds tasteful and comfortable rooms inside, enlivens ourrepresentations, and one gladly lingers nearby because the senses arethereby strengthened . -- O n the other hand, poverty and ostentatious-ness, the luxurious finery of a lady who glitters with diamond s and whoseclothes are dirty; -or, as once with a Polish magnate, extravagantly ladentables and numerous waiters at hand, hut in cr ude footwear- hese things [163]do not stand in contrast but in contradiction, and one sense representa-tion destroys or weakens the other because it wants to unite what isopposite under one and the same concept, which is impossible. --Butone can also make a comzcal contrast and express an apparent contra-diction in the tone of truth, or express something obviously contemptiblein the language of praise, in order to make the absurdity still morepalpable - ike Fielding in his Jonathan WZ d the Great, or Blumauer inhis travesty of Virgil; and, for examp le, one can parody a heart-rendingromance, like C l a r i ~ s a , ~ ~errily and with profit, and thu s strengthen thesenses by freeing them from the co nflict that false and harmfu l conceptshave mixed into them.b NoveltyThrough the new, to which the rare and that which has been kept hiddenalso belong, attention is enlivened. For it is an acquisition; the senserepresentation thereby wins more power. E v e y d a y l f e or the familiarextinguishes it. But by this are not to be understoods8 the discovery,contact with, or public exhibition of a work of antiquity, whereby a thingi7 Henry Fielding (r707-17j4). English novelist and dramarist, author of Tom Thumb (1730).lonothan Wid (1743-Kln t misquotes the title), the history of a superman of crime, has beencalled the most sustained piece of irony in English. Johann AloynBlumau er (1755.98). author ofDie Abenreuer drr jmmmcn H~lden&ear (Vienna, 1783-1786). "Clori~~a"efers to a book byEnglish novelist Samuel Richardson (168~1761)- .e., Clanrsa, or. rheHis~ory fa Young Lady! (7 vals., r747-1748).C m e d our in H: underrrood [for it can be new enough, and because of the nriry and likcwire

i seclusion that lies wirhin it. Th e attention].


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Anthropological Didacticisbrought to mind tha t one would have supposed was destroyed long agob>- he force of time according to the n atural course of events. T o sit on apiece of the wall of an ancient Roman theater (in Verona or N imes); tohave in one's hand s a household utensil of that ancient people, discoveredafter many centuries und er the lava in Herculaneum ; to be able to show acoin of the Macedonian kings or a gem of ancient sculpture, an d so on,rouses the keenest attention of the expert's senses.i9 T h e tendency toacquire knowledge merely for the sake of its novelty, rarity, and hidden-ness is called curiosity. Alth ough this inclination only plays with id eas andis otherwise without interest in their objects, it is not to be criticized,except when it is a matter of spying on that w hich really is of interest toothers alone, - But as concern s sheer sense impressions, each morning,through the mere novelty of its sensations, makes all sense represent-ations clearer and livelier (as long as they are not diseased) than theygenerally are toward evening.

[r64 c ChangeMonotony (complete uniformity in one's sensations) ultimately causesatony (lack of attention to one's condition), and the sense impressionsgrow weak. Change refreshes them, just as a sermon read in the sametone, whether it be shou ted out or delivered with a measured yet uniform1-oice, puts the whole congregation to sleep. -Wo rk and rest, city andcountry life, social conversation and play, entertainment in solitude, nowwith stories, then with poems, sometimes with philosophy, and then withmathematics, strength en the mind. -I t is one and the same vital energythat stirs u p th e consciousness of sensations; but its various organs relieveone another in their activity. Thu s it is easier to enjoy oneself in walkingfor a considerable length of time, since one muscle (of the leg) alternatesat rest with the other, than it is to remain standing rigid in one and thesame spot, where one m uscle must w ork for a while without relaxing. -Th is is why travel is so attractive; the only pity is that with idle people it

jq :Marginal note #nH Monotony, dirhan nony, and atony of the faculty of sensation.They increase with the dosage.Habit makos them necersary. C~orredournH:arrenrion [One alls the inclination to see suchrarities ru"oriiy; although that which is concealed merely becau* it ir regarded arrecrer and willbe found out i s also designated by this name, but then it server to name an inattentive person.]

