EJIL2002* Professor of Law, New York University Law School. This paper was originally prepared for a conference atKyushu University on The Acceptance of Modern International Law in East Asia; a version of this paperwillinduecourseappearintheconferenceproceedings,editedbyProfessorsMichaelStolleisandMasaharuYanagihara(MaxPlanckInstituteforLegalHistory,Frankfurt,forthcoming).Discussionswith participants at the Kyushu University conference, the comments of Andrew Hurrell, and the supportoftheFilomenDAgostinoandMaxE.GreenbergResearchFundatNYULawSchool,aregratefullyacknowledged.ThewriterisimmenselyindebtedtoProfessorMathiasSchmoeckelforhiskindnessinsending,priortopublication,adraftofhisarticle,TheStoryofaSuccess:LassaOppenheimandHisInternationalLaw.SchmoeckelsinvaluablearticleisthemostcomprehensivestudyofOppenheimknown to the present writer. The writer also thanks his former student Anja Meyer, of the Max PlanckInstituteinHeidelberg,forhersuperbresearchassistance,andhercarefulstudyoftherelationshipbetween the work of Philipp Lotmar and the ideas put forward in Oppenheims Gerechtigkeit und Gesetz(1895)andDasGewissen (1898)...............................................................................................................................................................EJIL(2002),Vol.13No.2,401436.............................................................................................LegalPositivismasNormativePolitics:InternationalSociety,BalanceofPowerandLassaOppenheimsPositiveInternationalLawBenedictKingsbury*AbstractBecausemainstreaminternationallawpositivisminthetraditionofLassaOppenheim(18581919) has sought to separate law from morals and from politics, many critics havedismissed this positivism as amoral, apolitical, and atheoretical. This article offers a readingofLassaOppenheimthatchallengesthisview.Drawingonthejurisprudentialtheoryarticulated in Oppenheims non-international law writings about conscience and justice, theauthorreadsOppenheimsadoptionofanausterepositivismininternationallawasatheoretically-grounded normative choice of a concept of law best suited to advance his moraland political values. The author thus treats Oppenheims normative positivism as political,and considers it together with Oppenheims advocacy of international society and balance ofpower as a statement of political conditions for international law. While concluding that theextenttowhichOppenheimconsciouslyacceptedsuchapoliticalandjurisprudentialunderstandingofinternationallawremainsspeculative,theauthorcontendsthatmain-stream positivism has had more enduring appeal because it has been at least sub-consciouslyopentosuchreadings.402 EJIL13(2002),4014361CitedinthispaperasOppenheim,InternationalLaw,withparticulareditionandvolumespecied.2AspectsoftheworksevolutionareconsideredinJanis,TheNewOppenheimandItsTheoryofInternational Law, 16 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (1996) 329; and Reisman, Lassa Oppenheims NineLives,19YaleJournalofInternationalLaw (1994)255.SeealsoGreig,OppenheimRevisited:AnAustralianPerspective,14AustralianYearBookofInternationalLaw (1993)227.JamesFawcettcommented, in relation to the successive posthumous editions of Oppenheim, upon that combination ofancestor-worshipandloveofrepairratherthanreplacement,whichcanturnEnglishlawbooks,endlessly re-edited, into a heap of many strata, in which curious fossils are to be found. Fawcett, ReviewofInternationalLawbyDPOConnell,82LawQuarterlyReview (1966)134.SeegenerallyWarbrick,Brownlies Principles of Public International Law: An Assessment, 11 European Journal of InternationalLaw (2000)621.Isthereanormative(ethical)caseforpositivismininternationallaw?Thispaperarguesthatthereis,andthatthevitalityofmainstreampositivisttraditionsininternational law has been sustained by a deeply felt commitment to the ethical viewthatlegalpositivismprovidesthebestmeansforinternationallawyerstopromoterealizationoffundamentalpoliticalandmoralvalues.ThepaperwillmakethisargumentwithparticularreferencetothepositivisttraditionassociatedwithLassaOppenheim and embraced by many of his successors in the eld. It will offer a readingofOppenheimswritingsthatisconsistentwiththisinterpretation.ThisreadingisproposedasonewaytounderstandOppenheim,buttheaimisnottoshowthatOppenheim would necessarily have articulated his positions in the manner proposedhere.Theaimisinsteadtoshowthatthispositivisttraditionisgroundedinanormative justicatory claim that engages it with political questions, to suggest thatthe appeal and inuence of this tradition has depended on it making such a claim, andto speculate that the implicit sense of making such a claim has been a reason for theappealofOppenheimswritingstosubsequentgenerationsofreaders.LassaOppenheim(18581919)isaperplexinggureinthehistoryofmoderninternationallaw.Hewasrespectedbyhiscontemporariesforhiscontributionsasprofessor,jurisconsultandprudentscholar,andaboveallforhistwo-volumeInternational Law (1905/1906).1This work was immensely well received. The lastingqualities of its format and approach have led a series of eminent British internationallawyerstokeepitupdated,sothatitsrstvolumeinparticularhasenjoyedauthoritative status over a full century.2Yet his writings on international law strikemanymodernreadersastheoreticallyshallow,andnaivelypositivisticinplacinggreat emphasis on the will of states and in seeking to exclude from international lawnotonlytherightsofallindividualsandtherightsofpeoplesoutsidetheEuro-American system, but also most considerations of morality, policy and politics.The present paper argues that Oppenheims separation of law and politics can be readas being embedded in a more fundamental view of international law that is premisedon his central political ideas, and that one of the most important of his political ideas isthat legal positivism is normatively justied as being the best conception of law for therealization of higher normative goals relating to peace, order, certain forms of justice,LegalPositivismasNormativePolitics:InternationalSociety,BalanceofPower 4033The science of international law . . . is merely a means to certain ends outside itself. Oppenheim, TheScience of International Law: Its Task and Method, 2 American Journal of International Law(1908) 313, at314. The term positivist usually requires further specication to be useful in discussions of internationallaw,becauseofthevastrangeofapproachesitcovers.UlrichFastenrath,forexample,developsatypologyofpositivismininternationallawthatcoversempiricalpositivism,withitsrecognitional,sociological and psychological branches (the last of which he divides into voluntarist and convictionistsubbranches),andGesetzespositivism,whichhedividesintologicalpositivism(Kelsen,AnzilottiandVerdross) and the approach to rules represented by Harts rule of recognition. Ulrich Fastenrath, LckenimVlkerrecht (1991).SeealsoKinjiAkashi,CorneliusvanBynkershoek:HisRoleintheHistoryofInternationalLaw (1998),ndingitnecessarysimplytostipulateadenitionofpositivisminordertoanswerthequestionofwhetherBynkershoekwasapositivist.Oppenheimsexplanationofhisownvarietyofinternationallawpositivismwillbediscussedlaterinthispaper,aswillhisownnormativecommitments.and the legal control of violence.3This paper considers just a sample of Oppenheimspoliticalideasinarguingthathisinternationallawuvre shouldbereadasadvocating three political ideas which he believed were essential for international law:(1)aninternationalsocietyofstatesasanecessaryconditionfortheexistenceofinternational law; (2) a balance of power between states as a requirement for durableinternationallaw;and(3)acommitmenttolegalpositivismasarequisiteforviableinternationallaw.AlthoughOppenheimsespousaloftheseideasisembeddedinatextbookthatreadsasaworkofdescriptiveoranalyticlegalpositivism,itwillbeargued that Oppenheims advocacy of these ideas was normative. He did not regardinternational society, balance of power and positive international law simply as factsto be described and accommodated; he wished readers to embrace his understandingoftheseaspoliticalconditionsforeffectiveinternationallaw,andtojoinhiminpromoting the social and political acceptance and thus the realization of theseideasinorderthatinternationallawcouldourishandhumanitymightadvance.Thepresentpaperthusseekstolayafoundationforamodestcontributiontotheperennialproblemsofunderstandinginternationallawasadistinctdisciplineandpracticeembeddedinaparticularpolitics,thebackgroundconditionsandsocialinterpretations of which are continuously changing. This foundation rests upon thesimpleparadoxthatthepositivistseparationoflawfrommoralargumentandfrompoliticsisitselfamoralandpoliticalposition.Thispointreceiveslessconsiderationthan it warrants within the Oppenheim tradition partly because major works in thistraditionhavebeencautiousaboutlegaltheoryandaboutmoralandpoliticalengagement,oftenconningsuchmatterstoshortandstylizedpreliminaries.Theresult has been a widely held opinion that this positivist tradition neither makes norcouldmakeaclaimtoethicaljustication.ItwillbearguedthattheOppenheimtradition can be better appreciated as one that makes signicant political claims, anddoes so for normative reasons. Whether or not the particular reading of Oppenheimsownworksproposedhereisonehewouldhaveendorsed,itissuggestedthatsomesuchunderstandingofthemhasimplicitlyinformedandsustainedthisinuentialtradition. With this understanding of Oppenheims project, it will be possible to assessmore clearly the normative case for basing international law on political propositions404 EJIL13(2002),4014364Schmoeckel, The Story of a Success: Lassa Oppenheim and His International Law, in Michael StolleisandMasaharuYanagihara(eds),TheAcceptanceofModernInternationalLawinEastAsia (2002forthcoming). See also Schmoeckel, The Internationalist as a Scientist and Herald: Lassa Oppenheim, 11EuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw (2000)699.5Schmoeckel, The Story of a Success, supra note 4, provides the most thorough account available, and isfollowedcloselyinthisparagraph.Thepublishednoticesintheformofobituaries,personalreminiscences, and entries in bibliographical dictionaries, are all relatively brief. Much valuable materialis included in Monica Kingreen, Jdisches Landleben in Windecken, Ostheim und Heldenbergen (1994). PartlybecauseofthedisappearanceofmanyofOppenheimspersonalpapers(lettersinthepapersofhiscorrespondents, and materials in ofcial collections, have yet to be consulted), little is at present reliablyknown about such matters as the extent to which his personal outlook and career choices were affectedbyanti-semitism,thereasonsforhisdecisiontoleaveBaselandespeciallyhischoicetoemigratepermanentlytoEngland,andtheextenttowhichhisGermanorGerman-Jewishidentityaffectedhisposition in the British establishment. Schmoeckel speculates that anti-Jewish prejudices and policies mayhave affected his discontinuance of the Referendariat he had begun with a view to becoming a judge in1882, his decision to present his habilitation not in Leipzig but in the relatively tolerant environment ofFreiburg,andhislackofsuccessineffortstobecomeProfessorOrdinariusinFreiburg.ofthissort,andtoweighthiscaseagainstcompetingmodernapproachesthatemphaticallyrejectthepositionsascribedheretoOppenheim.Whilefewmodernprofessional