Key Elements for Regulations

(ANNuR/IAEA/JNRC/KINS Joint Workshop, Sept. 2013, Amman)

Ho-Kee KIM, SSCS/NSNI

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CONTENTS

I. GLOBAL SAFETY FRAMEWORK

II. IAEA PROVISIONS FOR CB

III. KEY ELEMENTS FOR LICENSING

IV. REMARKS

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Safety is a national responsibility vs.

Accident is a global concern

• Fukushima Daiichi (‘11), Chernobyl (‘86), TMI (‘79) • Do not respect national boundaries

Global safety harmonization

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Global safety framework towards harmonization

International Legal Instruments Conventions and Codes of Conduct

IAEA Safety

Standards

IAEA Safety

Services

GNSSN and Networks ANSN, ANNuR, FNRBA, FORO, RCF, TSOF, etc.

National Capacity

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Global movements

12 major items of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety after the Fukushima accident

• Safety enhancement of the existing NPPs – Safety evaluation of a stress-test type

• Mostly, associated with capacity building of member countries – Systematic approach

– Include self-assessment of member countries, peer review, and planning to fill the gaps identified

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What is capacity building? • Institutional and legal framework development

– Making legal and regulatory changes to enable organizations, institutions and agencies at all levels and in all sectors to enhance their capacities

• Organizational development – Elaboration of management structure, process and

procedures, not only within organizations but also managements of relationships between the different organizations and sectors

• Human resource development – Process of equipping individuals with the understanding,

skills and access to information, knowledge and training that enables them to perform effectively

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CONTENTS

I. GLOBAL SAFETY FRAMEWORK

II. IAEA PROVISIONS FOR CB

III. KEY ELEMENTS FOR LICENSING

IV. REMARKS

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1. International legal instruments

• From the beginning of nuclear age – Regulation of the safety of nuclear facilities was deemed a

matter of national jurisdiction

• Following Chernobyl accident in 1986 – The necessity to establish the international legal

instruments on nuclear safety became evident

• International instrument requires: – A state to conform its internal laws and regulations to the

terms of the instrument – A state also incurs obligations to all other states that are

party of the instrument

Developed reactively and progressively 8

• International instruments adopted by and under the auspices of the IAEA: – Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident,

1986 – Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident

or Radiological Emergency, 1986 – Convention on Nuclear Safety, 1994 – Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management

and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management,1997 – Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive

Sources, 2003 and supplementary import/export Guidance, 2004

– Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors, 2004

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• The scope covers: – Nuclear power plants – Spent fuel and radioactive waste – Radioactive sources – Research reactors – Corresponding emergency preparedness and response

system

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2. IAEA Safety Standards

• According to the statute of the IAEA, the Agency is authorized: – IAEA statute Article III, A.1 “To encourage and assist

research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world; …”

– IAEA statute Article III, A.6, “To establish or adopt, …, standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property …and to provide for the application of these standards ”

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• Nature of the Safety Standards – Developed through an open and transparent process for

gathering, integrating and sharing the knowledge and experience gained from the actual use of technologies and from the application of the safety standards, including emerging trends and issues of regulatory importance

– Non binding on Member States, but may be adopted by them

– Binding for IAEA’s own activities – Binding on States in relation to operations assisted by the

IAEA or States wishing to enter into project agreements with IAEA

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• Categories of the Safety Standards

Safety Fundamentals Fundamental safety objective and principles for

protecting people and environment

Safety Requirements Requirements that must be met to ensure protection of

people and environment –’shall’

Safety Guides Recommended ways of meeting the requirements

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3. IAEA peer reviews

• Performed upon request of Member States • Assess compliance with Safety Standards and provide

recommendations for improvements • Also identify good practices to be shared with the

industry • Results publically available, unless formally

requested by Member State • Cover all areas of nuclear safety infrastructure

– Regulatory framework (IRRS), Technical safety of NPP (PSA, design, accident, management,…), Siting, Operational safety of NPP (OSART), Research reactors, Fuel cycle facilities

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• Examples of peer review – Integrated Regulatory Review Services (IRRS) – Generic Reactor Safety Reviews (GRSR) – International Probabilistic Safety Assessment Review Team

(IPSART) – Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) – Peer Review of Operational Safety Performance Experience

(PROSPER) – Safety Aspects of Long Term Operation of Water

Moderated Reactors (SALTO) – Integrated Safety Assessment of Research Reactors

(INSARR) – Safety Evaluation of Fuel Cycle Facilities during Operation

(SEDO) – Site and Seismic Safety Review Services

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• Provide IT and human networks to ensure that the knowledge and experiences are exchanged, globally

• IT network is linked with: – Global networks: RegNet, GSAN, TSOF, NEWS – Regional networks: ANNuR, ANSN, ENSREG, FNRBA, FORO – Others: RCF, NNRP, INES, Action Plan, CANDU, CSN, WWER,

etc.

