[Klaus Gallo] Great Britain and Argentina From in(BookFi.org)

Klaus Gallo

Great Britain andArgentina

From Invasion to Recognition, 1806-26

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Great Britain andArgentinaFrom Invasion to Recognition, 1806–26

Klaus GalloProfessor of HistoryUniversidad Torcuato di TellaBuenos AiresArgentina

in association with

St Antony’s College, Oxford

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© Klaus Gallo 2001

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission ofthis publication may be made without written permission.

No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied ortransmitted save with written permission or in accordance withthe provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988,or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copyingissued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham CourtRoad, London W1T 4LP.

Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to thispublication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civilclaims for damages.

The author has asserted his right to be identifiedas the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published in paperback 2001 byPALGRAVEHoundmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10010Companies and representatives throughout the world

PALGRAVE is the new global academic imprint of St. Martin’s Press LLC Scholarly and Reference Division andPalgrave Publishers Ltd (formerly Macmillan Press Ltd).

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A catalogue record for this book is availablefrom the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataGallo, Klaus, 1961 –

Great Britain and Argentina: from invasion to recognition,1806-26 / Klaus Gallo.

p. cm.Includes bibliographical references (p.) and index.ISBN 0–333–92099–61. Great Britain—Foreign relations—Argentina. 2. Argentina–

–Foreign relations—Great Britain. 3. Great Britain—Foreign relations—1800–1837. 4. Argentina—Foreign relations––1817–1860. I. Title.

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Contents

Acknowledgements

Introduction 1

1 The River Plate Viceroyalty 9

2 The British Invasions of the River Plate 33

3 The Ministry of All the Talents and the River Plate Invasions 51

4 Strangford, Independence and the London Missions 85

5 Rivadavia and the British Attitude towards Recognition 115

6 Great Britain and the Recognition of the River Plate 137

Conclusion 161

Notes 165

Bibliography 181

Index 187

v

Acknowledgements

Among numerous debts and obligations of gratitude the first is tothe supervisor of my thesis – which has now been transformed intothis book – Professor Malcolm Deas, for his expert teaching andguidance in a field of which he has a profound understanding; I ammost grateful to him for his unfailing care and conscientiousness. Ithank my parents Professor Ezequiel Gallo and Professor FrancisKorn for their support and encouragement and for their commentson my draft thesis. My wife Mercedes Güiraldes helped me through-out by reading and correcting the later chapters, and DanielWaisbein was so good as to offer his advice on the earlier chapters.Professor John Lynch, Professor Leslie Mitchell and Professor AlanKnight each read portions of the work, and I am particularly gratefulto them for personally according me their suggestions for improve-ment. I would also like to thank Mr Carlos María de Alvear for hiskindness and also for his guidance on the subject of his famousancestor’s life. At the Archivo Nacional de Buenos Aires, I benefitedfrom the invaluable aid of Dr Carlos Mayo and of Dr E. Saguier intracing recondite sources. My thanks are also due to Gloria Cavanagh,Professor Paula Alonso and Professor Eduado Zimmerman for theirfriendly observations on my work.

A special mention is due to the examiners of my thesis, ProfessorsPatrick O’Brien and Carlos Malamud, for their valuable remarks andsuggestions for improvement of this book.

I am especially indebted to the Fellows of Wolfson College forhaving awarded the Norman-Hargreaves Scholarship to me during thecourse of my studies. I would also like to extend my gratitude toFundación Antorchas, Editorial A–Z and Professor Sergio Labourdette.

vi

Introduction

This book is an analysis of the relations between Great Britain andthe River Plate during 1806–26. It is essentially a study of the evolu-tion of the political and diplomatic relations between the two coun-tries. These commence with the British invasions of Buenos Airesand begin to take a more dramatic course after the emancipation ofthe River Plate from Spain in 1810, concluding at the time when theBritish Government acknowledges recognition of the UnitedProvinces of the River Plate as an independent nation.

This work aims to analyse and expand the previous contributionsmade by the historians who have written about British andArgentine relations in the nineteenth century. I consider that inspite of their publications there is still room for new interpretationson this subject, as I shall explain in this introduction.

The history of the relations between Britain and Spanish Americain the early nineteenth century is a subject that has been studied byseveral historians, especially British, mainly between the late 1930sand the late 1960s. The most obvious examples are Webster (apioneer in this topic), Humphreys, Kauffmann, Rydjord, Lynch (thehistorian who has written more than anyone else on this subject),and, most recently, Miller. Also worth mentioning is Robertson,who worked on the relations of other European nations, such asRussia and France, with Spanish America in the early nineteenthcentury.1

There have also been historians who have focused on the relationsof Britain with one particular Latin American nation during thisperiod. In the case of Britain and Argentina, the works of Roberts,

1

Ferns, and Street are the three most notable examples.2 Roberts’sbook is principally concerned with the events that took place duringthe British invasions of the River Plate. He also covers, to a lesserextent, the period up to British recognition. This was the firstserious work on the relations between the two countries in thatperiod, and Roberts spent a long time in the British archives collect-ing material on this topic. This is reflected in the enormous amountof information in his book, which remains one of the most usefulsources on the British invasions of the River Plate. However, hiswork now appears somewhat outdated. Although the sources usedappear listed at the end of the book, there are no footnotes in hisbook.

Ferns’s work is a thorough analysis of the relations between thetwo countries throughout the nineteenth century, with specialemphasis on the political and commercial aspects. It is a masterlystudy and is still today the best source on this subject. As Ferns’swork covers the whole century, his analysis of the earlynineteenth century is not as thorough as that of the other twostudies mentioned here. Nevertheless it remains very useful,especially in its analysis of the commercial relations between thetwo nations.

Street’s study covers the same period in the relations betweenBritain and the River Plate as does this book. Street makes full use ofthe available PRO material and exploits Argentine sources as well.His study is a political, diplomatic, and economic account of therelations between the two countries. The chapters on the period1808–16, which deal with the influence of Lord Strangford in SouthAmerica, represent his most significant contribution to this subject.For some reason, however, Street neglected the manuscripts in theBritish Library. The omission of this material is reflected in the lackof a thorough analysis of the role of the British Governmentthroughout the period, especially in the chapters on the invasions.There one finds little analysis or explanation of the role of theMinistry of All the Talents, which is essential to an understanding ofthese events. Street also neglects the period after 1816, the yearswhich led to recognition. He only devotes a few pages of his lastchapter to explaining the process by which recognition was finallyattained, which therefore leaves the treatment of this periodmarkedly unbalanced with respect to previous years.

2 Great Britain and Argentina

Street’s book is one of the last significant contributions to thestudy of British and Argentine relations during the early nineteenthcentury. For the last 30 years this subject has been almost totallyignored.3 The reason for the abandonment of this topic probablylies in the notion, prevalent amongst some historians, that it hasalready been thoroughly investigated by the authors mentionedabove. Nevertheless in the last 30 years new manuscript sourceshave been unearthed, especially in Britain, many of which are ofspecial interest to the historians of British relations with SpanishAmerica in the first half of the nineteenth century. A significantamount of secondary work on the history of this period has alsoappeared during these years in both Britain and in Argentina. Someof these publications have made full use of the primary sources thathave recently come to light, and therefore provide more informa-tion as well as new interpretations on aspects of British andArgentinian history during these years. It is thus my opinion that ifthese new sources are incorporated into the material already used inthe previous works on this topic, they justify a new study of therelations between Britain and Argentina during the early nineteenthcentury. It is mainly for this reason that I consider that a general re-evaluation of this subject is both necessary and feasible.

As mentioned above, this book primarily emphasizes the politicaland diplomatic aspects of the relations between the two countries.The commercial elements involved in the relations between thesetwo countries during this period are too important to omit and willnaturally be present in this work. However, it is not my intention toanalyse the economic aspects as thoroughly as the political anddiplomatic. The main reason for this is that I consider the study ofcommercial relations as almost a subject in itself. To incorporatethem into this work at the same level of detail as the political anddiplomatic relations, would necessarily require either a moresuperficial approach to the subject, or a far more voluminous book.

It is important, when tackling the history of the relations betweenthe two countries, to find an adequate equilibrium between thesubject matter – the bilateral relationship – and the general situationof the two countries in the global context of the period. These con-siderations are even more weighty when the two countries areimmersed in such diverse historical and political contexts as wereBritain and Argentina in the early nineteenth century. It is vital to

Introduction 3

have a clear idea of the different perspectives of the two countriestowards each other during this period. In the era 1806–25, Europewas first under Napoleonic dominance and subsequently, after thefall of the French Empire, found herself dominated by an unstableconservative alliance of the leading states, which was seen as ameans of achieving a stable balance of power. Britain led the fightagainst Napoleonic France, and later on more timidly resisted thedesigns of Metternich and the Holy Alliance. The recognition of theSpanish American colonies was not seriously considered by Britainuntil 1824.

The River Plate region, after achieving independence in 1810,began to look in the direction of Europe, but especially Britain, inthe hope of achieving recognition and assistance. For GreatBritain, relations with the River Plate were a minor item in herforeign policy when compared to her relations with Europe at thattime. However, the River Plate Governments during the post-independence period considered relations with Britain as anessential and central component of their foreign affairs. Toillustrate this point even more crudely, the British invasions of theRiver Plate, for example, are considered a legendary episode inArgentine history and are familiar to all Argentines. The samecannot, however, be said about Britain, where one looks in vainfor the merest reference to the invasions in the standard historiesof Britain in the nineteenth century.

This book is divided into six chapters. The second and third chap-ters cover 1806–7, and deal with the events of the British invasionsof the River Plate. This may give the impression of a somewhatunbalanced structure, given that the next three chapters involve theremaining years of the period under study. The reason is that theBritish invasions are the most important and significant events inthe relationship between the two countries in the whole twentyyears and, the most abundant in terms of available archival materialand secondary sources, which allow a much more extensive analy-sis. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the subject and is dividedinto two sections. The first section is a short introduction to thehistory of the Plate and focuses particularly on the period from1776, the year the River Plate was made a Viceroyalty by Charles IIIof Spain, up to 1806. By this time the economic and social condi-tions of this area had changed substantially, facilitating a more


active participation in political life by the leading creole citizens.The second section of this chapter offers a resumé of British strategicdesigns on Spanish America in the eighteenth century. Of centralinterest is the period 1780–1804, when Pitt the younger served asprime minister. During these years the Venezuelan FranciscoMiranda had been in London lobbying the Government to mount aliberating expedition to South America. Henry Dundas, one of Pitt’smost important ministers, showed great interest in these SouthAmerican projects and gradually came to realize that the River Platewas the most interesting focus for British interests in that continent.

Chapter 2 deals directly with the British invasions of the RiverPlate. It includes an account of the preliminaries which led toAdmiral Home Popham’s decision to capture Buenos Aires, and theactual events which took place. It offers an analysis of the maincharacters involved in the affair and, without entering into all thedetails of the actions which took place, provides a chronologicalaccount of the military campaigns.

The third chapter continues the story of the invasions and of theconsequences for the two countries involved. It is also divided intotwo sections. The first part reviews the role of the British administra-tion in power at the time: the Ministry of All the Talents, aWhig–Tory coalition formed after Pitt’s second Administration cameto an end. The reactions of the opposition factions and of publicopinion towards the Buenos Aires affair are also analysed here. Thesecond section addresses the repercussions of the invasions in theRiver Plate, and the attitudes adopted by the leading Spanish andcreole figures towards the British invaders. Thus, the invasions areconsidered in Chapters 2 and 3 from three different perspectives.

Chapter 4 covers the post-invasion years, and stretches from 1807to 1815. This was a highly eventful period that commenced withthe Portuguese court moving to Brazil as a consequence of theFrench invasion of Portugal. The role of the British ministerattached to the Portuguese court in Rio de Janeiro, Lord Strangford,is examined, specifically in relation with the River Plate. His arrivalcoincided with the preliminary stages of the independence move-ment which was to reach its full development in Buenos Aires acouple of years later. Strangford was to play a pivotal role as media-tor between the River Plate and the Portuguese over Uruguay andwas at the time the only official link which the new Government in

Introduction 5

the River Plate had with Great Britain. This chapter also analaysesthe first diplomatic missions sent to England from the River Plateand the effects the British alliance with Spain had on Britain’s reac-tion towards River Plate independence. This is accompanied by areview of the complicated internal situations in both countries andthe way these affected their relationship. The chapter concludeswith the fall of Napoleon and the dilemma that Britain faced withthe dominance of the Holy Alliance in Europe.

In Chapter 5 I analyse the period 1816–22. In 1816 full indepen-dence was declared in the River Plate. This, however, did not put animmediate end either to internal turmoil, or to the external menaceof the Portuguese in Uruguay. Therefore assistance and recognitionfrom Great Britain were still sought. Nevertheless, there was no sub-stantial progress in the relations between the two countries duringthese years. In Britain the Liverpool Ministry was still finding itdifficult to break with the Holy Alliance, and thus was reluctant toadopt novel policies vis-à-vis South America. Towards the end of thisperiod, however, certain events occurred which indicated thatrecognition was not so far away. In the River Plate, BernardinoRivadavia rose to prominence in 1821, and signs of political stabilityand economic progress seemed to be emerging. In Britain, GeorgeCanning replaced Lord Castlereagh at the Foreign Office in 1822,and his more liberal attitude promised favourable consequences forSouth America.

Chapter 6, the last chapter, analyses the years 1823–26 whichfinally bring recognition. In 1823 Canning sent consuls to threenewly-formed Latin American states, the River Plate being one ofthem. This marked the beginning of formal relations between thetwo countries, and it appeared to many at that time that recogni-tion was now a mere formality. Nevertheless, in spite of growingpressure both from members of the opposition Whig faction in par-liament, and from a considerable number of British merchants whopressed for recognition, Canning hesitated. He was essentially infavour of recognition, but waited to receive more assurances fromBritish Consuls concerning the political stability of the region. Thisapplied in the case of the River Plate, where the political situationappeared to be unstable after Rivadavia’s fall from power in 1824.News of Rivadavia’s fall provoked great concern in Britain, especiallyin commercial circles where Rivadavia had been highly appreciated.


By this time, however, the United States’s recognition of the newstates in 1823, and Britain’s increasing detachment from theCongress System in Europe, added to the generally satisfying reportsreceived from Latin America, led to Britain´s recognition of the RiverPlate Provinces in 1825. Therefore, almost twenty years after theBritish invasions of Buenos Aires, formal relations between Britainand Argentina now commenced.

Introduction 7

1The River Plate Viceroyalty

The River Plate is the name given to the river that flows past BuenosAires into the Atlantic Ocean. It was also the name assigned to theterritory which today forms the Argentine Republic. The river wasdiscovered by Juan Díaz de Solis in 1516, who named it the MarDulce. This is considered as the traditional date of discovery. In1520, Fernando de Magallane’s expedition explored the Argentinecoast from the River Plate to the strait that bears his name. Fromthis voyage comes the first description of Patagonia. Magallane alsodiscovered the river Uruguay. This expedition was followed by thatof Sebastian Cabot in 1527–29, which explored the Paraná river andfounded Fort Sancti Spiritus, the first Spanish settlement in RiverPlate territory. The Portuguese visited the River Plate for the firsttime in 1531, and thus gave the Spaniards the incentive to occupythe area. In 1536 the Spanish Crown sent out the adelantado Pedrode Mendoza, who founded Buenos Aires in the same year.

In 1541, however, Buenos Aires was abandoned, a victim ofhunger, disease, and Indian attacks. The settlers moved to Asunción,the present capital of Paraguay, which became the new centre ofSpanish settlement and government.

Shortly afterwards, in 1543, the Indian chieftain Diego de Rojasestablished the first settlements in the vast area of what is today thenorth-west of Argentina. This region was to become theGobernación de Tucumán in 1563, attached to the Viceroyalty ofPeru, which had been created in 1542. Thus all the lands formerlyunder the Inca Empire were united under Spanish rule. The juris-diction of the Tucumán area included the present Argentine

9

provinces of Jujuy, Salta, Catamarca, La Rioja, Tucumán, Santiagodel Estero and Córdoba. All these provinces had been foundedduring the period 1540–80, as a result of two Spanish colonizingstreams, one from Peru, the other from Chile. It was also the mostheavily populated Indian territory found in Argentina. This vastarea was governed from the capital Santiago del Estero under theAudiencia of Charcas.

The consolidation of the Tucumán provinces coincided with theappearance of other cities in the future River Plate terrain – notablyCorrientes, to the east, and Santa Fe, to the north of Buenos Aires –and with the second foundation of Buenos Aires by Juan de Garayin the year 1580. Towards the end of the sixteenth century, BuenosAires had already surpassed Asunción in terms of strategic impor-tance and wealth. The Jesuits arrived in the River Plate area in 1607,and established the Doctrinas, Indian missions which stretchedalong the Paraguay, Paraná, and upper Uruguay rivers, and whichrapidly developed into well organized administrative towns. TheJesuits controlled most of the primary education, in what is nowArgentina, and all the secondary and university education until theywere expelled by the Spanish Crown in 1767. The Jesuits were alsoresponsible for creating the first University in the River Plate, in theyear 1622 in the city of Córdoba.

Buenos Aires had already been proclaimed the new capital of theprovince of the River Plate in 1617. This province also includedSanta Fe, Corrientes and Concepción del Bermejo, which were laterto be known as the provinces of the Litoral area of Argentina. Theother two main provinces in the region were Paraguay andTucumán, which consisted of the cities that had composed theGobernación. These provinces were each under the control of aGobernador, and were still subject to the Audiencia of Charcas in theViceroyalty of Peru. Although this system lasted for a century and ahalf, the distances of the provinces from the central authority inPeru was often a cause of complaint from the local authorities.Moreover, the general desire of the Spanish Bourbon Kings was tostrengthen colonial administration, and to increase the royal rev-enues from the American colonies.

The most radical of the reforming Bourbons, Charles III, createdthe Viceroyalty of New Granada in 1737 in the north of the SouthAmerican continent, which included modern Colombia, Ecuador,


and Venezuela; and the Viceroyalty of the River Plate in 1776,which included the present republics of Argentina, Bolivia,Paraguay, and Uruguay. The territory was divided into eightIntendencias: Paraguay, La Paz, Potosí, Charcas, Buenos Aires, LaPlata, Córdoba and Salta del Tucumán; the first Viceroy was Pedrode Ceballos. As a consequence of these administrative changesimposed by the Spanish Crown, Buenos Aires gradually turned intoone of the most important centres of commerce in Spanish SouthAmerica. The rapid demographic, economic, and political growth ofthis city from the mid-eighteenth century, and the steady decline ofLima as a centre of commerce, had been one of the most significantreasons for the creation of this Viceroyalty.1

There were also, however, strategic reasons which induced theSpanish Crown to effect these changes, such as the need to defendthe River Plate against French and English designs on the SouthAtlantic and, more significantly, Portuguese encroachment in theRiver Plate area. In 1680 the Portuguese had founded Colonia deSacramento, situated on the coast of Uruguay, separated fromBuenos Aires by the River Plate. This post attracted English mer-chants, who had originally arrived in the River Plate attracted by thewealth of Potosí. However, the commercial restrictions imple-mented by the Spanish Crown, which allowed its South Americancolonies to trade only with the Spanish port of Seville, made itextremely difficult for the British to develop any sort of regular com-mercial enterprise. Nevertheless, as Buenos Aires emerged as one ofthe main centres of commerce in South America, British merchantssought to establish commercial links with the port. For this reasonColonia rapidly became a centre of contraband, which was facili-tated by the lack of Spanish patrols in the area.2 Furthermore, afterthe Utrecht Treaty of 1713, which ratified Colonia as a Portuguesepossession, the British were authorized for the next thirty years toparticipate in the slave trade in South America.3

This course of events had serious consequences for the SpanishAmerican economy, and resulted in the loss of significant revenuefor the Spanish Crown. Facing the menacing prospect of losing theirpredominance to the Portuguese and British in the continent, theBourbons were forced to review their commercial policies inAmerica, and decreed the opening of trade between Spain and allSpanish American ports.

The River Plate Viceroyalty 11

The growth of the River Plate during the last decades of empire was,therefore, a consequence partly of the reforming policies of theBourbons, and partly of the new economic reorientation they gaveto their American colonies by allowing them free commercial inter-course with Spain and with other Spanish colonies. Nevertheless,the colonies were still not authorized to enter into direct commer-cial relations with other European nations.

The demographic growth of the River Plate area was clearlyevident in the rise of the city of Buenos Aires from the mid-eighteenth century: in the 1750s, Buenos Aires had a mere 19 000inhabitants, a figure which had slightly increased by 1777, when thepopulation reached 23 000. However, by the early nineteenthcentury a significant leap had occurred, and the population hadreached 40 000 inhabitants.4 Other indications of progress in theRiver Plate were the rapid development and expansion of the pas-toral economy in the countryside, especially in the wide area whichtoday is known as the province of Buenos Aires, and also in theLitoral, where the provinces that run along the Paraná river, SantaFe, and Corrientes, were rapidly becoming the main rural centres ofthe Viceroyalty.

Of these three provinces, Corrientes was the least wealthy. It wasessentially a centre of commerce and navigation; its ship-buildingindustry was responsible for the construction of the boats thatnavigated the Paraná and Plata rivers, and of a few that reachedthe Atlantic. Also important in this province was the trade in com-merce of wool and yerba mate.5 Santa Fe, a creation of the Jesuits,who used this province as commercial link between their missionsin Paraguay and the actual province of Misiones with BuenosAires, owed its wealth to agriculture, and had benefited enor-mously from the breeding and trade of the mules employed in thePotosí mines.6

On the Southern frontier of Santa Fe begins the northern sectorof the province of Buenos Aires, which surrounds the northern,western, and southern limits of the city of Buenos Aires, like SantaFe. Here, agriculture and cattle were developed on the estancias,the large estates established in the province of the Buenos Airesregion. The main activity in these estancias was cattle breeding,which provided hides. The production of wheat was alsosignificant, although by 1790 there was a marked decline in its


activity, as a consequence of restrictive official policies. The sameoccurred with the hide trade, and for a few years the Buenos Airesregion gave a new emphasis to mule breeding. Nevertheless, cattlebreeding revived in Buenos Aires with the creation of thesaladeros, which enabled producers to preserve meat.7

According to Halperín Donghi, by the end of the eighteenthcentury the city of Buenos Aires was comparable to a city of thesecond order in Spain. By then, too, a significant number of Spanishmerchants had established themselves as the leading members of a newly-formed commercial elite. They included Manuel deAnchorena, Martín de Alzaga, Gaspar de Santa Coloma, and JuanLarrea. Most had arrived in Buenos Aires as representatives ofSpanish commercial houses and were responsible for infusing a newentrepreneurial spirit in this city.8

The situation that arose in Europe after the revolution of 1789 inFrance, which led Spain to declare war first against France in 1793and then against Great Britain in 1796, would necessarily affectfuture developments in the commerce of South America and theRiver Plate area. As a consequence of events in Europe, Spain foundherself unable to maintain normal commercial intercourse, sinceshe was successively at war with the two most powerful Europeannations. Several modifications were introduced into the commercialregulations of her colonies in South America, emergency laws whichallowed new commercial liberties, permission to trade freely withother nations.

This new economic order further increased commercial activity inthe River Plate, and would rapidly pave the way for the emergenceof a local commercial group in Buenos Aires, which included futurerevolutionary leaders such as Manuel Belgrano, Hipólito Viéytes,and Mariano Moreno. Belgrano had received his education inBuenos Aires and later emigrated to Spain to complete his studies atthe University of Salamanca, where he graduated as a lawyer. On hisreturn to the River Plate in 1794 he was designated Secretary of theConsulado of Buenos Aires, the merchant tribunal. From this posi-tion he promoted the cause of development in the River Plate,writing a wide range of articles on economic matters, among otherthemes.9

The other renowned and enthusiastic promoter of agriculturaldevelopment and free-trade ideals was Viéytes, a Rioplatense journal-


ist and writer on economic questions in the Semanario de AgriculturaIndustria y Comercio, which he founded in 1802, one of the firstweekly papers to appear in Buenos Aires. He was also the owner of asoap factory where meetings were held of the members of a secretlocal society which he had organized with Nicolás Rodríguez Peña,another future revolutionary leader.10

The enigmatic and controversial Moreno, a lawyer and publicist,was also from Buenos Aires. He had received his education in theprestigious Colegio de San Carlos, and later in the University ofChuquisaca in Upper Peru, where he was heavily influenced by thepolitical and economic ideals of the Enlightenment, especiallyRousseau and Adam Smith. On his return to Buenos Aires herapidly became involved in public affairs. At first he attachedhimself to the Spanish liberals who formed Alzaga’s group, actingfor a while as their lawyer. However, he gradually became a vigor-ous exponent of local demands against the restrictions in tradeproposed by the Spain-based monopoly merchants. In 1809 hepublished his Representación de los Hacendados, in which hedefended the interests of the local merchants and demanded theopening of the River Plate economy. This document wouldbecome one of the most powerful antecedents of the revolutionthe following year.11

These three men, along with other leading creole characters, wereto a large extent the initiators of the River Plate independencemovement. However, their evolution towards the ideal of politicaland economic emancipation from Spain was gradual, and onlybegan to take coherent shape after 1806. Until then, this enlight-ened creole group of merchants and lawyers seemed content tocoexist with the Spanish merchants.12

Meanwhile, other innovations in the River Plate Viceroyaltytowards the turn of the century were the reorganization of the edu-cational system (which had not been modified since the Jesuits hadbeen expelled), the creation of the Royal Academy of San Carlos, theinstallation of the first printing press, and the inauguration of thefirst theatre in Buenos Aires.

However, the political situation, since the creation of theViceroyalty, had not suffered many changes. When ViceroySobremonte, the seventh holder of the post, took over in 1804, thesituation in the River Plate was generally speaking one of economic


progress and political and social stability, in spite of the warfaretaking place in Europe at that time.

William Pitt and South America: the emergence of theRiver Plate as a new focus of British attention

William Pitt the younger was the first British Prime Minister to take adirect interest in the Spanish American colonies. Nevertheless, as oneof Pitt’s biographer’s points out, plans of one sort or the other regard-ing South America had been taken into consideration since the 1740sby other Prime Ministers, such as Walpole, the elder Pitt, Bute, andShelburne.13 It was not until the 1780s, however, that Great Britainbegan taking a more serious interest in the Spanish colonies and, aswe shall see, the ensuing plans began to include Buenos Aires as oneof the key areas of British intervention in South America.

British interest in South America was already manifest in themid-seventeenth century after British troops took possession ofJamaica in 1655, and Oliver Cromwell declared his interest ofextending British conquests to South America as well. The firsteighteenth-century plan for a British expedition to SpanishAmerica dates from 1711 when Governor Pullen of Bermudaadvised Queen Anne’s chief minister, Robert Harley, the Earl ofOxford, that the River Plate was the best place in the world forestablishing a British Colony.14

This suggestion was not taken seriously, and it was not until1741 that British interest would focus again on South Americawhen Admiral Vernon, after failing in his attempt to attackCartagena, sought to persuade his Government that Britain oughtto favour Spanish American independence in order to open up newmarkets for the benefit of British merchants. This idea apparentlyinterested the Prime Minister Robert Walpole, but was disregardedby the Government that took office a year later.15 Admiral GeorgeAnson during his famous voyage which began only a few monthsafter Vernon’s expedition, was eager to head towards the coasts ofChile and Peru in order to cut off communications between thesecolonies and Spain.16 Also worth mentioning is the unofficial jointPortuguese–British expedition to the Uruguayan coast in December1762, though it failed in its objective to recapture Colonia de


Sacramento, which had been taken by the Spanish a few monthsbefore.17

The British also attempted to take possession of the FalklandIslands during this period. They claimed these islands for the firsttime in 1765 when an expedition commanded by Commodore Sir John Byron, grandfather of the famous poet, established a short-lived settlement. This provoked a confrontation with Spain.Britain eventually left the islands in 1774, but did not, however,renounce her claims to this land.18

One reason adduced for Britain’s more persistent interest inSpanish America after 1780, is that both the Franco-Spanish agree-ment of 1768 and the Franco-Portuguese one of 1783, had placedthe French on the same legal footing in the Peninsula as GreatBritain. This raised fears in Britain about French activity in theSpanish American colonies, as did the 1778 decree whereby Spainopened the major ports of her American colonies, thus threateningto shift the balance of trade in a new direction.19 Another reason,no doubt, was the presence in London of the VenezuelanFrancisco de Miranda, who had arrived in Britain in 1785 and hadbeen advocating the cause of South American emancipation eversince he had set foot in Europe. The British thought it desirable todevise a new and more vigorous policy with respect to SpanishAmerica.

One of the first serious plans to be found relating to SouthAmerica was made a few years before Pitt took office. This plan wassketched out in June 1780, during the final years of Lord North’slong and turbulent Ministry. Elaborated by Colonel WilliamFullarton and approved by the cabinet, it proposed an expeditionto South America via India, with the purpose of securing advanta-geous positions in Mexico, Peru, and Chile, offering independenceto their colonies, and opening the trade of South America to theEast Indian territories. This expedition was to be supported finan-cially by the East India Company, as was made clear by the authorof the project:

If this plan should be adopted by government an arrangementshould be made by the confidential directions of the East IndiaCompany and orders immediately dispatched by land to Madrasand Bengal, that ships, stores and sepoys may be prepared to join


the troops to be sent from England. If the troops sail from hencein September they may arrive in Madras in January and in fourmonths from the time the monsoons permit them to leave Indiathey may reach the coast of South America.20

The East India Company agreed to be a party to this enterprisebut, as we later learn from Fullarton himself, the expedition wasabandoned on the declaration of the Dutch War.21

These speculations with respect to South America were notconfined to residents of Great Britain. John Hippisley, a politicalwriter and later an MP, also took a deep interest in the affairs of theSpanish American colonies during a sojourn in Italy in 1779 and1780, from where he maintained confidential communications withthe British government. Hippisley encountered many Jesuit societies,especially the Hispanic–Mexican and Hispanic–Peruvian groups,which were composed of Jesuits who had served in Spanish Americaand who were confined to the Vatican after 1767, when Charles IIIexpelled them from Spanish America. Through their informationHippisley became acquainted with the unrest that, according to theseinformants, existed in some parts of the Spanish American domin-ions.22 In 1782 he wrote to Warren Hastings, the Governor-General ofBengal, on Fullarton’s behalf, advising that if the situation in Indiaallowed a revival of the previous South American enterprise, theColonel would readily submit information on the subject. Hippisleyalso confirmed news of a revolt in Peru, the Tupac Amaru rising,which had occurred the previous year.23

However, after the Versailles Treaty of January 1783, whichmarked the end of the American War of Independence, there was tobe peace in Europe for the next few years. This led Great Britain torefrain from elaborating further agressive policies towards SpanishAmerica. Nevertheless, that war had left a resentment in Britaintowards both Spain and France for their support for American inde-pendence. Ideas of revenge were entertained by certain members ofthe Government. Viscount Hood, in charge of the Admiralty, wroteto Lord Hawkesbury:

I hope that this Ministry will always keep it in mind the part thatSpain took in obtaining the independence of North America andreturn them the compliment in liberating Spanish America


which I have not a doubt may be effected with a few troops whenshe is engaged in a war.24

The King, however, although he also felt resentment against Franceand Spain, would have none of this, as he had made clear to Pitt ayear before:

I return also the two letters from Mendiola and approve the dis-claiming in the strongest manner all idea of interfering in the dis-contents of the inhabitants of the Spanish settlements in SouthAmerica, as I ever thought the conduct of France in NorthAmerica unjustifiable, I certainly can never copy so faithless anexample.25

It is true, however, as John Lynch rightly points out, that theabsence of compelling political and commercial motives wasanother reason that governed British policy towards those posses-sions for some years after 1783.26

In December of 1783 (at the age of twenty-four) William Pittbecame Prime Minister, in spite of opposition from those who hadbeen part of the previous coalition government, including the Whigfaction led by Charles James Fox, and the Tory wing led by LordNorth. Pitt’s Administration was characterized by its break from theparty alliances which had maintained different factions of the Whigand Tory parties in power during the two previous years. He went asfar as excluding the main figures of his own faction, the ChathamiteWhigs, who had been influential in his own rise to power. The mostnotable victim of this exclusion was Lord Shelburne, one of Pitt’smain political mentors. As Hobhouse has summarized:

Party was forgotten in Pitt’s overwhelming triumph; a Whigruled, and the Tories backed him. Foreign politics were neglectedafter the Treaty [Versailles] had been signed. It was a time for eco-nomic recovery, the least spectacular sort of politics. Pitt couldgive the country exactly what it needed – sound finance andtranquillity.27


The recovery of Britain’s finances and the maintenance of peacewere among Pitt’s main objectives. These were to be achieved, to aconsiderable degree, in the years preceeding Britain’s entry in theFrench Wars of 1793. During the first ten years of his governmentstate revenues increased significantly, and wars with the otherEuropean powers were avoided.

Economic recovery was achieved mainly thanks to the introduc-tion of efficient fiscal policies and greater trade. From 1784 to 1793British trade almost doubled. Imports increased from 10 millionpounds to 20 million during the 1783–90 period alone, while thevalue of exports during the same period rose from 12 millionpounds up to 20 million. Pitt’s Government was responsible forimplementing several commercial treaties with other nations wherefree-trade regulations were implicit. In this sense, it has been fre-quently suggested that the British Prime Minister was considerablyinfluenced by Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations which had been pub-lished a few years before.28

Pitt’s attention was also directed, during these years, to otherproblems related to the Empire, such as the investigations beingheld into the irregularities in the management of the East IndiaCompany. This became a major issue for the Whig faction of Burke,Fox, and Sheridan, who were the main prosecutors in the House ofCommons when the investigations finally led to the impeachmentof Warren Hastings in 1788.

In the field of foreign affairs, the end of the 1780s brought with itthe repercussions of the French Revolution, which had a profoundeffect in Britain, and to a great extent conditioned Pitt’s domesticpolicies, especially with regard to parliamentary reform. Thiswidened even more the breach that already existed between thePrime Minister and the Foxite Whigs and the radical groups, and itwould have effects on Pitt’s foreign policy. In the case of SpanishAmerica, moreover, it would make Pitt suspicious about Miranda’splans for emancipation.

The Nootka Sound crisis of 1790 turned Britain’s and Pitt’s atten-tion to Spanish America once again. The conflict was the conse-quence of a dispute between England and Spain over the right tomake settlements on the north-west coast of North America. At onepoint, the conflict drove Pitt and William Grenville, the PrimeMinister’s cousin and Home Secretary, to entrust an expedition to


Sir Archibald Campbell and Colonel William Dalrymple to accom-pany the main expedition to Louisiana, a focus of this crisis, andlaunch an assault on Mexico. There were also plans to attack Chileand Peru from India, a revival of the Fullarton project. The chancesof these plans being put into execution seemed to increase when on6 May 1790, after his speech in the Commons on the Nootka affair,Pitt (accompanied by Grenville), met Miranda to discuss theprospects of supporting a rising in South America. Pitt showed theVenezuelan’s papers to his cabinet.29 To Miranda’s disgust, theconflict was resolved a few months later and peace with Spain wasrestored.

The Nootka Sound conflict represented, according to Ehrman, apeak in William Pitt’s diplomatic achievements, and strengthenedhis control over foreign affairs.30 This was just as well, for during the 1790s many problems would arise abroad as a con-sequence of the drastic changes occurring in France, and in therest of Europe.

The first conflict to arise was the declaration of war by GreatBritain on France in 1793, as a result of French involvement inHolland and Belgium. The need to attract Spain to the coalitionagainst France now became greater. Once this was achieved,however, Britain did not provide the expected support for Spain.From the autumn of 1794 until March 1795 the Spanish court wasconcerned with the possibility of a French invasion, and thereforelooked to Britain for encouragement and assistance. But LordGrenville, now Foreign Minister, responded with only the occa-sional dispatch, and made clear how little faith he had in Spanishresolve. It is no wonder that in 1796 Spain had a peaceful accommo-dation with France.31 This would bring South America once againinto the picture.

By this time, however, Miranda was no longer at hand. He hadbecome a general in the French army under the command ofGeneral Charles Dumouriez, and was to take part in the Netherlandscampaign. He had gone to Paris with the hope of persuading theFrench to assist him in his emancipation projects for South America,after his failure with Pitt in England.

However, an influential figure in the Pitt Administration was bynow starting to develop a firm interest in South America. HenryDundas was rapidly becoming Pitt’s most faithful and valuable sup-


porter. Upon Pitt’s accession to power Dundas had begun asTreasurer of the Navy, a position he held until 1800. Later hebecame President of the Board of Control, where he handled themanagement of the affairs of India, and by 1791 he was HomeSecretary. In 1794 he was given the War Office, and from this posi-tion he developed an interest in Spanish America. As Lynch has sug-gested, it is probable that Dundas was encouraged in this interest bycertain individuals close to Miranda and at the same time close tothe government. They included Governor Brooke of St. Helena andNicholas Vansittart, a prominent young barrister and Tory memberof parliament.

These two men formed with others a South American ‘lobby’under Dundas’s leadership.32 In September 1796 Dundas elaborateda secret memorandum proposing an expedition against SpanishAmerica. He strongly recommended that:

The sooner this armament sails the greatest would be the proba-bility of its meeting with a successful passage and it shouldproceed directly to Buenos Aires which would make very little ifany resistance. The squadron would there find a healthy climateand all sorts of refreshments particularly cattle in the greatestabundance, every means should be used to open an amicableintercourse with the Indians of the late Jesuit missions inParaguay as it is probable the whole of that extensive countrymight be induced to claim the protection of the British govern-ment, and would form one of the most productive and improv-able colonies in the world.33

Interestingly enough, attention was now focused on Buenos Aires,not on Mexico, Chile, or Peru, as in the previous plans, nor onCaracas as Miranda favoured. As future plans reflected, Dundas pre-ferred this part of South America more than any other. It is possiblethat his interest in this specific region, as well as the idea of co-oper-ation with the Indians, was a consequence of his aquaintance withHippisley, although there is no sure evidence that the two men werein contact at that time.

