KAS International Reports 02/2011

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INTERNATIONAL REPORTS

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SAARC – 25 Years of Regional Integration in South AsiaTomislav Delinić

ASEAN and G20 – Indonesia’s Foreign Policy PerspectivesWinfried Weck

Immigration Country Norway – Demographic Trends and Political ConceptsNorbert Beckmann-Dierkes / Johann C. Fuhrmann

After the PresidentialElections in Côte d’Ivoire –Can the Political Crisis Be Resolved by Diplomacy?Klaus D. Loetzer / Anja Casper

People with Low Expecta-tions are Seldom Disappoin-ted – Climate Summit in Cancún Did not Fail, but Was it Successful Enough?Frank Priess

Republic of Moldova at the End of an Election Marathon?Holger Dix

KASINTERNATIONAL REPORTS2|11

ISSN 0177-7521Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V.Volume 27

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Editor:Dr. Gerhard Wahlers

Editorial Team:Frank SpenglerHans-Hartwig BlomeierDr. Stefan FriedrichDr. Hardy OstryJens PaulusDr. Helmut Reifeld

Editor-in-chief:Stefan Burgdörfer

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EDITORIAL

SAARC – 25 YEARS OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN SOUTH ASIATomislav Delinić

ASEAN AND G20 – INDONESIA’S FOREIGN POLICY PERSPECTIVESWinfried Weck

IMMIGRATION COUNTRY NORWAY – DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS AND POLITICAL CONCEPTSNorbert Beckmann-Dierkes / Johann C. Fuhrmann

AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE – CAN THE POLITICAL CRISIS STILL BE RESOLVED BY DIPLOMACY?Klaus D. Loetzer / Anja Casper

PEOPLE WITH LOW EXPECTATIONS ARE SELDOM DISAPPOINTED – CLIMATE SUMMITIN CANCÚN DID NOT FAIL, BUT WAS ITSUCCESSFUL ENOUGH?Frank Priess

REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA AT THE END OF AN ELECTION MARATHON? A NEW VERSION OF THE ALLIANCE FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, AND MORE UNCERTAINTYHolger Dix

4 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 2|20114

EDITORIAL

Dear Readers,

“Paradise in flames!” was one of the many, sometimes rather inapt headlines to recent articles on the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia. Clearly the country was hardly a paradise. Nevertheless, over the years Tunisia has taken some positive steps in terms of development thanks to its moderate, Europe-oriented policies. Even the civil uprisings experienced by its larger neighbour Algeria in the early nineties failed to shake the country’s position as the Maghreb’s anchor. It has enjoyed solid economic growth for years, its illiteracy levels are amongst the lowest on the continent and equal status of men and women has been implemented and guaranteed under law. These develop-ments have been driven by a middle-class which is much larger than that of many other countries in the region.

But at the end of the day this was not enough. The most-repeated words during the demonstrations in Tunisia were “dignity” and “freedom”. The lesson to be learned from the events in Tunisia – and those in the rest of the region – is that economic development and growth cannot be separated in the long term from the safeguarding and granting of human rights, especially political rights.

Mohammed Bouaziz, a Tunisian greengrocer, suffered continual harassment at the hands of the security forces. He felt that he had lost his personal freedom, and eventually took the desperate step of setting himself on fire. This was the beginning of the uprisings that have since engulfed large parts of North Africa and the Middle East. After Bouaziz’s death more and more people, disenchanted with the economic and social situation, came together to form a movement which only gradually took on political overtones. This movement soon reached the capital Tunis, driven mainly by young, college-educated Tunisians. Their goals were initially very diverse and remain so to some extent, but in order to disseminate their ideas and

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organise protest rallies they used the internet, in particular Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. Their pressure forced President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali to step down.

Just a few weeks earlier hardly anyone would have predicted that stable Tunisia, with its well-developed economic and social structures, would undergo this kind of revolution. Events in the country have belied the conviction held by many autocrats in the region, and shared by many western political representatives, that first of all there must be economic and social reform and then personal and political rights will follow. This is a misapprehension, for economic and political freedoms are mutually dependent. Irrespective of their economic situation, Tunisia’s young people, bound together by their internet networks, have demonstrated that they are no longer prepared to accept state repression at the hands of the police and security forces.

What began in Tunisia is now spreading like wildfire across the whole region. Promises of political reform are no longer enough for the demonstrators in Algeria and Egypt, Jordan and Yemen. Whatever differences there may be between the countries and their political structures, first and foremost the people are protesting against the ruling establishment. “Go away” is written on the placards, a sentiment directed at each and every autocratic leader.

These same placards are being waved in Egypt, where 82 year old Hosni Mubarak has been ruling the country for three decades, more recently preparing his son, Gamal, to take over the dynastic succession. Once again we see that economic progress is proving to be no substitute for democratic progress. Despite considerable economic growth in recent years, the social chasm between rich and poor has grown ever wider. Here too, young people with


few prospects in life are now connected with the world and each other through the internet, and they no longer want to wait for promises of change or political placebos.

The message from the people on the streets in the Maghreb and the Mashreq is clear: we want to live with dignity. Of course this includes attaining a certain level of prosperity and social security, but it also involves personal freedom and a say in political decision-making, both long-awaited by the people of the region. There is no doubt that a rocky road lies ahead. Many countries which sweep away their governing parties go on to re-organise themselves totally and rebuild their structures from scratch. Along with establishing new constitutional bodies, first steps have to be taken towards democracy. And decisions must be made on how to deal with the Muslim Brotherhoods which are an ever-present factor. In the midst of all the euphoria we should not forget the fragility engendered by these times of change – a slide into chaos and anarchy is still a serious possibility.

The countries of the region are facing tremendous challenges. It falls to political foundations to play their part in the social and political change process. The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung is aware of its responsibilities in this respect and sees this as one of its key areas of focus over the coming years.

Dr. Gerhard WahlersDeputy Secretary-General


Tomislav Delinić

Even well-informed political observers have to admit that hardly anyone would cite SAARC, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, as a role model for regional cooperation when examining different forms of political or economic regional integration. Such a discussion would first of all focus on the European Union, ASEAN in South East Asia and Mercosur or NAFTA in the Americas. SAARC is overshadowed by these organisations and some observers may have never even heard of it. But although this regional association is of many years’ standing, having existed at least as long as Mercosur and NAFTA, can it be deemed to be equally successful? In the eyes of the world it has enjoyed comparatively few real successes since it was founded in 1985. The Charter signed by the founders of SAARC (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) promises much and bears many similarities to the founding charters of the other regional associations mentioned above. But even regional observers criticise SAARC for having good intentions but achieving few practical results. Since it was established, there have been scores of meetings – unlike the other organisations, held mostly at top government level – and a host of agree-ments have been signed. But analysts believe there has been a shortage of concrete successes leading to closer cooperation between the member countries.

Afghanistan, one of South Asia’s main regional headaches, has been a member of SAARC since 2007. The other member countries point to Afghanistan as one example of how South Asia might be able to take on responsibility for itself. The last summit meeting of SAARC government heads was peppered with wake-up calls and declarations of intent designed to show that SAARC had not given up

SAARC – 25 YEARS Of REgIONAL INTEgRATION IN SOuTh ASIA

Tomislav Delinić is Head of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s SAARC Regional Project in New Delhi, India.


on itself.1 The media’s take on the situation is that “It’s time to walk the talk”, and they expect the regions two biggest players, India and Pakistan, to step up to the plate. The smouldering conflict between the two regional nuclear powers hangs like the Sword of Damocles over South Asia’s efforts to promote stability in the region and to bring its players closer together. More cooperation and agreement is needed if the successes of other regional alliances around the world are to be emulated.

However, it is not appropriate to measure SAARC’s development solely by the usual criteria. Any assessment needs to take into account the difficult starting position, the regional situation and the complicated

backdrop to the organisation’s formation. Only then can the agreements be viewed not just as an immense symbolic success for a crisis-ridden region but also as a strong cornerstone for the challenges to come. So how does SAARC work, what difficulties did and do its member countries still face, does SAARC have a future and what opportunities will result from further regional cooperation?

AN ALLIANCE Of CONTRASTS AND COmmONALITIES

South Asia’s constellation is certainly not a simple one. India, Pakistan and the other raft of SAARC member states comprising Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, the Maldives and Sri Lanka are worlds apart on questions of population, territory, military power, technological development, infrastructure and political influence. These countries are either in actual fact small nations or they are wrongly perceived as such by the rest of the world. Bangladesh, with a population of 160 million, is one of the biggest countries in the world, and even Nepal’s population of almost 29 million is larger than that of most EU member states.2 The SAARC region, with its almost 1.5 billion

1 | Cf. Dipu Moni, “Saarc now deliberates more on action,” The Daily Star, May 27, 2010, in: http://thedailystar.net/new Design/news-details.php?nid=140263 (accessed December 14, 2010).2 | Cf. Fischer-Weltalmanach, “Nepal”, http://www.weltalmanach.de/ staat/staat_detail.php?staat=nepal and “Bangladesch”, http://www.weltalmanach.de/staat/staat_detail.php?fwa_ id=banglade (both accessed December 13, 2010).

Any assessment of SAARC’s develop-ment needs to take into account the difficult starting position, the regional situation and the complicated back-drop to the organisation’s formation.


The South Asian countries are united by the fact that today all SAARC coun-tries are being run according to basic democratic principles.

inhabi tants, makes up a considerable proportion of the world’s population, and in any case its position on the border with China places it at the heart of a vibrant world region.3

India is the dominant player, due to its territorial size, large population, the current rapid pace of economic growth, its position as a nuclear power and its recent appointment as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. In this way, the country’s remarkable growth could act as an anchor for the whole region and make a positive contribution to its development. This is certainly much-needed, as despite India’s impressive success, South Asia as a whole is plagued by extreme poverty, mega-urbanisation, immense disparities between rich and poor and fundamental problems in the areas of infrastructure, energy and the environment. On top of this there are also high levels of internal conflicts and political instability within the region.

But outside of these problems, the SAARC member states have things which bind them. South Asia has a long and closely-interwoven history. Its individual countries are actually closer to each other in terms of culture, ethnicity and religion than might be suspected in light of the political developments of recent years. Almost the entire region was also part of the British Empire. There are often cross-border similarities in traditions, languages and customs. Could these form a basis for a common South Asian identity? The countries of the region are also united by the fact that today, after years of turmoil, internal disputes, military conflicts and political upheaval, all SAARC countries are being run according to democratic principles. This could be an important step on the path to closer regional cooperation.4

3 | Cf. ibid., “SAARC: 14. Gipfeltreffen in Neu-Delhi,” http://www.weltalmanach.de/suche/suche.php?search=saarc (accessed December 13, 2010).4 | In their inaugural addresses at the 16th SAARC summit in Thimphu/Bhutan, the heads of the member states stressed the region’s democratic progress, cf. http://saarc-sec.org/ Sixteenth-SAARC-Summit/75 (accessed December 17, 2010).


India fears that its neighbours will join together to oppose the country’s inte-rests, particularly in light of the role of Pakistan and China.

INDIA – ThE REgION’S hEAvYwEIghT

On closer inspection, India’s position of prominence is shown to be one of the many hurdles standing in the way of South Asia’s integration. Its neighbours often view India as both a saviour and as part of the problem. In terms of its geographical size, its demographic and economic potential

and its political weight, the country towers above the other countries in the region. Other regional alliances have not had to deal with such a constellation, or only in a more limited way. Even Indonesia’s prominent position in

ASEAN is much less of an issue. In turn, India fears that its neighbours will join together to oppose the country’s interests, particularly in light of the role of Pakistan and China’s involvement in the region.

There is also another factor which puts India more and more in the spotlight – India borders every other SAARC country, but the other SAARC states do not share any mutual borders except with India. Afghanistan and Pakistan are exceptions in that they either border India or only have geographical access to the other SAARC members through India.

So even in terms of geography, it is almost impossible to get past India. Particularly the smaller member states such as Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh have felt the effects of this for a long time, as their borders are separated from each other by just a few kilometres of Indian corridor. Without the cooperation of both sides, and particularly without the cooperation of India, there has been no possibility of trade, border crossings, energy agreements or other initiatives. In practice, these kinds of complications have often meant exchanges between SAARC countries grinding to a halt.

The political restraint displayed by all the member countries towards their neighbours is a logical consequence of not only this constellation, but also of the centuries-long upheavals in South Asia, particularly the many conflicts which have broken out since the subcontinent was parti-tioned in 1947. And the after-effects of three wars between India and Pakistan and numerous regional and domestic conflicts, civil wars and political upheavals within the countries of the region can still be felt.


The special relationships between India and the Soviet union and between Pakistan and the uSA are examples of the difficult circumstances surrounding any increased South Asian cooperation.

A more positive evaluation of SAARC can, therefore, be achieved by assessing South Asia’s relative efforts at cooperation rather than by enumerating the concrete steps taken towards integration. SAARC was formed despite the many obstacles put in its path and the strong nationalist forces which were expressly set in motion to counter the idea of increased cooperation on a regional level. And this happened in the middle of the 1980s, a time which was characterized by antagonism and antipathy between the SAARC countries. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the special relationship between India and the Soviet Union after the signing of the Friendship Treaty, and the parallel “special” relationship between Pakistan and the USA are just a few examples of the difficult circumstances surrounding any increased South Asian cooperation in the run-up to SAARC’s creation.

hOw SAARC wAS ESTAbLIShED

An initiative by Bangladesh led to seven parties signing the SAARC Charter on 8th December 1985, following on from a series of co-ordinating meetings. The tensions in the region were clearly mirrored in the final document, which categorically excludes controversial bilateral issues from the SAARC remit and stipulates that all decisions must be unanimous. Still today many commentators view these sections as a reason why SAARC in practice has often not been able to act in the face of disputes between the region’s two major players, India and Pakistan. If bilateral issues had been included in the Charter, this could possibly have been used as a means for the smaller SAARC nations to act as a mediator between India and Pakistan.5 As a result, the South Asian association focused its initial activities on areas such as agriculture, health, the fight against poverty and for food security, in many cases with quite considerable success. A number of committees were set up to tackle the problems they had jointly identified.

The structure created by the SAARC Charter formed a solid and strongly-institutionalized base for the alliance. Four levels of decision-making were established, with

5 | Cf. Partha S. Ghosh, SAARC: Institutionalization and Regional Political Processes, (New Delhi, 2009), 4 et seq.


The discussion of bilateral disputes has in fact turned out to be one of SAARC’s greatest successes. Regular meetings within the framework of the association have brought about this significant side- effect.

implementation then taking place at the lower levels. The highest level comprises summit meetings of the Heads of State and Prime Ministers. The SAARC Charter stipulates that the highest representatives of the member states should meet at least once a year to discuss and make decisions on current issues. These meetings rotate around the member countries, with the 2010 summit having been held in Bhutan and the 2011 summit heading to the Maldives. Many commentators criticized the summits as being more of a PR exercise, and indeed they have so far resulted in rather few concrete actions. But on the other hand these meetings can be seen as one of SAARC’s greatest successes – whereas most of the world’s associations for cooperation work mainly at committee level, SAARC regularly gathers together all the leaders of its member states, with the notable inclusion of India and Pakistan. Searching the internet using the key word ‘SAARC’ turns up results which almost exclusively refer to high-level meetings between the two neighbours. After the Mumbai attacks in 2008, high-level representatives of India and Pakistan met for the first time at the 2009 SAARC Congress in Colombo. SAARC summits have often provided a framework for the two sides to hold discussions and resolve disputes – something which is important for the alliance and for the whole region.

Already in the more-distant past SAARC summits have often provided a platform for bilateral discussions, even

if these talks often tended to take place out of the public gaze behind closed doors. The important thing was that these meetings took place at all. It is ironic that the one thing which the Charter clearly outlawed – the discussion of bilateral disputes – has in

fact turned out to be one of SAARC’s greatest successes. The issues are not tackled by SAARC itself, but the regular meetings between the member states political leaders within the framework of the association have brought about this significant side-effect.6

6 | It should however be noted that some SAARC summits were cancelled because of the refusal of some participants to sit down together.


SAARC AS A PLATfORm fORSOuTh ASIAN DEvELOPmENT

This strength pervades the other levels. Even though SAARC’s critics accuse it of achieving little in the way of tangible results, it cannot be denied that the member states involvement in a tight network of committees, boards and organisations has proven to be one of the association’s major strong points. In view of the difficult circumstances which reigned at the time of the associa-tion’s establishment, it is a significant step forward that the region’s players will at least sit down together and enter into discussions.

Alongside the summits, the Council of Ministers provides another level for political action. Ministers from various departments meet several times a year in order to draw up political plans, assess the effects of previous actions, identify new areas for cooperation and if necessary decide upon new methods and mechanisms.7 These meetings were originally intended for the countries’ foreign ministers, but other ministries are increasingly being included. So, for instance, in summer 2010 the SAARC interior ministers gathered to discuss the establishment of an Interpol-type police structure to tackle cross-border terrorist networks, human trafficking, drug trafficking and smuggling within the region.8

Resolutions passed at the summits and by the Council of Ministers are then administered and implemented by “Standing Committees” (consisting of high-level repre-sentatives of the relevant ministry), the “SAARC Secre-tariat”, “Technical Committees” and their offshoot, “Action Committees”. Meetings are scheduled at regular intervals, as required. Another of SAARC’s strengths is the fact that decision-makers and specialists from the individual countries come together regularly in these committees in order to discuss their problems, ideas and possible solutions – at least in theory.

7 | Cf. Charter of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (Dhaka, 1985), Article IV, 2.8 | Diplomatic Correspondent, “SAARC police proposed,” The Daily Star, June 27, 2010, in: http://www.thedailystar.net/ newDesign/news-details.php?nid=144341 (accessed December 15, 2010).


Outside observers, including not only the citizens of South Asia who are trying to identify with SAARC, are finding it in-creasingly difficult to get a handle on the alliance’s huge range of activities.

There is one major criticism of SAARC which should not be ignored. Within a very short time-span, a plethora of insti-tutions, initiatives, bodies and committees have sprung up within the organisation, with different remits ranging

from biotechnology and forestry to coastal management and meteorological cooper-ation. There is no doubt that close consul-tation between partner countries cannot hurt. But the phrase “less is more” would seem to apply here. Outside observers, including not

only the citizens of South Asia who are trying to identify with SAARC, but also the region’s well-informed politicians, are finding it increasingly difficult to get a handle on the alliance’s wide range of activities.9 The fact that the SAARC summit host country sets the agenda for the conference has just intensified this explosion of issues tackled by the regional association and the plethora of largely institution-alized actions taken.

The members could have benefited from concentrating their resources and energies on the region’s economic integration. But the SAARC countries have long shied away from internal trade liberalisation as long as other regional alliances have made this their focus and achieved significant results in just a short time.10 The region’s political framework did not initially allow for this kind of cooperation.

fROm SAPTA TO SAfTA –EN ROuTE TO A fREE TRADE ZONE?

However, the members of SAARC gradually felt their way towards putting the issue of economic cooperation on the association’s agenda. The SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) was signed in 1993 and entered into force in 1995 with a view to paving the way for increased economic integration in the region, as trade between member states was practically non-existent, apart from a tiny amount of foreign trade. Alongside the agreement to increase cooperation in the area of customs tariffs and

9 | Cf. Nischal Pandey, Regional Cooperation in South Asia: A Nepalese Perspective (Kathmandu, 2005), 4.10 | Cf. Muchkund Dubey, “Looking Ahead”, in: Dipankar Banerjee and N. Manoharan (eds.), SAARC Towards Greater Connectivity (New Delhi: Anshah, 2008), 242.


by signing the SAfTA agreement the governments committed to follow a concrete road map towards facilitating the cross-border movement of goods.

duties, SAPTA established the important goal of providing more support for the least developed member states.11 Although four rounds of trade liberalisation negotiations were concluded under SAPTA, the agreement had little real effect on increasing trade between SAARC nations. But SAPTA was successful in one respect: the agreement opened the doors to future progress. SAPTA helped to focus the alliance’s political leaders on the need for greater economic cooperation in order to achieve real economic integration.

Following on from this, SAFTA, the South Asian Free Trade Area agree ment, was signed at the 2004 Summit of Foreign Ministers in Islamabad and entered into force on January 1, 2006. By signing this agreement, the governments of the member nations committed to follow a concrete road map towards facilitating the cross-border movement of goods (with the perspective to abolish all customs duties by 2015), to harmonising product testing procedures (still a major barrier to trading between the SAARC countries) and to increased cooperation on the question of cross-border transport infrastructures. The issue of support for the least developed member states, a question which had already been tackled within SAPTA, was also brought into the SAFTA agreement: Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives and Nepal were awarded special conditions and conces-sions in meeting the deadlines set out by SAFTA.

So what has been achieved after four years of this free trade agreement? Many critics say “not much”. The agreement might have produced better results if it had set tighter deadlines, created a fund for the less developed member nations, drawn up a concrete plan for abolishing the non-tariff trade barriers which were such a stumbling block to trade and initiated a clearly-defined cooperation on infrastructure projects.12 But as it was, any real results for intra-SAARC trade remained limited. Trade between the majority of SAARC nations is still negligible,13 and the

11 | Cf. Agreement on SAARC Preferential Trading Agreement (SAPTA), (Dhaka, 1993), 5.12 | Cf. Dubey, n. 10, 244 et seq. 13 | India is again an exception, having directly or indirectly the largest share in the balance of trade of most SAARC nations. More details: “Making SAFTA more effective” (New Delhi, 2010).


foreign companies shy away from in-vesting in South Asia, even in India, because of the many hurdles they have to face. This has a detrimental effect on the whole region.

day-to-day operations of businesses in South Asia are still hampered by non-tariff barriers, transport problems and visa complications. It is hardly surprising that many local

businesspeople prefer to engage in projects with South East Asia, China, America and Europe rather than in investments and trade with their neighbours. The reverse is also true – Indian businesses are often keen to

take advantage of the excellent opportunities for importers within the European single market, but foreign companies shy away from investing in South Asia, even in India, because of the many hurdles they have to face. This has a detrimental effect on the entire region.

LIbERALISATION, COOPERATION ANDA LOOK TOwARDS ThE EAST

There is great potential for increased cooperation and liberalisation within the countries of South Asia. But there is a need to better understand the benefits of a free single market. Even the smaller countries have in the past been reticent on the question of abolishing duties, as this revenue has always made up a significant, even substantial, part of their income. They are also afraid that their domestic markets will be flooded with Indian goods, resulting in the collapse of their local manufacturing industries. Other regional organisations have shown that a single market may have this effect, but it is by no means inevitable. The example of Europe shows us how the principle of investment in structurally-weaker member states in the end brings benefits for all parties involved.

The crucial factor in all this is that the trading partners feel they can trust each other’s words and actions. There seems to have been a resurgence of this trust, at least among some South Asian countries. In the last few months India, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan have moved closer on the issue of transit regulations for goods and passenger transportation and on the use of deep-sea ports. This is a remarkable and significant step which has been a long time in the making.14 Although trucks and containers still

14 | Cf. Dipu Moni, “Transit to benefit four countries,” The Daily Star, August 9, 2010, in: http://www.thedailystar.net/new Design/news-details.php?nid=150000 (accessed December 15, 2010).


with its economic dynamism and glo-bal recognition, ASEAN exerts a strong pull on the countries of South Asia, especially India. but there is a crucial difference between ASEAN and SAARC.

have to be fully unloaded and reloaded at borders, causing considerable expense and even financial losses due to the time required, in future cross-border trade could be speeded up significantly.