expositors of international law are content to base themselves on the setof basic positions here associated with Oppenheim, it will be suggested that the case forOppenheimsapparentlyoutmodedapproachismorerobustthanitappears.This paper is not intended as an historical study of Oppenheim or of the intellectualsources of Oppenheims ideas, matters analyzed in the learned and lucid work of thelegalhistorianMathiasSchmoeckel.4Nevertheless,ashortbiographicalsketchprovides useful background for the arguments developed here.5Born at Windecken,near Frankfurt am Main, in 1858, he was the youngest of seven children in a familywhich, on his fathers side, was long-established in the Jewish community in the area.His fathers horse-trading business apparently achieved considerable prosperity, andfrom1869thefamilylivedinFrankfurt,whereLassacompletedhisschooling.Hestudied at Gttingen (to where he later returned and where, in 1881, he completed adoctoraldissertationdealingwithbillsofexchange),Berlin,Heidelberg(wherehefollowedacourseofJ.C.Bluntschli,andlateracoursebythepsychologistWilhelmWundt)andLeipzig,whereheworkedonhishabilitationdissertationoncriminalperversion of justice under Karl Binding. For unknown reasons, his habilitation tookplace in the law faculty at Freiburg im Breisgau, in 1885, where he thereafter taughtcriminallaw,servingasProfessorExtraordinariusfrom1889to1892.Hethenmoved to Basel, becoming Professor Ordinarius in 1893, but apparently suffered therefromsomekindofill-health.Inadecisionseeminglymadepossiblebysubstantialindependent means derived from his family, he moved in 1895 to London, became aBritish citizen in 1900 (at which time he seems formally to have adopted his Englishmiddle names, Francis Lawrence), and married Elizabeth Alexandra Cowan, a Britishwoman, in 1902. Although he had paid some attention to international law while inBasel,hetookupthesubjectashisfull-timeactivityinLondon,teachingforsomeyears on a contract basis at the London School of Economics. The publication of hisInternational Law in 1905 and 1906 brought him to prominence. He succeeded JohnLegalPositivismasNormativePolitics:InternationalSociety,BalanceofPower 4056TheTimes,19May1915,at10.7JosefKohler(18491919).Schmoeckel,TheStoryofaSuccess,supra note4,citesJosefKohler,GrundlagendesVlkerrechts (1918)iiiiv,whoconcludesadiscussionoftheadvantagesofGermanhistorical-dogmatic jurisprudential method as against English and French methods with the remark: DerDeutsche, der sich unter das Diktat der Englnder stellt, verleugnet damit sich selbst. The other text citedbySchmoeckel,theintroductionsignedjointlybyKohlerandMaxFleischmannin9ZeitschriftfrVlkerrecht (1916)14,emphasizestheGermancharacterofthejournalandGermanperspectivesonvariousdoctrinalissuesrelatingtotheconductofthewar,butisnotsoclearlyreadasapersonalindictmentofOppenheim.8Karl Strupp, Lassa Francis Oppenheim, 11 Zeitschrift fr Vlkerrecht (19181920) 645, at 646. GleichFusinato, gleich unserem Kohler ist Lassa Oppenheim ein Opfer des Krieges geworden. Voll tiefer TrauerneigenwirunsinGedankenvordemgrossenGelehrtenunddemmenschlichenMenschen.9Oppenheim, International Law, vol. 1 (1st ed., 1905) vii; repeated in Oppenheim, International Law, vol. 1(2nded.,1911)viii.CartyreinforcesthischaracterizationbypointingoutthattheviewofgeneralcustomarylawinOppenheimstextbookiscryptic,andthathismetaphorofstreamsofwateremanatingfromasubterraneansourceisdecidedlyunclearasanilluminationofcustomaryinternationallaw.AnthonyCarty,TheDecayofInternationalLaw (1986)34.Onthisspecicpoint,itWestlakeasWhewellProfessoratCambridgein1908,whereheremainedinpostuntil his death in October 1919. The second edition of his textbook appeared in 1912,and he had done much of the work on a third edition by 1919, although this editionwas completed under the editorship of Ronald Roxburgh and published in 1921. HeadvisedtheBritishForeignOfce,wasactiveintheInstitutedeDroitInternational,wasamemberoftheAmericanInstituteofInternationalLaw,contributedtotheAmerican Journal of International Law in 1908, was involved in preliminary planningleading to the posthumous founding of the British Yearbook of International Law, andco-editedwithJosefKohlertheZeitschriftfrVlkerrecht (founded1907)from1909untiltheoutbreakoftheFirstWorldWar.Thewaryearsseemtohaveimposedaterrible strain. Beyond the massive human suffering, and the assault on many rulesand values of international law, as a public gure of German origin in Britain he feltobligedtomakeapublicdeclarationofloyaltyinalettertoTheTimes in1915,denouncing Germanys attack on Belgium as the greatest international crime sinceNapoleonI,aswellasdeploringtheattackontheLusitania andotherGermanconduct.6For his partiality to Britain he was criticized by some German colleagues includinganapparentifindirectdenunciationbyhiserstwhilecollaboratorJosefKohler7withwhomthewarhadanyhowbroughtanendtocontact.Thenalbreakdown of his health in 1919 seems to have been inuenced by overwork trying tocope with international legal material resulting from the war and its aftermath. KarlStruppsobituary,inwhichiscitedaletterfromOppenheimin1912expressinghisanguishoverthesufferingintheBalkanwar,putitpoignantly:LikeFusinato,likeourKohler[whodiedjustafewweeksearlier],LassaOppenheimisavictimoftheWar.Fullofdeepsorrow,webowtothisgreatscholarandhumaneperson.8In the remainder of this introduction, brief mention will be made of the relationshipofthepresentprojecttorecentassessmentsofOppenheimsuvre.OppenheimdescribedhisInternationalLaw asanelementarybookforthosebeginning to study the subject,9and elementary is also a reasonable description ofthe style of the best-known of Oppenheims other books on general international law,406 EJIL13(2002),401436shouldbenotedthatamorethoroughandintelligibleaccountofOppenheimsviewsoncustom,including a more comprehensible presentation of the same metaphor, is to be found in Oppenheim, ZurLehre vom internationalen Gewohnheitsrecht, 25 Niemeyers Zeitschrift fr internationales Recht (1915)1.10The1911Germanwork,DieZukunftdesVlkerrechts,wastranslated(withminorrevisions)by1914,althoughonlypublishedinEnglishposthumouslyin1921asLassaOppenheim,TheFutureofInternationalLaw (trans.JohnPawleyBate,1921).ThetranslationisnotasfelicitousasOppenheimsown English prose, but it was approved by Oppenheim. For convenience, citations in this paper are to theeditioninEnglish.11LassaOppenheim,TheLeagueofNationsandItsProblems (1919),comprisedthreelecturesdeliveredduringthewar.12Carty, Why Theory?: The Implications for International Law Teaching, in Colin Warbrick (ed.), TheoryandInternationalLaw:AnIntroduction (1991)75,at80.TheFutureofInternationalLaw (1911)10andTheLeagueofNationsandItsProblems(1919).11Anthony Carty, a leading critical historian of international law, concludesthat Oppenheim was not a theoretician but merely the humblest scribbler of studentmanuals.12Cartys baleful view of Oppenheims impact on the English internationallawtraditionisthatOppenheimimportedintoEnglishthoughtanexotic,German-inspired statist-institutionalism that took root so well that it smothered earlier EnglishtraditionsembodiedintheworkofRobertPhillimore(18101885)andespeciallyJohn Westlake (18281913), until these traditions were revitalized in the 1990s byPhilip Allott. Cartys thesis is that Oppenheim placed the state and its acts of willing(its consent) at the centre of international law despite the previous absence of anygeneral theory of the state in English academic thought and, reinforced by Brierley,McNair and Lauterpacht, prompted international lawyers to focus their efforts on thesifting and analysis of source material for customary and treaty rules, leading later tothe transformation of the eld into one preoccupied with what is done by courts andbyadvocatesappearingincourts.Cartys assessment is not implausible. An implication of the interpretations offeredin the present paper, however, is that, despite his elementary style and the sparsity ofthe explicit theorizing in his international law works, Oppenheim must be regarded asamoresophisticatedtheoristthanCartysappraisalsuggests.Cartysspecicargument that there exists a major break between Westlake and Oppenheim is fullyjustied with regard to each of the three issues discussed in this paper. The paper thusoffers some support to Cartys suggestion that Oppenheims work marked a normativesignicantdiscontinuityintheEnglishinternationallawtradition,butthismatter,andthequestionofOppenheimslong-termimpact,cannotbeconsidereddirectlyhere.Mathias Schmoeckel explains Oppenheims own reasons for the simplicity of styleandeschewalofexplicittheoryinhistextbook:The elementary nature of the main text helps to inform the public and to spread the knowledgeof international law. It lessens doctrinal differences and contributes to the dissemination of theidea of a peaceful international society where disputes are solved by law and not by wars. InLegalPositivismasNormativePolitics:InternationalSociety,BalanceofPower 40713Schmoeckel, The Story of a Success, supra note 4. See also Mathias Schmoeckel, The Internationalist asaScientistandHerald:LassaOppenheim,11EuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw (2000)699.14Oppenheim,InternationalLaw,vol.1(1sted.,1905)7375.15Oppenheim,InternationalLaw,vol.1(2nded.,1911)82.16Oppenheim,InternationalLaw,vol.1(3rded.,ed.RonaldRoxburgh,1921)100.17Cf. Charles de Secondat Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (1748, trans. Anne Cohler et al., 1989) 7: the[law] of nations is by nature founded on the principle that the various nations should do to one another intimes of peace the most good possible, and in times of war the least ill possible, without harming their trueinterests.this respect, Oppenheims International Law is thoroughly based on his legal theory, applies hisconvictions,andservesasanexampleoftheeffectivenessofhisbelief.13This cogent summary is endorsed in the present paper, but the argument to be madeherefocusesnotontheinternallegalcoherenceofOppenheimsproject,butonthenormativesignicanceofOppenheimsintegrationofpoliticsintothisproject.Much of the appeal of Oppenheims International Law comes from his treatment ofpolitics: the foundational concepts of a society of states and a balance of power, and aset of doctrinal views that allow some moderate scope for prevalent liberal values andtheroleofpublicopinion,whileleavingconsiderablescopeforpowerandpower-politics.Conversely,otherpotentiallyrelevantpoliticalconsiderationsweredeliberatelyplayeddown:nationalism;humanrights;socialism;anti-colonialism;mercantilism.Oppenheimembracedaminimalarchitecturenecessarytoaninter-national order, in which essentially political institutions such as war, diplomacy andthebalanceofpowerweregivensomelegalshape,andlegalinstitutionssuchastreaties, claims and protests were functional to the requirements of politics. His list ofmorals for the future . . . deduced from the history of the development of the Law ofNations is to some extent indicative of his political ideas. The ve morals set forth inthersteditionofhistextbookrelatedtothenecessityforinternationallawofabalanceofpower,theimportanceofstatesbasingtheirmilitaryinterventionsandpolitical behaviour only on real state interests (as opposed to dynastic