At the same time debates occurred in Cabinet about the merits ofsupporting continental campaigns in Europe against the French, as


opposed to a concentration on overseas conquests. Dundas wasclearly a supporter of the latter, whereas Grenville was committed toa continental strategy and was influential in restraining Pitt fromsuccumbing to the arguments on the side of Dundas’s overseaspolicies.34

By the end of 1796, Britain’s priority was the Mediterranean,where she was assisting the Austrians, now Britain’s only ally, intheir struggle to keep France and Napoleon out of Italy. All thesame, William Huskisson, Dundas’s under-secretary at the WarOffice, suggested that:

The plan of making an attack on Buenos Aires ought neverthelessto be acted upon, and carried into effect as soon as the attentiondue to the Mediterranean service will admit.35

But this plan was soon rejected once again. Some members the Cabinet were, however, unhappy with the abandonment of the Buenos Aires plan. Lord Spencer, who had replaced Dundas atthe Admiralty Office, shared this dissatisfaction, as his views in aletter to Dundas reflect:

I need not tell your Lordship, who knows all my feelings on thesubject, that I never in my life put pen on paper with more reluc-tance than I do to relinquish a plan of operation, which pre-sented to this country much fair prospect of glory and permanentadvantage.36

Towards the end of 1797, Thomas Picton, the future Governor ofTrinidad, suggested to Dundas that ‘a moral revolution’ should beattempted, preferably in Cumana or Caracas.37 In 1798, after thecapture of Trinidad by British forces, Pitt himself seemed to inclineonce more towards plans for South American expeditions. Thisrenewed interest was enhanced by the return to England ofMiranda, who had failed in his attempts to persuade the French totake action in South America. His adventures in France took placeduring the apocalyptic years of 1793 to 1797. As mentioned above,Miranda had enrolled as a general of the French army in the Dutchand Belgian campaigns under General Dumouriez, with whom he


had become friendly. However, after the complete failure of thisexpedition, Dumouriez and Miranda blamed each other for thereverse. Miranda subsequently spent the rest of his days in France inand out of jail, and narrowly escaped being guillotined during theJacobin terror.38

As soon as he set foot in England again, Miranda again soughtPitt’s assistance. The main problem was to know who exactlyMiranda was representing and what certainty there was of immedi-ate creole support in South America for any British expedition.Neither his explanations – that he was representing a revolutionaryjunta composed of ‘deputies’ who had been sent from SpanishAmerica to co-ordinate a project for the emancipation of theirnative lands from Spain, a junta which was supposed to have met inParis in December 1797 – nor his military plans convinced Pittcompletely.39

Some time in 1798 or 1799 Sir Ralph Abercromby, who had beenresponsible for the capture of Trinidad, presented a memorandumto the Government. He recounted the circumstances that had led toBritain’s involvement in Egypt, recently attacked by NapoleonBonaparte. He concluded:

Of all the objects that ought to claim our attention, the liberationof South America from the dominion of Spain seems to stand first;it can only be accomplished while we are still at war with Spain,and if it should be happily effected, it would be beyond the negoti-ation of peace. It should be undertaken without any view to con-quest, to exclusive commerce or to plunder. Every port in SouthAmerica, and the whole trade of that extensive continent, shouldbe declared free, and laid open to every nation in the world. Everycountry should feel interested in it, Spain and Portugal excepted:Great Britain from her enterprise, from her capital, and from herindustry, would in reality possess nine parts in ten of this greatcommerce. A market would be equally opened for British and EastIndia commodities.40

He added that Buenos Aires and Montevideo, because of their strate-gic importance, should be considered the main targets of this plan.

This new project, together with the continuous pressure fromMiranda and rumours about the possibility of the United States’s


involvement in South American liberation schemes, increased thepressure on the Government to reach some decision. Dundas wasstill in favour of sending an expedition to South America to emanci-pate the colonies from Spain, much on the same lines suggested byAbercromby’s plan. His view, however, was opposed yet again byLord Grenville:

I have a very strong opinion that we ought not by any means toengage in the projects of General Miranda, or in those of thegovernment of the United States of America, on this subject. Itought to be a very clear and certain prospect of good to be doneby such measures, that should induce us to extend the spirit ofrevolutions, and to involve in that system the whole continentof South America.41

Lord Grenville’s views on this matter were not that much in accordwith those of William Windham, the Secretary of War, who later, inconjunction with Grenville, was to play a major role in Britain’sSouth American policy:

Every one, I suppose, will have a great distrust of the projects ofGeneral M.[Miranda], and not any great confidence in those ofthe United States of America. It is, in fact, from the horror of a revolution conducted by either one or the other, and theapprehension that such an attempt will notwithstanding bemade, that I cannot but join with Mr. D.[Dundas] in thinkingthe subject well worthy of consideration, however strong the objections to which every measure of the sort must beliable.42

Pitt agreed with Grenville. He was wary about supporting emanci-pation and republican ideals after what had happened in Franceand, closer to South America, in Saint Domingue a few yearsbefore.

During the course of November 1799, there were more debates inPitt’s cabinet concerning Great Britain’s future policy, chieflybetween Dundas and Grenville. On this occasion, the latter’s argu-ments were supported by the Home Secretary Lord Portland (whohad replaced Dundas in that position in 1794) and Windham, in


what basically turned out to be a clash between the War Office andthe Foreign Office. Dundas warned Grenville that he should notregard overseas conquests as diplomatic pawns that could beexchanged for territorial concessions on the continent. He alsoattempted to persuade the Foreign Minister, with regard to strategy,to give more priority to existing colonial trade, and to think ofextending it to South America. His main concern, however, waswith the defence of Turkish dominion in the Middle East in order toprotect the Indian Empire.43

Dundas was the loser in this discussion, as the government choseto concentrate on a continental strategy. This did not, however, dis-courage the Secretary of War’s appetite for elaborating new plans fora South American campaign. In April 1800 Dundas presented amemorandum in April 1800 suggesting that the Government shoulddrop its plans for attacking France, in alliance with the Austrians,and direct operations towards the Mediterranean and South Americainstead.44 He wrote to the Prime Minister as follows:

If I am right on the ideas I have formed on the importance ofthe South American market to the interests of this country it iscertainly highly material that the present moment should notbe lost; for we cannot suppose that Spain, in its exhausted state,is capable to retain an efficient sovereignty over that country, aslittle can we suppose that France will long refrain from con-verting to her own use these advantages which will obviouslyresult from a commercial intercourse with South America.Indeed, it is by no means unlikely that if we neglect the meansnow in our power, our foreberance may lead to the introduc-tion and extension of a revolutionizing system to that immenseempire.45

He later added that:

Such being my view I disclaim all plan of conquest or coloniza-tion; but I propose to secure to this country commercial stationsin such positions as bid fair to open to us, gradually and perma-nently, a commercial intercourse with the inhabitants of the richprovinces of the continent of South America.46


He further suggested that the main points of interest should be suchwidely distant locations as New Orleans, the River Plate, the riverOrinoco and the coast of Chile.

Grenville reacted strongly against the persistence of Dundas andhis South American schemes asking:

What possible justification can he find, for involving in all thehorrors of confusion, anarchy, & civil war a large portion of theGlobe, containing many millions of men, who have done us noinjury, nor contributed in any perceptible degree to prolong orsupported the war.47

In fact, the clash between the two ministers was not to last muchlonger. In March 1801 Pitt resigned after failing to persuade theKing to accept his Catholic Emancipation policy. South Americanpolicy was thus left in limbo.

It is difficult to define exactly Pitt’s attitude towards SpanishAmerica during these years. Most of the time, he seemed uncomfort-able when the issue was raised. Although he usually agreed withDundas, when it came to Spanish America he was more inclined toadopt Grenville’s position. It seems rash then, to assert, as Robertshas done, that Pitt favoured South American independence for com-mercial reasons.48 John Street also agrees with Roberts on thispoint.49 Although this was certainly the position of Dundas, and Pitthimself was certainly interested in South America as a market, thereseems to be no evidence that this led him to favour South Americanemancipation. As Miranda’s biographer concludes ‘we can do littlemore than speculate about Pitt’s precise object in the SpanishIndies’.50

The new Administration was led by Henry Addington as PrimeMinister, who signed the controversial Peace of Amiens with Francea year after taking office. The administration included NicholasVansittart as joint Secretary of the Treasury. Vansittart, as men-tioned before, had been interested in South American affairs formany years, and was one of Miranda’s closest friends in England. Hewas also responsible for introducing Miranda to Admiral Home


Popham, who had just arrived from the Cape of Good Hope.51

Popham was closely linked to Dundas, a fellow Scot, and had keptin touch with him and Husskisson during his stay at the Cape,encouraging them not to abandon plans for an expedition toBuenos Aires.52 He formed a close association in London with bothMiranda and Vansittart, as well as with Alexander Davison, a suc-cessful government contractor. These men rapidly began to elab-orate plans for an expedition which would have as its aim theemancipation of South America.

The main problem they were to encounter was that the Britishgovernment, although still on unfriendly terms with Spain, was alsoconcerned that Spain should not fall completely under Frenchdominion. Lord Pelham, the Home Secretary, showed interest inSpanish American emancipation, but had to emphasize this point toall those interested in the South American cause:

The idea of liberating South America is certainly not a new one tome; but I think it one of those great measures, the consequencesof which must have so very extensive an influence that I can notventure to give my consent to making the attempt without afurther discussion, and without knowing the principles and ulte-rior views of those with whom I am to embark in the enterprise.It might be the means of shutting us completely out of Europe –an extremity we may be driven to, and, therefore, it might bewise to look to it. But I am not prepared to say that we shouldengage in an enterprise that may accelerate it by throwing Spainstill more into the hands of France. It is impossible to support theindependence of Old Spain, and be admitted to a participation ofthe trade in New Spain.53

The Government’s caution did not, however, stop Miranda andPopham from preparing plans for an expedition. After the renewalof war with France in 1803, Popham presented a secret memoran-dum to Charles Yorke, the Secretary of War, in which he proposedan expedition to South America which would have Buenos Airesand Venezuela as its main targets. Most alarming in this plan werePopham’s ideas regarding the fate of these colonies once liberatedfrom Spain. Though it had never hitherto been clear what Popham’sposition was on this point, here it was made manifest:


It must be evident to every person who possesses a knowledge ofthe geographical situation of the great continent, its populationand resources, that any permanent influence of Great Britain,whether fixed by absolute conquest, or conquest in the firstinstance, followed up by successful political intrigue, (which Icontend is authorized by all usages of war) must offer the greatestcommercial advantages, not only to this country, but to our pos-sessions in India, by opening a direct trade on each side of thecontinent, and drawing all the wealth of Spanish America fromour enemies, which has always been their principal support inevery war with Great Britain.54

It seems evident that Popham’s main idea for this enterprise wascommercial and that he envisaged British conquest to achieve thisgoal, unlike Miranda who clearly expected assistance from thisnation to help secure independence from the Spanish Crown. It isalso worth noticing that the link with India appears once again,and they are similar to the objectives contained in Fullarton’splan.

During its three years of office the Addington Administration nevershowed much interest in South America. There was no decisive breakbetween Great Britain and Spain during these years. Addington’s gov-ernment was unpopular, and the nation was alarmed by the Frenchmenace, now that Napoleon was in such a commanding position. Itdid not come as much of a surprise when in May 1804 Pitt returned topower.

The return of Pitt to office also brought back Dundas, by nowreferred to as Viscount Melville, who this time went to theAdmiralty. But not all the old Pitt loyalists were back. Lord Grenvillerefused to join the new Ministry after his cousin, stronglyinfluenced by the King, had rejected the idea of forming a union ofparties, which would include Fox and his faction, and whichGrenville believed was essential in the circumstances.55 Grenville’sabsence signified an additional boost for the Spanish American‘lobby’ for they would now be able to deal with Melville, and even-tually with Pitt, without any opposition from the Cabinet. Theircause was further enhanced when Spain once more declared war onBritain that same year, after the seizure of Spanish frigates by Britishforces.


These circumstances were enough to whet the appetite ofMiranda, Popham, and their friends. It was not long before newmemoranda and all sorts of plans on Spanish America startedpiling up again. In October 1804 Pitt arranged a meeting withMelville, Popham, and Miranda to discuss the possibility ofsending an expedition to South America. At this meeting Mirandawas assured by Melville that if such an expedition was to takeplace, its sole objective would be to secure independence for theLatin Americans:

For even if England wished to retain a part of South America forherself she could not do so because the difficulties encounteredin sending from time to time two thousand Englishmen to Indiato preserve dominions that she possessed in nearly absolutesovereignty was almost impossible.56

This conclusion was further emphasized in Popham’s new memo-randum, which contained a significant change from his previousproposal, and was also clearer in its objectives:

The idea of conquering South America is totally out of the ques-tion, but the possibility of gaining all its prominent points, alien-ating it from its present European connexions, fixing on somemilitary position and enjoying all its commercial advantages canbe reduced to a fair calculation, if not a certain operation; thenerve and spirit which such an enterprise would give to thiscountry if successful are incalculable, the riches that it wouldbring in, the new sources that it would open for our manufac-tures and navigation both from Europe and Terra Firma, andfrom Asia to the Pacific are equally incalculable and the popular-ity and stability it would give any government that undertook itmay be estimated from the preceding propositions with the addi-tional satisfaction of knowing that some accounts must bereceived of the result of its first operation in three months after itsailed from England.57

The destination of this new expedition would once again beVenezuela and Buenos Aires, in that order of preference.


Another plan was sent to the Government by William Jacob, atraveller, miscellaneous writer, and later Tory MP for Rye, Sussex.58

Jacob’s plan consisted of a triple expedition to different points ofSpanish America, the logic being that

If one or even two of them failed, the other might be secure, andform a point, from whence future attacks might be made, withthe greatest certainty of success.59

The targets were Buenos Aires, Chile and Panama. Jacob arguedthat the great advantage for both Britain and South America was the

[c]onsumption of our manufactures; and as I have no doubt butin their present state, to say nothing of what improvement maybe produced, by infusing British spirit amongst them, the inhabi-tants of that country would consume a quantity of our commodi-ties, equal in value to what we now export to every part of theworld, I feel no necessity of enlarging on its advantages orshowing how much such an increase of exports, would augmentour marine, and improve every other source of our nationalprosperity.60

There was a novel element in this project. As is clear from by its title, it embodied detailed analysis about the character of theinhabitants of Spanish America. This knowledge was acquired byJacob no doubt through conversations with South Americans andSpaniards living in England, such as the New Granadan PedroFermin de Vargas and Joseph Pavia, a former Spanish officer whohad held posts in both Venezuela and Mexico. Like Miranda, theywere eager to take part in any British expedition.61 Influenced bytheir accounts of the favourable disposition of the SouthAmericans towards a British expedition, Jacob came to the conclu-sion that it would be in Britain’s best interest to transform thesecolonies into independent states. He was also confident about theproposed attack on Buenos Aires:

I consider the landing of the troops, and the submission of thecountry the same thing. Buenos Aires is unfortified, and itsnumerous population is fed principally on animal food, which is


brought daily from the plains, and therefore if for but a day ortwo that channel was stopped, famine could produce a surrender.The few troops at Cordoba, and Corrientes, and Tucuman, whencollected would never be able to meet our own forces, or inter-cept their supplies.62

In the light of future events Jacob’s optimism appears somewhatsimple-minded, but it is nevertheless clear that Jacob possessed atleast some information about the territory he was proposing toattack.

In a follow up letter to Pitt Jacob said that he hoped ‘the glorywhich awaits the liberator of Spanish America will be yours andinmark [sic] the honourable custom [sic] of your name’.63

At about the same time Captain Charles Herbert warned Melvilleabout the urgency of organizing an expedition to Spanish Americabefore the French got hold of any portion of this continent. He rec-ommended that the attack should not be directed against the islandcolonies, Mexico or the Spanish Main:

Those are not parts of America to attack for many reasons, ofwhich the least forcible, is the terrible enmity of the climate toEuropeans; any army landed there, would always melt awayunder its pestilence, before it could do anything decisive. Rio dela Plata must be the spot where the death blow to SpanishAmerican power must be struck.64

Pitt, however, though he had shown renewed interest somemonths earlier, was now once again rapidly losing interest in thewhole South American cause. Kauffmann suggests that one reasonwas that Pitt was too occupied with the formation of the ThirdCoalition against France, and was obsessed with obtaining Russia’sparticipation in this alliance. A major condition for Russian agree-ment was that Great Britain should re-establish relations withSpain. Tsar Alexander expressed to Pitt his desire to see the conflictbetween Spain and Britain resolved. Eventually, the Act ofCoalition was signed in April 1805. It provided for the inclusion ofSpain, and Russia was to use her influence in Madrid to put an endto the conflict between Spain and Britain.65

Another major blow to the Spanish American lobby was, asRydjord points out, the impeachment of Melville, which forced him


to retire from office. A special commission had been formed toinquire into frauds and irregularities in the naval departments. ByFebruary 1805 suspicions of Melville’s conduct while he had beenhead of the Treasureship of the Navy between 1784 and 1798increased: there was conclusive evidence that large sums of publicmoney had been applied to uses other than those of the Navy.66

Even after France reached a commanding situation in Europe as aresult of Napoleon’s resounding victories over the Austrian andPussian armies during 1805, Pitt remained unconvinced about theSpanish American strategy. According to Lynch, the main cause forPitt’s continuing indecision was ‘the traditional factors inhibitingBritish policy in Spanish America, fear of the political consequencesof disrupting the area, reluctance to undertake the heavy militarycommitment involved, and lack of conviction in the commercialargument’.67 These factors, along with the absence of Melville, seemto have reinforced Pitt’s reluctance to endorse plans for SouthAmerican expeditions, even though Popham and Miranda kept onpressing him. Eventually Popham and Miranda decided to partcompany. Miranda, with the permission of the British Government,began to recruit volunteers, and set off to recruit more in the UnitedStates, in order to gather enough men for an expedition to Caracas.Popham departed for the Cape of Good Hope, where a British expe-dition had been sent to recover the Cape, then in the hands of theFrench. The main reason why Popham embarked in this expeditionwas because the Cape was the ideal spot from which to launch anexpedition to South America when the time was ripe.

William Pitt died in January 1806. The defeat of the ThirdCoalition, at Austerlitz, although partially alleviated by the news ofTrafalgar, was a final blow for him. The question of SpanishAmerican policy was left unresolved by Pitt and his administration,although the events that were to take place in the months thatfollowed were in part a consequence of these previous years ofplanning and scheming.


2The British Invasions of the RiverPlate

It is probable that the British invasions of the River Plate wouldnever have taken place had it not been for the determination of SirHome Popham. He had been exploring the possibilities of carryingout his plan for an expedition to this area for six years. Althoughthe other commanders who took part in this expedition and theBritish Government itself were also to blame for the many mistakesmade during this enterprise, Sir Home Popham was responsible forensuring that the River Plate expedition got under way in the firstplace.

The only person who could have prevented Popham’s expedi-tion from setting out was the Military Commander in the Cape ofGood Hope, Sir David Baird. He agreed to give Popham permissionto embark on this project as Naval Commander, and supplied himwith troops which were placed under the command of GeneralWilliam Carr Beresford. The following words adressed to Beresfordby Baird express the ambiguity and confusion that would charac-terize the expedition:

it is alike impossible and unnecessary for me to give you anyspecific instructions or advice. Your proceedings can alone begoverned by circumstances, and I feel the fullest persuasion, thatthe general good of the service will be the leading principles ofyour conduct in all situations.1

One would have thought that the ‘leading principles’ ofBeresford’s conduct should have been provided by Popham, who

33

after all had spent so many years – with Pitt, Melville, and Mirandaamong others – sketching out memoranda on all sorts of expedi-tions to South America. Nevertheless, two days later Baird wrote toLord Castlereagh at the War Office, assuming joint responsibility forthe enterprise on behalf of both himself and of Sir Home:

In forming this determination I am perfectly aware that both theCommodore and myself have taken upon ourselves a highresponsibility; but the great importance of the object, in anational point of view will, I trust, bear us out, and excuse us toHis Majesty, for conducting a service, having previously receivedhis special and gracious commands.2

By this time, however, Lord Castlereagh was no longer in office. Onthe death of Pitt, the Government was replaced by the ‘Ministry ofAll the Talents’.

Popham, for his part, was also in touch with Lord Castlereagh, aswell as with William Marsden at the Admiralty. In his first letter toCastlereagh, he sent a copy of his 1804 memorandum proposing anexpedition to the River Plate by way of justifying his presentconduct. He added:

You will observe my Lord; that the paper in question holds outunder certain combinations, some prospect of a general emanci-pation in South America, and that the great organ of action inthis undertaking is General Miranda who is now in London. Riode la Plata is one of the points proposed to be attacked, and wasconsidered more a military position than one of absolute negoti-ation, though considerable dependence was placed on the effectwhich a successful issue in other places might have had in thatrespect. If therefore such an enterprise on general grounds ofadvantage to the Kingdom has been so long in agitation by dif-ferent cabinets, I have reason to conclude that no formidableobjection has ever existed either to the principle or policy of themeasure. I am however aware that much has been said on theexpediency of foreign territorial acquisition, taken simply as aconquest, but the agreement applied to situations without com-mercial resources, and which were exceedingly remote from theinspection or intercourse of the mother country.3


The British Invasions of the River Plate 35

There were a few errors in this letter. General Miranda was notin London at that time; he was in Caracas. With the few Americanand English soldiers he had managed to recruit, he was trying to overthrow Spanish rule and promote independence. Pophamwas obviously unaware of this. He also misunderstood, orintentionally avoided mentioning that a British expedition toSpanish America had been vetoed by previous British Govern-ments, precisely because the principles and policies justifying suchan enterprise never seemed sufficiently convincing. The lastparagraph is the most intriguing; Popham seems convinced of the‘expediency’ of not taking the River Plate as a conquest. This was consistent with the main principles set out in his last memo-randum on this subject, but it was a notion that was dropped oncethe troops disembarked in Buenos Aires and operations had begun.According to Ferns, the contradiction between conquest andliberation was one Sir Home was never able to resolve during theexpedition.4

The controversial character of Sir Home should not, however,have surprised those who were acquainted with him, for contro-versy seems to be a constant feature of his career. Home Pophamwas born on 12 October 1762 in Tetuan, where his father Stephenwas Consul. He was the twenty-first child of his mother, who diedafter giving birth to him. He was educated at Westminster andCambridge. In 1778 he entered the Navy and, after stations inCalcutta and Ostend, he served with distinction in China. Shortlyafter, however, he was charged with illegal trading in contraven-tion of the East India Company charter. In later years he served inAntwerp – where he was made a Knight of the Order of Malta bythe King and Queen of Holland for his services – and also in Egypt.Here he met another South American plotter, Sir RalphAbercromby, who was probably the man first responsible forPopham’s later interest in the continent. In 1804 Sir Home wasunder investigation for ‘enormous and unnecessary’ expenditurewhile in India, but apparently these accusations were unproven.They had been advanced by Benjamin Tucker, the secretary ofAdmiral Lord St. Vincent, who for some unknown reason alwaysdisliked Popham. By this stage in his career, Popham had madequite a few enemies in the Navy. Other notable features of hisnaval career include his abilities as an astronomical observer and


his use of the chronometer for determining longitudes whilst inthe Red Sea – a method which at that time was rarely so consis-tently employed. He also perfected a code of signals which wasadopted by the navy in 1803 and which continued in use for along time.5

Although he made many enemies in the Navy – apart from St.Vincent, he was also disliked by such notables as Sir Samuel Hoodand Sir Richard Goodwin Keates – Popham managed to securehimself successive seats in Parliament, where he was Tory memberfor several different constituencies. From this position he strength-ened his links with the Pittite faction and with other prominentTory politicians who supported Pitt’s policies. The most notable ofthese figures were Melville, William Huskisson, and NicholasVansittart. They cultivated Popham, and made him their chosencandidate for the command of an expedition to South Americawhenever it should be approved. As early as February 1801Popham was corresponding with Huskisson, then junior secretaryto Melville at the Admiralty Office, and advising him about theconvenience of sending an expedition to the River Plate as soon aspossible.6 This occurred while Popham was at the Cape of GoodHope, from where Melville had asked him to give detailed noticeof any news he heard from Buenos Aires. As we have seen, anexpedition to the Plate had been one of Melville’s favourite pro-jects for some time.7

Lord Melville was out of office at the time of the River Plate inva-sions – he was being subjected to thorough investigation for irregu-larities in the administration of the East India Company. He wasnonetheless elated when he heard the news of Sir Home’s initialsuccess:

… you know that for a number of years the acquisition of themarket of South America has been a most favourite object withme and if our ministers are not infatuated they have it now intheir power without a difficulty. I am likewise most truly rejoicedthat the prize has fallen into Sir Home’s hands: if some of thosewho sit at the table of the Admiralty can blush I think they musthave done so when they read the dispatches and recollect themultiplied injuries they have done that gallant and meritoriousofficer and servant of the public.8

It was absolutely clear that, from the moment in the summer of1805 when Sir Home had finally persuaded William Pitt to allowhim to embark on the expedition to recover the Cape of Good Hopefrom the French, this was for him a springboard for his SouthAmerican venture. As he himself put it in his court martial morethan a year after the failure of his expedition:

On the 29th of July, 1805, I took leave of Mr. Pitt, when I had along conversation with him on the original project of theexpedition to South America; in the course of which Mr. Pittinformed me that [in] the then state of Europe, and the con-federacy in part formed, and forming against France, there wasa great anxiety to endeavour, by friendly negotiation, to detachSpain from her connection with that power; and that, until theresult of such an attempt should be known, it was desirable tosuspend all hostile operations in South America; but that incase of failure in this object, it was his intention again to enteron the original project.9

Once he had reached the Cape, Sir Home sought desperately forany excuse that would allow him to go ahead with his main objec-tive. That moment finally arrived:

On the 4th March 1806, I learnt of the defeat of the RussianArmy at Austerlitz, and that Bonaparte was in possession inVienna. This Honourable Court will, therefore, not fail toobserve the causes which contributed to suspend any expedi-tion to South America, as a matter of policy, and to change myoriginal destination to an attack on the Cape, were suddenlydone away.10

According to The Morning Chronicle, Sir David Baird only agreed toprovide men to Popham for this enterprise once he was assured thathe would receive two-fifths of the prize money from the River Plateinvasions.11

On 28 March Popham received details of the defenceless state ofthe River Plate from an American merchant called Thomas Waine,12

and on 9 April he wrote to the Admiralty informing them that heintended to sail to the South American coast in search of flour.13


This he did eventually on 14 April, taking with him Beresford’stroops. His original idea was first to take possession of Montevideo,but it was then argued that there was a better chance of securingsupplies for his army in Buenos Aires. He changed his destination.Whether this was just an excuse is not known but, as we have seen,the latter city had always seemed to be the main target in the differ-ent memoranda. Fortescue has nevertheless suggested that thereason for the change of destination to Buenos Aires was that therewas more prize money to be found in that city.14

When, on 27 June 1806, Sir Home arrived in Buenos Aires, with amere 1600 troops, he did not act according to the memorandum hehad elaborated years before with Lord Melville. What ideals guidedSir Home during the whole enterprise are hard to establish. GeneralBeresford’s letter to Lord Castlereagh of 11 July 1806 illustrates thelack of any clear guidelines for the operations:

His Majesty’s Ministers must be fully aware of the very peculiarpredicament in which I am at present placed, being not onlywithout instructions to guide me in the civil duties I have toperform; but altogether unacquainted even with the outlines ofwhat may be the intentions of His Majesty’s government inrespect to this place.15

Later in the same letter, Beresford makes some interesting obser-vations about the possible reaction of the population of BuenosAires to the invaders:

Since writing my letter to Sir David Baird I have had such infor-mation as assures me that the people of this city are not onlymore reconciled to the change of masters but would be wellsatisfied and desire to remain under His Majesty’s protection andnothing but the fear of again falling under the dominion of theirlate masters prevents them from coming openly forward and ourpresent small force cannot give them sufficient confidence not tofear the consequences of such a step and being myself ignorantof what may be the intentions of His Majesty’s Government I amnecessarily cautious of advancing anything that will commit it oroccasion the people to commit themselves and until I aminstructed on that point I will be satisfied that everything


remains quiet. Certainly however if we retain this place onlyduring the war and that my instructions will permit me we canact a part here that will totally alienate the affections of thepeople from the Spanish yoke and which if it is again restored tothat government will make it extremely difficult for it togovern.16

From these observations one could conclude that Sir Home andGeneral Beresford were waiting for Government authorization to goahead with some kind of liberation. However, what seems to beimplicit in the memorandum is that from the moment Sir Homedecided to launch the expedition, the liberation question wouldremain vague. In a letter to W. Marsden written a few months later,Sir Home hints that the lack of resolution regarding liberation wasnot his responsibility:

… the object of this expedition was considered by the natives toapply principally to their independence; by the blacks to theirtotal liberation; and if General Beresford had felt himself autho-rized, or justified, in confirming either of these propositions, noexertions whatever would have been made to dispossess him ofhis conquest.17

This was indeed a serious accusation to make. Apart from thefact that apparently Beresford and Popham never got on well witheach other, this assessment raises the question of who was in factin charge during this enterprise.18 Although Beresford was thetroop commander, it is difficult to imagine that, had it been SirHome’s firm intention, right from the start, to assist the natives in their emancipation, he could not have persuaded Beresford to comply. Moreover, Popham seemed interested in having other details settled before resolving that matter. One of his firstimprudent actions after occupation was to invite the mercantilecommunity in England, to whom he wrote immediately, to take advantage of such a significant acquisition. This step would surely have been more appropriate once it became clearthat he had effectively taken control of the situation there. Whatis more intriguing however, and what raises even more doubts


about Popham’s real intentions, is the lack of evidence of any type of contact between him and the inhabitants of the RiverPlate. In the letter to Marsden he indicated that he had been in touch with Juan Martín de Pueyrredón, who was graduallyemerging as one of the main figures of the Buenos Aires resistancemovement. Nevertheless Popham does not appear to have mademany other approaches to the creole faction. One of the reasonsfor this may have been that for most of the time he remained on board ship, but this seems a lame explanation for failing toestablish closer contacts with the creoles. Furthermore, had hebeen eager to favour an emancipation scheme, one might expectthat he would have dwelt more on this subject during his courtmartial.

It is not our intention to go into all the details of the develop-ments that led to the failure of the initial phase of the expedition.However we must flag the main events.19 Things started to gowrong for the British squadron earlier than expected. Right fromthe start there was an urgent need for reinforcements. Beresfordhad sent requests for such reinforcements both to Baird, now inSaint Helena, and to Castlereagh. Baird promptly sent around2000 men, but the government sent reinforcements only when itreceived the first dispatches from the Plate. This was in mid-September and by that time Lord Castlereagh, as mentionedabove, was already out of office, replaced by William Windham.The reinforcements were sent under the command of Sir SamuelAuchmuty and sailed on 9 October. All communications betweenthe commanders in the Río de la Plata and the British Governmentwere subject to the enormous time it took in those days fordespatches to arrive. This must always be borne in mind whenfollowing developments in Buenos Aires and the handling of thesituation by the government.

The reinforcements did not arrive when they were most needed.Although July had been quiet in terms of skirmishes between theBritish garrison and the River Plate population, the latter graduallybegan to grow impatient as it became clearer that the Britishinvaders had no intention of initiating any king of emancipation, at


least not until they got some sort of go-ahead from England.Beresford’s proclamation granting freedom of worship, religion andcommerce (with England only) to the River Plate Provinces, whichwas promulgated as soon as the expedition had arrived in BuenosAires, had little effect on the locals, especially given that these so-called advantages were to be effected under the patronage of KingGeorge III.

Sir Home Popham also provoked resentment when he orderedthe immediate confiscation of the local treasure which was beingtransported inland by the Viceroy of the River Plate, the Marquessof Sobremonte. He had decided to flee to Córdoba to prevent theBritish laying hands on the treasure, an action which was regardedby the creoles as combining cowardice and treachery. This state ofaffairs gave rise to a state of animosity towards the British, and thenative elite decided to create a militia led by Martín de Pueyrredónand Santiago de Liniers, a French officer in the service of theSpanish Crown who had arrived in the River Plate a few yearsbefore.

In early August this local militia under the leadership of Liniersconfronted a British battalion led by Beresford. Although the militiawere quickly dispersed, reinforcements arrived from Montevideo.The city of Buenos Aires prepared to confront the British Army, andon 12 August after almost three days of fighting, the British wereforced to surrender and the locals recaptured the city. This was afatal blow for Beresford and for Popham, the main architect of thisproject.

Both men later complained bitterly to the British Governmentabout the conduct of the local inhabitants, many of whom hadsworn their allegiance to King George III. This complaint Fortescuecorrectly calls ridiculous. If the creoles had been guaranteed someassistance from the British in liberating themselves from Spain, suchlamentations would have been more understandable. Given theambiguous nature of the enterprise from the very moment theBritish forces arrived in the River Plate, it was to be expected that ata certain point an insurrection would take place. Beresford wastaken prisoner. Popham, who was safely on board his ship, managedto sail back to England a few months later. According to Fortescuethis was most unfortunate, for it prevented the colonists ‘hanginghim as he deserved’.20


Since first landing at the Cape of Good Hope Popham had usedevery possible argument to persuade his superiors to allow him toembark on this expedition. He had obviously spent a considerableamount of time working on this project, and his memoranda clearlysuggest that he was aware of many factors, including such as theeconomic oppression to which the South American colonists weresubjected by the Spanish Crown, and he had probably persuadedhimself that this was reason enough to atempt the expedition. Butgiven his complete irresolution, his lack of both tact and realismonce he had arrived in the River Plate, one finds it difficult to agreewith Ferns when he concludes that Sir Home ‘had a good knowl-edge of the politics behind his adventure and shrewd notions ofwhat might be the consequences of his action in economic as wellas military terms’.21

When Sir Home eventually landed in England, he had to face aCourt Martial for having acted without official instructions. The trial took place in 1807, and was presided over by Admiral Lord St. Vincent (which Popham must have deeply resented). Amongthe witnesses called were Lord Melville and Huskisson, who weremainly questioned about the contacts between themselves, Pittand Popham. They confirmed that Pitt had never authorized suchan expedition, but that he had always remained open-mindedabout such a project, should the situation in Europe favour it.Popham conducted his own defence so well that he got off withonly a severe reprimand for his actions.22

Beresford, as we have already mentioned, was taken prisoner and sent into the interior with many other British officers andsoldiers. His ordeals in captivity will figure in the next chapter.Although both Beresford and Popham have been criticized fortheir failure to help emancipate the creoles of the River Plate, theinstructions that were eventually sent to them by Windham werehardly more decisive:

But the part of your conduct requiring most care is that whichrelates to the assurances to be given, in proclamation or other-wise, to the inhabitants of these provinces as to the supportwhich they may ultimately have to expect from His Majesty’sArms, as from stipulations to be made in their favour in the eventof peace. On this head you cannot follow a better rule than that


which you have hitherto pursued, of abstaining from any declar-ations by which His Majesty would stand pledged to any condi-tions which might not be in his power to make good, and whichmight lead the inhabitants of the Spanish provinces into mea-sures of which they might afterwards repent.23

Needless to say, by the time these instructions were drawn up thefate of the initial stage of the expedition had been sealed. However,they are a good indication of the degree of confusion the newGovernment suffered with respect to the whole enterprise, althoughas we shall see later, their members had never even been warnedthat the expedition was taking place.

As mentioned above, a squadron under the command of Auchmutyhad been sent to reinforce Beresford’s men. Auchmuty naturallyreceived from Windham the same orders that had been given toBeresford and Popham. He was to place himself under Beresford’scommand and, if the latter had surrendered or was found to be indifficulties, he was to establish a foothold in the area and hold it forat least three weeks, by which time further reinforcements of threethousand men would arrive.24

Auchmuty reached the shores of Montevideo on 29 October,where he met Popham, still on board his ship awaiting forpermission to sail back to England. He acquainted Auchmuty withthe new situation. Auchmuty sailed towards the eastern coast ofwhat is now Uruguay and, once there, decided to take possessionof both the island of Gorriti and the locality of Maldonado, whichwere defenceless, in order to establish a headquarters and basefrom where he could eventually attempt to recapture Buenos Airesonce the reinforcements from England had arrived. However, toget closer to Buenos Aires Auchmuty decided that there was noalternative but to occupy Montevideo itself, even withoutreinforcements. This Auchmuty succeeded in doing at thebeginning of February.

In Buenos Aires meanwhile, the local militia commanders haddeposed Sobremonte and named Liniers as his successor. Onhearing this news Auchmuty was optimistic about the prospects of


persuading Liniers and his faction to throw off Spanish rule andaccept that of King George. He was still under the impression thatthe creoles would prefer anything to falling again into the handsof their old masters. He would, however, be rapidly disillusionedby the information received from Beresford, who had arrived inMontevideo in May after escaping from the Argentine interiorwith the assistance of two prominent Rioplatense creoles. Heassured Auchmuty that there was no way he could achieve hisambitions with Liniers’s Government.

Auchmuty offered the command of his forces to Beresford. Thisoffer was declined and therefore Auchmuty had no alternative butto wait for reinforcements to arrive. In the meantime he spent histime corresponding with members of the Government in BuenosAires in search of some kind of peaceful solution. Auchmuty neversatisfied the Rioplatenses, for he expected that they would surrendertheir positions so that the British could recover the city. This corre-spondence, along with the information he received fromMontevideo, might have enabled Auchmuty to form a clearerpicture of the situation in Buenos Aires, of the politics of the rulingfaction, and of their attitudes to both the English presence andSpanish rule. However, in March Auchmuty sent this somewhatsimplistic report to England:

From the answers [of the local inhabitants] it may be supposed,that the leading people are unanimous in their determinationto defend the place and to keep their prisoners. But it appearsthat there are two parties in that city. The party now in power,are mostly natives of Spain, in the principal offices of thechurch and state and devoted to the Spanish Government. Ithas been their policy to inflame the minds of the lower orderagainst the English, by every species of exaggeration and false-hood, and to lead them to such acts of atrocity as may precludethe possibility of any communications with us from a con-sciousness, that similarly situated, they would breathe nothingbut revenge, they expect no mercy, and are become desperateand determined. The second party consist of natives of thecountry, with some Spaniards, that are settled in it. The oppres-sion of the mother country, has made them most anxious to


shake off the Spanish yoke and though from their ignorance,their want of morals, and the barbarity of their dispositions,they are totally unfitted to govern themselves, they aim tofollow the steps of the North Americans, and erect anindependent state. If we would promise them independence,they would instantly revolt against the government and join us,with the great mass of inhabitants.25

Apart from the fact that Auchmuty’s opinion of the native factionwas extremely exaggerated and dismissive, he had not grasped theessence of the situation.