On the cognitiuefacultyleaves behind a void (atony), as the consequence of the monotony ofdomestic life.Nature itself has arranged things so that pain creeps in, uninvited,between pleasant sensations that entertain the senses, and so makes lifeinteresting. But it is absurd to mix in pain intentionally and to hurtoneself for the sake of variety, to allow oneself to be awakened in orderto properly feel oneself falling asleep again; or, as with Fielding's novel(The ~ou ndling ),60 here an editor of this book added a final part after theauthor's death, in order to introdu ce jealousy that could provide varietyin the m arriage (with which the story ends). For the deterioration of a statedoes not increase the interest ou r senses take in it; not even in a tragedy.And th e conclusion is not a variation.

d Intensification extending to perfectionA continuous series of successive sense representations, which dzfferaccording to degree, has, if each of the following representations is alwaysstronger than the one preceding it, an outer limit of tension (intensio); to [165]approach this limit is arousing, on the other hand to exceed it is relaxing(remissio). But in the point that separates both states lies the perfection(maximum) of the sensation, which brings ab out insensitivity and, con-sequently, lifelessness.If one wants to keep the faculty of sensing lively, then one must notbegin with strong sensations (because they make us insensitive towardthose that follow); rather it is better to deny them to oneself at thebeginning and a pportion the m sparingly to oneself, so that one can alwaysclimb higher. In the introduc tion th e preacher begins with a cold instruc-tion of the understanding that points to reflection on a concept of duty,then he introduces a moral interest into his analysis of the text, and th enhe concludes in the application with an appeal to all incentives of thehuman soul through sensations that can give energy to the moral interest.

Young man! D eny yourself gratifications (of amusement, indulgence,love, and so forth), if not with the Stoic intention of wanting to dowithout them completely, then with the refined Epicurean intention ofhaving in view an ever-increasing enjoyment. This stinginess with the

" Kant s referring to Henry Fielding's book, TheHirrory of TornJones, A Aoundlrng (1749)


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Anthropological Didacticassets of your enjoyment of life6' actually makes you richer through thepostponement of enjoym ent, even if, at the en d of life, you have had to giveup m ost of the prof it from it. Like everythin g ideal, the consciousness ofhaving enjoyment in your control is more fruitful and comprehensivethan anything that gratifies through sense, because by this means it issimultaneously consumed and thus deducted from the total quantity.

On the i n h i b i t i o n , w e a k e n i n g , and total lossof the sense f a c u l t i e s

T h e sense faculties can be weakened, inhibited, or lost completely. Th usthere exist the conditions of drunkenn ess, sleep, unconsciousness, appa-rent d eath (asphyxia), and actual death.Drunkenness is the unnatural condition of inability to order one's:; sense representations according to laws of experience, provided that thecondition is the effect of an excessive consump tion of drink.I! [166] According to its verbal definition, sleep is a condition in which a!! healthy human being is unable to become conscious of representationsthrough the externa l senses. T o find the real definition of this is entirelyY. up to the physiologists, who, if they are able, may explain this relaxation,?:! which is nevertheless at the same time a g athering of power for renewedexternal sensations (through which the human being sees himself as anewborn in the world, and by which probably a third of our lifetimepasses away unconsc ious and ~ nr eg re t t ed ) . ~ ~