A major catalyst for this new rapprochement can also be found in the policies of India and its Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, who has spoken of the Indian willingness to take on more asymmetric responsibility within SAARC.15 This is an important signal for the region after SAARC has been through a further weak phase in which the many bilateral agreements between individual member states seem to render the regional association increasingly obsolete.

The “Look East” strategy of some South Asian nations could also be viewed as competition for SAARC. With its economic dynamics and global recognition, ASEAN in particular exerts a strong pull on the countries of South Asia, especially India.16 But trying to compare ASEAN’s success with SAARC’s development is a little like trying to compare apples and oranges. Along with the previously-mentioned problems inherent in the closer and faster integration of South Asia, there is a crucial difference between these two organisations. The example of ASEAN highlights the importance of a clear political commitment to economic cooperation and eventual liberalisation and the need to take consistent steps in this direction. For the reasons previously discussed, SAARC was not able to achieve this in its early stages and later on also missed its opportunity. As a result South Asia is increasingly feeling its way towards the East, trying to build contacts with adjoining countries.

“Sub-regional integration” is the key phrase which lies behind the formation of organizations such as BIMST-EC in 1997. In the framework of this “Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation”,

15 | Cf. Nihal Rodrigo, “SAARC in Perspective,” in: Dipankar Banerjee and N. Manoharan (eds.), SAARC Towards Greater Connectivity (New Delhi: Anshah, 2008), 6.16 | More on India-ASEAN relations at IPCS Special Report, № 72, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, May 2009, in: http://ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR72-Final.pdf (accessed January 10, 2011).


Observers recently sent representati-ves to the SAARC summits, and even China is showing increased interest in membership of a South Asian regional association.

Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Thailand, joined later by Myanmar, Nepal and Bhutan, set similar goals to those of the SAARC Charter. Its aims are political and economic cooperation. Observers see great potential in the BIMST-EC project, if only because, unlike SAARC, the organisation includes Thailand and Myanmar but does not include the crisis-ridden countries of Pakistan and Afghanistan.17

So do these sub-regional integration initiatives really constitute serious competition for SAARC? Regional integration always hits a barrier when the question of common identity is raised. Do the BIMST-EC countries actually have anything in common other than their interest in economic development, profit and prosperity? In contrast with SAARC and the deeply-rooted sense of history of South Asia, the answer has to be a resounding no.

ExTERNAL INTEREST IN SAARC IS gROwINg

The trend towards deeper bilateral agreements and the desire to join other multilateral organisations is paradoxi-cally taking place at a time when interest in SAARC in Asia, but also world-wide, is growing. Since 2005 Australia, China, the European Union, Iran, Japan, South-Korea, Mauritius, Myanmar and the USA have all been granted observer status.18 This allows them to take part in the inaugural and closing sessions of summits and the oppor-tunity to make proposals on the development of SAARC

and show its own interests for possible future cooperation. The observers recently sent (often high-ranking) representatives to the SAARC summits, and even China is showing increased interest in membership of a South

Asian regional association. However, Nepal’s proposal in early 2010 to convert China’s observer status into full membership was vetoed by India. Some commentators from the smaller SAARC nations see China’s membership as a possible way of balancing out India’s strength within

17 | Cf. Yogendra Singh, “BIMSTEC: Need to Move beyond the Linkage Syndrome,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, December 15, 2008, in: http://ipcs.org/article/southeast- asia/bimstec-need-to-move-beyond-the-linkage-syndrome- 2753.html (accessed December 15, 2010).18 | Cf. SAARC Secretariat, http://saarc-sec.org/Cooperation-with- Observers/13 (accessed December 15, 2010).


Despite extremely difficult political cir-cumstances, SAARC has managed to create situations, institutions and fo-rums where heads of State shake each others’ hands.

SAARC,19 and also view China’s massive growth as a possible way of giving impetus to the economic integration process. What is more, many people feel the sheer size of such an alliance would raise its credibility in the eyes of the world.

But this is not likely to happen in the near future. SAARC will have to rely on its present configuration to resolve the existing challenges and questions of the imbalance between India and its other members, the disputes between India and Pakistan and its stuttering progress towards economic integration. But the increased external interest in SAARC should be a pointer for South Asia to realise that the bodies created have more potential than the member states think themselves. Or do Europe, the USA, China and the other observers see more in SAARC than there really is?

A NEED TO fOCuS ON CORE ISSuES

So what is in store for SAARC? In South Asia there are currently three different opinions on SAARC: the project will be given up due to indifference or ignorance; it is a failure; or it is a good idea with great potential but also with a lot of problems. Hardly anyone would claim that SAARC is going well in every respect, and it’s true that tangible results are few and far between. But there have been successes: over the last 25 years, despite extremely difficult political circumstances, SAARC has managed to create situations, institutions and forums where Heads of State have had to shake each others’ hands and go into talks together. SAARC has tackled important topics for the region such as a social charter, development agreements and even the sensitive subject of fighting terrorism and has achieved some good results. The food and development banks are important steps in the right direction. Exchanges in the areas of civil society and science have become one of the pillars of South Asian integration efforts.

19 | Comments made to the author during the conference “Nepal’s Foreign Policy: The Way ahead” on November 22, 2010 in Kathmandu.


All the SAARC countries are showing positive economic developments. The potential for foreign investors is huge, and South Asian integration is also coming to the forefront on a political level.

One thing is true of all this: SAARC should not lose its direction by getting involved in too many areas at once. Political signals and the political will for clear progress towards economic integration are what will tip the scales in favour of successful regional cooperation in South Asia. Activities in hundreds of other areas cannot compensate for failure in the question of economic liberalisation.

In some respects SAARC’s prospects have never looked better. For the first time in its history, the governments of its member states are being run on democratic principles. All the SAARC countries are showing positive

economic developments. And international interest in South Asia has never been stronger: the potential for foreign investors is immense, and South Asian integration is also coming to the forefront on a political level. The regional players should focus on these developments and not trip themselves up by making independent bilateral agreements. But there will not be a closer integration without achieving more stability in the region, beginning with Afghanistan and progressing to the domestic conflicts which plague almost all of South Asia’s young democ-racies. India should take a particular interest in this – if the regional heavyweight wants to progress further on the path to growth it needs to make sure there is stability and peace in its own back yard. Its smaller neighbours also offer interesting potential in the area of energy production and resources. For India, a country which currently has negligible levels of trade with other South Asian nations, the region offers immense potential for growth. It would not be a case of reinventing the wheel if India were to invest heavily in its neighbours in order to develop strong consumer markets, for the European Union has already shown that this can work successfully.

However, the European project would have never succeeded without trust and respect for the perceptions of its partners, especially the smaller ones. As South Asia’s major player, India needs to prove that it is the driving force behind integration and act to push forward the development of the whole region, if it is really serious about forging closer ties. The difficult starting position should not be used as an excuse, for if we look at Europe’s situation after the Second


World War and even during the 1950s, it did not exactly inspire any more confidence than the position of South Asia in the 21st century. Yet the European project has been successful – for large and small members alike – thanks to its strong convictions and the development of measures designed to build trust.

In this respect SAARC has a long road ahead. The obvious problems have to be addressed, while at the same time its successes should be celebrated. The opportunity is there to build a successful common future – now it is a matter of grasping it.

Article current as at December 17, 2010.


Winfried Weck

Indonesia’s acceptance into the G20 has opened up new avenues for the country’s participation in international processes and development. Indonesia is also taking over the presidency of ASEAN this year. After President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was able to make his voice heard at the 2009 G20 Summits in London and Pittsburgh with a number of interesting initiatives, including the reform of international financial institutions, Indonesia is now keen to position itself as a mouthpiece for ASEAN countries and as a representative of developing nations within the G20. The country has made the headlines recently as host to a number of high profile events, including the 2008 Climate Change Conference in Bali, aimed at updating the Kyoto Protocol, and the 2009 World Ocean Conference in Menado/Sulawesi 2009, and will continue in this vein with the organisation of the 2013 APEC Summit. For this reason Indonesia has already taken over the 2011 ASEAN Chair-manship and will host the annual summit in autumn 2011.1

So what are now the priorities for Indonesian foreign policy? Should the country concentrate on ASEAN, which adopted its charter2 in 2008 and which from 2015 will take a first decisive step towards becoming a community of states? Or is concentrating on cooperation with the powerful G20 a better alternative to focusing on the somewhat indecisive ASEAN? Will Indonesia’s foreign policy be appreciated by

1 | Indonesia was actually meant to take over the ASEAN presidency in 2013 but requested the presidency in 2011 at the Summit in Hanoi in April 2010 in order to be able to better prepare for the APEC Summit.2 | In 2008 Indonesia ratified the charter as the last member country to do so.

Winfried Weck is Repre-sentative of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung for Indonesia and East Timor.

ASEAN AND g20 – INDONESIA’S fOREIgN POLICY PERSPECTIvES


its own people and, if so, how? Isn’t the strong sense of national identity, not only amongst Indonesians, but also amongst nearly all the other peoples who come under the umbrella of ASEAN, fundamentally at odds with integration policies along European lines? What does Indonesia actually get out of its regional cooperation in ASEAN? These are the kinds of questions that are dominating foreign policy debates in Indonesia, not only amongst experts, but also amongst all levels of the population as a whole.

ASEAN – ThE ROCKY ROAD fROm A CLub fOR AuTOCRATS TO AN EffECTIvE COmmuNITY Of STATES

To understand Indonesia’s political stance towards ASEAN, as well as that of all the other member countries, it is necessary to take ASEAN internal sensitivities into conside-ration. All too often ASEAN is compared to the European Union in an international context and it is not unusual for these comparisons to emanate from the EU or ASEAN themselves. However, the objectives behind the founding of ASEAN are in no way comparable with those of the process of European unification. The idea of creating peace and prosperity through integration and shared sovereignty have until recently never been a subject for discussion within the ASEAN political framework.

ASEAN was founded on August 8, 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines. The aim of these relatively young countries was to create a loose network, without a legal basis under international law, to promote economic cooperation, to avoid conflicts between member states and to develop strategies against possible threats from outside. From the very beginning ASEAN played a central role in Indonesia’s foreign policy under the then still young President Suharto, who was anxious to clearly distance himself from the anti-West rhetoric and policies of his predecessor Sukarno. So in addition to the Vietnam War, the fact that ASEAN tended towards anti-communism from the very beginning and saw itself as a protection organisation for its member countries against the People’s Republic of China, is down to the influence of

The objectives behind the founding of ASEAN are in no way comparable with those of the process of European unification.


Indonesia.3 And yet for the original ASEAN members it amounted to little more than an informal “cozy club of authoritarian regimes”4, for whom conflict resolution was less important than avoiding conflict amongst themselves in the first place. This can be seen in the fact that the first ASEAN summit in Bali in February 1976 only took place nine years after its formation5 and in the following 27 years only 8 further summits were organised. Even the arrival of new members such as Brunei in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Myanmar and Laos in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999 did not lead to any significant change in ASEAN’s self-image.

This type of non-binding cooperation was not some kind of compromise, but was something that all the participating

governments were specifically striving for. Jakarta for instance was constantly afraid of having to enter into any agreement within the framework of ASEAN with the aim of forming some kind of permanent structure or which might have been considered to be a measure

designed to promote integration. Indonesia was particu-larly wary of even the smallest efforts to create a common market. Even today there is the fear that the home market could be flooded with cheaper imported goods from other highly competitive ASEAN member states.6

However much Indonesia’s role in ASEAN has always restricted and slowed the possible better utilization of their common economic potential, Indonesia still considers ASEAN as a means to create a regional political identity. After various attempts at creating some kind of foreign and security policy integration in Southeast Asia had

3 | Cf. Preamble of the Bangkok Declaration: “…the countries share a primary responsibility to ensure (…) their stability and security from external interference in any form or from propaganda (…).”4 | Foreign policy expert Dewi Fortuna Anwar of the Indonesian Institute of Science LIPI at a KAS conference in Bandung in February 2010.5 | At the Bali Summit in 1976 the position of ASEAN General Secretary was also created.6 | This is equally true of the free-trade zone ACFTA (ASEAN- China Free Trade Agreement) created at the beginning of 2010. In April 2010 Indonesia tried to negotiate the removal of customs duty on a total of 228 of their domestic products (incl. shoes, textile goods but also popcorn), but to no avail.

Indonesia was particularly wary of even the smallest efforts to create a common market. Even today there is the fear that the home market could be flooded with cheaper imported goods.


Since its formation, territorial integrity has been a fundamental hallmark of the nation’s self-identity and the highest national goal of Indonesia.

failed7, ASEAN created the Southeast Asian Zone for Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971, at the height of the Vietnam War, with Indonesia as the driving force. Indonesia’s overwhelming desire to see a zone of neutrality within the region was the result of a number of inter-related factors. The most important reason was that Indonesia had been created from a former Dutch colony and so had no links to those classic colonial powers Great Britain and France, unlike the whole of the Southeast Asian mainland, with the exception of Thailand. Since its formation, territorial integrity has been a fundamental hallmark of the nation’s self-identity and the highest national goal of the Indonesian Republic. Political leaders in Indonesia have always considered the country’s political independence as the most important way of protecting this integrity.8 For this reason they were always very careful about not allowing themselves to come under the influence of the Soviet Union or the USA.9 Added to this was the fear of an all-too-powerful People’s Republic of China, which had developed into a regional power after the Cultural Revolution.

However, in the first 20 years ZOPFAN lacked a common political strategy. Some of the member states like the Philippines and Singapore had too many links to the super-powers so that for them independence along Indonesian lines was out of the question. The compromises within the 1971 ZOPFAN Declaration in Kuala Lumpur showed that the aim of ZOPFAN was to turn the region as a whole into a zone of neutrality rather than each individual country.

7 | The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) military alliance, created in 1954 on the initiative of the USA along the lines of NATO was dissolved in 1977. Four years earlier the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), formed in 1966, a union of Southeast Asian states, Australia and New Zealand, suffered a similar fate.8 | It was no coincidence that the 1955 conference aimed at the founding of non-aligned states took place in Bandung (Island of Java, Indonesia).9 | The country’s founder Sukarno moved too far down the socialist path, leading to a coup and the takeover of power by Suharto. Even today terms like communist, socialist and even social are seen in an extremely negative light by a large part of Indonesia’s population.


It was only with the end of the Cold War and the hope of a new world order at the beginning of the 1990s that the somewhat sleepy ASEAN started to show more signs of life. However, this newly discernable dynamism within ASEAN is in no way proactively driven but is almost entirely reactive. Even the “shot in the arm” afforded by its new members Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia did not lead to any fundamental change in its traditionally passive behaviour and especially not that of Indonesia. It took the massive economic and financial crisis of 1997 to make them wake up to the realisation that they needed closer economic cooperation and to accelerate the formation of the AFTA free-trade zone, for which 15 years had originally been scheduled.10

The truly historic and decisive moment for the future development of ASEAN came at the 13th ASEAN summit in Singapore in November 2007. There the member states signed a charter that had been two years in the making and which gave ASEAN a legally binding status for the first time and so made it subject to international law.11 The Charter came into effect on December 15, 2008 after Indonesia had ratified it as the last ASEAN member country to do so on October 21, 2008. It created the legal basis for a community of states promoting cooperation

on security, economic and socio-cultural issues12, to be established by the year 2015. This community is committed to democracy, the rule of law and good government as well as human rights and basic civil liberties,

rejects unconstitutional changes in government and plans the creation of an ASEAN human rights body.13 There is no doubt that the Charter has a high symbolic value in terms of reflecting ASEAN’s new found self-image. However, it seems highly unlikely that it will be implemented as

10 | At the 4th ASEAN Summit in Singapore in 1992 the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was set up with import duties between zero and five per cent for the period 1993 to 2008. However, AFTA only came into force on January 1, 2003.11 | Cf. Art. 1 ASEAN Charter, http://www.aseansec.org/21069.pdf (accessed January 10, 2011).12 | ASEAN Security Community (ASC), ASEAN Economic Commu- nity (AEC) and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC).13 | Cf. Art. 14 ASEAN Charter, ASEAN Human Rights Body, http://www.aseansec.org/21069.pdf (accessed January 10, 2011).

The Charter has a high symbolic value in terms of reflecting ASEAN’s new found self-image. however, it seems highly unlikely that it will be implemented as envisaged.


ASEAN consisted in the beginning only of countries with non-democratic governments, and that is still predomi-nantly the case today.

envisaged, and it is largely dependent upon the will of the individual member states. The instruments which ASEAN uses to achieve its own goals and objectives have not really evolved and remain very weak.14 This fact leads indirectly to the somewhat provocative question as to whether ASEAN shouldn’t indeed be compared to the European Union.

COmPARINg ASEAN AND ThE Eu: A CLASh Of IDEAS

First things first: what is most apparent is not so much what they have in common but the differences between them. From the very beginning the European Union was conceived as a community of values, while ASEAN has done its best for decades to avoid even discussing a common set of values, let alone implementing them. This was never really their intention, for in contrast to the European Union, with its clear commitment to an anti-Eastern Bloc, pro-West/transatlantic community of values, ASEAN’s main objective was to reduce the influence of both blocs and superpowers and that of China on the Southeast Asian region as much as possible.

The (lack of) common values are a result of the highly different forms of government in both organisations. The European Union is a club for democracies and being a plura- listic, democratic, constitutional state is a basic prerequisite of membership. Only the actual day-to-day organisation of the democratic system is left to each individual country (representative or direct, parliamentary or presidential, federal or central democracy, majority or proportional representation-based elections, etc.). ASEAN, on the other hand, consisted in the beginning only of countries with non-democratic governments, and that is still predominantly the case today. Members include communist countries such as Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, the self-confessed military dictatorship of Myanmar, authori-tarian single or multiparty states such as Singapore and Malaysia, a kingdom regularly beset by government crises and military coups in Thailand and the absolute Sultanate of Brunei Darussalam. Against this political cacophony,

14 | Cf. Art. 20 ASEAN Charter, http://www.aseansec.org/21069. pdf (accessed January 10, 2011), Decisions should be made on the basis of consultation and consensus.


while the Europeans work together in an often confrontational, but predomi-nantly constructive way, ASEAN mem-bers work according to a code of con-duct they call the Asian way.

the most developed democracies of Indonesia and, to a lesser extent, the Philippines can only make themselves heard because of their importance and their size.

The very different nature of these two membership groupings has led to funda-mental differences within both the EC/EU and ASEAN as to how members should deal with each other. While the Europeans

seek to resolve problems by working together in an often confrontational, but also predominantly constructive way, and through the systematic creation of interdependencies in nearly every political sphere, ASEAN members work according to a code of conduct they like to call the Asian way15 and which is made up of three basic parts:

▪ strict non-interference in the internal affairs of other member states;

▪ a common duty to respect national sovereignty and identity and territorial integrity;

▪ avoidance of the creation of sub-ASEAN institutions which could lead to a sharing of national sovereignty at community level.

All ASEAN cooperation is therefore non-binding in character. The final aspect of this comparison may have long-term effects on cooperation within the ASEAN region and beyond and therefore needs to be looked at in more detail: if we take the geographical location, the current population size and the political and economic influence of individual EU member states into consideration, then the history of European integration can be seen as a permanent process of balancing out, especially between the larger member states. The EC was originally made up of three countries of roughly the same size (Italy, France and West Germany) and three smaller countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg). When Great Britain joined the EC the club of three big countries became a club of four, and this balance of power was to be fundamentally important to the development of Community processes. After German reunification this balance was completely thrown out of kilter. Almost overnight one of the members of the club of four (also the strongest economically) suddenly enjoyed a

15 | Established in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 1976.


until now differences in size, and especially the vastness of Indonesia were of no real significance in the way ASEAN was run.

substantial growth in physical size and, more importantly, an almost 20 million increase in population. Compared to Great Britain, France and Italy, who each had between 50 and 60 million inhabitants, Germany now had 80 million and was therefore primus inter pares, a situation that even Germany’s closest EU partner, France, found difficult to deal with. It was therefore vital to reinstate the balance of power and this led to urgent steps towards expansion and to spreading the integration process beyond the existing economic community.16 The more integration and sharing of national sovereignty, the greater the checks and balances and the building of trust between members: this is the historical lesson that can be learned from the Maastricht Treaty.

If we were to look at ASEAN from the viewpoint of those key issues mentioned above, then it can be seen that of the approx. 575 million people in the ASEAN region 240 million, or around 40 per cent, come from Indonesia alone. There is then a significant gap to the Philip-pines and Vietnam (each with approx. 90 to 95 million inhabitants) and Thailand (70 million). Until now these differences in size, and especially the vastness of Indonesia, both in terms of population and geography17, were of no real significance in the way ASEAN was run. However, under the terms of the new Charter this situation could change drastically. If the ASEAN member states really want to build a community of nations along the lines of the European Union then it will soon become apparent who is in the driving seat and who should be considered more as passengers. The Charter sensibly allows for a two-speed process in certain areas so that more progressive member states can move more quickly towards integration.

But which group will Indonesia belong to? Official government rhetoric suggests that they naturally see Indonesia assuming the role of leader on the basis of the size of their country in comparison to other member states, as mentioned above. But what if the other countries do not

16 | Refers to the second and third pillars of European Union.17 | At 5,100 km Indonesia is almost as long as the distance between New York and Los Angeles and covers three time zones.


Everybody in the region is very aware of Indonesia’s sense of national identity. most of the smaller ASEAN states are worried about a possible Indonesian hegemony.

want to be led by the giant archipelago next door? After all, border disputes within ASEAN states have been smoul-dering for decades. Indonesia has been fighting constant diplomatic battles over the treatment of Indonesian

migrant workers, especially with Singapore and Malaysia. And emotions continue to run high on both sides in the Malaysian-Indonesian dispute over who stole whose language (Indonesian and Malaysian are

almost identical). Everybody in the region is very aware of Indonesia’s sense of national identity, which in recent times has once again bordered on xenophobia. Most of the smaller ASEAN states are worried about a possible Indonesian hegemony. ASEAN lacks the kind of set up and mechanisms that help to allay similar fears amongst smaller members of the European Union and to maintain the balance of power, which is to say a grouping of similar-sized countries that keep each other in check and a process of integration aimed at achieving interdependencies.

fuTuRE OPTIONS: ASEAN + ?

The general feeling amongst ASEAN member states seems to be that ASEAN has no alternative but to look for ways to face up to today’s challenges. The solution that seems to offer the most likelihood of success in tackling current problems, especially for want of better alternatives, lies in cooperation between ASEAN countries. This concept of “ASEAN+” has seen various initiatives put forward in recent years as a consequence of participation in a bewildering number of dialogue and cooperation platforms between ASEAN and third parties. With the help of the group known as the ASEAN Dialogue Partners18, the “ASEAN+3” process was developed in 1997 (also APT: ASEAN Plus Three), a dialogue platform between ASEAN, China, South Korea and Japan aimed at improving cooperation in 20 different areas, including crime prevention, tourism, security and health. China and India have become new members of the security platform established in 1976 as part of the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). ASEAN is now

18 | The official ASEAN Dialogue Partners are Australia (first Dialogue Partner 1974), China, India, USA, Russia, EU, Canada, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea. The UNDP also has Dialogue Partner status.