interests), theinevitabilityofnationaliststateformationandtheneedforminorityrights,theprudentialcounseltomakehasteslowly,andtheinterdependencebetweeninter-national law, international economic interests and public morality.14He added to thesecond edition (1912) a sixth moral, asserting that the progress of International LawdependstoagreatextentuponwhetherthelegalschoolofInternationalJuristsprevails over the diplomatic school.15To the third edition, published posthumously in1921, was added a seventh moral, concerning the importance for international law ofthetriumphofconstitutionalgovernmentoverautocracy.16Itistemptingtotreatthese ve or six or seven morals as a precise statement of Oppenheims credo, but thisis misleading, for some of these morals are fundamental to his thought, while othersappear (on present interpretations) to have little impact in his writing. In particular,hedidnotsayagreatdealaboutnationalismandminorityrights,andheshowedalmostnointerestinexploringthecausalrelationsbetweeneconomicinterestsandinternational law. His demand that states act only on the basis of real interests was anexpression of his general theory of the state and of his commitment to rationality ininter-statepolitics,17butthespecicrejectionofdynasticwarsandofintervention408 EJIL13(2002),40143618JohnWestlake,CollectedPapers (1914)59.19Schmoeckel,TheStoryofaSuccess,supra note4.20This argument is developed more fully in Kingsbury, Grotius, Law, and Moral Scepticism: Theory andPracticeintheThoughtofHedleyBull,inIanClarkandIverNeumann(eds),ClassicalTheoriesofInternationalRelations (1996)42,at49.21HerschLauterpacht,TheGrotianTraditioninInternationalLaw,23BritishYearbookofInternationalLaw (1946)1,especiallyat37and5152.SeealsoCharlesRousseau,PrincipesGnrauxduDroitInternational Public, vol. 1 (1944) 22; and Louis Le Fur, La doctrine du droit naturel depuis le XVIII mesicle et la doctrine moderne, 18 RdC (1928-III) 73. These are mild statements of the case compared tothe vituperation heaped on Vattel in Cornelis van Vollenhoven, Les Trois Phases de Droit des Gens (1919).For a thoughtful overview and extensive discussion of different assessments of Vattel and his relationshipto earlier writers, see Emmanuelle Jouannet, Emer de Vattel et lmergence Doctrinale du Droit InternationalClassique (1998); also Andrew Hurrell, Vattel: Pluralism and its Limits, in Ian Clark and Iver Neumann(eds),ClassicalTheoriesofInternationalRelations (1996)233.22Hedley Bull, The Grotian Conception of International Society, in Herbert Buttereld and Martin Wight(eds),DiplomaticInvestigations (1966)51.undertheprincipleofmonarchicallegitimacyechoedasentimentwidelysharedamong international law writers at the time, including Westlake,18and was not muchpursuedinhiswork.Bycontrast,othersofthemoralsrepresentrecurrentthemes.Schmoeckel assesses the festina lente motto in this way;19and it will be argued that theemphasis on the struggle of the legal school for supremacy over the diplomatic schoolwasfundamentaltoOppenheimsentireproject.SchmoeckelconcludesthatOppenheimsInternationalLaw sumsuptheclassicalinternational law and inspires the modern . . . [T]his ambivalence is the mark of a trulytimelesstext. . .tobecomparedwiththewritingsofGrotiusandVattel.Thecharacterization of ambivalence can be applied to almost every body of thought thatemploysopenstructuresanddoesnotoccupyapolarpositionondichotomizedmodernquestions.20ThepresentpaperaimstodisentangletheimpressionofambivalenceinOppenheimsviewoftherelationsoflawandpolitics,andtoarguethat his work embodies a clear if subtle position on these issues. More generally, it maybe observed that the suggestion of a unity-in-ambivalence among Grotius, Vattel andOppenheimoccludesconsiderationoftheparticularsignicanceofdifferentideasadvancedbyeachofthesewriters.HerschLauterpachtandothersarguedpassion-atelythatthelineofdevelopmentfromVatteltoOppenheimwasanegationofthegreaterpossibilitiesofinternationallaw,possibilitieswhichmustbereopenedbyrevitalizingaGrotiantraditionintegratinglawandethics,andrejectingpoliticalrealism and raison dtat.21Early in his career Hedley Bull drew a similar distinction inordertodefendpluralistpositionstakenbyOppenheim(and,Bullargued,Vattel)againstwhatBullregardedastheexcessivesolidarismofneo-GrotianssuchasLauterpacht.22The present paper focuses instead on distinctive ideas associated withOppenheimsmodernAnglophonepositivisttradition.The next three sections of this paper consider three of Oppenheims political ideaswhich were, in his view, essential conditions for the existence, durability and progressof international law: international society, a balance of power and legal positivism. Itis not suggested that these form a credo, but they are at the core of Oppenheims ideasLegalPositivismasNormativePolitics:InternationalSociety,BalanceofPower 40923Oppenheim,InternationalLaw,vol.1(2nded.,1911)93.24The term is used by Travers Twiss and other text writers. One of many examples of its use in advocacy is intheproceedingsinHerMajestysSupremeCourtinShanghaiin1893concerningthesinkingoftheJapanesewarshipChishima-Kan byaBritishmerchantvessel.MrFrancisQCofHongKongreferredtoBritish extraterritorial jurisdiction over counterclaims as a term under which Japan was admitted to thegreat family of nations. Marston, British Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction in Japan: The Case of the RavennaandtheChishima,67BYbIL (1997)219,at243.25Commenting on the League of Nations Covenant, Oppenheim regarded the League as a sui generis subjectof international law, with international personality. He thought it was intended, when fully realized, totaketheplaceoftheFamilyofNations.Oppenheim,InternationalLaw,vol.1(3rded.,1921)269.26JohnWestlake,CollectedPapers (1914)78.aboutthepoliticalconditionsforinternationallaw.ThestudyoftheiradvocacyilluminatesOppenheimsnormativecommitments,andhelpscasthispositivistunderstandingoftherelationsbetweeninternationallawandpoliticsinnormativeterms.1 International SocietyOppenheims most basic idea was that international law is the law of an internationalsociety of mutually recognized states, which he called the Family of Nations. This wasnot,ofcourse,anoriginalidea.Itwasalmostanecessityforanyaccountofinternational law not premised on a command theory or on contract. But Oppenheimtook the concept of a Family of Nations in a direction that proved inuential as an ideaofinternationalpolitics.Hisconceptionmaybedescribedas:narrowlystatistwithregardtothecompositionofinternationalsocietyandagencywithinit;broadlypluralistwithregardtothepursuitofdivergingstateinterestsandvalues;andgeographicallylimitedbutpotentiallyuniversalizable.Hisexpositionanddevelop-ment of the idea was not simply a description of a concept that everyone agreed upon,norwasitmerelythepostulatingofalogicalnecessityforinternationallaw.Hebelieved,itissuggested,that,inthecircumstancesthenexisting,thisparticularconceptionofinternationalsocietywasrequiredfortheeffectivedevelopmentofinternationallaw.Oppenheim believed that community was a requisite for law, but he did not believethat an international community of individuals was a viable hypothesis: he regardedthecivitasgentiummaxima asastrained(bywhichheapparentlymeantuntenable)conception.23The international community (in German he uses the term Vlkerrechts-gemeinschaft) is the Family of Nations,24which in his view (at least until the foundingof the League of Nations25) consisted exclusively of states. There is in Oppenheim littletrace of Westlakes idea that, while states are the immediate members of internationalsociety,humanbeingsaretheultimatemembers,andthatthedutiesandrightsofstatesareonlythedutiesandrightsofthemenwhocomposethem.26PerhapsOppenheimsmostenduringimpactoninternationallawwashisconstructionofarigorouslystatistconceptionofinternationalsociety.Statismisapreconditionorevenanaxiomforhisversionofinternationallawpositivism.Forinternationallawpurposes,Oppenheimheld,thestatemeantthegovernment.ParliamentsdonotbelongtotheagentswhichrepresenttheStatesintheir410 EJIL13(2002),40143627Oppenheim, International Law, vol. 1 (2nd ed., 1911) 216. Cf. Stephen Krasners defence of the assertionthat states can be treated as unied rational actors in the international political system by focusing onsomeelementofthedomesticpoliticalstructurethatcouldengageinsuchsystems-orientedandresponsivebehavior. . .[namely]thosecomponentsofthegovernmentwhich. . .arerelativelyindependentofparticularisticpoliticalpressuresandarechargedwithpursuingthegeneralinterestofthe society as a whole rather than the particular interests of one of its component parts. For the UnitedStates,themostobviouscomponentsofthestatearetheWhiteHouse,theStateDepartment,andelements of the Departments of Defense and Treasury . . . [T]he contention that the state is a distinct partof the polity that could be distinguished from civil society and pursue its own agenda has been labeledstatism.Krasner,Realism,Imperialism,andDemocracy:AResponsetoGilbert,20PoliticalTheory(1992)38.28Following a connected pattern, Oppenheim holds that, if members of the armed forces commit violationsbyorder oftheirgovernment,theyarenotwarcriminalsandcannotbepunishedbytheenemy.Oppenheim,InternationalLaw,vol.2(1sted.,1905)264.Similarly,adiplomatbearsnopersonalresponsibility for acts commanded or authorized by the sending state. Oppenheim, International Law, vol.1(2nded.,1911)216.Thestateitselfbearsresponsibilityforallsuchactsofdiplomats,and(underArticle3ofthe1907HagueConvention)allactsofitsarmedforces.29Oppenheim,InternationalLaw,vol.1(2nded.,1911)217.30JohnWestlake,CollectedPapers (1914)78etseq.31DiplomacysfelicitousimageryforthefailureofdiplomacytoaverttheFirstWorldWar.internationalrelationswithotherStates.27Hencestateresponsibilityforinjuriousacts by a parliament is merely vicarious, and the government has the duty to providereparation no matter that its position as a representative government answerable toparliamentmaybedifcult.28Similarly,incaseofsuchdenialorunduedelayofjustice as is internationally injurious, a State must nd means to exercise compulsionagainst[its]Courts,notwithstandingthatinmoderncivilizedStatesthesefunc-tionariesaretoagreatextentindependentoftheirGovernment.29Oppenheimsstatism was grounded in this narrow view of agency between the state and a coterieheadedbytheheadofstateand/ortheheadofgovernmentalongwiththeforeignministerattheheadoftheministryofforeignaffairs.Hedidnothavemuchconception of an agency relationship between government and people. The state (notthepeople)wasthesourceofsovereignty(thusevenamonarchisnotasubjectofinternationallaw,andhasinternationallawimmunitiesonlyderivativelythroughthe state). Westlake, in contrast, had held that it is the consent of the people who arethe ultimate members of international society with the caveat that for the most parthecountedforthispurposeonlypeoplewithinthezoneofsharedEuro-Americancivilizationthatdetermineswhetheravalidlegalruleexists;ifthereisageneralconsensusofopiniononsucharule,itmaybeinvokedagainstastateeveniftheauthoritiesofthestateneverassentedtotherule.30Westlakes liberal political theory corresponded to his liberal emphasis on the role ofpublic opinion and his belief in the commonality of education, literature, ideas, law,social mores and