" Lebem~efikl.6% Croned our in H unregretted. [If one feels tired when one goes ro bed, but for some unknownreason nevertheless can not fall asleep, by calm attentivenes s to one's physical sensations one mayperceive something ~pasr icn the muscles of the foot as well as in thc brain, and at the moment offalling asleep feel a fatigue which is alsoa very agreeablesensation.- hat wakingis a condition ofstrain and contraction of all fibers is also observable in the phenomenon that recruitr, who, afterthey have jusr been woken from sleep and aremeasured standing up, are found to beabout hal faninch longer than the still shorter height which they would have been found in if they had beenlying awake in rheir bed for a while.Sleep is not merely a need far relaxation ofexhauste d powers but also an enjoyment afcomforrar the beginning (ar the moment o ffalling asleep) as well ar ar th e end (at the moment o f waking"01. However. with this. as with all eniovments. it is neccssarv to be thrift", because it exhausts. . . .rhecanacitv for sensation mda lon e with rhisalso rhevital forc e-I t is the same with~-.~~ ~~ ~ "rhi, ar u t t h , he i r l ahammcd~ n ' ~dnncr of reprerenun? iuoJ propbrtlon. \,here 11 I, s a d thatua . l lm ~e \er ) ,~nglc uman bv in ~a t i r th rhour how much hc \nould nl It hceat\n Ih~r,nen hc

On the cognitive fac ult yT he unn atural condition of dazed sense organs, which results in alesserdegree of attention to oneself than would normally be the case, is ananalogue of drunkenness; that is why he who is suddenly awakenedfrom a firm sleep is called drunk w ith sleep. -H e does not yet have hisfull consciousness. -But even when awake one can sudden ly be seized by

confusion while deliberating about what to do in an unforeseen case, aninhibition of the orderly and ord inary use of one's faculty of reflection,which brings the play of sense representations to astandstill. In such acasewe say that h e is disconcerted, beside himself (with joy or fear),perplexed,bewildered, astonished, he has lost his Tramontanog and so on, and thiscondition is to be regarded as like a mome ntary sleep that seizes one andtha t requir es a collectingof one's sen sations. In a violent, suddenly arousedaffect (of fear, anger, or even joy), the human being is, as we say, besidehimself(in an ecstasy, if he believes that he is gripped by an intuition whichis not of the senses); he has no c ontrol over himself, and is temporarilyparalyzed, so to speak, in using his outer senses.

Unconsciousness, which usually follows dizzine ss (a fast sp innin g circle o fmany differen t sensations that is beyond comprehension), is a foretaste ofdeath. The complete inhibition of all sensation is asphyxia or apparentdeath, which, as far as one can perceive externally, is to be distinguishedfrom actual death only through the result (as in persons drowned,hanged, or suffocated by fumes).No human being can experience his own death (for to constitute an [167]experience requires life), he can only observe it in others. W hethe r it ispainful cannot be judged from the death rattle or convulsions of thedying person; it seems much more to be a purely mechanical reactionof the vital and perhaps a gentle sensation of the gradual release

will have consumed his portion soon nd will die early; if he ears moderately, then he has a longrime toear, and th erefore also to live.-Onecould also say just rhesame abour sleep: he who sleepsa lot in the younger bur still manly years will have little sleep in old age , which is a sad fare. -T h eKalmucks regard sleeping during the day ar shameful, and the Spaniards' sierra does nor shed afavorable light on rheir vigor.Th e Norrh Scar is called T~omonrnno r Tmmonrono, and prrderr la rmmonrona, to lore chc NorthStar (as rhe sailor's guiding sar), eans to lose one's composure, nor to know how to find one'sway abour.

'j Lehenrkrofi.


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i Anthropological Didacticfrom all pain. - T he fear of death that is natural to all human beings,even the unhapp iest or th e wisest, is therefore not a horror of dying but,as ~ o n t a i ~ n e ~ ~ightly says, horror a t the thought of having died (that is,of being dead), which the candidate for death thinks he will still haveafter his death, since he thin ks of his corpse, which is no longer himself,as still being him self in a dark grave or somewhere else. - This illusioncannot be pushed aside, for it lies in the nature of thought as a way ofspeaking to and of oneself. Th e thought I am not simply cannot exist;because if I am not then I cannot be conscious that I am not. I can indeedsay: "I am no t healthy," and think suchpredicates of myself negatively (asis the case with all verba); but to negate the subject itself when speakingin the first person, so that the sub ject destroys itself, is a contradiction.