ASEAN must now be prepared to take a further decisive step beyond the “ASEAN+” concept and allow full member status to new, economically strong democracies from the region.

trying to persuade the other two APT partners, Japan and South Korea, to also join TAC. It is hoped that Russia will join in 2011. In 2009 President Obama showed an interest in the USA also signing up. The term “ASEAN+8” is already being considered for this expanded TAC grouping.19 It is also worth mentioning the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the ASEAN Cooperation Dialogue (ACD).

An analysis of ASEAN’s external contacts would suggest that it is trying to fix or at least conceal the shortfalls inherent in its own systems through a confusing number of platforms, (pseudo) organisations and discussion forums between ASEAN and other players. However this “head in the sand” policy will not be enough in the long term to make ASEAN capable of meeting global challenges ahead. As a result ASEAN must now be prepared to take a further decisive step beyond the “ASEAN+” concept and allow full member status to new, economically strong democracies from the region such as South Korean and Japan, but also Australia and New Zealand. This would have the effect of balancing out Indonesia’s exceptional status and help to strengthen democratic processes throughout the whole ASEAN region. The idea of a cautious expansion of ASEAN, which until now has only been floating around in the region as a kind of desirable political utopia, could quickly gain momentum if, after 2015, the ASEAN member states actually seriously opt to go down the integration and community route within certain political areas. Anyhow, as early as 2005 the first East Asian Summit took place in Kuala Lumpur, with the participation of the ASEAN+3-countries together with India, Australia and New Zealand.

Political and economic necessity may also play a part in the successful implementation of this kind of expansion option in the mid-term. The European unification process didn’t come about because a few European countries suddenly became aware of how much they liked each other, but because the tragedy of the Second World War and the initial

19 | ASEAN + Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Russia and the USA.


The member states must choose between a comfortable ASEAN with no institutional importance or an ASEAN regional power with an important po-litical and economic role on the world stage.

establishing of blocs made it necessary for the Europeans to find new ways to ensure that there would be peace, at least amongst themselves. Maintaining peace was and still is the main objective of European Union. In Southeast Asia there has so far been no similar external or internal necessity to integrate, which may well be the main cause of ASEAN’s relative weakness. However, you do not need a profound knowledge of the region to recognise that the superpower China will be the biggest factor putting pressure on the whole of the East and Southeast Asia region to act. Whether individual countries will be able to withstand this political and economic pressure is debatable. An expanded ASEAN would create an economic and security area on a par with both China and the European Union.

ThE DILEmmA bETwEEN wANTINg TO AND hAvINg TO

At the Hanoi Summit in April 2010 all the countries’ leaders expressed their agreement with the Charter and especially with the creation of an economic union by 2015. “There is a growing realisation among the leaders that the size of the market matters”, claims Sanchita Basu Das, an analyst from the ASEAN Study Centre in the Institute of South East Asian Studies, Singapore.20 The question is: are these positive signs just playing lip service or have the politicians understood the global challenges and accepted there is no really serious alternative to integration, union and the loss

of a certain amount of national sovereignty in certain clearly-defined political areas? Only then can the weaknesses inherent in the Charter be overcome, such as the fact that in addition to the traditional decision-making process (principle of unanimity) there are no

new proposals on how to settle differences of opinion or disputes.21 The ASEAN union now stands at a crossroads. Its members must choose between a comfortable ASEAN with no institutional importance or an ASEAN regional power with an important political and economic role on the world stage.

20 | Sanchita Basu Das, in: the Business Times, April 21, 2010, 19.21 | The original idea to set up an ASEAN court to settle disputes was not pursued. The consensus principle and independent arbitration proceedings in individual cases remain the sole means of settlement. The latest arbitration issue concerned the ASEAN Summit.


Indonesia’s policy of “promoting a dynamic equilibrance” is very much open to interpretation.

It is still unclear as to what Indonesia will do next. If we believe the official statements on the Foreign Ministry website then Indonesia wants to be one of those countries pushing through the Charter and the development of further cooperation: “Indonesia and ASEAN share the view that the development of regional architectures not only needs to recognize the significance of ASEAN as a driving force, but also must be carried out with a view to strength-ening efforts towards ASEAN Community-building. At the same time, efforts at ASEAN Community-building must also be implemented within each ASEAN member country’s domestic conditions so as to elevate ASEAN Centrality.”22 The Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa wants to leave us in no doubt as to Indonesia’s good will: “Indonesia will be chairing ASEAN in 2011 and this is a good opportunity along the line for us to be part of the effort to help shape our regional architecture. For us, sooner is better than later.”23 However, ASEAN would not be ASEAN and Indonesia would not be one of its most influential members if the there wasn’t a qualification to this: “But at the same time, we are very much aware that this is about comfort levels, we must proceed as they said in ASEAN language: at the best comfortable rate for all.”24 This policy of “promoting a dynamic equilibrance”25, as it is known in the Indonesian government’s phrasebook, is very much open to interpretation.

At this point it is also worth mentioning the significant fact that the whole ASEAN process on Indonesia’s side (as for all the other member states) will be carried out and developed by relevant internal ministries, even though until now this has been the exclusive domain of the Foreign Ministry. As far as Indonesia is concerned, ASEAN is part of foreign policy. As a result Jakarta has until today been able to avoid the dilemma of claiming on the one hand to want to be one of the driving forces of the ASEAN process, while

22 | Website of the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Indonesia: http://www.deplu.go.id/pages/news.aspx?IDP=3104&1=en (accessed December 2, 2010).23 | Lilian Budianto, “ASEAN presence a prerequisite in any future Asia Pacific community”, in: Jakarta Post, May 1, 2010, 324 | Ibid.25 | “U.S. and China vie to win over Jakarta,” in: International Herald Tribune, November 10, 2010, 1.


As the only g20 country from the ASEAN group, Indonesia is taking the opportunity to represent the whole region and is trying to position itself as the defender of interests for all developing nations.

on the other hand, and despite rhetoric to the contrary, pursuing a completely opposite policy, driven by nationa lism and protectionism, designed to limit and put a brake on all efforts to develop ASEAN into a serious political and economic community of values. Many local experts have either been very critical of Indonesia’s claim to be leaders in the ASEAN process or simply don’t take it seriously.

ThE wORLD AND INDONESIA: AN INSIDE vIEw Of A hETEROgENEOuS ISLAND KINgDOm

Indonesia is well aware of its growing international importance, and this new-found self-confidence has been boosted by its membership of the G20. Here this nation with the fourth biggest population in the world no longer holds a cautious or watching brief but adopts positions and takes initiatives. It is no accident that the Yudhoyono

government claims to consider the G20 as the institution most likely to succeed in creating global economic processes and preventing future global economic and financial crises. As the only G20 country from the ASEAN group, Indonesia is taking the opportunity to

represent the whole Southeast Asian region and is trying to position itself at the same time as the mouthpiece and defender of interests for all developing nations. In concrete terms the Indonesian government is particularly keen to see the inclusion of non-G20 states in internationally coordinated G20 activities, above all in order to avoid beggar-thy-neighbour situations arising.

Membership of the decision-makers club at a time when the development of ASEAN seems to be showing no signs of growth has raised the question among experts as to whether G20 membership is more important for Indonesia than being in ASEAN and whether Indonesia’s commitment to the G20 may spell the end of its involvement in ASEAN in the long run. Surprisingly, even foreign policy experts seem to be ignoring the fact that the G20, as a worldwide forum for the coordination of economic policies, cannot be considered in any way similar to a community of states like ASEAN, as both institutions have completely different functions.


Indonesian economic experts like to point out that, at a time of world economic stagnation, only China, India and Indonesia have achieved above-average economic growth. Indonesia is still expected to report over 6 per cent economic growth for 2010. At the same time the Indonesian economy proved to be less vulnerable during the latest financial crisis than the big export/import nations. Many Indonesians from the educated classes are aware of this. Today you can sense a noticeable feeling of national pride, especially amongst those in government positions and political life. The general feeling seems to be that Indonesia does not need any outside help, especially not from the West.

Amongst the wider population people are not really aware of what is happening in the G20. National print and broadcast media only give very rudimentary accounts of G20 meetings, if they bother to report them at all. Only a very small part of the population is aware that their own country is a member of G20. This is also basically true of people’s awareness of the ASEAN process, even if there is a higher level of awareness of ASEAN itself as a result of its 40-year existence.

However, it is not only experts who believe that Indonesian foreign and ASEAN policies should be better explained to the people. Above all it is important that Indonesia’s involvement in ASEAN is not presented as an end in itself but must clearly answer the question as to cui bono with policies for the benefit of the people.26 This politically-driven push for an effective ASEAN community is therefore especially necessary, as nationalism in Indonesia as well as in neighbouring countries may be viewed positively in light of their colonial past and still relatively recent sovereignty, and especially while prejudices towards direct neighbours still prevail amongst opinion-formers on all sides.

26 | According to Evi Fitriani of the Department of International Relations of the Universitas Indonesia: “Community building is a long process that requires the participation of not only elites but also the common people at the grass-root level. Without the involvement of the people, the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC) and ASEAN Social and Cultural Community (ASSC) are likely to remain empty political slogans.” Asia Views, Vol. IV, № 6, October/November 2010, 6.


Norbert Beckmann-Dierkes / Johann C. Fuhrmann

Per capita income, education levels, life expectancy: for many years Norway has been the number one country in United Nations development studies.1 In the latest Human Development Report 2010 Norway was once again top of the list. And with its second place in the recent study by the World Economic Forum (WEF), Norway is also seen as one of the leading countries for gender equality.2 With such positive social factors in its favour it is hardly surprising that immigration numbers into Norway have been climbing significantly in recent years – for many migrants Norway is the land of their dreams.

Migration and integration are global social phenomena: today there are an estimated 200 million migrants worldwide, a fraction of whom – more than half a million – live in Norway. The “Campaign for Expulsion”, started by the Swiss People’s Party, the debate over the deportation of Roma and Sinti peoples in France, the success of Geert Wilders and the liberal-right Party for Freedom in the Netherlands and the latest debates in Germany on integration underline the fact that immigration is now a permanent feature on the European political agenda.

Experiences with immigration and the way in which it is handled differ from country to country. In this respect,

1 | Cf. United Nations 2010, Human Development Index, http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Complete.pdf (accessed January 10, 2011).2 | Cf. World Economic Forum 2010, The Gender Gap Report, http://www.weforum.org/pdf/gendergap/rankings2010.pdf (accessed January 10, 2011).

ImmIgRATION COuNTRY NORwAY – DEmOgRAPhIC TRENDS AND POLITICAL CONCEPTS

Norbert Beckmann-Dierkes, Team Europe and North America of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, is responsible for Central and Eastern Europe. He lives in Norway.

Johann C. Fuhrmann, Team Europe and North America, studied International Politics at the London School of Economics and Sciences Po in Paris.


At the beginning of the 19th century it was estimated that a million Norwegi-ans had already left their Scandinavian homes to move to the united States.

the example of Norway seems especially remarkable. The number of immigrants in Norway has risen dramatically in a short space of time: since 1970 the total has risen nearly tenfold. What is also unusual is the high proportion of refugees among these immigrants. At the beginning of 2010 3.1 per cent of the Norwegian population had a refugee background. At the same time, the latest election successes by the Progress Party (FrP), show that immigration has now also become a part of the political agenda. What trends are we seeing? How do you become a Norwegian? And how is the increase in immigration reflected in Norwegian politics?

ThE REvERSAL Of hISTORY:fROm EmIgRATION TO ImmIgRATION

A hundred years ago the big issue was emigration out of Norway, not immigration into it. At the beginning of the 19th century it was estimated that a million Norwegians had already left their Scandina- vian homes to move to the United States. The desire to buy fertile agricultural land and an active campaign by the Americans to attract immigrants were deciding factors during this migration period. But as with the passengers on the Mayflower, religious freedom also played its part, at least initially: like many migrants, Cleng Peerson, a Norwegian-American pioneer, actively tried to persuade his fellow-countrymen to move to America. Together with Knud Olsen, Peerson travelled to America in 1821 on behalf of a Quaker religious community in Stavanger in order to look into immigration possibilities. Handbooks and periodicals were produced to try to persuade other Norwegians to make the journey. Probably the most famous of these publications was Ole Rynning’s “Sandfaerdige Beretning om Amerika” (True Account of America), which appeared in Norway in 1838 and gave an idealised account of the life of exiled Norwe-gians in America.

The call for new migrants fell on receptive ears in Norway at this time: the economic situation there was getting worse, agricultural land was becoming more and more scarce and the introduction of new technology into agriculture meant there were now too many agricultural workers. The


Today eleven per cent of the population is either an immigrant or has an immi-grant background. Thirty five per cent of immigrants living in Norway now have Norwegian citizenship.

political situation in the USA made this country seem even more attractive for immigrants, with the Homestead Act of 1863 allowing every person who was at least 21 years old to settle and work a piece of land (up to 160 acres). Many Norwegian immigrants into the USA were particularly attracted to Minnesota and North Dakota. This wave of emigration reached its high point in the 1860s when ten to fifteen per cent of the population of Norway moved out. It wasn’t until after the end of the Great Depression that the number of emigrants finally tailed off.

By exploiting its gas and oil reserves Norway has seen enormous economic growth in a relatively short space of time. It has grown from one of the poorest western European countries, with an economy built primarily on shipping, fishing, agriculture and forestry, into one of the richest countries in the World. Today the private service sector accounts for 35 per cent of mainland GDP in Norway.

For a long time Norway was seen as having a relatively homogenous ethnic and religious society. A high birth-rate and large numbers of immigrants led to the population of Norway more than doubling between 1900 and 2010, growing from 2.21 million to 4.9 million.

While there were only 59,000 immigrants living in Norway in 19703, this number has increased nearly tenfold to over 550,000 within the space of a few decades. Today eleven per cent of the population is either an immigrant or has an immigrant background. Thirty five per cent of immigrants living in Norway now have Norwegian citizenship.

Norway has experienced specific influxes of immigrants due to war and displacement, including Jews from eastern Europe at the beginning of the 20th century and refugees from Hungary in the 1950s. However, as with many other European countries, the real growth in immigrant numbers began in the 60s and 70s. It was mostly migrant workers from Asia, and from Pakistan in particular, who came to Norway. This wave of immigration continued into the 1970s and as a result people with a Pakistani immigrant background now represent the largest non-European

3 | Cf. Vebjørn Aalandslid, “A Comparison of the Labour Market Integration of Immigrants and Refugees in Canada and Norway”, Statistics Norway Reports 2009/31, 30.


24 per cent of non-Scandinavian immi-grants between 1990 and 2008 were refugees, 24 per cent were migrant workers and 11 per cent moved to get educational qualifications.

immigrant group in the country. Today over 30,000 people with Pakistani roots live in Norway. However, with around 45,000 people or 0.9 per cent of the population it is the Poles who represent the largest immigrant group overall. Since the European Union expanded eastwards in 2004 the number of Polish immigrants has risen significantly. Manual and skilled workers are particularly drawn to Norway as wages are significantly higher than in their homeland. More and more of these workers are choosing to move to Norway and take up Norwegian citizenship. Other large groups of immigrants come from Sweden (approx. 29,000), Iraq (approx. 25,000), Somalia (approx. 24,000), Germany (approx. 21,000) and Vietnam (approx. 20,000).

The capital has a particularly multi-cultural society. According to Statistics Norway (Statistisk sentralbyra) 160,500 people in Oslo have an immigrant background. Out of a population of 587,000 this amounts to 27 per cent. There is also a high percentage of people with an immigrant background in Drammen (22 per cent), Lørenskog (19 per cent) and Skedsmo (18 per cent). Approximately 15 per cent or more live in Stavanger, Askim, As, Træna, Rælingen, Moos and Bærum. In 2009 Oslo had the highest net immigration (6,200) followed by Rogaland and Hordaland (4,200 each) and Akershus (3,600).

Norway is a member of the Schengen Area which allows the free movement of people within the countries known as the Schengen countries. Norway is also a signatory country of the Dublin Regulation which regulates asylum applications within signatory countries at the European level. Of non-Scandinavian immigrants between 1990 and 2008, 24 per cent were refugees, 24 per cent were migrant workers and 11 per cent moved to get educational qualifications.4

4 | Cf. Statistics Norway 2010, Immigration and immigrant, http://ssb.no/innvandring_en (accessed January 10, 2011).


The biggest number of skilled workers from outside the European Economic Area came from India, followed by Rus-sia, China, the uSA and the Philippines.

CuRRENT TRENDS

In 2009 there were 65,200 new immigrants and 26,550 emigrants. The net immigration figure of 38,650 was below that of the previous year but was still the third highest ever recorded.5 Once again Poles accounted for the largest group of new immigrants (10,500), although the actual number of Polish immigrants was significantly down on the previous year (13,000), followed by Swedes (6,000) and immigrants from Lithuania (3,200). Twice as many immigrants came from Estonia as in the previous year (1,100). There were also fewer Germans moving to Norway than before: only 2,800 compared to 4,300 the previous year. The number of refugees from Eritrea (1,700) and Afghanistan (1,400) was double that of 2008. The number of immigrants from Africa stood at approx. 3,000 per year at the turn of the millennium, went up to 4,000 and reached 5,150 in 2009. The number of immigrants from Asia fluctuated between 6,000 and 9,000 for a number of years and reached 10,300 in 2008 and 11,100 in 2009. Immigration from North and South America remained at around 1,500 to 2,000 over the last twenty years but rose slightly in 2008 and 2009 to 2,400.

As there was a fall in demand for workers in autumn 2008 and early 2009 as a result of the financial crisis, fewer work permits were issued to immigrants from the

European Economic Area, according to the OECD.6 The number of work permits issued to skilled workers from developing countries was also reduced. In May 2009 Norway revoked the Transitional Arrangements which

it had agreed with the eight central and eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004. The biggest number of skilled workers from outside the European Economic Area came from India, followed by Russia, China, the USA and the Philippines.

5 | Cf. Statistics Norway 2010, High immigration and emigration 2009, May 6, 2010, http://ssb.no/english/subjects/02/02/20/ innvutv_en (accessed January 10, 2011).6 | Cf. OECD 2010, “Recent changes in migration movements and policies”, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/17/456294 32.pdf (accessed January 10, 2011).


Alongside the high number of immigrants, 2009 also saw a large number of people leaving the country. 26,550 people left Norway, of whom 18,400 were foreigners. According to Statistics Norway this represented the largest number of foreign immigrants to leave Norway ever recorded, 3,200 more than the previous year and 6,000 more on average than over the previous twenty years. The trend towards higher emigration and lower immigration of Poles and Germans began towards the end of 2008, at the start of the financial crisis, and continued strongly in the early part of 2009. For the first time the Poles were the largest group to emigrate (3,600), followed by Swedes (3,100). The financial crisis and economic factors in general were the biggest influence on people’s decision to emigrate. For Norwegians themselves there were other factors in addition to moving for work that also played a role (for instance moving abroad to study).

The total number of asylum seekers within the OECD as a whole has risen since 2006. In 2008 the USA was the most important host country with 39,400 asylum seekers being allowed in, followed by France, Canada, the United Kingdom and Italy, where the total number of asylum seekers accepted exceeded 30,000.7 However, based on the size of their populations, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland were the most popular host countries. The number of people seeking asylum in Norway has grown significantly and reached almost 14,500 in 2008. Preliminary estimates for 2009 suggest that more than 17,200 applications were made, despite the reduction in the number of applicants from Iraq. The majority of appli-cations for asylum in 2009 came from people from Afghan-istan, Eritrea and Somalia. In July 2009 the government introduced measures to bring Norway’s asylum laws into line with those of other European countries. The aim is to reduce the number of asylum seekers who don’t actually need any protection and to bring down the current number of immigrants, which is currently relatively high compared to other EU countries.

7 | Cf. OECD 2010, “International Migration Outlook – SOPEMI 2010”, 20.

based on the size of their populations, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland were the most popular host countries for asylum seekers in 2008.


hOw DO YOu bECOmE A NORwEgIAN?

According to the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (Utlendingsdirektoratet/UDI) the following conditions need to be met to qualify for Norwegian citizenship:

▪ Proven or established identity ▪ Minimum 12 years old (and agreement of parents prior to 18th birthday)

▪ Place of residence in Norway and with intention to maintain this residence

▪ Fulfilment of the requirements for the issuing of a permanent residency permit (people with a work or residency permit in accordance with EWR/EFTA regula-tions are exempted)

▪ A total of 7 years residency in Norway in the previous 10 years.

▪ Of good moral standing ▪ Loss or relinquishment of previous citizenship8

Unlike in the USA, being born in Norway is not enough to become Norwegian. It is also necessary for one of the parents to have Norwegian citizenship. Since September 1, 2006 it is no longer necessary for the father of a child to be married to the mother. Since 2006 children under the age of 18 who have been adopted by Norwegian parents have automatically been given Norwegian citizenship. Since September 1, 2008 it has been necessary to demonstrate sufficient command of the language, something which may be achieved by taking a three-hundred-hour language course.

In 2009 citizenship was conferred on 11,400 foreigners. The biggest group of new citizens came from Somalia (1,700), followed by former citizens of Iraq (1,270) and Afghanistan (860). Around half of those given citizenship came from Asia. The second biggest group were the Africans with 25 per cent. Citizens of other European countries made up 21 per cent of those who were given Norwegian citizenship in 2009. Since 1977 approx. 225,000 people have been

8 | Cf. Norwegian Directorate of Immigration, “Citizenship”, April 15, 2010, http://udi.no/Global/upload/Publikasjoner/Fakta Ark/Faktaark_Statsborgerskap_Citizenship_EN.pdf (accessed January 10, 2011).


The new law also introduced new crite-ria for families to join existing immi-grants in the country. These include strict requirements on proof of income.

given citizenship, of whom more than 70 per cent are of European origin.