Reinforcements finally arrived at Montevideo on 10 May underthe command of General John Whitelocke, who had been chosenas the new Commander in the River Plate by the Talents Ministry.The circumstances surrounding the nomination of this officer were quite peculiar. Whitelocke’s record included distinguished service in the West Indies and a controversial intervention in SaintDomingue in 1794 where he had last served. According toFortescue, his character was enough to indicate that he was not theright man for this job:

His most objectionable characteristic seems to have been arro-gant but spasmodic self-confidence, with an affection for coarsespeech and manners which he conceived to be soldier-like blunt-ness, but which often degenerated into mere rudeness towardssome of his inferiors and familiar obscenity of language towardsothers. He stooped to court the favour of the rank and file byaffecting use of their phrases, with the inevitable result that he earned only their thorough contempt. The inference is that hesought popularity with the lower rank of the Army because he was unable to gain the respect of the higher. Such an Officer iswholly unfit for any command.26

Whitelocke’s forces were soon to be joined by more reinforce-ments under the command of Colonel Robert Crauford, who arrivedin Montevideo in the early days of June. Crauford’s original missionwas to cross the Andes and take Chile; not surprisingly, this goalwas later dropped and he was sent to reinforce the River Platetroops. The orders given to Whitelocke and Crauford were that they


should reduce Buenos Aires, without ‘necessarily annoying theenemy’, while capturing as much territory as they could.27 Therewas to be no mention of liberation. Rather, the instructions implic-itly ruled this possibility out. It would be interesting to know whatthe position of the Government would have been if they had readthe accounts of Beresford or Popham of the locals’ reactions to theexpedition.

British troops finally set foot in Buenos Aires on 28 June.Reinforcements had been left, however, in both Colonia andMontevideo. Whitelocke was not optimistic about recovering thecity, even if the odds seemed clearly in his favour given the advan-tages of his army over the local militia. The conclusions he arrivedat a few weeks after landing in the River Plate clearly show hisstate of mind:

I cannot but lament what is in fact too true, that we havescarcely one friend in this country, and unless I am enabled bythe aid of a very fine army, materially to change the presentimpression, there is nothing to expect from the formation ofcolonial costs, so much to be desired.28

On 4 July the troops were finally ready to make the assault. Itremained to be seen how this attack would be conducted. A con-temporary anecdote is significant. Whitelocke’s original planconsisted of approaching the outskirts of the city and bombardingit until it surrendered. This seemed to be the safest tactic to followin order to recover the city, and it was the plan which most of theother officers endorsed.

However, Whitelocke gradually abandoned his original strategy,and gave in to the arguments of his second-in-command, GeneralLeveson-Gower, who opposed the bombardment, sustaining that itwas inhumane and would only provoke even more animosityagainst the British army. He suggested instead that the troops,divided in columns, should march through the main streets of the city with their rifles unloaded, so they would not be temptedto open fire, followed by the artillery. This was the strategy even-tually adopted, which proved responsible for the capitulation ofthe British army a couple of days later, on 6 July. The Britishtroops might have continued to fight and might still have suc-


ceeded, but the many casualties caused Whitelocke to surrender, adecision which was severely criticized by some members of thearmy.29

On returning to London, Whitelocke, like Popham, had to face acourt martial. He was extremely unpopular with large sectors ofBritish society, and an exemplary punishment was expected.Whitelocke had certainly not proved competent and, judging by hisindecisive manner, Fortescue is correct in assessing that he was notthe most suitable person to take command of this expedition or, asThe Morning Chronicle reflected, to command an army of consider-able size and quality.30 However, it is surprising that Whitelockeshould have received so much more blame than Popham, who bycontrast had found ample support when he returned to Britain. Thisraises the question of the extent to which public opinion had beencorrectly informed about these events. Leading newspapers such asThe Times and The Morning Chronicle had published many lettersfrom the commanders in the River Plate to the Government, as theywould later publish the proceedings of Popham´s and Whitelocke´strials. Yet few people knew how Popham had encouraged the enter-prise through his active lobbying. The contradictions and lack ofprinciple which characterized his actions in the River Plate werenever fully exposed to the general public.

General Miranda had been the inspiration of Popham´s advo-cacy. After the failure of his expedition to Caracas, Mirandashowed his thorough disappointment with Popham’s conduct atthe Plate in a letter he sent to Admiral Thomas Cochrane (theBritish naval officer who had supported Miranda during hisatempt to liberate Caracas):

I wish Sir Home Popham had shown, (when he pretended tohave gone to promote and execute the plans that were pre-con-certed with me by Lord Melville, Mr. Pitt, Mr. Addington, etc.)that it was never a question of entering the country as mastersand confiscators; but on the contrary as allies and supporters oftheir independency, for the benefits of trade and commercethat were to be stipulated with the government of Great Britain,besides a considerable sum of money, as a recompense to thearmy and navy that were to co-operate in this human andbeneficial enterprise. They may have been the plans of General


Beresford and Sir Home Popham but they certainly were neverthose of the British Ministers I have just mentioned, or ofmine.31

Whitelocke was a victim of the Talents Ministry’s complete lackof cohesion. He was confronted with a complicated set of instruc-tions, not at all easy to fulfil. Moreover, he seemed from the startto suffer the same pessimism that most of the Talents ministershad felt about the enterprise from its inception. This was reflectedin his letter of 20 June to Windham, and in his statements duringhis trial:

It was supposed that the character of this country for liberalityand good conduct towards those who came under our domin-ion, ensured us the good wishes of the greater part, and the co-operation, at least of the community. The public hopes andexpectation were raised to the highest pitch, and no suspicionexisted that it was possible for the greater part of the popula-tion of South America to entertain any than a just feeling ofattachment to our Government; still less that it was possiblethat such a rooted antipathy could exist towards us, as to justifythe assertion (the proof of which has been shown to demonstra-tion) that we had not, when I arrived in South America, onesingle friend in the whole country. Whether the opinion of theillustrious statesman [Pitt], now no more, who had frequentlyturned his thoughts towards South America, had led him tocontemplate the propriety of establishing military posts there,of the co-operating only with those who gladly have followedthe example of North America, and availed themselves of ourassistance in their independence, I have no means of knowing,but experience has shewn, that any other course of proceeding,even if most successful, and almost in proportion to success,had the effect of placing us at a greater distance than ever fromour ultimate object – those of friendly intercourse and tradewith the country. An attack, attended with temporary successand ultimate misfortune, had taught us to estimate rather morehighly, the difficulty of obtaining an establishment in thecountry; but the decision upon the subject of the feelings of thepeople towards us still prevailed.32


He later emphasized, quoting Auchmuty’s letter to Windham of 6 March, that the expedition would have been more successful had thecommanders been allowed to aid the creoles and help them achieveindependence.33 Whitelocke was found guilty, and was expelled fromthe army. Many had expected a much harsher sanction, even death. Inmany ways, Whitelocke’s trial marked the end of the affair. However,in Ferns’s view, the British invasions of the River Plate marked thebeginning of British–Argentine relations.

The idea of sending expeditions to South America did not endwith this episode. On the contrary, the lessons learned in the RiverPlate now sharpened the precise objectives of British policy in SouthAmerica. Castlereagh, now at the War Office, immediately beganpreparations for a liberating expedition to South America under thecommand of Sir Arthur Wellesley, and Beresford began advising himon the numbers of men required and on the necessity of an expedi-tion of all-out liberation directed at the River Plate.34

Great Britain had been forced to surrender and to evacuate itstroops from the River Plate without achieving any of the advantageswhich an expedition to South America supposedly offered. Neitherconquest nor emancipation had been achieved. Britain had beenunable to establish either a strategic military base or a stronger com-mercial link in South America. More embarrassing, as The MorningChronicle repeatedly emphasized, was the fact that a British armyhad been defeated by improvised creole and Spanish militia units.35

Nevertheless, somewhat paradoxically, the invasions helped acceler-ate the emancipation process in the River Plate.

One must be careful, however, when estimating how influential theinvasions were in bringing about independence in the Viceroyalty.Obviously many other internal and external circumstances wereinvolved. What is beyond doubt is that Argentine independence owedlittle to the alleged shrewdness and sound calculation of Sir HomePopham. Ferns, for example, has suggested that Sir Home was not asmuch a fool as he was made out to be, given that, after all, his timingof the expedition and his assessment of the animosity of the creolesagainst their Spanish masters was correct. This view lacks substance,essentially because Popham’s motivations for embarking on this enter-prise are still open to discussion.

Although there is not enough evidence to suggest that whatinduced Popham to invade the River Plate was, as has been fre-



quently stated, the prize money, his indecisive participation in theinvasions makes it unwise to exclude this interpretation. Moreover,his actions might easily have contributed to complicate the futurerelations of Great Britain and the Spanish American colonies. As itwas, the events which followed his rash initiative placed Britain inan advantageous position.

The River Plate adventure provoked a great deal of uproar andembarrassment in England. It did however constitute a landmarkwith respect to the future policy to be adopted towards thesecolonies. The experience enabled the British to obtain a clearerpicture of the situation in a very significant region of the SpanishEmpire. This gave them a strategic advantage over the otherEuropean powers.

3The Ministry of All the Talentsand the River Plate Invasions

In February 1806, after the defeat of the Third Coalition by Franceat Austerlitz and the death of Pitt, a new Ministry was formed inGreat Britain. This ministry was labelled the ‘Ministry of All TheTalents’; it was a coalition government, and it owed its distinctivename to the presence in its ranks of some of the most prestigiouscharacters in British politics. The Prime Minister and First Lord ofthe Treasury of this new ministry was Lord Grenville, who hadserved for many years in his cousin Pitt’s Ministry, both as HomeSecretary from 1789 to 1791, and as Foreign Secretary from 1791 upto 1801. In that year Pitt’s first Ministry was replaced by theAddington Administration.

Grenville had started to distance himself from Pitt, because hiscousin had supported the Peace of Amiens, sponsored by theAddingtonians, and because of Pitt’s unwillingness to join forceswith Fox in order to consolidate a union of parties, whichGrenville considered indispensable for the country, in view of thecurrent crisis in Europe and the French menace. He had begun tomove closer to the Foxites and had refused to form part of the new Pitt administration in 1804, despite the pleas of both Pitt and George III. Grenville’s main ambition was to resist Frenchexpansion, and he thought that the best way of achieving thisconsisted in supporting the efforts of determined allies withmodest subsidies and auxiliary campaigns to restore the Europeanequilibrium.1

Charles James Fox became Foreign Secretary in this new Ministry.He was the most prestigious member of the Administration. For

51

more than twenty years he had been at the head of the Whig partyand he represented the main opposition to the Pitt Ministry. He hadremained completely out of favour with King George III after he hadsupported the principles of the French Revolution, and also becauseof his close association with Prince George, who he influencedtowards the Whig faction and against his father’s and Pitt’s policies.For these reasons, and because of his excessive gambling andincreasing personal debts, Fox’s public appeal had also declined con-siderably. The combination of these factors had kept him out ofoffice for a long time. Nevertheless, his support for such progressivecauses as the abolition of the slave trade and Catholic emancipa-tion, his undoubted political talents, and his notorious charm, stillmaintained him as a popular figure on the British scene. His mainobjective as Foreign Secretary was to reach a peace agreement withFrance, although this line of policy was not the most popularamong the majority in the Government.2

Other prominent members of this Ministry at the War Office wereWilliam Windham, a disciple of Edmund Burke and a formermember of Pitt’s first Government; Lord Howick (the future EarlGrey of the Reform Bill), an ardent supporter of Fox’s Whig princi-ples; Lord Sidmouth (previously Addington, the man responsible forthe peace of Amiens); Tom Grenville, brother of the Prime Minister;and Lord Holland, nephew of Fox.

As we have said, this was a coalition Government. The mix of thedifferent factions inside the Cabinet is well explained by Trevelyan:

It was composed of two sorts of Tories and two sorts of Whigs:The Foxite Whigs; the Grenvillites, Whig and Tory; and theAddingtonian Tories. The last-named could scarcely claim to addto the Talents of the Ministry, but they served to give it a broaderbottom, and so left its enemy the King no immediate chance ofsending for a different set of servants.3

This was therefore a predominantly Whig Administration; the major counter-balance was the Tory element inside the Grenvillefaction.

Nevertheless the differences between the two main figures of theGovernment were not so great, and even though Fox was moresceptical than Grenville about continental alliances and was more


optimistic than the Prime Minister about peace talks withNapoleon, this did not mean that Fox´s and Grenville’s foreignpolicies were radically opposed.4 Both agreed in sending the Earl ofLauderdale to Paris to open conversations with Talleyrand. Indeed,Fox seemed a very good choice as Foreign Secretary. According toone of his biographers, foreign policy was Fox’ s forte: ‘it was onforeign politics alone that he could rise to full height, and unfoldthe whole power of his mind’.5 Chancellor maintains that Fox’swish for peace negotiations with France was not only doctrinaire;he was also concerned with keeping good relations with theUnited States, supporting the economy of the West Indies, andhad favoured revolutionary schemes against the Spanish coloniesin South America as a way to check Bonaparte’s power in Europe.6

But, by this time, Fox was a sick man. He died on 13 September1806, and the Government lost one of its most valuable members.Lord Howick, Fox’s most loyal follower, succeeded him as ForeignSecretary, leaving his previous post at the Admiralty to TomGrenville, also a Whig. On that very same day news had arrived inBritain of the taking of Buenos Aires by British troops underBeresford on 27 June.

As described in the previous chapter, the idea of an expeditionagainst Buenos Aires had been contemplated by Popham, Pitt, andespecially Melville, who also considered the possibility of aidingMiranda. Although no serious force had been organized duringthose years, Miranda eventually managed to mount a small expe-dition of British and American volunteers and had reached theshores of Venezuela, near Caracas, in April 1806. As we have seen,Popham had persuaded Pitt to allow him to embark on an expedi-tion to the Cape of Good Hope with the idea of eventually gainingpermission from the Prime Minister to organize an expedition toSouth America if matters in Europe took a turn for the worse. Afterthe expedition commanded by Sir David Baird had taken posses-sion of the Cape, Popham had decided to take matters into hisown hands. As soon as he heard about the defeat of the Austrianarmy at Austerlitz, and once Baird agreed to allow him to embarkon this mission, he had set off on 14 April. The Ministry of All theTalents was completely hostile to all these South Americanschemes. As seems to have been usual in those days, Pitt andMelville had not informed the rest of the Government about any

The “Talents” Ministry and the River Plate Invasions 53

such plans and had taken all the papers relating to these projectsto their respective homes, so that by the time a new Ministrystepped in, there was no existant record.7

When it learnt about Miranda’s expedition, the Talents Ministrydecided to allow him to employ a small number of British troops. Lord Howick at the Admiralty outlined the cabinet’sfeelings on 3 June, in his instructions to the British naval com-mander, Lord Cochrane, who had been sent to observe Miranda’smovements:

…so long as the persons engaged in this undertaking shallconduct themselves in a manner not prejudiced to the interestsof the British Government, you are to take care that they sufferno interruption from any part of the Force under yourcommand, and if, in the course of these transactions, anyBritish ship should proceed for the purpose of commerce, to theports occupied by the insurgents, they will, off course, receivethat protection which they are entitled to expect in any port ofthe world; but you are carefully to abstain from any measureswhich may tend to commit His Majesty’s Government thefuture support of an undertaking, in which it has hitherto takenpart.8

This last sentence makes evident the caution of the ministry whenit came to promoting revolutionary activities, but, as we saidbefore, Fox had been interested in the possibility of fostering revo-lution in these colonies and had welcomed Miranda’s expedition,especially after the news of the apparent failure of peace negotia-tions in Paris, and the prospect of the collapse of his continentalstrategy.9

Public opinion also seemed to be favourably disposed towards thisexpedition, as reflected in an article in The Morning Chronicle on25 October 1806.10 However, the general feeling inside the Cabinetwith respect to this specific adventure was sceptical. Windham, forexample, was in favour of British intervention in South America, butregarded support for Miranda as ‘throwing in a fire brand and stand-ing back’.11 Nevertheless, as John Lynch points out, Miranda’s ill-prepared scheme was one thing and the capture of Buenos Aires bya British expedition was quite another.12


The news of this event put the Ministry in an uncomfortable situ-ation. The first warning the Government received of an attack onBuenos Aires came towards the end of June 1806, when a dispatchsent by Popham announcing his departure from the Cape on thisnew enterprise was received at the Admiralty. A meeting of thecabinet was immediately arranged to consider the matter. After themeeting William Windham informed the King:

It is humbly submitted to Your Majesty that Sir Home Pophamshould be superseded in his present command, and recalled togive an account of his conduct in having left his station and pro-ceeded, without any instructions or authority to do so, to attackthe Spanish settlements in the Rio de la Plata.

The King agreed completely:

Sir Home Popham and Sir David Baird having undertaken theattack upon the Spanish settlements on the Rio de la Platawithout any orders or authority whatsoever, The King considersthat such conduct should be checked as bad precedent, andtherefore cannot disapprove of the Minute of Cabinet submittedto him by Mr. Windham.13

However, after the news of the taking of Buenos Aires, the reactionof both Minister and King was somewhat different. Windham wroteto George III, on 13 September 1806:

The dispatches received this morning from M.Gen.Beresford andSir Home Popham appear to be so important and to containintelligence so satisfactory that Mr. Windham trusts your Majestywith them at an unusual hour. They contain an account of thecomplete success of the expedition undertaken by those Officers,so far as it has hitherto gone, and as far as its consequences canbe anticipated, and prove the state of things in the countrywhich has been the object of it, to be as comfortable to the viewsand information on which they had acted, as may form someexcuse possibly in your Majesty’s eyes, for the irregularity on theproceeding on the part of those by whom the expedition was seton foot.


Mr. Windham should be sorry if he appeared to your Majesty,in presuming to offer the above reflections, to be willing tojustify by success what was in itself improper. He merely wishedhumbly to urge in their favour that their fault not be aggravatedby their having engaged on an enterprize not likely to redoundto the advantage and aggrandisement of your Majesty’sKingdoms.

The King replied on 14 September 1806:

The King has received with much satisfaction the dispatcheswhich report the capture of Buenos Aires, as communicated by Mr. Windham, and although the undertaking appears in the first instance to have been unauthorized, it is impossiblenot to approve of the manner in which it was planned andexecuted by the Commander and the troops and the seamenemployed. His Majesty trusts from the reports made, that theacquisition of Buenos Aires will prove very advantageous to thisCountry.14

What now remained to be seen was how the Talents Ministrywould handle this unexpected acquisition. A few days after thenews of the invasions was received, The Times reported that LordAuckland, President of the Board of Trade, had arranged a meetingwhich included other members of the Government such asGrenville, Petty, Spencer, Ellenborough, and the Spanish Americanschemer Vansittart, to consider trading prospects with BuenosAires, and in what way they could exploit the commercialadvantages to be found there.15 Four days later their efforts were rewarded quite inadvertently, when The Times publisheda circular sent by Popham to the merchants and manufacturers of Britain alerting them to the benefits to be found in this newSouth American market. This letter provoked a combination ofuproar and euphoria in the financial community of London,although the Government regarded such an action as prematureand unwise.16

One of the most important questions the Ministry had to decidewas how the expedition should conduct itself once it had taken pos-session of Buenos Aires. Should its commanders act as conquerors,


or should they help the South American creoles achieve emancipa-tion from Spain? One thing was clear: Sir Home Popham had begunthis enterprise with no specific orders from the Pitt Administration,and in the complete ignorance of the Government that replaced it.As we have seen, when Miranda had discussed the matter withPopham, Lord Melville, and Pitt in October 1804, Melville hadassured him that if such an expedition ever took place its onlyobjective would be to secure independence for the LatinAmericans.17 However, it had never been clear what Pitt’s thoughtson the subject were, and Popham himself had always been sus-pected of being more interested in prize money than in fosteringrevolution in the Americas.

The Talents Ministry’s position on this issue was also at first unclear,although on 11 September 1806 Windham had written to LordGrenville expressing his view that attempts to revolutionize SpanishAmerica should not be allowed, and that this conquest shouldrather be seen as an opportunity to prevent the French from menac-ing these territories:

To pass from this to an opposite quarter, I cannot but feel astrong conviction of the truth of the opinions contained in theletter you sent me from Hislop, and a great longing that a part ofthe force which we are now disposing of, was applied, not to therevolutionizing, but to the obtaining possession of part of theSpanish settlements in South America. A footing once obtainedthere, the rest would do itself by a mild and gradual operation;or, if it did not, we should equally be in a situation to secure agreat position or the advantages which such an event is supposedlikely to produce, and what is most of consequence of all, toprevent probably the French from establishing themselvesthere.18

Windham had in fact received many letters at the War Office con-cerning South America before the Ministry had any idea ofPopham’s ambitions in relation to South America. They came


mainly from businessmen and politicians familiar with the area. Thetwo most interesting characters in this respect were William Jacob,whom we have already mentioned, and Thomas Douglas, fifth Earlof Selkirk, a Scottish peer in the House of Lords, a close friend ofWalter Scott, and a man well known for his interest in projects andtheories of colonial settlement, especially in Canada, where he hadbeen living two years earlier.19

A letter of 22 March 1806 written by Selkirk to John Hippisleywho, as we have seen, also had a keen interest in South America,had reached Windham’s office. It contained interesting observationson South America, showed a deep knowledge of the situation in thedifferent Viceroyalties, and suggested sending a British expedition tothe area as soon as possible, making very clear what the objective ofthis expedition should be:

Any partial or predatory expedition on the other hand, wouldonly tend to disgrace our National character. But a comprehen-sive plan for liberating those provinces, for establishing in them anational independent government of their own, and for openinga free trade with them, would not only promote our commercialinterests, but would be such a proof of dignified moderation in ourgovernment as would tend to recover and establish our nationalhonor and consideration all over the world.

He later added with great insight that:

I must own however that my hopes of seeing anything doneeffectually, is very much damped by the consideration of theindividuals, to whom the conduct of such an expedition is mostlikely to be intrusted. This is an enterprise in which the talentsof a statesman are much more needed than those of aGeneral.20

On 7 June of that same year Selkirk wrote a memorandum toWindham himself entitled ‘Observations on the proposed expedi-tion to Spanish America’, again emphasizing the convenience ofhelping the creoles to gain independence from Spain, and theways in which the Government might derive the full benefit ofSouth American trade.21 Whether Selkirk had any previous infor-


mation about Popham’s plans we do not know. He was aware, asmentioned in this letter, that Miranda’s expedition was on its wayto Caracas, but unless he had close connections with Popham’sfriends at the Admiralty, or with members of the previous Admin-istration, it seems unlikely that he would have had any knowledgeor information about the Buenos Aires expedition, for the news ofPopham´s departure for the River Plate reached the Governmentalmost a month after Selkirk’s memorandum was received.Windham did not seem to pay much attention to his suggestions,as we shall see.

Fox had also received information on South America as early asFebruary 1806, when he had just taken office. Jacob sent him aremarkably complete and accurate geographical description of theSouth American continent. This was in fact the copy of the report hehad already sent to both Pitt and Windham, during the last Adminis-tration.22 According to Jacob, Buenos Aires was valuable not only as amarket, but also as a potential source of naval stores, of hemp andflax, which ‘would enrich Great Britain and render her independentof both Russia and India’.23 Prior to that, in early February, NicholasVansittart, who had been joint Secretary of the Treasury duringAddington’s Ministry, advised Fox to reach some type of commercialagreement with the South American inhabitants. This would beadvantageous, according to Vansittart, especially in view of thenumerous complaints received from Lancashire about the stagnationof trade, and it was imperative that it should be done before Franceannexed the continent to its Empire.24 Vansittart was one ofMiranda’s closest acquaintances in London, and had been responsiblefor introducing him to Popham and to both Melville and Pitt, henceit is likely that he had previous knowledge of the two expeditions andother interesting information besides.25 However when he later joinedthe Government, at Sidmouth’s recommendation, he never, as far aswe know, gave any further information about the expeditions at atime when the Ministry, and particularly Grenville, were anxious toknow more.

There were more advocates of action recommending theGovernment to intervene in South America. They included a certainGeneral Sullivan, who was against the idea of Miranda’s joint enter-prise with the United States and suggested that an expedition to theRiver Plate and Chile should be sent as soon as possible,26 and also


the political writer Sir Philip Francis, better known as – or at leastsuspected of being – Junius, who favoured the idea of taking actionin the River Plate, the most appealing of all the Spanish Americanmarkets.27

After Fox’s death, Grenville was uncertain what line to follow inforeign affairs. After all, Fox had been the champion of peace withthe French. Curiously, his successor as Foreign Secretary, LordHowick, apparently upset with the slow progress of the peace talksin Paris, was urging war; so was Windham, opposed to continentalinvolvement and more favourable to South American schemes.Grenville, faced with the possibility of a rupture inside his Cabinet,stood by the peace negotiations.28 Then, all of a sudden, Grenvillebegan to regard the conquest of Buenos Aires as an ideal tool forsuch negotiations. The first indication of this switch is contained ina letter Grenville sent to Lauderdale in Paris, of unknown date, butalmost certainly written a few days after receiving confirmation ofthe capture of Buenos Aires:

I always felt great reluctance to the embarking in SouthAmerican projects because I knew that it was much easier to getinto them than out again. The capture of Buenos Aires,trumpeted as it was by Popham and his agents, has alreadyproduced such an impression here as will make the surrender ofthat conquest most extremely difficult, unless one could getmuch more for it in the way of security in Europe than I knowhow to shape or expect.29

The almost ill-tempered tone of this letter is a good indication ofGrenville’s feelings towards the conquest and its complications. Hemade his point clearer on 14 September, when he wrote again toLauderdale:

Of Buenos Aires I say nothing, except that it may, I think, tend tofacilitate peace, or to afford an opening for measures that willmake a deep impression in France. My earnest wish is that youmay be able to make use of it effectually for the first of theseobjects.30


As he mentioned in the previous letter, Grenville was under pressurefrom the enthusiasm with which the news of the conquest ofBuenos Aires had been received in England, especially by the mer-cantile community. His new attitude, as well as the peace negotia-tions themselves, would prove increasingly unpopular amongstboth his cabinet colleagues and the public at large.

Nevertheless, towards the end of September preparations werebeing made for sending reinforcements to the River Plate. TheMarquess of Wellesley offered the services of his brother, thefuture Duke of Wellington, recently returned from service in India,and Grenville seemed to agree that it would be a good idea to sendhim to Buenos Aires as the new commander.31 But Windham wasagainst this idea. He suspected that, given Beresford’s success, ‘…Sir A. Wellesley will not be popular, though really very proper’, ashe told Grenville.32 By this time there were plenty of advertise-ments on the front page of The Times regarding trips to BuenosAires, and details about the different types of merchandiseavailable for buying or selling.33

Eventually, on 11 October a new expedition set off, under thecommand of Sir Samuel Auchmuty. All the same, in the sessions ofthe House of Commons which began in December the Governmentwas accused by the Tory opposition, notably by Canning andCastlereagh, of sending this supporting expedition much too late.These accusations were made at the time when rumours were circu-lating about the recapture of Buenos Aires. Windham replied to oneof Lord Castlereagh’s accusations in a comprehensive and humorousstyle:

If the expedition was only across the Channel, there were plenty ofvessels that might have been easily got ready for that purpose; butwhen it was recollected that they were to cross the Atlantic, to lookfor another expedition; and if they could not find it, or should dis-cover that it had been unsuccessful, to recross it again, to look for aplace of safety; it would not be supposed that such a description ofships could be got ready and fitted out in so short a time. The Noble


Lord would perhaps have sent them over in air-balloons, or somesuch other expeditious mode of conveyance.34

As Fortescue argues, it is difficult to see what more the Govern-ment could have done.35 But some coherent instructions as to howthese forces should conduct themselves once they had arrivedshould have been imparted to the commanding officer. Instead,they were to proceed under the same instructions that had beensent to Beresford towards the end of the previous month. Basically,these insisted that the invading troops should retain possession,avoiding any participation in revolutionary enterprises.36 The sameorders were also to be found a few weeks later in Windham’sinstructions to General Crauford for his aborted expedition toChile.37 This, as Harvey maintains, implies that the Government,assuming that the South Americans were pleased with a British pres-ence, did not themselves question the terms on which the invaderscame.38 The Government had been warned by Jacob about theproblem on 24 September, a few days before Auchmuty’s expeditionleft, when Jacob wrote to Windham as follows:

It will, I presume, appear wise that in all the future official papersrelative to Buenos Aires the idea of conquest be as much as possi-ble kept out of sight, the fact of its having been obtained by con-quest is too obvious to admit of a doubt, but the less it strikes theview of the inhabitants the more easily and economically thebusiness of government be conducted.39

One can only conclude, at this point, that the Government waswaiting for more detailed information about what was going on inBuenos Aires. Only then could it decide what further steps would beadopted. In the meantime, the only thing clear with respect to itsnew conquest was that they had to hold on to it, especially as thesituation in Europe was getting more complicated.

On 10 November the Ministry learnt of the failure of Miranda’sexpedition. Worse news followed. After destroying the Prussianforces at Jena in October, Napoleon Bonaparte promulgated theBerlin Decrees on 22 November, which excluded British commercefrom all ports under his control. This marked an end to the peaceconversations. It also meant a turning point in the Ministry of All


the Talents’ position towards South America. Earl Fitzwilliam, LordPresident, summed up the feeling thus: ‘There is an end of the oldworld and we must look to the new.’40

William Windham was from now on to become the key figure in allthe decisions respecting South American policies. He was in chargeof the War Office and had been the firmest advocate of a SouthAmerican policy, right from the start. This policy was now sup-ported by most of the cabinet. According to John Courtnay, a WhigMP, even Fox had remarked a few days before his death that ‘ifpeace could not be had on tolerable terms, the war must be carriedon vigorously, but chiefly in South America’, and Grenville, now infavour of the continuation of war, agreed that there was no otherplace in which to fight.41

Windham was an intriguing character. He had been SamuelJohnson’s closest friend, and his attachment to Burke was so closethat Windham became the Irishman´s political pupil.42 After hisparticipation in the Pitt Administration, he firmly opposed theAddington Government, and by the time Pitt was back in office in1804, he had already joined forces with the Grenville faction. Onceback in office, his main obsession was to change the recruitmentlaw, replacing life enlistment in the army by recruitment for sevenyears. This scheme was opposed by the King, which oppositionseemed at one point to be a major obstacle in the way of the forma-tion of this Government.43

Now that South America was a central issue, it is paradoxical thatboth Windham and Grenville were supporting a policy they hadpreviously opposed: in fact, during Pitt’s Administration, they hadstood against Melville’s wishes to enlarge Britain’s overseas posses-sions, not least in South America.44 Grenville, moreover, nowthought that the whole of South America could be captured intwelve months, and was so eager to get on with it that, with thehelp of Lord Wellesley among others, he started preparing a series ofalarmingly unrealistic projects for expeditions to Mexico and SouthAmerica. This did not mean, however, that the Ministry had a clearidea of whether it favoured either conquest or liberation for the con-tinent. The only exception was Lord Holland, who had become Lord


Privy Seal in October. He made his point when Lord Grenville con-sulted him about the proposed expedition to Mexico. He told thePrime Minister that

… unless the experiment is connected from the beginning with someplan of establishing an independent Monarchy in Mexico, I shouldvery much question the policy of undertaking it all.45

Lord Holland’s preference towards independence in Mexico alsoapplied to Buenos Aires, as he made clear in the Cabinet meeting on11 February 1807 when, after news had been received of the recon-quest of Buenos Aires by local forces, the Government had to decidewhat steps it would take.

The news of the recapture of Buenos Aires was officiallyconfirmed in London on 25 January 1807, although rumours hadstarted to seep through as early as the beginning of the month.This was almost five months after the actual event had taken placewhich, even for those days, was a long time for such news to taketo arrive. This new development precipitated several debates in theHouse of Commons, where the issue had already been raised inDecember, the month the parliamentary session had started. LordHowick, the Foreign Secretary, found himself under attack by theopposition, which blamed the Ministry for not having openly sup-ported Miranda’s expedition and for not being more resoluteabout reinforcing the troops in Buenos Aires. The protestsintensified with the news of the reconquest. As mentioned before,Canning and Castlereagh were the most outraged of the opposi-tion. Both Lord Howick and Windham explained the difficultiesand risks of sending reinforcements across the Atlantic to supportsuch a dubious expedition. Howick further emphasized theGovernment’s position when he stated that: ‘….Whatever successwe have obtained in South America, His Majesty’s Ministers do notpretend to give themselves any credit for.’46 As for the complaintsby the opposition regarding the Government’s nomination ofGeneral Crauford, who was considered unfit for such command,Howick responded that the selection of Popham, who had at leastthe same number of superiors in the navy, had never excited suchcomplaints (here there was an implicit suggestion by Howick, tothe effect that Popham was a Pittite and also an MP in the Tory


interest).47 Howick also condemned the fact that Popham hadunnecessarily raised the expectations of the business community,by sending them a letter in which he invited his readers to takecommercial advantage of the new possessions as soon as possible.Howick added that:

Perhaps his [Popham’s] letter to seek mercantile gratitude, whileoffending against professional duty, was one of the fatal effectsto be apprehended from that mischievous system of rewardadministered by the committee at Lloyd’s, called The PatrioticFund, a committee which is held out to the Navy as givinggreater reward and encouragement than the government of thecountry.48

Nevertheless, during these heated debates there was no mentionon either side of the House on whether the expedition shouldfavour conquest or rather assistance to the Spanish Americans fortheir emancipation from the Spanish Monarchy. This point hadonly come up, as we have stated, when a Cabinet meeting was heldon 11 February 1807 to decide whether or not a new expedition wasto be sent to Spanish America. In the course of this meeting, theviews about Buenos Aires of the different members of the TalentsMinistry became clearer. Windham, as expected, advocated sendinga new force to recover the conquests recently lost. Tom Grenvillewas also in favour of this policy, and thought that even temporarycontrol of Buenos Aires would be useful for peace negotiations.Sidmouth preferred a South American policy to European inter-vention. Howick thought the whole enterprise was too dangerous,and that an insecure hold on Buenos Aires would only prove to be aconstant drain on national resources; he was keen on sticking to acontinental policy. His Foxite colleague, Lord Holland, as alreadymentioned, favoured intervention in Buenos Aires on the conditionthat its aim would be to foster independence in those lands, a view shared by Lord Moira, head of the Ordnance Office.49 Indeed,the Cabinet must have been aware of Popham’s letter to W. Marsden, of 25 August 1806, quoted in the previous chapter,which had arrived in January, where he gave his opinion that theSpanish Americans had been expecting the expedition to assistthem in gaining emancipation.50


However, Lord Grenville did not favour any plan which had inde-pendence as its main object. Holland himself later explained whyhis views were not shared by the Prime Minister:

A revolution in a country inhabited by such a variety of races andcolours, all animated with feelings of jealousy and resentment toone another, and all inexperienced and ignorant of the govern-ment of mankind, would lead, it was urged, to interminable civilwars, massacres, and outrages, which would convert the wholecontinent of South America into a scene of confusion, plunderand carnage.51

This apprehensive attitude towards the emancipation of theSpanish American colonies is similar to Pitt’s own position on thisissue a few years before, when he indicated his fears that emanci-pation would only help to promote Jacobin ideals in SouthAmerica.

Nevertheless, Grenville did not offer any alternative, and it seemsreasonable to suggest that he placed his faith in whatever policyWindham decided to adopt. As it was, the Government finallydecided to reinforce the troops in Buenos Aires. Lord Howickrecorded his opinion against the measure in a separate minute;other than this, there seems to have been no other major dissensioninside the Cabinet. It would appear that, apart from Windham’sinfluence on the final decree, Lord Sidmouth’s support for thismeasure was also critical, overcoming the opposition of the Foxitefaction.52

The next step, a crucial one, was to choose a commander anddecide on the instructions he should receive. Windham’s choice wasto prove controversial indeed. It fell on General Whitelocke, whoseprevious performance in Saint Domingue during the uprisings of1794 had, as we have pointed out, raised many doubts about hisability to command.

Lord Holland’s account of this choice is remarkable:

Anxious as he [Windham] was about South American projects, hedid not select the officer from any knowledge of his qualificationsor confidence in his skill, but from motives of convenience.Whitelocke had been Inspector-General. In that capacity he had


courted the Duke of York, and offended Mr. Windham by oppos-ing the favourite project of the latter for enlisting for a term ofyears, and not for life. To give that wise and recent measure a fairchance, Mr. Windham was desirous to appoint an Inspector-general who was friendly to its success.53

Thus, the best way of getting rid of Whitelocke was to send himdown to Buenos Aires, which is, to say the least, an astonishing wayof selecting a commander for an expedition across the Atlantic. ButWindham claims that he had suggested Sir John Stuart, and that thedecision to select Whitelocke was mainly due to the influence of theDuke of York, the King’s brother.54 Windham’s instructions toWhitelocke were also to be the subject of controversy. In Fortescue’sopinion they were absurd. This author’s summary of the orderswhich Whitelocke had to fulfil proves the point:

…. He was to reduce the province of Buenos Aires by force ofarms and exile the authors of the insurrection which had over-thrown Beresford; and yet he was to consider that his mainobject was not to distress or annoy the inhabitants to British rule,but was forbidden to give them assurance of British protectionagainst the vengeance of Old Spain after the conclusion ofpeace.55

These were ambiguous and complicated orders.The story surrounding the final draft of these instructions con-

tains some curious elements. They were signed on 3 March by LordHowick, who had been largely against the idea of the expeditiontaking place, and not by Windham, the Minister of War and practi-cally the mastermind of the whole operation. The reason whyWindham was unable to draft the final instructions was laterexplained by Lord Holland, the member of the Cabinet most criticalof the manner in which this whole affair had been conducted.According to Lord Holland, Windham had made an ‘unnecessary’journey to Norfolk when the instructions were being drawn up. Theinstructions were finally completed by another Secretary of State,who Lord Holland does not name, without any supervision fromWindham, who later, according to Lord Holland, regretted anddisapproved of some of their contents.56 If his account about this


extremely puzzling episode is accurate, it raises many questionsabout the handling of the whole operation. The most obviousquestion, given Windham’s eagerness for the project throughout theexistence of this administration, is the following: how was itpossible that, when the moment finally arrived for him to organizethe whole enterprise, Windham was so careless and irresponsible inboth the selection of the commander and in the drafting ofinstructions?