identity in the Euro-American world so that a common opinion waspossible. Oppenheim was much less enthusiastic than Westlake about public opinioninrelationtointernationallawOppenheimsstatistviewofinternationalsocietyfavouredrmcontrolofinternationallawmattersbyministriesofforeignaffairs,atleast until the lights went out in the chancelleries of Europe.31For example, althoughthepressureofinternationalpublicopinionwaswidelythoughttohaveinuencedLegalPositivismasNormativePolitics:InternationalSociety,BalanceofPower 41132DavidCaron,WarandInternationalAdjudication:Reectionsonthe1899PeaceConference,94AmericanJournalofInternationalLaw (2000)4,at16.SeegenerallyArthurEyfnger,The1899HaguePeaceConference:TheParliamentofMan,theFederationoftheWorld (1999).33Oppenheim,TheFutureofInternationalLaw,supra note10,at55.34Oppenheim,DasGewissen (1898)4850.35Oppenheim,GerechtigkeitundGesetz (1895)18.36Oppenheim,InternationalLaw,vol.1(2nded.,1911)194.ThesameissuehadbeenexploredbyOppenheim much earlier, in Oppenheim, Gerechtigkeit und Gesetz (1895) 18. The argument for collectivebutnotunilateralinterventionwastakenupthoughtfullyinKarlLoewenstein,PoliticalReconstruction(1946).37Oppenheim,TheScienceofInternationalLaw,supra note3,at338.38Albert Venn Dicey, Lectures on the Relation Between Law and Public Opinion in England During the NineteenthCentury (2nded.,1920).39Carty,supra note12,at90.40Thisworldisevocativelysketched,withaperceptivedistancecraftedontheEstonianF.F.Martensposition as a slight outsider in the Russian establishment and in that of the Western internationalists, inJaanKross,ProfessorMartensDeparture (trans.AnselmHollo,1994).Germanytoattenuateitsoppositiontoanyinternationaladjudicatorymechanismsand accept the modest innovations achieved at the two Hague Peace Conferences,32Oppenheimcharacteristicallyrestedhishopesforthedevelopmentofinternationaladjudication at the Third Hague Peace Conference, scheduled for 1915, not on publicopinionandthepeace-through-lawmovement,butonstateinterests,especiallystates economic interests.33He nevertheless recognized that public opinion had somerole. In Das Gewissen, he sketched a process whereby anti-war movements might bringabout rst a change in the conscience of peoples, then a change in moral attitudes towar, and nally a change in law.34In Gerechtigkeit und Gesetz, he noted the powerfulroleoffeelings(Gemt)inconceptsofjustice,withexamplesthatincludeEuropeanreactionagainsttheinhumanityoftheslavetrade,andreactionsoftheChristianworldtooppressionofChristiansinMuslimstates.35InhisInternationalLaw,hereferred, with more understanding than enthusiasm, to the power of public opinion inprecipitating episodic military interventions on grounds of humanity, and envisagedthat the result of such practice eventually might be that these interventions becomelawful,providedtheyareundertakencollectively.36Elsewherehesuggestedthat,ifthereexistedapracticeofconqueringstatesassumingthepublicdebtsoftheconquered, it would be relevant to the international legal status of this practice thatpublic opinion of the world at large approved of and expected this attitude.37In sum,Oppenheims view of the role of public opinion in international law matters was at thecautiousendofthespectrumprevalentinlate-VictorianandearlyEdwardianEngland:aliberaldispositiontoregarditaspartofachievingprogressinlawandpublic policy, epitomized by Diceys Law and Public Opinion in England,38but a lack ofconvictionthatatrulyinternationalpublicopinionwasreallypossible.39ExactlywhoOppenheimmeantbythepublicinrelationtointernationallawisnowhere quite clear. His early work on the engagement of law with national issues oflawandjusticesuggeststhatherecognizedthatitwasnotsufcienttoconstructpublic opinion simply as the elite in their clubs or common rooms, to conne it to theworldofreadersofTheTimes andLeTemps thatconstitutedestablishmentinter-nationalism.40Hehadconsiderablemisgivingsaboutpublicopinionorganized412 EJIL13(2002),40143641Schmoeckel,TheStoryofaSuccess,supra note4.42Seee.g.Anghie,FindingthePeripheries:SovereigntyandColonialisminNineteenth-CenturyInternationalLaw,40HarvardInternationalLawJournal (1999)1;and(onThomasLawrence),Riles,Aspiration and Control: International Legal Rhetoric and the Essentialization of Culture, 106 HarvardLawReview (1993)723.43Onuma, When Was the Law of International Society Born?: An Inquiry of the History of InternationalLawfromanIntercivilizationalPerspective,2JournaloftheHistoryofInternationalLaw (2000)1.44Oppenheim,InternationalLaw,vol.1(1sted.,1905)34.45Ibid.,at269.46SeeUdaySinghMehta,LiberalismandEmpire:AStudyinNineteenthCenturyBritishLiberalThought(1999). Mehta (ibid., at 5) quotes Lord Curzon: Imperialism is becoming everyday less and less the creedofapartyandmoreandmorethefaithofanation.throughmassmovements,exempliedbythecordialscepticismaboutpeacemovements expressed in his early international law writing. As mass movements ofpublic engagement intensied with the massive suffering and democratizing effects ofthe First World War, however, Oppenheim took more conciliatory positions towardsadvocatesofpeacethroughlawandinternationalorganizationitisdifculttodeterminewhethertheseconcessionsrepresentacombinationofexhaustionanddespair with his own pre-war system, as Schmoeckel suggests,41or the beginnings of agenuine and well-considered revision of his thought that was cut short by his death.Oppenheims account of international society, like that of most authors in EuropeandtheAmericasinthisperiod,wastiedtoaconceptionofwhatitmeanttobecivilized that was exclusionary and legitimated much violence and dispossession. Hisdivision of the world into civilized and various categories of others who were largelyoutsidethescopeofinternationallawbuttressedthesenseofcommunityofinternational society he was anxious to see grow among the civilized.42How fartheframingconceptsandconstructionofthisarchitecture,orthemodesofpracticewithin it, were in fact inuenced by those marginalized within or outside his systemhasnotyetbeensufcientlystudied.43Heunderstoodinternationalsocietyascomprised principally of states in Europe and the Americas, plus a few others deemedby these to meet the requisite standard of civilization, with a further group of membersoftheFamilyofNationsforsomepartsofinternationallawonly,andnotusuallyprotectedby(orsubjectto)thelawsofwar.Heheldthechillingviewthatthetreatment of states outside the Family of Nations by states members of the Family ofNations was a matter of discretion.44He did not believe that native tribes were legallycapableofanytransactionsgovernedbythelawofnations.45Inhisview,international law did not impose many constraints except upon the member states ofinternational society inter se. Peoples outside recognized states were not protected orconstrained by international law. Like most English liberals, including Macaulay andJ.S. Mill,46Oppenheim seems to have had little difculty reconciling his enthusiasm fordemocraticgovernmentwiththemaintenanceofcolonialrule.Acontrastmaybedrawn,however,betweenthequietudeofOppenheimsliberalacquiescenceincolonialarrangementsandtheworkofhistwoimmediatepredecessorsintheWhewell Chair. The more anthropologically engaged Henry Sumner Maine (who heldLegalPositivismasNormativePolitics:InternationalSociety,BalanceofPower 41347During the long Roman peace not only did bloodshed practically cease, but the equality of the sexes, themitigation of slavery, and the organization of Christianity made their appearance in the world. HenrySumnerMaine,InternationalLaw (1888)10.48Ibid.,at11.49JohnWestlake,CollectedPapers (1914)145.50Oppenheim,TheScienceofInternationalLaw,supra note3,at355356;Oppenheim,TheFutureofInternationalLaw,supra note10,at6668.51Owada,Japan,InternationalLawandtheInternationalCommunity,inNisukeAndo(ed.),JapanandInternationalLaw:Past,PresentandFuture (1999)347,suggeststhatthekindofanalyticalpositivismOppenheimsworkisusuallytakentoembody,andthekindofpower-politicalappreciationofthemanipulability and limits of international law and institutions, were absorbed into Japanese thought andpracticeduringthisperiod.ThesensehegivesofJapansengagementwithinternationallawbutwarinessaboutitaftertheYokohamaHouseTax caseisalittlelessebullientthanOppenheimspicture.52HedleyBullandAdamWatson(eds),TheExpansionofInternationalSociety (1984).theWhewellChairforonlyafewmonthsbeforehisdeath,tobesucceededbyWestlake)acknowledgedthatgreatempireswerearesultratherofmansrapacitythan of his humanity, but nevertheless argued for the virtues of the peace establishedbytheRomanempire,47andopinedthatweretheBritishempireinIndiatobedissolved, the territories which make it up would be deluged with blood from end toend.48Westlaketooaddressedquestionsofimperialismdirectly,notinginliberalfashionthehonourablelineofargumentinsupportofaboriginalinterestsrunningfromVitoriaandCovarruviastocontemporaryEuropeansupportersofaboriginalpeoples(hepresumablyhadinmindgroupssuchastheAboriginesProtectionSociety),andendeavouringinhislegalanalysistogivesomelimitedsignicancetoparticularagreementsmadebetweenindigenousrulersandEuropeanstatesoradventurers. Westlakes conclusion, that international law regulates, for the mutualbenet of civilized states, the claims which they make to sovereignty over the region,andleavesthetreatmentofthenativestotheconscienceofthestatetowhichthesovereigntyisawarded,49wasbroadlythesameasOppenheims,butWestlakeexplainedandjustiedthispositionwithasustainedsetofliberalrationalistargumentsthatOppenheimdeemedirrelevanttoabluntexpositionofthelegalposition. Oppenheim may well have shared such views, but for normatively groundedtheoreticalreasonshismoreaustereaccountofinternationallawdidnotexplicitlyinvokethem.Heenvisagedthegradualexpansionoftheinternationalsocietyofstates,drivenbythecontinuedprogressofcivilizationinwhichhebelievedpassionately;50thus he lauded Japan for its remarkable efforts in becoming a civilizednation and a great power.51His exclusionary conception of international society waspoliticallypalatabletotheclassofdecision-makerswhomOppenheimsoughttoinuence in his attempt to promote construction of an effective system of internationallaw. But it also offered a blueprint for its own eventual geographical universalizationthathasbeentremendouslyinuentialininternationalpolitics.52Aconceptofinternationalsocietythatwascontingentonpowerandonthen-dominantsocialmores proved durable because it was capable of supporting political and social changeinawaythatitsunderpinningconceptofcivilizationwasnot.The political vitality of Oppenheims conception of international society was greatlyenhanced by its modular structure. Oppenheims Family of Nations was comprised of414 EJIL13(2002),40143653RichardTuck,PhilosophyandGovernment15521651 (1993).54Oppenheim, International Law, vol. 1 (3rd ed., 1921) 100. In his stimulating review of the ninth edition,ReismansuggeststhatthemoralconcerningtheimportancetointernationallawofdemocraticgovernmentwithinstateswasintroducedbyMcNairinthefourthedition(seeReisman,LassaOppenheimsNineLives,19YaleJournalofInternationalLaw (1994)255,at266270)butitinfactappearsinthethirdedition.AlthoughitisnotcertainthatitwasaddedbyOppenheimratherthanRoxburgh,collateralevidencesuggestsOppenheimsauthorship,aviewsharedbySchmoeckel(Schmoeckel,TheStoryofaSuccess,supra