KAS International Reports 03/2011

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INTERNATIONAL REPORTS

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Upheaval in the Middle East – What Comes Next After the Events in Tunisia and Egypt?Michael A. Lange

Southern Sudan BeforeIndependence – Local Cele- brations, Disappointment in Northern Sudan and International ConcernMartin Pabst

Kenya’s New Constitution:Triumph in Hand, Testing Times Ahead?Tom Wolf

Economic Policy in SouthAfrica – Growth Plans and Growth ObstaclesWerner Böhler

Pakistan After the FloodKarl Fischer

The Long Shadow of the Belarus PresidentialElectionsStephan Malerius

The German Minorityin PolandStephan Georg Raabe

KASINTERNATIONAL REPORTS3|11

ISSN 0177-7521Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V.Volume 27

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Editor:Dr. Gerhard Wahlers

Editorial Team:Frank SpenglerHans-Hartwig BlomeierDr. Stefan FriedrichDr. Hardy OstryJens PaulusDr. Helmut Reifeld

Editor-in-chief:Stefan Burgdörfer

The designated contributions do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the editorial team.

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EDITORIAL

UPHEAVAL IN THE MIDDLE EAST – WHAT COMES NEXT AFTER THE EVENTS IN TUNISIA AND EGYPT?Michael A. Lange

SOUTHERN SUDAN BEFORE INDEPENDENCE –LOCAL CELEBRATIONS, DISAPPOINTMENT IN NORTHERN SUDAN AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERNMartin Pabst

KENYA’S NEW CONSTITUTION: TRIUMPH IN HAND, TESTING TIMES AHEAD?Tom Wolf

ECONOMIC POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA – GROWTH PLANS AND GROWTH OBSTACLESWerner Böhler

PAKISTAN AFTER THE FLOODKarl Fischer

THE LONG SHADOW OF THE BELARUS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS – PROCEDURES, RESULTS AND POLITICAL FALL-OUTStephan Malerius

THE GERMAN MINORITY IN POLANDStephan Georg Raabe

5KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS3|2011

EDITORIAL

Dear Readers,

If you stand in Tahrir Square, there is no escaping the waves of joy and optimism radiating from the young men and women around you. They are proud of what they have achieved and determined to drive forward the changes they have started. These young people and all those who risked their lives to drive out the old rulers should indeed be proud of what they have done. A police state which had brutally oppressed thousands of people was finally forced to give way. The police no longer dare to show their faces on the streets, for people have not forgotten the cries of torture victims ringing out from the open windows of police stations. Many places of torture and arbitrary violence have gone up in flames, the prisons of the secret police have been stormed. Thousands of piecemeal acts are a strong reminder of the events of 1989. It is sad to hear despondency being voiced in certain parts of the west in the face of these changes. Of course we are left with a feeling of great uncertainty as to what the future will bring. And we have learned the lesson that those who start a revolution do not necessarily emerge as the victors. But this should not stop us welcoming the changes whole-heartedly and offering energetic support to those who are striving to build a constitutional, democratic and socially just nation.

6 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

The challenges are overwhelming. They include outmoded economic structures, high unemployment, low levels of education, an absence of the rule of law, a barely developed civil society and an organised Islamist movement. Of course there is no room for naivety, but we should not miss the chance to celebrate the fact that an Arab people have succeeded in standing up to despotism and to rulers who have for years disregarded basic human rights.

Dr. Gerhard WahlersDeputy Secretary-General

[email protected]


Michael A. Lange

Over the last few weeks the world has been watching the Arab nations with great interest and a certain degree of admiration, closely following media coverage as the sensa-tional events have unfolded. For political observers who thought they knew these countries from past experience, these events have been both surprising and worrying.

The people of these Arab states who have been oppressed and bullied for so long are rising up against the arbitrary despotism of their rulers, rebelling against their pater-nalism and wilful disregard for the views of their citizens. They are demanding to be heard and to be shown respect. They want to be involved in decisions about their future and will no longer allow themselves to be fobbed off with empty promises: “We want democracy – now!”

UPHEAVAL IN TUNISIA

Mohamed Bouazizi, a young IT graduate from the small town of Sidi Bouzid in southern Tunisia discovered it was impossible to find a suitable job, despite his qualifications and travelling to the country’s capital to seek work. He swallowed his pride and returned to his home town, where he tried to earn a crust in an honest, but less academic, fashion.

He tried to make a living selling vegetables on the street. The town’s authorities treated this “rogue” academic with suspicion and refused to issue him with a street vendor’s licence, partly because he could not or would not pay the necessary bribes. When he continued trading regardless, the police locked him up, confiscated his donkey cart and

UPHEAVAL IN THE MIDDLE EASTWHAT COMES NEXT AFTER THE EVENTS IN TUNISIA AND EGYPT?

Dr. Michael A. Lange is head of the team Political Dialogue and Analysis in the Department for European and Inter-national Cooperation at the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Berlin. For almost 20 years he worked as a KAS Resident Repre-sentative in the Middle East, including Tunis (1985-88) and Cairo (2001-07).


vegetables, beat him for not having the cash to pay them off and then let him go again.

The young graduate felt deeply humiliated. After this procedure had been repeated several times, in his despair and shame he saw suicide as his only way out. He doused himself in petrol and tried to kill himself, but he initially survived the attempt. The country’s President, Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali, was so shocked by this terrible act that he hastened to the desperate victim’s hospital bed to express his sympathy as telegenically as possible. But it was too late; the symbolic handshake was not enough to save either the desperate “victim” or the worried “perpetrator”. On January 4 Mohammed Bouaziz died of his injuries.

Almost 25 years earlier, on a peaceful November morning in 1987, Prime Minister Ben Ali had seized power in Tunisia. With the support of the army and police, and without

bloodshed, his “medical coup” forced his long-time patron and founder of the Republic, Habib Boughiba, to take retirement “on medical grounds” due to his encroaching senility. The Tunisian people welcomed the end of a long period of economic stagnation and political procrastination. The new president immediately created a new political alliance, the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (RCD), which tried to break new ground and attracted many committed young people. The aging governmental elite of the Bourghiba era was removed. A new official party committed to the new president gave him the party political support he needed.

The events in neighbouring Algeria after electoral victory by the Islamists and the resulting civil war helped the new president to win the support of the majority of his people for the subsequent massive persecution of Islamists in Tunisia. Islamist leader Rachid Ghannouchi ended up being isolated and forced to flee into exile in London.

The president also dissolved the association between Tunisia and the PLO and distanced himself from the pan-Arab dream and the Palestinian conflict. This meant he could now count on increased western cooperation in

In 1987, Prime Minister Ben Ali had seized power in Tunisia. With the sup-port of the army and police, he forced Habib Boughiba, to take retirement.


Even Tunisian entrepreneurs who had previously been close to the president now found themselves suffering under rather than profiting from his presi-dency.

the political and economic sphere. With its new internal stability and foreign policy positioning, Tunisia could now concentrate on opening up the economy, encouraging small and medium-sized businesses and tourism. The economy grew in the shadow of a police-controlled state.

The president then married a daughter of the well-known Trabelsi clan, one of the biggest and most economi-cally powerful families in Tunisia, though their operating methods were highly controversial. Under the president’s protection the family became even more brazen, bending the law to suit themselves. The Trabelsi clan or the president’s family had their fingers in every large company or profitable concession. Even Tunisian entrepreneurs who had previously been close to the president now found themselves suffering under rather than profiting from his presidency. They saw their profits disappearing due to the forced shareholdings of the Trabelsi clan, and they increasingly began to refuse to pay the regime’s “protection money”. They stopped investing in their own country, turned their faces towards Europe and gradually drained the country of urgently-needed investment capital. Once Tunisia’s economy was hit by the economic and financial crisis, and there were fewer and fewer jobs available for the growing number of highly-qualified college graduates, the resurgence in confidence among the Tunisian population was replaced by mounting frustration.

Finally the young student’s suicide rocked the country and this latent discontent manifested itself in attacks on police stations, first in rural areas and then in the capital. People’s displeasure with the dehumanizing actions of the (police) authorities could no longer be controlled and it spilled over into protests. These were even joined by the urban middle classes, who nurtured the simmering unrest in the capital with the support of large numbers of their discontented compatriots who flooded into Tunis from the country’s rural areas. The presidential clan panicked and tried to mobilise the loyal state police and security services to get a grip on the situation. But when this proved unsuccessful and the army refused to fire on the people, the game was up.


The internet controls were originally aimed at watching over the Islamists and their protagonists, who were sur-prisingly proficient in the area of tech-nology.

The president fought back only briefly, then fled the country like a common thief. However, he still managed to appropriate the central bank’s gold reserves with the help of his wife. He headed for France first of all, thinking this was a friendly country, but soon had to learn the hard lesson that a fleeing head of state soon becomes an ostra-cized head of state, even in a country which had such close historical ties.

UPHEAVAL IN EGYPT

Khalid Said, a young Egyptian student, loved the new world of the internet, social networking and all the new ways he could get in contact with like-minded people to debate the latest issues, including politics. But his network did not only consist of like-minded people. It included the well-equipped and highly-educated Egyptian secret

service, who felt they had to keep an eye on this much-trumpeted internet freedom and who were prepared to intervene when it came to politics. The controls were originally aimed at watching over the Islamists and

their protagonists, who were surprisingly proficient in the area of technology. But the secret service ended up having total control over the internet, using it for such things as ferreting out gays and student activists.

This young student also became an activist. He became a blogger, soon attracting attention in the Egyptian blogger community, and – unfortunately – further afield. The security services gave him the usual warning to keep his activities within the limits tolerated by the state. When he defied this warning the police repeatedly arrested him, and finally beat him so badly that he died of his injuries. When the blogger community and then students in general heard this news, their resentment grew, as did their desire to protest. Then they heard the news from Tunis.

Almost thirty years earlier, after the assassination of President Anwar As Sadat in October 1981, Hosni Mubarak took over power in Egypt, a constitutional act as he was Vice-President at the time. In light of rumours that Sadat had chosen his former air force chief to hold this important office because he thought he did not have the charisma


With the support of the military, Mu-barak weeded out the Islamists who had obviously infiltrated the lower commissioned and non-commissioned ranks of the army.

to be a serious rival, many people thought he was just an interim president.

On the heels of this assassination by radical Islamists, Mubarak concentrated first of all on consolidating the domestic political situation. With the support of the military, he weeded out the Islamists who had obviously infiltrated the lower commissioned and non-commissioned ranks of the army. Since then the armed forces have been made up of professional soldiers who are loyal to the regime. He also created a political powerbase in the form of a new political alliance, the National Democratic Party (NDP). He made it the official party of government, thus calling a halt to the tactical party political games played by his predecessor.

After successfully achieving domestic stability, Mubarak then turned his attention to the rehabilitation of Egypt in the eyes of the world. The country had lost its seat in the Arab League and the support of the majority of Arab states after the Camp David Peace Accords. Mubarak managed to uphold the essence of the Accords and even made them “acceptable” to the Arab League upon Egypt’s return to the fold.

This proof of his steadfastness and reliability makes him the West’s most trusted ally in the Middle East in terms of foreign and security policy. As a tireless, though of late not particularly successful, mediator in the Middle East conflict, if nothing else he benefited from the financial support of his western allies and the willingness of foreign investors to put money into his country. He succeeded in opening up Egypt’s economy by making it possible for local entrepreneurs to become involved in his party, even allowing them to join high-level committees, which up to then had been dominated by the old guard from the army and civil service.

However, in recent years this balance of power has been increasingly overshadowed by the unresolved question of who would be his successor. The Egyptian president still seemed to have good reasons to continue to shoulder the burden of office, despite ever-growing discontent and


The events in Tunis provided the youth of Cairo with the hope that change was possible. People were carried away by the power of the moment.

increasing repressiveness on the part of the security forces. Over the last few months there has been much debate about whether Mubarak should stand again, but his critics seem to have no clear or uniform idea of who could stand in his place. Any potential candidates have spent too many years standing in the president’s shadow, and have not managed to carve out their own individual identity. A dynastic successor in the form of a transfer of political power to Mubarak’s son Gamal was vehemently rejected by the largely republican-leaning military.

So once again it was a case of “wait and see”. The ability of the regime to map out policies which looked to the future and set in motion clear reforms was fading with every month that the ailing president remained in power. And the governing party failed to send out the right signals at the right time by gathering a group of younger politicians around Gamal Mubarak who would have actually been able to take over many executive functions.

So in the end the outcome seemed inevi-table. The events in Tunis provided the youth of Cairo with the hope that change was possible, and the case of Bouazizi brought

back memories of the Egyptian blogger who had been killed in police custody. Revolution was in the air and people were carried away by the power of the moment, overcoming their fear, defying the curfew and demanding change.

THE NORTH AFRICAN BREAK-UP

Egypt and Tunisia have been the most stable countries in North Africa, with both having only a small number of presi-dents over the last 50 years: two in Tunisia (Bourghiba, Ben Ali) and three in Egypt (Nasser, Sadat, Mubarak). If we take a look at the latest events and developments in these two countries we can see many similarities, but also clear differences, in the underlying causes of these recent events.

In both countries, the new presidents had to take immediate steps to stabilise a domestic situation which was in crisis. In Tunisia the government was in danger of becoming


In Tunisia a growing middle class took root, while in Egypt too few peo-ple shared in the prosperity to have a long-term stabilising effect on the country’s political situation.

unduly involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because of personal sympathies on the part of members of the president’s family. This led to radical Islamists threatening to destabilise Tunisia, spurred on and supported by the events in Algeria. In Egypt, after the Islamist motivated assassination, the secular state had to defend its core and the country had to find its way back to the family of Arab nations. It was a real achievement to manage this without turning away from the West or going back on economic and political “openings” such as Infitah or the peace process. These countries continued their programme of economic liberalisation which brought a degree of prosperity, though not for everyone. In Tunisia a growing middle class took root, while in Egypt too few people shared in the prosperity to have a long-term stabilising effect on the country’s political situation.

The presidents’ two monolithic alliances, the RCD and NDP, also contributed to the fact that there was no real room for competing parties, because of their exclusivity and close ties to the president. Indeed, there were times when the illusion of party politics had to be created. Even vague hopes of achieving political change through democratically-run parties were destined to be disappointed.

The two countries followed a similar course in the way the people were increasingly subjected to repressive measures. They both declared a state of emergency at the time of the transfer of power, which they subsequently never lifted. Repression not only increased, but control of their citizens infiltrated almost every area of everyday life thanks to new tools such as the internet and mobile phones. Nothing remained hidden from the security services: the “transparent citizen” inescapably became the target of intimidation and reprisals as soon as he did anything which caused ripples in ruling circles.

Young people in Arab states were starting to come of age, largely thanks to the globalisation of the media. Their sense of frustration mounted, along with their protests that they were being robbed of their basic human rights and freedoms. Their barely-controlled anger was soon to spill over. To make a cycling analogy, it is a sign of the


Both presidents and even their secu-rity forces were taken by surprise by the outcry. But none of the opposition parties were prepared for it either.

excess pressure which has been building up amongst the youth of the two societies that it only took a tiny hole in the inner tyre for the whole tyre to go flat. There is no chance of riding the bike home on a soft tyre – the tyre is flat and urgently needs to be repaired. A patch is no good; it needs a whole new inner.

The different political constellations in the two countries now have to deal with current events. Both presidents and even their security forces were taken by surprise by the

outcry, but they were not the only ones. None of the opposition parties were prepared for it, and even the generally well-organized and well-informed Muslim Brotherhood were late to jump on the demonstrators’ bandwagon.

So former fighter pilot Hosni Mubarak will not be sneaking off like his Tunisian counterpart Ben Ali. He still is much more widely accepted by the majority of the Egyptian population (though not by the demonstrators in Tahrir Square) than the flown Tunisian president. But both of them have already missed their chance to hand over power with dignity, something which Mubarak certainly deserves more than Ben Ali. The Egyptian president relies mainly on his armed forces, while Ben Ali draws on the support of the (secret) police. In both countries, the army is generally well-thought-of, while the police have a dreadful reputation.

In Tunisia it was not just the young unemployed who wanted to get rid of the president. They were joined in large numbers by the middle classes who had been battered by the corruption of the presidential family and the economic and financial crisis. In Egypt the protest is mainly being led by angry young people, with the army and huge state bureaucracy (for the time being) standing on the sidelines. They have too much to lose if not only the president but also the whole regime is forced to stand down. So let us now take a look at some possible scenarios for future political developments in these two countries.


New political beliefs need time and space to reformulate themselves. Time is also needed to create the constitu-tional basis for different selection and election procedures.

TUNISIA’S FUTURE SCENARIO

Politics

The understandable attempt by the remaining government members to hang on to power as the “interim government” was destined for failure. The fact that the president had directly and largely voluntarily escaped being sentenced by the people meant that the Tunisian demonstrators were looking for other victims of the revolts. It is true that the RCD party headquarters in Tunis was not damaged as badly as the NDP’s building in Cairo, but the protesters called for ministers in league with the RCD and other political officials to also be “punished”. Leaving the party was no solution, as politicians remained “contaminated” by their closeness to the regime. In the end the prime minister was allowed to lead the government on an interim basis, only because he agreed that his role and function were temporary and that he would not stand for public office.

At the moment constitutional requirements are largely being followed in Tunisia, even though most of them origi-nated under Ben Ali. So far there are not enough political parties with close ties to the people to build a true parlia-mentary democracy. An urgent reorganisation of the (pre-) political arena is needed before new parliamentary and presidential elections are held. Unions and professional associations also need to reinvent themselves, as they are necessary for the state but have in the past been too close to the government. In any case, new political beliefs need time and space to reformulate themselves.

Time is also needed to create the constitutional basis for different selection and election procedures and to agree on how to make them the basis of a new political direction. It now has to be decided how to do this, whether by the elected parliament, which is now discredited, by a consti-tutional convention of “elders” or by a round table of all the political parties. In many, though not all, respects, the situation in Tunisia can be compared to the break-up of the GDR.


The removal of presidential corruption will certainly be an important factor in motivating Tunisian businesspeople to start investing in Tunisia again rather than predominantly abroad.

Economy

Along with the restructuring of political players and entities it is also necessary to make use of the country’s quickly-restored stability to get the economy back on track. Fortunately the tourist resorts have not suffered too much damage at the hands of the demonstrators. And the medium-sized contract manufacturers also seem to have largely survived the protests without too much harm.

So the signs are good that the country will soon regain its former economic strength, though it will not necessarily be in a position to immediately remedy all its socio-economic deficits. The removal of presidential corruption

will certainly be an important factor in motivating Tunisian businesspeople to start investing in Tunisia again rather than predominantly abroad. This kind of “patriotic” attitude will help to speed up the process of economic recovery and make the change process more focused and rigorous.

Society

The fact that the revolts in Tunisia were caused by the despairing act of a frustrated IT graduate is symptomatic of the economic and particularly the demographic challenges which are currently facing the Arab world. When 50 per cent of the population of the Arab nations is under 30 and the Facebook generation of 20-30 year-olds alone makes up 20 per cent of the population, there is serious potential for protest. Their different way of communicating means that most demonstrators are not going to just give in, like the Tunisian Mohamed Bouazizi, but are more likely to boldly demand their right to a share in economic prosperity and political decision-making.

The scale of the potential for conflict is even more obvious if we consider how in Tunisia the ratio of sixty-year-olds (the power elite) to twenty-year-olds (the youth) is at 2:3, and in countries like Egypt it is even more pronounced at 1:4. This provides the potential for long-term protest or even violence, something which is currently clearly targeted at the old power elites. Even if the present elite were to be completely removed from power, there would


Almost every public position was filled by party members. It was impossible to find a decent job without proof of your loyalty to the regime.

be at least three applicants for every position becoming vacant in business and society. This means that Tunisian society cannot feel quite comfortable when facing a future with an average age of “only” 30. But Tunisia has fewer potentially frustrated or violent young people than its neighbours. Countries such as Egypt with an average age of 24 or Yemen and the Gaza strip with an average age of 17 have even greater concerns.

EGYPT’S FUTURE SCENARIO

Egypt will not find it so easy to get back to normal. There are various factors which will make the healing process much more difficult. What happens in Egypt has an enormous impact on developments in other Arab countries. Of course not every change in the Arab world originates in Egypt, but anything new generally only becomes significant for the whole region once Egypt has adopted it. A democratic awakening in Sunni countries will doubtless have ramifica-tions for other Islamic nations.

The political system in Egypt has always been highly-centralised and bureaucratic, with the civil service, military, various security forces and previously even more numerous state-controlled companies being closely tied in with the ruling party. Almost every public position was filled by party members; indeed it was impossible to find a decent job without proof of your loyalty to the regime.

There could well be a lot of people who have something to lose – too many perhaps, if their loyalty to the “old” regime becomes a selection criteria for future political functions and professional assignments, as the present development in Tunisia has shown. At the same time in view of the continuing mass protests, the military as well as the security forces will play an important, if not a decisive role, during the political restructuring process.

Ever since the beginning of the republic, every Egyptian president, who has always had a military background, embodied the honour and dignity of the military forces. It is for this reason that the military was not interested in seeing their “highest” representative, even if he was now


Only free elections can accurately re-flect the preferences of the Egyptian people in terms of both policies and personalities.

“civilianised”, chased from his position by some demon-strators in a most undignified manner. Therefore the newly installed “Highest Military Council” who implemented the president’s deprivation of power, announced that the president had “resigned”, although Mubarak had not initiated this at all.

When we are talking about “some demonstrators” then the reason for this is that even 50,000 or 100,000 coura-geous opponents do not represent the wishes and hopes of a majority of 80 million Egyptians by a long way. Even

if the protesters’ opinions are getting an impressive amount of coverage in the inter-national media, it is only free elections which can accurately reflect the preferences of the Egyptian people in terms of both policies

and personalities. Care must be taken not to assume that the opinions of anti-regime demonstrators will necessarily be mirrored in upcoming elections. These interviews just present a snapshot and may even be helping to distort the picture of the real mood prevailing in the country.

This particularly applies to the hopes of new leadership which are held by the majority of Egyptians, not just the demonstrators in Tahrir Square. At the moment it is difficult to really make these out due to the frightening lack of substance in the opposition’s demands, both in terms of policy and personnel. The country’s observers have known for a long time how the country’s (party) political opposition is totally fragmented, as is still shown both between and within the opposition parties. The groupings are always capable of being against something but very rarely for something.

So the opposition’s view that Mubarak cannot remain in power cannot hide the fact that there is very little that unites the protesters in Tahrir Square. And this does not take into account all those Egyptians who on a daily basis face quite different problems to those of the predominantly middle-class students thronging Tahrir Square.

If the aim of the protests is somewhat vague and undefi-ned, the opposition also lacks a leader who can unite all the parties – the same is true in Tunisia. The Egyptian


It would be reckless to leave the future of the insurrection and hence the fu-ture of the country solely in the hands of the army.

Foreign Minister of many years’ standing, Amr Moussa, is the only one who can claim to be something of a “dissident” because he resigned his post after differences of opinion with the president and became Secretary-General of the Arab League. In this way he distanced himself to some extent from the Mubarak regime, something which could stand him in good stead in light of current developments. Mohamed El Baradei, whose name is constantly mentioned by the Western media, has won a degree of recognition for his work and awards, and perhaps holds a certain appeal for the international public, but he remains largely unknown to the majority of Egyptians because of his many years spent abroad. Egyptians who turn their backs on their country for long periods are still to some extent viewed as “traitors”, particularly by the many rural Egyptians who feel close ties to their homeland. He can use the excuse that he was carrying out international missions, but, unlike the demon-strators, he cannot claim to have suffered for years at the hands of the regime. This is why he will not be the one to lead the liberation movement, despite the hopes of certain western governments.

This leaves the army and security forces as the main protagonists who will not allow themselves to be pushed about by civil society. But when one sees the hatred aroused by Interior Minister Adli and knows that he and the other representatives of the security forces are in agreement over the necessary political steps, it seems doubtful that these forces can really meet all the protesters’ demands. It would be equally reckless to leave the future of the insurrection and hence the future of the country solely in the hands of the army, particularly as a return to autocratic structures and processes could then not be ruled out. So there will be no successful outcome without a process of “reconciliation” between civil and military ways of acting and thinking. Politicians and military must come together to lead this country from its current impasse towards a brighter future.

Many political observers, who assumed that Egypt might choose to use a “revolutionary council” with executive powers, as has been practised before, were proven right. The “round tables” with representatives of the Egyptian


Very few Egyptians who have contact with western representatives admit to being members of the Muslim Brot-herhood.

civilian society, could not develop a permanent strategy, mainly due to obvious disputes between the various groups. Instead the “Highest Military Council” suspended the Egyptian constitution and installed a committee con- sisting of trusted experts to present a new draft consti-tution within two weeks, which will be used as a sort of “transitional constitution” to be brought into force by a referendum. This will then serve as a basis for new elections in six months’ time.

The “Highest Military Council” made a resolute decision by dissolving the present Egyptian government, which was elected under questionable circumstances and nobody expected this government to play a constructive role in the restructuring process of the Egyptian governmental system.

EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD – CAN THEY TAKE OVER POWER?

One of the great imponderables of this whole restructuring process in Egypt is of course the possible future role of the Muslim Brotherhood. The alleged or actual threat to the Egyptian regime posed by this organisation has for many years been the main reason why Western governments have accepted the Egyptian leadership’s “robust” style of government.

There are wide-ranging views on how ready or able this group may be to fill the political vacuum which is opening

up and to influence or even determine the process of political transformation taking place in Egypt. For many people, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is still a black box. Very few Egyptians who have political contact with

western representatives in Cairo admit to being members of this organisation which is officially banned but which has at times often been tolerated by the regime. This is why the size of its membership remains unclear and it is hard to assess their potential appeal to voters in a free and secret ballot.


Political position papers have been presented, which can be traced back to the Muslim Brotherhood. But clarity will only be achieved by the political dialogue which is to come.

Many experts believe their election chances are actually less now than they were a few months ago. This may be due to the new alternatives which have presented themselves, but could also be a misapprehension as a result of clever political manoeuvring on the part of the Brotherhood. Their behaviour during the current Tahrir Square protests – where, amazingly, hardly a single Islamic slogan has been in evidence – should not hide the fact that Egypt’s long-term political future will not be decided in the centre of Cairo but rather in a new, freely-elected Egyptian parliament. Then the young students who are today so readily providing foreign TV stations with interviews will certainly find themselves in a minority.

What is more, the Brotherhood has for some time had a declared strategy which is not geared towards the short term (legislative terms) but is aimed at the Islamic “infil-tration” of all political institutions. If we take at face value their previous successes in various Egyptian professional association elections, it would seem their strategy has borne fruit.

It is not absurd to assume that the Brotherhood’s present impressive restraint is actually a calculated manoeuvre to allow the Cairo students who are so popular with the Western media to push through democratic change, which the Brotherhood can then utilise in order to take over power in a democratic and hence legitimate way.

At the moment it is equally unknown to what extent the Brotherhood will cling to their rigid ideology once they become a political party, or whether a part of the organisation would be prepared to tread a parliamentary path similar to that of the ruling AKP in Turkey. One thing is certain: the leaders of this mysterious organisation have always been very reticent about their political position whenever they have made public appearances. Political position papers have of course been presented by certain representatives in parliament, which can be traced back to the Muslim Brotherhood. But clarity will only be achieved by the political dialogue which is to come.


The country’s position as the third lar-gest Arab economy is in acute danger. Economic growth rates of up to seven per cent will be hard to emulate.

However it does not hurt to study these papers if we want to evaluate the wide spectrum of political opinion which will soon be asking for the support of the Egyptian electorate. It is hard to conceive that the aging leaders of the existing opposition parties could actually be effective in countering this well-organised and ideologically hardened movement in a way that is ideologically consistent and which promises results.

It seems more realistic that the new Egyptian government will include representatives of the army and security services and that as a result some of this body’s many privileges will be retained, at least for the time being. It is equally questionable whether it the old generals will still have an influence in this direct transition phase. Younger army officers would be better placed to record the new constructive distance to the political process than those old generals who just a few days ago had to appear on state television alongside the embattled president.

NDP representatives will find it difficult to exert any political influence in future. There seems little chance that the old regime’s great white hope, the president’s son and head of the NDP political committee, Gamal Mubarak, will have a future role to play.

THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMY

The future of the Egyptian economy has, at least for the time being, been overshadowed by the latest protests. The recent chaos has led to property and assets being destroyed, not only in Cairo, and many small and medium-sized businesses have fallen prey to vandalism and looting.

These businesses have formed the backbone of Egypt’s astonishingly robust economic growth over the last few years. The country’s position as the third largest Arab economy, built up as a result of the former Nacif-led

government’s economically liberal policies, is now in acute danger. Economic growth rates of up to seven per cent (more recently five per cent) will be hard to emulate, and then only with foreign assistance. The depressing experiences of young Egyptian businessmen during the protests need to be converted into new hope and a new


Egypt will only be able to create a new political order without running into conflict if it can guarantee the survival of its industry and tourism.

readiness to engage and invest. The support of domestic and international banks and new lending will be required to save these businesses and encourage new start-ups. A lot will depend on how the international financial institutions assess the crisis and what happens next. It will be impos-sible to avoid the country’s credit rating being downgraded in the medium term, along with a slide in the Egyptian stock exchange and significant weakening of the Egyptian currency.

All this can and will make it much more difficult, if not impossible, to start on the country’s urgently-needed economic revival, unless the international community decides now to support Egypt with all the economic means at its disposal. Without some kind of “Marshall Plan” the Egyptian banking sector will be totally overextended in trying to finance the reconstruction.

A future role will also be sought for representatives of the Egyptian (private) economy who are not tainted by corruption. Along with their political comrades-in-arms, they will have to shoulder equal respon-sibility for keeping the ship of state afloat. Egypt will only be able to create a new political order without running into conflict if it can guarantee the survival of its industry and tourism. Without this, there is the danger that radical autocrats of every hue could once again take control as a result of a widespread economic crisis in the country. But it is also clear that economic growth and the resulting prosperity cannot be limited to the few as has happened in the past. It is true that the government, and particularly the president, fought for years against the IMF’s demands to cut subsidies on basic foodstuffs and energy, thus saving the majority of the population from suffering a drop in their standard of living, but state-controlled wages could rarely keep up with inflation. This prepared the ground for the present insurrections.

Any new Egyptian government will have to find flexible ways to confront corruption and the continuing close ties between the political and economic oligarchies. Egypt can only look forward to a bright future if there is a fairer distribution of income and assets which allows the “simple


It is not clear to what extent a politically-strengthened Muslim Brotherhood would be prepared to guarantee the Coptic minority the same rights granted to them by the previous administration.

Egyptian” to also benefit in a material way from all the upheavals which are taking place.

THE POSITION OF THE COPTIC CHRISTIANS

Any future democratic government in Egypt will face a particular challenge in dealing with the question of relations between the Muslim majority and the Coptic Christian minority. In light of recent attacks on Coptic Christians it will be necessary to calm the situation and at least return to a peaceful co-existence, even if an equal cooperation is not on the cards.