On January 1, 2010 a new immigration law came into effect. Separate work and residency permits were replaced with a single residency permit which incorpo rates a general work permit. The new law also introduced new criteria for families to join existing immigrants in the country. These include strict requirements on proof of income (financial support) and a prerequisite of four years work experience and/or education in Norway. In the case of family immigration there is a fundamental requirement for the person already living in Norway to prove they have sufficient income during the year prior to the arrival of the rest of the family. In addition it must be shown that an appropriate level of income will also be available in the following year. A new rule was introduced whereby the person already living in Norway is not allowed to claim any social benefits during the year prior to the family’s arrival. However, there are some exceptions to the experience requirements, especially for family members from the European Economic Area and for migrant workers. People from the European Economic Area (with the exception of Romania and Bulgaria) since January 1, 2010 do not need either a residency or work permit, they only need to register upon their arrival in Norway (for instance with the police) and obtain an open-ended registration certificate.

mIgRATION AND INTEgRATION AS POLITICAL ISSuES

Integration and migration issues are getting more and more media coverage these days, especially in relation to the large number of refugees that Norway has accepted in recent years. Before the new immigration law of January 1, 2010 came into force, further measures were introduced designed in part to protect the country’s own workers, but also to protect the migrants themselves. In order to limit the exploitation of foreign workers and to protect Norwegian workers, Norway introduced new measures in 2008 to counter social dumping. These included an increase in inspections together with sanctions for infringements, stricter recruitment laws and the introduction of ID cards for workers in the construction sector. At the same time,


many communities are reluctant to ac-cept any more refugees, claiming that it is no longer possible to guarantee a reasonable proportion of foreigners relative to the number of local people.

an action plan aimed at combating poverty and promoting participation in the employment market was set in motion. Measures to help the victims of human trafficking were also introduced. Victims of human trafficking who are prepared to act as witnesses in court receive certificates of exemption. The aim of these measures is to stop illegal immigration into Norway. Since September 2009 foreigners who return to developing countries of their own free-will receive special support. At the same time the country continues to try to attract highly-qualified people from other countries. It is now possible for qualified foreigners to apply for a stay of up to one year in Norway to learn Norwegian or to obtain further qualifications. At the same time as they are studying they can also undertake part-time work.

The Progress Party (FrP) enjoyed considerable success in the elections to the Norwegian Parliament (Storting) which were held on September 14, 2009 with their demands for a limit on immigration and the expulsion of foreign criminals. With 22.9 per cent of the vote, the FrP was the second biggest faction. This serves to underline the fact that immigration has now become an important issue among the public. The latest OECD report on migration quotes several studies that suggest that 70 per cent of the Norwegian people would like to see stricter controls on and/or reduced

levels of immigration. This figure of 70 per cent puts Norway at the top of the statistics in the report alongside Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.9 Other statistics suggest that there is only a small majority in favour of stricter immigration

controls.10 However, even in this survey, 36 per cent of those questioned see immigrants as a potential source of social problems. Many communities and small villages are reluctant to accept any more refugees, claiming that it is no longer possible to guarantee a reasonable proportion of foreigners relative to the number of local people. The FrP has to a certain extent taken a populist stance in the debate by, for example, encouraging members of parliament not to accept any more refugees in their constituencies.

9 | Cf. OECD 2010, n. 7, 118.10 | Cf. Statistics Norway 2010, “Appreciate immigrants’ contribution to working life”, http://ssb.no/english/subjects/00/01/ 30/innvhold_en (accessed December 13, 2010).


Asylum seekers from certain coun-tries, including Serbia, macedonia and montenegro, are interviewed and then expelled by the police if there is no evi-dence that they need protection.

The new immigration law that came into effect in January 2010, together with the other new measures enacted, shows that the red-red coalition government under Social Democrat Jens Stoltenberg has taken the immigration issue to heart. It is almost certain that the political measures introduced by the government are aimed at reducing the influence of the FrP. It seems obvious that the government does not want to leave the issue of immigration in the hands of the FrP, who might then enjoy even greater electoral success. The new legislation is designed to limit immigration and to deport immigrants who do not have residency permits. In 2010 a large number of illegal immigrants were deported. By mid-September 4,042 people had already been expelled from Norway. On September 11 a group of 71 people were flown back to Serbia under police escort.11 Stoltenberg expressed his hope that this spectacular forced expulsion would lead to more illegal immigrants leaving the country of their own free will. Just as effective was the introduction of a 48-hour rule for asylum seekers from certain countries, including Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro. People from these countries are interviewed and then expelled by the police if there is no evidence that they need protection. The effect of this new rule was that by mid-September 2010 Sweden had accepted 4,000 asylum seekers from Serbia while Norway had only taken in 178.

For most people from non-European countries the road to the Norwegian “paradise” has become generally longer and rockier. Norwegians are significantly more open to migrants from European countries than they are to people coming from developing countries. This is partly because the latter group tends to include asylum seekers who are not so well-educated and who often do not take up employment. However, there is a significant difference between income levels of Norwegians and western immigrants on the one hand and non-western immigrants on the other. 15 per cent of immigrants from Africa were unemployed in the third quarter of 2010, while the figure was only 3.6 per cent

11 | Cf. Rolleiv Solholm, “More illegal immigrants expelled,” The Norway Post, September 12, 2010, in: http://norwaypost.no/ news/more-illegal-immigrants-expelled.html (accessed December 13, 2010).


In order to reduce potential disadvan-tages for applicants whose name might suggest an immigrant background, the høyre party is considering the idea of making job applications anonymous.

for western Europeans.12 The OECD report on migration described the situation of many foreign workers in Norway as difficult: compared to local Norwegians they are over twice as likely to be unemployed. In August 2010 7.9 per cent of immigrants were unemployed while only 2.3 per cent of the rest of the population were without work.13 This discrepancy shows that Norway cannot be held up as a perfect example of successful immigration, despite its high standard of living. The reality of the uneven distribution of wealth in Norway is mirrored by the domestic situation of many non-western immigrants. In 2008 17 per cent of them lived in homes of less than 50 m² – the figure for Norwegians was 4 per cent. More than half of non-western immigrants lived in households of more than two people in which not everybody had their own room. The Høyre party put forward several proposals how to avoid discrimi-nation and encourage participation in the job market. At

their annual conference in May 2010 there was support for a proposal to introduce new regulations on the job application process. In order to reduce potential disadvantages for applicants whose name might suggest an immigrant background, they are consid-

ering the idea of making job applications anonymous, so there would be no name or photo included.14 The debate over reducing immigration numbers has been fuelled recently by the high proportion of immigrants appearing in crime statistics and the fact that some schools in big cities (especially in Oslo) have more foreign students than Norwegian ones.

Conflicts that are not addressed can only become worse. In this respect it is good that the immigration issue is now being debated in Norway. It is important that this debate is carried out objectively. Warnings by the FrP that Norway is threatened by Islamization do not reflect reality. Only one immigrant in three comes from a predominantly

12 | Cf. Statistics Norway 2010, “Still growth in immigrant unemployment,” November 4, 2010, http://ssb.no/english/subjects/ 06/03/innvarbl_en (accessed December 13, 2010).13 | Ibid.14 | Cf. Fiona Weber-Steinhaus and Andreas M. Klein, “Erna Solberg als Vorsitzende von Høyre bestätigt”, KAS-Länderbericht, May 11, 2010, in: http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_19599- 1522-1-30.pdf (accessed December 22, 2010).


Obviously it is important and necessary to have measures in place to control immigration, but exaggerated security policies can lead to an increase in ille-gal immigration.

Islamic country, as shown in statistics from the Norwegian Christian Intercultural Association and Statistics Norway.15 Immigration policies have become a permanent part of the political agenda and it is highly likely that these issues will play an important role in the elections in 2013. On the immigration issue, Høyre is adopting a liberal-conservative stance. So far all conservative parties have ruled out any cooperation with the FrP. If Høyre are not able to get the FrP to move away from their extreme right, populist position, it is unlikely that they will be able to work together at government level in the future. In any case, if it came to a multi-party coalition, it is more than questionable whether it would be possible to achieve a political consensus between potential coalition partners like the Christian Democratic Party (KrF), the Liberal Party (Venstre) and the FrP. The polemical debate in France has highlighted the risks that can arise when the migration issue is used as a political football. It remains to be hoped that discussions in Norway develop into a serious debate to which Høyre and the Christian Democratic Party can make constructive contributions.

It has so far not been possible to achieve a comprehensive harmonisation of immigration policies within the European Union or the Schengen Area: quotas, targeted immigration policies, differing legislation according to employment groups, large-scale or only minimal legalisation – all of these things are going on within Europe without any underlying agreement between the various countries and based upon each country’s individual needs, the prevailing political mood or economic constraints. The majority of Schengen countries are tending towards making job-based migration easier but are making it more difficult to qualify for asylum or for families to join existing immigrants. As we have seen, this is also the case in Norway, although it has to be said that, until now, the country has accepted more than its fair share of asylum seekers. Obviously it is important and necessary to have measures in place to control immigration, but exaggerated

15 | Cf. Statistics Norway 2009, “Members of religious and life stance communities outside the Church of Norway 2006- 2009,” http://ssb.no/english/subjects/07/02/10/trosamf_en/ arkiv/tab-2009-12-09-02-en(accessed January 10, 2011).


security policies can in fact lead to an increase in illegal immigration. Norway is not being invaded by immigrants, but there is a significant gap between the superficial discussions on the topic that have so far taken place and reality. In Germany, where the government has recently introduced measures to recognise foreign qualifications, the lack of skilled workers cost the economy fifteen billion euros in 2009 alone, according to the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology. Further serious debate on these issues is required – a debate which should ideally be Europe-wide.


Klaus D. Loetzer / Anja Casper

It’s time to come back down to earth. After a five-year delay, the first round of the Côte d’Ivoire’s presidential elections finally went off peacefully and without technical hitches on October 31, 2010, leading many people to think that the country had taken a miraculous turn for the better. But they were soon to be disillusioned. After the run-offs on November 28, both candidates have been sworn in as President and they have both named their Prime Ministers and cabinets.

Laurent Gbagbo, 65, is the socialist leader of the FPI and has been the incumbent president since the disputed elections held in 2000. He entered the second ballot as candidate for the LMP coalition. As the incumbent President, he has control over the country’s institutions such as its fiscal authority and state television. And most importantly, he has the backing of the country’s armed forces and police. He is still presiding over the country from his presidential palace, but he is internationally isolated. Côte d’Ivoire has been suspended by the Economic Community of West African States (CEDEAO) and the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO), based in Dakar. Senegal has frozen Gbagbo’s access to the Central Bank’s funds.

Ex-Premier Ouattara1, 67, an internationally-recognized economist and president of the RDR entered the run-offs as the candidate for the RHDP coalition2, an alliance of parties which came together to fight the elections and which sees

1 | Prime Minister 1990-1993 under Félix Houphouët-Boigny.2 | Rally of Houphouetists for Democracy and Peace.

After the PresidentiAl elections in côte d’ivoirecAn the PoliticAl crisis still Beresolved By diPlomAcy?

Klaus D. Loetzer is head of the Konrad- Adenauer-Stiftung’s Regional Programme “Political Dialogue West Africa” in Cotonou, Benin.

Anja Casper worked for the Konrad- Adenauer-Stiftung in Benin from 2008 to 2010. She is now working in the European and Inter-national Cooperation Department in Berlin.


ouattara was recognized as the victor by the whole international community, including the Un security council. he also had the support of the central Bank of West African states.

itself as the natural successor to the nation’s founder and long-serving president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny.3 The PDCI, led by former president Bédié4, which came third in the first round of voting also joined this coalition. Bédié was able to mobilise the majority of his supporters to

vote for Ouattara in the second ballot, thus ensuring Ouattara’s victory. However, there was not sufficient solidarity amongst the RHDP parties for them to agree on a joint candidate for the first round. Ouattara was recognized as the victor by the whole inter-

national community, including the UN Security Council. He also had the support of the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO), of which he is a former head, and as a result has a certain amount of control over the country’s state finances. He is running his government from the Hôtel du Golf, guarded by UN peacekeepers5.

Fig. 1Presidential elections, 1st ballot october 31, 2010

Source: CEI (confirmed by CC), http://ceici.org/elections/docs/EPR_31102010_RESUL_PROVI_CEI_03112010_A4.pdf (accessed December 14, 2010).

3 | In office from 1960 to his death in 1993.4 | In office from 1993 to 1999 (coup).5 | UN peacekeeping mission UNOCI (United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire).

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Abbr.: CEI – Commission Électorale Indépendante (Independent Electoral Commission), CC – Conseil Constitutionnel (Constitutional Council), RHDP – Rassemblement des Houphouétistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix, LMP – La Majorité Présidentielle, FPI – Front Populaire Ivoirien, RDR – Rassemblement des Républicains, PDCI – Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire


the people had no confidence in the elections going off peacefully, but no-one imagined quite how bad it was going to be.

Fig. 2Presidential elections, 2nd ballot november 28, 2010

Source: CC, http://news.abidjan.net/h/382101.html (accessed December 14, 2010).

With two rival presidents being declared after the second ballot, Côte d’Ivoire has politically fallen way behind in terms of the progress that was hoped for after the end of the 2007 civil war. The process which was set in motion at this point, which included preparation for the elections by agreeing a register of voters and an amicable resolution of the thorny problem of citizenship, had awakened high hopes, but more among the international community than among the Ivorians themselves. Otherwise we would not have seen the mass hoarding of food and petrol that broke out even before the first round of voting, and even more so in the lead-up to the second ballot. It is clear that the people had no confidence in the elections going off peacefully, but no-one imagined quite how bad it was going to be. Andreas Mehler, political analyst and expert on West Africa, and Director of the GIGA Institute of African Studies, writes in this respect: “Over the last three-and-a-half years, a power sharing deal between Gbagbo and ex-rebel leader Guillaume Soro has brought a period of relative peace, but has not proven to be the hoped-for overall solution. This power sharing arrangement was clearly only meant for a transitional period”.6 In any case, Mehler continues, hardly anyone was asking the question: “A transition is fine, but where is it leading?”

6 | Andreas Mehler, “Côte d’Ivoire: kein Ausweg durch Macht- teilung,” GIGA Focus Afrika, № 10/2010 , 1, in: http://giga- hamburg.de/giga-focus/afrika (accessed December 16, 2010).

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Gbagbo’s security forces have blocka-ded the temporary offices of Alassane ouattara at the Unoci-guarded hôtel du Golf. Un patrols have been shot at.

escAlAtion of violence reminiscent of civil WAr

In light of the current political stalemate, the situation in Côte d’Ivoire is very tense. Despite an official curfew, official sources report that 60 people have been killed and several hundreds injured.7 Every day there are reports of fresh atrocities, not just coming from the Ouattara camp but also from credible sources such as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay. She places the blame for the nightly killings and abductions on Liberian and Angolan mercenaries, supported by Gbagbo’s elite

Garde Républicaine. Gbagbo for his part has publicly demanded the withdrawal of UNOCI peacekeeping troops and supporting French units from the country, on the grounds that they are partisan. As a result his security

forces have blockaded the temporary offices of Alassane Ouattara at the UNOCI-guarded Hôtel du Golf. UN patrols have been shot at and armed students supporting Gbagbo, the Jeunes Patriotes, have been threatening UNOCI staff at night in their homes. If this continues, the position of the UN’s blue berets will become increasingly precarious, and increasing their ranks with 500 more soldiers (as agreed on December 20 by the UN Security Council) will do little to improve matters.

The international community headed by the UN – the EU, USA, African organisations such as the African Union (AU), the West African Economic Community CEDEAO and the West African Central Bank BCEAO – all oppose Gbagbo and support Ouattara as the Côte d’Ivoire’s lawfully elected president. The AU’s attempts at mediation through South Africa’s former president Thabo Mbeki and more recently through AU Commission President Jean Ping have been fruitless. The EU and USA have imposed limited sanctions in the form of travel bans for Gbagbo and his close supporters, but all these actions just seem to make Gbagbo and his camp all the more determined to stand firm.

The danger that “the side which loses the elections will become radicalized”8, which Mehler refers to in his article, materialized just two weeks after the elections. The paradox

7 | Copy deadline of this issue: December 22, 2010.8 | Mehler, n. 6, 6.


the Gbagbo camp knows that they ma-nipulated the election results, but they believe this manipulation is morally justified, indeed imperative.

is that the Majorité Présidentielle (LMP) does not see itself as the loser, although this would seem to be true at first glance. On closer inspection it becomes more complicated. Among a total population of around 21 million, only approx. 5.78 million are eligible to vote because almost half of the Côte d’Ivoire population are minors. This soon puts any electoral majority into perspective. The Gbagbo camp seems keen to lay particular emphasis on this, irrespective of other factors. This is where the danger lies: they know that they manipulated the election results, but they believe this manipulation is morally justified, indeed imperative, because they are convinced that they have a majority. They ignore the fact that many people who were excluded from voting because of questions over their ancestry were supporters of Ouattara. With this conviction, and of course with the backing of the army, the Gbagbo camp feels ready to stand against the whole world.

PArAllels With ZimBABWe’s dictAtor, mUGABe?

Other factors are at play here. One is the idée fixe of libe-ration from its ex-colonial master, France. In this respect Gbagbo is at one with another dictator who lost an election but who has clung to power against the wishes of the international community: Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, another socialist. He has used the same rhetoric to bring about the economic destruction of his country. This has been going on in Zimbabwe for more than ten years and it is still not over, although the people are literally at a point of economic collapse, as is shown by the widespread return of bartering. There are other parallels: Alassane Ouattara (winner of the 2010 elections) is to Gbagbo what ex-leader of the opposition MDC (Movement for Democratic Change), Morgan Tsvangirai (winner of the 2008 elections), is to Mugabe. In both cases, the political opponent is seen as an agent of the West who defends foreign interests above the true interests of the people. Another parallel which Mugabe and Gbagbo would never mention is nevertheless very obvious. This is the question of tangible interests – in both cases the leader and his henchmen have amassed great wealth through corruption, abused human rights, and once they lose their grip on power they can expect to face charges at the International Court of Justice.


It is tempting to draw a parallel from the situation in Zimbabwe as to how long the current situation can continue in Côte d’Ivoire. The start of the crisis in Zimbabwe can be traced back to the turn of the century 1999/2000, so it has been going on for more than ten years. However, it should not be assumed that the present crisis in Côte d’Ivoire will also last that long. Zimbabwe has a totally different historical background, involving a war of liberation and the attainment of independence in 1980. In Zimbabwe the “Securocrats”, the commanders of the security forces such as the army, police and secret service, wield the true power and Mugabe knows he can rely on them. They of course have their own internal disputes, but they would

never defect to the Tsvangirai camp because of their view of themselves as revolutionaries and armed fighters in the war of liberation. In Côte d’Ivoire the security forces, particularly the elite Garde Républicaine, also known as

the Gard Présidentielle, also guarantee Gbagbo’s hold on power. But this is as far as the comparison goes, because, with the possible exception of the Garde Républicaine, their loyalty will not necessarily last forever and there is no similarity with Zimbabwe’s totally different situation and history.

Up until 2002 the Ivorian army was dominated by the north. Gbagbo deliberately changed this, filling the critical command posts and higher ranks of officers with his own appointments. In November 2010 the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s regional programme “Political Dialogue West Africa” (PDWA) based in Cotonou organised a congress of regional army officers, which included two participants from Côte d’Ivoire. These participants have remained in contact with their colleagues from Benin, who think it possible that there could at some point be a coup against Gbagbo. This would be likely to involve much bloodshed and could cost Gbagbo and others their lives. The question is, how could this situation arise?

in côte d’ivoire the elite Garde répu-blicaine guarantees Gbagbo’s hold on power. But their loyalty will not neces-sarily last forever.


When his mandate ran out in 2005, Gbagbo postponed the elections eight times, and a few weeks before the vote he explicitly stated that he would never hand over power.

GBAGBo UsUrPs PoWer With the helP of the constitUtionAl coUncil

Laurent Gbagbo, the incumbent president until the elections, is closely linked to the political destiny of Côte d’Ivoire. During the presidency of the nation’s founder and first president Félix Houphouët-Boigny, this socialist student leader spent long periods in prison as punishment for his criticism of the one-party regime. Proud of his peasant roots, Gbagbo stood in the 1990 presidential elections for the first time, but won less than 20 per cent of the vote. After the disputed elections of 2000, when allegedly only 37 per cent of the population cast their vote,9 Gbagbo refused to hand over power. His desire for power is bolstered by his ambitious wife Simone, who was also active in the socialist student movement and who, it is claimed, is not only the power behind the throne but was also implicated in war crimes during the Ivorian civil war. She is also accused of being involved in the murder of a journalist who was investigating corruption in Côte d’Ivoire.10 When his mandate ran out in 2005, Gbagbo postponed the elections eight times, and a few weeks before the vote he explicitly stated that he would never hand over power to Houphouët-Boigny’s successors. In August 2009, so as not to leave anything to chance or to the democratic will of the people, Gbagbo appointed his party crony Paul Yao N’Dré to the post of president of the Ivorian Constitutional Council. According to electoral law, the Constitutional Council has the final say on matters relating to electoral protests and announces and confirms the official result of the elections.

This appointment of Paul Yao N’Dré to President of the Constitutional Council meant that President Gbagbo had a fellow party member ensconced in the most crucial strategic position when it came to the elections. The appointment

9 | The circumstances are contested. There was violent rioting after first General Robert Gueï, and then Laurent Gbagbo announced themselves victors before all the votes had been counted. It is therefore possible that the count was stopped before all the votes were counted.10 | Cf. e.g.: france24.com, “Affaire Kieffer – Simone Gbagbo entendue par des juges français à Abidjan,” http://f24.my/ f2kVtl (accessed December 14, 2010).


came under fire from all the opposition parties, who felt it strongly compromised the neutrality of the election process. Nevertheless, the appointment was in fact constitutional, as the previous incumbent had reached the end of his term. It was repeatedly argued that Paul Yao N’Dré should be appointed as a political counterweight to the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI), which was dominated by the opposition and of which the Chairman, Youssouf Bakayoko, is a member of the PDCI. They may have had a point, but Gbagbo went on to change the configuration of the Electoral Commission so that it was politically biased.11 In early 2010 he dissolved the CEI Electoral Commission, with Bakayoko only then taking over as Chairman, and Gbagbo could have dissolved the Commission again if he thought Bakayoko was too partisan.

Once Bakayoko announced Ouattara’s victory with 54 per cent of the vote on the night of Wednesday to Thursday

after the elections, the Gbagbo camp weighed in. The final decision lay with Gbagbo’s crony N’Dré. The current situation in Côte d’Ivoire highlights the serious shortcomings in many of Africa’s constitutional democracies. Constitutional bodies such as the CEI and the Constitutional Council are defined by

their Chairmen, who also influence the public perception of these institutions, rather than being meaningful as independent organs of a constitutional state. The weakness of their institutions means that many African nations only have a democratic facade. It was also clearly a mistake to make political appointments to key institutions such as the CC and CEI, but the proposal that the electoral process should be depoliticized by appointing independent experts was rejected by all parties in the lead-up to the elections. At the end of the day, all sides were hoping to gain an advantage by exercising influence on these bodies.

11 | As happened in the Pretoria Agreement, upon which the 2007 Ouagadougou Agreement was based. Cf. Radio France Internationale (RFI), “L’accord de Pretoria du 6 avril 2005,” http://rfi.fr/actufr/articles/064/article_35315.asp (accessed January 10, 2011).

the current situation in côte d’ivoire highlights the serious shortcomings in many of Africa’s constitutional demo-cracies. the weakness of their institu-tions means that many African nations only have a democratic facade.