In March 1807 the Ministry of All the Talents came to an end,after increasing pressure for Catholic emancipation had provedintolerable to the King, who chose to replace it by an administrationmore amenable to his wishes. This short-lived Ministry is bestremembered for finally having brought about the abolition of theslave trade. Beyond that, it could boast no other major achieve-ment. There was not much else it could do, given the resistance itencountered from George III to many of its Whig-orientedinitiatives. The Tory ministry that took over included GeorgeCanning as Foreign Secretary and Lord Castlereagh at the WarOffice. They had both been closely following the events in the Ríode la Plata, and Castlereagh presented a memorandum to theCabinet in May 1807 on South America. He complained about thecomplete lack of principle of the previous Ministry in its operationsin that region. When he analysed what the role of the presentAdministration should be regarding South America, he made hisview clear that

In looking to any scheme for liberating South America, it seemsindispensable that we should not present ourselves in any otherlight than as auxiliaries and protectors.57

The lesson had no doubt been learnt. But one should not forget thatthis approach had been prevously recommended by people likeJacob and Lord Selkirk and, inside the Government, had been fruit-lessly advocated by Moira and Lord Holland throughout the previ-ous year.

The loss of Buenos Aires in June produced a great deal of resentmentand criticism amongst both opponents and supporters of the previousGovernment. Criticism was directed at both the military commandersand the politicians. Among newspapers The Morning Chronicle was one


of the most critical of the whole conduct of the invasion. An articlewhich appeared in the middle of September blamed the previousGovernment for creating unfounded expectations among the peopleabout the favourable outcome of this enterprise.58 The Duke ofNorthumberland, an old Pittite, later remarked that:

The easy capture of Buenos Aires at first blinded, however, oursilly Ministers, and they determined to perservere in the business,which they have now brought to a fine issue. I understand muchabuse is bestowed on General Whitelocke. Without pretending inany degree to justify him, it appears to me that the Cabinetwhich gave into this foolish plan and ordered the execution of itis the most culpable.59

Of those who had been part of the previous Government, LordAuckland complained to Lord Grenville:

I suppose you lament over the catastrophe of Buenos Aires; nothingbut the plan adopted could have produced it. It is extremely morti-fying, for our garrison was living on the best of terms with theSpaniards, our trade was rapidly increasing, and if we had chosen toplay the game of independence, I am confident we would haveplaced all the Spanish provinces on their legs without bloodshed orrevolutionary convulsions. I never was so hurt. Many obvious pro-jects of infinite importance are gone for ever.60

Richard Sheridan, the celebrated poet and playwright, MP of theFoxite faction, and Navy Treasurer during the Talents Ministry, iron-ically remarked that the Talents ‘not only ran its heads against awall, but actually built a wall for the purpose of running its headagainst it’, in reference to the River Plate expedition.61

Others who had been closely related with the late Ministry alsoresented the fact that independence had not been the main goal ofthe expedition. Like Lord Holland, they thought Windham was tobe blamed. As Lord Temple, brother of Grenville, explained:

What makes all this sad story worse, is that it is hinted we mighthave had Buenos Aires and the whole of New Spain without theloss of a man, for every purpose to which we ought to have


looked, had we agreed to acknowledge the independence of thecountry, or that we even might have held them in dominion hadwe engaged not to give them up at a peace, but that Whitelockerefused proposals which were made to him with a view to theseobjects, before the fatal attack upon this town. If this is so itmakes the story doubly horrible. Whitelocke is to be tried butCrauford not. The language of government is, that there are docu-ments in the Colonial Office that will implicate Windham, orthey will show that remonstrances were made to him, principallyfrom the Duke of York’s office, against the appointment ofWhitelocke, whose former conduct in Santo Domingo hadproved him to be quite unfit for the command. I am ratherinclined to believe that there is some foundation in this.62

The writer William Burke, a friend of Miranda, and who in fact, asrecent research has spotted, turned out to be the Utilitarian philoso-pher James Mill, emphasized the point:63

This object, so far as it related to the restoration of peace,undoubtedly reflects honour on those who entertained it; butwith respect to Spanish America, which was to be degraded into amere make-weight in the scales of negotiation, it wascomptemtible and ill-advised, and affords for history an humili-ating instance of the persons, who over their wine toasted ‘libertyover the globe’, issuing instructions to crush her in SouthAmerica.64

As we can see, most people blamed the Talents Ministry for failingchosen to instruct the expedition to proclaim a guarantee of inde-pendence to the Spanish Americans, as Lord Holland had suggestedin that famous Cabinet meeting of 11 February when the reconquestof Buenos Aires was being discussed. One is tempted to ask whatwould have happened had Holland’s uncle, Charles James Fox, beenalive during those deliberations. Leslie Mitchell points out thatuncle and nephew walked absolutely in step along the main lines ofpolicy.65 Fox might therefore have shared Lord Holland’s views onSouth American affairs and, influential as he was in the Cabinet, hemight have helped sway policy in favour of independence. One isalso tempted to ask what would have happened had the Tories been


in office during these events. Would they have taken more decisivemeasures? It is unfair to suggest, however, as Roberts and Street havedone, that the Pittites and the Tories had always favoured the ideaof independence, whereas the ‘Whigs’, as they put it, preferred con-quest.66 As already stated, there is no evidence that Pitt favoured theemancipation of the Spanish Colonies; on the contrary, it seemsthat he was not too sympathetic to the idea. Castlereagh andCanning, on the other hand, began thinking of supporting indepen-dence only after the invasions of the River Plate had already takenplace. Both had urged the quick reinforcement of the troops alreadythere, but there is no evidence that either man had supported apolicy of emancipation. The Ministry was much divided on thisissue. True, Windham’s view of ‘hanging on’ to the new possessionafter recapturing it finally prevailed over the idea of either emanci-pation or non-intervention. But this idea had not been shared bythe entire Cabinet. One cannot but agree with Lynch when heemphasizes the same point, that ‘The attempts of historians (forexample Roberts[…] and Street[…]) to contrast a Tory policy ofemancipation with a Whig policy of conquest are not supported bya sufficient amount of continuous evidence.’67 Lynch also summa-rizes well the main inconsistencies of the Ministry of All the Talents:‘The policy of this administration, indeed was marked by neitherimperialism nor liberalism but by utter improvisation’.68

It is understandable that, in the midst of the Napoleonic wars,when fears of invasion by the French dominated most politiciansand the population in general, this new government was not at allprepared to solve the dilemma presented by the sudden capture of asignificant part of the Spanish possessions in South America. Thewhole plan had been conceived during the days of the previousadministration, in the utmost secrecy, and had unexpectedly beencarried out by a naval commander. It also seems clear that some ofthe members of the Talents Ministry, especially Grenville, wouldhave preferred not to have had to deal with the problem at all. Thiswas later confirmed by Lord Howick in the House of Lords, when hedeclared that the Government did not even feel proud when thenews of Popham’s early success had reached England. However,these shortcomings are not enough to explain why Windham andthe rest of the Ministry were so careless in the planning and prep-arations of the new expedition.


Spanish and creole attitudes to the British invasions

On 23 January 1808, almost a year after his River Plate adventures,Colonel Beresford wrote from Madeira, where he was now posted, tothe Foreign Secretary, Viscount Castlereagh, concerning the charac-ter and disposition of the people of Buenos Aires with particularregard to their attitude to the British invasions:

In respect to the political sentiments of the great body of thepeople (I must say the creoles) I was too well acquainted withthem to be induced to change my opinions of them from what Ihave ever declared to your Lordship, yet whoever on thataccount expects assistance from them towards furthering theirown wishes, little knows the people and would be disappointed;they must be first conquered, and the Spanish part shifted fromthem, before they will be much inclined to come forward, andthey must be well assured that the object of Great Britain is togive them independence, for though they are decidedly inclinedto throw off the yoke of Spain, they are still more hostile toreceiving that of any other nation, and we conquering it for our-selves would be carrying a millstone about our necks, as theywould be continually watching and plotting to get rid of us, andit would give too powerful a handle to our enemies and thefriends of Spain to work upon the ignorance and fanaticism ofthe lower class.69

This letter was written at the time when Castlereagh was preparinga new expedition to South America. It is likely that he hadrequested intelligence from Beresford, given his recent experiencein the River Plate. The passage accurately depicts what had beenthe general mood amongst the inhabitants of Buenos Aires duringthe invasions. There were, however, more complexities to thematter.

The analysis of Rioplatense sentiment during the invasions is not aneasy task. There are hardly any private documents or publications ofthis period available, so one has to rely on the official correspon-


dence of the Viceregal Government and on the memoirs and privateand official correspondence of British officers and statesmen. Thereare a few letters of the period which contain interesting details andanecdotes of the invasions, as well as of the trials held to determinewhether certain citizens had been guilty of treason during the inva-sions, notably Alzaga’s trial in 1809. These documents are to befound in Argentina’s Archivo General de la Nación and in theMuseo Mitre, and help to throw more light on these events. Somesecondary sources are also helpful.

Roberts suggests that already by 1803 there existed in BuenosAires two independence movements. One, apparently more inclinedto Great Britain, was headed by Juan José Castelli; the other sympa-thized more with France, and was led by Santiago de Liniers and hisbrother, and included Juan Martín de Pueyrredón in its ranks.According to Roberts, this explains why Liniers and Pueyrredónwere closely connected with the organization of the local militia tocombat the British forces.70

Liniers had been born in Niort, France, in 1753, the son of a navalofficer. After a military education in Malta, he returned to France in1768 only to leave again in 1774, this time for good. His destinationwas Spain. Like many other French soldiers at that time, he offeredhis services to the Spanish Crown. He entered the training schoolfor marines in Cádiz, and in 1776 accompanied Viceroy Cevallos’expedition to the River Plate, although he returned to Spain shortlyafterwards. In 1778 he was again sent to the River Plate as PortCaptain responsible for guarding the estuary. Thereafter heremained in the River Plate.71

Castelli, born in Buenos Aires in 1764, was a lawyer closely con-nected with Belgrano, Viéytes and Rodríguez Peña, and had workedwith them to promote economic progress in the River Plate region.It was apparently Castelli’s faction which sent Mariano Castilla toLondon with the object of securing British support and assistancefor the independence of the River Plate Viceroyalty.72

There is, unfortunately, scant information concerning these twofactions. There is however evidence of Castilla’s stay in London. Heremained for about three years, which included the time of theinvasions, and he corresponded with Foreign Secretaries Windhamand Castlereagh. One of his letters to Castlereagh is highly dramatic.Castilla gives a thorough account of his misfortunes since he arrived


in London: he had not received any payment from the BritishGovernment for his services, and more worrying for him, he hadreceived news from his friends in Buenos Aires that he was consid-ered a traitor by the Viceregal authorities. His friends consideredthat he had not achieved anything substantial for the cause of inde-pendence since he had left. Worst of all he had also lost a lot ofmoney as a result of these activities.73

According to Roberts, Castilla was part of a network of SouthAmerican spies operating in London who were paid by the BritishGovernment, which feared that France had firm intentions of orga-nizing an expedition to South America.74 The British kept thesemen, all of whom were creoles, under close watch and contem-plated the possibility of assisting independence movements inSpanish America when the time was right.

Such conspirators included the New Granadan Pedro Fermín deVargas and, of course, Francisco Miranda, the earliest and mostprestigious of them all.75 There is evidence that Castilla was incontact with these men. Unfortunately we do not know withwhom he was keeping in touch in Buenos Aires. The theorysuggested by Roberts, that he had been sent by one of the revolu-tionary factions, presumably Castelli’s, seems plausible, but thereis no hard evidence for it.

Another interesting aspect of these affairs prior to the invasions isthe role of Colonel James Burke, who would later reappear in1808–9 as a British agent operating in Rio de Janeiro and BuenosAires. In 1804 he arrived in Buenos Aires, apparently under Castilla’sauspices, as a British spy collecting information about the revolu-tionary movements in the River Plate.76

Here again one is confronted by a lack of evidence. It would bemost interesting to find out whether Burke had any contacts withPopham, Miranda, and the ministers who favoured sending anexpedition to South America. It seems highly unlikely, however,given the existing evidence about the antecedents of Popham’sexpedition, that Burke’s mission (if it was indeed a mission), hadany influence on the eventual decision to invade. Roberts has sug-gested that it is likely that Burke had assured the revolutionaryfaction in Buenos Aires that Great Britain would be willing to sendan expedition to assist them in their emancipation from Spain. Thisconjecture is also based on insufficient evidence. As we can see, the


origins of creole activity before the invasions are obscure. The activ-ities of these revolutionary groups, to which some of the mostnotable creoles supposedly belonged, if they existed at all, werecarried on in the utmost secrecy.

When the British army arrived in Buenos Aires, one of its com-manders, presumably either Popham or Beresford, was ‘con-fronted’ by a leader of a creole group. Most sources seem to agreethat this person was Castelli, who inquired about the objectives oftheir mission.77 The answers received from the British comman-ders must have seemed highly unsatisfactory to the leaders of thismovement. The British did not clarify at all what was the object ofthe enterprise, and certainly did not leave the creoles at ease withwhat they were most eager to find out, namely if there was anyprobability that they would be assisted by this force in gainingemancipation. Beresford apparently told Castelli that he could nottake any decisions on this matter until he received orders fromEngland.78

Some two weeks after disembarking Beresford reported that thetown remained tranquil and that the people in general seemedsatisfied with the British presence. He added:

The creoles or in other words the inhabitants of the country areonly prevented by the power of Spain from coming forward withenthusiasm to express their joy at the change of sovereigns andany assurance guaranteeing them from such a change would Ithink bring them forth with gladness and zeal to offer their assis-tance in maintaining His Majesty’s dominion over this countrybut they all express their fears of being given up at the end of thewar.79

What seems to have occurred, however, is that most of themembers of the alleged independence group, once it became clear tothem that the invaders were not comitted to support independence,decided to join the local militia which was preparing to combat theinvaders. This was the case with Pueyrredón and Manuel Belgrano,for example. Others, such as Castelli, decided to wait upon events.As we shall see, very few decided to support the British.80 There wasalso a feeling of anger and impotence at the ease with which a fewBritish soldiers had taken possession of Buenos Aires. This induced


many creoles to join the local militias, which were rapidly organiz-ing themselves to recover the city. Manuel Belgrano, for example,after his early doubts, decided to join the militia in part from suchindignation:

Confieso que me indigné, y que nunca sentí más haber ignorado,como ya dije anteriormente, hasta los rudimentos de la milicia;todavía fue mayor mi incomodidad cuando vi entrar las tropasenemigas y su despreciable número para una población como lade Buenos Aires: esta idea no se apartó de mi imaginación y pocofaltó para que me hubiese hecho perder la cabeza: que era muydoloroso ver a mi patria bajo otra dominación y sobre todo en talestado de degradación, que hubiese sido subyugada por unaempresa aventurera, cual era la del bravo y honrado Beresford,cuyo valor admiro y admiraré siempre en esta peligrosaempresa.81

This reaction was similar to that of Mariano Moreno who stated:

Yo he visto en la plaza llorar a muchos hombres por la infamiacon que se les entregaba; y yo mismo he llorado más que otroalguno, cuando, a las tres de la tarde del 27 de Julio de 1806, vientrar 1560 hombres ingleses, que apoderados de mi patria se alo-jaron en el fuerte y demás cuarteles de esta ciudad.82

The local miltia were divided into two regiments, the Patricios andArribeños, which consisted entirely of creoles. They were led bySantiago de Liniers. A Spanish militia was also organized and was com-manded by Sentenach, Ezquiaga, and Esteve y Llach, three Catalansfully loyal to the Alcalde Mayor, Martin de Alzaga. It is important tomention at this stage that, after the Viceroy Sobremonte had decidedto flee to Córdoba with the treasure, Alzaga had established himself asthe commanding figure in Buenos Aires, a situation which would,however, substantially change after Liniers’s military victories in the‘reconquest’. Nevertheless, as we shall see later, Alzaga’s role duringthe invasions remains the most interesting and conspicuous of all theparts played by local characters in these events.

A Spanish merchant who had arrived in the River Plate several yearsbefore, Alzaga had acquired a great reputation as one of the most suc-


cessful entrepreneurs in the region. He epitomized the sentiments ofthose leading Spanish merchants who were strongly opposed to theinfluence of the British free-trade ideals which had rapidly penetratedin Buenos Aires, and which had attracted the creole elite and thosewho formed the revolutionary groups. The local creoles and theSpanish army had at a certain point realized that the British were notas numerous as they had once thought and, as Captain Gillespieexplains, they came to see that they themselves might not be so inca-pable of confronting this small English army:

Widely scattered over the Pampas frontiers in small bodies, andnever regimented for exercise or combined evolution, they werestrangers to obedience, and on the day of trial, they could beexpected to act only as a rabble, without motive or object. Thiswas the description of our opponents, when we disembarkedupon the shores of La Plata, in 1806, to whom was joined a het-erogeneous mixture of nominated peons. None of them havingever seen an enemy in the field, they were panic-struck at theoutset, and carrying it along with them in their precipitateretreat, the city surrendered under a similar impression. While weheld the place, they had time to pause, and to recover from it,and it was during that peaceful interval they first began to calcu-late upon the popular strength, and on the means of applying it.Every individual possessing either observation or feeling, wasstung with shame when he ascertained the numbers by which hiscapital had been conquered, and each telling a tale to hiscomrade from wounded pride, one universal flame of revolt waskindled against us. The calamitous issue is well known, arisingout of the inequality of the conflict, but the retrospect is adducedin circumstantial detail of the origin of that military bias whichhas since charactarized, and has spread a new impulse of activityover all orders in those dependencies.83

The invaders had established General Beresford as the newViceroy. This was the only change they imposed on the Viceroyalty,as they left the Cabildo, the Audiencia and the Church completelyuntouched. They invited the local citizens to sign their allegiance toKing George III, and a list of some 58 names was collected.Unfortunately there is no trace of this tantalizing list, which would


prove more than interesting.84 There were some rumours thatCastelli, who appeared under the name Francisco, was part of thislist.85 One of his biographers, however, denies that it could referhim.86 What seems highly likely, given the apparent inactivity ofthose prestigious members of the revolutionary groups, is that, asRoberts suggests, they chose to wait and see.

The ambiguity in the attitude of these men is not hard to under-stand, if it is true that Beresford, when approached by this group,simply assured them that he could do no more than attempt to getofficial authorization to assist their emancipation.87

It is important to note, however, that the British officers cannotbe blamed for failing to take the initiative and espouse the creolecause. In any case they would later be proved right for not havingtaken part in any such scheme, in the light of the orders sent by theWar Office to Beresford in September:

It is almost superfluous to observe to you that my instructions ofthe 24th of July last, having been written with views wholly differ-ent from those which your present dispatches give rise to, can beno longer considered as being in force. They may serve however toshow what in every state of things must be alike impressed uponyour mind that the great and ruling consideration which has solong restrained His Majesty from invading this part of His enemy’sterritories, has been the fear of exciting in those countries, fromtheir known impatience of their former governments, a spirit ofinsurrection and revolt leading to consequences the most fatal,and which except by the presence of a very superior force, HisMajesty may not have the means of controlling.88

As mentioned above, there were only sporadic cases of declaredsupport for the British. However there was to be one notorious case.After the reconquest, Beresford, Pack, and many other Britishofficers and soldiers were made prisoners and confined to variousinterior provinces instead of being sent back to England as theywould have wished. Beresford was sent to Luján, and it was therethat he became acquainted with Saturnino Rodríguez Peña, Liniers’ssecretary and an officer in his army. Rodríguez Peña was also, withhis brother Nicolás, a member of the one of the most influencialRioplatense pro-independence creole groups. Many times he had


been sent to Luján by Liniers with messages for Beresford. It wasduring these meetings that Rodríguez Peña was persuaded byBeresford that, if he were set free, he would try to persuadeAuchmuty and the other British commanders in Montevideo tohelp the creoles gain emancipation from the Spanish crown. It ispossible that Beresford’s assurances were genuine, judging by hissuggestions to Castlereagh the following year, in the letter wequoted at the start of this chapter.

The most intricate aspect of these dealings, however, are the sus-picions which arise about Liniers’s role. The historian WilliamsAlzaga suggests that the behaviour of both Liniers and Martín deAlzaga was highly suspicious during this episode.89 He reached thisconclusion taking into account that Rodríguez Peña had beenLiniers’s secretary, and that, therefore, the latter was probably awareof the negotiations. Alzaga had agreed to grant an interview toRodríguez Peña and to listen to his arguments in support of therelease of the English Officers in Luján. Two years later he wassubject to a trial on account of this action, at which he was accusedof treason.90

Beresford’s escape eventually took place in mid-February. Aided by Rodríguez Peña, he managed to arrive safely inMontevideo.

Saturnino Rodríguez Peña was the only well-known Rioplatense whodecidedly embraced English interests during the invasions, and whoactually offered his services to them, thinking that this was the bestchance for emancipation. He was assisted in this mission by anothercreole who was not, however, from the River Plate, the Alto-Peruvian Manuel Aniceto Padilla, an obscure and intriguing charac-ter who was serving a prison sentence at the time of the invasionsfor having stolen the jewels of his concubine, and who was laterreleased by Beresford for some unknown reason.91 These two creolesalso succeeded in escaping, and a few months later they served asemissaries for the British Government in the Portuguese Court inRio de Janeiro, and later reached England.

Towards March 1807, however, the situation looked bleak indeedfor the British, as well as for their prospects of gaining creole


support. The creoles had however given sufficient proof of theirantipathy towards the Spanish authorities, as Auchmuty wrote fromMontevideo when news was received of the removal of ViceroySobremonte that same month:

The seizure of the Viceroy by the inhabitants of Buenos Ayres, anevent certainly very important in itself, first gave me an insightinto the views of many of the leading men, and convinced me,that however inimical they were to us they were still more so tothe present government.92

It must have begun to become clear, at this stage, to Auchmutyand to many other officers, that even if they had been strongly rein-forced since the reconquest, what they needed from the Govern-ment in England more than men were official instructions allowingthem to assist the creoles in their emancipation schemes. Suchinstructions, as we know, never arrived.

In the meantime, while the British forces were in Montevideowaiting for reinforcements to arrive for a new attack on BuenosAires, Auchmuty had occasionally been sending his officers onpeace missions to Buenos Aires, where they warned General Liniersabout the difficulties he and his men would encounter once theBritish army, newly reinforced, decided to occupy the city oncemore: he should surrender in order to avoid more bloodshed.Liniers, however, remained unperturbed by these insinuations. Hedid not have much choice anyhow, for by then the whole townwas determined not to surrender in such a disgraceful manner everagain. Liniers was hardly a free agent and, as one of Auchmuty’senvoys, General Campbell, reported in a particularly vividaccount, his situation was far from comfortable:

On my enquiring for the General, or the person who had thechief command, I was introduced by the officer of the Navy,who conducted me on shore, to Gen.Liniers. I then deliveredmy dispatches, and on the General receiving them, the crowdwas so great, that gathered round him, that he could hardlyopen them, some reading over his shoulders, others holding thepapers by the corners, that they may be the better able to seethe content of them. After a great deal of conversation regard-


ing my mission, the General told me, they had the greatestconfidence in their numbers, and that the sword must decide,at the same time adding, that it did not depend on him, as acouncil must be held. I was asked to dinner. The table was largeand crowded, and every attention was paid me by the Generaland his staff, but a short time after dinner, a person ran into theroom, saying my boat was coming towards shore, with a whiteflag, on which some of the people at the table got up, and saidwe must be prisoners. Their expression was ‘Liniers, they mustbe prisoners, they have broken the truce.’ Others said that weshould not be prisoners, and the dispute ran so high, and insuch a manner, that General Liniers found it necessary to takeme into his own room, and sent one of his aid de camps for aguard, to clear the mob, that I might get on board, regrettingthat I would not come on shore anymore, but that he wouldsend the answers on board. From what I could see, there seemedto be a great deal of party work amongst them, and I thoughtthat General Liniers was in a disagreeable situation, and hadlittle authority.93

General Liniers was, on the whole, thoroughly respected by theBritish officers. However there were a few exceptions. CaptainGillespie, for example, was unimpressed with his character:

Public economy, and the immemorial system of a governmentwhich had ruled with a suspicious jealousy, might have beensupposed, after every danger had ceased, to have suggested thedisbandment of so many natives in arms, but no reduction fol-lowed, and General Liniers who had commanded them withreiterated fortune in war, was continued at their head afterpeace. In testimony of the popular gratitude, he was succes-sively called to be governor of Buenos Ayres, and at last to fillthe viceroy’s chair, vacated by the dethronement of the marquisSobremonte, which was the highest dignity in their power tobestow. The crowded successes that had accompanied him,were erroneously imputed to his talents and firmness, but inreality he possessed neither. Since landing in South America asan emigrant from the naval service of France, and a refugeefrom her convulsions, his habits had been depraved, and his


associates low, and having a natural genius for politicalintrigue, he exercised it amongst the lower orders of the capital,as well as through some of his national accomplices, in theinterior. Although now an officer in the service of Spain, he wasin every sinew, and at heart a gaul.94

At this stage, however, no matter how controversial Linier´s roleas a leader might have seemed, it is beyond doubt that the prevail-ing feelings amongst the creole and Spanish soldiers was one ofabsolute loyalty towards the Spanish Crown, and of clear and utterrejection of the British invaders, and all this, in no small degree, wasdue to Liniers’s organizational skills.

The situation confronted by General Whitelocke once he enteredBuenos Aires in June was completely different from that faced byBeresford a year before. Whitelocke encountered no revolutionarygroups, timidly speculating about the possibility of finding aid foremancipation, nor the shabby Spanish guard, nor bewildered citi-zens too shocked to react. The whole town was ready to play its partin defeating the enemy. Moreover, the militia, emboldened by theknowledge that it had defeated the same enemy before, had alsobeen reinforced and was more prepared than ever to confront theBritish army. As General Whitelocke reported:

The whole system appears to have been galling to the inhabi-tants, and instead of an impression favourable to Great Britain, Iam persuaded that it will be difficult ever to do away with theidea that individual interest influenced the whole of these pro-ceedings, and not any great national object! I say so muchbecause I cannot but lament what is in fact too true, that we havescarcely one friend in the country.95

There were still however a few pro-British members of the revolu-tionary group, like Viéytes, Castelli, and Nicolás Rodríguez Peña, thebrother of Saturnino, who at the time of the second invasion,although not volunteering their services to the British, chose toretire to the countryside and to await the outcome of Whitlocke’snew attack. According to Williams Alzaga, these men expected to berewarded by Whitelocke if he was successful.96 By now, however,


this small focus of creole sympathizers was completely irrelevant toa commander who had explicit orders to recapture the town on HisMajesty’s behalf. Moreover the new invaders seemed quite disgustedwith what they saw:

The people of this country have been totally misrepresented theyare slothful to the last degree, and obtain food at so easy a ratethat they will not labour. The Spaniard who is the only descrip-tion of person who trades, is ruined by the arrival of the Britishmerchants, the creole, who wishes to live in that indolencewhich alone is grateful to him, dislikes the restraint which theneighbourhood of an armed force imposes to him, above allbigotry is here at its height, and has so much influence that noarmy of protestants could ever against this vast population haveultimate success.97

It was Whitelocke, however, who summed up the state of totaldesolation of the British army in the River Plate, especially withrespect to the lack of creole support:

Upon the evacuation by a British Army it might be naturallyexpected, that some adherents would be committed in its cause,and thereby become obnoxious of their former government,and dependent on ours for support. But nothing can morestrongly mark the inimical disposition of the country towardsus, than the circumstance of their having only two individuals[Padilla and Rodríguez Peña] of any respectability, who havingsacrificed their Spanish connections and prospects, are thrownon the generosity of the British nation for the means ofsubsistence.98

This last remark reflects vividly the River Plate creoles’ attitudetowards the British throughout the invasions. Right from the start‘the inimical disposition’ had prevailed.

We have repeatedly stated that, had the British arrived with theintention of assisting the emancipation of the creoles, this disposi-tion might well have been altered. Even then, one should recall thatshortly before these events took place in the River Plate, FranciscoMiranda had commanded an ostensibly liberating expedition to


Venezuela, and his mission did not encounter the expected creolesupport.

It seems likely that the only men who would have been capable ofchanging the course of public opinion among the creoles werefuture revolutionaries such as Castelli. However the British policy ofconquest right from the start left absolutely no room for such meneven to consider openly approaching His Majesty’s troops. It is nowonder then that Rodríguez Peña and Padilla were the only twofigures of any reputation amongst the creoles who opted to supportthe British cause wholeheartedly. Castelli and his followers evi-dently preferred to wait and see.

Moreover, the resolute manner in which Liniers, Pueyrredón, andAlzaga resisted the invasions and organized the militia to combatthem, contributed rapidly to a feeling of resentment towards theinvaders. Speculations about the possible involvement of these threemen with emancipation plans, which could imply that they in factentertained ideas of reaching some agreement with the British, seemvery unfounded. Justifiably, they are still seen as the heroes of theseevents.


4Strangford, Independence andthe London Missions

By 1807, Napoleon Bonaparte’s domination of Europe was at itspeak. A year later his invasion of Spain eventually provided theBritish army with the scenario in which to confront his army. Thisnaturally meant a new alliance between Great Britain and Spain,added to the traditional alliance Britain already had with Portugual,whose Prince Regent, the future King Joao VI, had in 1807 decidedto move his court to Brazil, due to the menace of a French invasionin the Iberian peninsula.

This event is most significant for the analysis of Britain’s relationswith Latin America during this period. For the first time, Britain haddirect participation and representation in the South American conti-nent. Lord Strangford was appointed as British representative to thePortuguese Court in Rio de Janeiro, where he remained for the nextnine years. Strangford had been instrumental in convincing thePortuguese Emperor to move to South America.1 The importance ofStrangford’s presence in Rio de Janeiro was magnified even more bythe outbreak of independence movements in 1810 in Caracas andBuenos Aires, both of which occurred as a result of the French occu-pation of Spain, and the attempt to make Joseph Bonaparte the newKing of the Spanish Empire.

These two revolutionary movements did not, however, declarecomplete separation from the Spanish Crown; they remained loyalto Ferdinand, son of the deposed King Charles IV. Nevertheless, theRiver Plate revolution marked a crucial twist for relations with GreatBritain, as the revolutionaries rapidly sought British recognition and

85

assistance. For the next fourteen years diplomatic missions wererepeatedly sent to London. Great Britain was in an awkward posi-tion: allied to Spain on the one hand, and on the other receivingdelegations from the revolutionary governments of both Caracasand the River Plate who were trying to obtain protection fromSpain. This situation would begin to clarify only in 1815 when thedefeat of Napoleon and the formation of the Holy Alliance allowedBritain to view her relations with Spain and its Colonies from a dif-ferent standpoint. Furthermore, in 1816 the River Plate declared itscomplete emancipation from the Spanish Empire.

Naturally enough, during this period 1807–16 the internal affairs ofboth Great Britain and the River Plate were affected, in one way orthe other, by the events which were taking place in both continents.In England three different Governments were formed during thesenine years, the Administrations of the Duke of Portland, SpencerPerceval, and Lord Liverpool, who would remain in power until1827. The Río de La Plata received during those years the lastViceroys, Sobremonte, Liniers, and Cisneros, and the first experi-ences of revolutionary government: the Primera Junta, the twoTriunviratos, and the three Directores Supremos – Posadas, Alvear, andPueyrredón – who followed.

The Ministry of the Duke of Portland succeeded the Talents who,apart from being largely responsible for the misfortunes of the RiverPlate invasions, had also failed to reach a peaceful solution withFrance. The Portland Administration was absolutely convinced thatno peace was possible as long as Napoleon was in power, and there-fore it decided from the start to adopt a Pittite line in foreign affairs.It was no surprise that the Cabinet should be composed almostentirely of Tories.2 Among them were George Canning and ViscountCastlereagh, who, as we have already seen, were the two mostprominent Tory opponents in the House of Commons of theTalents’ policies in South America. Canning became ForeignSecretary, and Castlereagh took the War Office. Castlereagh hadbeen the first of the two to take an interest in South Americanaffairs, and this was reflected almost as soon as he had resumed hisministerial functions. As mentioned in the previous chapter, he


started to sketch plans for an expedition to South America. He wasnot certain about the exact destination of this new expedition, buthe was absolutely clear about the objectives: the enterprise wouldhave the sole intention of assisting in the emancipation of theSpanish colonies, which would enable Great Britain to gain com-mercial advantages, and also to prevent possible French designs onthis region.3 The expedition would be commanded by General SirArthur Wellesley (the future Duke of Wellington), and supported byGeneral Miranda. Troops were sent to Cork and were set to sail forSouth America but they were diverted to Spain, where Wellington’sfame awaited, once news of Spanish resistance to Napoleon per-suaded the British Government to aid the Spaniards.

Castlereagh’s interest in South America did not however fadeaway after this event. Whilst laying plans for the expedition, he hadtaken a keen interest in analysing the most appropriate form of gov-ernment for the Spanish Americans once they were liberated fromthe Spanish Crown, an issue that in the past had deterred successiveBritish governments from taking part in any of Miranda’s expedi-tions to South America. The fear of Jacobin principles emergingonce liberation was achieved had been the traditional excuse givenby Pittites and Tories, and Castlereagh was also subject to such fears.Nevertheless, Castlereagh had been warned by General CharlesDumouriez, the former French revolutionary, now military advisorto the British Foreign Secretary, that the best policy England couldadopt with respect to Spanish America was to relinquish all ideas ofmilitary conquest and instead support the emancipation of the terri-tories. Furthermore, Dumouriez suggested that once emancipationwas achieved, a constitutional monarchy should be established withthe exiled Duke of Orleans as King.4 This idea was more appealing toCastlereagh than the menacing notion of a new democracy.Dumouriez had in fact been in contact with Miranda several yearsbefore, as already mentioned, when he commanded the Frenchexpedition to Belgium and Holland in 1793. It is probable thatDumouriez got most of his information on the the Spanish coloniesfrom Miranda.

Nevertheless, Dumouriez’ interest in South America remainedlively, and he became one of the British Government’s main infor-mants on the area, in part as a result of his new South Americancontacts, such as Pedro Fermín de Vargas, Mariano Castilla, and

Strangford, Independence and the London Missions 87

Aniceto Padilla. After assisting Beresford’s escape, Padilla had fledto Rio de Janeiro and later to England, where he received paymentfrom the British Government for his services.5 Apparently he kept the General well informed about events in the River Plate,and from this source Dumouriez passed on information toCastlereagh.6

Castlereagh’s interest quickened when towards the end of 1808 hedecided to send his own agent to the River Plate. For this secretmission he designated Captain James Burke. He instructed him thatthe object of his journey was to find out as much as he could aboutthe sentiments of the Rioplatenses. He was also ordered to inform theofficials concerning the situation in Spain, and assure them thatEngland had fervently embraced the cause of Spain; that as a conse-quence of this, the hostilities between the two nations had come toan end; and furthermore, that Britain had supplied the Spaniardswith money, arms, and ammunition, and was firmly allied withthem in their cause against the French. Castlereagh concluded thisnote emphatically, stressing to the Captain that:

You will therefore direct all your exertions in working the mindsof the Spaniards against the French, and inculcate that the solemotive which influences the conduct of Great Britain has beenand is to prevent Spain and the Spanish provinces from fallingunder the yoke of the French, and to enable them to maintaintheir independence against that power.7

Castlereagh’s opinion clearly reflects the degree of concern inGreat Britain at the possibility of France spreading her hegemony toSpanish America, one of the few commercial and strategic resortsleft to Britain in the face of the Continental blockade Napoleon haddecreed, which was creating enormous complications.

By now the Portuguese court was established in Rio de Janeiro andAdmiral Sidney Smith and Lord Strangford, the two British emis-saries who had been so instrumental in this move, were already sta-tioned there. These two men were also close cousins. Sidney Smithwas born in 1764, and his extensive and eventful naval career is well


known. He was also a Member of Parliament. By the time he arrivedin Rio de Janeiro he had already served and seen action in France,Sweden, Gibraltar, Turkey, Naples, and Portugal, where he had beensent to make the arrangements for the departure of the PrinceRegent and the Royal Family to Brazil. He had eventually been madecommander of that naval station.8

Strangford was born Percy Clinton Smythe in 1780. After studyingat Trinity College, Dublin, he entered the diplomatic service as sec-retary of the legation in Lisbon. He soon established himself as arespected figure at the Portuguese Court, especially after he hadtranslated and published Portuguese poetry in The Edinburgh Review.He had convinced the Prince Regent and the rest of the Court toemigrate to Rio de Janeiro in November 1807, as the Frenchadvanced. Strangford was ordered to follow them to Rio, where hewas appointed Envoy Extraordinary.9 A certain rivalry existedbetween the cousins, who both claimed the credit for having suc-cessfully escorted the Portuguese Royal Family to Brazil.10 As weshall see later, Strangford and Smith were frequently to clash onmatters concerning the Portuguese Crown’s policy in the RiverPlate.

As soon as these two men arrived in Brazil, they were confrontedwith a delicate situation. The Portuguese Court in Rio de Janeirowarmly espoused the idea of annexing the Banda Oriental – the terri-tory which had for decades been in dispute between Spain andPortugal – and possibly even thought of annexing Buenos Airesitself. This desire had developed before news arrived of the Spanishuprising against France and, therefore, before it was known to theEnglish emissaries that Spain was now allied to England. At firstSmith had been inclined to assist the Prince Regent Joao in hisdesigns, which were a consequence of Portuguese resentmentagainst Spain for having assisted the French in the occupation ofPortugal. Strangford went along with this, for he was primarily con-cerned that the River Plate should be protected from any possibleFrench attack. But once news arrived of the so-called Farse ofBayona, the subsequent Spanish revolt of May 1808, and, moreover,of Britain’s decision to send forces to the peninsula, Strangford wasdetermined to avoid any confrontation between the two peninsularnations, now that they were both allied with Great Britain againstthe common enemy, France.