The previous administration under President Mubarak stood up for the Copts’ right to religious freedom and managed to give them protection, even if it was unable to prevent every attack. It is debatable whether this minority would get better treatment under a democratic system. It mainly depends on the denominational make-up and direction of

the new democratic political institutions and government bodies. A request for dialogue with the Muslim Brotherhood without offering the Coptic minority the same opportunity or at least consciously involving them would prove that the religious minority’s represent-

atives were laying claim to special rights. At the moment it is not clear to what extent a politically-strengthened Muslim Brotherhood would be prepared to guarantee the Coptic minority the same rights and protections granted to them by the previous administration.

REPERCUSSIONS FOR THE ARAB WORLD

It was to be expected that the events in Tunisia and now also in Egypt would lead to demonstrations in other Arab countries. After all, the political and socio-economic frame-works in these countries are not much different to those of Tunisia and Egypt. At the same time many independent observers were predicting that events would unfold in a similar way to the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in Europe. And while that possibility cannot be excluded, there is also good reason to suppose that there will not actually be such a direct domino effect. It is more likely that we will see a


Commenting on the recent develop-ments in Egypt, Iran’s revolutionary leader Khameini indirectly positioned himself on the side of the demonstrators.

more flexible but nonetheless serious reaction by individual regimes to the latest developments that have taken place.

What is clear is that the former Tunisian president Ben Ali did his colleagues in power no real favours when he fled the county so quickly. What will be interesting to see will be how the Saudi leadership reacts to his apparent request for asylum, bearing in mind that an international warrant has been issued for his arrest.

His current temporary asylum could be a double-edged sword for Saudi Arabia as it cannot fall back on the old argument that they should protect Muslim rulers from “retribution by non-Muslims”, as they did with Idi Amin. However, to protect a Muslim “thief”, who is not particularly well-known for his religious beliefs, from his equally Muslim “victims” and to offer him long-term sanctuary, could prove to be a difficult undertaking, even if the reasons for doing so are clearly apparent. Taking the example of the Egyptian leadership’s behaviour towards the Persian Shah Pahlevi is not really going to help the Saudi leaders.

If they do eventually hand over Ben Ali, it could prove to be a destabilising loss of face for the Saudi leadership. It has to be assumed that Iran, their biggest competitors for hegemony in the region, would be more than happy to exploit this situation if it arose. Commenting on the recent developments in Egypt, Iran’s revolutionary leader Khameini indirectly positioned himself on the side of the demonstrators, even though they have little common ground, by suggesting that there was clearly an Islami-sation of the Egyptian people underway. The Egyptian leadership were furious at this attempt to interfere in the country’s internal affairs.

The present situation of the former Egyptian president is, however, a different matter. It is assumed that he was forced to resign against his expressive wish and was placed under house arrest in his villa in Sharm el-Sheikh by the “Highest Military Council”. It is obvious that the change of power in form of a military coup was not constitutional, however, since the “Highest Military Council“ suspended the


In Jordan and Morocco, there is certainly more serious political frustration hidden behind the social and economic prob-lems, but it collides with the loyalty which is still afforded to the monarchy.

constitution meanwhile, this has become irrelevant. There are rumours about Mubarak, being deeply disappointed by “his” generals, is at present refusing to take his medication following an operation in Germany. According to some Arabic press releases he has secretly been taken to receive medical treatment, possibly in Tabuk, Saudi Arabia.

Amongst Tunisia and Egypt’s neighbouring states, it is Yemen that seems most at risk of losing its last vestiges of internal stability. This may well be the reason for the hasty announcement by Yemen’s president that, in contrast to his earlier declared intentions, he will now no longer stand for another term of office in 2013. In doing so he was basically offering to go along with what is still an uncertain process of change and to give it some kind of organisa-tional framework.

The situation in the former “socialist” inspired republics of Algeria and Syria is somewhat different. Here too there have been demonstrations, but the demonstrators’ griev-ances have been less about the country’s leadership than about socio-economic issues and the need to address them. (So far) there has not been sufficient revolutionary impetus in these countries for these demonstrations to pose a direct threat to the governments themselves. The state security apparatus in both countries would have soon put a stop to that anyway. The demands of the protesters, which were much less potentially explosive than in other Arab countries, and which were possibly even initiated by the governments themselves, or at least controlled by them, were met by the regimes with a sudden lowering of prices and a raising of subsidies that took the wind out of the sails of the protests.

The Arab monarchies, particularly Jordan and Morocco, seem even less threatened by the domino effect. As in the past, the controlled protests were aimed at economic problems and their governments, which have much

less influence on the stability of these countries. As a result the rulers were able to soothe the unrest in the population by making a few cosmetic changes. There is certainly more serious political frustration hidden behind the social and economic problems which were brought to the fore, but


Israel must be aware of the fact that “democratisation” in Egypt will mean that their relationship will become more of an issue in future debates between the various political camps in Egypt.

it collides with the loyalty which is still afforded to the monarchy in these countries. What is more, the security forces in these countries, particularly the army, are solidly behind the monarchy and not on the side of the people, a result of its composition and methods of recruiting high-ranking officers.

The Libyan regime seems also to be provoked not only just by the confusing statements of its “revolutionary leader” Ghaddafi. Whether the still ongoing demonstrations in the country will reach the “critical mass” to represent a serious threat to Ghaddafi, who has been in power for more than 40 years, remains to be seen. Just as other autocrats in the region before him, he recently successfully suppressed revolts originating in Bengasi with military force.

REPERCUSSIONS FOR ISRAEL

A look at the potential impact of events in Tunisia and Egypt on the region as a whole would not be complete without considering Israel’s situation and its possible reactions to what is happening. It is clear to every political observer in the region that the current destabilisation of the “southern front” increases the likelihood of another war on two fronts.

After the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan and the international intervention in Iraq, Israel was able to concentrate on the military threats from the “north”, that is to say the direct threat from Lebanon and Syria as well as the indirect threat from Iran. While it is true that there was still a threat from the Gaza strip, this did not really require any strategic change to the country’s defence efforts. However, depending on how events unfold, especially in Egypt, a strategic change may now prove to be necessary.

Even Israel must be aware of the fact that further “demo cratisation” in Egypt will mean that the relationship between Egypt and Israel will become more of an issue in future debates between the various political camps in Egypt. This will not be a major problem for Israel if these debates are confined to democratic institutions such as parliament or the government. However, if this central


It is very unlikely that there will be a parliamentary majority for one faction in the Egyptian parliament due to the expected number of new parties that will be formed.

foreign policy issue becomes a political football during a democratic election, there could be incalculable conse-quences for Israeli-Egyptian relations. It is well known that a majority of the Egyptian people are against the idea of peace with Israel and in the past have repeatedly called for the cancellation of the peace agreement with Israel, the expulsion of Israeli embassy staff or even the (eventual) closure of the embassy itself. These sorts of demands have always been popular in Egypt and it would be very surprising if there are no factions which take up these issues in future democratic election debates.

Israeli observers’ biggest reservation about whether the Muslim Brotherhood should be officially recognised is based on the realisation that, should the Brotherhood be allowed to take part in democratic elections as a recog-nised political party, they would bring their well known critical opinions of Israel (which is putting it mildly) into the debate to try and gain support from large numbers of Egyptian voters. There could be untold consequences. Even if only 20-30 per cent of members of a future parliament held similar views, which is a best-case scenario, it would not be possible for any Egyptian coalition government to

avoid having to change the current foreign policy approach to dealings with Israel. And in future it seems very likely that Egypt will have a coalition government along the lines of that in Lebanon. It is very unlikely that

there will be a parliamentary majority for one faction in the Egyptian parliament due to the expected number of new parties that will be formed. The founding of a party political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood is just as likely as the creation of a Coptic party.

The Israelis are well aware of all this, which is why they have so far been very cautious in their statements about the “democratic movement” in Egypt and other Arab states. While it is true that democracies tend not to turn to war as often (or as quickly) as dictators, especially against other democracies, it is also true that an Arab dictator who is “sick of war” is still better for Israel than a “bloodthirsty” Arab majority.


How to structure this change and achieve a successful transition in a peaceful way is the task which is now facing everyone, especially those in political office.

The Israeli leadership is also fully aware that if a future democratically-elected Egyptian government decides to scrap the Egypt-Israel peace agreement, then Jordan will be forced to follow suit in order for its regime to hold on to power. If this happens then all the successful attempts over recent decades to create stability in the region will be lost and Israel’s future will be as uncertain as it was before.

However, many observers are more optimistic and believe that there will in fact be a relaxation of relations as the practice of many despotic Arab regimes to use criticism of Israel’s policies as a convenient way of providing an outlet for the totally unrelated frustrations of people in their countries will come to an end. The hope is that, at the point where genuine internal political and socio-economical problems start to dominate political debate in Arab countries that are going through the process of democratisation, foreign policy issues and relations with Israel in particular will start to disappear from the front pages of newspapers. Whether this is just a pipe-dream remains to be seen.

CONCLUSION

This article is not meant to give the impression that the demands of sections of the Egyptian population for more freedom and justice and a change in the political order towards democracy and the rule of law is not universally popular. There is no doubt that such changes were long overdue and that the established regimes, especially in Egypt, have not shown sufficient willingness to introduce the kind of reforms necessary to lead their countries out of the quagmire of unresolved succession issues and political reform processes.

They are now facing a much more difficult and wide-reaching change to the political order. How to structure this change and achieve a successful transition in a peaceful way is the task which is now facing everyone, especially those in political office, but also all the new players on the stage. The people started this process with their demands for freedom and democracy, and at the end of the day they will be the ones who will bring it to its natural conclusion.


Offering unsolicited advice or trying to get involved in the political pro-cess from the outside is not going to help. The Tunisian and Egyptian peo-ple would not be prepared tolerate it anyway.

The accusations by die-hards that recent events had been instigated by radical fundamentalists in collaboration with the usual “foreign enemies” and with the help of naive, innocent citizens in order to bring down the regime, have been rejected by most observers as typical self-serving fabrications by the government.

What the American government has failed to do in eight years, namely to force the Egyptian president to introduce comprehensive reforms, has been achieved in eight days by brave citizens who have overcome their normal apathy. This just goes to prove that the influence of outsiders and the supposed omnipotence of autocrats are in fact relative. Many of those in positions of power in the region will be rightly concerned about this and will hopefully be encouraged to introduce reforms of their own.

While foreign countries may talk about their hopes and concerns, it will be the key players in the effected countries themselves who will be responsible for the political developments to come. Offering unsolicited advice or trying

to get involved in the political process from the outside is not going to help, and the Tunisian and Egyptian people would not be prepared tolerate it anyway.

Dignity and pride, together with a new-found self-confi-dence will be what drive the internal process until that point is reached where the representatives of the new political order are happy to discuss their hopes and ideas with other countries. It is conceivable that Egypt will not be able to deal with all these upheavals on its own or without the help of other countries or financial assistance. Egypt’s economy may need to be helped just as much as the new democratic order within the (pre-) political arena. The necessary new elections will require fundamental as well as legislative change. They can only take place once the new democratic political players have consolidated their positions to such an extent that they can compete not only with the well-organized Muslim Brotherhood, but also with those who profited from the old political order and who will surely have regrouped by the time of the elections.


In this respect there is now an opportunity, especially for Europe, to play a constructive part in the change process and to give a fresh impetus to those institutions and instru-ments of Mediterranean politics that have been created in recent times. Germany, along with other East European countries, still has fresh memories of experiencing similar political upheavals. Obviously not every step along the path of change will be the same, and not every instrument will be suited to this very different cultural and religious frame of reference, but that does not mean they are totally irrelevant. It is now for the Egyptians to decide whether and to what extent they want to accept the help that is offered. They should not have to wait long for these offers of help to arrive.


Martin Pabst

After the people of Southern Sudan voted overwhelmingly in favour of an independent state in the recent referen dum, the new state is expected to be established on July 9, 2011. 55 years after independence, Sudan is now to be split in two, and the regional balance of power must be established all over again.

The decolonisation of Sub-Saharan Africa began with Sudan being granted independence on January 1, 1956. The number of new countries grew rapidly. The Organisation of African Unity, founded in 1963, was at pains to avoid the continent becoming a plethora of tiny states and one year after being established it spoke out in favour of retaining the old colonial borders. Both the superpowers and the old colonial powers feared there would be uncontrolled destabilisation, so they supported the territorial integrity of the new states, even when they were ruled by dicta-torial regimes, and discriminated against particular ethnic groups and outlying regions.1 Until 1990 there were no successful attempts at secession. In this year the process of decolonisation was completed with the acceptance of Namibia as the 151st member of the United Nations.

The stability which was largely maintained externally during the East-West conflict was now clearly a thing of

1 | There are few exceptions to the rule. From 1960-1963 Belgium made significant efforts to help Katanga split away from the Congo, and France provided clandestine military support to Biafra when it broke away from Nigeria between 1967-1970. Both these secessions were driven by European support, but in the end were put down by the central governments.

SOUTHERN SUDAN BEFORE INDEPENDENCELOCAL CELEBRATIONS, DISAPPOINTMENT IN NORTHERN SUDAN AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERN

Dr. Martin Pabst is a freelance political scientist based in Munich who specia-lizes in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 2008 a new edition of his book “South Africa” was published by C.H. Beck as part of their series “Länder”.


the past. Today the international community has to deal with a Sub-Saharan Africa characterized by “failed states”, insurrections and civil wars, the plundering of resources, massive human rights abuse, piracy and secessions. In 1991 Somaliland declared its independence from Somalia and today is a de-facto state which is waiting for diplo-matic recognition. In 1993 Eritrea split away from Ethiopia after a referendum which was recognized by the international community. Now the first country to gain independence, Sudan, is itself the subject of secession. After a long conflict, Christian/Animist black African Southern Sudan is splitting away from the Arab/Islamic North. The biggest country in Africa (2,5 million km² and 39 million inhabitants) will lose 620,000 km² of its territory, around 9 million inhabitants, three-quarters of its oil reserves and large areas of fertile agricultural and grazing land.

The international community is watching developments in Sudan with some concern. In the short term it is feared that the North will resort to force to prevent a secession which is so detrimental to its interests. In the medium term there is the threat of destabilisation in both of the new states, with a worst-case scenario of further territorial disintegration. The international community is also wary of the long-term effects of Southern Sudan’s secession. Will it encourage secession movements in the north-east and other areas of Africa? Will the dividing lines between black Africa and Arab/Muslim Africa become even more pronounced? Will Jihadists use the developments in Sudan to their own ends and make Sub-Saharan Africa a favoured field of operation?

NORTH VERSUS SOUTH – THE PERENNIAL CONFLICT IN SUDAN’S HISTORY

In Khartoum there is disappointment about the South’s “secession”. Many Northern Sudanese suspect it is part of a Western-led conspiracy – hardly anyone is prepared to accept that they may themselves bear some responsibility for the situation. In contrast, the Southern Sudanese are celebrating their “independence” from Khartoum, which they consider to be a foreign and autocratic regime. For

Now the first African country to gain independence, is the subject of seces-sion. After a long conflict, Christian Southern Sudan is splitting away from the Islamic North.


them, the process of decolonisation is only now coming to an end, a view which is echoed by many Africans from Nairobi to Cape Town.

The rift between North and South is far deeper than many international observers ever realised. The Southern Sudanese suffered greatly in the 19th century. Under the rule of the Egyptian-Ottoman Khedive (1821-81), slave hunters made forays into their villages. The Mahdi regime which ruled from Khartoum from 1881-99 introduced Sharia law into Southern Sudan and tried to forcibly convert the “infidel” to Islam.

During the Anglo-Egypt Condominium (1899-1955) Southern Sudan was administered separately from the North and largely isolated. Northern Sudanese and foreigners needed special permits to enter the “closed districts” of the South. English, rather than Arabic, was the language of administration and schools, and Christian missionaries were encouraged, while the advance of Islam was halted. London invested in strategic regions of the North and shielded the Southern Sudanese population, who still lived in their traditional ways, from the encroachment

of the modern world. Although it was not the sole administrative power in Sudan, Great Britain planned to add Southern Sudan to its East African colonies, in line with a 1930 directive.

However, at the Juba Conference in 1947 the British government made a momentous U-turn: from now on they would advance Sudan’s independence as a single political entity. And the less-developed South was now taken in hand. The lack of qualified local people meant that civil servants were sent in from the North, which encouraged the spread of Arab language and culture.

The Southern Sudanese were not represented at the Juba Conference and were not asked for their opinion. Many of them feared the North would take control and soon out- number them. They placed their hopes in a federal structure, which was promised by the British, but when Sudan was granted independence on January 1, 1956 Northern Sudan set about building a centralised government. Over

At the Juba Conference in 1947 the British government made a momen-tous U-turn: from now on they would advance Sudan’s independence as a single political entity.


the next five decades the rulers in Khartoum constantly tried to foist a single identity upon the country, first Arab nationalist, then Arab socialist and finally Arab Islamist.

They also broke the promise made at independence that all areas of the country would be developed equally. Today there are immense differences, as can be seen in the following example. In 2006 86.3 per cent of all children in the state of Khartoum attended primary school, in Sinnar 66.6 per cent, in South Kurdufan 53.3 per cent, and in West Darfur 46.4 per cent. The figures are even worse for the South: Central Equatoria, which contains Juba, the capital of Southern Sudan, had 43.0 per cent, with neigh-bouring East Equatoria at only 13.9 per cent. Bringing up the rear were Northern Bahr el-Ghazal and Unity with 5.7 per cent and 4.3 per cent respectively (country average: 53.7 per cent).2

Just like in the period of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, investment and development projects were focused on the Dongola/Sinnar/Kosti triangle with the Khartoum-Omdurman conurbation at its centre. In 2005, in a paper delivered to the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), Finance Minister Abdul Rahim Hamdi proposed to continue with this strategy.

Since independence, the ranks of Sudan’s political and economic elite have been drawn from three ethnic groups based to the north of Khartoum: the Ja’aliyyin, Shaigiya and Danagla, which together make up five per cent of the Sudanese population. General Umar al-Bashir, who took over the country’s presidency following a military coup in 1989, is a Ja’aliyyin, and Vice-President Ali Osman Taha is a Shaigiya. The long-standing leaders of the opposition parties in Khartoum are also members of these ethnic groups. The political and economic elite justify their pre-eminence by stressing their “pure Arab ancestry”, with the Ja’aliyyin even claiming they belong to the tribe of the Prophet Mohammed, the Quraysh.3 However, it is clearly

2 | Summary Table of Findings. Sudan Household Health Survey (SHHS) and Millennium Development Goals (MDG) indicators, Sudan, 2006, http://www.irinnews.org/pdf/pn/SHHS report.pdf (accessed January 20, 2011).3 | The Southern Sudanese call the unpopular Northern elite “jellaba” after their traditional Arab robes.


visible that most Arab-speaking ethnic groups in Northern Sudan are of mixed Arab-African descent.

In Sudan, skin colour and religion are factors which determine access to prestige, power and resources. At the top of the pyramid are light-skinned, Arabic-speaking Muslims, in the middle come black African Muslims, and right at the bottom of the pile are the black African Christians and Ani- mists. Even today it happens that the Northern Sudanese inflame their black African compatriots by using discrimi-natory terms such as “kufr” (infidel) or “abid” (slave).

The power of the small central elite was consolidated by building alliances with local leaders in the outlying regions and through the co-option or corruption of representatives from other ethnic groups. If necessary, Khartoum stirred up unrest and recruited auxiliary forces in the outlying regions. It made little difference whether power was in the hands of democrats, single party rulers or generals.

As sceptical British administrators had prophesied, resistance broke out in Southern Sudan against the single state, even before independence in 1955. At first the rebels demanded a federal system, then later independence for Southern Sudan which they called “Azania”, the Latin name for East Africa. The Anya Nya (“snake poison”) were left to wage a fierce war against the greatly-superior forces of the North. In 1972 a peace treaty was agreed in Addis Ababa which granted Southern Sudan autonomy and self-government. The Anya Nya were incorporated into the army.

The people of Southern Sudan enjoyed a short period of peace and development during the 1970s, and the

University of Juba was established. But when the socialist head of state General Jaafar Mohammed al-Nimeiri reconciled with the conservative Islamist Umma Party and the Islamist Muslim Brothers in 1977 it

was another nail in Southern Sudan’s coffin. The cancel-lation of Southern Sudanese autonomy in 1983 and the rollout of Sharia law across the whole country brought a new outbreak of resistance. Sharia law also extended to non-Muslims, bringing with it not only an alcohol ban,

The declaration of Southern Sudanese autonomy in 1983 and the rollout of Sharia law across the whole country brought a new outbreak of resistance.


SPLM/A leader John Garang de Mabior, a Dinka from Southern Sudan, fought for a socialist, secular and united Su-dan.

corporal punishment and a strictly-enforced dress code but it also affected the education system, the allocation of land, the economy and banking systems.

The newly-formed Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) also fought against large-scale economic projects which served the interests of the centre but which threatened the homes and livelihoods of local people and were environmentally damaging, such as the exploitation of Southern Sudanese oil and the construction of the Jonglei canal through the vast swamps of the White Nile (the Sudd).

After the Islamist military coup led by General Umar al-Bashir and chief ideologist Sheikh Hasan al-Turabi in 1989, the North/South civil war became increasingly brutal. The rulers in Khartoum tightened up Sharia law, declared “Holy War” on the “infidels” in 1992 and recruited fanaticised young men to their newly-created militia, the “Popular Defence Forces“ (PDF). They also escalated the war to include the Nuba mountains in South Kordofan, north of the North/South divide. This area was settled by the black African, mainly Muslim Nuba. As some of the Nuba sympathised with the insurgents in Southern Sudan, Khartoum declared war on them as a whole, using the same methods of attack in the Nuba mountains and Southern Sudan as they were later to use in Darfur: violent evictions and expulsions, air force bombing of civilians, the systematic starvation of whole regions, and the recruitment of militias with orders to plunder and rape.

The SPLM/A were not fighting for independence, but for a reformed “New Sudan” – which is why the freedom movement’s name did not include the word “South”. The SPLM/A leader John Garang de Mabior, a Dinka from Southern Sudan, became interested in Marxism during his time as a lecturer in Tanzania and he fought for a socialist, secular Sudan which guaranteed all its citizens equal access to power and resources. He had no time for nationalism based along ethnic and cultural lines, and as a former colonel in the Sudanese army his thinking was rooted in the idea of a united Sudan. He led the liberation movement with a rod of iron, allowing no different opinions. But many of


A series of protocols on specific issues finally resulted in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on January 9, 2005. The UN Security Council had shown their support for the agreement in a special meeting in Nairobi.

his followers still wanted independence, as did other rival liberation movements in Southern Sudan.

In 1995 the SPLM joined with the banned Northern Sudan opposition parties and became part of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). This meant they were also a factor in Northern Sudanese politics, and they garnered support among Southern Sudanese living in the North and among reform-minded Northerners. From 1997 the SPLM/A put pressure on the government by opening up a second front in the east. They joined with Northern Sudanese resistance groups and Eritrean troops to fight against the Khartoum government.

Despite its oil income, Sudan had huge debts and by the end of the 1990s it could no longer sustain the enormous cost of the war, which was running at one to two million U.S. dollars per day. The SPLA were also constantly making successful guerrilla strikes on oilfields, pipelines and roads. In 1999 President Umar al-Bashir offered the

rebels peace talks and even dangled the possibility of secession. Peace negotiations started in Kenya in 2002 under the auspices of the regional organisation, the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Led by the USA, the international community strongly promoted peace, as the humanitarian consequences of the war had

been catastrophic. Between 1983 and 2005 more than two million people were killed and four million were driven from their homes. A series of protocols on specific issues finally resulted in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on January 9, 2005. The UN Security Council had shown their support for the agreement in a unique meeting in Nairobi (UNSR-Resolution 1574 dated November 19, 2004). The UN, the African Union, the Arab League, the IGAD, the EU, Egypt, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Great Britain and the USA signed the Agreement as guarantors. A military and civil peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was sent to offer support during the transition period from 2005 to 2011.


The NCP asserted that Sharia was still the most important legal basis in Northern Sudan. Without a separation of religion and state, national unity would cease to be an attractive option for the Southern Sudanese people.

HOW NATIONAL UNITY WAS FRITTERED AWAY

At the commencement of peace talks in 2002, the notion of national unity was still a promising possibility. Both sides, Garang’s SPLM and the NCP of President al-Bashir, were in favour of this goal, which also took into account economic realities. Negotiations were based on the IGAD Declaration of Principles of July 20, 1994, which was accepted by both parties and which granted the people of Southern Sudan the right to determine their future political status through a referendum. However its declared priority was the unity of Sudan and there was no mention of the right to secede.

After 2002, a variety of factors led to the goal of national unity fading more and more into the background and to developments focusing increasingly on the secession of Southern Sudan. The refusal of the NCP government to give up Sharia law in Northern Sudan – in contravention of the IGAD Declaration of Principles which it had ratified in 1997 – had the most far-reaching consequences. The Declaration stated: “Sudan is a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural society. Full recognition and accommodation of these diversities must be affirmed. [...] A secular and democratic state must be established in the Sudan. Freedom of belief and worship and religious practice shall be guaranteed in full to all Sudanese citizens. State and religion shall be separated. The basis of personal and family laws can be religion and customs.”4 Despite this, the NCP asserted in the CPA that Sharia was still the most important legal basis in Northern Sudan and any Christian or Animist Southern Sudanese people who lived there were merely exempted from it during the interim phase. Without a separation of religion and state, national unity ceased to be an attractive option for the Southern Sudanese people.

Garang had previously had the right to secession enshrined in the first agreement in 2002 – not because this was his preferred solution but because he wanted to keep it as a fall-back position. Garang did not trust Khartoum after their earlier broken promises, and he insisted on retaining

4 | Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought (former name of the IGAD, MP): Declaration of Principles, July 20, 1994.


An alliance between the Southern Su-danese, marginalised areas of Northern Sudan and the opposition in Khartoum would create a political heavyweight.

two effective bargaining chips in the CPA: the continuance of his military arm the SPLA until the end of the transition phase, and the right to secession subsequent to a refer-endum on self-determination. However the first item 1.1 of the CPA made national unity the priority for the two parties, in line with the IGAD Declaration of Principles, and in item 1.5 they agreed an undertaking to sweep aside historical differences in the way growth and resources were distributed in order to make unity more attractive.5

When John Garang was killed in a helicopter accident on July 30, 2005 the Southern Sudanese lost their strongest advocate for national unity. His successor and former deputy Salva Kiir Mayardit was more inclined towards secession. As the interim Vice President of Sudan he hardly appeared in public but instead concentrated on his job as President of autonomous Southern Sudan. The SPLM sent their B-team to sit in the multi-party transitional government in Khartoum, and their performance was correspondingly bland. In contrast to the weak Northern

Sudanese opposition, the SPLM-North led by the Arabic-speaking Muslim Yasir Arman could have proved to be a dynamic force. An alliance between the Southern Sudanese, margina lised areas of Northern Sudan and

the opposition in Khartoum would create a political heavy-weight. Garang’s triumphant reception in Khartoum on July 9, 2005 was unforgettable – after so many years away he was welcomed by hundreds of thousands of people from both South and North.

The NCP’s policies during the transition period between 2005 and 2011 finally put paid to all hopes of national unity. The democratic reforms stipulated in the CPA failed to materialise, as did the development projects promised for the whole country. Clearly the NCP felt it was more important to hold onto power in Northern Sudan than to win the people of Southern Sudan over to the idea of national unity. Even neighbouring Egypt, strong supporter

5 | The Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between The Govern- ment Of The Republic of The Sudan And The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ Sudan People’s Liberation Army, Naivasha January 9, 2005. These framework conditions had already been agreed on 26.5.2002 in the Machakos Protocol, which formed part of the CPA.


Over the last six years Khartoum had finally frittered away the trust of the people of Southern Sudan. Their desire for their own nation reflected their existential need for respect and dignity.

of Khartoum and advocate of Sudanese unity, criticized the al-Bashir government for its failure to make unity attractive.

Against this backdrop, the Southern Sudanese can hardly be blamed for voting for secession in huge numbers. This vote cannot only be explained in terms of the desire for prestige among SPLM politicians, nationalist hysteria and (unrealistic) expec-tations of rapid economic improvements, though of course these factors played their part. Over the last six years Khartoum had finally frittered away the trust of the people of Southern Sudan. Their desire for their own nation reflected their existential need for respect and dignity, which had been denied them for decades by the North. This is what fired up the Southern Sudanese people to cast their votes in the referendum.6

THE PROGRESS AND OUTCOME OF THE REFERENDUM

The referendum was organised by the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission (SSRC), a body which is independent of both the Sudanese government and the autonomous government of Southern Sudan. All citizens who had reached the age of 18 and were “of sound mind” were eligible to vote, as set out in the Southern Sudan Referendum Act of 2009. Voters had to prove that one of their parents came from one of Southern Sudan’s native ethnic groups which had been domiciled in Southern Sudan before or on January 1, 1956, or that their ancestors could be traced back to these ethnic groups. People were also allowed to vote if they, their parents or grandparents had lived continuously in Southern Sudan since January 1, 1956.

Polling stations were set up in Southern Sudan, Northern Sudan and in eight countries with appreciable Southern Sudanese populations (Egypt, Ethiopia, Australia, Canada, Kenya, Uganda, USA, UK). The choice was between unity

6 | In Juba a story went round that an illiterate man had confused the symbols on the voting slip and inadvertently voted for unity. It was said that he was so upset that he committed suicide the next day.


Internal and external observer missi-ons judged the process to be “free and fair”. A turnout of 60 per cent was hit within three days.

and secession. For the result to be valid there had to be a 60 per cent turnout of registered voters and one of the two alternatives had to win more than 50 per cent of the vote. During voter registration from November 15 to December 8, 2010, more than 3.7 million people were found to be eligible to vote in Southern Sudan, 116,000 in Northern Sudan and 60,000 overseas. In view of the fact that 1.5 to 2 million Southern Sudanese live in Northern Sudan, the number of registered voters was astonishingly low. It seems that most people decided to travel to Southern Sudan for the vote because they were afraid of government pressure. It is also clear that there was no attempt to inflate the numbers of eligible voters in Northern Sudan. It was feared that the government in Khartoum would try various tricks including falsifying documents in order to increase the numbers of unity supporters who did not come from Southern Sudan.

The referendum took place between January 9 and 15, 2011 and went off peacefully. Internal and external observer missions judged the process to be “free and fair”. A

turnout of 60 per cent was hit within three days; indeed 97.6 per cent of registered voters cast their vote.

There was a landslide majority of 98.8 per cent in favour of secession. An exception to this was the partial result in Northern Sudan, where 57.65 per cent voted for secession and 42.35 for unity. The split was probably between those Southern Sudanese who were planning to return home and those who wanted to stay in the North and who feared they would be personally disadvantaged by secession. In fact they are in danger of discrimination, and possibly even violence and expulsion, as happened to the Ibos in Northern Nigeria during Biafra’s secession.

In accordance with the Southern Sudan Referendum Act, the parties have to clear up all disputed issues relating to their bilateral existence before the expiry of the CPA. Then the independent state of Southern Sudan can be estab-lished on July 9, 2011.