Table 1electoral data

1st ballotoctober 31, 2010

12

2nd ballotnovember 28, 2010

13

Population (2008)14 approx. 20 million

regions 19 15

no. of voting stations 19,854 20,073

eligible voters 5,784,490 5,780,490

absolute per cent

1st ballot 2nd ballot 1st ballot 2nd ballot

votes cast 4,843,445 4,689,366 83.73 81.12

invalid votes 225,624 99,147 4.66 2.11

Sources: Election results of the CEI 12, 131415

electorAl comPlAints: Arithmetic rAtherthAn vote checkinG

Even before the election results were announced, the Gbagbo camp had challenged the legitimacy of the voting in four northern regions,16 which were controlled by the Forces Nouvelles, and on the Thursday morning they submitted an official complaint to the Constitutional Council. At 3 pm that same day Yao N’Dré cancelled the results of the Electoral Commission, annulled all votes in the seven northern provinces and declared Gbagbo to be the winner. This was all the more surprising in that there had been no time for any kind of vote checking. They simply worked on the arithmetic and annulled enough votes in the northern provinces until Gbagbo had a mathematical majority of more than 50 per cent. This corresponded to around 600,000 votes or approximately 13 per cent of votes cast.

12 | Cf. Overview with detailed election results, Commission Electorale Independante, http://ceici.org/elections/docs/ EPR_31102010_RESUL_PROVI_CEI_03112010_A4.pdf (accessed December 14, 2010).13 | Cf. electoral data with a detailed breakdown of results, Commission Electorale Independante, http://ceici.org/ elections/docs/EPR2010_2T_RESULTATS_VALEURS_0212 2010.pdf (accessed December 14, 2010).14 | Cf. other key data: “Die Côte d’Ivoire in Stichpunkten,” http://kas.de/wf/de/71.6530 (accessed December 14, 2010).15 | Plus city of Abidjan and diaspora (mainly Paris).16 | (1) Vallée du Bandama (Bouaké), (2) Savanes (Korhogo), (3) Worodougou (Séguéla) and (4) Denguelé (Odienné).


If they had only annulled the votes in the four provinces they had initially complained about, Ouattara would still have retained his majority. This was said publicly by the real hero of the Ivorian election drama, the undaunted United Nations Special Representative for Côte d’Ivoire and Head of the UNOCI peacekeeping mission, the South Korean Youn-jin Choi.17 The votes of expatriate Ivorians living in France were also summarily declared to be invalid.

Another argument made by the Constitutional Council against the legitimacy of the results announced by the CEI was that the Electoral Commission did not announce the result within the legally-required time period. But this breach of electoral rules was actually caused by the Gbagbo camp. As all parties are represented in the independent Electoral Commission, Gbagbo’s fellow party members were able to delay the announcement of the election results. In the event of disputed results, the CEI normally makes a decision based on consensus. This resulted in the CEI’s results announcement being highly dramatic. To comply with electoral law, the election results must be announced no later than three days after the voting stations have closed, so the latest possible

time was midnight on Wednesday. The first attempt was made on Tuesday evening at the Electoral Commission’s office in front of live national (RTI) and international (RFI, BBC, CNN, Radio24) TV cameras. Just as the CEI representative was about to announce

the first results, Gbagbo supporters within the Electoral Commission intervened and physically prevented him from reading out the results. On live TV they snatched the list of results from his hand, while the Garde Républicaine security forces simply looked on. Indeed, rather than protecting the CEI representative, they went on to clear the building of observers, journalists and TV cameras. This marked the end of the independent Electoral Commission which over the preceding months had managed to successfully defend itself against Gbagbo’s influence. The independent Electoral Commission could only remain “independent” as long as it gave President Gbagbo the results he wanted, as happened

17 | Cf. “YJ Choi (ONUCI): ‘Pourquoi j’ai certifié les résultats du scrutin’”, in: Abidjan.net (Le Patriote), http://news.abidjan. net/h/382148.html?n=382148 (accessed December 11, 2010).

Just as the cei representative was about to announce the first results, Gbagbo supporters physically preven-ted him from reading. on live tv they snatched the list of results from his hand.


the fact that Gbagbo’s supporters only managed to prevent the announce-ment at the very last minute did not detract from the cei’s results, which have been accepted as legitimate by the international community.

in the first round. By Monday evening the Gbagbo camp knew the election result and knew that their candidate had lost. So now they were using every means at their disposal to prevent the announcement of this result. However, the incident at the results announcement made it clear that the CEI had not allowed itself to fall totally under Gbagbo’s control. The fact that Gbagbo’s supporters only managed to prevent the announcement at the very last minute, and on live TV, just showed the public that the Gbagbo camp wanted to stop the announcement and did not in any way detract from the CEI’s results, which have been accepted as legitimate by the international community including the UN and AU.

internAtionAl oBservers declArethe elections democrAtic

At the instigation of the UN Representative, the interna-tional community pressed for the election results to be announced quickly, in order to improve the precarious security situation and speed up the transfer of power to Ouattara. The elections were declared to be transparent and fair by the UN, by observers from the West African Economic Community CEDEAO led by Prof. Théodore Holo, President of the Benin Supreme Court, and above all by the 120-member EU observer mission led by the Romanian MEP Christian Preda. At a press conference, Holo stated: “One or two irregularities do not mean that the legitimacy of the whole election has been compromised.”18 Particularly in view of Ouattara’s clear victory, we could add. The Carter Center in the USA also repeatedly called for an immediate announcement of the election results.

A few hours after the expiry of the deadline, the results were announced by CEI Chairman Youssouf Bakayoko outside the CEI’s offices at the Hôtel du Golf, in front of the international press but in the absence of RTI, the Ivorian state television. The hotel, which was now the headquarters

18 | “Présidentielle/Observation de la mission de la CEDEAO – Pr Holo Théodore (Chef de mission) ‘Deux ou trois incidents ne peuvent pas invalider ces élections,’” in: IVOIRTV.net, http://ivoirtv.net/index.php/news/54-politique/545 (accessed January 10, 2011).


of President Ouattara, was guarded by heavily-armed UN peacekeeping units. Here too, the UNOCI Chief Youn-jin Choi played a decisive role. He deployed 150 blue berets to make sure Bakayoko was safely escorted to the Hôtel du Golf. But his continuing interventions incurred the wrath of incumbent President Gbagbo, who threatened to

declare him persona non grata as a result of his interference in his host country’s internal affairs. The involvement of the UN Special Representative and the role of the UN in the conflict has since then been hotly debated. Was it legitimate for Choi to speak

out so plainly in favour of Ouattara’s victory? Choi’s special role was based on the 2005 Pretoria Agreement.19 As a signatory, Laurent Gbagbo agreed to the special role of external institutions and gave away some of Côte d’Ivoire’s sovereignty. But this was a conditio sine qua non, the only way to break the stalemate. After the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement in July 2007, the UN Security Council passed a resolution, article 6 of which gave the UN Special Representative the power to decide whether all stages of the election process had been carried out in accordance with democratic principles.20 He was given this mandate for good reason, as was later to become clear. A common thread in all of Laurent Gbagbo’s actions is the desire to renege on previous agreements.

Despite all his threats, so far Gbagbo has not taken action against Youn-jin Choi, but after the results announcement he imposed an immediate ban on all foreign TV and radio stations broadcasting from the Côte d’Ivoire. Since then, the people have been treated to socialist-style misleading and one-sided government propaganda by the state TV and radio broadcaster RTI, who also came to Gbagbo’s aid during the election campaign. Only people with internet access still have a chance of getting independent information.

19 | Cf. n. 11.20 | Cf. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1765 (2007), in: http://undemocracy.com/S-RES-1765.pdf (accessed January 10, 2011).

the involvement of the Un special re-presentative and the role of the Un in the conflict has been hotly debated. Was it legitimate for choi to speak out so plainly in favour of ouattara’s victory?


exclUsion of northern voters

The manoeuvres of the Gbagbo camp meant that voters across the whole north of the country were excluded. As a result, the attempt to start a process of unification in order to close the gap between north and south – something which had been a goal of these elections – suffered a major setback. A driver from the north comments: “The Gbagbo camp has shown us that the Forces Nouvelles were right. I never really understood why we were fighting. We were told we were being attacked from outside. But now we can see that we were fighting for the north’s rights.”21

After the first round had gone off largely peacefully, tensions between rival supporters increased in the lead-up to the second ballot. Even early on there were deaths and injuries in the north and west of the country, but also particularly in the densely-populated southern areas of the country’s economic hub, Abidjan. Tensions increased still further in the week following the run-offs and significant violence broke out. On the Thursday after Gbagbo had been declared victor by the Constitutional Council, the situation escalated sharply and the military sealed off all land, air and sea borders for four days. Public statements by politi-cians of both sides just served to inflame the situation, although both leaders called on their supporters to remain calm and renounce violence. The deteriorating situation aroused anxiety among the population of neighbouring countries such as Burkina Faso. They remembered only too well the civil war years of 2002 and 2003 when thousands of Ivorian refugees had flooded over the border. At the moment there are more than three million immigrants from Burkina Faso living in Côte d’Ivoire, who could flee back to their homeland if there is trouble. According to the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), 4,500 people have already fled to Liberia and Guinea (Conakry).

The events in Côte d’Ivoire have provided further proof that in the short-to-medium term “winner takes all” elections cannot be seen as lasting political solutions in

21 | “Le sentiment d’exclusion se renforce dans le Nord ivoirien,” Abidjan.net (Reuters), http://news.abidjan.net/h/382913. html?n=382913 (accessed December 11, 2010).

in the week following the run-offs, significant violence broke out. After Gbagbo had been declared victor by the constitutional council, the situation escalated sharply.


African multi-ethnic states22 with serious political conflicts (Zimbabwe is another example). On the contrary, these types of elections often just serve to exacerbate the problems and before, during and to some extent after the ballots lead to increased numbers of refugees, increased violence including deaths and injuries and, in the case of Zimbabwe and elsewhere, instances of torture. This is also attended by (additional) curbs on freedom of speech and freedom of assembly.

economic fAll-oUt And PoliticAl instABility

The political turbulence which has pervaded the country since the announcement of the “double” election victories of 28 November is more than just the result of a disputed presidential ballot. The elections were supposed to finally create a positive direction for the country. For the last 17 years it has been in a phase of political instability, which looks like it is going to continue for the foreseeable future.

Côte d’Ivoire was once the driving force of the West African economy and the region’s most stable nation. The country prospered after gaining independence in 1960 and foreign companies, particularly from France, queued up to be part of its nascent industrialization. Côte d’Ivoire profited from the high prices which could be achieved in the world market for its main export goods, cocoa and coffee. This prosperity soon attracted an influx of immigrants from neighbouring Sahel countries, particularly Burkina Faso

and Guinea. Founding father and President Félix Houphouët-Boigny argued that people should have the right to own the land which they cultivated. But the collapse of raw materials prices on the world markets in

the mid-80s ushered in the end of the Ivorian economic miracle and triggered a deep economic crisis. Despite this, more and more immigrants continued to flood in and soon were made scapegoats for all the country’s economic and social problems, resulting in their exclusion from Ivorian society. This was accompanied by a change in the national consciousness: previously a true Ivorian was considered to be someone who was involved in building the country,

22 | In the sense of states with many different ethnic groups, as in the majority of African countries.

the collapse of raw materials prices on the world markets in the mid-80s trig-gered a deep economic crisis. despite this, more and more immigrants flood in côte d’ivoire.


Boigny had ruled the country in an authoritarian fashion for thirty years without a prime minister. But when the economy became more precarious he turned to ouattara.

but now it was all tied up with the question of origins and ancestry and in terms of citizenship it became a political concept. This, despite the fact that today around one quarter of the population has foreign roots.

When President Félix Houphouët-Boigny died at the age of 88 in December 1993, after 33 years in office, there was a power vacuum. Boigny had run the country with an iron hand and his state party, the PDCI, had kept tight control of the country’s administrative institutions. Opposition parties were allowed to exist after 1990, but they had no real effect. After Boigny’s death, the precarious economic situation was heightened by a political crisis caused by the uncertainty over the President’s successor. The collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War played its part in the resulting implosion of the one party system.

The law states that in the event of the death of the incumbent President, the President of the National Assembly should take over as transitional head of government until such time as new elections are held. In this way, Henri Konan Bédié succeeded the state’s founder to become the second President of Côte d’Ivoire. However, many people would have liked to see the economist and technocrat Ouattara at the nation’s helm. Ouattara had been Prime Minister of Côte d’Ivoire since 1990 and enjoyed Boigny’s total confidence. Boigny had ruled the country in an authoritarian fashion for thirty years without a prime minister, but when the economy became more precarious he turned to Ouattara, who had studied economics in the USA and spent many years working at the IMF, to consolidate the nation’s stricken finances. As a result he was viewed by Boigny’s supporters as the “well-deserved and popular” successor. For his part, Ouattara still denies today that he had his sights on being Houphouët-Boigny’s successor at that time.

ivoirité: from electorAl mAniPUlAtion to A coUP

Henrie Konan Bédié, the constitutional successor, was aware of the PDCI’s loss of power and Ouattara’s enormous popularity. He tried to hang onto power by making the question of Ivorian nationality and ancestry a campaign


in 2010 outarra has been recognized by the international community as the legitimate victor. But there are still questions about the role he played in the political unrest at the turn of the new century.

issue, and the racist concept of Ivoirité can to a large extent be traced back to Bédié. The word appeared for the first time in the revised election legislation of 1994. Bédié, the instigator of this revision, stipulated that all candidates for the presidential elections to be held in 1995 had to comply with the Ivoirité clause which required not only the candidate himself but also both his parents to have been born in Côte d’Ivoire. In this way Bédié was able to prevent his fiercest rival, Prime Minister Ouattara, from standing as a candidate because it was said that one of his parents came from Burkina Faso. Ouattara himself has always denied this, but his objection was not recognised by the Constitutional Court and he was excluded from the 1995 elections. Laurent Gbagbo, founder of the underground FPI in 1982 – the first opposition party to come out against the PDCI – and who had spent some years in exile in France, criticized Bédié’s decision and joined with other opposition parties to boycott the election, making Bédié’s victory in 1995 a mere formality.

The 1995 presidential elections made it obvious that the political landscape in Côte d’Ivoire had been dominated by the same people for many years: firstly Henri Konan Bédié, who admittedly became President in a constitutional fashion but who never actually had to go to the people. Then Laurent Gbagbo, who for more than 30 years had personified the fundamental opposition to the PDCI state

party and who had argued vehemently for a multi-party system. At one time he had been prepared to boycott the elections and hence give up what could have been a very real chance of being elected to the presidency in 1995. But after ten years in power he has

also thrown his democratic principles overboard. And finally Ouatarra, the technocrat, who as far back as 1993, was considered by many to be Boigny’s legitimate successor. Now in 2010 he has in fact been recognized by the inter-national community as the legitimate victor, but there are still questions about his political entanglements and the role he played in the political unrest at the turn of the new century. His opponents accuse him of using the concept of Ivoirité, which was originally used as a weapon against him, to drum up support from the people of the north. In the two-hour TV debate between the two candidates


President Bédié’s hold on the country’s leadership was slipping, and the resul-ting political instability led to a coup in december 1999.

held on November 25, 2010, Gbagbo constantly threw the accusation in Ouatarra’s face: “You are responsible for all the catastrophes in Côte d’Ivoire!”23

A second aspect of Ivoirité was that it enabled Bédié to exploit the country’s economic crisis by making immigrants responsible for all the economic difficulties. But Bédié underestimated the consequences of the concept of Ivoirité. After the 1995 elections, this manipulation of the question of identity led to growing discrimination against large sections of the population, who responded with increasing unrest. The immigrants – who mainly lived in the north – were no longer prepared to put up with being disparaged and deprived of their rights as citizens. Many of them were not allowed to vote or buy land, although they had been born in the country. President Bédié’s hold on the country’s leadership was slipping, and the resulting political instability led to a coup in December 1999. It is ironic that Bédié, who had once used the idea of Ivoirité to help him become President, should now be driven out of office because of this discrimination which he set in motion against the immigrants in the north, and which even helped one of these immigrants to win a majority.

the 2000 PresidentiAl elections:GBAGBo hits the finishinG line

Towards the end of 1999 the country was getting ready for the presidential elections to be held in 2000. Ouattara wanted to stand once again, so in summer 1999 he returned to Côte d’Ivoire. He was elected President of the RDR founded by Djeni Kobina and became the party’s new figurehead. He reiterated his claim that his parents were both Ivorians and submitted his candidacy papers to the electoral bodies. The state expressed doubts about the authenticity of these papers and began proceedings against him for forging documents. He was found guilty and a warrant for his arrest was issued while he was out of the country. This led to growing unrest, with the situation

23 | “Présidentielle en Côte d`Ivoire: débat télévisé courtois entre les deux finalistes,” in: Abidjan.net (RFI), http://news.abidjan. net/h/381174.html (accessed December 14, 2010).


Gbagbo emerged as the victor in 2000, but the elections were marked by vi-olent protests. more than 300 people were killed.

quickly escalating in the space of a few weeks. Before 2002, most members of the armed forces had been northerners and as such had suffered from the discrimination which had been directed at them for so many years. They rose up against Bédié. General Gueï, who came from the west and who had been a close confidant of Boigny, took over provisional leadership of the country. Bédié fled abroad and Ouattara returned, knowing that he could rely on Gueï’s support. In the lead-up to the elections it now looked as though Gbagbo and the FPI, who had consistently spoken out against the concept of Ivoirité and discrimination against immigrants, would now stand in direct opposition to Ouattara and the RDR. Ouattara’s popularity had not diminished during his long absence. Gbagbo and Gueï, who was also a candidate, were only too aware of this fact. The General increasingly distanced himself from Ouattara, whose role in the December 1999 coup is still unclear. It was also thanks to the efforts of Gueï that the Constitu-tional Court once again accused the RDR and Ouattara of making false statements.

History repeated itself when interim president Gueï gained a mandate via referendum to change the electoral regula-tions, once again making it a requirement that both parents of presidential candidates must be born in the Côte d’Ivoire. Just as in 1995, Ouattara was not allowed to stand. This time Gbagbo did not protest for he knew that his political

opponent was very popular and he and Gueï both saw him as their strongest rival. Bédié was also prevented from standing on flimsy procedural grounds. Gbagbo emerged as the victor in 2000, but the elections were

marked by violent protests after first Gueï, then Gbagbo was announced as the winner. The supporters of the RDR, whose candidate Ouattara had been excluded from the vote, reacted particularly violently. More than 300 people were killed. The CEI finally announced Gbagbo to be the official winner with almost 60 per cent of the vote, with a turnout of 37 per cent, according to the CEI. The results were widely questioned, but the RDR’s demand that the elections should be rerun was ignored.


Fig. 3division of côte d’ivoire

diAloGUe of nAtionAl reconciliAtion endsin civil WAr

Gueï initially refused to accept the result, but then fled to the north of the country. Gbagbo, realizing he was in a precarious position, joined with Gueï, Bédié and Ouattara to start a dialogue for national reconciliation. In 2002 Ouattara was officially granted Ivorian citizenship by the Constitutional Court. A few weeks later, the unrest which had been simmering for two years escalated further and on September 19, 2002 a coup attempt led to civil war, in the course of which Gueï was killed and Ouattara fled the country. Ouattara’s role was again brought into question: although he accused Gbagbo of inciting unrest by arresting several RDR members who came from the north, the uprising by the northern-dominated army was difficult to explain.

But the coup attempt by sections of the army did not lead to Gbagbo being forced from office. He was still there at the start of the civil war which lasted until 2007 and which led to the country being divided into the rebel-controlled north and the government-controlled south.

The civil war in Côte d’Ivoire should not be simplified by describing it as a conflict between the Muslim north and the Christian-Animist south. The religious divide is more readily explained by the fact that most immigrants who

Zone de Confiance (buffer zone)


the ouagadougou Agreement provided for a government of national unity which would bring together the countries different power bases.

were denied their rights as citizens because of the concept of Ivoirité came from the Muslim countries of the Sahel and hence are Muslims. So the civil war was not a religious conflict, as in Nigeria for example.

In March 2007 the Ouagadougou Agreement, which was mediated by the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré, brought an end to a civil war which had led to the

displacement of 1.7 million refugees and the division of the country.24 It was the last in a long series to resolve the conflict. The Ouagadougou Agreement provided for a government of national unity which would bring together all the countries different power bases. Guillaume Soro, the rebel leader from the north, was appointed Prime Minister. He was not able to stand in the 2010 elections as he was under the legally-stipulated age of 40 years. A few months later, in June 2007, the militias began to disarm and the buffer zone between north and south was dismantled.

After the Ouagadougou Agreement, preparations were set in motion for the presidential elections which had been overdue since 2005. It soon became clear that the planned timeframe of ten months was much too short because of two delicate issues. First of all, the accuracy of the electoral register had to be ensured in order to avoid renewed conflicts on the question of nationality. An accurate electoral register was an indispensable condition for peaceful elections, particularly as the 2002 register excluded many voters and was therefore hotly disputed. But the fact that many Ivorians do not possess any proof of ancestry meant that clarifying the identity of many people was a political, rather than practical, issue. The question of identity has still not been clearly dealt with, as more than 40,000 entries in the electoral register were rejected.

Another important factor was the disarmament of the former rebel troops in the north and their integration into the armed forces, which proved to be a long and difficult process. Complications with voter registration and rebel disarmament were the two most common causes of the eight election postponements.

24 | Cf. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, “Das Abkommen von Ouaga- dougou – Dem Frieden ein Stück näher,” http://kas.de/wf/ de/71.6533 (accessed December 15, 2010).


This explains why the process of preparation was so important for holding peaceful elections. But for a long time it looked as if the country’s politicians, particularly President Gbagbo, had no real interest in holding elections and in the end only scheduled them as a result of external pressure. Since 2007, Gbagbo has headed up a government of national unity. By constantly postponing the elections he has succeeded in holding onto power for ten years and expanding his party from its initial urban roots into more rural areas. The other parties involved in government also benefited from having access to power and resources. Political declarations and justifications for postponing the elections often appeared half-hearted, as each side knew that after the elections one of them would have to give up their sinecure.

It finally became clear that elections could no longer be avoided and that President Gbagbo could now only play for time. He dissolved his government and the independent Election Commission (CEI) in February 2010, knowing their reformulation would delay the elections by another few weeks. Gbagbo had from the start few opportunities to influence the CEI because it had remained neutral and independent through working with the UN and other international organisations. It is also a requirement that all parties send representatives to the CEI. So dissolving and reforming the CEI was not a strategic coup on Gbagbo’s part which would secure his grip on power. Instead, as previously discussed, the key was his appointment of party crony Yao N’Dré as head of the Constitutional Council.

the first roUnd of the PresidentiAl elections – the côte d’ivoire mirAcle

When set against the Côte d’Ivoire’s recent history, the run-up, the ballot itself on October 31, 2010 and the immediate aftermath of the first round could be described as “The Côte d’Ivoire Miracle”.25 For the most part

25 | For more detail on this and following cf. Klaus D. Loetzer, “Côte d’Ivoire: Seit fünf Jahren überfällige Präsidentschafts- wahlen verlaufen friedlich,” KAS-Länderbericht, November 5, 2010, http://kas.de/westafrika/de/publications/21041 (accessed December 10, 2010); cf. also detailed online chronology at http://kas.de/westafrika/de/pages/9708 (accessed December 10, 2010).


ouattara was way ahead of all the other candidates in terms of content, topics covered, presentation, organisation and the use of audio-visual media. in contrast, Bédié seemed tired.

campaigning went off peacefully, apart from election posters being defaced and one or two ill-chosen slogans which Gbagbo used against Ouattara (“Alassane is a liar!”) and Bédié against Ouattara (“The one who suddenly got rich!”). Gbagbo not only made use of the state radio and TV broadcasters to help his campaign but also used the state bus company to transport his supporters. Campaigning ended in Abidjan with Gbagbo and Ouattara holding

impressive mass rallies of supporters. When we assess the campaigns, it is clear that Alassane Ouattara was way ahead of all the other candidates in terms of content, topics covered, presentation, organisation and the use of audio-visual media. In contrast, the

76 year-old Bédié seemed tired. When his advisers tried to spur him on, his retort was “On n’a pas fait campagne!”26, adding the argument that, “I achieved much more between 1993 and 1999 than Gbagbo has since 2000”27 He was the only one out of the fourteen candidates not to take part in a TV presentation, and he refused to print T-shirts, that essential ingredient of all African election campaigns. He also failed to put up any election posters, while the other candidates’ photos and slogans were on every street corner.