Smith, however, remained in favour of the court’s scheme, espe-cially after the Prince Regent’s wife, the formidable Princess CarlotaJoaquina, sister of the future Ferdinand VII of Spain, had decided thatshe would create a Regency in the River Plate. Smith, who hadbecome very intimate with the Princess, maintained that his motivefor supporting this plan was to secure Great Britain’s commercialadvantages in the River Plate. Strangford, however, remained scepticaland decided against further action until instructions arrived fromGreat Britain. Moreover, at the Foreign Office, Canning had expressedhis disapproval of Smith’s intentions.11 Strangford, like Smith, wasalso in favour of securing the British commercial position in the RiverPlate, but not at the cost of Carlota’s plan which implied, of course,the separation of the Plate from Spain.

However, in spite of Strangford’s and more significantly ofCanning’s feelings, Smith decided to go ahead with the Princess’sproject. He used a letter Castlereagh had sent in August 1808, inwhich the latter mentioned that in the eventuality of France crush-ing the Spaniards he might consider taking action in the River Plate,to support his strategy.12 In March 1809 Smith addressed a letter toLiniers at Buenos Aires in which he set out the advantages Linierswould enjoy if he accepted Carlota Joaquina as new Regent, and inthis way rid himself of the Spaniards.13 Smith also claimed that thisproject was consistent with Great Britain’s strategy against France inEurope, and emphasized his country’s position with respect toSpanish America:

… if by any hard fortune Spain shall fall into the grasp ofBonaparte, it is as much the duty of Great Britain as it is that ofthe Spanish Colonies to preserve them from falling into the sameservitude and it is in the interest of these colonies to securethemselves from so ignominious a fate, but in doing so GreatBritain would aim [at] neither sovereignty nor territorial occu-pancy and would confine her views to forming such a connec-tion with the Spanish dominions in South America as might bebest calculated to protect their independence and resourcesagainst the designs of the common enemy.14

Admiral Sidney Smith then wrote to Castlereagh to inform him ofthe evolution of his plan, but by that time Strangford had managed


to persuade Joao to send an official note to King George III askingfor the removal of the Admiral, on the grounds of his threat to thepeace of the region. This eventually occurred; Rear-Admiral DeCourcy was nominated as Smith’s replacement. Thus ended theadventures in Rio de Janeiro of a British emissary who openly sup-ported a plan that favoured the independence of the River Plate,whatever its extravagant nature. It is interesting to consider whatline Strangford now adopted, and what the reaction now was in theRiver Plate towards the whole Carlota scheme.

Between the reconquest and the arrival of the Portuguese Court inRio de Janeiro, the situation in the River Plate had been relativelystable. Santiago de Liniers had been confirmed as Viceroy by theSpanish Crown towards the end of 1807 – he received the news ofthis ratification in June 1808 – and was still held in esteem by thepeople of Buenos Aires because of his role during the British inva-sions. The creole faction that had shown inclinations towards inde-pendence remained loyal to him. Juan Martín de Pueyrredón, theother great hero of the reconquest, had sailed for Spain. There hewitnessed the precarious situation of that nation, and saw howrapidly it was now falling into the hands of France. On hearingabout British preparations for a liberating expedition to SouthAmerica, he became enthusiastic about the idea and in May 1808sent to London two emissaries, the future revolutionaries JoséMoldes and Manuel Pinto, to find out more. These emissaries metMiranda, and Moldes was received by the Prime Minister, the Dukeof Portland, who gave him an account of the preparations for theexpedition. However, while they were still in London, news of theAnglo–Spanish alliance arrived, which put an end to all plans for anexpedition to Spanish America.15

According to Roberts, the River Plate authorities had also heardabout this expedition. Liniers had organized his troops and putthem on alert. The creole party were also aware of the news, andwere preparing to assist this new enterprise.16 They were most incontact with Saturnino Rodríguez Peña who, after assistingBeresford’s escape, had fled to Rio de Janeiro, and from there wasmaintaining a frequent correspondence with Padilla and Miranda in


England. Through Miranda, Rodríguez Peña learnt of the expeditionplans, which he favoured, and towards the end of June 1808 he toldMiranda that he had already warned his acquaintances in the Plateabout the expedition. He insisted that Miranda should try to mountthe expedition as soon as possible, for he was already aware thatthere was a strong possibility of an agreement between Spain andEngland.17 This information he probably picked up from Strangford,with whom he maintained close relations.As soon as news of the alliance between Britain and Spain wasreceived in the River Plate, Liniers, aware that an expedition was nowunlikely to attack Spanish America, allowed the entry of English mer-chants into Buenos Aires. However, the events taking place in Spainmade matters more uncomfortable for Liniers given his French origin,and allowed certain Spaniards and creoles who supported the Spanishcause in the River Plate to raise suspicions about the Viceroy’s possibleloyalty to Napoleon. This movement was headed by such prominentfigures as Alzaga, Juan Antonio de Santa Coloma, and MarianoMoreno. In early 1809 they pressed Liniers to resign. However, whennews of the suspicions held by these men was made public byLiniers’s loyal commanders Cornelio Saavedra and Martín Rodríguez,there was a popular demonstration in favour of the Viceroy and hisposition was restored.

Soon, Liniers would be confronted by another delicate situation:Princess Carlota Joaquina’s plan. Saturnino Rodríguez Peña was anardent supporter of this plan and had established links with AdmiralSidney Smith, the main backer of the scheme. In the River Plate, thecreole faction to which Rodrígez Peña belonged, which alsoincluded his brother Nicolás, Belgrano, Viéytes, and Castelli amongothers, were also in favour of this idea, and in September 1808 hesent a note to Carlota Joaquina and her brother Pedro Carlos, askingthem to come to the River Plate and establish a monarchy. Thecreole group argued that a constitutional monarchy would best suitthe River Plate, and would also benefit commerce with Great Britain,of vital importance to them.18 The Princess agreed to send JamesParoissien, an English friend of Rodríguez Peña who was at that timeresiding in Rio de Janeiro, as secret agent to the River Plate for the


purpose of influencing the inhabitants in favour of Carlota.19

However an informant of the Princess in Rio de Janeiro, José Presas,warned her that Rodrígez Peña and his party were in fact republi-cans, and were using her in order to get rid of the Spaniards. He alsomaintained that both Paroissien and Rodríguez Peña were doubleagents. Although this was not true, Carlota was persuaded by herinformant and warned the Spanish authorities in the River Platethat Paroissien was an impostor. Paroissien was therefore arrested assoon as he arrived in Montevideo.20

In November, Carlota Joaquina sent another emissary to the RiverPlate to inform her about the situation, and to see if she should per-severe with her plan. This emissary was the Portuguese FelipeContucci, an acquaintance of Miranda.21 There was still somesupport for Carlota Joaquina’s cause despite the fact that she hadfallen into disrepute with many of the creole faction because of theRodríguz Peña incident. Some notables among the more moderatecreoles, such as Gregorio Funes, Juan José Paso, and CornelioSaavedra, expressed their sympathies, but by the time she sentJames Burke south in March 1809, the movement was completelydiscredited; Burke was arrested, and later fled.22

The arrival of a new Viceroy, Baltasar Hidalgo de Cisneros, sent bythe Spanish Junta to the River Plate, marked the end of Carlota’sdesigns. Since the events of Bayona the creole movement underBelgrano (who had supported Liniers and now openly rejectedCisneros) had advocated allegiance to Ferdinand VII and looked toGreat Britain, more precisely to Strangford, for assistance and guid-ance. Strangford, with no instructions from England, played adouble role: he supported Spanish interests but secretly kept intouch with the River Plate creoles. However, he received no instruc-tions until 1812.23 This was caused to a considerable degree by thechange of government in England. The Duke of Portland’s Ministryended in late 1809, and was replaced by that of Spencer Perceval,another predominantly Tory Cabinet that followed the same strat-egy in foreign affairs. However, with regard to Spanish America thischange of Ministry proved to be significant. Having discarded theservices of Castlereagh and Canning, the new Ministry could findno one with knowledge of South America. The new ForeignSecretary, the Marquess of Wellesley, was not as well informed as hispredecessors, in spite of the fact that his brother had in the last six


years been involved in several projects for Spanish Americanexpeditions.24

The consequences of this change were to become apparent nowthat South America again demanded serious consideration by theEnglish Government. Yet, for some unknown reason, no instruc-tions were sent to Strangford in the course of the three years thatthis Ministry remained in office. Anglo-River Plate relations stag-nated. Strangford’s role in Spanish America, and especially in theRiver Plate, acquired great importance during these years. All com-munications between the River Plate and Great Britain during thisperiod were entirely conducted by him.

After the Carlota affair and the events which led to the arrival ofCisneros, the situation in the River Plate entered another period ofapparent stabilization. Strangford was aware, however, that dis-content lurked under the surface. People were much alarmedabout the situation in Spain and the uncertain future prospectsthere. Another source of discontent were Cisneros’s persistentattempts to jeopardize the freedom of commerce with GreatBritain, which had been advocated earlier by Mariano Moreno anddecreed in November 1809, although precariously maintained.There was also a great deal of uneasiness in the River Plate withthe liberal Cortes formed in Cádiz, which had established that allSpanish colonies should remain politically attached to the SpanishMonarchy. The creoles however, considered themselves as one ofthe kingdoms united and governed by the King, and his absencefrom the Throne meant therefore, that they were now entitled totheir own political rights.25

Matters came to a head on 22 May 1810 when a Cabildo Abierto, anopen assembly, was called, at which a group of notable Rioplatensecreoles claimed that as the Spanish Throne was vacant, sovereigntyshould revert to the people of the River Plate and an autonomousgovernment should be formed. On 25 May popular pressure forcedthe Spanish authorities to yield. Cisneros had to resign, and a localJunta composed almost entirely of creoles was formed. Its memberstried to make it clear that theirs was not a revolution declaringabsolute emancipation from Spain, and that they maintained their


loyalty to Ferdinand, the King in captivity.26 The leading personalitiesof this newly formed Junta were Cornelio Saavedra and MarianoMoreno. The former represented the more moderate line of thegovernment, whilst the latter, with other members of the Junta, suchas Belgrano and Castelli (in spite of his previous allegiance to Alzaga), now embodied the more intransigent line within the revolution.27

The Junta, however, was immediately confronted by reactions in theinterior, still loyal to Spain. This provoked violent uprisings againstthe Junta and militias were therefore formed in Buenos Aires inresponse. In Córdoba, for example, Santiago Liniers, the hero of theinvasions, who had voiced his opposition towards the revolution, wasarrested and later executed. Two years later, Alzaga was to meet thesame fate.

The Junta had decided to bid for Britain’s friendship and protec-tion and therefore communicated to Strangford the news of the rev-olution and their allegiance to Ferdinand. He respondedsympathetically, and especially praised the revolutionaries fordeclaring free trade with all friendly nations and for their loyalty toFerdinand.28 He confessed, however, that he had no orders fromGreat Britain and could not offer any sort of protection until hereceived them. The Junta therefore decided to send a delegate toLondon to seek recognition and arms for the defence of theterritory.

The man chosen for this enterprise, the first official diplomaticenvoy from the River Plate to Great Britain, was Matías Irigoyen, ayoung naval officer.29 He arrived in London on 6 August 1810, andmet Wellesley shortly afterwards. The Marquess had alreadyreceived delegates from Venezuela, which had revolted againstSpain a few months before and sent Luis López Méndez, AndrésBello, and the young Simón Bolívar to England. They arrived withinstructions similar to those of Irigoyen, and Wellesley had assuredthem that despite her friendly relations with Spain, Great Britainwould not supply Spain with military aid to use against hercolonies. Moreover, he urged the Spanish Cortes in Cádiz to openthe ports of the colonies to British commerce.30 He could not,however, formally recognize their independence nor supply themwith arms, although he did not object to their request to allowMiranda to return to Caracas as head of the revolutionarymovement.


In September Irigoyen informed the Junta that when the Marquessasked what aid the Junta expected to receive from England:

….yo contesté a S.E. que eso que no podía ser sino fúsiles;entonces me dijo S.E. que eso era una cosa que no podía ser, puesque ademas de oponerse a las leyes del Reyno, ya no habían porhaberse consumido más de 300 mil en España.31

In spite of this, however, Irigoyen optimistically added:

Ya he dicho que esta reunión fue presenciada por el Secretario dela Embajada Española, y yo creo que es partido tomado por elMinisterio Inglés para tranquilizar a los Españoles. En fin estasituación no puede durar, la derrota de los Ingleses, que se esperapor momentos, nos dará la primacía, entre tanto el MinisterioIngles aunque se gobierna con mucha circunspección, por noromper con los Españoles, no por eso oculta sus miras, y deseosque toda la América se haga independiente, pues así lo demuestracon enviar a Miranda al Reyno de Caracas.32

This optimism was premature. Wellesley had been sympathetictowards the emissary from the Plate, but in fact he had granted himonly the same concessions that had been promised before to theother South American delegates: basically, that Great Britain couldprovide protection for these colonies against France, that theywould not support any designs by Spain to attack the colonies, butthat they would not provide the creoles with arms, or concede themofficial recognition.33 The Junta had also sent two other men toEngland in August, an Army officer named José Agustín Aguirre,who accompanied an English merchant resident of Buenos Airescalled Thomas Crompton, hoping that the latter, because of hisnationality, would be able to convince his Government to supplythe River Plate with arms and ammunition. These negotiations cameto nothing.34

At the same time, incidents occurred in the River Plate as a conse-quence of a naval blockade declared by a Portuguese squadron.


Strangford had been unable to prevent the Portuguese from invadingthe Banda Oriental in June, but he was assured by them that theywould take no action in the River Plate. The blockade was only a pre-caution against revolutionary forces operating near the Brazilianborder. Strangford nevertheless made an official complaint against theblockade. He also sent Padilla, now assisting him in Rio de Janeiro,with letters to the Buenos Aires Junta clarifying his position andasking them not to take any aggresive measures against thePortuguese in Montevideo. However, when things seemed to be set-tling down, the Spanish authorities in Montevideo convinced CaptainElliott, the British naval commander stationed in the River Plate forthe protection of British merchant interests, to maintain the blockadeof Buenos Aires. The British merchants in Buenos Aires, representedby Alexander Mackinnon, complained bitterly to Elliott, and the Juntasent Padilla back to Rio de Janeiro with a formal complaint toStrangford, asking him to get rid of Elliott.35 Strangford in turn sentAdmiral De Courcy to the River Plate with orders for Elliott to end theblockade, and to tell him that he was to be replaced by CaptainRamsay.36 Ramsay, together with Captain Fabian, had been stationedin the River Plate since the revolution and had maintained friendlyrelations with the Junta.37

Strangford informed Wellesley about these events towards the endof September. He also took the opportunity to ask for instructionsand to make his government aware of the intricate situation thatnow faced the rebellious Spanish American colonies, especially inregard to their future relations with France and Britain:

The question whether these countries are to become English orFrench is now an issue, and its decision will most probablydepend upon the part which the British Cabinet may take,whether it should resolve to support the cause of the SpanishAmericans, (availing itself of the opening which is left for thatpurpose, in consequences of the government having preservedthe name of Ferdinand VII), or whether it should refuse toacknowledge that government, and thereby compell the peopleto insist on a declaration of independence, a step to which theywould certainly have recourse, sooner than return to the ancientsystem, and which the agents of France would not fail to convertto the most profitable account.38


This last point made by Strangford is both intriguing and curious.The fear of France taking advantage if the colonies declared fullindependence, may have been in part a consequence of certainJacobin ideals which had been advocated by the revolutionaries inCaracas and Buenos Aires, but seems more likely a case of the tradi-tional Tory prejudice of the time, that revolutions would systemati-cally tend to adopt Jacobin ideals. However, Strangford did mentionthat in the River Plate the inhabitants were much more inclined toGreat Britain. All the same, he warned his Government that:

Although the government of Buenos Ayres are sincerely andentirely disposed in favour of Great Britain, they cannot butremember they owe their own political existence to the choice ofthe people. They have already experienced the full force ofpopular influence, and they naturally look with apprehension toevery circumstance which by rendering Great Britain an object ofsuspicion to the people at large might eventually direct thatinfluence against themselves.39

Strangford’s, and supposedly Britain’s, stand with regard to therevolution in the River Plate was clear. Britain supported the move-ment in so far as it was faithful to Ferdinand and represented arejection by the creoles of Spanish rule now that the country wascompletely in the hands of France. What was also clear, however,was that Strangford was aware that if full emancipation wasachieved, either England’s alliance with Spain or her close relationswith the Spanish colonies, especially the River Plate, would suffer acrisis which at that moment England was in no way prepared toface. Strangford’s task therefore was to see that the River Plate revo-lution maintained itself on a steady course, as this was of vitalimportance for his nation’s interests. Street has argued, against thetraditional view prevalent amongst certain Argentine historians,that Strangford’s favourable position towards the revolutionarieswas not a consequence of his sympathy towards them, but only ameans of maintaining Great Britain’s commercial and strategicadvantages in South America. This to a great extent seems to havebeen the case. However, it clearly reflects the talents of a man actingwith no instructions from his Government, devising what he con-ceived was best for the interests of his nation.


Towards the end of 1810 Mariano Moreno, in charge of theforeign relations of the Junta, clashed with Saavedra and resigned.Apparently, it was due to this confrontation that he was later sentto England on a mission accompanied by his brother Manuel andTomás Guido, with the same instructions as Matías Irigoyen.Another reason why Moreno was chosen for this mission, apartfrom the fact that it was thought necessary to send a prestigouspolitical figure, was that he had always favoured closer commercialrelations with Great Britain. He was supported by the British mer-chants in the River Plate, who strongly recommended him to theirGovernment.40 Moreno might thus have made a favourableimpression on the British Ministry, although it was likely, as Streetsuggests, that he would not have much luck in gaining any con-crete benefits.41 Unfortunately Moreno died on the ship that wascarrying him to England. His brother took charge of the mission.This represented not only a blow for the River Plate provinces whothus lost one of their most charismatic revolutionary leaders, butalso a set-back for the mission itself. Moreno was the only officialemissary. Neither his brother nor Guido carried official credentials.Nevertheless Manuel Moreno decided to persevere with themission.

On their arrival to England Moreno and Guido were rapidlyinformed by William Hamilton, Secretary to the Foreign Office, thatGreat Britain’s position towards the South American revolutionariesremained unaltered. Wellesley agreed to meet the two men in June1811, and confirmed this opinion.42 Moreno remained confidentabout the prospects of success of his mission, for he had reason tobelieve that changes in the British Government would favour theircause. In August he informed his Government:

El Príncipe Regente se halla en el día ligado a varias restriccionespuestas por el Parlamento hasta que entre en el pleno ejercicio delos derechos de la Corona: sus ideas son muy liberales, y cuandose cumpla el tiempo prefijado por el Parlamento, que será el 20 o25 de Octubre próximo, en cuyo tiempo si el Rey no se mejora sele declarará enteramente exonerado de sus funciones, o biensuceda su muerte que por momentos se está esperando, noseguirá el presente sistema. Entonces se mudará enteramente elMinisterio, y se prestará más atención a los asuntos de America,


segun la opinión de los que estarán en el oficio, y ya se señalancon el dedo por la confianza y amistad que les profesa el Príncipe.Entretanto hay que esperar se mude la conducta de este gabinetecon respecto a nosotros, y según su empeño por las cosas deEspaña, todo lo que se podía conseguir es la perfecta neutralidadque hasta ahora han guardado en nuestros domésticosdisgustos.43

That King George III was expected to die at any moment, and thathis son, the Prince Regent, would succeed, was naturally encourag-ing for Moreno. It was well known that the Prince Regent was closeto the Whig faction of Grey and Lord Holland, who since the fall ofthe Talents Ministry had remained in opposition to the Ministriesthat had followed. It was almost a foregone conclusion that whenthe Prince Regent succeeded, a Whig Ministry would take office.Moreno thought that this would automatically mean a change inpolicy towards Spanish America. Until this occurred, however, theWhig position was far from clear, and although Whig newspaperssuch as The Morning Chronicle had shown their support for the revo-lutions, the famous Holland House circle and Lord Holland himselfwere more inclined towards the cause of the Spanish Cortes, andtherefore did not much appear to favour the South Americanrebels.44 Nevertheless, George III still lived, and there was moreroom for doubt than Moreno thought about the expectations of theimminent formation of a Whig Ministry once the Prince Regentcame to the Throne.

By now matters in the River Plate were again in turmoil. The Spanishauthorities in Montevideo named the Royalist General Elío as newViceroy of the River Plate. The nomination was naturally rejected bythe revolutionaries in Buenos Aires. As a result of this negativeresponse the Spaniards, on February 1811, declared Montevideo thenew capital and ordered the renewal of the blockade of Buenos Aires.This was shortly followed by an uprising in the interior of the BandaOriental by rural militias under the leadership of Captain José GervasioArtigas, in clear defiance of the Revolutionary Junta.45 The Portugueseforces remained in the area, so the Junta sent Manuel de Sarratea to Rio


de Janeiro to request Strangford’s mediation. After strenuous efforts,strangford managed to convince Elío to desist from the blockade. Elíorepented in November, and ordered the blockade to continue. Afterthe renewal of hostilities in the area, Strangford decided to distancehimself from these events. For a while this attitude provoked irritationand suspicion in the River Plate towards Strangford, who was merelyavoiding adding further confusion to the situation. He was afraid thatif he showed his sympathy to the revolutionaries, they might take it asan invitation to attack Montevideo.46 As a result of these events, theJunta was replaced by a Triumvirate composed of Sarratea (who wasmuch esteemed by Strangford), Manuel Chiclana, and Juan José Paso,of the Moreno faction.

In London, Manuel Moreno was having trouble in getting theBritish government to recognize his official character. His positionwas complicated even more by the presence in London of ManuelPadilla, who now claimed that he had also been sent as envoy of theRiver Plate, though he was only being used by Strangford to delivermessages to the Foreign Minister. That his friend Dumouriezrecommended his services to Wellesley made Padilla feel entitled toact officially, infuriating Moreno to such a degree that hedenounced Padilla’s activities both to the British Foreign Ministerand to his home Government.47 Things had not gone well forMoreno, as Wellesley’s policy towards the Spanish Americancolonies had not changed. Wellesley had ordered his brother Arthurin Cadiz to negotiate some type of solution with the Cortes: Britaincould not afford to have the Spanish American colonies attacked bySpain, as this might provoke the South Americans to join forceswith France. It was also necessary for Great Britain to maintain hercommerce in the area. These arguments were firmly rejected by theSpaniards, and no further progress was achieved. This was as far asthe Marquess would go in support of the Spanish Americancolonies, in view of the complicated state of affairs in Europe.48 Thesituation was indeed difficult, but one wonders why Wellesley didnot take advantage of Strangford and his considerable influence inSouth America. He neither corresponded with him nor took any ofhis advice.49


Manuel Moreno also tried to attract attention by obtaining supportfor the cause of the colonies in the press and in other publications. Heestablished relations with José María Blanco White, the Spanish exilewho had founded El Español, which favoured the cause of the rebels inSouth America, and who was also close to the Holland House circle,and also with William Walton, a publicist who wrote numerous arti-cles in the The Morning Chronicle. As mentioned above, The MorningChronicle was favourable to the Spanish American revolutions. Waltonwrote also for other newspapers, criticizing his Government for notadopting a more liberal attitude.50

Early in 1812 Moreno’s expectations rose when Castleregh wasrecalled to the Foreign Office. Although clearly identified with theTory foreign policy line of maintaining a cautious stand withrespect to the Spanish American colonies, Castlereagh had shownmore interest than Wellesley in their affairs, and had already corre-sponded with Strangford in his last period in office. He was there-fore familiar with the situation both in Brazil and SpanishAmerica.51 Nevertheless, the Moreno mission was already in jeop-ardy. Although he wrote regularly to his Government, Moreno inturn did not receive any instructions on the future line of policy tofollow.

The situation within the British Government remained unclear.Although George III was still alive, rumours were still current thatthe Prince Regent might form a new Ministry. Moreno wrote toBuenos Aires:

Todos los papeles públicos de estos países hablan de unamutación muy pronta en el Ministerio actual. El Príncipe Regenteha pasado una carta al Duque de York en que manifiesta ser suvoluntad hacer una reforma en el plan actual de laAdministración; ninguna duda cabe ya de que habrá unavariación en pocos dias: lo que no se ha aclarado aún es si serátotal de todos los que están en oficio, o solamente parcial combi-nando en la presente administración algunos miembros distin-guidos de la oposición, a cuya última parte se inclinan los papelesministeriales.52


The Prince Regent, however, was not as strongly inclined to the Whigsas he had been in the days of Fox and Sheridan. Although Grey stillthought that he was loyal to them, Prince George was in fact no longercommitted to this Whig faction. Evidence became conclusive whenPrince George had to form a new Ministry after the murder of SpencerPerceval in June 1812. He decidedly favoured the appointment, asPrime Minister, of Lord Liverpool, an ardent Tory who formed a pre-dominantly Tory Ministry with Castlereagh remaining in the ForeignOffice. Other members included Lord Bathurst at the War Office,Melville, Vansittart, and Sidmouth.

Almost immediately, there was evidence of a new approach toSpanish America by this new government, which appeared moreinclined than previous ones to pay more attention to the eventstaking place in that continent. An example was Castlereagh’sapproach to Moreno, some few weeks after he returned to theForeign Office. In a letter that Moreno was to deliver to his govern-ment, Castlereagh gave a detailed explanation of the reasons forWellesley’s position and for his silence respecting the affairs of theRiver Plate in the last two years.53 Moreno was on his way back, thusending his mission. According to Street, Moreno had done little toenhance relations with Great Britain and, furthermore, he had left apoor impression in England, especially on account of the Padillaaffair.54 In the letter Castlereagh explained to the River Plate patriotsthat Britain’s silence had not been a product of indifference,pointing out that his government had pressed the Cortes to respectfree trade in the area and not to take military action against thecolonies.55

A few months later in 1812 Castlereagh was also in touch withStrangford, who after three years finally received instructions fromhis Government. With respect to the Portuguese blockade,Castlereagh ordered Strangford to ensure that this should not interfere with the normal commercial intercourse betweenBritain and the River Plate. Towards the end of his dispatch heemphasized that:

In any future communication which Your Lordship may have withthe local Government of Buenos Ayres, you may assure them thatthis line of conduct has been adopted by H.R.H. the Prince Regent,at the same time that his influence with the Court of Brazil is also


extended to procure the evacuation of the Spanish territories by thePortuguese Troops, in the sanguine expectation that his offers ofmediation between Old Spain and her transatlantic provinces maybe met equally by both parties with a true spirit of conciliation, andthat Buenos Ayres will be ready to take advantage of the firstfavourable opportunity to set the example to the other parts ofSpanish America by cordially uniting their brethren in Europe inacknowledging their allegiance to their lawful Sovereign, FerdinandVII, and in contributing, under the sanction of his name, to theefforts now making in Europe to uphold the integrity of theSpanish Monarchy.56

Thus, although there was a clear intention of giving greater prior-ity to South America, British policy remained basically unchangedin relation to the independent status recently achieved by some ofSpain’s colonies in that continent. The British Foreign Ministerpointed this out prettty clearly when he made reference to ‘theexample’ the River Plate was expected to give by not moving furthertowards independence, remaining faithful to Ferdinand and settingan example for the rest of Spanish America.

Castlereagh’s letter was enough for Strangford to put pressure on thePortuguese Court in Rio de Janeiro, now that the position of GreatBritish opposition to the Portuguese presence in the River Plate hadbeen made official in May. The Portuguese had sent an envoy toBuenos Aires, an officer named John Rademaker, who reached anagreement with the Triumvirate to end hostilities. However, when theBuenos Aires government asked Rademaker to assist them in signingan armistice whereby Montevideo would be incorporated in theUnited Provinces of the River Plate, the Portuguese emissary realizedthat he was not empowered so to do. The Triumvirate asked Strangfordto intercede. Strangford was not pleased by this proposal, but never-theless in September sent Captain Heywood to communicateCastlereagh’s desire that the Portuguese troops should evacuate theBanda Oriental, and his hopes of re-establishing commercial relationsbetween Great Britain and the River Plate. Strangford added that hehoped the River Plate would stay loyal to Spain.57 The River PlateGovernment thanked Strangford for his services, and confirmed theirfriendship with Great Britain. They made no reference, however, totheir loyalty to Spain.


During 1812 news had gradually been arriving in both Braziland the River Plate of the victories of the British and Spanisharmies over the French in the Iberian peninsula. While this newsserved to enhance Strangford’s position, it was received withmixed emotions in the River Plate, where many people were bynow accustomed to the benefits of autonomous government, andwere beginning to favour the idea of declaring completeindependence from the Spanish Empire. This feeling was surelyincreased with the arrival in Buenos Aires in March 1812 of threecreole officers, Matías Zapiola, Carlos María de Alvear, and thefuture liberator José de San Martín. They had been fighting in theSpanish army against the French, and now returned after a shortstay in London, where they had established contacts with otherSpanish Americans – López Méndez, Bello, the Mexican FrayServando Teresa de Mier and, probably, Miranda. It was in Londonthat they had apparently joined the Venezuelan’s masonic lodge,which had been established in London with the object of spread-ing patriotic ideals in Europe and South America.58 For this reasonthey created a similar organization to that of Miranda in the RiverPlate, the ‘Logia Lautaro’, with the firm intention of furtherpromoting independence.

They soon joined forces with another independence movement,the ‘Sociedad Patriótica’, headed by a fervent supporter of the eman-cipation cause, Bernardo de Monteagudo, who, with the support ofthe three newly arrived officers, pressed the Triumvirate to call aconstituent assembly which would discuss the prospects of totalindependence.59 The Triumvirate was already unpopular on accountof its heavy-handed actions and of the defeats of the army com-manded by Manuel Belgrano in the northern provinces, still loyal toSpain. Now it rejected the idea of a constituent assembly. Soonafterwards, a revolution headed by Monteagudo, Alvear and SanMartin ousted the Triumvirate.60

A new Triumvirate was then formed, whose members were Paso,Antonio Alvarez Jonte, and Nicolás Rodríuez Peña. It wasannounced that a constituent assembly would meet in January 1813in Buenos Aires, made up of representatives of all the River Plate dis-tricts that were loyal to the revolutionary government. TheConstituent Assembly declared that the United Provinces of theRiver Plate were autonomous; there would be no more invocation of


Ferdinand’s name. This was an enormous step towards fullindependence. If the latter was not declared immediately this was toa great extent the result of apprehension regarding Great Britain’sreaction.61 Apparently alarmed by all these changes, Strangforddecided to send further news of the allied victories in Spain, hopingthat this would impress the creoles in the River Plate, and inducethem to reconsider their position. But his efforts did not have thedesired effect.62

Towards the end of 1812, the government of the United Provincesof the River Plate was the only major Spanish territory in SouthAmerica which remained independent. There were growing fears,however, that the Spaniards would soon send forces to the RiverPlate, as they had to Caracas. The Triumvirate therefore decided tosend Manuel de Sarratea once again on a mission to Rio de Janeiro,where he would meet Strangford, and then to Spain and England, toseek recognition from Great Britain and to persuade the BritishGovernment to prevent any Spanish attempt to reconquer the Plate.Robert Staples, who had been acting as unofficial British Consul inthe River Plate, wrote to William Hamilton at the Foreign Office,giving him details of this emissary:

With respect to Mr.Sarratea, he has the character of being anambitious man. He was at the time I left this country, a memberof the government. He has always appeared one of the mostmoderate men here, and complained of the violent measures andcharacter of his former colleagues. He is well informed on thesubjects relating to this country and is generally looked upon as aman of superior talents to most of those here.63

These qualities, as mentioned before, were also appreciated byStrangford, who now favoured the policy of Sarratea’s Governmentas regards Britain’s assistance. He therefore explained to Castlereaghthat:

The leading persons at Buenos Ayres have now discovered thatthe liberation of Spain, the supposed impossibility of which was


the groundwork and justification of all their proceedings, hasactually been effected, and they were in consequence led toapprehend that the disposable force of that country will soon besufficiently augmented to enable her to make a powerful anddecisive effort to recover her Transatlantic dominions, to meetwhich all their means of resistance would be totally inadequate.These considerations have operated very strongly in producing amuch more pacific disposition on the side of the government ofBuenos Ayres. It is now ardently hoped by that body that it maynot be too late to recur with success to the intervention and pro-tection of Great Britain, through which it might not only be pos-sible to obtain such terms of accommodation as should providefor the security of their persons and property against the futurevengeance of Spain but also to guarantee and ensure the execu-tion of those terms when granted.64

Strangford tried to persuade the Spanish royal representatives inBrazil to accept the conditions offered by the River PlateGovernment, but the Spaniards, after hearing the news of the suc-cessive victories of loyal forces in the northern provinces of theRiver Plate, decided not to make any decision.65 Strangford, in turn,asked Castlereagh for instructions:

I hope most earnestly that the reception given to the proposals ofwhich Manuel de Sarratea was the bearer may have been such asto encourage and augment these favourable dispositions. If,however, weighty reasons should prevent his Royal Highness’sConfidential Servants from advising the resumption by GreatBritain of the character of mediatrix between Spain and herColonies, I beg most earnestly to be furnished with instructionsas to the adoption of the alternative to which the latter will inthat case most probably resort.66

This letter reflects Strangford’s alertness respecting the possibility ofacts of aggression by Spain in the River Plate, which he now fearedwould seriously compromise Great Britain’s relations in the region.Strangford also seems to display substantial sympathy not only toSarratea but to the River Plate Government in general.


In January 1814 the Assembly decided to change the Triumvirate andleave the executive in the hands of a single person only. The choice ofDirector Supremo was Gervasio Posadas, Alvear’s uncle. This changehad arisen from the need to create a more decisive and centralizedgovernment which could get a firm grip on the situation in the north-ern Provinces, and also as a consequence of the constant menace ofthe Spanish Royalists, now led by General Gaspar Vigodet, who werestill contemplating attacking the Buenos Aires Government.67 ByFebruary the situation was so tense, after new attempts to sign a trucehad failed, that an expedition was sent to Montevideo commandedby the Irish-born Admiral William Brown, with Alvear and GeneralJosé Rondeau in command of the troops, which eventually emergedvictorious and helped re-establish peace in the area.68

Strangford, on hearing the news of this victory, suggested to theBuenos Aires government that this was an opportunity to settletheir dispute with Spain, further underlining his desire for fullrestoration of relations and the avoidance of any emancipation dec-laration in the River Plate. His desires were made known to Posadasin Buenos Aires.69

Despite the victory, Posadas’s government was still under pressureon many fronts. Most worrying were the efforts of the Uruguayanpatriot leader Gervasio Artigas to unite the provinces of the Litoralarea and oppose the centralized rule of the Buenos AiresGovernment.

After the final defeat of the French armies in Spain, the news ofthe restoration of Ferdinand VII to the Spanish throne renewed fearsthat a Spanish expedition might be sent to the River Plate.70

Alarmed, the Buenos Aires Government decided to ask for GreatBritain’s assistance. Strangford’s suggestions were therefore takenseriously and a new diplomatic mission, was despatched, designedto reinforce that of Sarratea. There was, however, another reason forthis mission. As a consequence of the growing insecurity of theRiver Plate Government, Posadas and a large faction favoured, as ameans for stabilizing the situation, the adoption of a constitutionalmonarchy in the River Plate, which they hoped would receive thesupport of Europe.71

The two persons designated for this mission were ManuelBelgrano and Bernardino Rivadavia. They received two kinds ofinstructions from their Government, one public, one secret. The


first was to obtain guarantees from the restored Spanish monarchthat there would be no further Spanish aggression against the RiverPlate Provinces; the second, which according to Halperín were moreexplicit, authorized the emissaries to negotiate political independ-ence, which implied creating an autonomous monarchy with aSpanish infante on the throne, or, at least, civil liberties for theRioplatense Government, which meant reincorporation to theSpanish Crown on the condition that they would be allowed to pre-serve their own government.72

Belgrano was chosen after being replaced as Commander of theNorthern Army by San Martín. Rivadavia had been Secretary of Warin the first Triumvirate. The son of Spanish parents, he had marriedthe daughter of former Viceroy Del Pino and, after fighting as anofficer in the Galician corps against the British during the invasions,he began to support the revolutionary ideals of Mariano Moreno. Hethen became deeply involved in the first actions of the revolution-ary government. According to Mitre, these two men were chosenbecause they were both sympathetic towards Great Britain, andbecause Belgrano at least favoured the idea of establishing a monar-chy. As we have mentioned before, he had been seriously involvedin the Carlota scheme.73 Strangford was apparently satisfied with theobjectives of the mission and with the two men selected. Heexplained to his Foreign Minister that:

They are to visit this place [Rio de Janeiro], whence they are togo to England in order to obtain from the Spanish Ambassadorin London such assurances of security for their persons as may be necessary to enable them to proceed with confidence to Spain. I do most earnestly hope that the Spanish govern-ment will not permit itself to cast away this opportunity,perhaps the last, of restoring an amicable understandingbetween Spain and her Colonies, and that the very concessionsrequired by the latter will be an increase of strength and wealthto the former.74

Belgrano and Rivadavia stayed in Rio de Janeiro till March of thenext year. There they were informed of another change in the RiverPlate Government, albeit a minor one which did not alter themission. As a result of increasing problems caused by the


Government’s inability to control internal affairs, as well as the sus-picions which the Belgano and Rivadavia mission provoked in theinterior, Alvear had replaced Posadas in the Directorio in January1815. To some it appeared that this mission had been designed tocreate an approach between the Government and the Spaniards.75

Alvear, the new Director, was an enigmatic character. He was the sonof Diego de Alvear, a Spanish Naval officer and later royal official,who arrived at Buenos Aires with Cevallos’s expedition in 1776.Here he was commissioned by the Spanish Crown to settle the ques-tion of boundaries with Portugal. Having married a creole, withwhom he had eight children including Carlos María, born in 1789,he stayed in the River Plate until 1804 when he decided to return toSpain with all his family. On the journey home, the vessel carryingAlvear’s wife and seven of his children was attacked by a Britishfrigate, as this nation and Spain were at war at the time, and allthese perished. Alvear and his son Carlos, however, survived, as theywere on another vessel. They were captured and taken to England.Here they were freed and financially compensated. After residing inLondon for a few years Alvear returned to Spain with an Englishwife, and his son Carlos accompanied them. In Spain Carlos Maríade Alvear began his military career and fought against the French.He returned in 1812 to his native country where, as we have seen,he immediately became immersed in political and militaryactivity.76

In late February, while in Rio de Janeiro, Rivadavia contactedAlvear just before his departure to England. After gathering informa-tion on the political British situation, he commented on theprospects of the mission:

Felízmente debe observarse que el Ministerio actual (en Londres)tiene razones particulares que no concurren en cualquier otro(excusa para evadirse) que pueda suceder: estos son los compro-metimientos contraídos durante la guerra con Napoleón, con laEspaña. Más es indudable que el Ministerio pierde a grandespasos su opinión y que al presente debe haberla perdido muchomas lo primero por las ventajas de los grandes talentos y opinióndel Lord Grenville y Lord Grey y Marques de Welleslley jefes de laoposición, a los cuales debe haberse agregado ya el Duque deWellington que se retiraba de Paris a Londres y lo segundo por las


fuertes armas de que usaba el partido de la oposición a las cualesse les ha agregado ahora la del poco ventajoso tratado con NorteAmérica, según se deduce del parte dado por el Ministerio al LordMayor. El Ministerio en tan críticas circunstancias para conser-varse no tiene otro recurso que ceder a aquellas opiniones quehace valer la oposición y llegan a hacerse populares : una de estases felizmente aprovechar las disposiciones de la América del Suren favor de su nación y de su comercio.77

This information on British affairs in England had probably beenpassed on to Rivadavia by Strangford, who mentioned to Rivadaviathat, although he supported the principles of this mission, he hadno official instructions from his own Government and thereforecould not anticipate his country’s support for this diplomaticventure.78 As is clearly shown in the above letter to Alvear,Rivadavia was excited by the prospect of a Whig Ministry beingformed by the time he arrived in England. But these expectationsproved to be exaggerated, as he would later find out.