At the moment Sudan is attracting a great deal of international attention. The USA is keen to prevent any esca-lation of the situation.

WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?

There is much international speculation as to whether Northern Sudan will accept the South’s secession or whether it will try to prevent it by force. Khartoum made a contractual agreement to accept secession in the event of a valid referendum result, but secession will mean the loss of three-quarters of its oil reserves. According to the IMF, in 2008 oil made up 95 per cent of Sudanese exports and 60 per cent of the state’s income. There are fears that Khartoum will use military force to prevent the South’s secession or at least to seize control of the lucrative oilfields south of the North/South dividing line.

But Khartoum has already missed its best opportunity for military intervention – it should have prevented the referendum taking place. In view of the huge majority which has legitimised demands for secession, military intervention would now leave the North in total political isolation. At the moment Sudan is attracting a great deal of international attention. The USA is keen to prevent any escalation of the situation and is wooing Khartoum with a mixture of incentives and threats. In 2009 U.S. President Barack Obama sent General (Ret.) Scott Gration as Special Envoy and Nathan Princeton Lyman as Ambassador. Lyman had already accompanied South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy between 1992 and 1995 and played a significant role in working out a compromise between black and white South Africans. The African Union assigned its African Union High-Implementation Panel (AUHIP), which had actually been set up to deal with Darfur, to work out a sustainable post-referendum arrangement, under the leadership of former South African President Thabo Mbeki and with the support of the two sides involved. The UN sent a three-person panel headed up by former Tanzanian President Benjamin William Mkapa to observe the refer-endum. Since July 2010 all the international players involved have been coordinating their activities under the umbrella of the Sudan Consultative Forum.

President Omar al-Bashir and other high-ranking NCP politicians have repeatedly emphasised over the last few months that they would indeed be sorry if the South voted


The Islamic wing of the NCP sees the South’s secession as an opportunity to exercise Sharia law more intensively in Northern Sudan.

in favour of secession, but that they would accept it. They know that they cannot win another civil war. Military intervention would endanger oil production, as the SPLA would be sure to counter by immediately attacking wells and pipelines. Even though there are projects afoot for a pipeline to Kenya and a refinery in Uganda, Southern Sudan will still be reliant on Northern Sudan to refine and ship the oil for many years to come. A negotiated share in the oil business would seem to present a more attractive option for Khartoum.

It seems likely that the NCP have decided that the South has been lost and that they should concentrate on holding

on to power in the North. And the USA has offered some tempting incentives: removal from the terror list, lifting of sanctions, generous debt relief. The Islamic wing of the party also sees the South’s secession as

an opportunity to exercise Sharia law more intensively in Northern Sudan.

Khartoum will be negotiating hard over the next few months and will not be afraid to use bargaining chips such as the unresolved conflict in the Abyei region in order to wring out maximum concessions from the secession talks. There is much to agree, including the distribution of state assets and liabilities, international agreements, the exact demarcation of the border, the distribution of economic resources, questions of citizenship, the rights of minorities and freedom of movement.

Once international involvement has receded, Khartoum may once again try to put pressure on the South in the usual way, e.g. through targeted destabilisation. On the day before the referendum began, President al-Bashir said in an interview with al-Jazeera, that Southern Sudan had neither the capacity to look after its citizens nor the ability to establish and administer a state.7 In Juba these words were viewed as a blatant threat.

7 | “Bashir doubts south’s viability,” al-Jazeera, January 8, 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2011/01/20111718 39053529 (accessed January 20, 2011).


In May 2008 there were fierce battles in Abyei between the army and the SPLA, resulting in dozens of people being killed and 60,000 being driven from their homes.

The most dangerous trouble spot at the moment is the region of Abyei which lies north of the North/South dividing line. In line with the CPA, it was planned that the region should hold a separate referendum on January 9, 2011 to decide whether it should be part of Northern or Southern Sudan. The people of Abyei had been promised this oppor-tunity to decide for many years. However, the sides have not been able to reach an agreement on who is eligible to vote, which meant that the parallel referendum has been postponed indefinitely. The majority of the population in Abyei are black African Ngok Dinka, who support the SPLM and lean towards the South. At certain times of the year Arab-speaking Misserya nomads come to Abyei for grazing. Many Misserya believe that they will lose this right if the region becomes part of Southern Sudan, a belief that is encouraged by Khartoum. The governing NCP supports the Misserya’s demand to be able to vote in the referendum in large numbers, something which the Ngok Dinka are vehemently opposed to.

Both sides sought arbitration from The Hague, and a ruling was made on Abyei’s borders in July 2009. It was relatively favourable for Khartoum – the North was awarded a strip of land which included two profitable oilfields (Heglig and Bamboo). The remaining contested territory contains another oilfield (Diffra). But NCP representatives soon distanced themselves from this ruling, apparently wanting to keep the whole region within Northern Sudan. In May 2008 there were fierce battles in Abyei between the army and the SPLA, resulting in dozens of people being killed and 60,000 being driven from their homes. Abyei’s eponymous capital was totally destroyed. This was the most serious breach yet of the ceasefire agreement. During the turn of the year 2010/2011 and even during the referendum there were armed skirmishes between Ngok Dinka and Misserya. It took a hastily-brokered peace agreement to restore some calm. It is possible that the two sides will now seek a compromise solution in Abyei rather than hold a referendum. But this emotionally-charged dispute could ignite a new North-South conflict, especially


Over the last few years the SPLM lea-der Salva Kiir has shown considerable tactical skill in bringing rival groups and dissidents into the party.

as the tribal groups involved are heavily armed and to some extent outside the control of Khartoum and Juba.8

The division of Sudan into two nations also means there will be a new dynamic in the medium-term. In Southern Sudan the euphoria over independence will soon evaporate, leaving everyday reality to take its place. Up to now, South Sudanese identity has been defined by resistance against the Arab-Islamist North. It is symptomatic that there was still no agreement on the new country’s name at the time of the referendum. Southern Sudan is home to more than 200 different ethnic groups. In 2009 there were numerous local armed conflicts, often over land or water, which left 2,500 dead and around 350,000 refugees – more victims than in the Darfur conflict in the same year. In the 1990s

the antagonism between the Dinka, who dominated the SPLM, and the Nuer led to a fierce civil war being fought within Southern Sudan itself. Over the last few years the SPLM leader Salva Kiir has shown considerable

tactical skill in bringing rival groups and dissidents into the party. It was also a clever manoeuvre by the SPLM to make Juba the capital of Southern Sudan rather than the Dinka city of Rumbek. Juba lies in an area which is mainly settled by smaller tribes (Bari, Makaraka, Nyanwara, Pajulu). Nevertheless, it will be a difficult challenge for the government to hold the country together.

Southern Sudan is very under-developed, large areas of the country have been laid waste by civil war, and the people live in extreme poverty. The UNDP drew attention to the huge challenges ahead in its September 2010 report entitled “Scary Statistics – Southern Sudan”. 50.6 per cent of the population live on less than one U.S. dollar per day and 4.3 million people are reliant on food aid. One in seven expectant mothers dies during pregnancy or during child-birth. Over 50 per cent of the population have no access to

8 | The situation is also volatile in two other regions north of the border, South Kordofan and Blue Nile.The CPA made no provisions on whether they belonged to Northern or Southern Sudan, merely stipulating non-binding “popular consultations” about their future status in Northern Sudan. The region’s resident black Africans such as the Nuba largely support the SPLM and could be tempted to affiliate their regions with Southern Sudan.


The SPLM now has to make the transi-tion from being a liberation movement to a democratic party and provide an equal playing field for its future poli-tical rivals.

clean drinking water, and only 6.4 per cent have adequate toilet facilities. 92 per cent of Southern Sudanese women are illiterate and less than 50 per cent of children complete five years of elementary schooling.9

There is still a dearth of skilled labour and civil servants from Northern Sudan will be leaving the country. Neigh-bouring countries are preparing to send temporary officials as a stop gap and to help with on-the-job training. Corruption has soared in Juba over recent years because of the high levels of oil income and aid. It should be remem-bered in this respect that Southern Sudan’s autonomous government of 1972 to 1983 was a hive of conflict, ineffi-ciency and corruption.

For the time being the SPLM is basking in the aura of the successful liberation movement and enjoying landslide victories, such as Salva Kiirs’ election as Pre- sident of Southern Sudan with 93 per cent of the vote in April 2010. The SPLM now has to make the transition from being a liberation movement to a democratic party and provide an equal playing field for its future political rivals. If the country’s domestic problems escalate, the government could be tempted to divert the tensions outwards by seeking confrontation with Northern Sudan or other neighbouring states. Southern Sudan is not “a failed state in the making” as some observers are rather prematurely suggesting, but there are certainly testing times ahead.

In Northern Sudan, the loss of the South has put President al-Bashir and the NCP on the defensive. The CPA was negotiated exclusively by the NCP and the SPLM/A, so the opposition parties bear no responsibility. Therefore they are able to accuse the NCP of selling out. President al-Bashir is under pressure, with a warrant for his arrest being issued by the International Criminal Court. The elections of April 2010 were fraudulent, and the CPA expires. This means that al-Bashir will lose the last vestiges of international legitimacy.

9 | UNDP, “Scary Statistics – Southern Sudan September 2010,” http://unsudanig.org/docs/APPROVED%20High%20Level%20 Scary%20Statistics%20-%20Southern%20Sudan.doc (accessed January 20, 2011).


President al-Bashir announced that Southern Sudanese remaining in the North would not be allowed to conti-nue working in the civil service if the South seceded.

Two factions within the NCP are fighting to take control of the party’s future direction. The pragmatists want to introduce economic reforms to provide a new basis for the economy and a cautious opening-up of the political system in order to make the most of the current climate of international goodwill and to remove the causes of brewing resistance. This had led to plans for development projects in Darfur to the tune of two billion U.S. dollars. Ranged against this faction are the hardliners and Islamists who want to clamp down still harder against opposition and rebel movements.

At the moment the latter seem to have the upper hand. On December 24, 2010 opposition politician Mariam Sadiq al-Mahdi and members of her Umma Party suffered severe beatings at the hands of the police, followed by her detention on February 10, 2011. On January 18, 2011 the Islamist opposition politician Sheikh Hasan al-Turabi,

who had fallen out with the NCP in 1999, was arrested along with members of his Popular Congress Party (PCP), charged with plotting to overthrow the state and sabotage. President al-Bashir announced that Southern

Sudanese remaining in the North would not be allowed to continue working in the civil service if the South seceded. They would also not be granted North Sudanese citizenship nor dual citizenship. The transitional constitution would be changed so that Islam and Sharia law would become the sole basis of the new constitution, with Arabic becoming the only official language. There would no longer be any possibility of cultural and ethnic diversity.10

Faced with these pressures, the NCP could be tempted to play the anti-Western card in order to divert attention from its own accountability. In September 2010 Foreign Minister Ahmed Ali Karti complained that the West and the USA wanted to divide up Sudan in order to inflict damage on the Arab and Islamist camp. Khartoum is filled with propaganda posters claiming that the USA and EU have caused Southern Sudan to split away from the union, with

10 | “Islamic law in Sudan if south secedes: Bashir,” Gulf Times, Doha, December 20, 2010, http://gulf-times.com/site/topics/ article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=405481&version=1&template_ id=37&parent_id=17 (accessed January 20, 2011).


With international attention focused on Southern Sudan, the opposing sides in Darfur have an opportunity to esca-late the conflict.

Israel conveniently being drawn into the equation. These accusations have found favour in parts of the Arab and Islamic world: the Iranian journalist Hassan Hanizadeh, a close supporter of the government, has aired his suspicion that there was a British/American conspiracy behind Southern Sudan’s secession with the aim of reducing Islamic influence and establishing an Israeli presence.11 There are however more moderate voices. The London-based Saudi newspaper Asharq al-Awsat made the following laconic comment on Karti’s accusations: “Here we say that there is no hope in a solution to maintain Sudanese unity, since the wound is much bigger than the band-aid”.12

The successful secession of Southern Sudan will also give new impetus to the Darfur rebels. It seems likely that they will step up their armed resistance and increase their demands, perhaps even taking up a separatist agenda. It should be remembered in this respect that there is no historical model for a Southern Sudanese state. On the contrary, between around 1650 and 1916 Darfur was an independent sultanate. Indeed, the Darfuris have always maintained strong ties with Khartoum. The strongest rebel movement, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) maintains good relations with the PCP and Umma Party. But at the moment the NCP government is taking a hard-line stance towards the Darfur conflict. At the end of 2010 they walked away from the Doha (Qatar) peace talks and stepped up their military operations against rebel groups, including aerial bombing of villages. With international attention focused on Southern Sudan, the opposing sides in Darfur have an opportunity to escalate the conflict.

For Northern Sudan, losing the South is both a warning sign and an opportunity. It would be possible to prevent further destabilisation and disintegration by allowing the outlying regions to have their fair share of power and resources and by extending democratic participation. But if the

11 | Hassan Hanizadeh, “British hands behind Sudan referendum,” Teheran, January 8, 2010, http://mehrnews.com/en/news detail.aspx?NewsID=1227710 (accessed January 20, 2011).12 | Tariq Alhomayed, “Sudan: Crying over Spilt Milk,” Asharq al- Awsat, September 28, 2010, http://aawsat.com/english/news. asp?section=2&id=22484 (accessed January 20, 2011).


The secession of Christian South brings Sudan into the firing line of internati-onal Jihadists. Al-Qaeda cells and sup-porters are already active in the Sahel.

regime decides to follow hard-line policies in order to hold onto power, the country will never find peace. Northern Sudan is also not made up of a single ethnic and cultural group. Although Arabic-speakers make up the majority of the population, they in fact number only around 55 per cent. There is also a certain amount of religious diversity: although the overwhelming majority of Northern Sudanese are Muslims, not all Muslims follow the line propagated by the NCP.

As things stand, the government is still in the driving seat thanks to their control over the security forces and economic resources. The opposition is financially weak, short of ideas and divided. However, the significant drop in oil income will have an effect on this system of patronage. The government has already had to reduce its subsidies on petrol and sugar. An alliance of Northern Sudan’s opposition parties – SPLM-North, PCP, Umma Party, Democratic Unionist Party, Communist Party – with rebel and opposition groups could cause the NCP problems in the medium-term. But to achieve this, the opposition parties need to develop a better understanding of the needs of the outlying regions.

At the moment we must be a little wary of trying to predict the long-term consequences of the secession. The country which has been the most important bridge between black and (Arab) Muslim Africa no longer exists. This is only likely

to exacerbate still further the continent’s division along the 12th parallel and increase tensions between population groups in other countries such as Chad, Niger, Nigeria or Mauritania.13

The secession of Christian South brings Sudan into the firing line of international Jihadists. Al-Qaeda cells and

13 | AU mediator Thabo Mbeki is trying to counter the impression that “African” Southern Sudan has split away from “Arab” Northern Sudan. In a speech at Khartoum University in January 2011 he stressed that the whole of Sudan was an African country and that Islam was a part of Africa. Speech by Thabo Mbeki, Chairperson of the AUHIP, for the University of Khartoum. Friendship Hall, Khartum, January 5, 2011, http://thabombekifoundation.org.za/files/downloads/speech- thabo-mbeki-friendship-hall-khartoum-january5-2011.pdf (accessed January 20, 2011).


Since the end of the nineties the NCP government has turned away from ter-rorism, and the spiritual form of Islam which is practised by the North Suda-nese population does not lend itself to Jihadist ideas.

supporters are already active in the Sahel (Algeria, Mauri-tania, Mali, Niger) and in Egypt and Somalia. In the 1990s there were ties between the Khartoum government and Islamist terror groups, leading to the temporary imposition of UN sanctions. Osama bin Laden lived in exile in Khartoum from 1991 to 1996. In October 2008 a group called “Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Niles” threatened to attack westerners in the Sudan, preceded by the killing of a U.S. diplomat in Khartoum. However, since the end of the nineties the NCP government has turned away from terrorism, and the spiritual form of Islam which is practised by the North Sudanese population does not lend itself to Jihadist ideas.

North East Africa’s precarious balance will be upset by the division of Sudan and will have to be recalibrated. If the two new states become destabilised and start to disinte-grate, they have plenty of neighbours who would be keen to fill the vacuum, including Ethiopia, Eritrea, Egypt, Libya, Uganda and Kenya. This could lead to war in the region.

And the possibility of a domino effect on other secession movements in the region (Oromia, Ogaden, Somaliland) and in other parts of Africa cannot be ruled out, despite the efforts of politicians who are currently insisting that Southern Sudan is a one-off situation. The biggest threat to stability would be territorial disintegration in Nigeria, the most important regional power in Sub-Saharan Africa after South Africa. The situation in Sudan is presenting the international community with one of its greatest challenges. It has the Herculean task of helping under-developed Southern Sudan to statehood, both politically and economically. At the same time it cannot take its eyes off Northern Sudan, where it needs to offer support to the reform-oriented actors. A UN follow-up mission is needed over the next few years. It should to patrol a demilitarised buffer zone along the newly-created border and support Sudan’s process of statehood.


Tom Wolf

Following a tortuous path of some two decades, Kenya finally obtained a new constitution when on August 4, 2010 two-thirds of Kenyans who participated in the national referendum voted to adopt it, and President Mwai Kibaki promulgated it at a festive ceremony in Nairobi three weeks later.

Yet even prior to its actual implementation, it should be stressed that from global perspective, adopting a new constitution, or even just substantially revising an existing one is not something that very often happens in a country – or even in the whole world. Moreover, such transforma-tions occur in a quite limited set of circumstances, most accompanied by violence: when a section of an existing state breaks away and declares its independence; when a revolt or rebellion results in the overthrow or replacement of an existing order, or leads to a ‘compromise’ agreement that accommodates at least the principal demands of the various parties.

By contrast, in Kenya this sort of ‘tectonic shift’ was largely lacking. Moreover, the main impetus for reform has come over the years not so much from within the political class as from outside, led by prominent individuals from the religious sector and various civic organizations, even if particular political leaders periodically championed proposals of one sort or another for a complex mixture of motives.

KENYA’S NEW CONSTITUTION: TRIUMPH IN HAND, TESTING TIMES AHEAD?

Dr. Tom Wolf, from Detroit (USA), works in Nairobi as a gover-nance consultant and opinion researcher. Earlier, he taught Politics at the Univer-sity of Nairobi and served as an advisor for USAID. He came to Kenya in 1967.


Even many public figures who had ne-ver been personally committed to or involved in ‘the struggle’ now associ-ated themselves with the reform.

These very long, drawn-out and often met-with-violence efforts reflected a growing body of opinion regarding flaws in the country’s constitutional order in terms of both content and practice. These included especially the following:

1. a concentration of largely unchecked power in the executive,

2. a concentration of power in Nairobi at the expense of the regions,

3. frequent (if geographically specific) electoral violence (often orchestrated by those in power) and other (violent and non-violent) forms of victimization of political opponents, including torture and several high-profile assassinations other ‘mysterious’ deaths,

4. large-scale if periodic extra-judicial killings and minimal protection of human rights,

5. an absence of any compensatory guarantees for women, ‘marginalized groups’, and people with disabilities , reflecting deeply entrenched cultural biases against them.

Three main factors account for the new constitution’s remarkable success. First, the length and frequent turmoil of the period during which such (if largely fruitless) efforts were made produced consi-derable ‘reform-fatigue’, so that even many public figures who had never been personally committed to or involved in ‘the struggle’ now associated themselves with it if only to enable the nation to finally put this milestone behind it, giving space for innumerable other pressing issues. In particular, the failure of the preceding effort during Kibaki’s first term – resulting from a major schism that emerged within the assemblage that was responsible for his electoral triumph in 2002 – when a draft constitution was defeated 57 to 43 per cent in the referendum of November, 2005, energized important players in both the political class and the wider society to ‘get it right’ this time.

Second, the election crisis in the years 2007 and 2008, easily the gravest threat to the country’s integrity in terms of the scale and geographic distribution of violence since independence, had three main positive reform-effects.


Several leading figures considered it best to conceal their misgivings about any new constitution. Kibaki was seen by some as a quite reluctant ‘convert’ to the cause of reform.

First, it demonstrated, especially to key political and private sector actors, the fragile nature of social cohesion in the country, and the now-manifest dangers of holding national elections under existing rules and institutions. Second, it allowed for the robust entrance of international players (especially certain Western governments through their diplomatic representatives, the UN, and the African Union) in an effort to end the violence and achieve a short-term political settlement, as well as lay out a longer-term reform agenda (known as “Agenda Four”) that included major constitutional reform. Third and closely related to the previous two factors, it encouraged those subsequently tasked with authoring the Review Act itself to insulate the process from ‘late-hour sabotage’ by the political class and the members of parliament (MPs), even if it did allow for their substantive input at particular stages.

A third and more immediate factor was that many individual political careers stood to gain by ‘riding the wave’ of popular

support for any new constitution. Specifi-cally, considering the early wide winning-margins predicted by various opinion polls, several leading figures who were reported to have serious misgivings about it considered

it best to conceal these. For his part, and in view of his performance during his first term, President Kibaki was seen by some as a quite reluctant ‘convert’ to the cause of reform.

Whatever the accuracy of such a characterization, the fact is that, devoid of any 2012 presidential ambitions, Kibaki was encouraged by many to leave a “positive legacy” by leading from the front, which he eventually did, and he earned considerable credit for doing so. These three broad realities, whatever their relative contributions to reform success, will have profound implications for the course of the new constitution’s implementation and future operation. THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: MAIN FEATURES

A brief listing of several central features of Kenya’s new constitution will demonstrate the major departure that it represents.


There will be twelve nominated MPs by political parties based on their propor-tion of MPs (as now) but only “to represent the interests of youth, persons with disabilities and workers”.

1. A presidential system, with much clearer separation of powers, with checks on the executive especially by a significantly empowered (and enlarged) legislative branch

Relevant here are such provisions that:

1. Cabinet members can neither be officials of political parties nor (as they must be at present) MPs,

2. the parliament would have a fixed, five-year term, with a specified election date,

3. the deputy-president must be formally identified as a presidential running-mate,

4. the Senate may impeach a president by a two-thirds vote, following a similar vote by the National Assembly,

5. all major executive appointments are either vetted by the National Assembly or stem from the decisions of a number of commissions that are largely independent of presidential influence, and

6. the size of the Cabinet is limited to 22 ministers and 44 assistant ministers.

Regarding the re-fashioned National Assembly itself, beyond the 80 additional regular constituencies, there will be a female representative from each of the 47 counties and another twelve nominated MPs by political parties based on their proportion of MPs (as now) but only “to represent the interests of youth, persons with disabilities and workers”, making a total of 349 compared to 222 at present (of whom 210 are elected). The Upper House (Senate), concerned exclusively with county-level issues, will be comprised of: 47 regularly elected members, 16 nominated by political parties based on their shares of the elected Senators, and two members representing the youth and disabled, respectively (of each gender).

Other examples of the legislature’s enhanced stature are that:

1. a bill passed a second time (with a two-thirds majority) by parliament becomes law after two weeks even without presidential assent,


2. a declaration of war requires National Assembly assent, as does

3. an extension of a state of emergency (declared by the president) beyond two weeks.

At the same time, in terms of ‘in-house’ accountability, several features seek to ‘tame’ MPs as well. Among these is that an independent Salaries and Remuneration Commission will set their terms of service (as it will for all public officials), so that they no longer (through the Parliamentary Service Commission) can determine their own salaries and benefits, which have made them among the highest-paid elected officials in the world. And at the individual level, a recall provision (initiated by a public petition at the constituency level) could encourage them to be more careful about such matters as campaign promises, adherence to party policy, and general constituency service than they have in the past.

2. New presidential election rules to mitigate conflict

The ‘toxic’ nature of presidential election contests is somewhat reduced by means of a requirement for a second round, run-off, contest between the top two candidates unless one of them obtains more than half of all votes cast on the first round including at least 25 per cent in at least half of the counties. In addition, the role of the new Supreme Court in resolving any presidential election petitions within two weeks should also help to ease potential tensions, as should the provision that no winner needs to be sworn in for seven days following the official declaration of the results. Finally, here, the credi-bility of the (to be established) Election and Boundaries Commission seems assured, based on its insulation from the influence of any particular office – in marked contrast to the Electoral Commission that oversaw the disastrous 2007 election. This should boost public confidence in its decisions.

3. Three other aspects of limited/more accountable executive power

In connection with ‘taming’ executive power, three other important provisions of the new constitution should be


briefly mentioned. One is the significant dilution of the Treasury’s powers, in that the control of public finance will be split between two offices – Controller of Budget and Auditor General – both enjoying institutional independence from the Office of the President.

Next, the police are subject to certain restrictions in their powers. Among these is the requirement that criminal suspects must be released on bail if the maximum sentence for the offense in question is a sentence of less than six months. More generally, any suspect should be released on bail or bond, pending being charged or taken to trial, “unless there are compelling reasons” for not doing so.

More broadly, the regular and Administration Police are to be merged, with both responsible to an Inspector General who, while appointed by the president, must be confirmed by parliament, and who shall take direction from a (supposedly) independent National Police Service Commission. Just how these various branches of the central government will perform, both in relation to each other and to the lower (devolved) level of government, however, will require a considerable period to observe, following the next election when they are all in place.

4. A more robust system of devolved government

The 47 local government units – counties, representing the first districts established under the British – will have a guaranteed allocation of 15 per cent of the total budget, apportioned on the basis of a formula (to be worked out) that combines population with area-size. While some have argued that the powers assigned to such units do not go far enough, the fact that a successful presidential candidate (as noted above) must win at least 25 per cent of the vote in at least half of them does accord them some political recognition. So, too, does the fact that they will be run by a popularly-elected Governor who will be leading a similarly elected council.

A related issue is the fate of the current 175 local government councils, since the new constitution makes

The regular and Administration Police are to be merged, with both responsible to an Inspector General who, while appointed by the president, must be confirmed by parliament.


The constitution commits the Govern-ment to carry out its human rights obligations under international law. It is only the world’s fourth of this nature.

no mention of them. Hence they were not included in the post-promulgation swearing-in ceremonies of their national official counterparts (MPs, judicial officials, etc.), leaving their fate to the post-2012 election parliament. As with the executive, however, there remain a number of imponderables as to how these county governments will actually function, starting, perhaps, with their capacity to raise revenue (beyond the mandated allocations from Treasury) and properly account for its use.

5. Greatly enhanced human rights guarantees

While the new constitution includes the most familiar rights such as freedom of expression, assembly, association, movement, right to property and to a fair trial, there are many others also recognized, including: a wider right to privacy, information, media freedom, the right to vote and to fair working practices, including the right to strike, to use the language of one’s choice, consumer rights, to fair administrative action, and to a clean environment.

But the Bill of Rights goes considerably beyond these, offering an expansive ‘platter’ of socio-economic rights, including those to basic welfare such as housing, sanitation,

water, and freedom from hunger, while protecting children and the aged from “neglect.” Moreover, the state has judicially enforceable obligations to the progressive reali-zation of such rights, even on behalf of groups or individuals who are unable to demand them, and which must not involve undue complexity or excessive (and in some cases, any) costs. These may be applied especially to particular “disadvantaged groups” – children, youth, persons with disability, the elderly, and to the “marginalized” in general. Further, the constitution commits the Government to carry out its human rights obligations under international law. Indeed, the inclusion of all the above, together with such enforcement provisions, makes this constitution only the world’s fourth of this nature.

6. A re-invented judiciary

It is widely acknowledged that corruption and vulnerability to political interference have plagued Kenya’s judiciary for


With regard to representation, 16 seats are set aside for women in the Senate. Each of the 47 counties shall have a female MP in the National Assembly.

years. As such, reform of the ‘bench’ was seen as essential ever since the momentum for a new constitution began.

The overall structure of the judiciary remains largely the same – with the notable exception of the creation of a Supreme Court that shall issue final judgments on cases coming from the Court of Appeal, resolve constitutional disagreements, and have sole jurisdiction over presidential election disputes (as noted). Still, a number of other changes are viewed as positive, if still short of the ideal. These include the following:

▪ The mandatory resignation of the current Chief Justice within six months. Future holders of this critical office will be selected by the Judicial Service Commission and approved by the National Assembly (their appointment by the president being only ceremonial). They will serve a maximum of ten years. The Attorney-General, though actually part of the Executive, also has to resign, in his case within a year.

▪ A much more independent/professional Judicial Service Commission;

▪ A higher level of security of tenure and remuneration without any possibility of judges’ salaries being cut during service or in retirement; and

▪ The use of a vetting process for all current judges who wish to continue in office to ensure that those serving under the new constitution meet its stringent ethical standards. This does not apply for magistrates, who handle far more cases that affect the general public.

7. Various forms of compensatory treatment for women and other ‘marginalized’ categories

The position of women has been elevated in various ways. One regards citizenship, in that a foreign man who marries a Kenyan woman will now (like a foreign woman who is married by a Kenyan man) be eligible for Kenyan citizenship. It also provides for a woman’s equal rights to marital property in the case of divorce, as well as rights regarding land issues more generally. Next, with regard to representation, 16 seats are set aside for women in the Senate. Each of the 47


Amendments to certain provisions – including all those contained in the Bill of Rights – will also require obtaining a majority in a referendum.

counties shall have a female MP in the National Assembly. Moreover, no less than one third of the county assembly seats will be held by women. Other bodies (e.g., commis-sions) must also have a certain minimum proportion of women – generally, one-third). “Equal opportunities” in terms of gender must be provided in the public service as a whole. Beyond these mandated requirements, parliament is obliged to pass legislation within five years to “promote” (though not to guarantee) “the representation of women” more generally.

Just how much the combined impact of such measures will reduce gender inequality remains to be seen, but they do appear to offer significant gains in terms of the status of women.

8. A two-track (if more arduous) amendment process

As noted earlier, Kenya’s independence constitution was radically altered after 1963 (especially during its first half-decade), many of the changes serving narrow purposes. These required the endorsement of 65 per cent of all 222 MPs.

To make such short-term, self-serving alterations more difficult, the bar has been raised substantially. It allows

for two methods. The first requires the proposed amendment to be introduced in the Lower House of parliament where it must stay for 90 days, and then win approval from at least two-thirds of the members of both

Houses. Moreover, amendments to certain provisions – including all those contained in the Bill of Rights, certain of those concerning land, and the structure of devolved government – will also require obtaining a majority in a referendum, which must include getting at least 20 per cent approval in at least half of the 47 counties. The second method involves obtaining at least one million signatures from the public, after which it is submitted to parliament, which then initiates the first method.

Inasmuch as so many provisions of this constitution appear more appropriately the content of ordinary legis-lation, making amendments so difficult to achieve may


Kenya’s escalating population clearly has profound implications for the new constitution’s promise of a broad array of socio-economic rights.

eventually be the cause of regret. Various proposals to modify Kenya’s ‘first-past-the-post’ electoral system failed to gain sufficient support for inclusion. But with this system now having constitutional rather than just ordinary legis-lative status, it will be that much harder to change, should national opinion shift in that direction. The same applies to all other provisions.

IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES: NOW THE HARD PART

Whatever its margin of victory in the referendum, and however attractive many of its provisions may be, the constitution’s actual future impact, even at this very early stage, cannot be accurately appreciated without noting some challenges of actually implementing it, especially with regard to particular sections as identified by various observers.