On the actual day of the election there were no reports of any particular incidents. The international election observers, particularly the EU who had already been in the country for four weeks, confirmed that the election had gone off in a democratic fashion, with transparency and fairness.

Fourteen presidential candidates stood in the first round, including one woman.28 Gulliaume Soro, General Secretary of Forces Nouvelles (FN), the political arm of the former northern rebels who had been Prime Minister under President Gbagbo since 2007, was not allowed to stand as he was only 39 years old (the minimum age for presi-dential candidates is 40). The other eleven candidates had no real chance against the political heavyweights Gbagbo,

26 | “We are not campaigning!”27 | Jeune Afrique, November 13-17, 2010, 26.28 | For an overview see http://kas.de/wf/de/71.6539 (accessed December 10, 2010).


Gbagbo was largely held responsible for postponing the elections, with his critics accusing him of delaying the vote in order to guarantee his own reelection.

Bédié and Ouattara. Put together, they only won around four per cent of the vote, the same per centage as the invalid votes, which were very high at 4.66 per cent. This was put down to insufficient voter training programmes, but it should be noted that the UN and other international bodies, with the help of Ivorian NGOs, carried out compre-hensive voter training during the run-up to the elections. And in the second ballot the amount of invalid votes halved to 2.11 per cent.

The extremely high voter turnout of 83.7 per cent can only be described as sensational. This was partly due to the fact that voters had gone so long without being able to exercise their right, for example it would have been the first time that a 29-year-old had ever voted. As the population of Côte d’Ivoire is very young (see chart), there was a high proportion of first-time voters. It was also clear that the population, particularly the young, had high hopes of using their vote to bring the country back together and create a better economic future. So the candidates’ main campaign topics were youth unemployment and the anticipated peace dividend.

As none of the candidates won an absolute majority in the first round, the Ivorians were obliged to go to the polls for the second time in four weeks, after this democratic right had been denied them eight times in the previous five years. The elections had been constantly postponed because of the sensitive and time-consuming process of voter identification and because of the lack of progress in disarming the ex-militia and soldiers of the Forces Nouvelles. But more recently the politicians themselves have been increasingly blamed for the failure to hold elections. Since the 2007 Agreement of Ouagadougou, all the main political players had been repre-sented in Prime Minister Soro’s government, including the ex-rebels. In this kind of all-party government, elections would inevitably lead to at least one side losing their political sinecures. But President Gbagbo was largely held responsible for postponing the elections, with his critics accusing him of delaying the vote in order to guarantee his own reelection.


Bédié and ouattara formed an elec-toral pact in october, in which they agreed that whichever one of them came first in the second ballot, that candidate would then benefit from the other’s votes.

oPPosition UnABle to Unite roUndA sinGle cAndidAte

By coming third in the first ballot, Henri Konan Bédié of the PDCI took on the mantle of kingmaker.29 Everything hung on which candidate he told his supporters to vote for in the second ballot. This was to all intents and purposes a foregone conclusion, as the PDCI and RDR had joined together with two smaller parties in 2007 to form the RHDP party coalition. However, this coalition had not managed to unite around a single candidate. As a result, Bédié, Ouattara and Albert T. Mabri of the RHDP-allied UDPCI30

all stood as candidates, but this latter 48-year-old came fourth with only 2.57 per cent of the vote. Against this backdrop, Bédié and Ouattara formed another electoral pact in early October 2010 in Yamoussoukro, at the graveside of Houphouët-Boigny, in which

they agreed that whichever one of them came first in the second ballot, that candidate would then benefit from the other’s votes. After seeing the results of the second ballot, we can assume that the majority of Bédié’s supporters followed his wishes. The slightly lower turnout of approx. 81.13 compared to 83.7 in the first round suggests that it was mainly PDCI supporters who stayed away in the second round, and particularly those who felt could not in all conscience vote for Ouattara, as Bédié and Ouattara had been bitter enemies after Félix Houphouët-Boigny’s death on the question of the president’s successor. This was why Bédié dreamed up the political concept of Ivoirité in 1994, unaware just how politically explosive this would prove to be. The concept took on a momentum of its own and in the end led to the outbreak of civil war.

Of the 19 regions in Côte d’Ivoire, Ouattara won five in the north, Gbagbo won the eleven central regions and Bédié won only three, two on the central plateau and one in the

29 | Even before the provisional election result had been announced by the CEI, the PDCI had called for a recount in their strongholds, alleging irregularities. The Constitutional Council disregarded this demand for procedural reasons, claiming that the complaint was not presented formally to the Consti- tutional Council after the official announcement of the election results. 30 | Union pour la Démocratie et la Paix en Côte d’Ivoire.


Gbagbo could let the division of the country become permanent, as most of the economically-important goods, jobs and tax-generating industries are located in the south.

south west.31 One third of voters live in Abidjan (approx. 3.6 million inhabitants in 2008), a city which is divided into ten quartiers. Of these, Gbagbo won seven and Ouattara three (Treichville, Adjamé und Abobo). Bédié was also the loser here: he was unable to win a single quartier in Abidjan, and indeed lost votes to Gbagbo.32 The Gbagbo camp’s belief that Ouattara could only win votes in the north was also proven to be false, though admittedly the majority of the population of the three quartiers which he won, particularly Treichville, had moved there from the north. As both factions had a lot of support in Abidjan, the city became the main flashpoint for confrontations between the hostile camps. The Gbagbo-loyalist security forces kept a particularly high profile in the three quartiers previously mentioned.

the cUrrent sitUAtion And oUtlook

The behaviour of the Ivorian Defence and Security Forces (FDS), in particular that of the army and Garde Répub-licaine, will be critical in determining how these power issues play out. After an army uprising resulted in a failed coup attempt in 2002, Gbagbo dissolved the armed forces and rebuilt them with the help of Angola. New appoint-ments were made, as in the past many officers, particularly lower-ranking officers, had been northerners. In 2004 he appointed his close supporter, General Philippe Mangou, to Chief of Staff, thus ensuring that a key position was held by one of his people. Gbagbo told his officers: “If I fall, you fall with me!” which, along with other rumours that are circulating, gives the impression that the army, like the political establishment, are not solidly behind Gbagbo.

However, the regular armed forces only control the south of the country, with the military arm of the ex-rebel Forces Nouvelles, the Forces Armées des Forces Nouvelles (FAFN) still holding sway in the north. Gbagbo could let the division of the country become permanent, as most of the economically-important goods, jobs and tax-gene-rating industries are located in the south. Agricultural

31 | Cf. map on RFI site at: http://rfi.my/hqpLxw (accessed December 10, 2010).32 | Cf. Jeune Afrique, November 13-17, 2010, 24.


products such as natural rubber, pineapples, palm oil, cocoa, coffee and wood, along with the ports, industrial operations, the trade and services sector, and oil and gas reserves for future extraction are all located along the coast, as is the case in neighbouring Ghana. The north only has a small amount of gold, diamonds and agricultural products such as pineapples, etc, but no export goods such as wood, cocoa or coffee.

A lasting political solution can only be achieved domesti-cally. Support from other African countries could be helpful, even essential. It is important to find “an African-led inter-national mechanism” in order to implement the foreign, particularly western demands for “good governance, democracy and the rule of law”, with “the power to back up fine words with firm action”.33 This could be in the form of military intervention by the AU, which however does not necessarily mean foreign soldiers on Ivorian soil. A possible solution could be interaction between the armed forces of neighbouring countries. The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s PDWA has created a good foundation for this with its network of senior army officers from West African French-speaking nations.

It is essential that foreign troops such as UN peace-keepers and their French support contingent maintain their neutrality, otherwise they will quickly be viewed as occupying troops with all the attendant security problems for their soldiers and staff. It remains to be seen to what extent the boundaries of neutrality have already been exceeded. In any case, the Gbagbo camp has been exploiting a supposed bias on the part of UNOCI against his political opponent Ouattara.

foUr PossiBle scenArios

In conclusion, we can briefly outline four scenarios which are currently under discussion.34 The first two scenarios

33 | Simon Tisdall: “Ivory Coast crisis exposes hollowness of west’s fine words,” guardian.co.uk, December 19, 2010, in: http://guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/19/ivory-coast-united- nations-france (accessed December 21, 2010).34 | Cf. “Pour mettre fin au bras de fer autour du fauteuil présidentiel: Voici les 4 schémas qui s’imposent à Gbagbo et Ouattara,” in: Abidjan.net (L’Inter), http://news.abidjan.net/ h/384222.html (accessed December 22, 2010).


if ouattara is the one to act by relin-quishing the sovereign power invested in him by the voters, the international community would be taken aback.

depend on the individual behaviour of one of the two protagonists, whereas in scenarios three and four they have to work together, something which is hard to imagine in light of their past history and individual egotism.

1. Gbagbo relinquishes Power

The first scenario is that Gbagbo recognizes Ouattara’s victory and gives in to international pressure. This would be based on acceptance of the election result by the independent CEI. This unexpected relinquishment would have the advantage of freeing Côte d’Ivoire from the political and diplomatic isolation which it has found itself in since December 2, 2010. This particularly relates to actions and measures which depend on international organisations and institutions, such as budget support from the World Bank in 2011, including obtaining the famous Completion Points for the HIPC initiative, which should be gained by the end of March 2011. If the present situation continues, then these important international support actions remain in balance.

2. ouattara relinquishes Power

In the second scenario, Ouattara is the one to act by relinquishing the sovereign power invested in him by the voters. In light of his election victory, this would be a kind of “denial of power”. It is not clear how the international community would react to this. They would certainly be taken aback, but would be forced to accept a victory by Gbagbo which did not happen, with the resultant lifting of isolation and sanctions. This would be immensely damaging to the meaning and credibility of democratic procedures such as elections.

3. A Zimbabwe-style Power sharing Agreement

In the third scenario, the two men agree to share power. Under the terms of the Zimbabwe Agreement, they would share power by one becoming President and the other Prime Minister. However, the power sharing is not working in Zimbabwe and it has the structural disadvantage that under the constitution the President wields more power


the more time goes by, the less possibility there seems to be of a solution which allows both protagonists to save face, something which is crucially important in West African culture.

than the Prime Minister. Some constitutional amend-ments were made under the terms of the “Global Power Agreement” (GPA), but Mugabe has simply ignored them, resulting in fruitless disputes over interpretation. But the security forces play a decisive role, and they are normally loyal to the President. And the egos of the two Ivorian protagonists make this scenario unworkable.

4. the congo Agreement

The fourth scenario involves a kind of power sharing based on presidential and vice-presidential roles. However, the question as to who becomes President and who “only” Vice-President means that such a scenario is doomed to fail. On top of this, the Ivorian Constitution of August 1, 2000 would have to be amended, and as the example of Zimbabwe has shown, even amendments which are made in writing are still not respected. It would also be necessary to hold a referendum before constitutional changes could be made.

At the moment it is quite unclear how the situation in Côte d’Ivoire is going to evolve. The more time goes by, the less possibility there seems to be of a solution which allows both protagonists to save face, something

which is crucially important in West African culture. The chance of a peaceful and diplomatic solution is fading with every day that passes. If Côte d’Ivoire were once again to sink into civil war, the difficult political consolidation which has taken place since 2002 would be set back years, if not decades. This would also have a devastating effect on neighbouring countries. For one thing, the widespread hope that Côte d’Ivoire would once again become the region’s economic driver would be dashed. Many refugees would return to their homes in the Sahel. And many other African countries with illegitimate governments and presidents who are just taking their first steps in political consolidation could point to another example of how the democratic process has led to undemocratic governance. Then there would be very few beacons of democracy left in West Africa.


Frank Priess

It is always difficult to measure results against expectati ons whose origins are not clearly defined. We know this from international stock markets and the assessments of analysts, and the same can be said of international confer-ences. It is all too easy for everybody to say that the UN Climate Conference COP16 in Cancún, Mexico, exceeded expectations because almost everybody involved, inclu-ding the hosts Mexico, took the opportunity in the months leading up to the conference to systematically lower expec-tations. Brasil’s President Ignacio Lula da Silva perhaps made this abundantly clear when he said at the beginning of December: “No big leader is going, only environment ministers at best. We don't even know if foreign ministers are going. So there won't be any progress.”

The first thing people gave up on was the hope of cemen-ting some kind of binding climate treaty out there on the Caribbean coast. The necessary preconditions were not in place to achieve this kind of agreement, as a successor to the Kyoto Protocol, according to a statement by Mexico’s Foreign Minister Patricia Espinosa in mid-October. In fact this wasn’t even really necessary, as the Protocol was set to run until 2012. For Espinosa the conference was now more about discussing a number of measures in the areas of “mitigación, adaptación, financiación y tecnología”.

This was a clever strategy, as all the participants in the climate process were still feeling the effects of the compre-hensive failure in Copenhagen. The UN had seemed to be

PEOPLE wITh LOw ExPECTATIONS ARE SELDOm DISAPPOINTEDCLImATE SummIT IN CANCúN DID NOT fAIL, buT wAS IT SuCCESSfuL ENOugh?

Frank Priess is Resident Represen-tative of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Mexico.


“we are very pleased that the uN pro-cess has been saved.” (Connie hede-gaard, Eu Commissioner for Climate Action)

on the brink of a disaster, the European Union had felt marginalised, the new “superpowers” had flexed their muscles in a negative way, and the USA and China had been pilloried by environmental activists as the bogeymen. A very unsatisfactory experience for everyone concerned, so there was good reason for people to want Cancún to achieve at least something.

And it did achieve something. “Cancún”, according to Green- peace spokesman Wendel Trio, “saved the negotiation process, but not the climate.” The main objective of COP16 was to re-establish the trust that had been lost in Copen-hagen, and in this respect it was successful. Christiana Figueres, Executive Secretary of the CMNUCC (Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático, in English UNFCCC, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change), went as far as to suggest that the conference had offered a “beacon of hope” and seen a

“historic agreement” take place. “Against all expectations common sense has prevailed” claimed World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) climate expert Regine Günther in Spiegel magazine. “We are very pleased that the UN

process has been saved”, said EU Climate Commissioner Connie Hedegaard. And German Federal Climate Minister Norbert Röttgen summed up the conference: “I believe that this has been a real success.” The international community had shown that it was capable of serious negotiation, he said.

Others were not so complimentary. A reader survey carried out by the international opinion-former The Economist suggested that 57 per cent of readers considered the climate summit to have been a failure. “The outcome of Cancún is not going to keep global warming below two degrees”, said Hubert Weiger, chairman of the League for the environment and Nature Conservation (BUND), the German Branch of Friends of the Earth. It also did not alter the lip service paid by the government. And the Mayor of Mexico’s capital, Marcelo Ebrard, commenting on the outcome of the conference, said: “I believe that the announcements coming out of Cancún are just a repeat of Copenhagen. I’m not saying that no progress was made,


Emerging nations like brazil, China and India will not be required to reduce their emissions. And yet, China is the world’s biggest polluter.

there were some interesting aspects, but in general it didn’t achieve what we hoped it would.” His city would, however, proceed on its own, as he had agreed with other mayors at a large city conference in the run-up to Cancún.

ThE PRObLEm IS ThAT NOThINg IS bINDINg

The Cancún Agreement, in the tradition of the Copenhagen Accord, did at least specifically recognise, for the first time in an UN document, the necessity of having a so-called “two degree target”, signed by China and the USA. This was progress, especially for the USA, where there are still a lot of (even politically influential) people who still have their doubts about man’s influence on climate change. Those island nations like Fiji, the Cook Islands, the Maldives and Tuvalu, who have the most to fear from a rise in sea levels, would have liked to have seen an even more ambitious target being set. They had campaigned for a maximum 1.5 degrees above pre-industrial levels. Nothing binding came out of the Agreement, however, and there were also no long-term reduction goals or even targets for specific energy-intensive sectors such as agriculture, sea and air travel. Negotiations on these issues were deferred and now everybody is pinning their hopes on COP17 in Durban, South Africa, at the end of 2011.

The proposal that by 2020 the industrialised nations should reduce their emissions by 25 to 40 per cent compared to 1990 levels remains just that: a non-binding proposal, at least for all those countries that did not sign the Kyoto Protocol. Emerging nations like Brazil, China and India will not be required to reduce their emissions. They are only expected to “limit the pace of their emission growth.” And yet, China is the world’s biggest polluter, and those other emerging nations India and Russia are numbers three and four in the league, ahead of Japan and Germany. In 2014 the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) will announce how much emissions must be reduced by to achieve the “two degree target”, and then we will be able to evaluate just how valuable the resolutions made at Cancún really were.


In developing nations there is still a need to create institutions which can deal effectively with carbon trading issues.

The future progress reports that countries are supposed to give to the UN every two years are also non-binding. Internationally-funded climate actions will be monitored, but all other measures will only be subject to national scrutiny.

The future of the Kyoto Protocol, which expires in December 2012, remains in suspense. Cancún created some breathing space to achieve an extension to Kyoto by the time the conference in South Africa comes around. In Cancún Japan, Russia and Australia were not prepared to agree to an extension to the Protocol. They argue that it makes no sense if the two biggest “polluters”, the USA and China, who are together responsible for 42.2 per cent of emissions, are not bound by it.

The Kyoto Protocol is also key to the issue of carbon trading, an important source of income for financing climate change measures, especially in developing nations. In a recent study the World Bank concluded that between 70 and 100 billion dollars will need to change hands every year until 2050 in order to pay for adaptation measures designed to reduce climate change. The poorest developing nations alone would require 26 billion dollars per year. The Protocol provides for such an adaptation fund, paid for by carbon trading (CDM – Clean Development Mechanism), so a failure to extend the Protocol could have direct financial consequences. The World Bank calculates that in 2009 alone certificates for the equivalent of 8.7 billion tonnes of CO² were traded. Of a total of 103 billion euros traded on the carbon market, the European Union alone accounted for 89 billion.

Although the adaptation fund goes back as far as the 2001 Climate Summit held in Marrakesh, it only really started to work after the Bali Summit in 2007. Volumes should

amount to around 360 million dollars by 2012 – Spain, Germany and Sweden have also made additional funds available. In the meantime projects in Senegal, Pakistan and the Solomon Islands have been certified for financing by the fund. 22 million dollars will be made available, a modest start. In developing nations in particular there is still a need to create institutions which can deal effectively


The u.S. President’s room for mano-euvre at home appears to be limited, despite his good intentions. he failed to get his energy and climate policy bill through the Senate.

with carbon trading issues. Those private enterprises that are involved need some kind of certainty in the planning process, which they don’t really have as things stand at the moment. This is also the case with other aspects of national and international energy policy. If, after the failure of Cancún to secure a binding agreement, a legally binding treaty to replace the Kyoto Protocol is adopted in Durban, then the ratification process among signatory nations could still take years to be completed. The result could be an international patchwork of legal provisions, something particularly feared by business leaders, according to a survey by the consultancy firm Accenture which was published in Spiegel magazine. A possible alternative would be a system of import duties aimed at reducing unfair competition both nationally and regionally.

DIffERENT INTERESTS

As far as the USA is concerned, hopes that Barack Obama might be able to achieve more on environmental policy than his predecessor and be more open to internationally-binding agreements appear to have been dashed. The U.S. President’s room for manoeuvre at home appears to be limited, despite his good intentions. He failed to get his energy and climate policy bill through the Senate in summer, and the new majority there suggests that this will not change. Cancún chief negotiator Todd Stern did however reiterate Obama’s promise from Copenhagen to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases by 17 per cent in comparison to 2005 by the year 2020. On the subject of the main sticking points of the Kyoto Protocol he made it clear that his country did not sign the Protocol and so would not be adopting a position on whether it made sense for it to continue. According to Stern, “That is for the Kyoto signatories to decide.” However, in the run-up to COP16 some discreet negotiations aimed at reconciling differ-ences of opinion do appear to have taken place, not least with China. Analysts such as Daniel Weiss from the Center for American Progress doubt, however, that this will lead to a change in approach before the presidential elections in 2012.


germany is even more ambitious: its aim is a 40 per cent reduction by 2020. by the end of 2009 they had already achieved a 29 per cent reduction.

The position of developing and emerging nations is clear: they do not want any limitations to be placed on their future growth and argue that it is the industrialized nations which have brought the world’s climate to the brink of disaster. This is basically the point Hu Tao of the Policy Research Center for Environment and Economy was making on December 7th, 2010 in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: “Why am I only allowed to produce around four tonnes of CO² per year while you Europeans can produce over 12 tonnes? And an American 22 tonnes? Why do you have that right and I don’t?” He said Europeans were prepared to do more than North Americans – “America should sign the Kyoto Protocol” – but this was by no means enough. They should be more flexible, especially on the issue of technology transfer. However, these arguments fail to recognise that China’s CO² emissions, according to the International Energy Agency, are already above the world average and by 2020 will probably have already reached European levels. China’s emission levels are currently twice the size of their share of the world’s economy. However it is hoped that China will aim to double its spending on the environment in its current five year plan to 2015 compared to the previous plan. The biggest problems will be the country’s inefficient energy production and the reliance on coal.

The Europeans haven’t really changed their position since Copenhagen. They are proposing to reduce their green-house gas emissions by 20 per cent compared to 1990 by the year 2020. If other important countries or country

groupings agree to do the same, then the EU Commission has a mandate to increase this goal to an ambitious 30 per cent, but they were not in a position to exercise this option in Cancún. Germany is even more ambitious:

its aim is a 40 per cent reduction by 2020, as stated in the coalition agreement between the Christian Democrats and the Liberal Party, with the help of an ambitious energy programme. According to Environment Minister Norbert Röttgen they had already achieved a 29 per cent reduction by the end of 2009. The target for 2020 is therefore quite realistic.


Those countries that are most in need of investment are the ones that have done the least to contribute to climate change. So for many this is a question of “historical fairness”.

However, the EU and its member states have made it clear that there will not be any further unilateral concessions. Industry is already struggling under the burden of high energy prices and a switch to using more renewable energy resources and the necessary legislative changes to ensure that this happens will only make matters worse. Even Germany will only be able to continue down its chosen path if there is a worldwide binding climate treaty in place by 2020, according to energy analysts. There is a danger that, if Germany or the EU should place the burden of costs for low carbon emission technology on the economy, then energy-intensive sectors may choose to move abroad. The head of the Federation of German Industries (BDI), Werner Schnappauf, talking about the outcome of the conference, claimed that “The EU will be able to raise its greenhouse gas reduction target to 30 per cent only if all other indus-trialised and emerging nations also commit to ambitious reduction targets and emission limits. Otherwise we will lose modern production facilities and jobs in Europe and Germany”. Also, if some countries make unilateral conces-sions, other countries may be tempted not to make as much effort to reduce their own emissions.

whO PAYS whAT TO whOm AND bY whEN?