note4,atn.221),whohashadthebenetofexaminingunpublishednotesforlecturesOppenheimdeliveredatCambridgeduringthewar.OppenheimarguedunlessGermanybeutterlydefeated,thespiritofmilitarism,whichisnotcompatiblewithaLeagueofNations, will remain a menace to the world . . . A military state submits to International Law only so longas it serves its interests, but violates International Law, and particularly International Law concerningwar, wherever and whenever this law stands in the way of its military aims. Oppenheim, The League ofNationsandItsProblems,supra note11,at1516.55The same argument is made in Le caractre essentiel de la Socit des Nations, 24 Revue Gnrale de DroitInternational Public (1919) 234, at 243. Schmoeckel, The Story of a Success, supra note 4, suggests thatthispassageinthelatterworkexpressesaKantianviewthatdemocraciesarelesspronetoaggrandizementandwar,butitisdifculttoseeastrongbasisforthisinterpretation.largelyundifferentiatedunits,sovereignstates.Theunderstandingofstatesover-eignty that is a foundation of his international legal doctrine is in signicant measurean outcome of specic historical features of post-Reformation political development inparts of western Europe. At least since Hobbes it has been recognized that the rise ofthemodernconceptofthestateassovereignwasinpartaproductofstrugglesinwestern Europe, especially England, France and the Netherlands, to establish a strongcentralauthoritywithinthestate(moreorlessErastian)toovercometheterribleimpactofreligiousconicttosubduefanaticism.53Theneedforsuchsupremecentralauthoritywithinstateswasprecipitatedorintensiedbythedeclineofeffective and accepted universalist claims of Pope and Emperor, and such central stateauthoritywasmadestarkerbythegradualerosionofmainlyfeudalsystemsofpersonalobligationthathadcutacrossthebordersofrealms.Asstatesbecamefree-standing units with a political theory of sovereignty (sovereignty of rulers, or ofstateinstitutions,orevenofthepeople),themostobviouspossiblelogicsofinternational relations became anarchy and hierarchy. Thus sovereignty in this formwasalocalandhistoricallycontingentidea.ButOppenheimmadesovereigntyafoundation for a universal theory of international law that presupposed both anarchyand society. Sovereignty may yet prove less durable as a universal, and less importantasabasisofinternationallaw,thantheconceptofinternationalsociety.Although he wrote relatively little about this in relation to colonialism, Oppenheimin other contexts recognized the tension between his statist theory and the normativevalue of liberal democracy, most evidently in the third edition of his International Law,whereheintroducedtheargumentthattheprogressofInternationalLawisintimately connected with the victory everywhere of constitutional government overautocraticgovernment,or. . .democracyoverautocracy.54Inansweringtheobjection that the League of Nations is just a league of states, he commented, ratherfuturistically, that some or all of each states three representatives to the League couldpotentiallybechosenbytheparliamentorbydirectelection.55HearguedstronglyLegalPositivismasNormativePolitics:InternationalSociety,BalanceofPower 41556(1906) 14 Scots Law Times Reports 227. See Oppenheim, Zur Lehre von den territorialen Meerbusen, 1Zeitschrift fr Vlkerrecht und Bundesstaatsrecht (1906) 579, at 583587. The subsequent parliamentaryproceedingsarereportedinextenso inOppenheim,DieFischereiinderMorayFirth,5ZeitschriftfrVlkerrecht und Bundesstaatsrecht (1911) 74. This full report gives a sense of the complex economic andpolitical context, involving ownership by British subjects of Norwegian-registered vessels, which by nomeanssimplypittedNorwegianinterestsagainstBritishinthewaysuggestedbytheabstractedinternationallawpointforwhichthecaseisusuallycited.57KennethWaltz,TheoryofInternationalPolitics (1979).58KennethWaltz,Man,TheState,andWar (1959)175.59Allott, Kant or Wont: Theory and Moral Responsibility, 23 Review of International Studies (1997) 339,at344.Statistanthropomorphismcontributestothegrievouslyfalseconsciousnessthatcausestheamoralizationofinterstatalunsociety.Seee.g.PhilipAllott,Eunomia (2nded.,2001)248.60Ibid.,at243248.that, in case of clear conict with international law, national courts have no choicebuttoapplynationallaw.OnthisgroundhedefendedthedecisioninMortensenv.Peters, in which an Edinburgh court upheld the conviction of the Danish captain of aNorwegianvesseltrawlingintheMorayFirth,astretchofwaterwhichunderinternationallawshouldprobablyhavebeenregardedasoutsideUKsheriesjurisdiction.56This dualism can be interpreted as respecting the democratic freedom ofpeople in each state to decide what the national law should be, even if the states elitehavetakenadifferentviewinmakinginternationallaw.Oppenheimsstatistpremisesseemingeneraltobeincompatiblewithaninternationaldemocraticpolitics,andwithaninternationalcommunitythatisobviouslynotcomprisedsimplyofstatesinthewayheasserted.Notmanyinternational lawyers would contemplate defending them in unadulterated form now.Yet Oppenheims approach is still prevalent in a strong realist strand of internationalrelations theory.57Kenneth Waltz, for example, whose Theory of International Politics(1979)isaleadingexampleofworksofthisgenre,earlierasserted:Instudyinginternational politics it is convenient to think of states as the acting units. Waltz wenton, however, to observe: At the same time, it does violence to ones common sense tospeakofthestate,whichisafterallanabstractionandconsequentlyinanimate,asacting.58Oppenheimsstatistaccountofinternationalsocietyneednotbereadasamyopicdescriptionofwhatis,norevenasaconvenientsimplicationtomakeanalysismanageable.Itcaninsteadbereadnormatively,asstatinganassumptionwhich he believed was necessary as a condition for a real and workable internationallaw. This judgment is of course open to attack. As Allott argues: States are not moralagents, so states are not morally responsible. States do evil, but they do not sin. Statesact shamefully, but they do not know shame.59Although Allott focuses his attack onVattel, he can be taken as denouncing Oppenheim as well as Vattel in condemning thetraditioninwhichinternationalsocietyisrenderedasastatistsovereignty-xatedinter-statal unsociety, unconstitutionalized, undemocratized, and unsocialized.60It istheinstitutionalmanifestationsofthisVattelOppenheimconstructionofinter-nationalunsocietythatheexcoriatesindescribingtheEuropeanCommunityasacynical perversion of a wonderful idea . . . of European-wide society, and the various416 EJIL13(2002),40143661Allott,KantorWont,supra note59,at354.Cf.Jean-JacquesRousseau:TherearetodaynolongerFrenchmen,Germans,Spaniards,Englishmen. . .thereareonlyEuropeans.ConsiderationssurleGouvernement de Pologne, in C.E. Vaughan (ed.), The Political Writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau, vol. 2(1915)432.62Oppenheim, International Law, vol. 1 (1st ed., 1905) 73; and Oppenheim, International Law, vol. 1 (2nded.,1911)80.63Oppenheim,TheLeagueofNationsandItsProblems,supra note11,at21.64Oppenheim,InternationalLaw,vol.1(3rded.,1921)294.65AlbericoGentili,DeJureBelli (1598)I.14.international institutions of the global public realm as a Leviathan of Leviathans.61Much of the effort of international lawyers in the century since Oppenheim wrote hasgoneintobroadeningthefunctioninglegalconceptionofinternationalsocietyfromthe narrowly statist one of Oppenheims Family of Nations. But it is difcult to arguethatarobusttheoryofinternationallawhasasyetaccompaniedtheseneweraccountsofmoreandmoreinclusiveandcomplexinternationalsociety,withdisaggregatedstates,aninnitediversityofnon-stateactors,privateorhybridrule-making, and an ever expanding range of topics covered by competing systems orfragments of norms. The extensive cognitive and material reconstruction required toactualize emancipatory projects such as that of Philip Allott is indicative of the scale ofthechallenge.HoweverunappealingOppenheimsapproachhasseemed,itscohe-rence and manageability are normative attractions that make its continuing politicalinuenceintelligible.2 Balance of PowerOppenheimregardedthebalanceofpolitico-militarypowerasafundamentalstructuralconditionfordurableinternationallaw.TherstandprincipalmoralisthataLawofNationscanexistonlyiftherebeanequilibrium,abalanceofpower,between the members of the Family of Nations.62Oppenheim was unswerving in thisview. Even as balance of power politics was being vituperated as a contributor to theoutbreak of the First World War, he argued that within a League of Nations some kindof Balance of Powers only can guarantee the independence and equality of the smallerStates.63In arguing for the balance of power, Oppenheim specically rejected hegemony asan attractive basis for political, and legal, order. This is a concomitant of his rejectionof any ideal that international law eventually become the command of a superior. Heexpressedgravemisgivingsaboutasuper-stateasanaspirationforinternationalorganization.64Hehighlightedthedangersthatarosepreviouslywhenthebalancewasoverturned,citingtheexpansionistaggressionofLouisXIVandNapoleonI.Inthis respect, he echoed Gentilis earlier calls for other states to balance to prevent theemerging preponderance of the Ottoman Empire or Spain.65By implication he perhapsshared the view, widely held in England, that maintaining a balance of power againstaspiringhegemonssuchasNapoleonwasaprotectionagainstanotherRomanEmpire. They realized, what the twentieth century forgot sometimes, that there areLegalPositivismasNormativePolitics:InternationalSociety,BalanceofPower 41766Buttereld,TheBalanceofPower,inHerbertButtereldandMartinWight(eds),DiplomaticInvestigations (1966).67Oppenheim,InternationalLaw,vol.1(2nded.,1911)193.68KaltenbornisnotcitedbyOppenheimonthispoint,buthisviewsarediscussedinthereviewoftheliteratureundertakeninAugustBulmerincq,Praxis,TheorieundCodicationdesVlkerrechts (1874),chapter2,aworkOppenheimdoesreferto.69HediffersonthisissuefromearlierEnglishwriterssuchasRobertPhillimoreandTraversTwiss.70Westlake,ReviewofInternationalLaw,vol.1,21LawQuarterlyReview (1905)432,at434.71Oppenheim,InternationalLaw,vol.1(2nded.,1911)193,195and289.72Mathias Schmoeckel makes an argument to this effect in The Story of a Success, supra note 4. BluntschlihadassertedthatonlytheEnglishwereobstructinggeneralacceptanceofadoctrineprotectingcommercial shipping of one belligerent from the ravages of the other. Cet obstacle disparatra, lorsquelAngleterreaurafaitladouleureuseexpriencequesoncommerceetsarichessesontsrieusementexpossparlemaintiendelanciennergle,etquesamarinemilitareesthorsdtatdelesprotger.Bluntschli,Dudroitdebutinengnraletspcialementdudroitdeprisemaritime,5RevuedeDroitInternational et de Lgislation Compare (1877) 557. This passage is quoted in Stefano Mannoni, Potenza eonlytwoalternatives:eitheradistributionofpowertoproduceequilibriumorsurrendertoasingleuniversalempirelikethatofancientRome.66OppenheimarguedthatbalanceofpowerisapoliticalprincipleindispensabletotheexistenceofInternationalLawinitspresentcondition.67LikeKaltenbornvonStachau,68he rejected the view that the balance of power is a principle of internationallaw.69Oppenheims point was that features of the structure of international politics, inparticular the conguration of the distribution