These are of two broad types:

1. those that stretch the capacity of the relevant institu-tions including that of the state as whole despite the best of intentions, and

2. those that threaten entrenched, status quo, interests (and which appear to have already met considerable resistance; see below). As anything approaching full treatment of such issues is impossible here, only a few examples of each are presented.

1. Capacity and Other Governance Weaknesses: Easier Said Than Done?

The promise of a vast array of socio-economic entitlements is likely to fall far short of fulfillment, however sincere the commitment to ensure this. Relevant here are the results of 2009 national census released, six months late, within days of the new constitution’s ratification. It revealed an increase of eight million over the last decade, now amounting to nearly one million annually. Such an escalating population clearly has profound implications for the new constitution’s promise of a broad array of socio-economic rights.


With Kenya’s annual debt obligation at some 40 percent of all such revenue, this allocation is likely to leave central government with a major expenditure shortfall.

Indeed, with 50 per cent of Kenyans still living below the poverty line, such figures provided a sobering ‘reality-check’ with regard to all such rights-guarantees, which include: universal medical care (“of a high standard”), compulsory and free basic education, shelter, nutrition, and employment for “youth”, together with the necessary training to enable them to obtain it, as well as care of the aged. Beyond services and other prescribed benefits, costs appear set to massively escalate as a consequence of the numerous new public positions and bodies (elected offices, units of government, oversight commissions, etc.), amounting to an additional 2,441 such personnel.

Another major challenge concerns devolution, in particular, the financial capacity of these units to perform their assigned functions, regardless of the basic-minimum central government grants to which they are entitled, based especially on the local (potential) tax and natural resource-base. According to the Director-General of the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, for example, “Once they start operating, you will see how others will drastically move very fast to great heights of economic growth while some will decline.” At the same time, the leadership and technical capacity of these units to perform their assigned functions is also likely to vary widely, with those repre-senting ‘marginal’ (i.e., especially pastoralist) communities at a distinct disadvantage reflecting both challenging natural environments and short-falls in suitable human capital.

Perhaps even more serious, the mandated proportion of total revenue that is to be shared out to these units (15 per cent, as noted above) may simply be unsustainable.

With Kenya’s annual debt obligation at some 40 per cent of all such revenue, this allocation is likely to leave central government with a major expenditure shortfall, especially since counties themselves have no responsibility to contribute to such national debt obligations.

A further issue regarding financial capacity has to do with the entire implementation process itself. According to the just-established parliamentary Committee on the Implementation of the Constitution (CoIC), some KES 4b


Two incidents that went considerably beyond several (unsuccessful) tech-nical-legal challenges to the referen-dum itself appeared to confirm the fears of governance abuse.

will be required over the next two years to accomplish this. Yet, the Minister for Justice “was concerned that the government had not committed any cash to the process.”

Next, regarding leadership, individuals with sufficient popularity to win positions of Governor may not possess the requisite leadership and managerial skills. A final and related implementation issue is corruption. In this regard, fears have been expressed that especially at the county level, oversight mechanisms may be inadequate, and considering the scale of resources involved, lead to greatly expanded opportunities for nepotism and graft.

2. Resistance: On Your Marks, Get Set… Not So Fast!

Given the history of governance abuses in Kenya – combined with the fact that the political elite that has so benefited from such abuses is still (as noted at the outset) largely in place – it is clear that many provisions in the new constitution, to say nothing of its stated underlying philosophy and principles, constitute a potent threat to deeply entrenched ‘ways of doing things’.

As such, it should be expected that various strategies and tactics have been and will be made to thwart at least some of its intended impact. However, in light of the high level of public support for the constitution as expressed in the referendum, such efforts may take any (or all of) three main forms:

1. to ensure that officials sympathetic to those likely to be most threatened by its various provisions occupy certain critical offices,

2. to subvert the use of such powers through corrupt inducements, and

3. to prevent those whose ascent to power in 2012 and thereafter is considered threatening for those implicated in various abuses from doing so.

Prior to its ratification and promulgation, two incidents that went considerably beyond several (unsuccessful) technical-legal challenges to the referendum itself appeared to confirm such fears. One was the ‘clandestine’ insertion


Some two months before the referen-dum, three hand-grenades were tossed into the crowd at a ‘prayer meeting’, killing six and injuring more than one hundred.

of the words “national insecurity” into the Bill of Rights section of the proposed constitution, just before its official printing began, with the clear intention of effectively negating their guarantee, or at least leaving their promise to the discretion of relevant Government officials. Suspi-cions mounted when the Attorney-General, whose final mandate in the process had been to make only “editorial and grammatical corrections” before publication, revealed that he had been approached by “a senior official” from the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) who had asked him to do just that (and which he claimed he had refused to do). Yet while he assured the public that an investigation would be launched into the affair, no further progress was reported, including any identification by the Attorney-General himself as to just who had made the initial request to him.

The other pre-referendum incident occurred near the close of an open-air Christian ‘prayer meeting’ in Nairobi’s Uhuru Park, some two months before the referendum.

Three hand-grenades were tossed into the crowd, killing six and injuring more than one hundred. Given the fact that this meeting was in reality part of the ‘No’ campaign, many assumed that the perpetrators’ goal was to discredit its ‘Yes’ opponents. Moreover, given the nature of the weapons used, and the subsequent failure of the Police to make any progress in the investigation, some drew the conclusion that the NSIS itself must have been behind it, on instructions from ‘above’.

Moving to the process of implementation itself, its basic outline should be noted. It requires two key bodies: an independent Commission of Implementation (CoI) and a Parliamentary Implementation Oversight Committee (PIOC). Relevant bills (49 are listed in the new constitu-tion’s Transition section) are then to be drafted by the Attorney-General with input and support from the CoI and the Kenya Law Reform Commission. The process then moves forward with oversight from the PIOC.

Yet various events suggested that full commitment to both the process and content of implementation may be wanting. On the basis of such events, observers have


The highly fractious political class tends to see most attempts at compro-mise only in terms of short-term parti-san gains and losses.

identified three main tactics by which this may be done, depending upon the circumstances:

1. to populate the constitution’s new structures with as many old-order loyalists as possible,

2. to rely on sympathetic forces within the judiciary to render favorable interpretations when relevant cases reach them; and perhaps even

3. to sponsor constitutional amendments that would undo various ‘offending’ provisions. The scene may thus be set for an increasingly dramatic struggle between these opposing forces.

CONCLUSION: THE TOUGHER TEST OF CONSTITUTIONALISM

One striking feature of the new constitution is its length, with much of its content more commonly found in ordinary statutes. This seems to be the result of three reinforcing factors:

1. the vast scale of inequality in society so that without at least the promise of greater equity (if not equality) no substitute for the old constitution was likely to win suffi-cient public support for adoption,

2. a related widespread popular mistrust in government based on quite bitter experience of many Kenyans, and

3. a highly fractious political class that likewise tended to see most attempts at compromise only in terms of short-term partisan gains and losses, and thus unwilling to leave details to future interpretations of ‘basic principles’ – let alone to ‘good faith’ – so that much of the text constitutes the broadest (if not lowest) ‘common denominator’.

Yet whatever its weaknesses, Kenya’s new constitution represents a radical break from the past in terms of significant improvements in all areas of governance. Yet its fate is likely to depend, above all, on political dynamics. The ultimate question for Kenya is thus: if the new consti-tution represents a genuine victory for the underprivileged and marginalized in threatening to deny the elite much of the self-serving, arbitrary power they have enjoyed in the


past, will the latter – still very much in place – allow this to happen? Or will the ‘Kenyan people’ be able to hang on to and thus confirm their referendum victory in its fullest sense?

As argued above, therefore, those with the most at stake in the status quo were out-flanked by the combination of local reformers and international actors whose clout was greatly enhanced by the 2008 crisis. As such, therefore, the country’s national constitutional drama has, in many respects, only just begun. And this is so even if, perhaps remarkably, the two main protagonists in the ill-fated earlier attempt of 2005 – the current president and prime minister – were united on this occasion in support of ratification. For the basic fault-lines of Kenyan society and politics remain, and are bound to be activated as the country moves towards the 2012 elections. The possi-bility that this contest, or any early challenge to national integrity that may arise, including the outcome of the ICC investigations, could undermine the constitution’s promise must not escape those who struggled so hard for this ‘new dispensation’, at such cost, for so long.


Werner Böhler

In 2010 South Africa impressed the world with an almost perfectly organised Football World Cup. Major infrastructure projects and new world-class stadiums impressively demonstrated the investment and mobilisation capacity of the country. South Africa has weathered even the economic and financial crisis relatively well. Negative growth was 1.8 per cent in 2009 and unemployment grew by about one million. In 2010 however, another good three per cent growth is expected, the inflation at four per cent is within the three to six per cent region set by the Central Bank. The rand shows unusual strength against the dollar and the euro, triggered by strong (volatile) capital inflow in the financial market. South Africa is the only African country in the G20, organises the COP17 climate conference in November 2011 in Durban, recently joined the BRICS countries, and is again a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for 2011/12.

On the other hand, with a Gini-Index of 65 in 2010 South Africa shared with Brazil the leading position in terms of unequal distribution of income. According to the latest UNCTAD report direct foreign investment fell by 78 per cent, while in the region the decline was only 14 per cent.1 The official unemployment rate is 25.3 per cent, while the actual figure exceeds 40 per cent. According to a study by the Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE), in larger cities, 2.6 million, that is, 65 per cent of the four million young people between 15 and 24 were

1 | Cf. “FDI slumps 80 per cent as mining debate deters investors”, The Star – Business Report, January 19, 2011, 1.

ECONOMIC POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA – GROWTH PLANS AND GROWTH OBSTACLES

Dr. Werner Böhler is Resident Represen- tative of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Johannesburg.


The opposition Democratic Alliance is promoting a liberal economic model that, in the face of the present majority, has no chance of being implemented.

unemployed in 2005.2 The proportion of the young people in unemployment between the ages of 15 and 34 was 52.7 per cent, according to the South Africa Survey 2009/2010 by the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR).3 Partly responsible for this is the deficient educational system with a great number of school dropouts and low standards in, especially, natural sciences. As a result, some much-needed skilled workforce is not or insufficiently available in the labour market.

The governing party ANC programmatically set its sights on becoming a “Developmental State”. However, up to now this has proved to be somewhat of an empty phrase, whose

contents have little or contradictory meaning. It is difficult to clearly identify the cornerstones of the desired economic system. By contrast, the official opposition Democratic Alliance (DA), in the Open Opportunity Society, is promoting a liberal economic model that, in the face of the present majority, has no chance of being implemented.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM SINCE THE DEMOCRATIC REBIRTH

Halfway through Nelson Mandela’s term, in June 1996, the government of National Unity (ANC, NP, IFP) abandoned the macro-economic Growth, Employment and Redistribution Plan (GEAR).4 It replaced the Recon-struction and Development Programme (RDP) established in 1994 that intended to fulfil the basic needs of the poor (water, low-cost-houses, electricity) but also led to a policy change with a negative impact on investor's trust and economic growth. First, it was the trade union federation, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), that strongly criticised GEAR, rejecting it as a

2 | Cf. Ann Bernstein (ed.), “South Africa’s ‘Door Knockers’ – Young people and unemployment in metropolitan South Africa”, CDE In Depth, № 8, July 2008.3 | Cf. South African Institute of Race Relations (ed.), South Africa Survey 2009/2010, http://sairr.org.za/services/ publications/south-africa-survey/south-africa-survey-online- 2009-2010/employment-incomes (accessed February 2, 2011).4 | Department of Finance, Republic of South Africa (ed.), Growth, Employment and Redestribution. A Macroeconomic Strategy, in: http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/ gear/chapters.pdf (accessed February 2, 2011).


liberal concept. At about three per cent, the targeted growth rates remained well below the expectations. Six per cent had been considered prerequisite for reducing the high unemployment. While inflation and budget deficit decreased, between 1996 and 1999, according to the National Labour and Economic Development Institute (NALEDI), 400.000 jobs were lost in the formal sector.5 President Thabo Mbeki and the government however retained the programme in the expectation of a long-term economic growth.

GEAR was replaced by the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA) in February 2006, with the goal of halving unemployment and poverty by 2014. Six points were identified as factors in preventing higher growth:

▪ Volatility of the currency, ▪ Costs, efficiency and capacity of the national logistics system,

▪ Lack of training and lack of skilled workers, ▪ Entry barriers, constraints on competition, and lack of investment opportunities,

▪ Overregulation, in particular with respect to small and medium enterprises (SMEs),

▪ Deficits of state administration and leadership.

It was an initiative that was to involve the business, trade unions, state-owned enterprises, and all government insti-tutions including ministries.6 The programme was comple-mented one month later by the Joint Initiative on Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA), aimed at professional skills, particularly skills in shortage (technicians, engineers).7

The challenge to GEAR was the beginning of the waning influence of Thabo Mbeki on the direction of the country’s economic policy. Although Mbeki came from the Marxist

5 | Richard Knight, “South Africa: Economic Policy and Develop- ment,” July 2001, in: http:/richardknight.homestead.com/ files/sisaeconomy.htm (accessed February 2, 2011).6 | South Africa Government Information, Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA), in: http://www.info.gov.za/asgisa (accessed February 2, 2011).7 | Joint Initiative on Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA), in: http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/docs/final-rep2.pdf (accessed February 2, 2011).


The party conference 2007 fundamen-tally changed the balance of power within the ANC and the Tripartite Alli-ance. The more radical portions of the Alliance set the agenda.

school, international organisations, the industry and large sections within the ANC saw in Mbeki a guarantee for an open, market-oriented economy. In advance of the 2004 national elections, the ANC initiated a debate about the Developmental State. The concept was part of the election platform, and aimed above all to keep the radical partners, COSATU and the South African Communist Party (SACP) as well as their voters within the “Tripartite Alliance”.8 The recognition of the African State and Government

Director connected with the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) to take on more individual responsibility and to thematize the developmental orientation of the African elites from within was attributed to this new debate.

The party conference in Polokwane in December 2007 fundamentally changed the balance of power within the ANC and the Tripartite Alliance. The more radical and left-leaning portions of the Alliance set the programme and the agenda, and, in Jacob Zuma, elected a popular people’s tribune from KwaZulu/Natal as party president. Thabo Mbeki and his entire party leadership were voted out. On 25th September 2008 Mbeki’s forced resignation as president followed. In this, he was bowing to the new party leadership, who prompted his resignation. This was followed by an interim government under Kaglema Motlanthe. As party leader – in the ANC-Tradition – Jacob Zuma was leading candidate in the elections on 22th April 2009, in which he was elected president.

In his first State of the Nation address on 17th June 2009 Zuma said that he intended to build a “developmental state”, improve public service, and strengthen the democratic institutions.9 In his next speech on 11th February

8 | Cf. Roger Southall, “Introduction: Can South Africa be a developmental state?‟, in: Sakhela Buhlungu et al. (eds.), State of the Nation, South Africa 2005-2006, (Cape Town: HSRC Press 2006), xvii-xliv; Peter Meyns, Charity Musamba (eds.), “The Develepmental State in Africa – Problems and Prospects: Introcuction: Recent Debates on the Developmen- tal State in Africa,” INEF-Report 101/2010, 7-10; Charity Musamba, “The Developmental State Concept and its Rele- vance for Africa,” in: Peter Meyns, Chrity Musamba (eds.), loc. cit., 11-41.9 | http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2009/09060310551001. htm (accessed February 2, 2011).


The private sector as economic actor or the contribution of the economy to the country’s development is not men-tioned in Zuma’s first State of the Na-tion addresses.

2010 Zuma praised his government and their hard work “to build a strong developmental state”.10 It would be premature to draw any conclusions from the fact that reference to democratic institutions was not made again. It is nevertheless significant that a “performance-oriented state through improved planning” is intended to be estab-lished, which, according to his further remarks, is to be responsible for virtually all other sectors, including the economy. It remains an open question where the necessary planning capacity and the appropriate qualifications are envisaged to come from and how these are to be efficiently managed. The private sector as economic actor or the contribution of the economy to the country’s development is not mentioned. Likewise missing are comments on the creation of adequate condi-tions for private business, in particular the development of medium-sized productive enterprises by the state.

Before and during the party conference in Polokwane Jacob Zuma made far-reaching promises and concessions to his allies from the left political spectrum, COSATU and SACP and the influential ANC Youth League. In the two State of the Nation speeches and other speeches at a party level or as head of government, far-reaching promises were made. Even two years after taking office there were no visible achievements in the areas of, especially, closing the poverty gap, fighting unemployment and the provision of social and other services (Service Delivery) Zuma came under growing pressure within the ANC to change political direction especially with regard to economics. The cabinet reshuffle of October 2010 consolidated his position. However, the number of government members was again extended by six vice-ministerial positions. When forming the government in June 2009, Zuma had already increased the number of ministers from 28 to 34 and created an additional planning department in the presidential office. In this way, Zuma was able to integrate his internal party critics especially those on the left of the political spectrum. A number of departmental responsibilities were created which were concerned with economic policy and would submit independent plans. Besides the state of the nation,

10 | http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2010/10021119051001. htm (accessed February 2, 2011).


there is the fiscal policy from the Minister of Finance, which sets fiscal policy, the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) 2009-2014, the Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) from the Ministry for Trade and Industry, and recently the National Growth Path (NGP) from the Ministry of Economic

Development. Meanwhile the National Plan- ning Commission, with ministerial rank in the president’s office, is working on its first National Plan, containing long-term goals, to be submitted in November this year.11

The NGP12 published in November 2010 gives the state complete control competence and was heavily criticised by the Opposition and the society in general. The NGP defines virtually no time frames or concrete implementation plans. It remains, in essence, a declaration of intent, such as were partly contained within the GEAR und RDP and AsgiSA and Jipsa. The word “entrepreneur” occurs once in this 35-page document. It completely ignores the three “Dinokeng” scenarios, named after the place near Johannesburg13 where they were worked out and discussed in 2009 by 35 respected personalities of different backgrounds. The first scenario ends in decline and disintegration of the country because the leadership is overtaxed, weak and divided, and is unable to solve the most important problems of the people such as poverty, underemployment, security, education, and health. In the second scenario the state assumes the role as leader, managing and strangling private initiative from the business community or civil society. State-led development will however fail due to the state’s inability and lack of capacity, and lead to an increasingly authoritarian system. The “Walk Together” scenario is complex, as it involves citizens in the decision-making processes, supports initiatives from civil society and creates stable conditions for economic development. The result is an inclusive society, as the constitution requires, and responsible government. The ANC is not at present taking part in this open dialogue with civil society.

11 | Cf. Anthony Butler, “Sloppy jobs promises set Zuma up for a backlash,” Business Day, January 28, 2011, 11.12 | http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=135748 (accessed February 2, 2011).13 | http://www.dinokengscenarios.co.za (accessed February 2, 2011). Among the initiators was anti Apartheid activist Ram- phele Mamphela and Graca Machel, wife of Nelson Mandela.

The National Growth Path (NGP) pu-blished in November 2010 gives the state complete control competence and was heavily criticised by the Opposition and the society in general.


Despite critical comments even from the government alliance Jacob Zuma asked the party committees and all departments to begin implementation of the NGP. On January 8th, in his speech at the 99th ANC party conference in Polokwane he declared the year 2011 the “year of job creation through meaningful economic transformation”.14 The primary instrument for achieving this objective is the NGP, intended to create sustainable employment (decent work), as required by the new labour laws that came into force in December 2010. Confusion arose as, at the party meeting from 12th to 14th January 2011, sec-tions of the ANC took the position that any work is better than no work.15 The question of harmonizing all these plans was not one Zuma tackled.

The chief editor of the weekly Mail & Guardian, Nic Dawes, commented on the launch of the NGP in November 2010: “As of this week, South Africa has three economic policies – or is it four? And that’s just the government. The ANC and its alliance partners account for several more.”16 The well-known cartoonist, Jonathan Zapiro expressed this in his cartoon of the proverbial broth and the Ministers as the cooks, with President Zuma asking: “How can I help? … Need more Cooks?”17 Justice Malala on the other hand, in his commentary in The Times on January 10, criticises the uncritical trust in the state as an agent of change and laments the lack of vision of the political leadership.18

14 | “ANC 99th Anniversary speech by Jacob Zuma,” January 8, 2011, in: http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/ANC- 99th-Anniversary-speech-by-Jacob-Zuma-20110108 (accessed February 2, 2011).15 | Cf. Terry Bell, “Decent Work and temp jobs tie ANC and Unions in Knots,” The Star – Business Report, January 21, 2011, 2. Cf. Christopher Malikan, “Decent work: Key to growth”; Loane Sharp, “… Or a hidden agenda?”, Mail & Guardian, January 28 - February 3, 2011, 33 and 36.16 | Cf. Nic Dawes, “Crisis calls for decisive Leadership,” Mail & Guardian, November 26 - December 2, 2010, 3.17 | Jonathan Zapiro, Mail & Guardian, November 26 - December 2, 2010.18 | Cf. Justice Malala, “SA needs visionary at the helm,” The Times, January 10, 2011, 8.

“South Africa has three economic poli-cies – or is it four? And that’s just the government. The ANC and its alliance partners account for several more.” (Mail & Guardian )


WHICH ECONOMIC SYSTEM?

The South African economic model can be accurately described as “State-interventionist market economy”. There is no planning policy in South Africa, in the sense of a clear definition of the economic system. From the perspective of the dominant ANC this may be purposefully connected in a de facto existing asymmetric two-party system19. With the Developmental State as concept, which is undermined by the direct intervention on the part of the government, all interest groups of the Tripartite Alliance can meet under the umbrella of the “Broad Church ANC”20, and see their interests represented.

It is not only since the financial crisis that the ANC and the government it forms have shown an interest in the

economic systems developing in Asia. The positive economic development in some countries and the rapid overcoming of the consequences of the financial crisis, as well as the increasing trade exchange are key.

However, it is very doubtful whether the so-called Asian model of a Developmental State is transferable to the African region or individual countries. Although each quite different, the Asian development models do have certain constituent conditions in common. These include, first and foremost, a clear definition of goals and a focused strategy, a strong state with an efficient and independent public administration and effective leadership.21

On the one hand, Government intervention destroys the foundations of a Developmental State, which, in South Africa, could be a “Democratic Developmental State”. Such a state would be forged by alliances with a broad base in society, not only allowing but promoting public participation.22 The conditions for this however cannot be met as long as the ANC and its Alliance partner hold on

19 | Cf. Siegmar Schmidt, “Länderprojekt Südafrika, Evaluierung,” 2010, 19.20 | Cf. Hans-Georg Schleicher, “Bald 100 – und dann?”, Afrika Post, 4/2010, 41.21 | Cf. John McKay, “The Asian ‘Miracle’ after the Global Financial Crisis: Some Lessons for Africa,” The Brenthurst Foundation, Discussion Paper 2010/07.22 | Cf. Charity Musamba, n. 8, 38 et sqq.

It is very doubtful whether the so-called Asian model of a Developmental State is transferable to the African re-gion or individual countries.


to the concept of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR).23 On the other hand, South Africa has been devel-oping away from market economy since 2007 and puts increasing faith in public investment plans. With the NGP, the ANC government has clearly settled for state control and intervention, and thus effectively put an end to the market-oriented GEAR policy. That plan was described by ANC speaker Jackson Mthembu to the media at the party meeting as a liberal concept that had led to “jobless growth”.24 Whether there were other factors or wrongly set basic conditions at play is a question not considered by the ANC and its alliance partners. A discussion of the Dinokeng scenarios would have provided this debate with a direction in terms of content, and could have led to new insights. Perhaps this connection would have also been clarified: one of the most important goals of the NGP, which, with an eye on the local elections due in May 2011, is being aggressively marketed by the ANC and the government, is the creation of five million jobs in ten years. However, during this period, every year 600,000 young people crowd the labour market.25

POLITICAL ERRORS

It is unclear what form the South African economic system will take in the future. Based on ideological dissent in the Tripartite Alliance it appears, however, that for the foreseeable future a type of “experimental interventionism” is forming, not always congruent, occuring at frequent intervals. At the same time, with increasing centralization, governmental planning will determine the economic trade of the government. At this point, the influence of China should not be underestimated. In view of the economic sales figures, Peking’s “Market Authoritarian Model” appears increasingly attractive to many countries – above

23 | “ANC 99th Anniversary speech by Jacob Zuma,” n. 14; cf. National Democratic Revolution: http://nehawu.org.za/ uploads/Res_political.pdf (accessed February 2, 2011); http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?include=docs/pol/2007/ strategy_tactics.html&ID=2535 (accessed February 2, 2011).24 | Cf. Sam Mkokeli, “Zuma tells ANC to put Patel plan into action,” Business Day, January 14, 2011.25 | Cf. Opinion & Analysis: “ANC cannot wish jobs into existence,” Business Day, January 10, 2011, 5.

One of the most important goals of the NGP, which is being aggressively mar-keted by the ANC and the government, is the creation of five million jobs in ten years.


all in the global South.26 In the last three years the political exertion of influence in South Africa came alongside the expansion of economic cooperation. Since the takeover of party leadership from Jacob Zuma delegations from the ANC leadership to China take place on a regular basis. The expenses are shared by ANC and China’s Communist Party. As a result ANC announced the establishment of a political school for party members which is oriented towards the

Chinese model.27 It shall be headed by Toni Yengeni, former Chief Whip of the ANC in the National Parliament, who was sentenced to four years in prison for corruption in connection with the “Arms Deal”28. At the

gala dinner before the 99th Party Convention the Chinese Chapter of the Progressive Business Forum (PBF) appeared as the main sponsor. The PBF is one of the ANC’s most important fundraising organizations.29 During the campaign for the presidential elections in 2009 the ANC confirmed receiving monies from friendly parties – including China’s Communist Party.30

The current party majority seems to be following this line. The South African Communist Party also trusts central planning, but rather derives this claim from the Marxist-Leninist body of thought.31 By contrast, COSATU ignores the high level of unemployment, and the consequences for the labor market, by appearing with high wage demands and implementing minimum wages. This is in direct conflict with cheap textile imports from China. The example of Newcastle, in the North of the KwaZulu/Natal Province, shows the danger of the migration of production facilities

26 | Cf. Stefan Halper, The Peking Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century (New York: Basic Books 2010).27 | Cf. Mandy Rossouw, “ANC ponders Chinese policy,” Mail & Guardian, November 26 - December 2, 2010, 39.28 | Cf. Andrew Feinstein, “After the Party – A Personal and Political Journey inside the ANC,” Jonathan Ball Publisher.29 | Cf. Mandy Rossouw, “Chequebook politics,” Mail & Guardian, January 14 - 20, 2011.30 | Cf. Andile Sokomani, 2010: “Party financing in democratic South Africa: harbinger of doom?”, in: Anthony Butler (ed.), Paying for Politics – Party Funding and Political Change in South Africa and the Global South, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2010, 179; Mandy Rossouv, “ANC’s dodgy funders,” Mail & Guardian, March 20 - 26, 2009.31 | Cf. http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?include=docs/history/ 1991/constitution7.html (accessed February 2, 2011).

During the campaign for the presiden-tial elections in 2009 the ANC confir-med receiving monies from friendly parties – including China’s CP.


ANC General Secretary Gwede Man-tashe explained that an independent think tank will be appointed for ad-visory support for the Economic Trans-formation Committee (ETC).

to neighbouring countries.32 By contrast, Julius Malema, Chairman of the ANC-Youth League (ANCYL), continuously demands the nationalization of the mines, and demanded at the National General Council (NGC)33 of the ANC in September 2010 that the subject be included on the agenda at the next ANC Party Con- vention in 2012. In an interview after the NGC, General Secretary Gwede Mantashe explained that an independent think tank will be appointed for advisory support for the Economic Transformation Committee (ETC). In comparison, the spokesperson of the ANCYL, Floyd Shivambu, demanded that in addition to the mines, the study should also include “other strategic sectors such as banks, energy and petroleum” and continues: “The political background of the researchers is vital because they should internalize and properly understand the ANC’s 3rd NGC characterization of the ANC, particularly the multiclass character of the ANC, with its bias towards the working class and the poor.”34 The UNCTAD study mentioned at the beginning attributes the drastic decrease in foreign direct investments in 2010 to the nationalization debate in the ANC.

PARTY AND STATE

Based on the National Democratic Revolution the ANC views itself as “the forefront of exercising people’s power”.35 Consequently, the ANC also views itself as the movement which represents the interests of the people and combines these within the Party. This leads to the incorrect assessment by many members and supporters that the ANC, as an “inclusive Party”, has a claim to sole representation of the concerns of the people. The result of this is that the separation between Party and State is increasingly blurred. This is made particularly clear with the filling of public offices. With regard to the “Strategy

32 | Cf. Barry Terreblanche, “Minimum-wage threat to factories,” Business Day, January 20, 2011, 1 et seq.; id.., “Clothing Industry – Only a miracle will stop Sactwu’s suicidal trajectory,” Business Day, January 25, 2011, 9.33 | Cf. Report of the 3rd National General Council, 48-49; http://www.anc.org.za/docs/reps/2010/3rdngcx.pdf (accessed February 2, 2011).34 | Cf. Matuma Letsola, “Nationalisation row grinds on,” Mail & Guardian, November 26 - December 2, 2010.35 | “ANC 99th Anniversary speech by Jacob Zuma,” n. 14, 2.


and Tactics” document from the 2007 Convention Jacob Zuma said, in his address to the 99th anniversary of the ANC, “that we place a high premium on the involvement of our cadres in all centers of power”. And he elaborates further: “We also need their presence and involvement in key strategic positions in the State as well as the private sector, and will continue strategic deployments in this regard.”36 General Secretary Gwede Mantashe explained, in connection with the forced resignation of Thabo Mbeki as President, that the ANC appoints its “Civil Servants” and, according to their decision, also dismisses them.37

In practice, this means that cadres appointed by the ANC are seated in practically all functions, above all in public service and the powerful parastatals, but also in the area of justice, CSO, and other public sectors. With this large number, it is questionable whether those who land in these positions possess the corresponding qualifications. The practice shows that other criteria, such as achievements in the struggle for liberation, affiliation to specific party factions and political machine, are frequently decisive. This leads to poor administration, in particular, on both subor-dinate political levels, the provinces and municipalities. Extensive corruption and patronage are the unavoidable

result. In South Africa, the term “Tender-preneur” was created for the preferential treatment for the allocation of public tenders, above all with infrastructure investments.

An additional result of the “Cadre-Deployment-Policy” of the ANC is the accumulation of power in the hands of a few officials at the head of the party, because the ANC is obligated to the principle of Democratic Centralism, as Party President Zuma explained. An efficient and not politicized administration is one of the basic requirements for the functioning of a social market economy. The Asian experiences clearly prove that this is also an indispensable requirement for the economic model of the Developmental State. More generally, The Economist 1999, formulates that no country is capable of developing itself without “an

36 | “ANC 99th Anniversary speech by Jacob Zuma,” n. 14, 7; http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?include=docs/pol/2007/ strategy_tactics.html&ID=2535 (accessed February 2, 2011).37 | Cf. Werner Böhler, Julia Weber, “Südafrika nach den Wahlen,” KAS-Auslandsinformationen 4/2009, 38 et sqq.