Mexico’s proposal to establish a “Green Fund” in addition to the funds from the Adaptation Fund incorporated in the Kyoto Protocol had fallen on deaf ears in Copenhagen. Now the Green Fund turned out to be one of the most concrete outcomes of COP16. 30 billion dollars are to be invested in climate protection in developing nations between 2010 and 2012 and it is planned that there will be an annual investment of 100 billion dollars by 2020. The moral behind all this is that it is generally accepted that those countries that are most in need of investment are the ones that have done the least to contribute to climate change. So for many this is a question of “historical fairness”, which is not an easy issue to deal with.

What is not clear, however, is from whom and how this money is going to be sourced and exactly how these funds will be administered. The World Bank should at


Environment groups are afraid that new pledges may be calculated using existing funds. There may be some simple reclassification of funds within development budgets.

least temporarily take on the role of treasurer for the first three years, with distribution policies being monitored by a committee made up of industrialised and developing nations with equal numbers of votes.

Now, of course, everybody has started to do the maths. Europe’s chief negotiator Artur Runge-Metzger pointed out in his interim accounts that the European Union has already paid out 2.2 billion of the 7 billion euros which

had been earmarked for climate protection for the period 2010 to 2012. Around one billion of this had been invested in measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, 735 million in adaptation measures and 562

million in reforestation programmes, among other things. Environment groups everywhere are afraid that new pledges may be calculated using existing funds, that there may be some simple reclassification of funds within devel-opment budgets, not to mention creative book-keeping where private investment is involved.

PROgRESS IN fOREST PROTECTION

Forest protection was another subject for debate in Cancún and here again there were some partial successes. According to UN studies, deforestation is still responsible for 18 per cent of greenhouse gas emissions. Here the buzzword is REDD (reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation). Behind this idea lies the principle that those who protect the tropical rainforest and demon-strably help to reduce the destruction of forests should in future be financially compensated. So forest protection as a service to the environment should also be economically worthwhile.

There are some tricky questions too, such as who exactly should profit and how, and what kind of monitoring system is required. It is also important to ensure that species-rich primary forest is not simply replaced by monotonous plantation trees. Also, many threatened areas lie in regions which have limited governmental controls. However, some countries, such as Brazil and Mexico, are having some success with this programme and are trying to improve the necessary mechanisms. One very important goal is


The normal negotiating process obviously is such that the two weeks of negotiations are merely seen as a lead up to a dramatic showdown. Cancún was no exception to this.

to ensure that foreign donors get a guarantee that funds donated will in fact be used for their intended purpose. It may also be possible to establish standards, based on practical examples that can then be incorporated into the binding regulations of the relevant UN mechanisms. Not for nothing did Brazil rank first in the Germanwatch Climate Risk Index, especially in light of recent successes in combating the destruction of the tropical rainforest.

For many environmental protection groups this whole mechanism goes against the grain, for example this was part of Bolivia’s argument at Cancún. They are afraid that this will encourage the privatisation of forests and could lead to the illegal acquisition of forest land. In their opinion the biggest sufferers would be the indigenous peoples who live in and from the forests. Their participation in any decision-making process on forest protection and the need for a higher degree of transparency are generally seen as the minimum requirements of REDD policy.

AT ThE END IT JuST CAmE DOwNTO ThE “DISSENTERS”

Right up until the very end representatives from the 194 nations had struggled with the wording of the final declaration, something which is quite normal for mega-conferences. The normal negotiating process obviously is such that the two weeks of negotiations are merely seen as a lead up to a dramatic showdown, while behind the scenes the ever-growing spectre of total failure lurks ominously. Cancún was no exception to this, with an agreement amongst the key players only being reached right at the last minute.

Only Bolivia fought to the very end against the solutions that were finally adopted – too little had been done according to their delegate, Pablo Solón Romo, who had sorely tried the patience of the other delegates. He had even gone as far as to describe the climate policies of the industrialised nations as “genocide”. Bolivia saw itself as the mouthpiece of the La Vía Campesina initiative, which was founded in 1993 to represent small and medium-sized agricultural producers and which now coordinates the


activities of 148 organisations in 69 countries. As part of the so-called “People’s Agreement” in Cochabamba in April Bolivia supported a call for developed countries to agree to a binding reduction of their CO² emissions of 50 per cent by 2017. A substantially larger “adaptation fund” should then be administered by COP with significant funds going to developing nations. Forest protection policies like REDD were rejected by La Vía Campesina.

To the surprise of many observers, in the end the Bolivians found themselves in an isolated position with their extreme stance on issues. Even their fellow ALBA members (Allianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de América) from Cuba, Venezuela and Ecuador sided with the rest of the international community, who one by one had given their agreement to the protocol. In the end the conference President glossed over Bolivia’s objections. To applause from other delegates Patricia Espinosa declared that “consensus does not necessarily have to mean unanimity”, in reaction to Bolivia’s attempt to stop an agreement being reached at the conference and to exercise a kind of quasi veto. La Paz had clearly gambled on too strong an end-game. At 3.30 in the morning of December 11 the result of the conference finally became official. The Bolivians, however, immediately announced that they would challenge the validity of the resolutions before the UN court and the outcome is far from certain.

Many people have started to seriously question whether these mega-events with tens of thousands of participants are really the ideal vehicle for making real progress, especially when at the end it comes down to a handful of genuine “negotiators”. There were 6,300 national and UN delegates at Cancún, while 15,000 representatives from around 300 national and international non-governmental organisations completed the line-up. While pictures and descriptions of conference dynamics can help to position topics firmly in the media spotlight, many reporters and some media formats failed to grasp the complexity of some of the issues, with the result that we saw the usual narrow focus, black and white portrayals and the search for scape-goats when the political decisions sometimes fell short of expectations, especially when those expectations had been dramatised by NGOs with vested interests.


In mexico, without climate protection measures the anticipated cost of environmental damage would be six per cent of gDP.

PRAISE fOR ThE hOSTS

Mexico was highly-praised for the way it hosted the event, as was Foreign Minister Patricia Espinosa who acted as conference president. Many participants felt that much of the conference’s success was due to Mexico’s skilful management of the event, its consistently constructive and confidence-building attitude and the way it did not shy away from the spotlight. UN General Secretary Ban Ki Moon also added his own words of praise. Mexico, with its rather low international profile, was happy to receive this recognition, as the country is still constantly compared to the much more high-profile Brazil. It was good for this country which is so stricken by drug-related violence to finally hit the international headlines for positive reasons.

During his inaugural speech at COP16 on November 29, President Felipe Calderón spoke out against the “false dilemma” of seeing growth and climate protection as opposites. “It is totally possible to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases while not only maintaining economic growth but also generating new forms of productivity, growth and job creation in a wave of green development, green growth and sustainability”. Calderón told the repre-sentatives of 194 nations that the fight against poverty would be afforded the highest priority. The President had already written in the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s publication Die Politische Meinung that the cost of doing nothing is higher than the cost of targeted action. In the case of Mexico, without climate protection measures the anticipated cost of environmental damage would be six per cent of GDP until mid-century, while the ongoing costs of environmental mitigation measures would only reach 0.56 per cent.

The President has declared climate protection to be one of his priorities. He has consistently taken advantage of inter-national summits to remind the international community of their collective responsibilities, most recently at the G20 summit in Toronto, and before that at the summit of African leaders in the Ugandan capital, Kampala and at the opening of the Bonn climate talks in mid-2010, alongside German Chancellor Angela Merkel. In Bonn the


mexico’s location between two oceans, along with its climatic and hydrological conditions, means that the subject of climate protection has now taken cen-tre-stage.

President said that the current economic difficulties should not divert the world’s attention from a set of problems which it only has one chance at resolving. Foreign Minister Espinosa conducted intensive shuttle diplomacy in order to get agreement on common policies, at least within Latin America. In July she also visited key countries in Asia to discuss their support for Cancún.

ThE ExAmPLE Of mExICO, AN EmERgINg NATION

Mexico has consistently placed itself in the middle, on the one hand warning the industrialised nations that they need to redouble their efforts towards reducing greenhouse gases and at the same time speaking out in favour of concrete commitments on the part of the emerging and developing nations. The country took the lead by committing to a 30 per cent reduction in its own greenhouse emissions by 2020. Mexico also continues to advocate international emissions trading and a second phase of the Kyoto Protocol. However, the country is only responsible for 1.6 per cent of worldwide CO² emissions – even an ambitious programme with a focus on renewable energies would be no more than a drop in the ocean in world climate terms.

The Mexican government has drawn up a Special Climate Change Programme (PECC) for the period 2009 to 2012, where the country’s particular vulnerability is analysed. According to this programme, 15 per cent of the nation’s territory and 68.2 per cent of the population are at increased

risk, while over 70 per cent of GDP could be affected. More than twenty million Mexicans live in areas which are affected by tropical storms. The country’s geographic location between two oceans, along with its climatic

and hydrological conditions, means that the long-neglected subject of climate protection has now taken centre-stage. Special “Risk Atlases” will detail vulnerability levels until 2012, and the programme will include the responsibilities of the federal states and launch a Programme of Environ-mental Reform.

The road ahead is shown by a draft bill proposed by PAN Senator Alberto Cárdenas Jiménez. Central to this is a stable legal framework for innovation in the areas of renewable


There have been alternating floods and widespread droughts with devas-tating consequences. Scientific studies point to ever more dramatic changes.

energy, energy-saving and CO² reduction, and he sets a clear target of reducing CO² by 52 million tonnes by the year 2012. He suggests setting up a Climate Commission with wide-ranging authority in order to implement these measures. Material resources could be streamlined using a kind of national Green Fund which would also accept international contributions. In addition, a national register of emissions should be set up and a market created for emissions trading, with clear sanctions being applied in the case of any violations. Energy efficiency and the efficient use of resources must also be significantly increased for the sake of sustainable development. But at the same time Mexico needs considerable assistance if they are to improve their own monitoring systems.

NATuRAL DISASTERS hELP TO RAISE AwARENESS

Extreme climate situations in recent times have helped to focus public opinion in the country on the issue of climate change, and awareness of environmental issues is growing. Every year more than 500 people lose their lives in Mexico as a result of natural disasters, while over a million people lose all their worldly goods, and infrastructure damage runs into the billions. In 2010 hurricane Alex laid waste to the north of the country and the industrial city of Monterrey.

The emergency services have recorded a significant increase in such events over the last ten years. Rainfall has become much more irregular and therefore harder to predict than before. There have been alternating floods and widespread droughts with devastating consequences for agriculture. Scientific studies point to ever more dramatic changes and suggest that sustained temperature rises will have a significant impact on Mexico’s biodiversity and not least on the country’s tropical rainforests. A study entitled The Economics of Climate Change in Latin America and the Caribbean, published by the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and The Caribbean (CEPAL) at the end of 2009, estimated the annual costs of natural disasters in the region to have already reached 8.6 billion dollars, and they are growing steadily.


In residential areas of the capital, around 40 per cent of the water doesn’t even reach the 22 million inhabitants. moreover, only a fraction of used wa-ter is repurified.

Awareness of environmental issues in the country is still not that widespread. Mexican car buyers can tell you exactly how powerful a car’s engine is, but they can’t tell you anything about environmental standards. Subsidised, cheap petrol has done a lot to ensure that the well-to-do classes in the county opt for prestigious cars whose average consumption is above 15 litres. Supermarkets give away mountains of plastic carrier bags free of charge, while Mexicans would only choose to make even the shortest journey on foot in exceptional cases.

Water wastage is legendary: in residential areas of the capital, which increasingly have to put up with restricted water supplies during dry spells, around 40 per cent of the

water doesn’t even reach the 22 million inhabitants. It has to be pumped over long distances, and much of it is simply lost along the way. Decision-makers see no political benefit in investing in the country’s ailing infrastructure. Only a fraction of used water is repurified. Massive subsi-dies on water prices, as with electricity, do nothing to help to encourage people to use this precious commodity spa- ringly. Having your car washed every morning by one of the household staff is still the norm in Mexico’s “better” areas, as is hosing down the pavements.

A SOmEwhAT QuIET PROTAgONIST

At the same time Mexico, with its still substantial but quickly declining reserves of non-renewable energy resources, especially oil, is particularly interested in the development and use of renewable energy and is open to ideas on the subject of energy conversion. The urgency of the debate is also due to the fact that Mexico still derives 40 per cent of budget revenue from the sale of oil. This is also its biggest source of foreign currency revenue, far more than the amount sent home by Mexicans living abroad or income from tourism. This is without taking income from the activities of organised crime into account.

As a result of various taboos in connection with the state-run energy concern PEMEX, the Calderón govern-ment’s first attempt at energy reform right at the beginning of its six-year term, has achieved far less than


wind energy and solar installations have the additional advantage of being able to supply smaller communities directly without the need to be con-nected to the national grid.

is needed and is crying out for a reform of the reform. This debate has taken on new immediacy following BP’s oil disaster in the Gulf of Mexico and the sinking of the Deepwater Horizon platform. Mexico’s shallow oil deposits, such as those of its most important oilfield Cantarell, can be extracted cheaply but are starting to run drastically low. To develop new oilfields they would need to use exactly that deep sea drilling technology which is now attracting so much criticism.

According to experts, Mexico has huge potential to exploit water and wind power as well as bio-fuels. Especially the south of the country and the state of Oaxaca, with its high levels of thermal activity on the narrow strip between the Pacific and the Caribbean, seem to offer the guarantee of excellent results. The north of the country, with its huge areas of desert and semi-desert, has huge potential for generating solar energy, and Mexican politicians are already investigating this technology in the USA and Europe. Wind energy and solar installations have the additional advantage of being able to supply smaller communities directly without the need to be connected to the national grid, and there are a lot of these communities. In trying to achieve a sensible balance of energy supplies Mexico does not want to discount nuclear power as an option, and the Laguna Verde power station currently makes a significant contribution to the country’s energy security. The picture is completed by the substantial uranium deposits, which however require significant levels of investment to extract.

On the other hand they are a bit more reticent about producing bio-fuels, as there is a fear that traditional food production, especially maize, could be threatened, which would have a significant impact on the poorest sections of the population. While agriculture only produces four per cent of the country’s GDP, it provides 15 per cent of the active population with jobs. Climate-sensitive maize is grown on 50 per cent of Mexico’s agricultural land. A recent report by the World Bank concluded: “The climate expecta-tions for Mexico in 2020 suggest a moderate reduction in the area of land on which maize can be cultivated and a growth in those areas where it cannot.”


Mexico’s problems and the potential solutions are not untypical of many developing nations. Its readiness to play a constructive part internationally, to recognize and accept its own responsibilities and to act as a mediator between developed and developing nations was clear for all to see in Cancún. Mexico’s belief in multilateralism and the UN has existed for decades. In spite of its size, with 112 million inhabitants and a GDP that almost places it amongst the top ten countries in the world, Mexico does not always see the need to be at the forefront. This is seen as a good thing by many observers on the international stage. Climate protection is a good example here of how a “quiet protagonist” can still achieve success.


Holger Dix

The parties which have come together to form the Alliance for European Integration (AIE) were able to clinch the early parliamentary elections held on November 28, 2010, and thus avoided the Communist Party’s return to power. But the elections did not pull the country out of the depths of its political and constitutional crisis. Once again the vote failed to produce the majority needed to elect a President, and further early elections are looming, just like in July 2009 and November 2010.

A CONSTANT SEARCh fOR IDENTITY

Since it was founded in 1991, the Republic of Moldova has been on a search for its political and geopolitical identity1 which has been characterized by constantly changing directions and ongoing political crises. Up to 2000 there was a phase of political instability; then during the first four years of the Communist Party’s return to government there was a phase of political stability and rapprochement to Russia (up to 2005). The Communist government then forged closer ties with the European Union, while at the same time becoming increasingly repressive. Later, the Communists were overturned by the Alliance for European Integration with correspondingly pro-European policies. Since 2009 there has been an ongoing political crisis marked by several elections which have failed to produce a clear result.

1 | For more detail see: Dan Dungaciu, Moldova ante portas (Bukarest, 2005).

REPubLIC Of mOLDOvA ATThE END Of AN ELECTION mARAThON?A NEw vERSION Of ThE ALLIANCE fOR EuROPEAN INTEgRATION, AND mORE uNCERTAINTY

Dr. Holger Dix is Resi-dent Representative of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Bucharest, in charge of the KAS offices in Romania and the Republic of Moldova.


Negotiations on an Association Agree-ment with the Eu, which should also include a comprehensive free trade agreement, have commenced and are successfully moving forward.

The real nature of the political protagonists also remains shrouded in mystery. The Communist Party comes across as extremely capitalistic in the way it looks after its supporters, democratic forces are under suspicion of being influenced by the oligarchs and their interests, and voci- ferous anti-Communists have become the lackeys of the Communist Party (PCRM). The nation’s unity is also highly precarious. The founding of the Republic of Moldova sparked a brief armed conflict, resulting in the more industrialized, Russian-speaking region of Transnistria breaking away to form its own separatist government, which is however not internationally recognized. The ongoing conflict with Transnistria means the Moldovan government has lost control of part of its territory, which limits its ability to act and is a stumbling block to hopes of European integration. Another region, the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia also broke away in 1990, first of all to form the unrecog-nized independent Gagauzian Socialist Republic, then since 1994 as an autonomous region recognized by the Republic of Moldova with its own Parliament and government.

The country has also been characterized by constant changes of direction with regard to ties with the European Union and Russia, which in hindsight seem to be more influenced by pragmatism than ideals. At present there

is a widespread desire among the people and across parties to move closer to the EU. The current government led by Prime Minister Vlad Filat and Foreign Minister Iurie Leancă has intensified relations with the EU since assuming office. Negotiations on an Association Agreement, which should also include a comprehensive free trade agreement, have commenced and are successfully moving forward.2 The new government also lifted travel restrictions on Romania, which had been introduced by the PCRM government as a result of the unrest in April 2009. Shortly before the November 2010 parliamentary elections Prime Minister Filat signed a border treaty with Romania.

2 | See statements by the incumbent Foreign Minister Natalia German and EU Ambassador Dirk Schübel on the occasion of the KAS conference “Republik Moldaus Zukunft in der Euro- päischen Union. Stand und Perspektiven der Annäherung” (The future of the Republic of Moldova in the European Union: State and perspectives of the rapprochement) on November 16, 2010 in Chișinău. Audio file at: http://kas.de/moldawien/ de/publications/21313 (accessed December 21, 2010).


Russia basically views the Republic of moldova as belonging to an exclusive zone of influence which also includes the other former Soviet states.

On the other hand, almost 20 years after the Republic of Moldova declared its independence, Russia still exerts a strong influence on the country, something which can take the form of cooperation and partnership or of peremptory intervention, depending on the attitude of the Moldovan government. Russia basically views the Republic of Moldova as belonging to an exclusive zone of influence which also includes the other former Soviet states. This influence is leveraged by the Transnistrian conflict, economic relations, energy supplies, Russia’s opinion-forming impact on the media, the Russian Orthodox Church and the country’s Russian minority.3 Russia works closely with the government in Tiraspol, providing political, financial, economic and military support. Any Moldovan actions against Transnistria spark a reaction from Russia, as in March 2006 when the Moldovan government blocked exports by Transnistrian companies which were not regis-tered in Chișinău. Russia countered by blocking imports of Moldovan wine. Russia still has troops and equipment stationed in Transnistria, despite having agreed to their withdrawal at the 1999 OSCE Summit in Istanbul. Russia is also still an important export market for Moldova and exploits its position as a key market in order to when necessary exert pressure on the Moldovan government, most recently through another import ban on Moldovan wine as a reaction to the announcement made by interim President Mihai Ghimpu that June 28 should be a day commemorating the Soviet occupation.

A fRAgmENTED POLITICAL LANDSCAPE ANDuNSTAbLE ALLIANCES

The Republic of Moldova’s political landscape is charac-terized by a large number of parties, many of which are very short-lived.4 Since independence, a total of 104 parties have been registered. If we exclude those parties which have just changed their names, we are still left with 77 different groupings which have fought to win the vote

3 | Cf. Radu Vrabie, “Relationship of the Republic of Moldova with the Russian Federation,” in: Foreign Policy Association and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (eds.), The Foreign Policy of the Republic of Moldova (1998-2008) (Chișinău 2010), 99-112.4 | Cf. Igor Volnitchi, Istoria Partidelor din Republica Moldova (Chișinău: 2010).


The PDm describes itself as social-de-mocratic and centre-left, is a member of Socialist International and has signed a partnership agreement with the uni-ted Russia party.

of the country’s 2.9 million-strong electorate over the last 20 years. Recent parties with the most realistic prospects of getting into Parliament have been the Democratic Party of Moldova, the Liberal Party, the Alliance Our Moldova, the Liberal Democratic Party and the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM).

The precursor to the Democratic Party of Moldova, the “Movement for a Prosperous and Democratic Moldova” (MpMDP), was founded in 1997 and then was renamed the

Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM) in April 2000. The party describes itself as social-democratic and centre-left, is a member of Socialist International and has signed a partnership agreement with the United Russia party. The PDM won seats in Parliament in 1998 as part of an electoral bloc, but in the early elections of 2001 the party failed to meet the election threshold, gaining only five per cent of the vote. They had earlier been involved in raising this threshold from four to six per cent.5 In the 2005 parliamentary elec-tions the PDM once again formed an electoral bloc and won eight seats in Parliament. As an independent faction, the party joined with the Christian Democrats (PPCD) and Social Liberal Party to support the presidency of Communist candidate Vladimir Voronin, in order to avoid a political stalemate. In 2007 there was internal conflict between the party leaders Dumitru Diacov and Vlad Filat, leading to the latter leaving the PDM and founding the Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova (PLDM). In the parliamentary elections held in April 2009 the PDM only won two per cent of the vote and therefore failed to gain any seats in Parliament.

Support for the party increased when former Speaker of the Moldovan Parliament Marian Lupu defected from the Communist Party to join the PDM shortly before the July 2009 parliamentary elections. However, the political costs of Lupu’s defection were high for the PDM’s old guard. Lupu successfully pushed through his appointment as party leader, along with the top five places on the party list for “his” candidates. The elections in July 2009 resulted in 13 MPs taking their seats in Parliament, with Marian Lupu being nominated as candidate for the presidency of the Alliance for European Integration (AIE).

5 | Ibid., 88 et sqq.


The Liberal Party is particularly strong amongst pro-Romanian voters and its political objectives are distinctly liberal. On a European level they align them-selves with the European Liberals.