• Human network is moving towards – Providing the leadership and securing the sustainability of

GNSSN and its linked networks

4. GNSSN and networks

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• GNSSN for ANNuR – Channel to share or mobilize global expertise, necessary

for building capacity of members – IT tool, ANNuR Website, to manage regional knowledge

and to facilitate collaborations of the members

Global hub for knowledge management and collaboration, regarding nuclear safety and security – Approximately, 80 member countries

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CONTENTS

I. GLOBAL SAFETY FRAMEWORK

II. IAEA PROVISIONS FOR CB

III. KEY ELEMENTS FOR LICENSING

IV. REMARKS

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What is government ?

• A body of people that sets and administers public policy, and exercises executive, political and sovereign power through customs, institutions and laws ‒ Legislator, administrator, and arbitrator in the administrative

bureaucracy who control a state at a given time ‒ Means by which state policy is enforced, and mechanism for

determining the policy of the state

One of the functions • Provide public goods and services for well-being of the

community as a whole ‒ Provide better than private business for the community at

large through pooling money and resources

1. Legal and governmental infrastructure

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Why the need for a legal and governmental infrastructure? • To ensure control over nuclear material, facilities and any other radioactive

material

• To ensure that nuclear energy and its applications are exclusively used for peaceful uses

• To ensure that nuclear facilities, nuclear materials and any other radioactive material are handled and operated safely and securely through a system of regulatory control

• To ensure that compensation mechanisms are in place in case of nuclear damage

• To define responsibilities, obligations and rights of parties

• To ensure confidence building in the use of nuclear power at national and international levels

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How to achieve these goals? • Establishing a legal and governmental infrastructure

– Adoption of a comprehensive nuclear law – Establishment of an independent RB – Implementation of international obligations of the State

What is nuclear law? • Provides a framework for balancing risks and benefits • Traditionally, encompasses 4 main fields

– Safety, Security, Safeguard and Liability

• Encompasses national and international level

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What is regulation?

• Administrative legislation that constitutes or constraints rights, and allocates responsibilities – Distinguished from primary legislation by Parliament or

judge-made law • Actions of conduct, imposing sanctions to the extent

permitted by the law – Costs for some and benefits for others, like any other form

of coercive action

A rule of order having the force of law, prescribed by a superior or competent authority, relating to the actions under the authority’s control

Efficient regulations are those where total benefits to some people exceed the total costs to others

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Nature of government regulations • Economic regulation

‒ Rules that limit who can enter a business (entry control, needs licenses), and

‒ What price they may charge (price control like railroads, telephone, etc.)

• Social regulation ‒ Broad category of rules, governing how any business or

individual carries out its activities with a view to correcting “market failure”

Benefits are enormous, but incalculable

Market fails: * When firms or individuals do not take account of the costs their activities may impose on 3rd

parties, or * When firms fail to supply sufficient information for consumers or workers to make informed

choices 23

2 approaches for safety regulations • Prescriptive approach

– Require comprehensive regulatory guides, prescribing detailed acceptance criteria to meet the regulatory requirements

– Provide with clearly defined provisions , prescribe the means and methods to be used to comply with regulatory requirements, reduce the time and skill for licensing

– Difficult to prepare, require detailed technical knowledge and expertise of the regulatory staff, place a high demand on regulatory resources for development and updating, lead to inflexibility that limits initiative of licensee to strive for better performance

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• Performance based approach – What is “reasonably practicable” is decided on a case-by-

case basis with the expertise and experience of specialists – Specify primarily overall safety objectives and allow more

flexibility in meeting safety goals – Easy to develop and focus on what is to be achieved in

terms of protection and safety, no need to be changed frequently to reflect new knowledge, promote continuous improvements and involvement of the operator

– Lead to inconsistency and wasted efforts, require highly competent regulatory staff

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2. Licensing

Licence • Legal document issued by the RB granting

authorization to create a nuclear installation and/or to perform specified activities

Licensing process is often used for nuclear installations • It includes all authorization processes for a nuclear

installation and its activities Licensee is the holder of a current and valid licence • Person or organization having overall responsibility

for a nuclear installation and its activities, and who is in possession of all necessary licences for the installation and its activities

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Basic principles

• Licensing process must be well-defined, clear, transparent and traceable

• Regulatory Body – Define the safety criteria, requirements, guidelines and

documents to be provided by the applicant – Establish a mechanism to solve safety issues with the

applicant • Operating Organization

– Prepare and submit the required documentation – Be prepared to respond to the requests of the RB

• The public should be given an opportunity to provide their views during certain licensing steps

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Steps of the licensing process

• Depends on national legislation but often covers: – Siting and site evaluation, which may include the

environmental impact assessment – design, – construction, – commissioning, – operation, – Decommissioning, and – release from regulatory control

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3. Documents Document • Any written, pictorial or electronic information

describing, defining, specifying, reporting, or certifying activities, requirements, procedures, or results (ASME/NQA-1-2008)

Report • An official document written by a group of people

who have examined a particular situation or problem (Oxford Dic.)