A result of the “Cadre-Deployment- Policy” of the ANC is the accumulation of power in the hands of a few officials at the head of the party.


independent class of public servants”, who free themselves from their political, ethnic, or other loyalties.38 The ANC follows the constitutional guidelines in Section 197 only insofar, that public service should be more representative with regard to the population. However, it disregards that, according to the same section, it must also be efficient, and politically independent.39 Minister Ebrahim Patel shares concerns with regard to the capacities of the national bureaucracy when he writes, with an eye towards the plans of the NGP that the bureaucracy capable of implementing those plans does not exist.40

Because a departure from “Cadre Deploy- ment” is not possible for ideological reasons, the ANC government brought about two reform plans: the inspection of the role, number, and borders of the provinces, and the “Single Public Service Bill”. Both reforms inevitably lead to more concentration of power for the national executives. The change in the province borders, or their merger, not only undermines the “Three-Sphere-System” anchored in the constitution, but would also eliminate the opposition government of the DA in the Western Cape and create a long-standing structural majority for the ANC. The imple-mentation of the Single Public Service Bill would, however, give the national government the opportunity to appoint their cadres at all political levels, at will. Unpleasant public servants could, in this way, be arbitrarily changed, even in opposition-ruled provinces and municipalities.

PARASTATALS

The number of state-owned enterprises in South Africa is estimated at 300; however the intention is to reduce that to 80 strategic entities.41 These ranges from Eskom (power

38 | Quoted from Jeffrey Anthea, 2010, Affirmation Action and Black Economic Empowerment in South Africa, 13; Working Paper prepared for the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung conference “Targeting Horizontal Inequality. Affirmative Action, Identity and Conflict” in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 11/2010.39 | Cf. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Section 197, Public Service.40 | Cf. Ebrahim Patel, “New Growth Path: An attemt to provoke a long-overdue conversation,” Business Day, December 3, 2010.41 | Cf. Mandy Mossouw, Lynley Donnely, “ANC ponders greater role in parastatals,” Mail & Guardian, December 10 - 16, 2010.

The ANC government brought about two reform plans: the inspection of the role, number, and borders of the provinces, and the “Single Public Ser-vice Bill”.


supply), Acsa (airport operator), PetroSA, Rand Water to South African Tourism, Telcom and Transnet.42 Meantime, the ANC now rules out privatizations, as discussed in the first decade of the democratic South Africa. Rather, the State Owned Enterprises (SOE) are viewed as strategic instru-ments in the hands of the state43 and should, according to the NGP among others, contribute to the reduction in unemployment, to the education of youth, and the modernization of infrastructure. However, the Parastatals largely do not fulfill this task. The main reason is again

to be found in the Cadre Deployment policy and the ANC’s exertion of political influence. Frequent changes at the management level of the state-owned enterprises combined with high severance pay (Golden Handshake)

are the result.44 The “Service Delivery” protests feared by the ANC express the dissatisfaction of the people with the basic supply of power, drinking water, and homes. In order to correct the widespread mismanagement the Minister for Public Enterprise, Barbara Hogan, intended to enable independent management of the Parastatals. She was replaced during the shuffling of the cabinet in October 2010. Instead, the ANC intends to subject the SOE to the orders of the ANC government thereby following the Chinese model.45

However, the Parastatals also serve to protect the power of the ANC by calling on them for party financing.46 The ANC has its own Fundraising Company, Chancellor House Holding (CHH). It is involved with 25 per cent of Hitachi Power Africa Holdings, which received a multi-million Rand contract from Eskom. The often-cited comment concerning

42 | http://www.afribiz.info/content/parastatals-and-government- structures-of-south-africa (accessed February 2, 2011).43 | Cf. Brendan Boyle, “The Big Bang – New unit mooted to take control of 13 parastatals wit hthe president in charge,” Sunday Times – Business Times, March 22, 2009, 1.44 | Cf. Brendan Peacock, “Fat-cat parastatal boses come and go but the get the cream,” Sunday Times –Business Times, December 2, 2010, 1.45 | Cf. Mandy Rossouw, “ANC ponders Chinese Policy,” Mail & Guardian, January 26 - Febraury 2, 2011, 39.46 | Cf. Zwelethu Jolobe, 2010, “Financing the ANC: Chancellor House, Eskom and the dilemmas of party finance reform,” in: Anthony Butler (ed.), Paying for Politics – Party Funding and Political Change in South Africa and the Global South, Konrad- Adenauer-Stiftung, 2010, 201-217.

The “Service Delivery” protests feared by the ANC express the dissatisfaction of the people with the basic supply of power, drinking water, and homes.


The General Secretary of the ANC and current Vice President of the Country, Kaglema Motlanthe, said in January, 2007 that BEE spurred corruption at all levels of government.

this from the General Secretary of COSATU, Zwelinzima Vavi is: “God help us all.”47 And, this is just one example. A gala dinner was held on the eve of both the NGC as well as the ANC Party Convention for the 99th anniversary. Companies could purchase a seat at the table of President Zuma for 500,000 Rand or a seat at a table of Minister’s for up to 300,000 Rand.48 Represented here are, above all, the Parastatals and BEE Companies. The new party headquarters of the ANC in the Limpopo Province, one of the poorest provinces in South Africa, was inaugurated with the Party Convention. The costs for the Frans Hohlala House, which was playfully referred to by local politicians as the Luthuli House II after the original building in Johan-nesburg, amounted to 40 million Rand. The new Party Headquarters, according to the statement of the Provincial Chairperson, Cassel Mathale, cost the ANC nothing.49

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND BLACK ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT

Leading ANC politicians already confirmed in 2007 that Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) failed. The former Minister for Public Enterprises, Alec Erwin, explained in July, 2007 in front of the South African Business Club in London: “affirmative action is for all intents and purposes dead”.50 The General Secretary of the ANC and current Vice President of the Country, Kaglema Motlanthe, said in January 2007 that BEE spurred corruption at all levels of government.51 Moeletsi Mbeki, entrepreneur and brother of Thabo Mbeki, uses strong language to express his criticism when he says BEE “strikes a fatal blow against black entrepreneurship by creating a small class of unpro- ductive but wealthy black crony capitalists made up of ANC

47 | Cf. Janet Smith, “Beacon, compass, watchdog,” The Star, December 3, 2010, 17.48 | Cf. Werner Böhler, “Der ANC wird 100 – und ist auf der Suche nach seiner Idendität,” Länderbericht, September 27, 2010, http://kas.de/wf/doc/kas_20608-1522-1-30.pdf (accessed February 2, 2011).49 | Cf. Mandy Rossouw, “Checkbook Politics,” Mail & Guardian, January 14 - 20, 2011, 8.50 | Quoted from Anthea, 2010, n. 38, 24.51 | Cf. Anthea, n. 38, 75.


politicians”.52 NGP Minister Ebrahim Patel adds: “Govern-ment has adopted the position that Black Economic Empow-

erment should seek to empower all histori-cally disadvantaged people rather than only a small group of black investors. Current BEE provisions have, however, in many instances failed to ensure a broad-based approach.”53 For the implementation of BEE the Broad

Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (BBBEE) was passed in 2003, which was, however, only brought into force in August, 2008.54 With this the prior existing sectoral charters were unified. An integral component of the BEE law is a complex “Score Card System” which includes seven elements based on codes, with which the “Empowerment Progress” of the company can be measured. These are:

▪ Direct empowerment through ownership and control of enterprises and assets.

▪ Management at senior level. ▪ Human resource development and employment equity. ▪ Indirect empowerment through: preferential procure- ment, enterprise development, and corporate social investment (a residual and open-ended category).55

There are objectives for the individual goals which must be reached after five to ten years. Their compliance is checked by accredited agencies. However, the basic problem does not lie in the lack of willingness of the companies to implement the BEE requirements. Out of 1,500 companies questioned 84 per cent implemented Affirmative Action measures during the transition phase through 1995, which the South Africa Survey, conducted by the Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), proves once a year since 1946.56 This also includes the participation of black people in the

52 | Moeletsi Mbeki, “Ripe for the plunder,” The Citizen, September 21, 2009, cf. id. 2009, “Architects of Poverty – Why African’s Capitalism needs changing,” Pan Macmillan South Africa.53 | http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=135748, 21, (accessed February 2, 2011); siehe auch Jana Marais, “The Billionaires are back,” Sunday Times – Business Times, 1 and 3.54 | http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=68031 (accessed February 2, 2011).55 | http://www.southafrica.info/business/trends/empowerment/ bee.htm (accessed February 2, 2011); As to the Codes cf. Anthea, n. 38, 38-57.56 | Cf. Anthea, n. 38, 20-24.

“Government has adopted the positi-on that Black Economic Empowerment should seek to empower all historically disadvantaged people rather than only a small group of black investors.” (NGP Minister Ebrahim Patel)


According to a survey in 2009 25 per cent of managers in first-line manage-ment of companies are black people. In 1994, this figure was five per cent.

company and leading management functions. However, the basic bottleneck exists in the shortage of “Black people”57 with the appropriate training and the necessary experience for senior positions, share ownership, or ownership.

The most recent survey from September 2009 conducted by P-E Corporate Services, estab-lished significant increases in the percentage of black managers in Senior Positions and middle management. According to this survey 25 per cent of managers in first-line management of companies and 28 per cent of middle management are black people. In 1994, these figures were five per cent and seven per cent.58 In his calculations, Lawrence Schlemmer comes to a comparable increase in the development of a “Black Middle Class”. However, he concludes that these growth rates cannot be continued due to the mediocre educational system.59 Numbers prove the steeply increasing demand for qualified managers over the coming years. Already in 1998, an additional need for up to 500,000 managers in middle and first-line management was established. With a growth of two to three per cent per year in the next 15 years an additional 750,000 managers will be needed. This number increases to 1.25 million with a growth rate of five to six per cent.60

Despite high unemployment companies cannot find enough trained, skilled workers and managers available in the labour market. Nevertheless, the companies must implement the BEE requirements if they want to participate in public contracts, or if they are dependent on licenses or permits. The most recent South Africa Survey from SAIRR proves that even the Parastatals cannot meet the quotas and that their employee-structure does not correspond to the overall distribution of the population. This is attributed to the lack of qualified workers, and is proportionate in every population group. The manager of the project, Marius Roodt, confirms this in a press release from January 26, 2011: “This is a reflection of the dire skills shortage

57 | Section 1 of the Broad-Based Black Economnic Empowerment Act defines black people as “a generic term which means Africans, Coloureds and Indians”, cf. n. 54.58 | Cf. Anthea, n. 38, 20-24.59 | Ibid., 69-70.60 | Ibid., 48-49.


The “pass-rate” at private schools is 98 per cent. State schools, though, are achieving very poor results.

in the country. Companies, and indeed Parastatals, have to take on skilled personnel, no matter what the colour of their skin.”61 International firms are also subject to these requirements. If they present an insurmountable hurdle due to the limitations of the labour market and restrictive immigration or residency regulations, this could have an impact on location and investment decisions, which the German Chamber of Industry and Commerce (Deutsche IHK) confirms for Southern Africa.

DEFICIENT EDUCATION SYSTEM

With a sum of 165 billion rand, education was the largest single item in the fiscal policy of 2010. This constitutes up to about 18 per cent of the budget. South Africa thereby spends more on education than comparable countries. Still in comparative studies of education results the country is regularly among the lower end.62 The Minister for Education, Angie Motshekga, considered the rise in the “Pass Rate” for National Senior Certificate (NSC) exams from 60.6 per cent in 2009 to 67.8 per cent in 2010, a growth of 7.2 per cent, to be a great success. The highest quota was reached in 2003 with 7.3 per cent.

A nuanced view however presents a different picture. While before 40 per cent of the maximum points were required for receiving the higher grade, the requirements for passing the NSC are now 30 per cent in individual subjects.

Of 1.3 million school beginners in the year 1999, only 579,384, or 44 per cent, finished in 2010 with an NSC certificate. When the at least 100,000 who did not go to their exams

are added to this and this is used as a basis, the “pass-rate” is only 57 per cent. Further insight is gained when private and state schools are differentiated. According to provided by the Independent Examination Board (IEB), the “pass-rate” at private schools is 98 per cent. There are certainly also state schools that, with comparatively fewer available means, achieve very good results. However, the

61 | South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), Press Release, “Parastatals not compliant with employment equity demands,” January 26, 2011, http://sairr.org.za/media/ media-releases (accessed February 2, 2011).62 | Cf. Sue Blaine, “Key sufjects spark pride and concern,” Business Day, January 7, 2011.


Minister Angie Motschekga declared in January 2011 that it would take two decades to make up the lag in the edu-cation system.

flipside of this is that other state schools are achieving very poor results. When differentiated according to subject combinations, it is apparent that math and science were chosen by fewer candidates than in 2008. It is these skills however that the economy desperately needs. The NGP has the goal of training an additional 30,000 engineers by the year 2014. How this is to be achieved with such a low “pass-rate” is not illuminated in the plan. In 2009, only 98,000 matriculation candidates, which is equivalent to the British A-level, passed the physics exam with more than 30 per cent. In order to be accepted by universities special-izing in natural sciences, 40 per cent is necessary.

Even 16 years after the beginning of democracy, education results do not correspond to the financial means employed. Minister Angie Motschekga declared in January 2011 that it would take two decades to make up the lag in the education system.63 Poor teacher training programs, under-payment of teachers, problems with recruiting teachers for schools in rural areas, school management deficits as well as wide-spread poor school infrastructure and insufficient equipment for teaching and learning materials are among the causes. Corruption through Cadre Deployment is another. It is apparent that the qualification requirements were “standardized” for the last matric exams. The director of the quality assurance office “Umaluse”, Professor Sizwe Mabizela, in an interview with the Sunday Times, confirmed that a change in the performance requirements was planned. However he maintained that he could not give any further details because of the danger of misinter-pretation. He stated that it was a “confidential process but not a secretive one”.64

Solutions could be found in a study by the CDE65 published in August 2010 on “low-fee private schools”, as they were introduced in countries like India, Chile and Ghana as “private schooling for the poor”. In South Africa, as the study proves, these were often founded or co-funded by

63 | Cf. SA-Today, December 6, 2010, 3.64 | Cf. Interview with Chris Barron in the Sunday Times, January 16, 2011, 7.65 | Cf. Ann Bernstein (ed.), “Hidden Assets – South Africa’s low-fee private schools,” in: CDE in Depth, № 10, August 2010.


Without a better school education, the universities will have to lower their own levels of quality. This would af-fect the international competitiveness of South Africa.

corporations. The actual percentage of these schools in all provinces is said to be about 30 per cent. The ministry of education indicated that the number of private schools in 2008 was 3.4 per cent. Parents say that factors in deciding to send their children to private schools are above all the better results in school certificates and the better educated and motivated teacher, who are, in part, paid less than other teachers. It is questionable whether or not the ANC government is opening itself up to this possibility of a mixed school system or if ideological reasons will hinder it. Alternatively, the national school system would have to be thoroughly reformed, above all in regard to teacher

training and their motivation. The fact that this is possible is underlined by the example of the Masibambane High School in the Bloekombos Community in the outskirts of Cape Town.66

Without a better school education, the universities will have to lower their own levels of quality. This would not only affect the employment market and job situations, but it would affect the international competitiveness of South Africa, also in comparison with other developing countries. For corporations, this would have the consequence that they would no longer be able to fulfil BEE requirements. Multinational corporations could rethink location decisions or revise investment decisions.

FURTHER ASPECTS

The NGP is characterized by a general mistrust in the allocation capability of the market through responsible decisions by business persons. For this reason the NGP has the goal “to redirect savings and investment toward productive and infrastructure projects in support of employment and sustained growth”.67 Moreover, many specifications and intention declarations are contained within the NGP without specific statements concerning their implementation and their achievability, with the exception of mentioning that the state and the government will be responsible. A statement about the partnership cooperation with the private sector in achieving set targets

66 | Cf. DA-Today, January 24, 2011.67 | Cf. n. 9, 27.


The capping of salaries at the level of approx. 45,000 Rand per month also has an unpleasant aftertaste when the minister earns 1.5 million a year.

is not to be found. However, the government is reliant on the cooperation with social partners in implementing the NGP.68

In addition, numbers in connection with political-ideological views of the ANC are partially established that have not recognizable political or economic basis. “A broad devel-opment pact on wages”69 that should be implemented by social partners is suggested. According to this, the monthly income of 3,000 to 20,000 rand per month should rise in relation to the inflation rate in addition to a measured rise in wage. Salaries over 20,000 should also rise in relation to the rate of inflation, without a rise in wage. Salaries of “senior managers and executives” over 550,000 Rand per year should be frozen at this level. This formulation seems to be an indication that “public servants” are not affected. Now it is the salaries of the public servants that are reflected in the budget. Alone the rise in salaries in the year 2010 burdens the budget with an additional 6.2 billion rand.70 Lavish bonus and salary payments for the Parastatals are also no model for what is demanded of the social partners in the NGP. The capping of salaries at the level of approx. 45,000 Rand per month also has an unpleasant aftertaste when the minister earns 1.5 million a year and Jacob Zuma approved a salary rise for his cabinet members of 5 per cent. It is equally questionable why the cabinet meeting of 16-20 of January 2011 took place in a luxury golf and safari resort in the province of Limpopo and not in the government buildings in Pretoria. The estimated costs were up to 15 million rand, which will be charged to the government treasury.71

According to NGP, the government is obligated, within the parameters of the “pact”, to secure social welfare payments to poor members of the communities and disadvantages employees. How this expensive promise is supposed to be administered is not said. Already approximately 14 million

68 | Steven Friedman, “New Growth Path success needs ‘new politics’”, Business Day, January 26, 2011, 9.69 | Cf. n. 9.70 | Cf. Annabel Bishop, “Civil servants wages eat into ability to build crucial capacity,” The Star – Business Report, 25.71 | Cf. Mandy Rossouw, “Luxury lekgotla irks officials,” Mail & Guardian, January 21-27, 2011, 2.


The potential of this country, a first-rate tourist destination with access to significant raw materials and a rela-tively well-developed infrastructure, is not used adequately.

people receive social welfare payments. This number will rise to approximately 18 million by the year 2013. In relation to this only 5.5 million carry 95 per cent of income tax generation. The corporate taxes of approximately 2,000 companies are added to this. This base of taxpayers is too small to finance the growing number of social welfare payments in addition to public services. The limits have already been stretched to such an extent that only a rise in the number of taxpayers can resolve the dilemma.72

Independently from the nationalization debate in the Tripartite Alliance the NGP announces the establishment of an government-owned mining company and a government-owned bank. However, the NGP does not answer the question of why these new companies in the hands of the government are supposed to be better managed than the existing parastatals. Many of these, such as the electricity supplier Eskom, the government airline SAA or the government station SABC, require regular financial injec-tions from the fiscal policy. Added to this is a fluctuation in the injection supplied to these government businesses that are either based on political influence or the incapability of the company leadership. “It was all about the state”, the Business Day commented on the speech by Jacob Zuma at the ANC party convention on January 8, 2011. This does not apply any less to the NGP.

OUTLOOK

The economic performance of South Africa has, in the two decades since the beginning of democracy, developed positively though at a low level, with the exception of the year

of crisis in 2009. In the nineties, the growth rate was a moderate two to three per cent. In the context of the positive world economic development, it rose in the last decade to four to 5.5 per cent. South Africa however remains signifi-cantly behind other emerging countries such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, or Vietnam. The potential of this country, a first-rate tourist destination with access to significant raw materials and a relatively well-developed infrastructure, is not used adequately due to false political directions.

72 | Cf. Annabel Bishop, n. 70; National Treasury and South African Revenue Service (ed.), Tax-Statistics 2009, 14.


The deciding factor is the mixing of state and party and, above all, the Cadre-Deployment-System with fatal consequences for independence and the efficiency of governmental admi-nistration.

The basic democratic conditions have changed negatively since the negotiated transition. Being in the position of dominant governing party, the ANC seems determined to secure its power permanently or at least long term. Included in this aim are the exclusive proportional right to vote with closed party lists, party financing as well as the increasing centralization of the concentration of power to national executives through weakening lower political levels, interventions in justice such as in the setting up of the Judicial Service Commission, the dissolution of the special unit for fighting corruption in the public sector (Scorpions), cutting off the National Prosecution Authority (NPA) or the purposeful limitation of the media through the Media Tribunal and the Protection of Information Bill. The deciding factor however is the mixing of state and party and, above all, the Cadre-Deployment-System with fatal consequences for independence and the efficiency of governmental administration. Accordingly, the quality of democracy in South Africa has worsened, mostly since 2007, and, as the Bertelsmann-Transformations-Index (BTI) and the Global Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forums (WEF) 2008/2009 compared with 2010/2011 attest, the competitiveness of the country has worsened as well.73

From 2007 at the latest, the ANC has defined South Africa as a “developmental state” with a “developmental economy”. Irrespective of whether this is meant to be the classic development state concept from Asian countries or the democratic-developmental model practiced in Botswana and Mauritius, an autonomous and efficient governmental bureaucracy, which is not present (anymore), is the basic requirement for this to work. Edigheji defines the Democratic Developmental State as “one that forges broad-based alliances with society and ensures popular participation

73 | Bertelsmann Stiftung, Transformation Index 2010, Gütersloh 2009, http://bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/fileadmin/ pdf/Anlagen_BTI_2010/BTI_2010__Rankingtabelle_D_web.pdf (accessed February 2, 2011); World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011, Geneva 2010, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitiveness Report_2010-11.pdf (accessed February 2, 2011); World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2008- 2009, Geneva 2008, https://members.weforum.org/pdf/ GCR08/GCR08.pdf (accessed February 2, 2011).


The South African economic system desperately needs a clear direction, because the high unemployment base of 40 percent presents the potential for a great amount of unrest.

in the governance and transformation process”.74 This criterion is not fulfilled in South Africa because the ANC acknowledges its democratic centralism and the internal debates take place within the party and within the param-eters of the “Broad Church”. Initiatives by the opposition and by (independent) civilians are, in contrast, ignored. The question of whether a developmental state concept can function in South Africa is therefore justified. The realities will again and again force the ANC government to continue interventions in the economy as long as no other basic directions are taken. This would require a complete revision of the ANC’s and their alliance partners COSATU and SACP’s objectives.

The daily policy interventions that, due to the complexity of economic processes, must be followed by further interven-tions go beyond the regulatory capacity of the government and the administration. Conflicting national plans and

ideological influences unsettle the private economy and scare international investors away. On the other hand, the South African economic system desperately needs a clear direction, because the high unemployment base of 40 per cent presents the potential

for a great amount of unrest. Dissatisfaction about the lack of social services (service delivery) and the widespread political machinery already led to violent street protests in townships that could again gain momentum before the upcoming communal elections in May 2011. Higher levels of migration resulted in the xenophobic attacks of May 2008.

In order to achieve a reduction in unemployment, growth rates of the BIP that are over six per cent are required. The achievement of this goal must have an economically friendly climate and trust in the economic system as its prerequisite. Clear basic conditions and a reliable legal state of law are absolute necessities. Active middle-ground policy to diversify the economy must also be the goal. The processing and refinement of raw materials would lead to a higher level of value and increased income from exports and would also create additional manufacturing jobs.

74 | Quoted from Meyns, Charity Musamba, n. 8, 40.


Additional jobs in larger corporations and a productive middle class would be created and, on top of this, young people would receive training. More people in employment expands the income basis of the state and lead to higher national revenues that can be used for the expansion and modernization of the infrastructure as well as the estab-lishment of a transparent social service system. In short, it means that: a move away from a state-interventionist market economy model and a move towards a regulatory policy of the social market economy must take place.

It is doubtful whether the ANC is in the position to renew its programs and to return the (strong) state back to the establishment of basic conditions in order to give the economy room to grow. Civil society is ready for a new direction in the economic and social system. The third scenario of the Dinokeng Iniative reveals this possibility.

The article was finished on February 1, 2011.


Karl Fischer

Six months after the biggest flood disaster in Pakistan’s history, approximately seven of 13 million people who lost their houses and possessions to the floods around the Indus and its tributaries1 are still without adequate protection or food in the face of the cold winter weather which has been prevailing since December. The worst affected are those hundreds of thousands of people who have already returned to their ruined villages because they could no longer stand the deplorable conditions in the refugee camps or because they were asked to leave the schools, boarding-schools and administration buildings that were being used as emergency shelters. And there are also those tens of thousands of flood victims who were unable to escape as the flood waters rose. It took until the beginning of December before representatives of the World Food Programme, together with a unit of the Pakistan Army and a non-governmental organisation (NGO), were able to reach eleven villages in the Jamshoro District that had been completely cut off by the floods. There were 1,700 families with around 11,900 people in these villages2, half-starved, living in what was left of their huts, and who had given up all hope of rescue.

The problem is not only the flooded areas but also the refugee camps, where around one million people still live, according to government figures. For weeks now there has been such an acute lack of the most essential supplies that well-known NGOs such as ActionAid Pakistan now believe there is a real danger of hunger riots breaking out. The UN had warned at the end of October that it did not have the financial resources to keep the flood victims supplied with

1 | Tahir Ali, “Left in the Lurch,” The News, December 12, 2010.2 | According to estimates by the World Bank (WB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) around 1.7 million people lost their homes. A Pakistani family comprises eight to ten people on average.

PAKISTAN AFTER THE FLOOD

Dr. Karl Fischer was ambassador to Pa-kistan (1988-1990), Deputy Head of the UN Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA 2001) and Chief-of-Staff to the UN Aid Organisation in Afghanistan (UNAMA 2002–2004). Since 2004 he works as a regional consultant for South Asia.


The visas of all aid workers active in Pakistan were cancelled as of January 31. But the reality is that after the floods the country still needs the assistance of international experts.

food and water over the whole winter because they had only received around a half of the two billion U.S. Dollars in aid money that had been pledged by donor countries.

In light of the dire predicament of millions of people it is hard to understand, especially for the victims themselves, why the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA)3 decided at the end of December to declare that the initial phase of direct disaster relief had in fact come to an end. More specifically the visas of all aid workers active in Pakistan were cancelled as of January 31. But the reality is that after the floods the country still needs the assistance of international experts to deal with what has proved to be an unprecedented humanitarian disaster.

In his official communication to the UN coordinator for humanitarian aid in Pakistan the NDMA Director General, General Nadeem Ahmed, claimed that “the situation had stabilised very quickly”, apart from one or two regions in the Sindh and Baluchistan provinces “where there is still flood water and people are not able to return to their houses.”4 It is clear that the NDMA is basing its estimate of the level of normalisation on the number of refugees who have returned home, irrespective of the living conditions they find where their houses once stood.

The International Crisis Group5 believe that this ignorance is due to the fact that the NDMA is dominated by senior officers, and they draw parallels with the way in which one and a half years earlier, after their military operation against the Taliban in the Swat Valley of North Pakistan and surrounding tribal areas, the army forced the people who had fled the war zone to return quickly to their bombed-out and destroyed homes, thus enabling them to claim that

3 | National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), the operations arm of the National Disaster Management Commission set up by the Pakistan government following the 2005 earthquake.4 | Riaz Khan Daudzai, “Close relief operation by end January: NDMA”, The News, December 31, 2010, http://thenews.com.pk/ TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=23093&Cat=2 (accessed January 12, 2011).5 | International non-governmental organization, founded in 1995 with the aim of analysing conflicts and developing solutions.


It is a tragedy in itself that this flood disaster struck precisely the war-torn areas, in which the people had just started to lead a normal life again.

the refugee problem had been “successfully resolved”. It is a tragedy in itself that this flood disaster struck precisely

those war-torn areas in the Khyber-Pakh- tunkhwa province (formerly known as North West Frontier Province – NWFP) and in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), in which the people had just started to lead

a normal life again, despite the ever-present threat from the Taliban.

The majority of the flood victims were living in extreme poverty even before the flood, but now their situation is completely hopeless. It is the same throughout the country, where every essential area of everyday life was already in serious difficulties even before the floods struck. But now this national disaster has made the economic, social, political and educational crisis much worse. Foreign financial aid will not be enough on its own to solve the problem. The country itself will also have to make a huge effort, including some serious rethinking of its economic and political direction.

LOSS AND DAMAGES

The cost of the floods, as calculated by the NDMA, only really hints at the true human cost of the tragedy for the loss of homes and possessions were not included in the figures.

By the middle of October the floods had claimed 1,985 lives and 2,946 people had been injured. By the end of September the UN World Health Organisation (WHO) had also recorded 99 cases of cholera. The fear is that during the winter many more people will fall prey to respiratory illness, malaria, diarrhoea and skin diseases, especially undernourished children and the elderly. Medical treatment in the flooded areas is severely limited as the floods destroyed or partially destroyed 515 existing medical facilities.6 And where individual hospitals and infirmaries are still functioning, collapsed bridges and washed-away

6 | ADB and WB, “Pakistan Floods 2010, Damage and Needs Assessment,” analysis delivered to the Pakistan Development Forum (PDF), Islamabad, November 14 and 15, 2010, “Health” section.


In the education sector alone the da-mages are immense: 10,248 schools have been destroyed or damaged, along with 23 higher education facili-ties and 21 technical colleges.

roads make it difficult for people to actually get to them. On December 9, the United Nations bulletin on the humani-tarian situation in the flooded areas reported that of the 1,938,207,510 U.S. dollars earmarked for emergency aid, only 50 per cent had so far been made available.7 Education projects are worst hit (nine per cent funded), followed by accommodation (20 per cent), water supply and hygiene (29 per cent) and medical treatment (35 per cent). In the already chronically-underfunded education sector alone the damages are immense: 10,248 schools have been destroyed or damaged, along with 23 higher education facilities and 21 technical colleges.8 The fact that hundreds of educational buildings had to be used as emergency centres well beyond the end of the summer break and had to be completely cleaned and sanitised once the refugees had left, means that in the Hyderabad district alone at least 17,000 school children and students will have to miss a full academic year.9

DEVASTATED LIVES AND SUPPLY BOTTLENECKS

The catastrophic impact of the flooding on the livelihoods of people in rural areas and on the supply of agricultural products to the rest of Pakistan can be seen in the fact that 19,000 villages with 1,750,000 houses were washed away, 2,244,644 hectares of agricultural land were lost and the harvest was destroyed. And nobody knows when the devastated fields and plantations can be planted or sown again. In addition, initial estimates from November 1410 suggest that 315,600 camels, water buffalo, cattle, horses and donkeys, 1,208,300 sheep and goats as well as 10,279,700 poultry birds also drowned in the floods. For the people returning to their villages, these animals should have been a source of food or income. The loss of so many animals also meant that the leather industry, Pakistan’s second largest export industry after textiles, has lost a significant part of its raw material supply. Wells everywhere

7 | OCHA, Pakistan Humanitarian Bulletin, Issue 9, Islamabad, December 9, 2010.8 | ADB and WB, “Pakistan Floods”, “Education”.9 | “17,000 students may face loss of academic year,” The News, October 16, 2010.10 | ADB and WB, “Pakistan Floods”, “Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries”.