of power, are fundamental conditionsfor international law. But the transition between law and what he regarded as politicalnorms was almost seamless. His view, much criticized by Westlake and others,70thatinterventionisdefacto amatterofpolicyratherthanlaw,hecombinedwithanargument that intervention in the interest of the balance of power must be excused,and that it is a matter of appreciation for every state whether or not it considers thebalance of power endangered and intervention necessary. In a similar way he arguedthat, even in situations where third states do not have a legal right to veto transfers ofterritory, there is no duty on the part of third states to acquiesce in such cessions ofterritory as endanger the balance of power.71These political norms are implicated inthe legal structure by Oppenheims argument that they are indispensable to a workingsystemofinternationallaw.FollowingOppenheimslogic,positivelawcouldnotproscribe third states from preventing certain cessions of territory, because for the lawtodosowouldentailthedemiseoflaw.Thebalanceofpowerprincipleisthusdeterminativeoflaw.Given his view that the balance of power is essential to international law, it is notsurprising that Oppenheims international law in turn functioned to uphold a balanceof power. In broad terms, Oppenheims legal technique favoured a dominant status quopoweragainstarisingrevisionistpower.HeappliedhismethodologyforidentifyingrulesofinternationallawtothelawofnavalwarfareinwayswhichmanycommentatorsregardedasupholdingBritishinterestswithregardtoattacksonforeign merchant shipping in wartime.72Oppenheim would presumably have repliedthathismethodologywasageneralonethatkeptlawinlinewithpower-politicalconcerns and the structure of the prevailing balance of power, not a matter of special418 EJIL13(2002),401436Ragione (1999)179.Mannonimakesacase,however,that,fromthebeginningofthe1890s,particularly after the intervention of Admiral Mahan, other publicists were increasingly rallying to theargument that effective war at sea involved attacking the enemys resources and means of supply as wellas the enemys armed forces, so that Oppenheims views would not by that time have been incongruousforacontinentaljurist.StefanoMannoni,PotenzaeRagione (1999)183187.Britishpolitico-legalpractice explicitly connected British political interests with the development of particular doctrines. Togive one of numerous illustrations, the (UK) Attorney-Generals concession in the Fagernes case (1927)thattheBristolChannelwasnotwithinBritishterritorialwaterswasexplainedbyHughBellotintheBritishYearbookofInternationalLaw (1928):IunderstandthatthemotiveoftheAdmiraltyforabandoning the claim to the Bristol Channel and other inland waters is that the nation which possessesthecommandoftheseaisinamorefavourablepositionifterritorialwatersarerestrictedasmuchaspossible. This was quoted, with the aim of undermining the weight of the actual decision in the Fagernescaseasevidenceofinternationallaw,inNorwaysCounter-MemorialintheFisheriesCase(UKv.Norway),ICJPleadings,OralArguments,Documents,vol.1(1951)443.73Oppenheim, International Law, vol. 2 (1st ed., 1905) 68. This argument is made simply by reasoning frombroadprinciple,withnosupportingstatepracticeorcitationoftreatiesorothernormativetexts.Itis,however, closely reminiscent of what seems a politically driven position he had taken in a letter to TheTimes in November 1900 asserting that the grim and hotly controversial campaign by the British againstthe Boers need no longer be regarded as regular war, Britain having already won the substantial victory.74E.H.Carr,TheTwentyYearsCrisis (1939)245,commented:Respectforlawandtreatieswillbemaintained only in so far as the law recognizes effective political machinery through which it can itself bemodiedandsuperseded.Theremustbeaclearrecognitionofthatplayofpoliticalforceswhichisantecedent to all law. Carr was preoccupied with the problem of peaceful change that played so large apart in the politics of the 19191939 Twenty-Years Crisis, and it may be noted that Oppenheim saw thisas an issue and criticized the League of Nations Covenant for its allocation of the issue to the Assemblyandtherequirementofunanimity.75Oppenheim,TheFutureofInternationalLaw,supra note10,at4650.76Oppenheim,TheLeagueofNationsandItsProblems,supra note11,at69.77Oppenheim,InternationalLaw,vol.1(3rded.,1921)299.pleading for Britain. Other of his arguments served the group of states that dominatedthe international system, including for example his polemical assertion that when theremnants of a defeated army carry on the ghting by guerrilla tactics it is obvious thatin strict law the victor need no longer treat the guerrilla bands as a belligerent Powerandthecapturedmembersofthosebandsassoldiers.73Similarly,Oppenheimbelievedthatinternationallegalinstitutionscouldonlybeeffectiveifdevelopedintandem with evolving political structures, including the balance of power.74Thus heconcededaroleforarbitrationbasedoncompromiseandthepriorityofdisputesettlement over positive law, even while advocating a permanent judicial body whichwouldmakelaw-governeddecisionswiththeadvantageoflegalcertainty.75InhisproposalsforaLeagueofNationsOppenheimexpressedastrongpreferencethatchallengestothecontinuedapplicabilityoftreatiesundertherebussicstantibusdoctrine (i.e. arguments that circumstances had changed) be addressed by a politicalCouncil of Conciliation or, absent that, the League Council,76although he also urgedthat any state be able to refer a rebus sic stantibus argument to the International CourtofJusticeforitsopinion.77Although he attached great importance to the balance of power, Oppenheim failedtoengagewithsomeofthemostseriousproblemsconcerningthescopeandconsequencesofthebalanceofpowersystem.OppenheimdidnotreallyenterintoLegalPositivismasNormativePolitics:InternationalSociety,BalanceofPower 41978AdescriptiveoverviewisgiveninMichaelSheehan,BalanceofPower:HistoryandTheory (1996)137142.79He does refer to the balance of power in the world, but this is not dispositive. Oppenheim, InternationalLaw,vol.1(2nded.,1911)198.80Ibid.,at81.81SeegenerallyCarty,supra note9.82Oppenheim,InternationalLaw,vol.1(2nded.,1911)196199.83He expressed admiration for the contributions of the US to international law, and was perhaps swayed inhisacceptanceoftheAmericanimbalancebythelegalismwhichformedpartofUSdiscourseanddiplomacytowardstheAmericasattheturnofthecentury.84Hume,OftheBalanceofPower,inDavidHume,PoliticalEssays (ed.KnudHaakonsen,1994)154.85Ernst Kaeber, Die Idee des europischen Gleichgewichts in der publizistischen Literatur vom 16. Bis sur Mittedes18.Jahrhunderts (1907)Annex.(TheeditionusedhereisthatofGerstenberg,1971.)Thisworkisreferredto,butnotdiscussed,inthethirdeditionofOppenheimstextbook.86Kaeber,supra note85,at149150.thequestion,oneofheatedAnglo-Germancontentioninthisperiod,78whetherthebalancewasconnedtoEurope,astheBritishurged,orshouldbeunderstoodglobally,asurgedbyGermanpoliticianswhothoughtGermanyentitledtocompensation vis--vis the imperialist powers for her paucity of colonial possessions.79Oppenheim utterly failed to advert to a tension between his advocacy of the balance ofpowerandhisrecognitionthatnationalism(theprincipleofnationality)isofsuchforce that it is fruitless to try to stop its victory.80Indeed, the dynamic of nationalismmadelittleimpressionanywhereinhistextbeyondhisdiscussionofmoralsderivedfromhistory.81ThesuspicionofsomeunevennessinOppenheimsbalanceofpowerdoctrine is reinforced by his position on the Monroe Doctrine he not only accepted itaslawful,butseemedquitesupportiveofit,conninghimselftoobservingthatabalance of power will emerge in the Americas only if another great power grows upthere.82Although in its origins the Monroe Doctrine facilitated the European balanceof power, why by the era of Theodore Roosevelt Oppenheim thought it not necessaryforinternationallawintheAmericastoadvocateabalanceofpowerthereisnotclear.83HisacceptanceofUSpreponderancemayparallelhissilenceonwhatnowseemsanunavoidabletensionbetweenBritishadvocacyofbalanceofpowerandhegemonicargumentsforthePaxBritannica.Perhapsbecausehedidnotdiscussthegroundingofbalanceofpowerideasinpolitical theory, in the work of David Hume for example,84he did not address critiquesofthistheory.ErnstKaeber,forexample,inhis1907doctoralthesis,identiedtwodifferent starting points in arguments that intervention or war could be justied in theinterestsofmaintainingthebalanceofpower.85First,ifthestateofnatureistheprevailingcondition,self-preservationmightjustifyactingtomeetanimminentthreatfromarisingpower,althoughthenaturallawyersGrotiusandPufendorfdeniedthatanimiapotentia didinfactjustifywar,andKaeberdidnotarguethatadding the maintenance of the balance of power to the list of approved causa belli wasnecessarytomeetsuchsituations.Secondly,if(asKaeberthought)acommunityofstatesandageneralcommunityinterestbothexist,theinstitutionofthebalanceofpowerprovidesabenetforallthatcanberealizedbyarticulatingspecicrulestopromoteitsoperation.86Butthisdoesnotsolvetheproblemsthat:thebalanceof420 EJIL13(2002),40143687SeethediscussionoftheworkofGanescoandMamiani,inBulmerincq,supra note68,atchapter2.88HeinrichBernhardOppenheim,discussedinBulmerincq,supra note68.89HansMorgenthau,TheProblemofNeutrality,7UniversityofKansasCityLawReview (1939)109,at116. Noting that the permanent neutralization of states such as Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerlandwas a nineteenth-century phenomenon, in 1905 Oppenheim presciently expressed doubt about whethersuch neutralization could stand the test of history. Oppenheim, International Law, vol. 1 (1st ed., 1905)144.powerhasnoxedmeaning;itsusualjusticationbyreferencetohistoryinvolvesverysubjectiveassessments;itentailsself-judgingthatislargelyacloakfortheinterests of the powerful;87it operates on the premise of a war of all against all; and ithas caused at least as many wars as it was supposed to prevent.88Failure to addressthesecritiquesweakenedOppenheimscaseforthebalanceofpowerasabasisforinternationallaw,althoughitdidnotdisturbtheenthusiasticassessmentofOppenheims view by theorists of international politics who independently believe thebalanceofpowerprincipleiscorrect.HansMorgenthau,forexample,departedonlymoderatelyfromOppenheiminarguingthattherulesofneutralityvariedwithtechnology and the circumstances of warfare, and that neutrality depends in the nalanalysis on the ever vacillating and unstable foundation of the opposition of variousalmost equally strong groups of powers which, by checking the power of each other,preventanyfromviolatingthefundamentalprinciplesonwhichthepolitico-legalorderisbased.89McNair, as editor of the fourth edition, continued to include Oppenheims moral onthe necessity for international law of a balance of power, but Lauterpacht in 1935 didnot, and ever since the notion that balance of power principles might be relevant tointernationallawhasbeenvirtuallyunutterableamongmembersoftheinvisiblecollege of international lawyers. It is a concept, however, that is only just beneath thesurfaceintheshoalswhereinternationallawformallyengageswithinternationalpolitics.Itisimplicatedontheliberalleftbypost-ColdWarclaimsthatcapitalismneeds an enemy, on the right by schemes such as Carl Schmitts Grossraumtheory, inpolitico-religiousdebatesbyproposalsforroughspheresofinuenceinwhichparticularreligionsareestablishedorprivilegedinspeciedpartsoftheworld,ininstitutional politics by proposals to extend or not extend the veto to new permanentmembers in the Security Council. As these examples suggest, notions of a balance ofpower now usually enter legal debates not as formulations of positive legal norms, butas an element of the set of political and ethical norms that enable international societyto function, and that inform the values and operation of international legal rules andinstitutions. This provides an illuminating contemporary illustration of the complexinterrelationship between legal normativity and other normative structures. The toofrequentneglectbyinternationallawyersofsuchinterrelationshipsbetweeninternationallawandnon-legalinternationalnormativestructuresisinparttheresult of positivist conceptions of law as a specialized and pure eld of inquiry whichOppenheimhelpedtofoster.Thisisironic,forOppenheimhimselfsawtheintimateconnection between balance of power as a norm (or principle) of international politicsLegalPositivismasNormativePolitics:InternationalSociety,BalanceofPower 42190Oppenheim added to the second edition of his textbook: It is necessary to emphasize that the principle ofthebalanceofpowerisnotalegalprincipleandthereforenotoneofInternationalLaw,butoneofInternationalpolicy.Oppenheim,InternationalLaw,vol.1(2nded.,1911)193.91Foradefenceofformalityinlaw,seeP.S.AtiyahandRobertS.Summers,FormandSubstanceinAnglo-American Law: A Comparative Study of Legal Reasoning, Legal Theory, and Legal Institutions (1987).SeealsoNeilMacCormicketal.