Shortly after Belgrano and Rivadavia had arrived in London inMay 1815, Alvear suddenly decided to send his secretary ManuelGarcía to see Strangford with secret instructions. Alvear expressedhis desire that the Provinces of the River Plate should from now onremain annexed to Great Britain and were ready to accept Britishlaws, and British Government authority, making himself responsiblefor this decision.79 To stress further the seriousness of his request,Alvear added emphatically that British troops should immediatelybe sent with an authorized Commander responsible for enablingBritish sovereignty in the River Plate Provinces.80

This stunning appeal for assistance at all costs is a clear reflectionof Alvear’s total impotence at this stage. His Government was ingreat difficulties because of growing dissatisfaction in the provinces(especially the Litoral area now under Artigas’s command) directedagainst the centralist policies of the Directorio. García, however,never made use of these instructions when he arrived in Rio deJaneiro, fearing correctly that they might be too extreme.81

Apparently, Alvear’s desires were reported to the BritishGovernment by Robert Staples.82

Shortly afterwards, Strangford was on his way back to England,ending nine exhausting years immersed in events in Brazil and the


River Plate. Almost immediately after he left, the Portuguese forcesagain invaded the Banda Oriental. Meanwhile, Belgrano andRivadavia arrived in London, where they contacted Sarratea, whoinformed them that in view of the present situation in Europe thiswas not the right moment to approach the British Government. TheLiverpool Administration, in spite of Rivadavia’s hope that it wouldbe replaced, was still firmly in office and allied to Spain, and there-fore would not remotely contemplate the independence of theSpanish American colonies.83 Moreover, it seems that the emissarieswere unable to meet with Castlereagh or any other minister. To addto this confusion, news was received in England of the revolt againstAlvear in June 1815. This did not help the River Plate improve itsreputation for stability.84

For a few months Sarratea was in touch with Charles IV, theformer King of Spain now exiled in Italy, who toyed with the idea ofnaming one of his sons, Francisco de Paula, as the future King of theRiver Plate. The idea soon came to nothing.85 The emissaries foundthemselves in a cul-de-sac. Towards the end of 1815 Belgranodecided to return to the River Plate, whilst Sarratea and Rivadaviastayed in Europe witnessing Napoleon’s final defeat and theestablishment of the Holy Alliance, awaiting more favourablecircumstances.

The situation in the River Plate in early 1816 was one of disorderand uncertainty. General Rondeau had taken over as new DirectorSupremo from Alvear, who had been forced into exile, and theLitoral forces were constantly threatening to topple the Govern-ment. Most of the creole revolutionaries were still seeking Britain’sassistance, as the new British consul in Rio de Janeiro informed hisGovernment:

They [the creoles] are deterred by the fear of vengeance, as I havebefore had the honour to state, from yielding to their formermasters, and are determined to die sooner than trust to themalone. It is almost needless to state to your Lordship that GreatBritain is the power to which their hopes are turned, and towhose mediation they look forward as the only prospect ofsafety.86


However, European events, as mentioned above, prevented anypossible aid or support from Great Britain. The main charactersinvolved in the May Revolution soon became aware of thisdifficulty. Internal turmoil induced them to convene a NationalCongress in Tucumàn in July 1816, which would complete theregion’s emancipation from Spain.


5Rivadavia and the British AttitudeTowards Recognition

The independence of the River Plate was proclaimed on 9 July 1816,marking the complete separation of the territory from Spain. Thethreat of the imminent arrival of a large Spanish expedition bent onreconquest was one of the main reasons why the River Plate creoleswere compelled to declare independence that year in the TucumánCongress. In April 1815 Spain had sent the largest expeditionary forceever to reach South America, under the command of General PabloMorillo. At first it was thought that the expedition might head towardsthe River Plate; however it later became clear that Venezuela was thedestination of Morillo’s expedition and was the main target of theSpanish reconquest in the continent.1 However, there were persistentrumours that a second expedition would head for the River Plate quitesoon, which created alarm in this area.

From 1814, British policy towards Spanish America had been con-ditioned by the more famous Congress that had met in Vienna.Now that independence had been openly declared in the Rio de laPlata, Great Britain had to decide whether or not to recognize thisnew status. The question of recognizing River Plate independencewas a delicate one for Great Britain. After aligning new forces withAustria, Prussia, and Russia at the Congress of Vienna and defeatingNapoleon at Waterloo the year after, Britain found herself immersedin a new European order, which under the conservative principles ofAustria’s Chancellor Metternich had formed a Holy Alliance toprevent the resurrection of republican ideals or of revolutionarymovements which might threaten the new post-Napoleonic balanceof power in Europe.2

115

This anti-revolutionary spirit also applied to all principalities, smallstates and kingdoms, and to overseas colonies which were still underthe rule of European powers. The news of the Tucumán Congress wastherefore not well received by Metternich and his associates in theHoly Alliance. Nor was all that well received by Castlereagh either, forhowever detached Britain tried to remain from the illiberal principlesof the Alliance, it shared many of its concerns, including the restora-tion of peace on the Continent and the preservation of the restoredBourbon Monarchy in France. Another British goal was to keep theFrench out of Spain and Portugal, which obviously implied the con-tinuation of the Anglo-Spanish alliance forged in 1808 to combat the Napoleonic menace.3

These imperatives seriously limited any support by Great Britainfor the emancipation of the Spanish American colonies. Moreover,Lord Strangford was no longer at hand, and although Robert Staplesreturned to the River Plate in early 1813 after a visit to London, hewas still denied official recognition by Castlereagh and the BritishGovernment.4

However, the British community in Buenos Aires reacted favourablyto the declaration of independence of the River Plate Provinces, asthey thought independence would enhance their commercialprospects in the area. The merchants urged Staples to contact theBritish Government and persuade it to recognize independence anddesignate him as Consul.5 This move, nevertheless, failed. Economicconditions had vastly improved for the British merchants since the1810 declaration of independence, especially after the decrees of theFirst Triumvirate which, once the last vestiges of Spanish monopolyhad been removed, had reduced import duties.6 But the developmentof a free market economy in the River Plate was still seriously impededby the cost of waging war against the Spaniards in the north and bythe internal disputes with the Litoral provinces of Santa Fé, Entre Ríos,and Corrientes. Under the leadership of Artigas these provincesopposed political centralism and what they regarded as the economicmonopoly of Buenos Aires, which sought to minimize the participa-tion of these provinces in foreign trade. Corrientes even introducedprotectionist measures against Buenos Aires, and in this way threat-ened free trade interests in the capital.7

These conflicts ruined the hopes of British merchants, both inBritain and in the Río de la Plata, which had risen high at the time of


the 1810 revolution. In fact, River Plate trade at this stage representeda very small part of British overseas commerce.8 Nevertheless, by 1816British products represented the major part of all foreign merchandisearriving at the port of Buenos Aires, and the low prices of the majorityof these products, especially textiles, created a great deal of animosityon the part of local merchants. The situation was even worse in theinterior, and British merchants found it much harder to establishthemselves in the provinces than in Buenos Aires, given the resent-ment they incurred amongst provincial merchants.9

The clearest example was the case of the Robertson brothers,authors of the well known Letters on South America, one of the mostfascinating contemporary accounts of gaucho and rural life in theLitoral area. Arriving from Scotland, they established themselves inCorrientes, but found it almost impossible to coexist with the creoletraders, both large and small, in the province. Fearing for their lives,they decided to move to Buenos Aires, which they found morecongenial.10

The plight of the British merchants was made all the more com-plicated by the internal and external unrest in the River Plate. Notonly were major provinces, such as Córdoba and Santa Fe, in openrevolt; there was also the menace of a Portuguese army advancing tooccupy the Banda Oriental and of a Spanish army in Upper Perupreparing to enter Tucumán. The meeting of the ConstituentCongress in Tucumán, which brought together the delegates of thedifferent provinces of the River Plate, was basically a response to thiscrisis, and although the declaration of full independence was agreedby all the delegates, it did not necessarily imply, as John Lynchrightly points out, the consolidation of national unification.11

However, the nomination of a new Director Supremo, in the personof Juan Martín de Pueyrredón, hero of the British invasions, wasacceptable to most of the representatives at the Tucumán Congress,and seemed as if it might placate differences.12 Pueyrredón was alsofavourably treated by the English press, as evidenced by an articleappearing in The Times in December 1817, which remarked that ‘He appears to us at present, the able vindicator of his country, hergovernment, her laws, and the right of her people […] in such acharacter he is entitled to our respect.’13

On the diplomatic front, the impact of the new Concert of Europewas rapidly felt by all those South American envoys who were trying

Rivadavia and the British Attitude Towards Recognition 117

in vain to attract Castlereagh’s attention and obtain Britain’s approvalof Spanish American independence. This was especially the case withthe representatives of the two countries where the independencemovement was strongest. The Venezuelan envoys Andrés Bello andLuis López Méndez, who had been left in London by Miranda andBolívar to work for some sort of British recognition, were instead strug-gling to earn a living, finding Castlereagh and the British Governmentincreasingly unresponsive.14 The River Plate delegates Rivadavia andSarratea were in much the same predicament. Furthermore, theirdifficulties were aggravated by a mutual quarrel. Sarratea made knownhis feelings about the futility of Belgrano’s and Rivadavia’s mission,now that they had been ordered to return to the River Plate by theDirector Supremo Alvear. Another reason for the disagreement had beenBelgrano’s and Rivadavia’s disapproval of Sarratea’s involvement withCount Cabarrus, in the Príncipe de Paula affair, mentioned in the previ-ous chapter.15 Belgrano had returned to Buenos Aires in November1815, but Rivadavia had decided to stay England. However, he was stillunable to shift Castlereagh’s stance.16 It was becoming clear thatwithin the Vienna Concert, Castlereagh was prepared to discuss theSpanish American question with the representatives of the otherEuropean powers, but not with creole envoys from South America inLondon, to whom, basically, he had nothing to say.

Rivadavia decided to try his luck in Paris in 1816, hoping toobtain a more favourable reaction towards the cause of SouthAmerican emancipation from the restored Bourbons, although the chances were surely not very high.17 Sarratea left Europe shortly afterwards and returned to Buenos Aires. He was appointedMinister of Government and Foreign Relations in Pueyrredon’sAdministration. Rivadavia thus remained the only River Plate envoyin Europe. He started to correspond with Pueyrredón, who readilyaccepted his role as Envoy of the River Plate and agreed to pay hima salary for his services.18

There was scant communication with the British in Rio deJaneiro either. When Strangford departed contacts were made withhis successor, Henry Chamberlain, but Chmaberlain did not carrythe same weight as his predecessor. However, when Manuel deSarratea arrived in Rio de Janeiro from Europe in early 1817, inorder to promote his plan for the placing of Francisco de Paula onthe throne of a new South American kingdom, Chamberlain con-


tacted Castlereagh to inform him about what he considered a veryfrivolous scheme. The tone of his letter emphasizes the unwilling-ness of the British Government to be a party to this monarchicalproject:

In order the more readily to induce people to join him [in sup-porting his scheme], he [Sarratea] pretends to have enjoyed adegree of confidence with the British Government neverbestowed upon any of the Agents from the River Plate that pre-ceded him, and he has officially but privately stated to theSupreme Director [Pueyrredón] that he was made acquaintedwith the whole policy of His Majesty’s Ministers with regard tothis quarter of America.19

The idea of establishing monarchies in South America had thusbeen revitalized after the abortive Carlota affair, especially with thereturn of Belgrano and Sarratea from Europe.

The role of Belgrano in the Congress of Tucumán had beenhighly influential, for he secured approval of two of the three pro-posals he put to the Congress. One, of course, was the declarationof full independence, to which almost all patriots readily adhered.The second was the adoption as the national flag of the blue andwhite flag he had raised after his victory over the Spaniards in thesame city of Tucumán four years earlier. The third and most con-troversial of his proposals, which was not decided on, was the cre-ation of a monarchy in the River Plate. As mentioned before,Belgrano had been a ‘Carlotino’ and, after his experience inEngland, he had returned home absolutely convinced that one ofthe main reasons why Britain had not provided sufficient supportto the independence cause in the River Plate, had been theabsence of strong government since the outbreak of the revolu-tion. Once this had been achieved, Belgrano felt that Britain andthe rest of Europe would be more inclined to accept the newpolitical order in South America.20

However, his intricate new monarchical scheme was not as readilyaccepted as his other two proposals. The new scheme consisted inthe placing of the descendant of an Inca on the throne of the newkingdom, a project perhaps inspired by Miranda’s proposal of 1804,which had been presented to William Pitt and his Cabinet. This idea


was supported by some leading creoles of the River Plate provinces,such as Martín de Güemes, leader of the gaucho army in the north,who thought this would be the best way of uniting Buenos Aireswith Upper Peru, and by José de San Martín, who was then prepar-ing his army to cross the Andes and to liberate Chile. However, theidea of installing such an exotic monarchy was unappealing to mostof the other patriots, notably to Rivadavia.21

Meanwhile, in Europe Rivadavia found his situation to be increas-ingly difficult because of events taking place in that continent.Nevertheless, he seemed satisfied with the attitude of France – thecountry where he was now living – towards the liberation of theSpanish American colonies, and he wrote to the new DirectorSupremo accordingly:

Claro es que el efecto, acaso primero y mas grandes de estos prin-cipios, es la libertad de la América. Así su independencia es elobjeto de los deseos de toda la Francia y demás Naciones delContinente. Ella es la gran cuestión del día, nadie se atreve ya aatacar directamente los derechos y justicia de los Americanos, quepelean por lo mas sagrado del hombre.22

Rivadavia also strongly condemned Great Britain’s intransigencetowards the cause of independence:

La dependencia mayor o menor en que todos los Monarcas estándel Gabinete de St. James, y la política profundamente antisocialque ha inventado y ejerce contra todo el mundo, son, en mi con-cepto, las únicas causas sólidas que, no solo retardan elreconocimiento de la independencia de América sino que ame-nazan su libertad. Este Gabinete, a quien solo la grandeza y felici-dad de sus crímenes libra de las calificaciones y de los renombresmas degradantes de la sociedad, ha empleado todo su influjo conel Gobierno de los Estados Unidos y le ha inducido a presentar alCongreso un Bill, dirigido a prohibir el que se venda a los llama-dos insurgentes, buques, armas y toda clase de municiones deguerra.23


Rivadavia’s anger reflected his resentment towards Castlereaghand the Liverpool Administration for the almost complete lack ofattention they had shown both to him and Belgrano during theirstay in England the previous year. Although his tone seems todenote an excessive sensitivity towards the British Government, afinal point of complaint in his letter, regarding rumoured Britishsupport for a renewed Portuguese attempt to invade the River Plate,genuinely alarmed him more than the other less important issuesmentioned in the passage above. Rivadavia did, however, make clearthat of English public opinion, the opinion of ‘la Nación Inglesa’ ashe put it towards the cause of South American independence, wasmuch more positive than that of the Government. He made clear toPueyrredón that:

No estará por demas advertir que no se hiera ahí de ningún modoa la Nación Inglesa, ella está en lo principal por nuestra causa, alcontrario, es preciso hacer una formal distinción entre ella y sugobierno. Tampoco debemos atacar a este abiertamente, sinomanifestar con prudencia y energía que estamos al alcance denuestros derechos, del poco lugar que se les hace y de las injuriasque se nos irrogan.24

Rivadavia never specifies in this letter exactly to whom he isreferring, or on what evidence he bases such an assertion concern-ing the British public’s view of the Spanish American cause,although he does refer to the attitude of the Whig opposition. Bythis time, several notorious Whig leaders were voicing theircomplaints in Parliament against what they felt was a clearinclination of the Government to support Spain against her SouthAmerican colonies. The most notable were Sir James Mackintosh,the famous historian whose Vindicae Galicae of 1791 was evidencethat he had espoused the French Revolution cause with even more enthusiasm than Charles James Fox; Henry Brougham, who,with Grey, was one of the most influential Whigs of the day; andLord Landsdowne, member of one of the most powerful Whigfamilies.

Rivadavia specifically referred to a speech delivered in the House ofCommons by Brougham, probably in March 1817, where he severelyattacked the Government and defended the mercantile interests of


the nation, claiming that the Government’s support of Ferdinand VIIhad cut off England’s natural connection with South America.25

Brougham was one of the main contributors to The Edinburgh Review,the principal organ of Whig thought, and among his writings werearticles favourable to South American independence.26 However, thereis no evidence that Rivadavia ever approached any of these Whigleaders during his stay in England. Some Venezuelans, notably AndresBello, were in touch with Lord Holland and frequented the HollandHouse ‘Spanish circle’ of Blanco White, but apparently this was notthe case with Rivadavia.27

Meanwhile, the Tory Government of Lord Liverpool was finding ithard to achieve an appropriate middle ground between the peacepolicy of the Holy Alliance and a suitable Spanish American policywhich would not conflict with Spain. According to Kauffmann,Castlereagh’s Latin American policies are understandable onlyagainst the background of his struggle for a Concert of Europe.28 InKauffmann’s view, during this period Castlereagh retarded theprogress of Spanish American diplomacy in order to satisfy hisCongress allies.29 Castlereagh’s main anxiety about the HolyAlliance’s attitude towards the Spanish American colonies, was thatit might lead to armed intervention. As soon as he saw that Spainmight appeal to her European allies for their support, Castlereaghproposed a ‘Confidential Memorandum’ to the Alliance on 28 August 1817, which received from them a commitment toneutrality. It was agreed that only Spain had the right to armedintervention in the American continent.30

Of the Congress nations, Austria and Prussia were the most enthu-siastic in backing Castlereagh’s memorandum. More than to any-thing else, this derived from the fact that Russia, their mostpowerful neighbour, wished to support Spain by imposing econ-omic sanctions on the South Americans. Russian support for Spainwas further shown in 1817, when Tsar Alexander I sold eight war-ships to the Spaniards. Although the Russians eventually acceptedthe memorandum and remained neutral, nevertheless Ferdinand VIIremained determined to send a Spanish expedition against SouthAmerica despite Castelereagh’s memorandum.31


The situation in the River Plate was complicated by a newPortuguese attack on Montevideo, but internally matters seemedmore stable after the Congress of Tucumán. To the west, San Martínhad successfully crossed the Andes and reached Chile, where hejoined the Chilean General Bernardo O’Higgins in February 1817and defeated the Spanish loyalist troops at Chacabuco. After suffer-ing some minor set-backs, San Martín defeated them again atMaipú, in April 1818, thus securing Chile’s independence. Thesevictories were the foundation of San Martín’s enormous reputationthroughout South America, and earned him the title of Liberator ofChile. News of his successes were received enthusiastically inEngland. At the same time they produced a certain uneasinessamongst the Liverpool Administration, which was concernd abouttheir effect in Vienna.

On receiving news of San Martín’s victory at Maipú, Chamberlainwrote to Castlereagh from Rio de Janeiro, expressing a degree ofoptimism about San Martín, now that the General had voiced hisdesire for British mediation in South America and his support forthe creation of monarchies:

The victory of Maipú has strengthened rather than diminishedhis wishes on this point [British mediation]. The prevention ofthe expected change in Government which he [San Martín]thinks would be a calamity and only retard the final settlementof affairs is the object that is supposed to have brought him fromChile [to Buenos Aires]. He is avowedly a friend to a monarchicalform of Government, and says that none other can suit thepeople of Buenos Aires and of Chile, or their habits.32

This would seem to imply that Castlereagh favoured some sort ofmonarchical solution for the independent states. A year later, theLiberator’s hope that Britain should assist his cause was confirmedwhen San Martín himself wrote to Castlereagh expressing his beliefthat a representative monarchy in Buenos Aires would be the bestpossible solution.33

San Martín’s role was central during the next four years. He enteredPeru in late 1820, paving the way for its eventual complete liberationby Bolívar, to whom San Martín ceded command at the controversialmeeting between the two heroes in Guayaquil on 22 July 1822. San


Martín had his detractors in Britain, especially amongst those whofavoured the establishment of republics in South America. Thefamous philosopher Jeremy Bentham had his suspicions about SanMartín’s political principles, and feared that he would tarnish hisliberating reputation by establishing authoritarian rather thanrepresentative governments. On learning of San Martín’s successfulinvasion of Peru, and his adoption of the title of ‘Protector of Peru’,Bentham felt his fears to be confirmed. He wrote, although he eventu-ally did not send, a letter to San Martín expressing admiration for hisvictories, but criticizing his attitude towards the liberated peoples.Bentham advised San Martín to ‘let the direction be temporary andthe end in view and real design a republican democracy as soon as thestate of the country is ripe for it, not only the end, but eventually thevery means’.34 Bentham preferred Bolívar, whom he admired both forhis military achievements and for his apparent sympathy with repub-lican ideals. While seriously questioning Bolívar’s political decisionsin the following years, Bentham maintained a regular correspondencewith him.35

In the meantime, Castlereagh consolidated the agreement amongthe Congress nations mandating strict neutrality towards SouthAmerica which he had proposed on the Secret Memorandum of1817. This became agreed policy at the first meeting of theCongress nations held in August 1818, at Aix-La-Chapelle, ameeting which now included France. At home, however,Castlereagh found it extremely difficult to reconcile the differentpolitical factions to his policy, which was unpopular in Britain.36

His extreme conservatism became the target of satire and wasmocked by the most celebrated romantic and radical poets of theday, such as Byron and Shelley, who also found a target in theForeign Minister’s dull personality.

Another source of discontent with the Government’s SpanishAmerican policy was the Royal Proclamation of 1817 against mili-tary service by British soldiers in South America. This proclamationwas issued after numerous complaints by the Spanish Ambassadorabout British volunteers enrolling in Bolívar’s and San Martín’sarmies. Two notable examples were David Florence O’Leary,


Bolívar’s Irish aide, and the legendary Alexander Cochrane, theScottish Admiral, brother of Lord Thomas Cochrane, who assistedSan Martín.37 The prohibition became law in 1819, as the ForeignEnlistment Act. It provoked great opposition both in and out ofGovernment. Canning complained on behalf of the merchants ofLiverpool, the constituency which he represented, claiming that thelaw would seriously damage Britain’s commercial intercourse withSouth America. The Whigs led by Lord Holland opposed it inParliament, on much the same grounds.38

Moreover, in October 1818 the Government refused to coun-tenance any reference of commercial matters with British navalofficers stationed off South America; it would only do so throughproperly appointed consuls. In early 1819, the Government madeclear to Staples in Buenos Aires, that he could not be appointed aConsul. He was nevertheless named British Commercial Agent bythe British merchants of Buenos Aires.39

As Ferns maintains, the policy of non-interference in SpanishAmerica pursued by the Liverpool Administration was basically aconsequence of its European policy, and of the anti-revolutionarysentiments of many of its ministers.40 Ferns maintains that the chiefobjectives of Castlereagh’s policy towards Spanish America weresimilar to those Castlereagh had set out to achieve in 1807, when,from the War Office of the Portland Administration, he had orderedan expedition to Spanish America.41 The idea then had been torestore and reinforce sympathy for Great Britain in that continent,after the embarrassing and suspicious experiences of the Río de laPlata the year before. Castlereagh favoured a solid commercial con-nection, opposed British political involvement, and wished to avoidthe appearance of any colonial designs in the region. As to theestablishment of the commercial connection, Castlereagh’s schemeof getting the Congress nations’ acceptance of a policy of neutralitytowards Spanish America was, in many respects, a means to securethe development of Britain’s Spanish American commerce.However, this was as far as Castlereagh would go, and he neverbowed to the pressures of the British mercantile community for amore vigorous commercial policy, irrespective of how this mightaffect relations with Spain. Castlereagh was only too aware thatthese pressures meant entering in the deep waters of recognition,which, at this stage, he preferred to avoid.


For Rivadavia in France, recognition was becoming a more andmore impossible ambition. The introduction of France into theEuropean alliance had raised his hopes, although he was aware, ashe mentioned to Pueyrredón, that France was joining the HolyAlliance fom a position of inferiority:

Lo que hay de mas trascendencia es, que habiéndose opuesto laInglaterra y la Austria a que la Francia entrase como igual en todoa cada una de las potencias, que componían la CuádrupleAlianza, o pudiendo ésta por otra parte subsistir ni con el mismoobjeto, ni en los mismos términos; se ha disuelto el Tratado quecontenía sus bases, y queda por consiguiente cada Nación libradapor si sola en su marcha política.42

Rivadavia at this point regularly commuted between Paris andLondon. He was still confident of reaching some sort of agreementwith the Spanish legation in London, hoping that his credentialswould be accepted and that recognition would at least be consid-ered. For this reason he embarked for England again in June 1818,and was received by the Duke of San Carlos, the SpanishAmbassador in London. However, his proposals were again rejectedand he immediately returned to Paris. Here, Rivadavia seemed to bemore comfortable; at least he spoke the language, whereas hisknowledge of English was limited. He also seemed to have moreacquaintances in Paris, including luminaries of the Parisian intellec-tual and political scene such as Destutt De Tracy, the Abbé De Pradt,and Lafayette, who were sympathetic to the cause of the SpanishAmerican independence.43

Rivadavia did have one illustrious contact in England. Duringone of his stays in London he had been introduced to Bentham byAntonio Alvarez Jonte, a Chilean agent.44 The correspondencebetween Bentham and Rivadavia lasted from 1818 to 1824, andBentham’s ideals were to have a significant influence onRivadavia’s future role in the politics of Argentina. Bentham wasnow in his seventies, and a much respected figure. A few yearsbefore, his attention had first been drawn to Spanish America byFrancisco de Miranda, a close friend of James Mill, John StuartMill’s father, who was closely related to Bentham. With Miranda,Mill had written a couple of articles for The Edinburgh Review.45


Before embarking for Venezuela, Miranda had regularly consultedBentham for advice on the legal code most suitable to for theemancipated nation.46 Subsequently, Bentham had closely fol-lowed the evolution of the independence movements in SouthAmerica and openly supported the cause. As correspondence withRivadavia shows, Bentham firmly believed that a republican formof government would suit the colonies better than the much-talked-about monarchical alternative, which Rivadavia himselfhad at one point favoured. In this respect Bentham differed notonly from Castlereagh and most of the Liverpool Administration,but also from Whig circles such as Holland House, and from TheEdinburgh Review, which also favoured the adoption of limitedmonarchy in South America.47 In October 1818 Benthamexpressed to Rivadavia his fears concerning the role of the SpanishAmerican liberators and the danger of their acquiring too muchpersonal power.48 This concern was to be the central theme of hisfuture correspondence with Bolívar and San Martín.

Back in France in January 1819 Rivadavia, through the goodoffices of Lafayette, met the Foreign Minister, the Marquis Dessolles.At that time Dessolles was, with Elie Decazes, the most influential ofLouis XVIII’s ministers. The Marquis took an interest in the RiverPlate, about which he had been previously unacquainted, and sug-gested that a constitutional monarchy would be most suitable.49 Inthe course of this same year a French emissary in the River Plateapproached Pueyrredón and proposed to him the establishment of amonarchy with a French prince. This emissary, Hilaire Le Moyne,was a former Colonel of the French army, and had been sent to theRiver Plate in late 1818 by the Marquis D’Osmond, the FrenchAmbassador in London. In March 1818, the Ambassador had con-tacted the Duc de Richelieu, one of the most important ministers ofthe King, urging him to establish a French monarch in the indepen-dent states of South America, and offered the services of colonel LeMoyne for this delicate mission.50

Since the French Revolution, France’s policy in Spanish America hadbeen relatively diffident and marginal compared to British policy.During the revolutionary period, the only time when a certain inter-


est was evident was when Brissot and Dumouriez floated the idea ofassisting Miranda’s emancipation plans for South America, andemployed him as a general in their army for the Dutch and Belgiancampaigns, with the idea of using his services later for a SouthAmerican expedition. During the Napoleonic period, French interestin Spanish America increased significantly. The defeat of the Frenchfleet at Trafalgar in October 1805, naturally reduced this nation’schances of establishing a significant pressence in South America.Nevertheless, in 1806 François De Pons, a French commercial agentin the Captaincy-General of Venezuela, warned Napoleon aboutEnglish designs and suggested that only French intervention couldprevent them. Shortly afterwards, during the invasions of the RiverPlate, Liniers sent his famous letter to Napoleon, announcing theBritish defeat and expressing his loyalty to France.51

In 1808, the French invasion of Spain – the event that ultimatelyprovoked the independence of the River Plate – threatenedNapoleonic intervention in the colonies as well. Napoleon andGeneral Murat were interested in securing commercial relationswith these colonies, and the rumours of a new English expedition toSouth America induced them to send the Marquise de Sassenay,who had resided and traded in Buenos Aires and was a friend ofLiniers, to the River Plate with the task of finding out as much aspossible about the inhabitants’ feelings towards France. As soon ashe arrived, however, there came news of the Spanish resistance afterthe events of Bayonne, which induced the Viceroyalty to declare itsloyalty to Ferdinand VII. Sassenay had to flee to Montevideo. Afterthis episode France paid scant attention to South American affairsfor over a decade, probably as a result of the political changes whichhad taken place in that continent during that period.52

The plan to install a French monarch in the River Plate was seriouslyconsidered in 1819 in both Buenos Aires and France. Pueyrredón, wholike Liniers was of French ancestry, wrote to Richelieu in March 1818offering commercial relations. Although his letter was never answered,the arrival of Le Moyne gave the Director Supremo another chance toestablish relations with France. Le Moyne suggested that LouisPhillipe, the Duc d’Orleans, was the ideal candidate for the local


throne. This idea was also favoured by Pueyrredón. When Le Moynereturned to France, the Director Supremo sent José Valentín Gómez, acanon of the Cathedral of Buenos Aires, on a secret mission to Paris tocarry this project foward. In mid 1819 Gómez met Dessolles, who hadalready been informed of the situation in the River Plate by Rivadaviaand who now favoured the idea of establishing a monarchy. TheFrench Foreign Minister, however, advised Gómez that it would bepreferable to nominate a different candidate other than Orleans,someone connected to both the French and Spanish royal families. Hesuggested the Duke of Lucca, son of a sister of Ferdinand VII and ofKing Louis of Parma. The Duke was not considered sufficiently distin-guished by Gómez, who decided to delay his response until hereceived further orders from Buenos Aires.

Meanwhile, Dessolles and the French Government had become soseriously involved in this project that they thought it necessary toinform Tsar Alexander, Russia being the dominant power in theHoly Alliance, that France was steadily working for a closer relation-ship. The Tsar agreed in principle with the idea, but thought that itwould be wiser not to interfere with the Aix-La-Chapelle neutralityagreement. On the other hand, he did not want to prejudice hisgood relations with Spain. In spite of her persistence, France had toabandon the whole project once Spain and the other Europeannations found out about the secret negotiations.53

News of this affair produced an outburst of fury in diverse sectorsof British public opinion. The Times commented on the secretmonarchical schemes of the French in the River Plate, blaming theBritish Government for not acting more resolutely, and claimingthat the Cabinet had ‘always treated the South Americans with thegreatest reserve, as if fearing contamination by simple contact’. The Times concluded that ‘British interest is likely to gain the ascen-dancy in the River Plate, rather through the disposition of theinhabitants than any influence exerted by our ministers’.54 Theseremarks came from a newspaper which originally supported theLiverpool Administration’s line of conduct towards SpanishAmerica. Castlereagh described the incident as further evidence of France’s diplomatic deviousness and hypocrisy. According to Webster, the episode drove the British Foreign Minister to think more favourably of the recognition of Spanish Americanindependence.55


After the nomination of Gómez by Pueyrredón, Rivadavia saw noreason to remain in Europe and returned to the River Plate, where thesituation remained extremely complicated. Although the victories ofSan Martín against the Spaniards in Chile produced a general state ofeuphoria in Buenos Aires, the internal conflicts in the River Plate con-tinued, with growing opposition in the provinces to the centralizingpolicies of the Supreme Government. In spite of the TucumánCongress, which was supposedly to balance the interests of theprovinces with those of Buenos Aires and reduce the risks of civil war,the Constitution promulgated in 1819 further enhanced the powers ofthe Director Supremo and reinforced the strongly centralizing tenden-cies of the government. The provinces also resented the commercialadvantages of the capital, and accused it of monopolizing most of thetrade. Under the leadership of local caudillos, the provinces started toform their own armies, threatening to declare their independencefrom Buenos Aires or to join forces with Artigas in Uruguay. The secretnegotiations of Pueyrredón with the French also prompted opposition.Pueyrredón found his situation untenable and decided to resign. Hewas replaced by General Rondeau, who immediately turned toBelgrano and San Martín for military aid against the provincialmilitias. His requests were ignored.56

The most powerful caudillos were Francisco Ramírez in Entre Ríosand Estanislao López in Santa Fe, both sympathizers with Artigasand advocates of a federal system in the River Plate. After theunofficial declaration of independence by these and other impor-tant provinces, including Córdoba and Tucumán, civil war wasinevitable. Rondeau, leading a weak army, was defeated by theforces of López and Ramírez at Cepeda in February 1820. Rondeauresigned, and the Buenos Aires Government collapsed.57 BuenosAires therefore had to give in to the caudillos’ demands. The Treatyof Pilar made a series of concessions to the provinces, recognizingtheir jurisdiction in the form of a federal structure, establishingfreedom for river navigation, and allowing free commercial relationsbetween the River Plate provinces, which had evidently been themain causes of friction. The Directorio was abolished and BuenosAires now acquired a Governor imposed by the caudillos themselves.The River Plate was left without a single national government. Thecandidate chosen for Governor of Buenos Aires, in spite of his previ-ous participation in the first centralist creole government, was


Manuel de Sarratea, who had displayed his sympathy for the federal-ist cause since returning from Europe.

However, Sarratea lasted only a few months. After internal elec-tions General Martín Rodríguez, another of the heroes of the Britishinvasions, was chosen as Governor of the Capital.58 These changesonly contributed further to emphasize the image of unreliabilitythat the independent colonies of Spanish America enjoyed amongstthe nations of the European Concert. To complicate matters evenfurther, since 1816 Ferdinand VII had again been organizinganother large expedition to recover his colonies in South America. Itwas only thanks to the Riego rebellion of 1820, when the Spanisharmy, supported by the Liberals, refused to sail and demanded therestoration of the 1812 Constitution in order to subvert absolutism,that this expedition was abandoned.

As a consequence of these events, Castlereagh was unable to argue thecase for recognition of the ex-colonies at the Concert meeting inTroppau, held in 1820. The Holy Alliance would not deliberate on theSpanish American colonies until Ferdinand VII was restored to histhrone. The Liverpool Administration also faced an internal crisis in1820 arising from the coronation of George IV who, after a prolongedregency, had become King on the death of George III. As soon as hehad succeeded George III he announced his intention of divorcing hiswife Queen Caroline on grounds of adultery. Caroline was to face adivorce trial, approved by the Liverpool Administration. The trialrapidly turned into a cause celébre with the active participation ofnotable Whigs such as Brougham and Grey. Castlereagh, not one ofGeorge IV’s favourites, was forced to focus his attention on these prob-lems. The Liverpool Government become increasingly unpopularbecause of its support for the King, and many of its members, includ-ing Castlereagh, feared for their lives in the face of the ever increasinghostility of the London mobs. The trial was excruciatingly long.Castlereagh could not turn his full attention to foreign affairs until1821, when the whole episode finally ended.59

Relations between Great Britain and the River Plate at this stagewere not flourishing either. A contributory cause was theunfavourable policy of the Pueyrredón Administration toward


British commercial interests. Pueyrredon´s Government had beenreluctant to allow the export of bullion and attempted unsuccess-fully to force loans on the British community residing in the RiverPlate. Worse followed when the political crisis of 1819–20 produceda marked reduction in commercial activity. Stocks of British mer-chandise remained unsold for some months.60

Nevertheless a vital turn in the commercial relations of GreatBritain and the River Plate occured in 1821, when Martín Rodríguezappointed Bernardino Rivadavia as his new Minister of Governmentand Foreign Affairs.61 Rivadavia was undoubtedly one of the mostable men involved in the early stages of emancipation. He was notthe most charismatic of characters, and did not attract the sympa-thies of the leading creoles, notably San Martín. His ideas were notmuch to the taste of the interior provinces either.