There will be bottlenecks in the supply of food to the country as a whole, a re-duction in the supply of raw materials to industry and therefore a noticeable loss in export volumes.

have been contaminated and 3,999 drinking water facilities and 2,842 sewage treatment plants have been damaged. They urgently need disinfection and repair at an estimated cost of 93.9 million U.S. dollars,11 in order to provide people and animals with clean drinking water and to prevent the spread of disease.

DAMAGED INFRASTRUCTURE

The extensive but outdated Indus Basin Irrigation System (IBIS)12 is the largest continuous irrigation system in the world. 90 per cent of the country’s agricultural production is situated in this area and it is here that 54 per cent of Pakistan’s workforce produces 23 per cent of the country’s gross national product. The irrigation system incorporates three large dams and reservoirs, 50,000 kilometres of canal systems and 1.6 million kilometres of irrigation channels.13 The damage to this system, which irrigates more than 18 million hectares of agricultural land used mostly for rice, wheat, maize, sugar, cotton, fruit and vegetable growing, is estimated at 277.6 million U.S. dollars. Initial estimates for the cost of rebuilding the system vary between 427 and 982.3 million U.S. dollars. In concrete terms there is damage to 46 dams and barrages, broken canal walls in hundreds of places in all provinces and a generally insuf-

ficient and neglected drainage system. As repairing these installations will take at least two to three years, it has to be assumed that harvest yields will be significantly down and this means that there will be bottlenecks in

the supply of food to the country as a whole, a reduction in the supply of raw materials to industry and therefore a noticeable loss in export volumes, and above all a level of poverty amongst people living on the land which it is not yet possible to predict.

Right up until the end of the year people in most of the flooded areas still had no contact with the outside world. People in those areas without mobile phone networks lost

11 | ADB and WB, “Pakistan Floods”, “Water and Sanitation”.12 | IBIS: Indus Basin Irrigation System.13 | Fazlur Rahman Siddiqi, “Indus Basin Irrigation System of Pakistan,” CSR & Companies, Reports & Surveys, July 10, 2008, 1.


The majority of roads are now non-existent or so badly damaged that they cannot be used for transporting aid to those in need. This has made it extremely difficult for refugees to re-turn home.

their only means of phoning relatives, friends or organi-sations or even of calling for help as a result of damage to 734 kilometres of telephone cables, 594 exchanges and 284 relay stations.14 In many places the only telephones available to the public were in administration buildings, but at least 1,437 of these buildings were badly damaged or totally destroyed.

The majority of roads are now non-existent or so badly damaged that they cannot be used for transporting aid to those in need. This has made it extremely difficult for refugees to return home. In total the floods destroyed 793 kilometres of main roads, including 33 bridges on eight of these main traffic arteries. 24,295 kilometres of minor paved roads in the provinces, districts and communities are now unusable. A large proportion of the broad network of unpaved roads has either been flooded or totally washed away as rivers changed their course during the floods and hillsides collapsed.

The under-developed and unprofitable rail network is not even close to being able to provide alternative transport to the road network. 1,224 kilometres of tracks need to be re-laid as many rails lay under up to a metre of water or were washed away. On six important lines operations had to be totally suspended. Estimated damages at the beginning of October were almost 60 million euros. On top of that there was a loss of income from reduced passenger and goods traffic of eight and a half million euros and additional expenditure required for train trips for delivering emergency aid. Four airports also sustained damage which limited their use for aid flights.15

The impact of the floods on energy supplies, which for many years have already been insufficient to meet the needs of industry and private households, have been particularly bad for Pakistan’s economic development and for people’s living conditions. 15 production plants in the oil and gas sector have been damaged along with one

14 | ADB and WB, “Pakistan Floods”, “Transport & Communication”.15 | ADB and WB, “Pakistan Floods”, “Transport and Communication”; NDMA, “Floods 2010, Damages & Losses, Roads”, Prime Minister’s Office, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad 2010.


refinery, 274 kilometres of pipelines, 3 fuel depots, 135 petrol stations and 310 gas or liquid gas distribution stations. If those who have returned to their homes cannot find wood or brushwood to burn they cannot even make a warming drink of tea. Energy supplies across the whole country have suffered, with electricity and gas being cut off for up to 12 hours per day, and in some areas hit by the catastrophe there have been periods with no supplies at all because one transformer station has been totally destroyed and 31 others substantially damaged. In addition, supplies along around 3,400 kilometres of high tension and other supply lines have been interrupted and 91 hydro or fossil fuel power plants can either no longer function at all, or can only manage a significantly reduced output as a result of flood damage.16

The Pakistan government, the ADB and the WB estimate that the flood damages that can be calculated so far to around six per cent of Pakistan’s gross national product for the financial year 2009/10, of which 50 per cent is due to losses incurred in agriculture.17 There can be no doubt that the effects of this unprece dented flooding will have a negative impact on Pakistan’s economic situation and increase inflationary pressures. At the same time reduced exports and the need for substantial imports as well as credit for reconstruction and compensation payments to flood victims will drive the negative balance of trade and payments even further into the red.

REACTION TO THE FLOOD CATASTROPHE

For almost a week after the floods began the central and regional governments in Pakistan did virtually nothing. During this period around 1,000 people died or were seriously injured in the mountainous north, where the disaster started to unfold. On August 1 the Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani finally announced the setting up of a flood emergency fund18, into which all cabinet ministers would give one month’s salary and all civil servants from level 17 and above (22 is the highest level) one day’s salary as an initial donation.19

16 | ADB and WB, “Pakistan Floods”, “Energy”.17 | ADB and WB, “Pakistan Floods”, “Economic Assessment”.18 | Prime Minister Flood Relief Fund.19 | “PM sets up flood relief fund”, The News, August 2, 2010.


Before the Pakistani government had even worked out what additional emergency aid they actually needed, they were already calling on the inter-national community for financial and material assistance.

As the sheer size of the floods became apparent, President Zardari, who was abroad at the time, did not feel it was necessary to return home, but peacefully carried on with his stay in England and France with this son and daughter. It was September 7 before he visited the crisis regions in Sindh and Belutschistan for the first time. Likewise, it was two weeks before Prime Minister Gilani visited the crisis region. And before the Pakistani government had even worked out what additional emergency aid they actually needed, they were already calling on the international community for financial and material assistance, as they usually do when there is some kind of calamity.

While private initiatives and national non-governmental organisations provided immediate help to the victims,20 politicians and civil servants were somewhat reluctant to donate funds to help. 150 of a total of 371 assembly members in Punjab province, for example, declined to donate to the Chief Minister’s flood relief fund. Apparently they preferred to spend the money in their own constitu-encies, so that their good deeds would be remembered at the next elections.21

The army was also initially reluctant to get involved in rescue and aid activities and focused instead on protecting their own military facilities. Eventually they did use their technical means and expertise to help and so strengthened their image amongst the people.

Donations from abroad were also very slow in coming, compared to past international disasters, which is probably due to Pakistan’s reputation for being notoriously corrupt and for their somewhat ambivalent attitude towards terrorists. In the first five weeks after the floods began, only 82 million of the 777 million U.S. dollars pledged and 60 million dollars worth of relief had been received, while

20 | There were many examples of victims staying with relatives or even strangers, of communities taking in refugees and providing them with free food and clothing, including warm meals, and of doctors providing free medical treatment and drugs.21 | “150 Punjab MPA refuse donation to relief fund,” The News, August 4, 2010.


Most embarrassing of all was the per-formance of the National Disaster Ma-nagement Authority (NDMA) that has so far limited its activities mainly to collecting statistical data.

in the same period after the 2005 earthquake around 6 billion U.S. dollars had flowed into Pakistan.22

Most embarrassing of all, according to Pakistan’s media, was the performance of the NDMA, whose responsibilities

included the organisation and coordination of national and international relief efforts in the event of a catastrophe. So far they have limited their activities mainly to collecting statistical data and maintaining their website. And their head, former Corps Commander

General Nadeem Ahmed, preferred to pose for press photos alongside foreign representatives in front of a map of Pakistan showing the flooded areas. As the NDMA has few resources of its own and insufficient links to civil organisa-tions, it has not had much success in managing crises in the past. However, near to Mianwali (Punjab province) they were able to manage a photo opportunity with the Prime Minister against the backdrop of an infirmary.23 The former member of parliament Shafqat Mahmud wrote that the authorities in this picture were hiding “the reality of their incapability behind an illusion of effectiveness” 24.

The NDMA basically left the organisation and coordination of the emergency effort to provincial and local authorities. They concentrated on helping the UN aid organisations, the WB and the ADB, who produced their first aid plan at the beginning of August25 and published it in its expanded form on November 5.26 At its heart this plan is as much as anything a plea to the international community to donate the 1.94 billion dollars needed for 471 aid projects. It does, however, also include recommendations from the WB and the ADB on how to overcome the crisis in 16 areas of Pakistan’s economy and society and outlines the political action that would be required.

22 | Ahmad Noorani, “The real scorecard of aid so far received,” The News, August 30, 2010.23 | Ahmad Noorani, “As NDMA is scrutinised its record shows it has miserably failed,” The News, August 19, 2010.24 | Shafqat Mahmood, “Where could the Messiah come from,” The News, August 6, 2010.25 | “Pakistan Initial Floods Emergency Response Plan”.26 | “Pakistan Flood Relief and Early Recovery Response Plan”.


While official incompetence enraged many flood victims, the Islamists were able to use the floods to strengthen their base of sympathisers and to re-cruit new members.

Extremist religious organisations such as the Al Rehmat Trust, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Harkatul Mujahideen and Sipah-e-Sahaba27 were quick to mobilise tens of thousands of volunteers and to be the first to provide people with accommodation, drinking water and food, especially in the inaccessible mountain regions, as they had done after the 2005 earthquake. In many places they were entrusted with the distribution of relief supplies by over-stretched local authorities. In three of the flooded areas in north Pakistan they distributed food to the value of 1,100 Rupees per family (approx. 100 Euro). While official incompetence enraged many flood victims, the Islamists were able to use the floods to strengthen their base of sympathisers in the affected areas and to recruit new members.28 However, well-known author Ahmad Rashid was probably being too pessimistic when he suggested that the government would lose control of the areas cut off by the floods and that these areas would be taken over by the Taliban. The much feared “Talibanisation of the flood” did not in fact happen.

The Pakistani government used the international Pakistan Development Forum (PDF)29 on November 14 and 15 in Islamabad to present the extent of the damages and losses, to outline who was responsible for carrying out the aid programmes and to once more ask the international community for substantial help. The interior minister Rehman Malik went so far as to demand the cancellation of 50 billion dollars of Pakistan’s international debt, arguing that, as the frontline state in the battle against terrorism, Pakistan was making the biggest sacrifices to ensure security for the western world.30 However, Finance Minister Abdul Hafeez Shaikh immediately rejected his colleague’s

27 | These groups are often called “the Taliban” by the media, a convention which is also used here.28 | Khaled Ahmed, “Sickness of flood politics,” The Friday Times, August 20, 2010.29 | PDF: An international consortium which meets at irregular intervals (last meeting 2007) to provide Pakistan with development assistance, a forum for the presentation of ideas for Pakistan’s development.30 | Khaleeq Kiani, “Pakistan seeks $50bn foreign debt waiver”, Dawn, November 15, 2010, http://dawn.com/2010/11/15/ pakistan-seeks-50bn-foreign-debt-waiver (accessed January 12, 2011).


A lack of transparency and control over the way the funds are used has led to significant amounts draining away into the morass of corruption caused by the elite’s self-serving mentality.

suggestion, as this had not been agreed,31 and such a move would affect Pakistan’s creditworthiness with all the attendant potential long-term negative consequences.

DIG DEEPER IN YOUR OWN POCKETS

Over the last few years Pakistan has faced repeated accusa-tions from its financial backers – chiefly the USA – that whenever there is a crisis the country’s knee-jerk reaction is always to ask for international financial aid rather than to look for its own solution to the problem. Parallel to this

there is growing criticism within the country that the government has wasted international aid money rather than using it to initiate structural reforms to promote sustainable social and economic development.32 A lack of transparency and control over the way the

funds are used has also led to significant amounts draining away into the morass of corruption caused by the elite’s self-serving mentality. Two years ago the USA were the first country to stop issuing the Pakistani government with billions of dollars in annual blank cheques for development aid. Instead they stipulated what the money should be used for and demanded that the funds be clearly accounted for. Responding to accusations that the U.S. was intruding in Pakistan’s financial and administrative affairs, U.S. ambas-sador Cameron Munter said at a scientific conference in Islamabad on January 7: “We appear to be intrusive because we care, we are the largest donor. Our aid comes as outright grant of assistance which is different from loans”33 In addition, the USA and other donors, including the EU, linked flood aid to the condition that Pakistan’s dollar millionaires dig equally deep in their own pockets to help their compatriots and to the requirement for donations to be documented in a full and transparent way. This was clearly stressed by foreign speakers at the PDF

31 | “Debt waiver,” Editorial, Dawn, November 16, 2010.32 | Sania Nishtar, “The PDF premise,” The News, November 22, 2010; Hadia Majid, “Development aid failure,” Dawn, November 12, 2010. 33 | Bakir Sajjad Syed, “Munter’s blunt talk: We pay so we intrude,” Dawn, January 8, 2011, http://dawn.com/2011/01/08/ munter’s-blunt-talk-we-pay-so-we-intrude (accessed January 12, 2011).


Economic experts criticised the IMF and WB for past structural programmes and strategies to alleviate poverty which had led to Pakistan’s increasing financi-al dependence.

conference.34 On September 21 the late Special Repre-sentative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, who died recently, called on the government of Pakistan to do more to get over the floods, as the inter-national community could bear no more than 25 per cent of the total reconstruction costs.35 Economic experts in Pakistan warned against further indebtedness and criticised the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and WB for past structural programmes and strategies to alleviate poverty which had led to Pakistan’s increasing financial dependence. In line with the requirements of the interna-tional credit institutions, on November 12 the government presented both houses of the National Assembly with a draft law to introduce sales tax, the Reformed General Sales Tax (RGST), along with a temporary flood tax.36 As at year’s end, this still awaited ratification.37 The government made its intentions known at the PDF conference and representatives of the provinces assured the donor countries and credit institutions that in future agriculture and the real estate industry would also be taxed.

Following on from previous failed attempts, the RGST is trying to record all purchases, sales and services to provide a basis for further taxation. The sales tax has been set at 15 per cent and within six months it should bring 30 billion rupees38 flooding into state coffers. It is hoped that the flood tax, set at 10 per cent of income tax, will produce an additional 42 billion rupees, and it is also planned to increase import duties. However, the transition from emergency aid to the reconstruction phase, set to begin on January 31, 2011, will need another 260 billion rupees in the current financial year,39 part of which will have to be diverted from other development projects. Allegedly the new strategy has already meant that 484 development projects in the sum of 585 billion rupees have already

34 | Kiani, n. 30.35 | “Pakistan govt. must do more for flood recovery: Holbrooke,” The News, September 22, 2010.36 | “Moving of RGST Bill,” Editorial, The Nation, November 14, 2010.37 | This delay is reducing planned tax income. It is possible that a parliamentary recess will be used in order to pass the proposed measures by presidential decree.38 | One Euro is 110 PKR (Pakistani Rupees), as at January 9, 2011.39 | July 1, 2010 to June 30, 2011.


It remains doubtful whether Pakistan’s spoilt elite will be prepared to take the painful steps necessary to stabilise the economy and rebuild after the floods.

been cancelled.40 The need for austerity has also forced the government to cut its expenditure for the financial year by 300 billion rupees and to reduce subsidies.

It remains doubtful whether Pakistan’s spoilt elite will be prepared to take the painful steps necessary to stabilise the

economy and rebuild after the floods. In the past they have often talked about austerity and transparency without anything actually being done. It seems likely that the expected fiscal deficit of 4.7 per cent will be more than

6 per cent and that the anticipated 9 per cent inflation rate will actually exceed 15 per cent due to soaring food and energy prices. As for the planned increases in income as a result of the tax reforms, they are in danger of being illusory due to a deeply-rooted tradition of refusing to pay taxes.41 The government of the Pakistan People’s Party will therefore find itself coming up against resistance from both the opposition and its coalition partners, as cabinet members and many members of parliament are feudals or industrialists and find themselves personally affected by the planned taxation reforms and the reduction in subsidies.

Analysts have criticised the PDF and the flood aid programmes, saying they do not pay sufficient attention to the social aspects of the crisis in their political recom-mendations. Former Secretary to the Government of Pakistan Roedad Khan has analysed Pakistan’s painful history of failed attempts to push through radical land reforms to free the country from the control of feudal elites and open up the possibility of a healthy democracy and market economy.42 But instead he sees a movement in the opposite direction, with the entrenched feudal classes working together with high-ranking army officers and government officials who have created a “neo-feudal” class by acquiring land through fair means or foul, to expand their political influence and prevent any changes in

40 | “Tough economic Steps,” Dawn, November 21, 2010; Sania Nishtar, “The PDF premise,” The News, November 22, 2010.41 | “Are Pakistan’s revised economic targets realistic?”, The News, November 17, 2010.42 | Roedad Khan, “Pakistan’s rural Iron Curtain,” The News, November 20, 2010: “A great divide, a yawning chasm – some call it a new Iron Curtain – separates the rich from their less fortunate countrymen, whose lives are hard, violent and short.”


The government’s aid programme for the reconstruction phase which is just now beginning also includes financial compensation for flood victims.

rural land ownership. “For something to change, everything must change” is his resigned prediction.43 Like businessman and columnist Ardeshir Cowasjee, he cannot perceive any power in Pakistan which is capable of instigating this kind of change in Pakistani society in the foreseeable future.44 In contrast, Zahir Kazmi, a scholar at the National Defence University, Islamabad, expresses cautious optimism when he says that although the bad state of the economy and education and political instability are Pakistan’s Achilles’ heel, it is still in the interest of the elite to bring about long-term economic and social reforms which, if implemented properly, could put Pakistan on the road to success within 40 years.45

The government’s aid programme for the reconstruction phase which is just now beginning also includes financial compensation for flood victims. They will be given watan cards which entitle each family to 100,000 rupees in instal-ments of 20,000 rupees at a time. This system, whereby local officials will only be handling cards rather than cash, is designed to prevent corruption. Yet in November Interior Minister Rehman Malik was forced to publicly admit that there were irregularities in the distribution of cards, such as the forging of false identities and the illegal sale of cards. A man from Nowshera Kalan on the Kabul river in North West Pakistan complained to a journalist: “People who have connections with members of parliament or government officials get their cards easily, while everyone else either has to wait or do deals with the card distributors.”46 Those who have managed to get their first 20,000 rupees are not necessarily better off, as most of them have had to use it straight away to pay for their families to return home and to buy a few mouthfuls of food. And the homeless are now clamouring all the more for their next instalments, so that they can at least build some kind of primitive shelters to protect them from the winter cold.

43 | Ibid.44 | Ardeshir Cowasjee, “The national stupor,” Dawn, November 21, 2010.45 | Zahir Kazmi, “Lessons from China,” Dawn, November 22, 2010.46 | Zulfiqar Ali und Faiz Muhammad, “Lawmakers cashing in on Watan cards,” Dawn, October 31, 2010.


The great majority of the population is frozen in a state of deep disillusion-ment and despair. Their main concern is how to survive from one day to the next.

OUTLOOK

In many ways the flood catastrophe has served to highlight the parlous state of Pakistan’s political system, and some

intellectuals see it as a chance for the country to progress beyond feudalism.47 The desired consequences would be economic and social resurgence and a robust democracy. But these are utopian ideals. The great majority

of the population is frozen in a state of deep social, economic and political disillusionment and despair.48 Their main concern is how to survive from one day to the next, which was made all the more difficult by the rocketing prices of basic foodstuffs since the floods. In the Punjab, for example, an area which was once Pakistan’s bread basket, flour is now three times more expensive than before the floods. Pakistan’s young intelligentsia, who could be the driving force for change, see no future in their own country and are leaving in droves for the USA, Europe or Dubai. On top of this, the all-powerful secret service, in alliance with the army and police, make sure any political resistance is nipped in the bud. There seems to be no answer to the despairing question of one committed democrat: “Where could the Messiah come from?”49

In economic terms, growth of less than three per cent will not be enough to stabilise the general living conditions of a population which is growing by around the same rate every year and to absorb the costs of the flood damage. So, for example, steel and cement producers face the problem of not being able to meet demand for reconstruction. Although cement production has increased almost three-fold since 2002 due to export markets in Afghanistan, Iraq and Africa, they are forced to continue exporting around 12 million tonnes annually because of the country’s critical shortage of foreign exchange.50 Resolving the dilemma by increasing capacity would necessi tate uninterrupted supplies of cheaper raw materials and energy, both of

47 | Najm Sethi, “Dismal outlook for 2011,” The Friday Times, December 31, 2010.48 | Ibid.49 | Shafqat Mahmood, “Where could the Messiah come from,” The News, August 6, 2010.50 | Naveed Iqbal, “Heavy resources required in post-flood reconstruction,” The News, November 15, 2010.


The flood has left Pakistan with a massive refugee problem. Millions of people are flocking to the cities, only to end up swelling the ranks of the army of day labourers and beggars.

which are far from guaranteed.51 Inflation will be fuelled by the anticipated steep rises in food, energy and building material prices. Manufacturers will also have to cope with power cuts lasting up to twelve hours a day, which of course will drive exporters faced with strict supply deadlines to the brink of ruin.

On a social level, the flood has left Pakistan with a massive refugee problem. Millions of people are flocking to the cities in the hope of finding work, only to end up swelling the ranks of the army of day labourers and beggars. This will inevitably lead to higher crime rates. And the backbone of Pakistani society, the social structures of its families and villages, is being destroyed.

This state of social and economic emergency is set against a security situation which is characterised by constant terrorist attacks. Between 2003 and 2010 around 31,000 people were killed in Pakistan by Islamist terror attacks, including 10,000 civilians.52 The terror spilled over from its heartlands into Pakistan’s cities and in Karachi, the country’s economic and trading hub, it has taken on a striking ethnic and political hue. Against Pakistan’s social and religious background, social uprooting, unemployment and poverty have come together to form an explosive mixture which is the perfect breeding ground for terrorist groups.

In terms of domestic politics, Pakistan is close to a position which in the past has resulted in the end of civilian government and a takeover of power by the military. At the moment this is counterbalanced by domestic and foreign policy considerations. The murder of Salman Taseer, the liberal PPP governor of the Punjab province on January 5 and the subsequent low-key official reaction to it clearly show the freedom which is afforded to extremist groups and their ideologies.53 In tune with these groups, the parliamentary opposition is blatantly pressurizing president

51 | Khaleeq Kiani, “Uncertainties in energy development,” The News, Economic & Business Review, November 22-28, 2010.52 | “After the deluge,” The Economist, September 16, 2010.53 | Taseer spoke out in public for a change in the blasphemy laws and for the pardon of Asia Bibi, who had been sentenced to death as a result of these laws.


In the arms race with India, Pakistan is hoping to obtain funding and mo-dern military technology from the USA under the guise of fighting terrorism.

Zardari and his government to stand down, blaming them for the dire economic situation and the consequences of the floods. At the same time, the ruling coalition has been on the verge of collapse since the beginning of the year, while the strongest opposition party and traditionally the fiercest opponents of the ruling PPP, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) led by Nawaz Sharif, is stridently calling for new elections. There is little left of the Charta of Democracy, which was signed by Benazir Bhutto on behalf of the Pakistan People’s Party and Nawaz Sharif for the Pakistan Muslim League on May 15, 2006, and hope of any long-term democratic change is fading fast.

Military domination of Pakistan’s foreign and security policy means the civilian government’s room for manoeuvre and strategic options are severely limited. Pressurised by the military leadership, the government is continuing to pursue a policy of confrontation with India, adding the potential of military conflict to the already-strained relationship between the two hostile nuclear nations. At the same time, Pakistan has willingly become a pawn of Chinese

interests by allowing itself to be drawn into Beijing’s border negoti ations with India as a third party, hoping that it will thereby gain advantages regarding the Kashmir conflict. In the arms race with its neighbour, Pakistan

is hoping to obtain funding and modern military technology from the USA under the guise of fighting terrorism. In this way it hopes to modernise both its weapons manufac-turing industry – built up with the help of China – and the equipping of its armed forces to at least try to balance out India’s combat strength.

On its western border Pakistan has been forced by the military to pursue the concept of “strategic depth” which is designed to guarantee its influence in Afghanistan after the hoped-for regime change in Afghanistan in 2014. It is also designed to open up the shortest route to the raw materials and goods markets of Central Asia. It sees the Taliban as being the next regime and for strategic reasons will continue to allow them safe heavens in the Pakistan/Afghanistan border areas.


Pakistan’s strategic geographic position and its crucial role in resolving the situation in Afghanistan and in maintaining peaceful conditions in South Asia lend top priority to strategic, political, economic and social considerations for providing Pakistan with substantial long-term development aid.


Stephan Malerius

Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, Europe has rarely seen elections as disastrous as the Presidential elections held in Belarus on December 19, 2010. This is not because of President Alexander Lukashenko’s landslide victory in the so-called elections. After his 16 years in office, no-one seriously believed that the votes would actually be counted or that the authorities would not rig the elections to suit Lukashenko. The real disaster lies in the brutality used to break up the peaceful demonstration on election night and the repression which followed over the next few weeks – something which even the worst pessimists had not foreseen. Indeed, the election campaign itself had been surprisingly liberal.

The 2010 Presidential elections in Belarus have produced only losers: the opposition has lost out because it was unable to come up with a joint manifesto or a joint candidate and after the elections most of its political leaders ended up in jail. Europe has lost out because all the hard work done to build closer ties with Belarus and to strengthen pro-European parties has been wiped out overnight. Russia has lost out because it recognized Lukashenko’s dubious re-election, failed to condemn the repressive measures and once again has shown that its attitude towards basic democratic principles is very different to that of the rest of Europe. And Lukashenko has also lost out because the demonstrations in front of the government building and subsequent repression have forced the formerly street-smart rulers into a blind alley. Perhaps the most astonishing thing about these elections is the way Lukashenko has, at

THE LONG SHADOW OFTHE BELARUS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONSPROCEDURES, RESULTS AND POLITICAL FALL-OUT

Stephan Malerius is Head of the country office Belarus of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. The office is based in Vilnius, Lithuania.


The local elections held nine months before the Presidential elections were something of a dress rehearsal. Chan-ges to electoral law were seen interna-tionally as a step in the right direction.

a stroke, dropped the “multi-vector foreign policy” which he worked so hard on and returned to his self-imposed political isolation.

So who was calling the shots on election night? And why, after three months of free campaigning, did it only take a few hours for violence to escalate? Was Lukashenko manipulated, and if so, by whom? Or was it Lukashenko himself who ordered the peaceful protests to be crushed upon finding out that the actual election results would mean a second ballot? These are the questions which must be asked if Europe is now going to build a new strategy towards Belarus.

THE LOCAL ELECTIONS AS A DRESS REHEARSAL

As political co-determination is practically non-existent in authoritarian Belarus, the people have very few opportu-nities in everyday life to feel that they can actually change things, even if this is somewhat illusory. The five-yearly Presidential elections present such an opportunity for political momentum, and so they are hotly anticipated well before election day. The local elections held on April 25, nine months before the main event, were something of a dress rehearsal. They were the first elections to be held since the changes to electoral law which came into force in January 2010 and which had taken into account the recommendations of the OSCE and independent local experts. These changes were seen inter-nationally as a step in the right direction, although they did not go far enough to really prevent electoral fraud. Still, it was hoped the April elections would show whether the new laws would at least make Belarusian elections a little fairer, freer and more transparent.

These hopes were soon dashed: of the 21,293 local councillors elected, only nine represented democratic parties. None of the candidates from the Movement for Freedom, the United Civic Party or the Belarusian Popular Front succeeded in winning a seat on any of the local councils. The elections were no different from all previous elections over the last fourteen years. Indeed,


It was becoming increasingly clear that not only the EU but Russia was losing patience and that Moscow was perhaps no longer prepared to support Lukashenko.

it was amazing how little effort the officials made to hide their vote-rigging. They used all their usual tricks when confirming the election results – in almost every case where a democratic candidate was standing against a government representative, there were considerable differences between the results of early voting and the votes cast on April 25. Around 30 per cent of the voters had voted early. And before the elections there were once again arrests of independent candidates, house searches and, on election day itself, there was rigging and government-organised voting within companies, closed constituencies (barracks) and student halls of residence. No pretence was made to count the votes more transparently than during the 2008 Parliamentary elections.

The fact that 80 per cent of the population believe the work of local councillors has no effect on their lives throws doubts on the claimed turnout of 79.5 per cent. The election organisers also seem to have treated the elections on April 25 as a dress rehearsal. At a Minsk press conference after the elections, Lidija Yermoshina, head of the Electoral Commission, declared that “Elections are never sterile”. It’s true that there were several small-scale aberrations, but no really serious irregularities.

Lukashenko seemed to want to use the election to make it clear that he is not prepared to make concessions to his democratic opponents nor to bow to demands from Europe to make democratic and constitutional changes in the country. As a result, all observers assumed that

the Presidential elections would follow the same pattern – the regime would produce its rigged election results, with the election itself being staged with greater or lesser success to give the illusion of legitimacy. At

the same time Lukashenko was losing his political room for manoeuvre. It was becoming increasingly clear that not only the EU but Russia was losing patience and that Moscow was perhaps no longer prepared to support him in another term, unlike in 2006. On top of this there was the unrest in Kyrgyzstan, which Lukashenko also interpreted as a warning shot across his bows. He publicly drew parallels with the events in Bishkek: “If something like this were to happen in my country and if anyone were to dare to try


Belarus had for many years been ma-king handsome profits by using cheap Russian crude oil to sell on oil products to the West at world market prices.

leading the people into a storm of violence, our response would not be weak. A government which does not know how to defend itself is worthless.” In mid-April, Lukashenko offered his protection to deposed Kyrgyz President Bakiyev and granted him political asylum in Belarus.

ECONOMIC DISPUTES, MEDIA WAR: DETERIORATING RELATIONS BETWEEN MINSK AND MOSCOW

Although the Kremlin has up till now been remarkably restrained in its remarks on the Belarusian Presidential elections,1 Russia is still the region’s central player and it is important to look at the changing relationship between Minsk and Moscow in order to assess the events on and around December 19. However, it is difficult to come to any conclusions beyond mere speculation due to the fact that most official contacts between the two neighbours take place behind closed doors. But it is a fact that relations between Lukashenko and the Medvedev/Putin pairing came to a head in summer 2010, to the extent that one political commentator in Minsk wrote that it was no longer possible to talk about the deteriorating relationship of Belarus and Russia as there was no longer a relationship. As so often in recent years, the catalyst for this was an economic dispute. On January 1, 2010, Russia began levying export duties on Russian oil supplied to Belarusian refineries in Novopolatzk and Mozyr. This decision was another attempt to gradually provide a pragmatic economic basis for its relations with its western neighbour. Belarus had for many years been making handsome profits by using cheap Russian crude oil to sell on oil products to the West at world market prices. Moscow has long been demanding its share of the pie, but in January Minsk argued that raising duties on oil was against the terms of the customs union agreed at the end of 2009 between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. The case went before the Economic Court of the CIS, which in late summer called on both sides to settle the matter out-of-court. While they were still trying to settle

1 | “We have to respect the choice of the Belarusian people. I am not prepared to talk about what happened during the elections. That is something that needs to be looked at in detail”, said Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on December 29, 2010. Quoted from http://naviny.by/rubrics/politic/2010/12/29/ic_ news_112_358358 (accessed January 31, 2011).