The Liberal Party (PL) was founded in 1993 as the Party of Reform. It had no electoral success until 2005, when it benefited from the decision made by the Christian Democrats and the Social Liberal Party after the 2005 elections to support the presidential bid of Communist candidate Voronin, a decision which caused disaffection among their voters. The party then selected the 27-year-old lawyer Dorin Chirtoacă to be their candidate for the mayoral elections in Moldova’s capital, Chișinău. This selection was particularly popular among the city’s young, reform-minded population, and in 2007 Chirtoacă was indeed elected mayor by a clear majority. In the April 2009 parliamentary elections the PL became at a stroke the strongest opposition party, winning 15 seats. In the July elections the party further increased its share of the vote, but still only held 15 seats. The Liberal Party is particularly strong amongst pro-Romanian voters and its political objectives are distinctly liberal. On a European level they align themselves with the European Liberals.

The Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova (PLDM) was formed only recently, in December 2007. They are led by the current Prime Minister, Vlat Filat, who organised and financed the party right from the beginning and then led them to success in the April 2009 parliamentary elections. With 15 seats, and in combination with the PL, the PLDM became the strongest opposition group. In July 2009 they increased their seats to 18. Immediately after the party was founded, the PLDM tried to forge ties with the European People’s Party and applied for affiliation, which will lead to it being granted observer status.

The Alliance Our Moldova Party (AMN) was founded in 1997 under the name “Civic Alliance for Reforms”. In 2001, as the “Party of Social Democracy” it took part in the parlia-mentary elections as part of an electoral alliance and won 19 seats in Parliament. The alliance was dissolved after the elections and the Party of Social Democracy became the Social-Democratic Alliance of Moldova (ASDM). In 2003 the ASDM merged with the Liberal Party and the Independents’ Alliance to form the new Alliance Our Moldova (AMN). In the 2005 elections the party joined forces with the PDM and the Social Liberal Party to form the Electoral


The Communists made their political breakthrough in the early parliamen-tary elections held in 2001, which were a result of Parliament’s failure to elect a President in 2000.

Bloc Democratic Moldova (BMD), winning 34 seats and becoming the strongest faction after the Communists. The party stood alone at the local elections in 2007 and became the country’s second political party, despite a few internal problems. However, they were unable to maintain this position in the parliamentary elections in April 2009, winning only 11 seats because of the emergence of two new parties in the centre-right spectrum, the Liberal Party and the Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova. In the 2009 elections the party only won 7 seats. The AMN has observer status within the Liberal International.

The Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) was founded in 1994 and declared itself to be the successors to the Communist Party which was active in Moldova during Soviet rule. The PCRM first put itself to the vote in the local elections of 1995. With results ranging from 5 to 15 per cent it proved that a Communist Party could still attract support among voters. The direct presidential elections of 1996 led to the PCRM candidate Vladimir Voronin winning

ten per cent of the vote and third place. In the 1998 parliamentary elections the PCRM won 30 per cent of the vote and 40 of the 101 seats. The Communists then made their political breakthrough in the early parlia-mentary elections held in 2001, which were

a result of Parliament’s failure to elect a President in 2000. In these elections the PCRM won 40.07 per cent of the vote and 71 seats, giving them the majority required to elect the President. In April 2001 the Parliament made Vladimir Voronin President of Moldova. The bad blood which arose between the Moldavian government and Russia as a result of Voronin’s last-minute rejection of the Russian proposal for resolution of the Transnistria conflict (the Kozak Memorandum) cost the PCRM the support of pro-Russian voters during the 2005 elections. After Russia’s failed attempt at mediation, Voronin announced that Moldova would be forging closer ties with the EU. As a result of this, the 2005 parliamentary elections saw the PCRM once again become the strongest party with 56 seats, but it fell just short of the 61 seats required to elect a President. Voronin could only be re-elected with the support of the Christian Democrat Party (PPCD), the Democratic Party and the Social Liberal Party. In the April 2009 elections the


On April 7, 2009 there was a mass rally of young people in Chișinău who pro-tested against the re-election of the Communists and the developments taking place in their country.

Communists managed to increase their share of the vote to 49 per cent and 60 seats, but were accused of becoming increasingly authoritarian and of repressing the opposition. Controversy over the PCRM’s surprisingly good election results led to violent public protests which were put down by repressive government action. This resulted in the Party losing popular support and the opposition parties closing ranks.

DISPuTED PARLIAmENTARY ELECTIONS IN 2009

Two parliamentary elections were held in 2009. Those held on April 5, 2009 united the political opposition and large sections of the country’s younger population in the hope that the Communists would lose power. The opposition tried to build on the fact that the Communists had been losing support over the previous few years. But the opposition parties’ hopes were dashed by the announcement of the preliminary election results. After 98 per cent of votes had been counted, it was clear that the Communist Party had won an absolute majority which would give them the right to govern alone for the next four years.

The Communists had won just under 50 per cent of the vote, followed by the Liberal Party led by the Mayor of Chișinău, Dorin Chirtoacă, with 13 per cent, the Liberal Democratic Party with 12 per cent and the Alliance Our Moldova with 10 per cent. With 61 of 101 seats, the Communists were in a position to elect a successor to the incumbent President, Vladimir Voronin, who was constitutionally barred from seeking another term. On April 7 there was a mass rally of young people in Chișinău who protested against the re-election of the Communists and the developments taking place in their country. The demonstration went off peacefully at first but later there was violent rioting which sent shockwaves through Moldavian society. The Moldavian government and police were overwhelmed by the situation and seemed unsure how to deal with it. Political tensions increased, and the initial failure of the state authorities to act, along with the lack of a protest culture, the lack of clear goals among the demonstrators and the probable manipulation of the protesters led to the occupation and partial destruction


visa restrictions were instituted against Romania, which the moldavian Presi-dent accused of being involved in a coup plot. The Romanian ambassador was ejected.

of the Parliament building and Presidential Office. The government blamed the opposition and foreign influence (Romania) for the violence. For its part, the opposition accused the government of using agents provocateurs to orchestrate the riots. After its initial hesitancy, the state reacted heavy-handedly.6 Protesters were arrested that

night and in the days that followed, there was a wave of arrests which included journalists. Four people died as a result of the riots and the subsequent government repression. In contravention of EU agreements, visa

restrictions were instituted against Romania, which the Moldavian President accused of being involved in a coup plot. The Romanian ambassador in Chișinău was ejected and President Voronin called Romania’s efforts to advance Moldova’s membership of the EU “humiliating”.

The final results of the April 5 elections sufficed to enable to PCRM to build a new government. But the party was one seat short of the 61 seats required to elect the President in Parliament. The PCRM then failed to obtain the one vote needed from the ranks of the opposition. The three opposition parties at that time – the Liberal Democratic Party led by Vlad Filat (PLDM), the Alliance Our Moldova (AMN) and the Liberal Party (PL) – formed a united front against the re-election of a President from the ranks of the PCRM. As a result, new elections were called on July 27, 2009.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION SYSTEm LEADS TO POLITICAL AND CONSTITuTIONAL CRISIS

The cause of the political crisis – along with the complicated election results and the inability of MPs to work with them – lies in the system for electing the President in Parliament. Since a constitutional amendment was made in July 2000, the Republic of Moldova’s system of government is a parlia-mentary democracy, which followed on from the previous semi-presidential system. This constitutional amendment strengthened Parliament and weakened the President, who was now elected by Parliament rather than by direct vote. The President has a role which is clearly still much

6 | Cf. Mihnea Berindei and Arielle Thedrel: “Moldavie, La fin de l’ère Voronine,” politique international 125 (2009), 249-261.


more than just ceremonial, but some of his prerogatives were taken away, including the right to participate in or lead cabinet meetings. But the office still carries weight, as is reflected by the high election threshold in Parliament, because of the responsibilities it still holds, such as the right to appoint the Prime Minister (who is then confirmed by Parliament), the right to initiate legislation and its role as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Accordingly, the President is elected by a 3/5 majority (61 seats) out of the total 101 MPs in Parliament. If the vote produces no result in the first round, there is a run-off between the top two candidates. If this also fails to produce an adequate majority, Parliament is dissolved and new elections are called.

The very first attempt by Parliament to elect a President failed in December 2000.7 The subsequent new elections on February 25, 2001 resulted in the Communists getting back into power with 71 seats. In order to break the stalemate, some opposition members voted for the Communist candidate, an action which consigned them to the political wilderness in the eyes of both many Western observers and the Moldovan people. It was a fateful decision for the Christian Democrats under Iurie Roșca, who never succeeded in winning back the trust of the people and who have since failed to win a single parliamentary seat in three attempts.

vOTINg OuT Of ThE COmmuNISTS IN ThEJuLY 2009 ELECTIONS

The new elections held on July 29, 2009 led to the Commu- nist Party being removed from power.8 The campaigns became increasingly bitter, with both camps (CP and opposition) laying the blame for the violent unrest of April 2009 with each other. The media was under the strict control of the Communist Party, but the opposition parties

7 | Cf. Ghenadie Vaculovschi and Norbert Neuhaus, “Dezideratul reformei constitutionale in republica Moldova,” in: IDRAD (ed.), Aspecte prioritare (Chișinău: 2010).8 | See also in particular Hans Martin Sieg, “Machtwechsel in der Krise,” KAS-Länderbericht, October 7, 2009, http://kas.de/ rumaenien/de/publications/17774 (accessed December 21, 2010).

To break the stalemate, some opposition members voted for the Communist candidate. It was a fateful decision for the Christian Democrats who never succeeded in winning back the voter’s trust.


The election result did nothing to re-solve the dilemma of achieving the majority required to elect a President. The Alliance still needed eight votes from the PCRm.

as a whole (PLDM, PL, PD and AMN) managed to gather momentum and win 53 seats, meaning that they could combine in the Alliance for European Integration (AIE) and form a government.

The PCRM only won 48 seats, and of the parties who had previously been in Parliament, the Liberal Democrats gained 18 seats, the Liberals 15 and the Alliance Our Moldova 7. The social-democrat Democratic Party of Moldova won 13 seats and re-entered Parliament. Vlad Filat (leader of the PLDM) was appointed Prime Minister, with Mihai Gimpu (leader of the PL) becoming Speaker of the Parliament and Marian Lupu (leader of the DPM) being selected as candidate for the Presidency. The main goals of the Alliance

were the reestablishment of the rule of law, overcoming the social and economic crisis, the promotion of decentralisation and local autonomy, resolving the Transnistria conflict, and European integration.

However, the election result did nothing to resolve the dilemma of achieving the majority required to elect a President. The Alliance still needed eight votes from the PCRM, which failed to materialise in any of the ballots.

CONSTITuTIONAL DEbATE AND A fAILED REfERENDum

This vote led to a debate on the need for constitutional changes, with proposed solutions ranging from changing the method of electing the President in Parliament, to the introduction of direct presidential elections, to compre-hensive constitutional reform.9 In March the PCRM made a proposal for a constitutional amendment which retained the President’s election by Parliament but which sought to lower the quorum needed for an absolute majority in a third ballot. In this way the PCRM cleverly appropriated the simplest and most obvious proposal for reform. But the governing coalition found it difficult to act on the suggestion of their political opponents, the more so because there were doubts about the Communist’s trustworthiness when it came to a parliamentary vote.

9 | See also Hans Martin Sieg, “Die Republik Moldau in der Verfassungskrise,” KAS-Länderbericht, April 23, 2010, http://kas.de/moldawien/de/publications/19419 (accessed December 21, 2010).


following the failed referendum, the incumbent President called new elec-tions in November 2010 – the third par-liamentary elections since April 2009.

Within the AIE it was the social-democrat Democratic Party (PDM) who supported the idea of direct presidential elections. Their popular leader, Marian Lupu, who had been selected as the coalition’s candidate for the presidency in December, would have stood a good chance in a direct election. The prospect of direct presidential elections and the attendant political upgrading of the office aroused the interest of the coalition partners to stand as candidates themselves – including the Prime Minister. The tensions which already plagued working relationships within the governing coalition became heightened still more by this growing rivalry.

Despite these dangers, in the end the coalition scheduled a referendum on September 5, 2010 with a view to intro-ducing direct presidential elections. Polls suggested that the coalition’s proposal met with the approval of 70 per cent of voters. On the day itself, more than 90 per cent of voters supported the proposal. Yet the referendum still failed because voter turnout was slightly under the required one third of the electorate. In the lead-up to the referendum the Communist Party had called for a boycott, and it seems they succeeded in persuading their supporters to stay away: exit polls in Chișinău indicated that it was mostly only coalition party supporters who took part in the referendum. Following the failed referendum, the incumbent President dissolved Parliament and called new elections on November 28, 2010 – the third parliamentary elections since April 2009.

SETTINg A DIRECTION fOR 2010

The governing coalition’s starting position at the parlia-mentary elections was unclear. In a survey carried out by the Institute for Public Policy in October/November 2010, 60 per cent of respondents said they thought the country was heading in the wrong direction. Only 24 per cent were satisfied with the direction being taken.10 Public approval of the performance of their political leaders was alarmingly low. Dissatisfaction among those surveyed was expressed as follows: almost 74 per cent were unhappy with health

10 | Cf. Institutul Politici Publice (ed.), Barometrul Opinie Publice (Chișinău: November 2010).


care provision, 85 per cent with the development of the job market, 78 per cent with the pension system, 80 per cent with the fight against corruption and 85 per cent with wage levels.11 The government’s performance under Prime Minister Vlad Filat was rated by three per cent of respondents as very good, 20 per cent as quite good, 35 per cent as neither good nor bad, 20 per cent as bad and 10 per cent as very bad.

In actual fact the government of the AIE was out of kilter, and the basic conditions required for successful governance were unfavourable. Prime Minister Filat had inherited from the Communists an economy which was in freefall with a negative growth rate of -6.5 per cent. The state institutions were bloated with poorly-trained employees who were badly paid and largely resistant to reform.12 The new government took over against an international backdrop of economic crisis in the EU states and a Russia which was trying to increase its influence in the region. The repeated failure of Parliament to elect a President had once again led to the spectre of new elections, making it difficult for the government to implement any medium-to-long-term measures. However, the government was still able to notch up some significant successes, including reopening talks with the International Monetary Fund and starting intensive and successful negotiations with the EU on forging closer ties with Europe and financial support. The economy was stabilised, and the budget deficit is expected to be brought down from 6.8 per cent in 2009 to 4-4.5 per cent in 2010. However there was no or very little progress made in reforming the judiciary and civil service and in safeguarding economic competitiveness.13 Right from the start the ruling coalition showed signs of being in a marriage of convenience which clearly shared common political goals but which did not possess the tools to ensure sufficient agreement and communication within the coalition itself.

11 | Results for ‘very unhappy’ and ‘not very happy’ were combined. Other response options were ‘fairly happy’ and ‘very happy’.12 | Cf. Expert Grup: Moldova Economic Growth Analysis (Analiza Creșterii Economice in Moldova), December 2010, http://expert-grup.org/?en (accessed December 21, 2010).13 | See also Igor Boţan: “Anul politic 2010” (Political year 2010), December 31, 2010, in: http://http://e-democracy.md/en/ monitoring/politics/comments/political-year-2010 (accessed January 3, 2011).


The Communist Party was once again the strongest party with 39.3 per cent of the vote and 42 seats in Parliament.

Perhaps also in face of the uncertain prospects of election success, in June the ruling coalition decided to make changes to the electoral law which to some extent worked to the advantage of the smaller parties. This brought suspi-cions that the changes had been designed to disadvantage the PCRM. These included lowering the electoral threshold from six to four per cent and a change in the way the votes were distributed for parties and alliances which were below this threshold. Previously these votes had been distributed on a proportional basis, which favoured the stronger parties. At the July elections, they were distributed for the first time equally between all parties which had won seats in Parliament. The formation of electoral alliances was once again permitted and candidates with multiple nationalities were once again allowed to stand for election.

20 parties and 20 independent candidates took part in the elections. On election night, a clear win was at first predicted for the Alliance for European Integration. Two polling institutes had predicted them to be clear victors with either 65 or 64 seats. One of these institutes (IRES) even gave the Liberal Democratic Party of Prime Minister Filat a lead of nearly nine per cent over the Communists. In the end these projections deviated from the following day’s official results announced by the electoral authority by as much as 16 per cent.

Once the official results were in, the Communist Party (PCRM) was once again the strongest party with 39.3 per cent of the vote and 42 seats in Parliament. The Liberal Democrats improved markedly on their previous result, gaining 29.4 per cent of the vote and 32 seats, making them the second most powerful party. The Democratic Party (Social Democrats) won 12.7 per cent and 15 seats and the Liberal Party gained 10 per cent and 12 seats. The Alliance Our Moldova which had previously been members of the Alliance for European Integration failed to win a single seat with only 2 per cent of the vote. The Christian Democratic People’s Party (PPCD) hit a new low with the voters, winning only 9,054 votes and 0.5 per cent of the vote.


The AIE, whose survival had been in question, won 59 seats, only just missing out on the 61 seats necessary to elect the President.

Fig. 1Changes in number of seats won

Source: Alegeri parlamentare în Republica Moldovaen, Asociaţia pentru Democraţie Participativă (ADEPT), http://e-democracy.md/elections/parliamentary (accessed January 3, 2011).

A comparison with the results of the two elections held in 2009 shows the steady decline of the Communist Party (PCRM) from 60 seats in April 2009 to 42 in the current vote. Of note is also the steady increase in seats won by the Liberal Democrats (PLDM) – in the meantime receiving support from the European People’s Party – from 15 seats in April 2009 to the present 32.

DIffICuLTIES IN buILDINg A COALITION AND OThER uNCERTAIN PROSPECTS fOR ThE gOvERNmENT

After the elections the possible constellation of the coalition remained open. One possibility was a continuation of the AIE, with the PLDM, PDM and PL forming a government. But it was questionable whether such a coalition was based on a sufficient level of trust, particularly between PLDM leader Filat and PDM leader Lupu.

11/2010 4/20097/2009PCRM

PLDM PL

PDM

AMN

PCRM

PLDM PL

PDM

AMN

PCRM

PLDM PL

PDM

AMN

42 32 12 15 0 48 18 15 13 7 60 15 15 0 1160

50

40

30

20

10

0


The visit of germany’s minister of State at the foreign Office during coalition talks was seen as an expression of the country’s interest in the formation of a pro-European coalition.

A coalition of the Democratic Party and the Communist Party was also a possibility and would have provided the majority required to form a government. The fact that Lupu had been a member of the PCRM until 2009 was a factor in favour of such a coalition, as he clearly had no fear of dealing with the Communists. Besides, in the course of talks the PCRM had offered Lupu the position of President and his party the chance to appoint the Prime Minister. A PDM/PCRM coalition would also have been very much in Russia’s interest. This fact was highlighted by a visit made by Sergei Nariskin, Head of the Russian Presidential Admin-istration, who offered incentives for a PDM/PCMR coalition in the form of reduced gas prices, the unobstructed export of Moldovan wine and agricultural products to Russia and even proposed solutions to the Transnistria conflict.14

The European Union also made its presence known during the coalition talks. The President of the EU Parliament, Jerzy Buzek, travelled personally to Chișinău to show the EU’s interest in the formation of the coalition and demonstrate the good relationship between the EU and the Republic of Moldova. The German government had already been active throughout 2010 and sent Werner Hoyer, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, to Chișinău during the coalition talks, which was seen as a clear expression of Germany’s interest in the formation of a pro-European coalition.15

However, neither coalition would have had the number of votes necessary to elect a President in Parliament. This majority could only have been achieved by a coalition of the Communists with the Liberal Democrats, which was however highly unlikely and quickly ruled out by Prime Minister Filat. An all-party coalition would have been possible in theory but would have been dubious from a

14 | Cf. “Republica Moldova: Moscova promite ieftinirea gazelor, daca PD face alianta cu PCRM,” HotNews.ro, December 11, 2010, in: http://hotnews.ro/stiri-international-8119587- republica-moldova-moscova-promite-ieftinirea-gazelor-daca- face-alianta-pcrm (accessed December 23, 2010).15 | See inter alia “Germania manifestă un interes real pentru Republica Moldova,” December 22, 2010, Mediafax, in: http://arena.md/?go=news&n=2294 (accessed December 23, 2010).


marian Lupu took over as Interim Presi- dent in December 2010. he became the third transitional President within three days.

democratic point of view, as the government would then have had no opposition.

After a month of arduous coalition negotiations, the PLDM, PDM and PL finally agreed to a continuation of the Alliance for European Integration. The Democratic Party had also

held talks with the Communists up until the coalition agreement was reached, exploiting their strong negotiating position when it came to forming a majority.

On December 30, 2010 Marian Lupu was elected Speaker of the Parliament by the Alliance and took over as Interim President. After Interim President Ghimpu (until December 28, 2010) and Interim President Vlat Filat, who took over as Head of State from being Prime Minister when Ghimpu’s term expired on December 28, Lupu became the third transitional President within three days. In this role he gave Vlad Filat the task of building a cabinet and drawing up a government programme which was approved by Parliament on January 14, 2011.

The composition of the cabinet shows the dominating position of the Liberal Democratic Party, which allocates the Prime Minister and seven other ministers, including the Minister of Internal Affairs, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Education. Five ministerial posts (including Deputy Prime Minister) go to each coalition partner. According to the agreements among the coalition partners, the chairman of the Democratic Party Marian Lupu shall be elected as president. Afterwards, Mihai Ghimpu, chairman of the Liberal Party, will substitute him chairman of the parliament.

Whether this coalition is really weatherproof and can offer a possible end to the country’s political crisis remains to be seen. The new AIE configuration will only achieve success if – unlike in the past – all the coalition partners make it a priority to work towards this success using all their political will and skills. The country’s geopolitical, political and economic situation means there will be no lack of challenges which could rapidly bring the coalition to an end. In concluding, three of these dangers are mentioned below.


Firstly, the coalition does not have the majority required to elect a President in Parliament. Failure to do this will once again result in new parliamentary elections. There are three possible scenarios for the successful election of the President:

1. The AIE manages to persuade two Communist Party MPs to vote for the AIE candidate, Marian Lupu.

2. The AIE unites with the PCRM to elect Lupu as President, by giving the Communists concessions or by playing on the PCRM’s well-founded fear that it could lose yet more seats in early elections.

3. The coalition gets around the election of a President in Parliament by making renewed efforts to change the system of voting.

After the history of failed election attempts in recent years, it is advisable to avoid trying to predict how future Presidential elections will play out.

A second risk factor is the local elections due in summer, which will doubtless place additional strain on the coalition. The deterioration in the coalition’s working relationships, something which was obvious before the parliamentary elections of November 2010 and the concurrent positioning for possible direct presidential elections after the refer-endum, does not augur well for the local elections and particularly for the election to the important position of Mayor of Chișinău. All three coalition partners have already declared that they want their own candidate to stand for office.

Finally, the financial interests of political protagonists could also be a stress factor for the coalition. The new Parliament includes a large number of businesspeople who, it is hoped, will use their professional experience to improve conditions for business. But it is also feared that some of these businesspeople have gone into politics in order to further their own financial interests, which could lead to non-political conflicts of interest between coalition partners.

The deterioration in the coalition’s working relationships does not augur well for the local elections and particu-larly for the election to the important position of mayor of Chișinău.


All these risk factors lead us to fear that the country’s political crisis is not yet over. Moldova’s Western partners would be well advised to continue keeping a close eye on the country’s political evolution and to do what they can to help promote democracy and good governance, so the current government will be in office for a full mandate of four years.

Documents

KAS International Reports 02/2011