(eds),PrescriptiveFormalityandNormativeRationalityinModernLegalSystems:FestschriftforRobertS.Summers (1994).92Koskenniemi,CarlSchmitt,HansMorgenthau,andtheImageofLawinInternationalRelations,inMichaelByers(ed.),TheRoleofLawinInternationalPolitics (2000)17,at29.93Oppenheim,InternationalLaw,vol.1(2nded.,1911)82.Theconnectionbetweenhiscommitmenttoformalismandhisviewofsocialchangeisdiscussedbelow.andthestructureofinternationallaw,whilebeingcarefultokeeptheseformallydistinct.90The reductionist focus on balance of power in the work of some realist theorists ofinternationalrelationsmissesthecomplexityoftheinterplaybetweenbalanced,hierarchicalandhegemonicdistributionsofpower.Oppenheimtooeclipsedthisinterplayinhisstarkadvocacyofabalanceasagainsttherisksofhegemony.Thehistorically grounded work of theorists of international society captures this interplaybetter.Understandingthisinterplayisessentialtounderstandingtheconditionsofinternationallawinthecontemporaryperiod,inwhichtheredoesnotexistastructural enmity, an even balance, or the afrmative power of a single hegemon toreconstruct international law. In so far as there exists US dominance and a Westernhegemony for certain purposes, some of the concerns Oppenheim voiced are realized:the struggle or counterpoint that could in other circumstances buttress legitimacy isat risk of being so one-sided that the strategy on the non-Western side may move awayfrom negotiation of liberal-capitalist Western values and towards their rejection; andthere is too little incentive for the hegemon itself to be sufciently respectful of otherinterests. The legitimacy of international law thus rests more and more on the hopethat Western values command enough legitimacy in themselves; but at the same timebasicinequalitiesandperceptionsofunfairnessthreatentoputthislegitimacyintoquestion.InOppenheimsownthinking,abalanceofpoweramongstatesisnecessarytoachieveandmaintainrespectforinternationallegalrules:itisaconditionforformalisminlaw.91Ifnobalanceexists,andonestatebecomespreponderant,thatstate will pursue anti-formalist approaches where these suit it better. Thus, after thedeclineandcollapseoftheUSSR,aUSscholarlyfocusongovernance,regimes,managerialcompliance,decisionprocessandthelike,andaUStendencytonegotiate detailed multilateral rule-making treaties which it does not then ratify, mayreect in some areas of international law a US preference for anti-formal malleabilitythat is inuenced by the aura of preponderant power.92A mistrust of anti-formalism isevident in Oppenheims strong argument in favour of the legal school as against thediplomaticschoolofinternationaljurists.93Thisunderpinshispositivism,andprovides one of the strongest normative arguments for this positivism. The normativecaseforOppenheimspositivismmustnowbeconsideredmorefully.422 EJIL13(2002),40143694Oppenheim,TheScienceofInternationalLaw,supra note3,at314.95Oppenheim,InternationalLaw,vol.1(1sted.,1905)ix.96Oppenheim,TheScienceofInternationalLaw,supra note3,at333.97Dworkin, A Reply, in Marshall Cohen (ed.), Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence (1984) 254.98Oppenheim refers to method in a way which to some extent includes concept, but he does not use thetermsconceptorconceptioninrelationtointernationallaw,sothesetermsareusedonlyasveryimprecise markers in this paper, without entering into the nuances of Begriffsjurisprudenz or the sorts ofproblems canvassed in, e.g. Bix, Conceptual Questions and Jurisprudence, 1 Legal Theory (1995) 465.99For this list, and the argument for mapping between analytical and normative concerns in positivist legaltheory,thewriterismuchindebtedtoWaldron,Normative(orEthical)Positivism,inJulesColeman(ed.),HartsPostscript:EssaysonthePostscripttoTheConceptofLaw (2001)411,at432433.3 The Normative Basis of Oppenheims PositivismOppenheimassertedthattheprincipaltaskofthejurististheexpositionoftheexistingrecognizedrulesofinternationallaw,94andhewasproudtoclaimthathisInternationalLaw presentedinternationallawasitis,notasitoughttobe.95Heregarded himself as applying a positivist method: The positive method is that appliedby the science of law in general, and it demands that whatever the aims and ends of aworkerandresearchermaybe,hemuststartfromtheexistingrecognizedrulesofinternational law as they are to be found in the customary practice of the states or inlaw-makingconventions.96Inthissectionofthepaper,itwillbearguedthat,notwithstandingthepaucityofjurisprudentialargumentinhisinternationallawwritings, Oppenheims international law positivism was jurisprudentially grounded,andthathiscommitmenttohispositivistapproachhadanormativebasis.FromoneperspectivetheclaimthatOppenheimspositivismwasnormativelygrounded seems trite, for many agree with Ronald Dworkins sweeping comment thatanytheoryoflaw,includingpositivism,isbasedintheendonsomeparticularnormativetheory.97TheclaimmadeinthispaperaboutOppenheim,however,ismore specic. He was engaged, as he saw it, in a project to build a desperately neededworkingsystemofinternationallawforthefuture,whichcouldonlybearobuststructureifbasedrmlyonpositivistfoundations.Thismeantastruggleovertheconcept of international law against those who based the subject on natural law, andagainst those legal positivists for whom international law was just positive morality.98HisrejectionofnaturallawandofAustinianismwasnotdependentonanydeepstructureofpoliticaltheory:itwasarst-orderdisputeastowhichconceptofinternational law should be accepted. He believed that the best means to advance thesubstantive normative values to which he was committed was to adopt and propagatehisparticularpositivistconceptionoflaw.Forthedevelopmentofaneffectiveinternationallaw,hesawnumerousadvantagesinfeaturesassociatedwithpositivisminlaw:thedistinctiveformulationandinterpretationoflegalrulesasabasisforclarityandstability;theirreductiontowritingtoincreasecertaintyandpredictability;theelaborationofdistinctlegalinstitutions;thedevelopmentofethically autonomous professional roles, such as that of international judge; and theseparationoflegalargumentfrommoralargumentsasameanstoovercomedisagreement.99LegalPositivismasNormativePolitics:InternationalSociety,BalanceofPower 423100Schmoeckel, The Story of a Success, supra note 4, convincingly argues that this aspect of OppenheimsinternationallawwasconnectedwithhisearlystudiesofgrouppsychologyunderWilhelmWundt.101Schmoeckel, The Story of a Success, supra note 4, cites in this respect Kelsens disparaging comments onOppenheim:HansKelsen,Thoriedudroitinternationalcoutumier (1939)1921.102JeremyWaldron,TheDignityofLegislation (1999)6162.ThisisacontestedreadingofKant,butthatdisputeneednotbeconsideredhere.103ApointnotedbySchmoeckelinrelationtoOppenheimsrecognitionthatalllawissubjecttohumanreasonandthusimperfect:Schmoeckel,TheStoryofaSuccess,supra note4,atnn.216217.Oppenheims positivist insistence that international law rules be based on consent isinterpretedbyMathiasSchmoeckelasadevicetomaintainthecontactbetweenconsensual law and general morality, and Oppenheims understanding of this contactisinterpretedasbeingpredicatedonOppenheimsacceptanceinpartofanidentitybetweenthevolontedetous andthevolontegnrale.ThusOppenheimspositivismmightbeunderstood,paradoxically,asanormativeprojecttomaintaintheconnection between law and morality by separating them. Oppenheim could thus beread as cleverly eliding, or less charitably as overlooking, the distinction between thewill of all and the general will.100This account is plausible if Oppenheim is read simplyasstrugglingwiththeproblemofhowtogroundpositivistinternationallawinmorality.ButitdoesnotofferaveryfullorcompellingnormativeexplanationforOppenheims advocacy of international law positivism.101It is more illuminating forappraising the normative arguments for such positivist projects, and perhaps fairer toOppenheim(althoughpossiblyattributingtoomuchtohim),toreadOppenheiminthewaythatJeremyWaldronreadsKant.Heshares:in the classic, but honest predicament of the true legal positivist. He has set out the advantagesof positive law, and given an indication of what we stand to lose if we abandon it. He does notdeny that the contents of legislation may be judged wanting from the transcendent perspectiveofjusticeandright.Herecognizes. . .themodesofthought. . .thatonedeployswhenonemakes moral criticisms of existing law. But in the transition from moral philosophy to politicalphilosophy, Kant insists that we now take account of the fact that there are others in the worldbesides ourselves. And he insists that we are to see others not just as objects of moral concernorrespect,butasotherminds,otherintellects,otheragentsofmoralthought,coordinateandcompetitive with our own. When I think about justice, I must recognize that others are thinkingabout justice, and that my condence in the objective quality of my conclusions is matched bytheir condence in the objective quality of theirs. The circumstance of law and politics is thatthis symmetry of self-righteousness is not matched by any convergence of substance, that eachof two opponents may believe that they are right. If nevertheless there are reasons for thinkingthat society needs just one view on some particular matter, to which all its members must deferatleastsofarastheirexternalinteractionsareconcerned,thentheremustbeawayofidentifying a view as the community view and a ground for ones allegiance to it, which is notpredicatedonanyjudgmentonewouldhavetomakeconcerningitsrectitude.102Like many German and Austrian legal scholars at the end of the nineteenth centuryand the early twentieth century, Oppenheim was inuenced by Kantian