Lukashenko accused high-ranking Russian officials of orchestrating a smear campaign against him, called Russia’s policies towards Belarus “half-cocked” and “brainless”.

the oil duty row by legal means, in June 2010 the tensions spilled over to the political sphere: Gazprom gave Belarus an ultimatum to pay its gas debts, which had supposedly been mounting up for months, and for a few days it reduced gas supplies to its neighbours by up to 80 per cent. The conflict seemed to be aimed at putting Lukashenko under pressure. Lukashenko replied by publicly going on the offensive for the first time in an open letter to Pravda and to Russia’s top business leaders. In this letter, he gave his view of the gas conflict and compared Gazprom’s demands on Belarus to Nazi Germany’s offensive against the Soviet Union.

Over the summer things escalated still further. From early July to mid-August the biggest Russian TV channel, NTW, showed a prime-time three-part documentary on Lukashenko, which claimed that he was responsible for the disappearance of political opponents in 1999/2000 and which described him as the head of a criminal ring which has been systematically plundering the country. These programmes were blocked from airing on TV in Belarus, but they could be viewed on the internet. By the end of August at least a third of the population had seen the documentaries. Lukashenko responded by sending a camera team to Tiflis to interview Russia’s “Public Enemy No. 1”, the Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, and

shortly afterwards he denounced a Molotov cocktail attack on the Russian Embassy in Minsk as the work of Russian provocateurs, a claim which the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov immediately rebutted, calling

it “blasphemy”. At the beginning of October Lukashenko invited a group of journalists from Russia’s regions to Minsk and gave a four-hour press conference. He accused high-ranking Russian officials of orchestrating a smear campaign against him, called Russia’s policies towards Belarus “half-cocked” and “brainless” and described his relationship with Medvedev and Putin as “bad, to put it mildly”. Two days later Medvedev accused Lukashenko in a video blog on his Kremlin website of wanting to base his election campaign solely on anti-Russian statements and warned him not to interfere in Russia’s internal affairs. After a declaration by Medvedev’s spokeswoman that relations between Belarus and Russia would never recover to where they were before


The first surprise for the country’s people was the previously-unknown freedom granted during the first phase of campaigning for the primaries.

under President Lukashenko, there was public speculation whether Moscow would use the Presidential elections in Belarus to get rid of Lukashenko. But there was no clear evidence of what this “Russian scenario” would be.

So it was all the more surprising when Lukashenko travelled to Moscow on December 8 to take part in the summit meetings of the Eurasian Economic Community and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. He spent an hour and a half in private discussions with Medvedev as though nothing had happened. Russia showed that it was prepared to withdraw the export duty on oil from the beginning of 2011, and in return Lukashenko signed 17 agreements designed to advance the planned single market for Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Not a word was said about the Presidential elections. THE CAMPAIGN: UNEXPECTED FREEDOM AND NEW EXPERIENCES

As soon as the summer break was over, and in the middle of the escalating conflict between Lukashenko and the Kremlin, the date for the Belarusian Presidential elections was set. On September 14 an extraordinary sitting of the House of Representatives in Minsk announced the elections would be held on December 19. The electoral procedure was officially set out: potential candidates had to name action groups by September 24 who then had a month from September 30 to collect the signatures of 100,000 supporters. In mid-November the Central Electoral Com- mission would announce the officially-registered candi-dates and then campaigning could begin. In parallel, the Belarusian Foreign Ministry made it known that interested parties (OSCE, CIS) were invited to an unrestricted election monitoring.

The first surprise for the country’s people, and also for international experts, was the previously-unknown freedom granted during the first phase of campaigning for the primaries. At the beginning of October, while the action groups were collecting signatures for their candi-dates across the country, a 30-year old woman spoke of a totally new atmosphere: “There was a rally in the centre of


A whole generation of people had the feeling that they could demonstrate freely, something they had never be-fore experienced in Belarus during 14 years of repressive authoritarian rule.

Minsk, the historic white and red flags were being waved and no one intervened, no police, no arrests. I’ve never

known this before in all my life.” A whole generation of people had the feeling that they could demonstrate freely, something they had never before experienced in Belarus during 14 years of repressive authoritarian rule. And there was another mood among

the people, a feeling that after 16 years they were tired of Lukashenko and were not afraid to express their support for other candidates. Everywhere people were saying “I will support anyone, as long as it’s not Lukashenko.”

This atmosphere remained during the critical phase of campaigning. First of all, anyone who had collected more than 100,000 signatures was officially registered as a candidate, meaning that the 2010 elections had more opposition candidates than ever before. But on closer inspection this seems to have all been part of an orches-trated game. A local observer who was present at the local Electoral Commission’s random checking of the signatures reported that almost every candidate’s list of signatures (including Lukaschenko’s) was forged: “The signatures of a hundred or more supporters had clearly been written by one person, without even taking the trouble to disguise the writing. The Electoral Commission’s liberal attitude was obviously being tested, and in fact all these forged signa-tures were declared valid.” So it seems that the decision to register ten candidates was taken from above and was politically-motivated – the more candidates who stood against Lukashenko, the better his chances.

But there was no doubt that change was taking root in the country. As in most countries, gatherings in public places were forbidden, but the authorities reacted quite diffe-rently to violations of this rule compared to 2006. When two Presidential candidates called on their supporters to gather for an illegal demonstration on November 24 in Minsk’s October Square more than 1,000 people turned up, but the protest was not broken up by the authorities and there were no arrests. The instigators received a warning from the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Central Electoral Commission, but nothing more.


The regime had promised to give the people free elections and was now trying to play this out. But liberali-sation was not to be confused with democracy.

It was also remarkable that in the next stages of campaigning the state-controlled electronic media were for the first time cautiously opened up. All the Presidential candidates were allowed two 30-minute slots on both TV and radio in order to present their manifestos or to talk about the country’s situation. The slots were broadcast live, so they could not be censored or otherwise manipulated. Nearly every candidate took advantage of this opportunity, particularly as a way of settling old scores with Lukashenko, who had largely denied them all access to a wider public since 1996. In his broadcast, the Social Democrat Nikolai Statkevich demanded that Lukashenko give back the stolen elections: “Fair elections depend on you and you alone, and not on the clowns in the so-called Parliament or the so-called Electoral Commission.” But otherwise nothing had changed in the electronic media: all news programmes were still dominated by Lukashenko to such an extent that he saw no need to present his manifesto once again on TV. He also refused to take part in the first televised debates between the candidates.

This is why political scientist Yuri Chausov talked about a kind of “invisible liberalisation”. The regime had promised to give the people free elections and was now trying to play this out. But liberalisation was not to be confused with democracy. According to Chausov, the Parliamentary elections of 2008 served as an example. Candidate regis-tration and campaigning had been relatively free, but the end result was a totally sterile Parliament without a single independent representative. Chausov thought the results of the 2010 Presidential elections were totally predictable: “President Lukashenko has kept away from the official announcement of candidates for good reason. He wants to show that he is not one of the actors in these elections, but rather the director.”2

Despite the orchestrated election campaign, the people felt that the new liberal atmosphere within the country was a positive change. For the first time since 1994 they could experience plurality, which still did not bring the chance of fair elections but which at least allowed the public airing

2 | Quoted from http://naviny.by/rubrics/elections/2010/11/18/ ic_articles_623_171295 (accessed January 31, 2011).


Lukashenko was faced by two candi-dates who either had never stood for office before or who acted as kind of guaranteed opposition candidates in the event that the opposition announ-ced a boycott.

of different opinions. But many observers took a sceptical view of how long this surprising freedom would last. How far would Lukashenko go in his attempt to get Western countries to recognize the election results?

THE CANDIDATES

Campaigning for the Belarusian Presidential elections also promised to be a strange political event because of its unusual range of candidates. Closer inspection reveals the following three different groups.

To begin with, Lukashenko was faced by two candidates who either had never stood for office before (Dmitri Uss) or who acted as kind of guaranteed opposition candidates (Vladimir Tereshtshenko) in the event that

the opposition announced a boycott and it was necessary to give the illusion of an election. Tereshtshenko at least was expected to follow the instructions of the President’s administration or its officials.

The second group consisted of five relatively high-profile candidates belonging to the democratic opposition: Jaroslav Romanchuk (United Civic Party), a liberal economist; Vitali Rymasheuski, a Christian Democrat; Grogori Kostusev and Ales Michalevich, long-time members of the Belarusian Popular Front, the driving force in the popular movement which resulted in Belarus leaving the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s. They both stood for a patriotic, pro-European orientation for Belarus, and Michalevich focused his campaign on the need to modernise the economy and society. Nicolai Statkievich carried the flag for the Social Democrats.

The third group of candidates consisted of two governors who at least on the face of it were Lukaschenko’s main competition: Vladimir Neklyayev and Andrei Sannikov, who had unusually large amounts of money to spend on their campaigns and who were obviously acting on behalf of unnamed foreign powers. Many people are still wondering what Neklyayev and Sannikov were trying to achieve and who was backing them. Few are convinced that they really believed in their campaign slogans “Tell the


Lukaschenko’s political strategy see-med to have paid off – a split opposition and a large number of candidates would make it easier for him to make his re-election appear relatively democratic.

truth” (Neklyayev) and “European Belarus” (Sannikov). In 2008 Sannikov had called for a boycott of the Parlia-mentary elections, criticising them as a farce. Now he was himself standing as a candidate although nothing had changed. The democratic opposition was weakened by this deliberate lack of transparency and the swirling speculation: are they Russian candidates? Are they being funded by the Russian oligarch Boris Beresowski, currently living in exile in London? Are they part of a Lukashenko master plan? During their campaigns, the two candidates sowed the seeds of yet more mistrust in an already tangled situation, making it even more difficult for the democratic parties to make a united stand. Lukaschenko’s political strategy seemed to have paid off – a split opposition and a large number of candidates would make it easier for him to make his re-election appear relatively democratic.

On top of this, Alexander Milinkevich, who had stood against Lukashenko as the democratic opposition’s unity candidate in 2006, announced in September that he would not stand for the 2010 elections. After his withdrawal many people felt they were left with no one to vote for. But the “Anyone but Lukashenko” attitude was so strong in large sections of the population that the other candidates found that people listened to their manifestos and for the first time came to the conclusion that there were other serious and much more interesting political offerings than “Batka” Lukaschenko.

VOTING, ELECTION NIGHT AND INCITEMENT TO RIOT

In the week before the elections the country became more and more nervous and the idea of a Ploscha (Square) was brought into play. This alludes to October Square in the centre of Minsk which, similar to the Maidan in Kiev, has been a symbol of democratic protest against fraudulent elections ever since the Presidential elections of 2006. On December 11 Vladimir Makei, Head of the Presidential Administration, declared that the opposition just wanted to use the election night demonstration to stir up trouble: “It’s quite clear that they do not want a peaceful demon-stration”, he said on RTR, the Belarusian state television.


“The Presidential elections must not be tarnished by any kind of clashes or protests. If the fly wants to fly, let it fly.” (Alexander Lukashenko)

“Fighters” were getting themselves ready, stocking up on warm clothing, pyrotechnic supplies and explosives. The opposition’s main aim was to provide western TV viewers with images showing the cruelty of the ruling powers and their brutality towards the voters. But Makei also made it clear that the government had sufficient forces and means to calmly and appropriately handle the situation.3 The opposition were not slow to respond, with several candidates dismissing Makei’s comments as an attempt at intimidation. They urged their supporters to ignore it and to join a peaceful demonstration on the evening of the election.

One of the keys to assessing the events of election night is a meeting held on December 15, where Lukashenko talked about various scenarios which could play out. The meeting was attended by commanders of the police and special forces, and parts of it were broadcast on state television.4 Makei did not attend. Lukashenko said they must not allow themselves to be provoked during protests: “On no account respond to provocation. Because they [the opposition, author’s note] want pictures so that they can say ‘Look at this undemocratic regime – once again Lukashenko has used bloodshed to hold onto power’”.

The most important thing was that “nothing must happen to the people, for God’s sake. We have to protect the people.” He went on to add that he was not expecting protests because the opposition were not capable of

organising them. There would not be a Ploscha because no one would show up. At the end of the meeting Lukashenko

3 | The interview can be seen on Youtube at http://youtube.com/ watch?v=HP8qd2rQR0U (accessed January 31, 2011). Makei’s predictions proved to be unfounded: it was not the opposition which stirred up trouble, and the security forces certainly did not react in a calm and appropriate manner. Some commentators thought Makei’s words were meant as a warning and an indirect challenge to the opposition to be alert and prepared for trouble from the security forces. Makei was considered to be a moderate within the regime.4 | I.a. Leonid Maltsev (Head of the Security Council), Anatoly Kuleshov (Minister of Internal Affairs), Yurij Zhadobin (Defence Minister), Alexander Radkov (Head of Lukashenko’s election team), Vadim Zaicev (Head of the KGB), Viktor Lukashenko and Viktor Scheiman. Excerpts of the meeting can be viewed on the internet at http://naviny.by/rubrics/ elections/2010/12/15/ic_articles_623_171684 (accessed January 31, 2011).


The opposition had called on their sup-porters to gather in October Square during the evening to wait for the elec-tion results and to protest against the anticipated vote-rigging.

repeated his instruction: “The Presidential elections must not be tarnished by any kind of clashes or protests. If the fly wants to fly, let it fly, no one will stop it. Nowadays the Government’s solidarity is so strong that we have no need of extraordinary measures”. The opposition failed to take this prophecy of doom seriously and also did not expect any violence on election night. One of the opposition candidates said on the day before the elections that talk of trouble on election evening was a joke. The regime was showing weakness and – just like during the 2006 elections – was trying to intimidate the people. But this would not happen because the population had lost its fear.

Election day itself went off quietly. 23.1 per cent of the population had already cast their votes over the preceding five days, 8 per cent less than in 2006. But reports were coming in from all over the country of how people were being pressurised to vote early. But this had been expected. The crucial question was what would happen on election night? The opposition had come together to call on their supporters to gather in October Square during the evening to wait for the election results and to protest against the anticipated vote-rigging. Voting on election day itself appeared to go off without a hitch, and by early evening no verdict could be given on the vote counting process because the polls did not close until eight o’clock.

A huge skating rink was erected on October Square with loudspeakers blaring out Russian pop music, so the candi-dates’ first statements could not be heard. It was also turning very cold and it seemed likely that the crowd of several thousands would start to break up after one or two hours. It seemed clear that none of the opposition candidates had a strategic plan for the Ploscha.

Trouble first broke out around 7.30 pm, when Vladimir Neklyayev was beaten while on his way to the demon-stration. Pictures of the unconscious opposition candidate flew around the world.5 Neklyayev was responsible for the PA system to be used for the candidates’ speeches.

5 | The incident can be viewed on Youtube at: http://youtube.com/ watch?v=trcsJ50jGWk (accessed January 31, 2011).


There were more than 600 arrests, among them eight of nine candidates. None of the protesters who had batte-red down the doors of the government building was immediately arrested.

Around 8.40 pm the crowd unexpectedly started moving from October Square towards Independence Square. Presidential candidate Kostusev later reported that they just wanted to go over to Lukashenko’s Presidential offices. But the police separated the opposition candidates from the crowd, which continued onwards along Independence Street, swelling in numbers as it went. It is not clear who led the crowd on this route. By 9.30 around 20,000 people had gathered in Independence Square to continue the demonstration. Loudspeakers were set up, candidates made speeches, and the crowd continually chanted their demands for new elections to be held without Lukashenko. By 10.30 the majority of demonstrators had gone home,

but a group of around 15 protesters began trying to batter down the doors to the government building, which was set back slightly from the Square. Shortly afterwards the security forces were deployed, using violence to break up the demonstration.

This ended up with people being chased right across the centre of Minsk. There were more than 600 arrests, among them eight of nine candidates. None of the protesters who had battered down the doors was immediately arrested, although they were kettled by the riot police at the scene. Their faces were even clearly shown that evening on state TV coverage of the riots.

Events on the street threw the election results themselves into the shade. Around five o’clock the next morning Yermoshina announced the preliminary results, with Lukashenko winning 79.67 of the vote, Andrei Sannikov 2.56 per cent and all other candidates less than 2 per cent. According to this, 6.47 per cent of people had voted against all candidates.

The OSCE/ODHIR observer mission made a provisional statement on the Monday in which it declared that the Belarus elections had not met democratic standards: “Yesterday’s Presidential elections have shown that Belarus still ha s a considerable way to go in meeting its OSCE commitments, although certain specific improvements have been made.”6 The voting process had generally gone

6 | OSCE/ODHIR, “International election observation, Republic of Belarus – Presidential Election, 19 December 2010, ▸


The OSCE/ODHIR observer mission classified the vote count procedure in almost half of all polling stations visi-ted as very bad. In contrast, the CIS observer mission described the elec-tions as free.

smoothly, but the situation deteriorated significantly during the vote count. The mission classified the vote count procedure in almost half of all polling stations visited as very bad.7 In contrast, the CIS observer mission described the elections as free, open and transparent.8 The mission’s head, Sergey Lebedev, even went so far as to attack the ODHIR/OSCE mission a few days later, saying that “their opinion before the elections was completely different to their view after-wards”, and pointing out that many OSCE observers had made positive statements beforehand. “And then on the day after the elections – this is true not only of Belarus but of other CIS countries – for no good reason we hear that there is a negative assessment and that the general conclusion is that the elections do not meet democratic standards and principles.”9

THE CONSEQUENCES: REPRESSION AND SANCTIONS

Election night set in motion a level of repression which is unprecedented in Belarus, even under Lukashenko’s regime. In this respect, the KGB are taking the leading role. The majority of those arrested on election night were sentenced to 10 to 15 days in prison, and as at the middle of January 20 people remain imprisoned. Another eleven people are being investigated under Paragraph 293 of the Belarus Criminal Code (Organisation of Mass Riots), which could lead to prison sentences of between 5 and 15 years.

Statement of preliminary findings and conclusions”, in: http://osce.org/odihr/74638, 1 (accessed January 25, 2011).7 | “While the overall voting process was assessed as good, the process deteriorated significantly during the vote count under- mining the steps taken to improve the election. Observers assessed the vote count as bad and very bad in almost half of all observed polling stations. The count was largely conducted in a non-transparent manner, generally in silence, which undermined its credibility. In many cases, observers were restricted and did not have a real opportunity to observe the counting.”8 | “We believe that these elections were transparent and met the requirements of the election legislation and common democratic norms,” CIS Executive Secretary Sergei Lebedev told reporters in Minsk.” Quote courtesy of the Russian news agency RIA Novosti, http://en.rian.ru/world/20101220/ 161854376.html (accessed January 31, 2011).9 | Quoted from http://naviny.by/rubrics/elections/2010/12/25/ ic_news_623_358119 (accessed January 31, 2011).


Representatives of the democratic opposition, human rights organisations, political parties, independent newspapers and journalists were subjected to house and office searches.

The exact condition of Vladimir Neklyayev and Andrei Sannikov, who were beaten on December 19, remains unknown. Nikolai Statkievich has gone on hunger strike. Grogori Kostusev lodged an appeal against the election reports on behalf of all the opposition candidates, but it was

thrown out as being without cause. After the arrests, during the holiday period (Catholic Christmas, New Year, Orthodox Christmas) representatives of the democratic opposition, human rights organisations, political parties, independent newspapers and journalists were

subjected to house and office searches, right across the country. Dozens of computers, notebooks and data carriers were confiscated. At the same time, scores of people were interrogated by the KGB, charged or imprisoned. The victims’ lawyers also soon found themselves in the Justice Ministry’s firing line and were threatened with having their licenses withdrawn. The whole of January saw the forces of democracy being subjected to constant terror.10 Belarus abruptly began to isolate itself, not just through its repressive measures but also on the diplomatic front. On December 31 a Foreign Ministry spokesperson announced in Minsk that the OSCE mandate in Belarus which expired at the end of the year would not be extended, saying there was no justification for having OSCE representatives in the country, the OSCE mission was fulfilled and they should no longer have a presence.

The international community was quick to comment on the vote-rigging, the election night protests and the subsequent repression, along with the closing down of OSCE representation. In an article in the New York Times published on December 23, the Foreign Ministers of Germany, Sweden, Poland and the Czech Republic stated that Lukashenko had made his choice, a choice which went against everything the European Union stood for.11 Many governments in Western and Central Europe

10 | At present it is not possible to predict further domestic developments. More detailed information on the election campaign, the elections themselves and the subsequent repression can be viewed on the election blog of the Konrad-Adenauer- Stiftung’s Belarus office under http://kas.de/belaruswahl. 11 | Carl Bildt, Karel Schwarzenberg, Radek Sikorski and Guido Westerwelle, “Lukashenko the Loser,” in: New York Times, December 23, 2010, http://nytimes.com/2010/12/24/ opinion/24iht-edbildt24.html (accessed January 31, 2011).


Europe now needs a whole new stra-tegy for Belarus. Questions need to be asked in order to understand what really happened on election night.

called for the immediate release of those imprisoned and punishment for those responsible. In contrast, Russia congratulated Lukashenko on his re-election, claiming the circumstances surrounding the vote were Belarus’s own affair. Other post-Soviet countries such as Georgia and the Ukraine took a similar line. On January 31, the EU Foreign Ministers in Brussels agreed to ban a total of 158 people who were responsible for the vote-rigging and repressions which followed the elections from entering the EU and to freeze their bank accounts within the EU. They declared that the list was open and could be changed at any time. The Foreign Ministers stressed that the EU was keen to continue talks with Belarus, but with the basic prerequisite that the Belarus government would adhere to principles of democracy and the rule of law and respect basic human rights. At the donor conference in Warsaw on February 2, the EU and its member states announced that 87 million euros would be made available over the next two years to support civil society in Belarus. Some of Belarus’s EU neighbours have abolished visa charges for ordinary Belarusian citizens.

WHO WAS BEHIND THE RIOTS?

Certain commentators have accused Europe of achieving nothing over the last two years in its attempts to carry on a dialogue with the regime and convert Belarus’s weak liberalisation into a sustainable democratic process. These accusations are unfair, as they suggest that the events of December 19 could have been foreseen, and they make no mention of what Europe should have done to prevent the riots. However, it cannot be denied that Europe now needs a whole new strategy for Belarus. Questions need to be asked in order to understand what really happened on election night: what caused the protests to escalate? Who staged them? And what was the desired outcome?

Outlined below are three different propositions which could explain what happened on December 19. They are not so much speculations about who was behind the protests as an attempt to clarify the challenges facing Europe over the next few months in relation to Belarus.


It became clear how hard it was for Lukashenko to deal with the openness of the campaigning and to allow the opposition to voice criticism without shutting them down.

First: In Lukashenko, Europe has to deal with an unpre-dictable and out-of-control autocrat who lacks the mental and intellectual capacity to accept democratic changes in his country, let alone implement them, and who is only concerned with maintaining his grip on power. The decision

to use violence against the protestors on December 19 came from Lukashenko. During the “liberal election campaign” it repeatedly became clear how hard it was for him to deal with the openness of the campaigning and

to allow the opposition to voice criticism without shutting them down. These three months did not sit well with the authoritarian mentality which he had nurtured over the previous 14 years. At one point Lukashenko was surprised by his own patience and thought his country was already so democratic that all its neighbours “would be afraid of so much democracy”. He had entered into this strategy with great reluctance in order to gain international legitimacy for his fourth term. Lukashenko had had to grit his teeth for three long months in order to stomach this controlled liberalisation. Then on election day he was faced with two pieces of information which threw him totally off-balance. While the official, sham results were being announced by the Central Electoral Commission on election night, votes were actually being counted in the local Electoral Commis-sions. Only a few insiders know the actual result of the vote, but it was not good for Lukashenko, with his vote probably being in the region of 44 to just over 50 per cent. This was the first shock for him on election night. Then he saw the masses of protestors making their way along Independence Street – 20,000 to 30,000 people who were openly and fearlessly demanding new elections without his participation. Shock turned into blind rage and he gave the momentous command to his henchmen, who were only too happy to oblige.

Secondly: Europe has to deal with a Mafia-like economic clique which uses its enormous criminal energies to restrict foreign – particularly European – political and economic influence. In this scenario, the riots were designed to make it impossible for the West to recognize the election results and to destroy the weak ties that Belarus has with the EU. Many representatives of Belarus’s present-day elite were and are not interested in any changes to the status quo.


There are many indications that the riots which broke out in front of the government building had been care-fully planned over several weeks.

They have watched with alarm the gradual rapprochement which has taken place between Belarus and Europe since 2008. Any transformation or modernisation of the country in line with European standards would not only threaten their very existence, but privatisation, transparency and European competition would also rob them of the oppor-tunity to grab the juiciest morsels of their own economy at very special prices.12 Privatisations are inevitable over the next few years; otherwise Belarus will be unable to service its huge debt, which is due for repayment from 2012. The question is just whether it will be an elite-dominated privatisation as happened in Russia or the Ukraine or whether the country will follow the path taken by its Central European neighbours during the 1990s.

There are many indications that the riots which broke out in front of the government building had been carefully planned over several weeks. One of these is the delivery van which was found packed full of Molotov cocktails in plastic bottles, stun guns and gas bottles, which had allegedly been prepared by the Opposition and which was shown on state television on election day. The deployment of special forces on election night also bears all the traces of a well-organised, tried-and-tested action. One thing is sure: the organisers were members of Lukashenko’s close circle. They knew exactly how and when they needed to feed him information in order to provoke the impulsive reaction which materialised on election night. In her analysis of the meeting on December 15, Svetlana Kalinkina writes: “Whoever had Lukashenko wrapped round their little finger, wrecking the plans to gain international recognition of his fourth term as President, was at the meeting on December 15. We can only speculate on their motivation, whether it was due to stupidity, ideology, revenge or fear.”13

12 | In this respect we must ask why Presidential candidate Ales Mikalevich is still in prison when there is no evidence that he took part in the election night protests and he avoided making any attacks on Lukashenko during the election campaign. Obviously his programme of modernisation (and Europeani- sation) was considered to be more dangerous than the Christian fundamentalism of Rymahewski, for example.13 | Quoted from Swetlana Kalinkina, “Sobstwennoe okruschenie obwelo Lukaschenko wokrug palca” (Lukashenko’s own people had him wrapped round their little finger), in: http://udf.by/ news/sobytie/37406-sobstvennoe-okruzhenie-obvelo- lukashenko-vokrug-palca.html (accessed January 31, 2011).


Former economic adviser to the Rus-sian President, Andrei Illarionov, clai-med that Russia had instigated a riot on December 19 as an “imitation of the Orange Revolution”.

Thirdly: Europe finds itself faced with a Russia which still views the territory of Belarus as canonic, which is opposed to the country moving closer to Europe and which is using economic ties to promote a creeping integration of Belarus into the Russian Federation’s sphere. Former economic adviser to the Russian President, Andrei Illarionov, gave

his own version of the events in Minsk during an interview on the Echo Moskwy radio station. He claimed that Russia had insti-gated a riot on December 19 as an “imitation of the Orange Revolution”, with a second riot being planned by the Belarusian KGB as an

“imitation of storming the government building”. According to Illarionov it is to be assumed that both scenarios were closely coordinated and that the secret services knew what the other side was planning.

Illarionov thinks the Russian action went ahead. It was designed to incite a reaction from the Belarusian regime which would result in the country’s links to Europe being broken and its return to the Russian influence from which it had been struggling to free itself over the last two years. The Belarusian secret service then jumped on the bandwagon and used the protests for their own ends, i.e. crushing the country’s democratic opposition and a complete political clear-out. This also proved successful and is still ongoing.

For Illarionov, the Minsk protests go far beyond the local and the domestic: “I think these difficult, tragic, dramatic events are a bitter lesson for Belarus society, but also for Russian society and the societies of other authoritarian states. Just when people are fighting to have a voice, to create a democratic society, to develop the rule of law in their own country, then they have to constantly bear in mind the powers that are ranged against them and the nature of this authoritarian regime. They have to antic-ipate how not only their own regime, but also other foreign regimes, are planning to incite unrest and the methods and tools they are prepared to use to achieve their goals.”14

14 | Excerpts from the interview at http://belaruspartizan.org/ bp-forte/?page=100&news=73938 (accessed January 31, 2011).


Lukashenko has no longer the backing of the people. He finally lost them by his brutality, and it is clear that his victory on December 19 was a Pyrrhic one.

SOLIDARITY WITH DEMOCRATS IN BELARUS

Since the events of December 19, there has arisen a wave of solidarity with those being persecuted. Before Christmas the offices of the Belarus Popular Front were swamped with aid packages and donations for the 600+ prisoners. “The people are queuing up to help”, said one of the coordinators. This desire to help shows how the country’s mood has changed: Lukashenko’s regime no longer has the backing of the people. Lukaschenko finally lost them by his brutality, and it is clear that his victory on December 19 was a Pyrrhic one.

This could also be an opportunity for Europe to work with the country’s people to bring about real change in Belarus. Three things are now needed:

1. The ban of a wide-ranging group of people who are responsible for the vote-rigging, riots and repressive measures from travelling to EU countries must be followed by an easing of travel restrictions to the EU for Belarus citizens. This includes consulate procedures and visa charges.

2. The EU Commission must massively and sustainably increase its support for Belarusian civil society. It is important to not only step-up the programme but also to make it more flexible. Posts in Brussels and delega-tions in Kiev and Minsk need to be filled by competent people who clearly understand the conditions which govern civil society in Belarus.

3. The EU must make it even clearer to Russia that it considers Belarus to be an independent, sovereign state and that it is taking a positive interest in its democratic development. At the same time Europe must also begin to understand that Belarus is a country with a long European history and tradition which in the past has been unfairly treated as either a blank space or as a tiresome addendum to its foreign policy agenda.


Stephan Georg Raabe

It is not easy to find out about the existence of national or ethnic minorities in the EU. In the extensive demographic statistics (edition 2006) of the European Commission, the minorities, which make up estimably 45 million people in the 27 EU countries, do not appear. Searching the internet for minorities in the EU is also not particularly promising. Where everything possible is being counted and weighed: A current overview of which minorities exist in the individual EU countries, of how big they are and what status they have, is almost not to be found amongst the information of the EU. This leaves only the laborious path of analysing the individual states.

According to the census of 2002, Poland has the following population groups, whereas the data concerning minority groups show them to be less than the estimates of observers and the minority organisations say themselves:

Table 1Population groups in Poland 2002

Number Per cent

Polish 36.98 m 96.75

Upper Silesians 173,200 0.45

Germans 152,900 0.40

Belarusians 48,700 0.13

Ukrainians 31,000 0.08

Romanis 12,900 0.03

THE GERMAN MINORITY IN POLANDBASIC DATA, STRUCTURE, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND TWO EXCURSUSES, ABOUT THE POLISH DIASPORA IN GERMANY AND ABOUT THE SILESIAN AUTONOMY MOVEMENT

Stephan Georg Raabe is Resident Represen-tative of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Warsaw.