The reasons for this antagonism towards him included his earlysupport for the liberal ideas of Mariano Moreno, his assumed supportfor monarchical projects, and his alleged preference for trade. He hadproved, however, to be an important figure in the first independentgovernments. The first Triumvirate named him their Secretary, andeven Alvear, who like San Martín originally disliked Rivadavia, madeuse of his services for the joint mission with Belgrano to Europe.Rivadavia’s years in Europe had acquainted him with the affairs of thatcontinent, and had furthered his political education. This stay abroadtransformed him into one of the most progressive and modernizingpoliticians in the River Plate, and this was reflected in the wide rangeof reforms he espoused, especially during the Rodríguez Government,where he acted as Minister of Government and Foreign Affairs, andlater in 1826 when he was elected as first President of The River PlateProvinces. These reforms included a radical transformation in thestructure of the legislative system, electoral refom, a plan for a newHouse of Representatives to replace the anachronic Cabildos, theguarantee of civil liberties, freedom of expression, the foundation of aNational Bank, and reform of bureaucracy, of the military, of publicworks, of protection of commerce, of the sciences, of the arts, and ofthe church.62

The political mind of Rivadavia had expanded thanks to the ideashe had received from Bentham, whose utilitarian principles fitted inwith Rivadavia’s incipient liberal tendencies, as they had in Englandamongst diverse political figures, including the radical Francis Place,


the reforming Whig Henry Brougham, and the liberal Tory RobertPeel, who adopted many of Bentham’s ideals at one time oranother.63 Many of the measures introduced by Rivadavia were, to adegree, the result of Bentham’s inflence.64 Rivadavia’s main concern,however, was fundamentally economic. His plan of economic mod-ernization included the development of industry, the federalizationof Buenos Aires and its customs house, the promotion of immigra-tion and land distribution (under the emphyteusis system), colo-nization, and fiscal reformation. All these reforms represented anabrupt transformation with respect to the economic policiesadopted by the previous creole governments.65

These economic, political, and social changes were evidentlywelcomed by the British residents in the River Plate, whodescribed Rivadavia as the best thing that had happened to them,even calling him the ‘William Pitt of Buenos Aires’. The Britishreaction was all the warmer considering the tribulations they hadgone through in recent years from the unfavourable economicdecrees of the Pueyrredón Administration, the confusion and fearof the years 1819–20, and the antipathy they faced from provin-cial merchants.66

In Europe, the main issue affecting the Concert of Europe was therepercussions of the Riego revolt and the revolution in Spain, whichhad left Ferdinand VII practically at the mercy of the SpanishLiberals, who forced him to abide by the 1812 Constitution.

Certain European Governments, namely France and the EasternEuropean powers, resolved that intervention was necessary in Spainin order to restore Ferdinand VII’s absolute powers. Austria, with thesupport of other nations, had already intervened in the Kingdom ofNaples after a Carbonari uprising. France was especially keen tointervene in Ferdinand’s favour; Louis XVIII anxiously desired thefull restoration of Bourbon rule in Spain. Castlereagh had no enthu-siasm for such intervention, especially in Spain, and managed topostpone intervention by appealing to the other nations of the HolyAlliance to reconsider.67 He disliked both the arrogance of the Kingof Spain and what he regarded as the naive and unrealistic attitudeof the Spanish liberals.68


Castlereagh believed that events in Spain would probably makehis Ministry more aware of the need to grant recognition to theSouth American states, and to decide which states were fit forrecognition.69 He now regarded recognition ‘rather as a matter oftime than of principle’, and was seriously entertaining the idea ofgranting recognition in the forthcoming Concert meeting whichwould begin on 22 October 1822 in Verona. The fact that he hadalready agreed to recognize the River Plate and Colombia, andprobably also Mexico and Chile, is an indication of his convictionin this respect.70

In August, however, Castlereagh committed suicide, after sufferingseveral weeks of severe melancholy, partly in consequence of the pres-sures he had been subjected to in recent years. Castlereagh’s replace-ment was not named immediately, although the LiverpoolAdministration sent the Duke of Wellington to represent Britain at theVerona Congress. This appointment was to have negative effects forBritish recognition of the Spanish American states. Wellington, like hisbrother the Marquess of Wellesley, had little understanding of thisissue and, moreover, was not particularly in favour of recognition. Allthe same, he was instructed by his Government to go ahead withCastlereagh’s plan, and to do as much as possible to get the otherEuropean nations to accept Spanish American recognition. However,when it came to the discussion of the South American question in theCongress, Wellington presented timid and unconvincing argumentswhich made little impression on the other nations present.71 Attentionwas diverted, to Villele, the French Foreign Minister, who sought arapid solution of the Spanish internal situation, on which France wasnow completely determined.72 Wellington’s lack of enthusiasm at thisCongress might have been the main reason why Lord Liverpool didnot name him as Foreign Minister.

The choice of Castlereagh’s successor as the head of Foreign Affairsshould have been obvious at the time. The Government was, at thisstage, eager to find a man with experience of office, who was in accordwith its line in foreign affairs. The natural candidate, therefore, wasGeorge Canning who, like Castlereagh, belonged to the same Pittitetradition, especially regarding foreign policy. Although he did notshare the ultra-conservative tendencies of some of the members of theLiverpool Administration, he had nevertheless supported this govern-ment from the start. Canning was fundamentally more liberal than


Castlereagh on economic issues policies as well as foreign policy, andalthough he was detested by the Whigs, especially by the Foxite wingwho considered him a ‘turncoat’, he could very well have belonged toone of their factions. But from the beginning of his political career hehad pledged his allegiance to the Pittite Tories and had remainedstaunchly faithful ever since.

Canning had initiated a new tendency inside his party, aligninghimself with fellow Tories who were basically more in favour ofeconomic reform and free-trade policies than the main bulk of the Liverpool Government. Members of this group, which includedthe likes of Huskisson and the young Robert Peel, were known asliberal Tories.73

Charles Webster, in his classic study of Castlereagh, was one ofthe first to sustain that had Castlereagh lived longer he would,sooner or later, have achieved the recognition of the SpanishAmerican states.74 Webster thus posed a counterfactual argument.One of his disciples, John Derry, maintains that ‘the chances arethat the outcome of British policy would have been similar, but themethod, if not the timing, would have been different. In essentialsCanning’s policy towards Spanish America differed little from thatof Castlereagh’.75 Webster is even more conclusive when he statesthat had Castlereagh lived ‘it would have been more clear to poster-ity that the independence of the Spanish colonies had been wonand maintained by the enterprise and heroism of the SouthAmericans themselves’,76 in clear reference to the fact thatCastlereagh, however favourable to recognition, would never haveconsidered himself the champion of their cause, a title moreidentified with his successor.

Canning had previously shown interest in Spanish Americanaffairs and, as we have seen, was especially concerned about the promotion of commercial relations between Great Britain and the independent South American colonies, and had also urged Castlereagh openly to support recognition.77 As CharlesPetrie maintains, Castlereagh had supported commercial relationswith South America to a certain degree, and waited for the right moment to declare political recognition, exploring thepossibility that these colonies might eventually adopt monarchicalgovernments which he would have welcomed.78 Canning,although also favourable to the creation of monarchies in Spanish



America, gave the impression that he had fewer preconditionsabout recognition.

As soon as Canning took over at the Foreign Office in September1822 he immediately focused his attention on the SpanishAmerican question, showing a much more energetic attitude thanhis predecessor.79 Canning had never sympathized with the HolyAlliance and its principles. His ambitions were, first, to shatter theCongress system, and second, to declare as soon as possible therecognition of the Spanish American colonies, not only as a matterof economic advantage for Great Britain, but also on the basis ofpolitical and ideological principle.80 Canning was soon pressing theCabinet to support his recognition policy.81

The breach which Canning was trying to open between GreatBritain and the European Concert of Nations provoked internalopposition from both the King and part of the Cabinet.82

Nevertheless, as Waddell asserts, Canning rapidly proved to theLiverpool Administration that he could command influence inEurope comparable to that of his predecessor.83 In November 1822Canning had already taken the first steps, by offering Spain the ser-vices of Great Britain as mediator in the dispute between thatcountry and its colonies. The year 1823 found Great Britain in adefiant position vis-à-vis Europe. Canning drew up a list of futureBritish Consuls to be sent to Spanish America, a condition consid-ered indispensable by the British Ministry for achieving official com-mercial relations with the new states. This clearly presaged theshape of things to come.84 These Consuls were effectively nomi-nated in 1824, and sailed for their destinations towards the end ofthe year. Canning had taken a decisive step towards British recogni-tion of River Plate independence, which would now be only amatter of time.

6Great Britain and the Recognitionof the River Plate

On 6 April 1823 French troops invaded Spain for the second time infourteen years, seeking to restore Ferdinand VII’s absolute powers andto end the Constitutionalists’ rule. This measure had negative reper-cussions among the other members of the Holy Alliance, especially inGreat Britain. From this moment Britian’s Latin American policywould take a more consistent course. Canning was at this stage clearlyset against the Holy Alliance. The fact that Austria, Prussia, and Russiareacted negatively against the French occupation of Spain did notimpress him. It was clear that these nations were not against France forintervening in Spain, but for not having done so in concert with theother members of the Alliance.1 But such concertation was preciselywhat provoked Canning’s criticism of the Holy Alliance. He was insis-tent that his Government should adopt a more independent stand,and therefore preferred a policy of every nation for itself.2

Spanish America became a crucial issue for Canning, and wouldfrom now on play a prominent role in Britain’s policy towards theAlliance and, most especially, towards France. As in 1808, fears arosein England concerning the future policy of France in SpanishAmerica. The terrifying prospect of French predominance in SouthAmerica was one of the main reasons why Canning accelerated hispolicy in favour of Spanish American interests from 1823 onwards.Canning’s initial policy in this area, as seen in the previous chapter,was commercial and strategic, and fundamentally designed to pre-serve the balance of power against the United States, whose growingcommercial expansion was coming to be regarded as a menace tothe interests of Britain and Europe.3

137

The major obstacles Canning had to overcome in Englandbefore establishing closer relations with the Spanish Americanstates were the lack of support and the suspicions of members ofthe Government. This reluctance was shared by the King himselfand, not surprisingly, by the Duke of Wellington. The animosityand lack of enthusiasm of the latter had already been seen atVerona, when he failed to put to the other European representa-tives a strong argument in favour of Castlereagh’s new approachtowards Spanish American recognition.4 The Duke’s positiontowards South America was best summed-up by himself someyears later, when he expressed that ‘I always had a horror ofrevolutionising a country for a political object. I always said, ifthey rise themselves, well and good, but do not stir them up; it is afearful responsibility.’5 This line of reasoning was shared by mostof his ultra-Tory friends.

Canning gradually began to exploit the situation in Europe, pro-voked by the French intervention in Spain, in favour of his SpanishAmerican policy. The most notable example of this line of conductwas manifested on 9 October 1823, when Canning met PrincePolignac, the French Ambassador in London. By May the FrenchArmy had reached Madrid, and had managed to suppress theConstitutionalist faction. One of the dilemmas now facing the FrenchGovernment was how to deal with the Spanish American colonies.France was only too aware that Britain had already established com-mercial links with some of the emancipated colonies, and that shewas now considering recognizing their independence in order toenhance and consolidate those relations.

France was also interested in furthering commercial relations withthe ex-colonies, and realized the disadvantages which would arisefrom prior British recognition. On the other hand, France wasclearly in no position to acknowledge Spanish American indepen-dence, given the close alliance it maintained with the SpanishCrown.6 The French Government authorized Polignac to seek asecret meeting with Canning in order to find a possible solution. Itwas clearly also in Britain’s interest to prevent any possible Frenchor Spanish interference in their commercial relations with SpanishAmerica. The meeting between Canning and Polignac was in factdue to Wellington’s initiative, for it was he who first suggested thatsuch a meeting would be the best way to sort out the differences


Great Britain and the Recognition of the River Plate 139

between the two nations.7 During the meeting, both men agreedthat the restoration of Spanish authority in the Americas or exclus-ive commercial privileges was hopeless, and resolved to oppose anyterritorial designs by other nations in the former colonies, althoughthis was not to restrict Britain’s existing trade with that continent.Thus Britain agreed to delay her recognition of the colonies, butwarned that any act of interference or aggression by any othernation would prompt immediate recognition.8

This agreement would later be known as the Polignac Memoran-dum. It remained secret for a few months and proved to be a mas-terstroke of diplomacy by Canning. With the completion of theMemorandum, he had achieved one of his main objectives, whichwas to destroy any prospects of French military intervention in theSpanish American colonies. This would not only have damagedBritain’s commercial relations in that area, but would surely alsohave forced her to take some sort of action against France. TheMemorandum would also help to deter possible designs on SouthAmerica on the part of other European nations, and it thereforeenabled Canning to remain in comfortable isolation fromMetternich and the Holy Alliance, from which he would detachhimself completely in the course of the following year.9

In the months before his meeting with Polignac Canning had beenfrequently in touch with the United States Minister in London,Richard Rush, aiming at an Anglo-American understanding tobalance the hegemony of the Holy Alliance nations and their possi-ble intentions towards the South American continent. TheAmerican Minister, on behalf of his Government, seemed eager toconsolidate this agreement with Britain, but when he suggested toCanning a joint recognition of the Spanish American colonies, theBritish Foreign Minister responded negatively. According toKauffmann, Canning delayed recognition while he waited to seewhether any of the Alliance nations would try to intervene in LatinAmerica. He considered that if British recognition were followed byarmed intervention by one of their European allies, this would notonly prove embarrassing but would also put in jeopardy his wholeinternational strategy.10

After completing the Polignac Memorandum, Canning saw nourgency in negotiating an alliance with the United States. The assur-ances implicit in the memorandum, preventing any possible Europeaninterference in the South American continent, allowed Britain toproceed more slowly towards the recognition of the emancipatedstates. Rush approached Canning again on this subject several timesduring the final months of 1823, and was somewhat surprised at themanner in which Canning suddenly seemed to have lost interest in anAnglo-American treaty and continually avoided any mention of theSpanish American question. He reported on Canning’s attitude to hisGovernment and, on receiving his despatches, President JamesMonroe and Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, decided to proposeSpanish American recognition to Congress.11 Throughout November,heated debates on this topic took place in Washington. Somemembers of the US Government feared that recognition might be toodefiant towards Great Britain; notables such as Thomas Jefferson heldthis view, but others, led by Adams, were convinced that this was theright moment to recognize Spanish American independence. Adamsgained Monroe’s approval, and on 2 December 1823 the ‘MonroeDoctrine’ came into existence. This was more than a recognition ofindependence, whereby the United States of America not only recog-nized Spanish American independence, but also declared that anyattempt made by European powers to invade with territories in theWestern Hemisphere would be met with North American resistance.This included any such attempt by Great Britain.12

The news of Monroe’s declaration was received with a certainuneasiness by Canning, who feared that the South Americans mightnow turn towards the United States as their main protector and com-mercial ally. For this reason, Canning immediately made the PolignacMemorandum public, and presented it as the forerunner of the NorthAmerican declaration. He also distributed copies of the memorandumin Parliament and made sure that they reached the independent statesof South America. It is worth mentioning at this point that in BuenosAires, in spite of the news of Monroe’s declaration, recognition of theirindependence from Great Britain was still more anxiously awaited andregarded as much more significant.13

Another precedent which Canning could cite as further evidenceof Great Britain’s goodwill towards the Spanish American colonies,was the sending of Consuls to those areas where the process of


emancipation was more advanced. The states chosen were the RiverPlate, Colombia, and Mexico. The man designated in October byCanning to act as Consul-General in the United Provinces of theRiver Plate government was Woodbine Parish, who thus became thefirst British diplomatic representative in Buenos Aires.

Born in England in 1796, Woodbine Parish was the son of aLincolnshire clergyman, received his education at Eton, and laterentered the diplomatic service, where he was an assistant of JosephPlanta, private secretary to Castlereagh. He was related to JohnParish of Bath, a businessman who had commercial relations inter-ests in the River Plate, and also to the Robertson brothers who werestill living in Buenos Aires at the time of his arrival in March 1824.It is probable that he was chosen as Consul precisely because ofthese family ties.14 He was twenty-seven when he arrived in theRiver Plate, describing it as a ‘disagreeable and disheartening place’,although he was to reside there for nine years.15

Canning had taken the necessary precautions of instructing hisConsuls to point out to the South American authorities in thesethree different states that they should not take their appointmentsas an indication of an imminent recognition by His Majesty’sGovernment. For this reason, in one of their first meetings, Parishwarned Rivadavia that it was his Government’s desire that recogni-tion should first be sought from Spain. The impossibility of suchrecognition was surely obvious at the time but, given the friendlyrelations of Great Britain with Spain, it was a formality that couldnot be avoided. Rivadavia explained to Parish that the SpanishLiberals had sent commissioners to the River Plate in 1823.However, they had demanded too many privileges and powers inreturn for recognizing River Plate independence. Furthermore,now that the Liberals had been overthrown by the French, whichmeant the restoration of the royal powers of Ferdinand VII,Rivadavia considered that any such effort would be completelyfruitless.16

Rivadavia was still the most influential minister in the Buenos AiresGovernment at the time of Parish’s arrival. His position at this stage,however, was not as solid as it had been during the first two years. At home, he had to confront the animosity of both the interiorprovinces – who accused him of trying to impose policies on themas if Buenos Aires were still the capital – and the political factions in


Buenos Aires itself, which made the prospects for the re-election ofthe Rodríguez ministry in the forthcoming elections look slim.17 Thecontinuing presence of the Portuguese in Uruguay still represented amenace. Brazilian independence had been declared in 1822, butRivadavia had no luck when he sent commissioners to Rio deJaneiro to urge new authorities to abandon all attempts to takepossession of Uruguay.

In spite of these difficulties, Parish rapidly showed his sympathytowards Rivadavia, and manifested his optimism concerning thestate of affirs in the River Plate, as is reflected in one of the firstreports he sent to Canning:

Such is a summary of the formation and progress of the presentfree government of Buenos Ayres. The first years, indeed, of therevolution were marked with those scenes of bloodshed and dis-order over which it might be merciful to cast the veil of obliv-ion; but where is the people who have established their libertywithout similar attendant circumstances; and what are thehorrors which have marked the former struggles for freedom notonly in this hemisphere, but in our own, in England, in France,Italy, and lastly in unhappy Spain ? Experience dearly bought isof the greater value. In this country, indeed, the lessons whichhave been learnt from the course of events are inappreciable.The errors of the past will be shunned for the future; and thebenefits of a good government, which has been at last estab-lished, are now quite sufficiently known and understood toensure the support of all classes of the people.18

Shortly afterwards however, details about the complexities ofincipient political life in the River Plate were also to be expressed byParish to Canning, on the occasion of Rivadavia’s leaving officewhen the Rodríguez Administration was ousted from the govern-ment of the Province of Buenos Aires after the elections of April1824:

He [Rivadavia] had done more for the general amelioration ofthis state in the last three years, than all his predecessors inpower, but in carrying his plans into effect Mr. Rivadavia hasnecessarily created many personal enemies especially amongst


the military and the clergy. The numbers of the first he has veryconsiderably reduced; and of the numerous convents and monas-teries which formerly possessed controlling influence in BuenosAires, few only now exist. The persons who have suffered bythese measures, have since the election of the new governor,been actively employed to raise a feeling against Rivadavia, and Iam sorry to add apparently not without some success.19

This last sentence clearly emphasizes how Parish consideredRivadavia an indispensable figure in the development of a peacefuland progressive state. He had impressed Parish favourably the fewtimes they had met, and the daunting prospect of a new Govern-ment, many of whose members were supposedly enemies ofRivadavia, no doubt produced a certain amount of anxiety in bothParish and the British commercial community. After all,Rivadavia’s liberalism, reflected in many of his reforms whilst inoffice, had helped to create a Government which was acceptable tomost of the British merchants, and to many of the politicians inEngland who believed that if such progressive goals could beachieved they would help to accelerate recognition from GreatBritain, indispensable for succesful commercial intercoursebetween the two countries.

There was, however, a fair amount of hasty optimism in Parish’searly reports to his Government with regard to the stabilityachieved in the River Plate since Rivadavia had taken office. As Fernscorrectly points out, these reports contrasted with those sent at thesame time by the British mercantile community in Buenos Aires.These correspondents revealed that, however fond they were ofRivadavia, stability had yet to be restored, and that only when thiswas achieved could the River Plate become a reliable and permanenttrading partner with England.20

The question of British recognition had been in Rivadavia’s mind eversince he arrived in office. As soon as he heard that Canning wassending a Consul to the River Plate, he decided in turn to designate arepresentative to act in the same capacity in London. He chose JohnHullett, from Hullett Brothers & Company, one of the most important


British firms in Buenos Aires. This choice did not please Canning at all.He thought it would have been much more convenient for bothnations if Rivadavia had chosen a native from the River Plate.21

Indeed, as if he foresaw that Rivadavia’s choice of Hullett would notplease the British Government, Parish had sought to convince him todesignate San Martín, who was now back in Buenos Aires, and whohad expressed his desire to emigrate to Europe. Rivadavia, who hadnever been on good terms with San Martín, astutely explained toParish that this nomination would not be entirely suitable as SanMartín the Liberator, was in favour of the installation of a EuropeanMonarch in the River Plate, and was still eager to negotiate this solu-tion. Rivadavia even claimed that it was the main reason why SanMartín wished to leave for Europe.22

More significantly, in November 1823, a few months before theBritish Consul’s arrival in Buenos Aires, Rivadavia decided to send adiplomatic mission to Great Britain, which was to be secret andunofficial, and another to the United States, for the purpose ofplacing a River Plate diplomatic aid in Washington. Ever since theappearance of a publication in the River Plate which announced,after the Verona Congress, that the Holy Alliance threatened tointervene in the revolutionary states, Rivadavia had felt the need togain British and American support against any Alliance expeditionto South America. Fears increased when news reached Buenos Airesof the French occupation of Spain the following year, promptingthe immediate despatch of the missions.23

The man chosen by Rivadavia to head the British mission andafterwards act as diplomatic representative in the United States,was none other than Carlos María de Alvear, who had beenDirector Supremo when Rivadavia had been sent to Europe on asimilar mission in 1815. After that tumultuous experience inpower, Alvear had been forced to live in exile in Rio de Janeiro andlater in Montevideo. Here he joined the Chilean José AntonioCarrera, with whom in 1819 he entered the Federalist cause in anattempt to oust the Pueyrredón Administration, allying with SantaFe Governor Estanislao López and his army, which was thenpreparing to attack Buenos Aires. After a misunderstanding withLópez, Alvear was soon forced back into exile.24 When theRodríguez Government announced an amnesty in November1821, Alvear decided to return. He was on good terms with


Rivadavia, which was further shown when Rivadavia appointedhim for this mission.25 Parish insinuated that Alvear should findno difficulties in approaching Canning, whom he had alreadyinformed about this visit.26

Alvear finally received instructions from Rivadavia in February1824. He was to seek an interview with Canning and explain to himthat the unofficial nature of his mission was due to the fact that theRiver Plate Government had no doubts about Britain’s favourabledisposition in favour of their cause. He also had to explain toCanning that the main aim of his journey was to report to theBritish Government on the situation in the River Plate and toreceive ratification of British support. He was told to find out asmuch as possible about the reaction of the British Government andof British public opinion towards the recognition of the SpanishAmerican states. Alvear was to put forward much the same argu-ments in his visit to the United States, as well as to thank Monroefor his declaration of the previous year.27

Alvear arrived at Liverpool on 5 June 1824 after an 84-day journey.There he was enthusiastically greeted by a delegation of local mer-chants who were interested in hearing about the situation in SouthAmerica. Six days later, on arriving at Birmingham, he was invitedto a meeting of merchants and manufacturers who were alsoanxious to inquire about the same subject.28 During his stay inEngland a petition for the recognition of the emancipated SouthAmerican states was presented to the Government by some of themajor firms of Liverpool and London.29 When he arrived in London,Alvear made sure that the favourable remarks he had expressedabout Rivadavia in these meetings were published in the newspa-pers, a means of predisposing English public opinion in favour ofthe cause of the independent South American states, and of promot-ing the case for recognition.30

On June 29 Alvear sent Rivadavia an account of what he had beenable to find out about the reaction in England towards SouthAmerica, and enclosed a copy of the Polignac Memorandum. It hadonly recently been made public, and was a complete novelty toAlvear. With respect to the British Government’s policy towards


South American states, Alvear transcribed the speech made by LordLiverpool in Parliament, and his answer to a question from theMarquess of Lansdowne, on the current state of relations with thenew states of Spanish America:

En la sesión tenida en la Cámara de los Lores el 24 del corriente, unmiembro de ella, el Marqués de Landsdown, habiendo preguntadoal primer ministro Lord Liverpool cuales eran las relaciones y dis-posiciones del Gobierno respecto de los nuevos estados de SudAmérica, respondió éste que el gobierno no tenía ningún compro-miso directo ni indirecto con potencia alguna para reconocer o nola independencia de aquellos estados y que estaba enteramentelibre para determinar sobre este punto, según los intereses de lanación inglesa; que habiendo dado el paso de proponer alGobierno Español fuese el primero en hacer el reconocimiento deaquellas sus antiguas colonias, haciéndole ver la necesidad y con-veniencia que le resultaría de tal procedimiento, el gabinete deMadrid había rehusado decididamente acceder a tal propuesta,razón porque el Gobierno Inglés quedaba ya libre aun con respectoa España, para hacer (a su debido tiempo) el reconocimiento deaquellos nuevos estados, y para contraer con ellos obligacionestanto morales como de cualquiera otra especie y añadió: elGobierno ha enviado comisionados a varios de aquellos estadospara que formando una idea exacta de la situación respectiva deellos, se pueda proceder a su reconocimiento; como el informe delos comisionados no ha llegado aún, se suspende todo proced-imiento, bien entendido; que estando salvo el Gobierno Inglés,como se ha dicho anteriormente, de todo compromiso, tanto conlas potencias extranjeras como con la España misma, sólo esperalas noticias de sus comisionados para determinar sobre el asunto encuestión.31

This announcement by the Prime Minister led Alvear to con-clude that the Liverpool Administration was inclined towardsrecognition, although he had yet to meet Canning to confirm thisassessment.

Alvear meanwhile met some of the envoys of the other SouthAmerican states, who were there for similar reasons. Among themwere José Manuel Hurtado of Colombia, José Mariano Michelena of


Mexico and Juan García del Río of Peru. García del Río had actuallyheld two meetings with Prince Polignac. Hurtado, moreover, hadalready managed to have a couple of conferences with Canning. Hetold Alvear that the British Foreign Minister had informed him thathe had recently exhorted the Portuguese to recognize Brazilian inde-pendence, and had expressed his hope that, if this were achieved,Spain might shortly recognize South American independence aswell.32

On 6 July 1824 Alvear had further reason to believe there was afavourable disposition towards the recognition of the River Plate. Onthe same day The Times reprinted Canning’s letter to Rivadaviaannouncing the appointment of Parish as Consul to Buenos Aires.There was also news about the completion of a loan from BaringBrothers to the Government of Buenos Aires. It had been negotiatedby one of the Robertson brothers, now a Director of the Bank ofBuenos Aires, and by Félix Castro, a prominent Rioplatense merchant.33

In spite of this good news, Alvear was unable to arrange a meetingwith Canning, and by late July his hopes of doing so were low. Alvearexpressed his regret to John Hullet that he had been unable to meetwith the Foreign Minister. A few days later, on 21 July – the very dayhe was to set to sail – thanks to John Hullet’s mediation Alvearunexpectedly received an invitation to meet Canning. On receivingthis invitation he naturally suspended his journey.34

The meeting between Alvear and Canning took place on 22 July1824. What transpires from Alvear’s account is that Canning gavehim a cool reception. Before the interview he had sent Alvear a setof questions about the state of affairs in the River Plate. Once hehad the Rioplatense envoy in front of him he immediately pro-ceeded to cross-examine him in a hasty and almost irritablemanner.35

Canning’s first move was to ask Alvear if he knew anythingabout Rivadavia’s departure from the Government, to which Alvearanswered that he had no official confirmation of this. The ForeignMinister carried on with the interrogation and asked a few ques-tions concerning the characteristics of the political institutionsfunctioning in the River Plate, such as the extent of authorityattributed to the Executive and to the Congress. He also enquiredabout the situation of the other South American states, and indi-cated that the events occurring in Peru, where Bolívar was still


attempting to defeat the Spanish, could prove menacing for theRiver Plate if the Spaniards were to triumph. Alvear replied thatthe River Plate Provinces had acquired their emancipation fromSpain fourteen years ago and no longer had reason to fear theSpaniards.36

Whilst reviewing the South American situation Alvear took theopportunity to bring Canning up to date about the situation ofUruguay, still being threatened by Portuguese troops, and to attemptto gain his sympathy for the River Plate. Canning initially reacted withalarm and surprise, but then merely asked if there was any way offinding a solution. He also asked Alvear about the real authority ofBuenos Aires over the other River Plate Provinces. Alvear answered that the capital had no authority over the Provinces, Canning astutelyfollowed the question by asking exactly whom Alvear was representingin his capacity of Minister to the United States. Alvear replied that hewas representing all the River Plate Provinces, since the United StatesGovernment had, with President Monroe’s declaration, recognized theindependence of all the Provinces which had comprised the RiverPlate Viceroyalty.37 The conference ended with Canning’s request tosee Alvear’s credentials. Alvear promptly refused this request, fearingthat it was a strategy to make him reveal official papers concerning hismission to the United States. He explained that he did not have hiscredentials with him at that moment. Towards the end of the meetingAlvear conveyed his Government’s conviction that Great Britain wasthe most progressive, illustrious, and moral nation in Europe, and themost sympathetic to the newly formed States of South America. At thispoint Canning abruptly interrupted Alvear’s speech and, bluntlyacknowledging the Rioplatenses praise of his country, put an end to themeeting.38

The effect this meeting had on Canning and on his appreciation ofthe situation in the River Plate is not easy to determine. Neither is itclear, for that matter, why he adopted such a cool attitude towardsAlvear during this conference. He could have been in a bad mood onthat particular day, or he might have felt suspicious about the exactnature of Alvear’a mission. Another reason might well have been acertain degree of irritation at the way in which Alvear had conductedhimself since arriving in England, stimulating the hopes of the Britishmerchants and exciting public opinion about the prosperous future ofthe River Plate. This served only to put further pressure on the Govern-


ment to take a rapid decision in the delicate matter of recognition.However, another likely explanation of Canning’s attitude may liein the arrival of news in London from Buenos Aires of Rivadavia’sdeparture from the Government, which may have created a negativeimpression on the Foreign Minister.

As to the influence this meeting had on Canning’s future deci-sions about South American states, it does not seem that Alvear’svisit contributed much by way of accelerating recognition. Nor didAlvear add much to what Canning knew already about River Plateaffairs. Alvear embarked on 29 July for the United States, where amore auspicious welcome was awaiting him. During the time Alvearwas in England, the Liverpool Ministry had to deal with frequentcomplaints voiced by the Whig opposition in Parliament. At thebeginning of the 1824 session Lansdowne, who was mentioned inAlvear’s letter to Rivadavia, and who was at this stage the mostactive of the Whigs in South America affairs, drew up a motion forthe recognition of South American independence as guaranteeagainst any Spanish attacks. The motion was defeated by 95 to 34.39

Brougham also condemned the Government for failing to opposethe Holy Alliance, and thus losing influence in Europe.40 Manyother prominent Whigs supported the London merchants and theirdemands for South American recognition. Mackintosh, for example,criticized Canning for having suggested that it was those with com-mercial interests in South America who were most anxious forrecognition. This eccentric Whig leader riposted:

With regard to the influence of what may be said here upon the loans to the independent states, I can only say, that I havenot the slightest interest in them. I find ample employment forthe whole of my capital at home; and however I mightspeculate in other matters, I am certainly not a speculator ofthat sort.41

Mackintosh was even more emphatic when he spoke in the Houseof Commons on 15 June 1824 on the occasion of the petition pre-sented by the merchants of London:

When Great Britain (I hope very soon) recognises the states ofSpanish America, it will not be as a concession to them, for they


need no such recognition; but it will be for her own interest, toprotect the trade and navigation of her subjects, to acquire thebest means of cultivating friendly relations with important coun-tries, and of composing by immediate negotiation those differ-ences which might otherwise terminate in war.42

The Times remained sceptical about Mackintosh’s position asregards towards Spanish America, which was not in favour of com-plete recognition, claiming that his efforts were ‘reduced to verylittle, in short to nothing’. It thought that the debate with Canninghad been dull, and argued that its only interesting feature was aslight indication that the Foreign Minister might consider some sortof partial recognition. It concluded that, if this was effected, ‘weapplaud the prudence of the British Minister’.43

Other notable Whigs chose to adopt a more moderate stance. TheHolland House circle, as mentioned before, had their loyalties toSpain, and this naturally put them in an awkward position regard-ing South America. Grey, for example, was more concerned for thestability of Europe, and reckoned that recognition would placeBritain in a difficult position. He agreed with Canning that Englandhad no right to stop Spain from trying to recover her colonies, butargued further that she had no right to prevent Spain’s allies fromhelping her. Nevertheless, he ended up favouring recognition andsupported Landsdowne’s motion.44

Canning also encountered bitter opposition within the Cabinet,from the more conservative faction, led by Wellington, which dislikedhis policy of distancing himself from the Holy Alliance.45 For thisfaction, more sympathetic to Castlereagh’s foreign policy, the Alliance,with all its faults, symbolized European stability, and they feared thatundoing it would only disrupt the order which had been maintainedon the continent since Napoleon’s defeat. They therefore viewed therecognition of the South American states as an anti-Alliance policyand, by the middle of 1824, Canning was certainly giving them theimpression that he was effectively working in favour of this cause. As ifthis were not enough, the King still strongly opposed South Americanrecognition.46 These diverse poles of opposition towards his handlingof South American recognition left Canning in a delicate situation. Hehad most of the Whigs pressing for immediate recognition while hisTory enemies, and the King himself, accused him of going too far.


Nevertheless, the Tory and Whig opposition to Canning’s SouthAmerican policy was not strong enough to effect any change in theForeign Office. The Whigs criticized his delay in announcing recog-nition, but basically favoured the policy he had adopted, and as forthe die-hard Tories, they were only too aware that Canning’s tenureat the Foreign Office guaranteed their own tenure in power. In spiteof their desire for a policy more sympathetic to the Holy Alliance,they were prepared to sacrifice such a stand in order to remain in the Ministry.47 This was apparent when, inParliamentary debates towards the end of July, Lord Liverpool andCanning managed to obtain a consensus in both Houses when theyformally declared that Britain no longer had to consult either Spainor her other European allies on South American recognition andwould, from now on, unilaterally determine the right moment forrecognition.48 This was what Alvear reported to Rivadavia.

At much the same time as his conference with Alvear, Canningsent to Parish his reactions to the first reports he had received aboutthe River Plate:

Your despatches contain, generally speaking, a satisfactory reportof the situation of Buenos Ayres; of the moderate principles ofthe Government, of its tendency to a stable and tranquil settle-ment; and of the disposition manifested, as well as by persons inpower as by the inhabitants at large, to cultivate with thiscountry the closest relations of friendly intercourse.49

Although there was no mention in this letter of his meeting withAlvear, Canning made clear the present stance of Great Britainregarding relations with the River Plate and with Spain. He enquiredmore about one of the points he had put to Alvear during hisinterrogation, which apparently was still not all together clear tohim:

It is neither the right nor the intention of Great Britain to doanything to promote the separation of any of the SpanishColonies from Spain. But the fact of that separation is an indis-pensable preliminary to any further proceedings or inquiries;and it is not till after the fact has been decisively ascertained,that a question can arise as to the expediency of entering into


arrangements founded upon a recognition of it. The fact of sep-aration seems to be clearly established with respect to BuenosAyres, by the length of time which has elapsed since its originaldeclaration, of independence, and since a Spanish force hasexisted in its territory; and by the absence of anything like aSpanish party in the state. The competency of that state toenter into arrangements with other countries does not appearliable to question. But there is one point upon which yourreport is not so clear, as might be desired, I mean as to thepower of the government of Buenos Ayres to bind by its stipula-tions with a foreign state, all the members of the government ofBuenos Ayres.50

It seems obvious that Canning was eager to know what authoritythe Government of Buenos Aires enjoyed over the rest of the RiverPlate provinces. Canning may have assumed that here lay the key tothe future stability of the state, which seemed to be a criterion forrecognition. He nevertheless instructed Parish that if the situationin the River Plate remained stable, he was to inform the Governmentthere that it was His Majesty’s desire to conclude a commercialtreaty with them soon. He stressed that:

The full power of the government of Rio de La Plata will necessar-ily set forth the political style and title by which thatGovernment designates itself; and you will not proceed to theopening of the negotiation unless that instrument shall bearupon the face of it the authority, not of Buenos Ayres alone, butof the whole of the States comprehended in the description ofthe United States of Rio de la Plata.51

The sudden appearance of this treaty question arose from theneed of Canning and Lord Liverpool to formalize commercial rela-tions as well as recognition. Nevertheless, they needed still furtherevidence of the stability and unity in the River Plate to present thecase for recognition to the rest of the Cabinet. At the same time,Rivadavia was preparing to embark on another trip to England. Afterrefusing to stay on as a minister in the Government of Las Heras,who had offered to keep him in his post in spite of his being consid-ered an ‘enemy’ of the new Government, he had decided to leave


for London, explaining that he was going for personal reasons, butalso as to promote the diplomatic and economic interests of theRiver Plate.52 He was named Charge d’Affaires of the River Plate inLondon. Parish was enthusiastic about Rivadavia’s trip to England,and reported to Canning that:

Mr. Rivadavia’s intentions in leaving this country were as I havealready stated in a former despatch to visit his children, andupon his private affairs; but it has appeared to me in public viewthat the greatest advantages may arise from his presence inEngland at this moment, advantages which I could neither rec-oncile it to myself to overlook or to hesitate at once to suggest tothe consideration of this government.53

Parish also believed that Rivadavia was the ideal representativeto communicate the state of things in the River Plate, as he had been the principal Minister of the previous Government. Headded:

That if the time be approaching and from my present knowledgeof the settled state of things here joined to the advises receivedfrom England, I feel that it cannot be far distant for entering intorelations with these provinces of a more ostensible character. Noone possesses to such an extent the confidence of the govern-ment and people of Buenos Aires as Mr. Rivadavia, no one isbetter qualified to enter upon any negotiations with His Majesty’sgovernment which may be necessary towards their finalestablishment.54

Rivadavia arrived in London in September. Canning seemed aspleased as Parish about his arrival:

M de Rivadavia arrived by the same packet which brought yourdespatches. He professes himself not to be furnished with anypowers on the part of his Government, but states himself readyto furnish every information in his power [as] to the state ofaffairs in Buenos Aires. It is certainly very important for His


Majesty’s Government to possess in him so valuable and soauthentic a source of information.55

Although it was true that one the reasons for Rivadavia’s journeyto England was to visit his children, who were in boarding schoolsin this country, and to persuade the Government that the RiverPlate was stable and thus accelerate recognition, he had otherprivate affairs to attend to, probably the most important reason forhis return. In November 1823 Rivadavia had written to Hullett &Company, informing them of the existence of rich mines of bothgold and silver in Famatina, near the city of La Rioja. He offeredthem participation in their exploitation and began negotiations tocreate an English mining company. Hullett & Company organizedthe Rio de la Plata Mining Company with a nominal capital of onemillion pounds. This association with Hullett & Company helpsexplain why Rivadavia designated John Hullett as Consul of theRiver Plate in London.56

Another venture Rivadavia was keen on exploring was to encouragethe immigration of British subjects to the Plate, in order to advancelocal agriculture. He thought that the introduction of immigrants fromEngland and northern Europe would improve the social, economic,and political condition of the River Plate and would eventually stimu-late agriculture. Rivadavia always regarded agriculture as the source ofwealth of the River Plate provinces. He intended to attract these immi-grants by offering them the same incentives he was offering for localfarmers by way of the Emphyteusis Law – Rivadavia’s most importantreform in agriculture – whereby state lands would now be rented totenants.57

Rivadavia’s most significant venture during this trip to London,however, was to secure a loan of a million pounds for theGovernment of Buenos Aires, which became effective in July 1824.This loan had been pursued by Rivadavia while he was still acting asMinister of the Buenos Aires Government, and had been approvedby congress in August 1822. The money was to be used by the gov-ernment to build adequate port facilities, to provide the city withrunning water, and to build towns on the southern frontier of theprovince of Buenos Aires to discourage indian raids.58

Canning soon realized that Rivadavia had other business to attendto in England apart from promoting the political credibility of the


River Plate states. Canning reported to Parish about Rivadavia’sactivities in England:

M. Rivadavia lived while here in constant intercourse with com-mercial establishments in this country, establishments highlyrespectable but still consisting of persons deeply interested in thefluctuations of commercial affairs. I desire that you will lose noopportunity of impressing upon M. Garcia how inexpedient it isthat the Government of Buenos Ayres should place the conductof their affairs in England in the hands of any person in such asituation.59

These strictures were written by Canning almost a year afterRivadavia’s arrival in London. It is worth clarifying here that,during the intervening months, Rivadavia had also been engagedin other activities, mentioned below, which had provoked similarreactions from Canning. The fact that as a rule British diplomatswere forbidden to trade, partly explains Canning’s negativereaction towards Rivadavia’s commercial activities whilst inLondon: he expected the similar ethical behaviour from a RiverPlate emissary.