thinking,103but the question of whether this particular set of views was associated by OppenheimspecicallywithKantisnotanswerablefromthematerialspresentlyavailable.Itisnotessentialtothepresentargument,whichisthatOppenheimconsciouslyembracedthekindofnormativepositivismsketchedhere.424 EJIL13(2002),401436104Raz,Authority,Law,andMorality,inJosephRaz,EthicsinthePublicDomain (1994)194,at199.105Ronald Dworkin asserts that positivists in general endorse what he calls the model of rules because theyadhere to a political theory that the function of law is to provide a settled public and dependable set ofstandards for private and ofcial conduct, standards whose force cannot be called into question by someindividualofcialsconceptionofpolicyormorality.RonaldDworkin,TakingRightsSeriously (1977)347. Jospeh Raz accepts such a characterization of his own argument in, e.g. Raz, supra note 104, at 219.106Oppenheim,DasGewissen (1898).Oppenheimsprimaryrstorderconcernwaswiththeconstructionofasysteminwhichinternationallawcouldmakeacolourableclaimtoauthority.AsJosephRazhasargued,everylegalsystemclaimsthatitpossesseslegitimateauthority. . .whateverelsethelawis,itmustbecapableofpossessingauthority.104AlthoughOppenheim did not articulate the claim of international law this way, the idea that tobe law international law must be able to make a claim to authority is inchoate in histhought, and led him, as it has led Raz, to a hard sources-based legal positivism. Theneedforauthoritativearticulationofinternationallegalrulesnecessitatedbuildinginstitutions capable of determining a legal rule even where there existed disagreementabout the relevant principles of justice.105These are some of Oppenheims rst-orderconcerns.Thesecondordervaluesanimatinghiscommitmenttotheserstorderprioritieswillbeconsideredlaterinthissection.Because of the sparseness of the discussion of jurisprudential theory in Oppenheimsinternationallawworks,andbecauseofhishesitancyinthoseworksindiscussingsecondordervalues,demonstratingthenormativityofOppenheimspositivismbyreference to his international law works alone is difcult. But Oppenheims personalapproachtojurisprudenceismuchmoreamplyindicatedinworkswrittenshortlybefore he turned full-time to international law, most notably Gerechtigkeit und Gesetz(1895)andDasGewissen (1898).Itwillbearguedthatthejurisprudentialfoundations visible in these works also underlie his international law, although theyaremoredifculttodiscernthere.SomeofOppenheimsideas,formulatedintheseearlyworks,areasfollows.Hebuildsonthenotionthateachindividualhasaconsciencewhichdevelopsthroughinteractioninsociety,anddevelopsdifferentlydepending on predisposition, milieu, intelligence, etc. The conscience is restrained byreason the conscience is the highest authority, but only after reason is convincedthat the conscience is right. Conscience changes, through the actions of the individualandthroughsocietysmorals,religionandlaw.Masschangesinconsciencecanoccur,sometimesdisastrously.106Mosthumanbeingsarestronglyanimatedbyasenseofjustice,whichhasitsoriginsinpsychology.Theviewsofindividualsandgroupsastowhatisjustorunjustareshapedbyfeelings(Gemt)andbyinterests,resultinginacontinuouschangeinperceptionsofjustice.Justiceinvolvesavaluefactor(theWertmoment),sothateachisjudgedaccordingtoindividualdeserts,notsimplyaccordingtosocialappropriateness.But,becausedeepdisagreementaboutjustice is almost inevitable in most societies, and judgmental decisions made simply onthe ground of justice would be subject to the ebb and ow of social struggles and wouldoftenbeunacceptabletothosewholoseaparticularstruggle,lawsareenactedtoreplacethesenseofjusticeasthebasisforauthoritativedecisions.Laws,asabstractionsthataretheresultoflegislativecompromisesandimperfections, LegalPositivismasNormativePolitics:InternationalSociety,BalanceofPower 425107Oppenheim,GerechtigkeitundGesetz (1895).108Ibid.,at2834.109Die ffentliche Meinung und die Rechtsprechung, 23 Deutsche Revue (JanuaryMarch 1898) 328339.110In ibid., at 339, Oppenheim is very anxious to establish that the judges remain independent and properjudges:EsgibtnochRichterinBerlin.inevitablydivergefromjusticeinparticularcases.Lawyersandjudgeshavesomepossibilities to bridge this gap, but ultimately for the judge the laws must be sacrosanctand unimpeachable. But this formal theory has sometimes been departed from, as inthecaseofthe1532criminalcodeandcodeofcriminalprocedure(theCarolina),whichfromtheeighteenthcenturywasineffectmodiedbythejudgesandlegalscholars while the legislature failed to enact any formal amendment. History teachesthatsucheventsoccurbecausetheyarenecessary,andthefactofsuchextra-legalalterationsinthelawmustbeaccepted.107Juristsshouldpayattentiontopublicopinion where it criticizes law in the name of justice, by instituting law reform and bythe use of customary law which evolves with the life and views of the people. Law is inthe end based upon public opinion, but judges and jurists should in general adhere tolaw;atriumphofjusticeoverlawisoftenaninjusticeforthose(andtheymaybemany)whoseparticularconceptionofjusticewasnotvictorious.Thedisruptionoflawhascoststhatendureforalongtime.108CommentingintheDeutscheRevue onpublic perceptions that the criminal justice system was being misused against socialdemocrats,Oppenheimnotedthatapreviouswaveofpublicdemandstousethecriminal law to deal with problems to which it was not ideally suited had precipitatedthe judicial excesses in these cases, and that the solution must now involve not onlyjudgesadoptinglessextensiveinterpretations,buttheGermanpeoplerecognizingthat the criminal law is not always the right answer to problems.109The pattern in hisearly works is thus to regard public opinion as sometimes well-founded on particularissueswhilealsoirresponsibleandinexpert,todefendlawandtheroleandindependenceofjudges,110buttorecognizethepracticalitiesthatjurisprudenceandjustice are not pure and independent but operate in society and involve public opinion.Oppenheim thus offered in his earlier works a rich and carefully balanced accountof the various normative systems that govern human behaviour, and of the particularfunctionsoflawinthefaceofdisagreementinothersystems.Hegroundedhisunderstanding of these systems in individual psychology and the interests and feelingsof individuals and social, economic and political groups. He saw all of these normativesystems as dynamic, and acknowledged that law must adjust to changes in the othersystems,eveninextremis bymeansthatareextra-legal.Glimmersofthesejurisprudentialideasfromhisearlyworksreappearinhisdiscussions of international law. A fully articulated construction of his internationallaw on the basis of his earlier jurisprudence could have been an edifying project had hedecidedtoattemptit.ButthemethodologyOppenheimadoptedwhenhewrotesystematically about international law did not include many of the fundamentals ofthisrelativelysophisticatedjurisprudentialsystem.Afewofthecontrastsmaybereiterated.Hisinternationallawabandonedindividualsasthestartingpoint,andindeedpurportedlargelytoexcludethemfromthesystem.Hisrichlyvariegated426 EJIL13(2002),401436111Oppenheimdidnotattemptthepotentiallymanageabletask(givenhisnarrowviewofthestate)ofdevelopingmicrofoundations,whichwouldshowhowthefeelings,interestsorvaluesofkeydecision-makingindividualsorgroupsshapethestatesinternationallegalpolicy.112Oppenheimrecognizedthat,inanovelsituation,thechoicefromamongthevariouslegalrulesandprinciplesthatcouldconceivablyapplyinvolvesrejectionofsomeongroundsoftheirincompatibilitywith justice, necessity, or good sense. He understood that anyone applying law to a specic new situationcannotbeobliviousofpoliticalaspects,evenwhilethetaskofthelawyeristoapplysuitablelegalprinciples.Buteveninsuchnovelcaseshewashesitanttogobeyondtheformsoflegalreasoningminimallynecessarytosustainaworkinglegalsystemcapableofaddressingsuchnewproblemsbyframing rules of positive law. This is exemplied by Oppenheims legal analysis of the proposed ChannelTunnel in Der Tunnel unter dem rmenkanal und das Vlkerrecht, 2 Zeitschrift fr Vlkerrecht (1907)1, discussed by Mathias Schmoeckel from this perspective in Schmoeckel, The Story of a Success, supranote4,atn.202.113Oppenheim,TheScienceofInternationalLaw,supra note3,at313and355.national community, with reference to social classes, political party afliations, etc.,wasdiscardedforaninternationalcommunityconnedexclusivelytostates.Conscienceandfeelingslargelydisappearedfromtheanalysis,becausehedidnotattribute these to states,111although he retained some role for mass conscience. Theroleofjusticevis--vis lawwasdiminished,beingconnedinhisinternationallawwritingmainlytoproceduralissuesconnectedwithlegalsecurityandcertainrule-of-law values. He aimed in his international law method to adhere more strictlytoanapproachtolawbasedonlyonitspositivesources,withoutenvisagingjudgesand jurists bringing about the kind of change that happened to the Carolina code.112Ininternationallawevenmorethannationallawhebelievedjudgesmustdecideaccording to law, not on extraneous moral or political grounds; arbitrators whose jobit is simply to resolve the dispute he viewed with toleration but some misgivings, muchasheviewedGermanorSwissjuriesandlayjudges,whohebelievedwereapttodecideongroundsofjusticeratherthanlaw.Hesoughttolimitthesignicanceforinternationallawofnationallegislativeorjudicialaction,inwhichconsiderationsextraneoustointernationallawmayappear.ThishasledmanyreaderstodoubtthatOppenheimspositivismisnormativelymotivated.TextualsupportfortheargumentthatOppenheimsinternationallawpositivismwaspartofanormativeprojectmaybederivedfromthesignicanceOppenheimattachedtothejuristictaskofcritiquingtheexistingrulesandpresentscopeofinternationallaw.Thistaskofthescienceofinternationallawisveryimportantandmustnotbeneglected,ifwewantinternationallawtodevelopprogressivelyandtobringmoreandmoremattersunderitssway. . ..Nothingpreventsusfromapplyingthesharpknifeofcriticism,fromdistinguishingbetweenwhatisgoodandbadaccordingtoourindividualideas,andfromproposingimprovements.113ButwhileOppenheiminvestedmucheffortspecifyingindetailhowjuristsshouldpursuethetaskofidentifyingexistingrulesofinternationallawanddistinguishingthem from mere usages and from rules de lege ferenda, he wrote much less about howthetaskofcritiqueshouldbeaccomplished.Althoughhiswritingsoffersomeindications of what values or criteria he himself would choose to use in the process ofcritique, he wrote little about what justied the choice, or about the relevance of otherLegalPositivismasNormativePolitics:InternationalSociety,BalanceofPower 427114HerschLauterpacht,TheFunctionofLawintheInternationalCommunity (1933)438.115See for example his references to a collectivity of Professional International lawyers, for whom he speaksin the liturgical form we believe . . ., in Oppenheim, The League of Nations and Its Problems, supra note 11,atvvi.116Oppenheim,TheScienceofInternationalLaw,supra note3,at355.117Ibid.,at355.118Schmoeckel,TheStoryofaSuccess,supra note4,textbeforen.248.119Oppenheim,TheFutureofInternationalLaw,supra note10,at13.disciplines to the task. Nor did he say much about the qualications that internationallawyersmighthaveforthistask,thelimitsofanyspecialcompetencetheymighthave,ortherestraintstheyshouldobservein