The Upper Silesians, meaning the Ger-mans, who stayed in their homeland, provide the largest group. In commu-nist Poland, they were exposed to a systematic polish assimilation pressure.

In addition, there are still several thousand Russians, Lemkos, Lithuanians, Kashubians, Slovenians and Arme- nians, who together account for less than 0.1 per cent of the population, and another two per cent of population groups respectively “unknown”.

From the German side, the number of Germans in Poland is estimated to be 300,000, which is approximately the number of those who identified themselves as Germans or Upper Silesians in the referendum. The high migration of Polish-German dual nationals to Germany and other Western countries, some of which are still reported in Poland, makes a reliable determination of the Germans actually living in Poland difficult.

THE BACKGROUND

Before the separations at the end of the 18th century, Poland was the home of many ethnic groups: Lithuanians, Latvians, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Germans and Jews. The latter, attracted by the great religious tolerance, settled in Poland since the High Middle Ages, peculiarly are still considered, to this day, a national minority and not just a religious community, as they up and into the 20th century were not, or only partially, integrated into the polish majority culture.

During the time of separation, the polish people themselves experienced what it meant to be a minority in Russia, Germany or Austria-Hungary. After the rebirth of Poland in late 1918 the population comprised of nearly 70 per cent Poles and just over 30 per cent other nationalities: 14 to 15 per cent Ukrainians also known as Ruthenians, about eight per cent Jews, three to four per cent Belarusians and two to four per cent Germans, whereas the nationalist policy against the Germans led to their partial migration. After the Second World War, the Holocaust, the displacement of Poland to the West, the evictions, relocations and subsequent expulsions the proportion of minorities in Poland decreased to around three per cent at last count. In that, the Upper Silesians, meaning the Germans, who stayed in their homeland, provide by far the largest group. In communist Poland, they were exposed to


Use of the mother tongue German was subject to punishment, which is why some members and representatives of German minority still only have a poor knowledge of German.

a systematic polish assimilation pressure and quite often repression. Under the impressions of the National Socialist criminal regime and the occupation of German land, all

German things, particularly the language and culture, had to disappear from public, but also private life. For a long time, use of the mother tongue German was subject to punishment, which is why some members

and representatives of the German minority still only have a poor knowledge of German. For a long time, the presence of Germans in Poland, their history and their culture was largely denied. 1970, when the “Fundamentals of a Normalisation” of German-Polish relations was negotiated, the Polish regime assumed there were only “a few tens of thousands” of Polish citizens of German origin.1

After 1989, the Germans in Poland could once again acknowledge their heritage and organise freely. When on November 12, 1989 some several thousand members of the German minority – with the support of the German Foreign Ministry – took part in the reconciliation service with Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki in the Lower Silesian Kreisau, the surprise was great on the Polish side. Irritation spread as they then even began to unfurl banners saying, “Helmut, you are our chancellor, too”.

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE AND INTEGRATION

After in 1990 many organisations of the German minority had already been formed, on September 15, 1990 at a meeting of representatives of German companies in Breslau it was decided to form a Central Council, based in Groß Strehlitz (Strzelce Opolskie) near Opole. One year later, on August 27, 1991, it was registered as “Association of the German Social-Cultural Societies in Poland” (VdG) with its seat in Opole. By its own account, VdG had about 250,000 members in 2008 (2007: 290,000). As an umbrella association, it has nine regional associations as permanent members, six associate members and five

1 | Cf. Gregor Schöllgen, “Wenn die Worte versagen. Bundes- kanzler Willy Brandt und die schwierige Verständigung mit Polen: Die Vorgeschichte des 7. Dezember 1970,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 7, 2010, 8.


The financial support through Germany occasionally evokes resentment, espe-cially since “the Germans”, for many years, have had the advantage of free access to the western job markets.

independent agencies, including each one youth, women and farmers’ organisation as well as education, business and charitable societies.

There are also a dozen German- or dual language media editors for newspapers, radio and television. By far the largest Association has its seat in the Voivodship Opole, with around 130,000 members (2007: 180,000) and about 300 local associations, the so-called German Friendship Circles (DFC), the second largest Association in the Voivodship Silesia has approximately 70,000 members. The office of the VdG has six employees.2

The Organisations of the Germans in Poland are charitably involved and are significantly supported through funds out of the federal budget. These range from economic devel-opment such as the Foundation for the Development of Silesia up to youth and adult education like the house of the German-Polish Collaboration in Gliwice, Opole. In addition, the support through “rich” Germany occasionally evokes envy and resentment, especially since “the Germans”, for many years, have had the advantage of free access to the western job markets and its associated earning potential, which the “Poles” were only granted a little at a time. Not until May 1, 2011, the complete opening of Germany’s job market comes into force.

Thus the life of the German minority in Poland remains a constant balancing act between the necessary integration into the Polish majority and the preservation of their own identity, while the emphasis is increasingly being put on the merits of a “multi-cultural identity of the region”.

Partially forgotten or neglected by the old homeland Germany and regarded with distrust or even rejected by their new home Poland, many of German origin living in Poland feel that neither Berlin nor Warsaw, neither the German refugee organisations nor the German minority organisations, represent them. So on one hand, the Upper

2 | Next to the Chairperson, Maria Neumann, there are also desk officers for Culture, School, Media and External Relations, Bookkeeping and Administration. Cf. http://vdg.pl.


German is teached to native speakers since 1992 in Polish public schools. In 2004, the number of schools rose from ten to 332, which were visited by around 35.000 students.

Silesian Autonomy Movement was able to grow strong. On the other hand, the importance of ethnic affiliation and thus the integration into the organisations of the

Germans decreases, which is furthered by the estrangement of the German language and culture. Admittedly, Polish public schools have been teaching German to native speakers since 1992, the number of these schools even rose from ten to 332 in 2004,

which were visited by around 35.000 students. Still, there is no separate schooling system for the German minority, such as a bilingual lyceum (secondary school).

NEW BEGINNINGS IN TERMS OF PERSONNEL

The last two years have seen a new generation in both the leadership of the VdG as well as the Opole Association. Norbert Rasch, a scholar of German studies born 1971, is the Chairman of the Social-Cultural Society of the Germans in Opole Silesia since April 26, 2008. Before that, the long-time Chairman Henryk Kroll, born 1949, who represented the minority from 1991 to 2007 in the Sejm, the Polish Parliament, without interruption, had resigned. Rasch, who since 2005 is a member of the Parliament of the Voivodship Opole, stands for the trend towards a shift in focus, away from economic and infrastructure policies towards culture and language policies, in order to ensure the survival of the minority. Since May 11, 2009, he also belongs to the new board of the VdG, whose Chairman since has been the trading entrepreneur Bernard Gaida Vintage, born 1958, from the Upper Silesian Dobrodzień (Guttentag). Similar to Rasch, Gaida also sees the creation of schools through comprehensive German lessons as a priority. He especially wants to take care of the “identity of the minority” and a maximised utilisation of minority policy opportunities of Polish legislation.3

3 | Cf. Martin Schmidt, “Bernhard Gaida – Mann der Hoffnung,” Berliner Schlesische Nachrichten (ed. Landsmannschaft Schlesien – Nieder- und Oberschlesien Landesgruppe Berlin/ Mark Brandenburg e.V.), 02/2009, 4 et seq.


If the members of a minority make up more than 20 percent of a community, then, since 2005, they have the right to use their native language when in contact with the local authorities.

THE MINORITIES ACT IN POLAND

On January 6, 2005, after more than ten years of debate, with the votes of the then ruling Left and the Civic Platform PO, the Sejm passed the “Law on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Languages”. It thereby fulfilled a task of the Polish Constitution and thus created a good basis for the co-existence. The law was hailed as a major progress by the German minorities. Representatives of the national party “League of Polish Families” (LPR) on the other hand saw this as the first step “of a broader campaign to Germanisation” of the region.4

Controversial was previously mainly the quota for the use of a minority language as official language next to Polish in the commu-nities. If the members of a minority make up more than 20 per cent of a community, then, since 2005, they have the right to use their native language when in contact with the local authorities. At the same time, these communities have the opportunity to put up bilingual city and street signs, which after a few years was used more and more, especially in Opole Silesia where the vast majority of the German population group lives, but partially led to resistance and resentment among the Polish population. A total of 30 municipalities could probably introduce bilingualism, 28 in the Opole Voivodship and 2 in Silesia. As of now, 24 communities have already implemented this. Likewise seven of twelve Pomeranian communities that meet the minority quorum have intro-duced Kashubian as a second language. The municipality Punsk, populated by many Lithuanians, and the munici-pality Gorlice, inhabited by Lemkos in Lesser Poland, are also bilingual. Twelve communities in north-eastern Poland could also introduce Belarusian as a supplement.

4 | The contents of the minority law is available in German: http://www.bilingual.com.pl/pdf/Polnisches%20Minderheiten gesetz.pdf (accessed February 3, 2011); Cf. Renata Mróz, “Polen verabschiedet neues Minderheitengesetz,” in: http://polen-news.de/puw/puw73-15 (accessed February 3, 2011); Markus Waschinski, “Die deutsche Minderheit in Polen,” Polen-Analysen Nr. 26, 2008, 6.


Table 2Communities with a German population over 20 per cent and/or German mayors

Per cent Number German mayors

Voivodship Opolskie / Opole

District Kędzierzyń-Kożle / Kandrzin-Cosel

Bierawa / Birawa 24.6 2,010

Cisek / Czissek ◪ 42.4 2,978 Alojzy Parys

Pawłowiczki / Pawlowitzke 20.7 1,802

Polska Cerekiew / Groß Neukirch 21.9 1,082 Krystyna Helbin

Reńska Wieś / Reinschdorf 34.5 3,042 Marian Wojciechowski

District Kluczbork / Kreuzburg

Lasowice Wielkie / Gross Lassowitz ◪ 37.6 2,735

District Krapkowice / Krappitz

Gogolin ◪ n/a n/a Joachim Wojtala

Krapkowice / Krappitz n/a n/a Andrzej Kasiura

Strzeleczki / Klein Strehlitz ◪ 41.6 3,418 Bronisław Kurpiela

Walce / Walzen ◪ 31.7 1,970 Bernhard Kubata

Zdzieszowice / Deschowitz n/a n/a Dieter Przewdzing

District Olesno / Rosenberg

Dobrodzień / Guttentag ◪ 25.0 2,762 Róża Kożlik

Gorzów Śląski / Landsberg n/a n/a Artur Tomala

Olesno / Rosenberg 23.8 4,608

Radłów / Radlau ◪ 27.9 1,295 Włodzimierz Kierat

Zębowice / Zembowitz ◪ 42.1 1,782 Waldemar Czaja

District Opole / Oppeln

Dobrzeń Wielki / Groß Döbern ◪ 20.3 2,885 Henryk Wróbel

Chrząstowice / Chronstau ◪ 25.7 1,705 Helena Rogacka

Komprachcice / Comprachtschütz ◪ 29.5 3,260 Paweł Smolarek

Łubniany / Lugnian ◪ 27.4 2,486 Krystian Baldy

Murów / Murow ◪ 31.0 1,955

Prószków / Prosaku ◪ 30.2 3,046 Róża Malik

Ozimek / Malapane n/a n/a Marek Korniak

Tarnów Opolski / Tarnau ◪ 23.8 2,447

Turawa 20.6 1,983 Waldemar Kampa

Percentage = Proportion of German, ◪ = bilingual municipalities


Percentage = Proportion of German, ◪ = bilingual municipalities

The law also provides for financial support of the State for the cultural activities of minorities. Beyond that, it contains nothing new. Most sections were in previous laws and regulations, such as the right to their own language, tradition, culture, its own educational and cultural institu-tions, native tongue education as well as their own first and last name. However, this new law determines for the first time which groups count as an ethnical minority. The law therefore refers to the national minorities of Armenians, Germans, Lithuanians, Russians, Slovaks, Czechs, Ukrainians, White Russians, to Jews and four ethnic minorities, which are the Karaites, Lemkos, Romani and Tatars, but not to the, in the recent years constituent, ethnic group of Silesia. It also regulates the use of the language of the Kashubians, located in the area southwest of Gdansk. The current Prime Minister Donald Tusk comes from Kashubia.5

5 | Additional literature: Peter Oliver Loew, “Nationale und ethni- sche Minderheiten,” in: Dieter Bingen, Krzysztof Ruchniewich (eds.), Länderbericht Polen, (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2009), 360-372; Markus Waschinski, “Die deutsche Minderheit in Polen,” Polen-Analysen Nr. 26, 2008; Stephan Georg Raabe, “Zur Lage der deutschen Volksgruppe in Polen,” KAS-Länderbericht, 2005.

Per cent Number German mayors

District Prudnik / Neustadt

Biała / Zülz ◪ 42.0 5,103 Arnold Hindera

Głogówek / Oberglogau ◪ 24.3 3,680

District Strzelce / Groß Strehlitz

Izbicko / Stubendorf ◪ 28.1 1,563 Brygida Pytel

Jemielnica / Himmelwitz ◪ 23.7 1,822 Joachim Jelito

Kolonowski / Colonnowska ◪ 41.1 2,703 Norbert Koston

Leśnica / Leschnitz ◪ 26.9 2,409 Łukasz Jastrzębski

Ujazd / Ujest ◪ 25.2 1,607

Voivodship Śląskie / Silesia

District Racibórz / Ratibor

Krzanowice / Kranowitz ◪ 20.5 1,285

Rudnik / Rudnick ◪ n/a n/a


For the Polish speaking population in Germany, Poland wants similar rights as the German minority has in Poland, referring to the German-Polish Treaty of 1991.

Table 3Communities with Auxiliary Languages

THE POLISH DIASPORA IN GERMANY

For the Polish Politics a good treatment of the national minorities in their own country is important insofar as there are autochthonous Polish minorities living in Lithuania, Belarus and the Ukraine and there is a large Polish-speaking

group in Germany. There are often disputes over the treatment of the Polish minority in Lithuania. For the Polish speaking population in Germany, Poland wants similar rights as the German minority has in Poland, referring

to the German-Polish Neighbourhood- and Friendship Treaty of 1991, which celebrates its twentieth anniversary on June 17 of this year. In round-table discussions at the invitation of the two interior ministries in February 2010 and with the participation of representatives of the German minority in Poland and the Polish Diaspora in Germany, the support of these population groups was discussed. Articles 20/21 of the German-Polish Neighbourhood Treaty grant the Polish Diaspora in Germany the same rights as the German Minority in Poland, although both the status of the population – established population on one hand and immigrants on the other – as well as the settlement patterns and the population structures in the two countries are different. In the Weimar Republic, the Polish were recognised as a national minority. Immediately before

Kashubian Voivodship

Sierakowice Pomorskie / Pomerania

Bytów Pomorskie / Pomerania

Stężyca Pomorskie / Pomerania

Chmielno Pomorskie / Pomerania

Szemud Pomorskie / Pomerania

Linia Pomorskie / Pomerania

Kartuzy Pomorskie / Pomerania

Lithuanian

Puńsk / Punskas Podlaskie

Lemko

Gorlice Małopolskie / Lesser Poland


the Second World War, however, the leadership of this Minority was arrested and interned in concentration camps in Sachsenhausen and Buchenwald. Shortly thereafter, the recognition as a minority was revoked by decree through the National Socialist dictatorship, the Polish minority organisations were prohibited and their property was confiscated. With the westward shift of the German-Polish border to the Oder-Neiße line in 1945, the territories in which an autochthonous Polish minority was established, (especially the border regions of the Prussian provinces of Upper Silesia, Grenzmark Posen, West and East Prussia), were now part of the Communist-ruled Poland. This is why today the Polish population in Germany is no longer recognised as a national minority, although the legal liquidation of the Polish minority before the war was lifted, with the coming into force of the Constitution of the Federal Republic in 1949. The majority of the Poles now living in Germany are German-Polish emigrants, who together with the Polish-born population make up approximately 1.3 per cent of the population (just over one million people according to the census of 2005). Between 1950 and 1989 alone, about 1.2 million German emigrants and their families came to the Federal Republic of Germany.

Nevertheless, from Warsaw’s point of view, the treatment of the Polish Diaspora is by far not the same as the privileges that the Germans have in Poland, which is why a greater promotion of language and culture, of organisational structure and the granting of participation opportunities is pushed for. Representatives of the Polish community also demand that the Poles in Germany are recognised as a national minority and the granting of the resulting rights. They also demand the elimination of what is in their opinion an asymmetry in the implementation of the German-Polish Neighbourhood Treaty. This carries political dynamite. As there are parliamentary elections due in the coming up fall, national-conservative forces will probably pick up this topic.

The Polish Diaspora is organised in the Union of Poles and in the Polish Congress in Germany, albeit with a relatively low number of members. Typically enough, the Chairman

The majority of the Poles now living in Germany are German-Polish emi-grants, who together with the Polish-born population make up approx. 1.3 per cent of the population.


In the Sejm, the DMi is now only repre-sented by one Member of Parliament, Ryszard Galla, who is also the Presi-dent of the House of German-Polish cooperation in Gliwice.

of the Union of Poles, Marek Wójcicki, came to Germany on the “German minority ticket” in the 1980s, which illustrates the peculiar conflict situation. A special role belongs to the Polish Catholic Mission in Germany, which, in addition to its pastoral work, offers education for children in Polish.

REPRESENTATION OF THE GERMAN MINORITY IN THE SEJM AND SELF-GOVERNMENT

Since 1991, the German minority submitted their own lists to the Sejm elections, whereby it is exempt from the five-per cent hurdle, which was introduced in 1993. In the first completely free elections in 1991, approximately 132,000 (1.19 per cent) people across the country voted for the lists of the German minority (DMi), 74,000 of which from Opole Silesia. This led to seven Member of Parliament mandates; in 1993, the DMi won four seats, 1997, 2001

and 2005 only two mandates in each year. In the 2007 elections only 32,462 (0.2 per cent) voted for the DMi. Thus, the support steadily decreased in the parliamentary elections. In the Sejm, the DMi is now only represented

by one Member of Parliament, Ryszard Galla, who is also the President of the House of German-Polish cooperation in Gliwice. The reasons for the weak performance in the 2007 elections on one hand was the increased voter turnout in the province of Opole (2005: 33.5 per cent; 2007: 45.5 per cent), which was connected to the fact that the election was characterised as a national referendum against the national-conservative party “Law and Justice” (PiS)6 and on the other, lay in the decreasing commitment, especially of younger people towards the political representation of the DMi, the lack of mobilisation as well as the over-ageing.

Added to this is the hidden labour migration from the region, which particularly applies to dual citizens. According to a study by the Voivodship Opole in 2007, approximately 330,000 autochthonous people are registered in the region, roughly a third of the total population. Among them are about 80.000 people, nearly a quarter, who live

6 | With a low turnout, the DMi so far had, in relation, better results because of its good network for mobilising of voters. From the rise in turnout by 12 per cent, however the major parties benefited disproportionately, particularly the Civic Platform PO, but also the PiS.


The current situation is also not with-out tension, as the governmental for-mation after the regional elections on November 21, 2010 made clear.

abroad, either partially or the whole time. Therefore, a part of the potential voters for the DMi is simply not present, as can also be seen in a regional comparison of the voter’s turnout, where the Voivodship Opole generally has the lowest, in particular in the districts with a strong German population. In 2007, the voter turnout there was six to seven per cent below the already low average of 45.53 per cent.

REGIONAL ELECTIONS 2010

The DMi is still strongly represented on the local government level of the Opole region, for example in the regional Parliament and in the district and municipal councils. Here, through its extensive network, it has a good tool for voter mobilisation, which, at such a low voter turnout, is a strategic advantage.

In the regional Parliament, the DMi, which evades a clear political classification, has been part of the government in various coalitions since 1998, since 2006 with the liberal-conservative Civic Platform (PO) and before that with the post-communist “Alliance of the Left Democrats” (SLD). The deterioration of the German-Polish relations during 2005 to 2007, when the national-conservative PiS was in office, according to representatives of the minority was felt even in the local government, particularly when the regional government faced a President of Government from the PiS. However, the current situation is also not without tension, as the governmental formation after the regional elections on November 21, 2010 made clear.

In these regional and local elections, the DMi achieved good results in the Opole region. In the Voivodship Opole, the regional Parliament received 17.77 per cent of the votes (+0.47 per cent over 2006), which is the second best result after the Civic Platform PO who received 31.93 per cent. In total, the minority received 53,670 votes, an increase of 4,539 votes compared to 2006. Thus, the negative trend of recent elections was stopped: In 2006, the minority received 49,131 votes, however in 2002 the received 54,385 votes (18.61 per cent).


In the last two legislatures, the minority had seven repre-sentatives in the Sejmik, the Voivodship Parliament, before that even 13 mandates. Now there are six, which is due to the strong election results of the Civic Platform (PO, 12 mandates, +4) and of the “Alliance of the Left Democrats” (SLD, five MP’s). Law and Justice (PiS) also received five seats, and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) two.7

Table 4Results of the regional elections in the Voivodship Opole

Election Committee Votes Per cent

PO 96,449 31.93

PiS 52,664 17.43

German Minority (DMi) 53,670 17.77

SLD 50,479 16.71

PSL 36,655 12.13

PPP 6,528 2.16

Others 5,631 1.87

Source: Official results according to the electoral commission (Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza), http://wybory2010.pkw.gov.pl/Komunikaty_PKW,2; Wyniki glosowania do sejmików województw wedlug komitetów wyborczych i województw (accessed February 3, 2011).

The German Minority (DMi) members of the Sejmik are:

1. Hubert Jerzy Kolodziej – Teacher, School Director, Education Officer of the Association of German companies VDG;

2. Norbert Rasch – Chairman of the Social-Cultural Society of the Germans in Opole Silesia (SKGD);

3. Herbert Czaja – Chairman of the Chamber of Agriculture Opole;

4. Krystian Adamik – Doctor of medicine;5. Józef Kotys – Vice Prime Minister the Voivodship Opole;6. Andrzej Kasiura – previously a board member of the

7 | In the Voivodship Warmia and Mazury Urszula Pasławska, on the list of the Polish People’s Party PSL was voted for by the German minority and elected to the Sejmik. Cf. Krzysztof Świerc, Agnieszka Szotka, “Erfolg der Deutschen Minderheit bei der Kommunalwahl,” Schlesisches Wochenblatt, E-Paper, http://www.wochenblatt.pl/index.php?option=com_content& view=article&id=237 (accessed February 3, 2011).


Voivodship Opole (regional government) was able to assert himself with 1,549 votes (52.53%) in the runoff elections for mayor of the district town Krapkowice (Krappitz) on December 5, against the PO candidate Maciej Sonik (1,400 votes, 47.47%). The current Vice Chairman of the Parliament, Ryszard Donitza, will succeed him.

TUSK AVERTS SCANDAL

The PO, PSL and DMi entered the elections, expressing their will to continue their previous coalition. However, only 24 hours after the elections, the PO formed a coalition with the PSL and the “Alliance of the Left Democrats” (SLD), which the DMi was informed of through the press. The regional head of the PO, Leszek Korzeniowski, justified this by stating that the cooperation had not been as expected, that agreements were not upheld and that the DMi had acted too selfish. “They kept the money in their own pockets”, he claimed.8 Furthermore, the new coalition was perceived more positively in Poland. For allegations were constantly made by the party headquarters that the minority enjoyed too many privileges and was exagger-ating in the exercise of their rights, such as bilingual town signs. This scandal regionally hit like a bomb. Quickly, the public talk was of an “anti-German coalition”. After all, the DMi had emerged from the elections as the second largest party in the Sejmik. Nevertheless, there were also counter votes in the PO. The European MP Danuta Jazłowiecka from Opole criticised the exclusion of Germans openly as a “mistake” of fellow party members. The Opole Voivodship is under particular scrutiny and support from Germany, it was said. Besides, the German tourism in the region is an important economic factor. The cold disempowerment of DMi immediately caused the head of PO and Prime Minister Donald Tusk to call for action. As a result, the PO Opole included the DMi in the government.9 The Voivodship is

8 | “Korzeniowski: w centrali były zarzuty, że MN ma za dużo przywilejów” (allegations were constantly made by the party headquarters, that the minority enjoyed too many privileges), in: Gazeta Wyborcza (Opole), November 21, 2010.9 | Website of the German-Polish Association Local Political Part- nership (AKP), “Tusk wendet Skandalkoalition ab. Deutsche Minderheit bleibt in Oppelner Regierung,” December 3, 2010, in: http://akp-dialog.de/index.php?view=article&catid=35%3 Aaktuelles&id=76%3A2010-12-03 (accessed February 3, 2011).


now governed by a grand four-way coalition, whereas the DMi however, has to accept disadvantages. The PO as the strongest parliamentary group provides the Marshall. However, neither of the two Vice-Prime Minister positions were awarded, as it would correspond to the proportional representation, to the Germans. The former German Vice Marshall Józef Kotys, who by far had the most votes in the elections, has to remain on the sidelines. As a successful

politician and string-puller, his outstanding election result speaks for him. His profile was probably too dominant for the PO. The PiS alone, now with five of 30 seats in the Sejmik now form an opposition.

Concerning the results of the German minority in local elections: 28 candidates from the DMi ran for mayor or community leaders, 24 of which were elected, 19 in the first round on November 21, 2010, and five in the runoff elections on December 5, 2010. The DMi provides 49 Council members to the district assemblies (2006:54). There, the distribution of seats is as follows:

In the districts Namysłów (Namslau), Brzeg (Brieg), Nysa (Neisse) and Głubczyce (Leobschütz), the DMi did not provide their own candidates. In the municipalities, the DMi won 278 council mandates (2006:304). The DMi

Concerning the results of the German minority in local elections: 28 candi-dates from the DMi ran for mayor or community leaders, 24 of which were elected.

Table 5Seats won by DMi in regional elections 2010 and 2006

Community Seats wonin 2010

Seats won in 2006

Mandatestotal

Strzelce Opolskie(Groß Strehlitz)

9 10 19

Krapkowice (Krappitz) 7 7 19

Kędzierzyn-Koźle(Kandrzin-Cosel)

5 8 21

Olesno (Rosenberg) 9 8 19

Prudnik (Neustadt) 5 3 17

Opole (Oppeln) 12 16 25

Kluczburg (Kreuzburg) 2 2 19

Source: Written statement of Joanna Mróz, spokesperson of the Social-Cultural Society of the Germans in Opole Silesia, November 26, 2010.


The Germans in the Voivodship Silesia did not provide their own list. Its can-didates were members of various elec-tion committees, but supported in par-ticular was the RAŚ.

therefore received a total of 357 mandates (2006: 365) in regional and local elections.

IRRITATION ABOUT THE SUCCESS OF THE SILESIAN AUTONOMY MOVEMENT

In regional elections, the movement Autonomous Silesia (Ruch Autonomii Śląska, RAŚ) won 122,781 votes (8.49 per cent) in the Voivodship Silesia and three seats in the Sejmik. Through this, they became the fourth-largest party after the PO (22 MP’s) the PiS (11) and the SLD (10). The PSL won two seats. 2006, the RAŚ received 58,919 votes (4.35 per cent) and a mandate. The Germans in the Voivodship did not provide their own list. Its candidates were members of various election committees, but supported in particular was the RAŚ.10

Rudolf Kołodziejczyk founded the movement in 1990. Since 2003, the historian Jerzy Gorzelik chairs it. It links in particular to the Autonomous Voivodship Silesia in the Second Polish Republic between the wars and wants to achieve more autonomy for the region, which is why it is sometimes accused of anti-Polish tendencies. Today’s Voivodship, after the territorial reform in 1999, makes itself up from the Voivodships Katowice, Częstochowa and Bielsko-Biala and includes mostly the territory of the former Autonomous Voivodship Silesia. Formed in 1922 out of the part of Upper Silesia, it was separated from the German Reich and Austria-Hungary after World War I, as a result of a referendum and rebellions. Then as now, the region with the industrial agglomeration area between Gliwice and Katowice is the most densely populated Voivodship in Poland. The German parties – the Catholic People’s Party, the German Party, and the German Social Democratic Party – in the 1920s elections achieved 21-30 per cent, and provided a representative to the six-strong government, the Voivodship Council.

In the now newly elected Sejmik, the RAŚ is part of a coalition with the PO and PSL, which amongst other things, was openly criticised by the Polish President Bronisław

10 | Cf. Świerc, „Erfolg der Deutschen Minderheit…‟, n. 7.


Komorowski and President of the EU Parliament Jerzy Buzek, who had his constituency in Katowice. Not until his second attempt on December 10, the Chairman of the RAŚ Jerzy Gorzel was voted into the board of the Voivodship, the regional government, where he is responsible for education, culture and external relations. During the first election a week earlier, there had been a stalemate, as some PO representatives refused to vote for their coalition partner. This, as well as the national reports in the major Polish newspapers, showed the irritation that the relatively strong performance of the Autonomy Movement evoked.

Overall, the RAŚ received 40 mandates in regional and municipal elections: three in the regional parliament, six in the district assemblies, seven in the larger city councils and 24 in municipalities:

In Godów (District Wodzisław) through Mariusz Adamczyk (re-elected with 90.3 per cent) and in the rural community Lyski (District Rybnik) through Grzegorz Gryt (64.67 per cent) it provides the directly elected mayors and the majority in the municipal council. In the regional assembly of Rybnik with a 25.61 percentage of votes, it has five mandates, in the regional assembly of Wodzisław with a 7.91 percentage of votes, it is represented with one mandate. In the cities, the RAŚ in Czerwionka-Leszczyny (ger. Czerwionka-Leschczin, District Rybnik, ca. 29,000 inhabitants) – centre of the polish rebellion under Wojciech Korfanty between 1919 and 1921 – is represented with four mandates (20.48 per cent) in Mysłowice (ger. Myslowitz, 75,000 inhabitants) with two (9.29 per cent) and in Ruda Śląska (143,000 inhabitants) with one mandate (8.18 per cent).11

PROSPECTIVE

As the major parties do not play a dominant role on the local level, but are often surpassed by the local citizen’s committees, the DMi will probably continue to play a larger role here. It also has a good chance, to continue to form a central force, regionally in the Opole Voivodship, insofar

11 | Cf. Ruch Autonomii Śląska, http://www.autonomia.pl/index. php?option=com_content&task=view&id=631 (accessed February 3, 2011).


as it maintains its own cultural identity and prevents the ongoing exodus of Germans. This calls for increased efforts with regard to the linguistic and cultural promotion and a perspective on life in the Upper Silesian region. At national level, however, involvement in the major political parties promises more success in contributing towards the integration of the German minority in Poland.

While the DMi fits into the given political context because of the minority law, the RAŚ, due to their aspirations for greater autonomy of Silesia (eastern Upper Silesia) evokes irritation in Poland. It will probably continue to play the role of a specifically cultural and political force in the region, whereas locally it is not anchored as strongly, which should give reason for the Polish majority society to handle the autonomy movement with more composure.

The author thanks Luke Skwiercz for the assistance in researching the local election results of the German minority.

Documents

KAS International Reports 03/2011