On the power of imagination$28T h e power of imagination (facultas imaginandi), as a faculty of intuitionwithout the presence of the object, is eitherproductive, that is, a faculty ofthe original presen tation of t he object (exhibitio originaria), which th usprecedes experience; or reproductive, a faculty of th e derivative present-

ation of the object (exhibitio derivativa), which brings back to th e mind anempirical intuition that it had previously. -P ur e intuitions of space andtime belong to the productive faculty; all others presuppose empiricalintuition, w hich, when it is connected with the concept of the object andthus becomes empirical cognition, is called experience. - Th e power ofimagination, in so far as it also produces images involuntarily, is calledfantasy. H e who is accustomed to regarding these images as (inner orouter ) experiences is a visionary. -A n involuntary play of one's images insleep (a st ate of h ealth ) is called dreaming.65

Miehel Eyquem de Monraigne (1533-,594, rench ersayisr, aurhor of the Errair (~ggj). hertatemenrKanr attributes o Montaigne is not quite to be foun d in theErrqvr. However, in Bk . 11,Ch. 13 ("Of Judging of the Death of Others"), Montaigne does cite approvingly Epicharmus'remark thar "It is nor death, bur dying rhar I fear" (The Comph r c Erroyr of Monraiznr, tnns.Donald M . Frame [Stanford: Stanford University Press, ~9581,. 461).See also Bk. I, Ch. I9("That our Happiness must not be Judged until after our Death").65 C ~ r o r dur in H: dreamin,. [rhar is, with the insensibiliry of all exremal sense organs there is ananalogue with the laws of experience enduring an involuntary play of imagin ation, although alsohe who in waking hassubmitred to the propensity to mix fantasy among experience3 and thereby

to merge them into each other is called a dreamer.]

On the cognitivefacultyT h e power of imagination (in other w ords) is either inventive (productive)or m erely recollective (reproduc tive). But th e produ ctive pow er of imagina-tion is nev ertheless not exactly creative, for it is not cap able of producing a [ha]sense representation that was never given to o ur faculty of sense; one canalways furnish evidence of the m aterial of its ideas. T o one who has never

seen red among the seven colors, we can never make this sensation compre-hensible, but to the person who is born blind we cannot m ake any colorscomprehensible, not even th e secondary colors, for example, green, which isproduced from the mixture of two colors. Yellow and blue mixed togethergive green; but the power of imagination would not produce the slightestidea of this color unless it had seen them m ixed toge ther.Th is is exactly how it is with each one of the five senses, that is, thesensations produced by the five senses in their synthesis cannot be madeby means of the power of imagination, but m ust be drawn originally fromthe faculty of sense. Th ere have been people for whom the representationof light by their faculty of sight consisted of no greater selection than w hiteor black, and for whom, although they could see well, the visible worldseemed like a copperplate engraving. Likewise, there are more people thanone would believe who have a good and even extremely sensitive sense ofhearing, but who have absolutely no musical ear; whose sense for tone isentirely indifferent not merely to imitating tones (singing) but also to

distinguishing them from noise. -T h e same may be true with the ideas oftaste and smell; namely that the sense lacks the material of enjoyment formany specific sensations, and one person believes that he understandsanother in this connection, while the sensations of the one may differ fromthose of the other not only in degree but specifically and completely. -There are people who lack the sense of smell entirely; they regard thesensation of inhaling pure air thro ugh th e nose as the sensation ofsmelling,and consequently they cannot m ake head or tail of any description whichtries to describe the sensationofsm ell to them. But where the sense ofsmellis lacking, the sense oftas te is also badly missing, and if someone ha sno senseof taste, it is wasted effort to instruct and teach him about it. But hung er andits satisfaction (satiation) is something qu ite different from taste.

So, no matter how great an artist, even a sorceress, the power ofimagination may be, it is still not creative, but must get the material forits images from the senses. But these images, according to the memories 11691forme d of them, are not so universally commu nicable as concepts of under-standing. However, sometimes we also name (though only in a figurative

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Kant Anthropology 7-27