Record • A completed document that furnishes evidence

of items and/or some activities (Oxford Dic.) 29

Documents produced by the operator • Documents required by the RB for approval at the

various stages of the authorization process • Reports that are submitted to the RB or, for event,

incidents or accidents which are identified in regulations

• Documents that are prepared for the conduct of the activities related to the facilities and are made available to the RB upon request

Documents produced by the RB for a specific facility • Results of review and assessment • Records of inspection activities • Records of enforcement actions • License document

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Contents of a licence includes:

• A sufficiently detailed description of the nuclear installation, its location and its activities, including a description of the site boundaries

• The maximum allowable inventories of sources covered by authorizations

• The requirements for notifying the RB of any modifications that are significant to safety

• Any limits on operation and use, such as dose and discharge limits

• The requirements for reporting events and incidents at the installation

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• The requirements for providing routine reports to the RB

• The requirements for retention of records by the person or organization responsible for the nuclear installation and its activities

• The requirements for arrangements for emergency preparedness

• The means and procedures for changing any information stated in the licence

• The documentary basis: – Documents in support of the application and those

prepared and/or used by the RB in the review and assessment process, which together form the basis for issuing the licence

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4. Safety assessment

• Primary purpose – Determine whether an adequate level of safety has been

achieved for a facility or activity, and – Whether the basic safety objectives and safety criteria

established by the designer, the operating organization and the RB have been fulfilled

• A safety assessment shall be carried out for all applications of technology that give rise to radiation risks; that is, for all types of facilities and activities

• Graded approach – Determine the scope, extent, and level of detail of the

safety assessment, consistent with the magnitude of the possible radiation risks arising from the facility or activity

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3 fundamental safety functions • Control of reactivity • Removal of heat from the core • Confinement of radioactive material

Defence-in-Depth • A hierarchical deployment of different levels of

equipment and procedures – To maintain the effectiveness of physical barriers placed

between a radiation source or radioactive materials and workers, the public or the environment, in operational states and, for some barriers, in accident conditions

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• The objectives – To compensate for potential human and component

failures – To maintain the effectiveness of the barriers by averting

damage to the facility and to the barriers themselves – To protect the public and the environment from harm in

the event that these barriers are not fully effective

• The strategy – To prevent accidents – If prevention fails, to limit their potential consequences

and prevent any evolution to more serious conditions

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Levels of Defence-in-Depth

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Multiple barriers against radioactive release

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• Regulatory body – Statutory powers to enforce compliance with the

requirements of regulations and license conditions – Authority to require to modify, correct or curtail any aspect

of facility’s operation, procedures, practices, systems, structures or components to ensure the level of safety

• Inspection – An examination, observation, measurement or test

undertaken to assess structures, systems, components and materials, as well as operational activities, processes, procedures and personnel competence

• Enforcement – To respond to non-compliance with specified conditions

and requirements, and to be commensurate with the seriousness

– Methods of enforcement: written warnings or directives, orders to curtail specific activities, modification, suspension or revocation of the authorization, penalties

5. Inspection and enforcement

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• Inspection programmes – Comprehensive and developed within the overall

regulatory strategy – Enough to provide a high level of confidence that

operators are in compliance with regulatory requirements and are identifying and solving all actual and potential problems

• Planned inspections – Carried out in fulfilment of a structured and largely pre-

arranged or base-line inspection programme – Linked to operators schedules at all stages of the

authorization process • Reactive inspections

– Initiated in response to an unexpected, unplanned or unusual situation or an incident

– To assess its significance and implications and the adequacy of corrective actions

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CONTENTS

I. GLOBAL SAFETY FRAMEWORK

II. IAEA PROVISIONS FOR CB

III. KEY ELEMENTS FOR LICENSING

IV. REMARKS

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• National policy and commitment on the peaceful use of nuclear energy

• Abundant global resources and opportunities than ever before

• Global harmonization as goal and means

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Thank you for attention!

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This activity is conducted with funding by the European Union