In the last months of 1824 Canning decided to press for the recog-nition of the River Plate. In spite of his doubts and suspicions aboutthe stability of the political situation, especially after Rivadavia’sdeparture from the Government, Canning was convinced at thispoint that the new state was ready for recognition.60 Parish’sdespatches had certainly done a lot to persuade Canning to take thisdecision. Around 3500 Englishmen were now residing in BuenosAires, and 39 English commercial houses were already operating inthe city, and this must surely have weighed favourably with him asa clear indication of the extent to which British commercial inter-ests in the River Plate had expanded.61

However, there was still dissent in Liverpool’s Cabinet.Wellington insisted that River Plate recognition should not bedeclared until there was some acceptance of the central authority of


Buenos Aires by the other provinces of the River Plate.62 Accordingto Webster, Wellington was only attempting to gain time in order toreach an agreement with the other European powers to preventrecognition from being granted at all.63 The decision was thereforeleft in suspense for a few more months. Canning, as he had alreadydone in August, sent further instructions to Parish in September,and pressed him to find more evidence about the stability and unityof the republic and report it to the British Government as soon aspossible.64

Parish immediately sought to satisfy Canning’s request by con-tacting Manuel García, who had replaced Rivadavia as the mostimportant minister of the new Government. A lawyer, García hadbeen Minister of Finance of the previous Government and seemeddetermined to develop the economy of the River Plate as Rivadaviahad done before him, especially by accelerating financial reform.Parish must have taken a liking to García, for he confidentially dis-closed to him many of Canning’s despatches.65 Parish also requestedthat the River Plate government declare religious toleration. This,García explained, might take some time.66 With respect to RiverPlate unity, Parish advised García that he should present to him aconvincing report so that Parish could put forward a reassuring caseto his government about this most vital requirement for the recog-nition of this state.67

In October, García duly complied and presented a formal note toParish, explaining that although all the River Plate Provinces hadseparate administrations for the conduct of their domestic affairs,they still looked to the Government of Buenos Aires for the handlingof all negotiations regarding foreign relations.68

In late October 1824, Parish wrote to Canning stating that heconsidered it wiser for Britain to delay any contacts or decisionsregarding the River Plate until a national government was consoli-dated. Parish regarded that there were reasonable chances for there-establishment of a national government which would unify allthe provinces with Buenos Aires as their capital. In January of thefollowing year a National Congress was due to take place inBuenos Aires to resolve this matter.69 Parish also informedCanning that he had taken the liberty of disclosing confidentiallythe last instructions he had received to García. This was to giveGarcía the notion of imminent recognition by the BritishGovernment, and was a clever move by Parish, who must surely


have been aware that by informing García of Britain’s favourabledisposition he could contribute to the desirable unification of theRiver Plate provinces.

In a despatch to Canning, Parish explained why he had disclosedsuch information:

With this feeling I called upon Mr.Garcia in the evening, andmade known to him confidentially the determination which HisMajesty’s Government had come to as to the establishment offuture relations with these provinces. I can ill describe the satis-faction with which this communication was received by theBuenos Ayrean Minister, nor had I the smallest difficulty in con-vincing him of the obvious necessity of the existence of a formalauthority on the part of the whole of the United Provinces beforethe negotiation could be in any way opened.70

Canning approved Parish’s proceedings in this affair after hereceived the above letter in late December, and praised the Consulfor his astute judgement.71

Also in December the news of the victory of Bolivar’s CommanderGeneral Antonio Sucre over the Spanish Army at Ayacucho in UpperPeru speeded the process by which the members of the Congressagreed to place the conduct of foreign affairs of the Confederationin the hands of the Government of Buenos Aires, thus providingParish and Canning with the requirement they had both beenawaiting. For this reason Parish, who in late December had alreadyannounced to the leading British residents in Buenos Aires and tomembers of the local government the imminence of British recogni-tion, signed the Anglo-Argentine Treaty of Friendship andCommerce with García on 14 February 1825. The Treaty establishedthe basis for the future relationship between the two countries.72 Itregulated the conditions for trade, and guaranteed the civil rights ofBritish citizens residing in the River Plate as well as formally grant-ing them freedom of worship. The Treaty was ratified by the BritishGovernment in May 1825. By then Canning had already achievedthe recognition of the United Provinces of the River Plate, or LasProvincias Unidas del Río de la Plata.

In mid-December 1824, Canning had urged the government toaccept his proposal for the recognition of Mexico, Colombia, andBuenos Aires, on the grounds that the Holy Alliance powers had per-


suaded France to remain in Spain, and that this represented a con-tinuing menace to British interests in South America. WhenCanning perceived that this plea was still met by opposition, bothhe and Lord Liverpool threatened to resign. In the face of thisthreat, recognition was accepted by the Ministry, and announced inan unenthusiastic message by the King in the opening session ofParliament on 7 February 1825.73 The fact that Canning did notneed to await any further confirmation about the situation in theRiver Plate implies that he was already satisfied from what he hadheard about the course of events there.

Canning thus consolidated his reputation of champion of theLatin American cause. However, many contemporaries remainedunimpressed with his achievement. The feeling amongst certainmembers of the Whig faction was that Canning had delayed far toolong in announcing recognition; Brougham, for example, claimedthat the credit should go to Mackintosh who, he considered, haddone a great deal to bring the Liverpool Ministry to consider SouthAmerican recognition.74 This muted reaction could also be seen inthe House of Commons in December 1825, when Canning againjustified South American recognition. In a speech he delivered onthe persistent Franco-Spanish conflict, he uttered his famous phrase‘I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of theOld’. After a moment of silence, this was followed by ‘the sound offaint mocking laughter from the corner of the chamber’, before theHouse erupted into cheering and applause.75

In spite of recognition, Canning was still confronted by problems inthe River Plate in the two years that followed. The question of theBanda Oriental was still unresolved. This had been one of the mattersRivadavia wished to settle during his stay in Europe. While still inLondon, however, he had further irritated the British Foreign Ministerwhen it was discovered that his mission was also destined for France.In a letter to Parish, Canning referred to this:

Such being the case, it is almost unnecessary for me to dwell atany length upon the irregularity of the double mission withwhich Mr.Rivadavia has been charged by his Government. It


must be obvious to you, and you will easily be able to convincethe Government of Buenos Ayres, that no satisfactory relationscould possibly exist between His Majesty’s Government and byany individual, however eminent, who should be accredited atthe same time both to this country and to France.76

Further strife followed when Rivadavia told Canning that it wasBritain’s duty to ensure that Uruguay was restored to the River Plategiven, he claimed, that a promise was implicit in a statement madein 1812 by Lord Strangford. Rivadavia argued that Strangford hadgiven a written guarantee to the River Plate Government thatBritain would ensure the Banda Oriental’s independence from thePortuguese in the Armistice signed that year.77 To these pretensionsCanning responded, arguing that:

Mr. Rivadavia ought to know that there is nothing in the wholecircle of diplomatic engagements so solemn as one of guarantee;that no nation ever contacts such an engagement without somestrenuous motive or some over-ruling interest; that even then noGovernment, having the honour of the country whose affairs itmanages, at heart, would contract that engagement but upon themost mature deliberation, and in the most precise and definiteterms.78

By this time, Rivadavia was already back in Buenos Aires, where hewas elected first President of the reunited Provincias Unidas del Río dela Plata in February 1826. Canning had written to Parish stating thathe was only too glad to see him leave England.79

The dispute between Brazil and Argentina over the fate of theBanda Oriental later developed into a war between the two nations,which began in early 1826. The eventual outcome of this disputewas the independence of Uruguay in 1828, one of the two solutionsCanning had effectively suggested when he delivered instructions tothe British commissioner sent as mediator:

First, that the cession of Montevideo by Brazil should be negoti-ated on the basis of the arrangement which was in progressbetween Spain and Portugal when the military revolution atCadiz broke out, Viz., that of a pecuniary compensation to be


paid by Buenos Ayres to Brazil for the expenses incurred by thatpower in the occupation of Montevideo; or, secondly that thetown and territory of Montevideo should become and remainindependent of either country, in a position somewhat similar ofthe Hanseatic towns of Europe.80

Thus, Canning had used the Latin American question as a defensivestrategy against the fading conservative ambitions of the HolyAlliance, and to this end was now even prepared to accept the estab-lishment of republics in South America; this from a man stillimbued with that anti-revolutionary Pittite tradition.


Conclusion

When Canning eventually recognized River Plate independence in1825, it seemed as if the slow and complicated process of initialexploratory relations between the River Plate and Great Britain hadcome to a happy end, and that a new and more straightforward rela-tionship was about to commence. This process had begun in 1806when British troops invaded the River Plate as a result of Popham’srash initiative. Although it was far from clear at the time, the inva-sions, as Ferns has pointed out, paved the way to an Anglo-Argentine relationshionship. After this affair, British knowledge andawareness about the internal affairs of the River Plate increasedconsiderably.

Britain’s interest in Spanish America had been evident throughoutthe eighteenth century, mainly for commercial and strategicreasons, and the River Plate area in particular had caught Dundas’attention. The British Navy, with which Dundas was connected fora long period, had warned the Government several times about theconvenience of South American expeditions. Lord Strangford’sarrival with the Portuguese court in Brazil gave Britain anotherchance to view the affairs in the River Plate at close hand.Strangford, as we have seen, took an immediate interest in theRioplatense situation, and at first it seemed that his interest wasshared by his Government. This was especially the case withCanning, who showed a high degree of concern over the Carlotaaffair. However, from 1809 to 1816 Strangford’s dispatches relatingto River Plate affairs no longer seemed to provoke the same interest.This apparent lack of interest had to do with the consolidation of

161

Britain’s alliance with Spain, which left her in an uncomfortableposition regarding the independence of the South American states.Therefore, during the period 1810–20, British policy towards thesestates was pretty diffident.

The effect in Europe of the River Plate’s declarations of indepen-dence in 1810 and 1816 was especially negative as regards the majorpowers. This was hardly surprising given the anti-revolutionaryspirit which prevailed in Europe during those years, and whichBritain partly shared. This aversion to possible revolutionary out-breaks in South America was reflected in British reactions to thevarious missions sent from Buenos Aires during this period. Notonly was Castlereagh’s attitude towards these diplomatic delegationsboth distant and hesitant; he also gave support to monarchical pro-jects in the new South American states. The diplomatic missionssent by the first independent Governments of the River Plate toGreat Britain clearly illustrate that Britain was the country seen asmost important by these Governments. Although Rivadavia eventu-ally became disillusioned with Britain’s apparent lack of interest in1816, and chose to try his luck in France, there always existed aclear idea amongst River Plate politicians that British support andrecognition were the most vital.

The advantages implicit in the consolidation of a sound commer-cial relationship between the River Plate and Great Britain, oncerecognition was granted, is undoubtedly a major explanation for theunderstanding of the Rioplatense inclination towards Britain.However, the correspondence between the River Plate emissariesand the government officials does not suggest that this was theexclusive objective. The commercial intercourse between Britain andthe new Latin American states began to develop more strongly fromthe 1820s onwards.

The original motives of the River Plate missions to London had todo with the need to gain political credibility and acceptance from thenation which they most admired and respected. This had been theposition adopted by the other Latin American states, such as Mexico,Venezuela and Chile, who also sent emissaries to England for thesame reasons. However, the succesive rioplatense agents sent on mis-sions to London, during the 1810s, lacked the sufficient diplomaticexperience to convince the British Government to acknowledge theindependence of the River Plate provinces.


The importance Britain attached to the new states’ political credi-bility was to be evident throughout the period 1810–25. It was, asmany historians have maintained, an excuse for delaying recogni-tion, but it also clearly reflected Britain’s concern about theoutcome of republican experiments in these nations. The appear-ance in Lord Liverpool’s Administration of a more liberal-mindedfigure, Canning, did not necessarily mean that these fears wouldrapidly evaporate. Like Castlereagh before him, Canning also pre-ferred the creation of monarchies in South America, and this wasone of the reasons why the Whigs questioned how open-mindedCanning really was with respect to South America. Nevertheless,Canning proved instrumental in making Britain adopt a more deter-mined and favourable inclination towards River Plate and LatinAmerican recognition.

No less significant than Canning’s appearance on the scene wasRivadavia’s entry into River Plate politics a year earlier. Whatseemed a very complex political situation in the River Plate in 1820,due to the constant Portuguese presence in Uruguay and theincreasing resentment of the River Plate provinces towards BuenosAires’s central government, changed substantially when the politicalstructure was modified, and the capital and provinces becameautonomous. Rivadavia’s incorporation to the newly createdGovernment of Buenos Aires, in 1821, proved highly significant ashe was largely responsible for introducing innovative economic andsocial reforms which provoked the admiration of the fast-growingBritish community in Buenos Aires. It would not take long for these new developments to attract the attention of the BritishGovernment.

The emergence of both Canning and Rivadavia was thereforesignificant for speeding the process of recognition. They had bothfollowed the evolution of relations between their countries for quitesome time. Canning was well aware of the confusion surroundingthe invasions as, along with Castlereagh, he was at the time verymuch involved in the parliamentary debates which they provoked.Canning had frequently stated his opinions against such enterprises.He was also in contact with Strangford during the latter’s first yearsin Rio de Janeiro. Later, when he was out of office, he became akeen advocate of the claims of the merchants of Liverpool, the con-stituency he represented, for free trade with South America.

Conclusion 163

Rivadavia, for his part, had lived in England for a considerablenumber of months during the time of his diplomatic mission inEurope, and was clearly influenced by British economic ideals. Healso had a declared admiration for the British educational system,and had expressed a desire to promote British immigration to thePlate Provinces.

In spite of being more interested in the Spanish Americancolonies than his predecessors in the Government, Canning’s mainline of policy did not differ that much from theirs. He clearly sub-ordinated the Spanish American question to the interests of Britishforeign policy in Europe. The recognition of the South Americanstates was no exception to this rule. This implicitly applied to theline of policy adopted by Britain towards the River Plate, andpartly explains the lack of a more regular and consistent policy.Canning’s decision to concede recognition to the South Americanstates, was partly motivated by the claims his government receivedfrom commercial agents at home, demanding free trade with thatregion, and from diverse sectors of British public opinion whoexpressed sympathy with the South American republics. The incre-ment of British commercial houses in Buenos Aires was anotherimportant reason.

Relations between Britain and Argentina were destined to becomemuch closer from mid-century, as Ferns has so vividly illustrated.Nevertheless, it was the indiscretion of Popham, followed by thediplomatic manoeuvres of Canning and Rivadavia, which openedAnglo-Argentine relations.


Notes

Introduction

1 The most important work of these historians on this subject are: C. Webster, Britain and the Independence of Latin America 1812–1830, 2 Vols,London, 1938; R.A. Humphreys, British Consular Reports on the Trade andPolitics of Latin America, London, 1952; W.W. Kauffmann, British Policy andthe Independence of Latin America 1804–1822, New Haven, 1951; J. Rydjord,Foreign Interest in the Independence of New Spain, Durham NC, 1935; R. Miller,Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, London,1993; J. Lynch, ‘British Policy and the Independence of Latin America’,Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 1, no.1, pp. 1–30, 1969; W.S. Robertson, France and Latin American Independence, Baltimore, 1939.

2 C. Roberts, Las Invasiones Inglesas del Río de la Plata 1806–1807, BuenosAires, 1938; H.S. Ferns, Great Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century, Oxford, 1960; J. Street, Gran Bretaña y el Río de la Plata, BuenosAires, 1967.

3 Two recent exceptions are the works of A. Hennessy and J. King, The Landthat England Lost: Britain and Argentina, a Special Relationship, London, 1992;and D. McLean, War, Diplomacy and Informal Empire. Britian and theRepublics of La Plata 1836–1853, London, 1995.

1 The River Plate Viceroyalty

1 N. Bessio Moreno, Buenos Aires, Puerto del Río de la Plata Capital de laArgentina. Estudio Crítico de su Población, 1536–1939, Buenos Aires, 1939; J.L. Moreno, ‘La Estructura Social y Demográfica de la ciudad de BuenosAires en el año 1778’, Anuario del Instituto de Investigaciones de Rosario, no. 8,1975.

2 J. Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration, 1782–1810. The Intendant System inthe Viceroyalty of the Río de La Plata, London, 1958. Argentine edition,Buenos Aires, 1962, p. 37.

3 ibid., p. 38.4 For full demographic details on Buenos Aires during these years see

N. Bessio Moreno, Buenos Aires, and J.L. Moreno, ‘La Estructura Social’.5 T. Halperín Donghi, El Río de la Plata al Comenzar el Siglo XIX, Buenos Aires,

1961, p. 33; and the same author’s Revolución y Guerra, Formación de unaElite Dirigente en la Argentina Criolla, Buenos Aires, 1972, pp. 27–40. Alsovery relevant for this subject is J.C. Garavaglia, Economía, Sociedad yRegiones, Buenos Aires, 1987.

6 T. Halperín Donghi, El Río de la Plata, pp. 35–6. For a vivid contemporarydescription of this area at that time, see Concolorcorvo, El Lazarillo deCiegos Caminantes, Buenos Aires, 1997.

165

7 Halperín Donghi, supra, pp. 36–44; Concorcorvo, El Lazarillo; On thedevelopment of agriculture in the province of Buenos Aires during this period,see the recent works of C. Mayo, Estancia y Sociedad en La Pampa 1740–1820,Buenos Aires, 1995; and S. Amaral, The Rise of Capitalism on the Pampas: The Estancias of Buenos Aires, 1785–1870, Cambridge, 1998.

8 Halperín Donghi, supra, p. 52. For a further understanding of the origins ofthe mercantile society in the River Plate in the late colonial period see S. Socolow. The Merchants of Buenos Aires 1778–1810. Family and Commerce,Cambridge, 1978.

9 On the formation and role of this group during the final stages of theViceregal period, see T. Halperín Donghi, Revolución y Guerra, pp. 130–42;J.C. Chiaramonte, Ciudades, Provincias, Estados: Orígenes de la NaciónArgentina (1800–1846), Buenos Aires, 1987, pp. 37–86.

10 T. Halperín Donghi, n. 6 supra.11 ibid.12 ibid. Also Socolow, The Merchants of Buenos Aires.13 J. Ehrman, The Younger Pitt. The Years of Acclaim, London, 1969, p. 385.14 C. Roberts, Las Invasiones Inglesas, Buenos Aires, 1938, p. 24.15 ibid.16 Dictionary of National Biography (hereafter DNB), London, 1908, vol. I,

p. 504.17 E. Barba, Don Pedro de Cevallos, Madrid, 1988, p. 77.18 For details on the antecedents of Britain and the Falklands see J. Goebel,

The Struggle for the Falkland Islands, 2nd edition, New Haven, 1982.19 ibid.20 ‘Extract for a proposal of an expedition to Spanish America, by India, dated

3 June 1780 – laid before the cabinet of Lord North and approved – by Col. Fullarton. 3 June 1780’, Public Records Office (hereafter PRO) War Office (hereafter WO) 1/178.

21 Colonel Fullarton to W. Pitt, 11 October 1787, PRO 30/8, 103/1.22 DNB, vol. IX, p. 904; R. Terragno, ‘Las fuentes del plan libertador’, Todo es

Historia, no. 231, August 1986.23 J. Hippisley to W. Hastings, 11 August 1782, published in C.W. Vane,

Marquess of Londonderry (Comp.), Lord Castlereagh, Memoirs andCorrespondence, 12 vols, London, 1948–53, vol. VII, p. 267. Hereafter,Castlereagh, Memoirs and Correspondence.

24 Viscount Hood to Lord Hawkesbury, 11 December 1787, British Library(hereafter BL), Additional Manuscripts (hereafter Add. Mss.) 38222.

25 George III to W. Pitt, 3 July 1786, PRO 30/8, 103/1.26 J. Lynch, ‘British Policy and Latin America, 1783–1808’, Journal of Latin

American Studies, vol. 1, no. 1, 1969. p. 10.27 C. Hobhouse, Fox, London, 1938, p. 168.28 J. Ehrmann, The Younger Pitt, p. 66; F. O’Gorman, The Long Eighteenth

Century. British Political & Social History 1688–1832, London, 1997, p. 218;D.D. Raphael, Adam Smith, Oxford, 1987, p. 27; P. O’Brien, ‘Public Financein the Wars with France’, published in H.T. Dickinson (ed.), Britain and theFrench Revolution. 1789–1815, London, 1989, pp. 165–87

29 J. Ehrman, The Younger Pitt, p. 562.30 ibid., p. 571.

166 Notes

31 P. Jupp, Lord Grenville, 1759–1834, Oxford, 1985, p. 176.32 J. Lynch, ‘British Policy’, p. 12. 33 ‘Secret Memorandum. Proposal for an expedition against Spanish America

by the Pacific Ocean. H. Dundas, September 1796’, Scottish Record Office(hereafter SRO) GO 51/1/520.

34 P. Jupp, Lord Grenville, p. 240. 35 W. Husskisson to H. Dundas, 30 October 1796, BL, Add. Mss. 38734. 36 Earl Spencer to H. Dundas, 2 March 1797, PRO, WO 1/178. 37 Thomas Picton to H. Dundas, 17 December 1797, PRO, WO 1/193. 38 W.S. Robertson, The life of Miranda, 2 vols., Chapel Hill, 1929, vol 1,

pp. 142–160. 39 ibid., vol. 1, p. 166. 40 ‘On the liberation of South America from the dominion of Spain’, by

Sir Ralph Abercromby. Castlereagh, Memoirs and Correspondence, vol. VII, p. 269.

41 ‘Memorandum for consideration of the Cabinet. 30 October 1799’,Castlereagh, Memoirs and Correspondence, vol VII, p. 285.

42 ibid.,p. 284. 43 P. Jupp, Lord Grenville,p. 241. 44 P. Mackesy, ‘Strategic problems on the British war effort’, in H.J.

Dickinson(ed. ), Britain and the French Revolution, p. 161. 45 Sir Henry Dundas to W. Pitt, 31 March 1800, PRO, WO1/193. 46 ibid.47 Note in P. Jupp, Lord Grenville, p. 248. 48 C. Roberts, Las invasiones Inglesas, p. 23. 49 J. Street, Gran Bretaña , Buenos Aires, 1967, p. 23. 50 W.S. Robertson, Life of Miranda, vol I., p. 118. 51 J. Lynch, ‘British policy. ‘ p. 12. 52 H. Popham to W. Husskisson, 19 February 1801, BL, Add. Mss. 38736. 53 Castlereagh Memoirs and Correspondence, vol VII, p. 286. 54 ‘Secret. Popham to Yorke. 26 November 1803’, Castlereagh, Memoirs and

Correspondence, vol VII, p. 288. 55 P. Jupp, Lord Grenville, pp. 324–344. 56 W.S. Robertson, Life of Miranda, vol I, p. 278. 57 Annonymous, ‘Miranda and the British Admiralty’, American Historical

Review, VI, 1901. p. 514. 58 D. N. B., Vol X, p. 559. 59 ‘Plans for occupying Spanish America with observations on the character

and views of its inhabitans’, W. Jacob, 26 October 1804. PRO 30/8 345. 60 ibid.61 W. Jacob to W. Pitt, 26 November 1804, PRO 30/8 133/1. 62 ibid.63 Jacob to Pitt, 26 November 1804, PRO 30/8 148/1. 64 Captain Charles Herbert to Melville, February 1805, Archivo General de la

Nación (Hereafter AGN), 2–5–4. 65 W.W. Kauffmann, British Policy, p. 12. 66 J. Rydjord, Foreign Interest, p. 239; D. N. B., vol VI, p. 189; P. Jupp, Grenville,

p. 338. 67 J. Lynch, ‘British policy’, p. 17.

Notes 167

2 The British Invasions of the River Plate

1 Sir D. Baird to General W. Beresford, 12 April 1806, PRO, WO 1/161.2 Baird to Castlereagh, 14 April 1806, PRO, WO 1/161.3 Popham to Castlereagh, 30 April 1806, PRO, WO 1/161.4 H.S. Ferns. Great Britain and Argentina, p. 22.5 DNB, vol. XIV, pp. 143–6.6 Sir Home Popham to William Huskisson, 19 February 1801, BL, Add. Mss.

38736.7 Popham to Huskisson, 19 February 1801, BL, Add. Mss. 38736.8 Lord Melville to A. Davison, 15 July 1806, Scottish National Library. MS

3393.9 A Full and Correct Report on the Trial of Sir Home Popham, London, 1807,

p. 92.10 ibid., pp. 94–5.11 The Morning Chronicle, 22 July 1806.12 T. Waine to Popham, 28 March 1806, PRO, WO 1/161.13 Popham to Admiralty, 9 March 1806, PRO, Adm. 1/58.14 J.W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army, London, 1899–1930, 13 vols,

vol. V, p. 315.15 Beresford to Castlereagh, 11 July 1806, PRO, WO 1/161.16 ibid.17 Popham to W. Marsden, 25 August 1806. In Trial to Sir Home Popham,

appendix.18 ibid.19 For a more detailed account of the actions which occurred during the inva-

sions see W. Fortescue, British Army, vol. V, pp. 310–18, 368–436; H.S. Ferns,Britain and Argentina; Carlos Roberts, Las Invasiones Inglesas, and I. Fletcher,The Waters of Oblivion. The British Invasion of the Rio de la Plata, TunbridgeWells, 1991.

20 H. Fortescue, British Army, vol. V, p. 371.21 H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina, p. 22.22 Trial of Sir Home Popham, London, 1807, p. 92.23 W. Windham to General Crauford, 30 October 1806, BL, Add. Mss. 37884.24 ibid.25 S. Auchmuty to Windham, 6 March 1807, PRO, WO 1/161.26 W. Fortescue, British Army, vol. V, p. 386.27 ibid., p. 389.28 Whitelocke to Windham, 20 June 1807, PRO, WO 1/161.29 W. Fortescue, The British Army, vol. V, p. 386.30 The Morning Chronicle, 14 September 1807.31 Miranda to Cochrane, 4 June 1807, PRO, WO 1/1113.32 Blanchard and Ramsay, The Trial at Large of Lieut-Gen. Whitelocke, Late

Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in South America, by General Court Martial,Held at Chelsea Hospital, on Thursday January 28th, 1808, London, 1808, pp. 689–90.

33 ibid., p. 694.34 Beresford to Castlereagh, 23 January 1808, PRO, WO 1/354.35 The Morning Chronicle, 30 September 1806.

168 Notes

3 The Ministry of All the Talents and the River Plate

1 P. Jupp, Grenville, p. 370.2 C. Hobhouse, Fox, London, p. 264. The latest and most exhaustive work on

Fox, is Leslie Mitchell’s Charles James Fox, Oxford, 1992.3 G.M. Trevelyan, Lord Grey of the Reform Bill, London, 1920, p. 142.4 P. Jupp, Grenville, p. 370.5 C. Hobhouse, Fox. p. 58.6 V. Chancellor, ‘The Ministry of All the Talents. January 1806–March 1807, a

Political Study’, unpublished D.Phil thesis, University of Oxford, 1978,introduction, p. 3.

7 Carlos Roberts, Las Invasiones Inglesas , p. 181.8 W.B. Taylor, ‘The Foxite Party and Foreign Politics’, unpublished Ph.D

Thesis, University of London, 1974, p. 186.9 V. Chancellor, ‘The Ministry of All the Talents’, p. 92.

10 The Morning Chronicle, 25 October 1806.11 V. Chancellor, ‘The Ministry of All the Talents’, p. 99.12 J. Lynch, ‘British Policy’, p. 19. 13 A. Aspinall, The Later Correspondence of George III, 1783–1810, Cambridge,

5 vols, 1962–70, vol. IV, p. 458. 14 ibid., pp. 469–70.15 The Times, 16 September 1806.16 The Times, 20 September 1806.17 W.S. Robertson, The Life of Miranda, vol. I, p. 278.18 Historical Manuscripts Commission, Manuscripts of J.B. Fortescue, Preserved at

Dropmore, London, 1892–1927, 10 vols, vol. VIII, pp. 352–3. Referred to asDropmore Papers hereafter.

19 DNB, vol. V, pp. 350–1.20 Thomas Douglas, Earl of Selkirk to Sir J. Hippisley, 22 March 1806, BL, Add.

Mss. 37849.21 Selkirk to Windham, 7 June 1806, BL, Add. Mss. 37884.22 Jacob to Fox, 26 February 1806, BL, Add. Mss. 51468.23 John Lynch, ‘British Policy’, p. 20.24 Vansittart to Fox, 5 February 1806, BL, Add. Mss. 51468.25 W.S. Robertson, The Life of Miranda, vol. 1, p. 260.26 Gen. Sullivan to Grenville, 19 April 1806, BL, Add. Mss. 59079.27 Sir P. Francis to Grenville, 19 February 1807, BL, Add. Mss. 59079.28 W.B. Taylor, ‘The Foxite party’, p. 86.29 Grenville to the Earl of Lauderdale, date unknown. Dropmore Papers,

vol. VIII, pp. 419–20.30 Grenville to Lauderdale, 14 September 1806, ibid., vol. VIII, p. 358.31 Wellesley to Grenville, September 1806, ibid., vol. VIII, pp. 433–4. 32 Windham to Grenville, 22 September 1806, ibid., vol. VIII, p. 436.33 The Times, 2 October 1806.34 Windham speech in the House of Commons on 21 January 1807, in

T.C. Hansard, The Parliamtary Debates, London, 1812, vol. VIII, cols 492–3.35 Fortescue, British Army, vol. V, p. 319.36 C. Roberts, Las Invasiones Inglesas, p. 186. Fortescue, British Army, vol. V,

p. 319.

Notes 169

37 Windham to Crauford, 30 October 1806, BL, Add. Mss. 37884.38 A.D. Harvey, ‘The Ministry of all the Talents: The Whigs in Office, February

1806 to March 1807’, Historical Journal, 1972, no. 15, p. 636.39 Jacob to Windham, 24 September 1806. BL, Add. Mss. 37884. promote

economic progress in the River Plate region. It was apparently Castelli’sfaction which sent Mariano Castilla to London with the object of securingBritish support and assistance for the independence of the River PlateViceroyalty.72

40 V. Chancellor, ‘The Ministry of all the Talents’, p. 214.41 W.B. Taylor, ‘The Foxite Party’, p. 108.42 DNB, Vol. XXI, p. 644.43 A.D. Harvey, ‘The Ministry of All the Talents’, p. 627.44 Ibid., p. 633.45 Holland to Grenville, 7 December 1806, Dropmore Papers, vol. VIII, p. 460.46 Parliamentary Debates, vol. IX, cols 73–74.47 Ibid.48 Ibid., vol. IX, cols 74–5.49 BL Add.Mss. 5191. V. Chancellor, ‘The Ministry of All the Talents’, p. 215;

E.A. Smith, Lord Grey 1764–1845, Oxford, 1990, p. 118.50 Sir Home Popham to William Marsden, 25 August 1806, in Correct Report of

Trial to Sir Home Popham, Appendix.51 Lord Stavordale (ed.), Further Memoirs of the Whig Party, 1802–21 by Lord

Holland, London, 1905, p. 114. 52 V. Chancellor, ‘The Ministry of All the Talents’, p. 215; E.A. Smith, Lord

Grey, p. 169.53 Lord Holland, Further Memoirs of the Whig Party, p. 116.54 H. Baring (ed.), Diary of the Rt. Hon. William Windham, 1866, p. 467.55 W. Fortescue, British Army, vol. V, pp. 435–6.56 Lord Holland, Further Memoirs of the Whig Party, pp. 115–16.57 Castlereagh, Memoirs and Correspondence, vol. VII, p. 321.58 The Morning Chronicle, 14 September 1807.59 Duke of Northumberland to Colonel Macmahon, 30 September, 1807.

In Correspondence of George Prince of Wales 1770–1812, ed. A. Aspinall, 1938,7 vols, vol. VI, pp. 211–12.

60 Auckland to Grenville, 23 September 1807, Dropmore Papers, vol. X. p. 138.61 W.W. Kaufmann, British Policy, p. 32.62 Temple to Auckland, 2 October 1807, BL, Add. Mss. 34457.63 J. Rodríguez, ‘William Burke’ and Francisco Miranda. The Word and the Deed in

Spanish America’s Emancipation, Landham, 1994.64 W. Burke, Aditional reasons for our inmediately emancipating Spanish America,

London, 1808, pp. 19–20.65 L. Mitchell, Holland House, London, 1980, p. 40. 66 C. Roberts, Las Invasiones Inglesas, pp. 182, 186; J. Street, Gran Bretaña y la

Independencia del Río de la Plata, Buenos Aires, 1967, pp. 44, 96.67 John Lynch, ‘British Policy’, note on p. 21.68 ibid., p. 21.69 Beresford to Castlereagh, 23 January 1808, WO 1/354. 70 C. Roberts, Las Invasiones Inglesas, p. 42.71 P. Groussac, Santiago de Liniers, Buenos Aires, 1907, pp. 3–12.

170 Notes

72 C. Roberts, Las Invasiones Inglesas, p. 42.73 The letter to Castlereagh is dated 27 August 1807, WO 1/1117. His other

correspondence is under PRO, WO 1/1111, 1/117 and 1/354. Further infor-mation about this mission can be found in C. Roberts, Las InvasionesInglesas, p. 49.

74 C. Roberts, ibid., p. 42.75 ibid., p. 49.76 ibid., p. 49.77 ibid., p. 118. ‘Notas de las invasiones inglesas recogidas por Florencio Varela

de Don Bernardino Rivadavia’, Museo Mitre 3–2–1; Alberto M. Salas, Diariode Buenos Aires 1806–1807, Buenos Aires, 1981, p. 107; J.C. Chaves, Castelli,el Adalid de Mayo, Buenos Aires, 1943, p. 86.

78 J.C. Chaves, Castelli, p. 86.79 Beresford to Castlereagh, 16 July 1806, PRO, WO 161/1.80 C. Roberts, Las invasiones Inglesas, p. 123.81 ‘Belgrano-Autobiografía’, published in Biblioteca de Mayo, Buenos Aires,

1960, p. 9.82 Manuel Moreno, ‘Memorias de Mariano Moreno’, published in Biblioteca de

Mayo, Buenos Aires, 1960, p. 5183 W. Gillespie, Gleanings and Remarks Collected During Many Months Residence

in Buenos Ayres and the Upper Country, Leeds 1818, p. 298.84 H.V. Livermore, ‘Captain Gillespie and the 58 Anglophiles of Buenos Aires

in 1806’, Hispanic American Historic Review, 1981, pp. 69–78.85 ibid., p. 78.86 J.C. Chaves, Castelli, p. 84. 87 C. Roberts, Las invasiones Inglesas, p. 123.88 Windham to Beresford, 21 September 1806, PRO, WO1/161.89 E. Williams Alzaga, La Fuga del General Beresford, Buenos Aires, 1965, p. 262.90 ibid., pp. 142–3.91 ‘Notas de las invasiones inglesas recogidas por Florencio Varela de

Bernardino Rivadavia’ Museo Mitre 3–2–1.92 Auchmuty to Windham, 6 March 1807. PRO, WO 1/162.93 General Campbell to Auchmuty, 20 March 1807, PRO, WO 1/161.94 Captain Gillespie, Gleanings and remarks, p. 299.95 Whitelocke to Windham, 20 June 1807, PRO, WO 1/162.96 E. Wiliams Alzaga, Fuga del General Beresford, pp. 230–1.97 General Leveson Gower to Windham, 9 July 1807, PRO, WO 1/162.98 Whitelocke to Castlereagh, 10 September 1807, PRO, WO 1/162.

4 Stangford, Independence and the London Missions

1 J. Street, ‘Lord Strangford and Río de La Plata’, Hispanic American HistoricalReview, vol. XXXIII, no. 4, November 1953, p. 477.

2 P. Jupp, Lord Grenville, pp. 421–3; G.M. Trevelyan, Lord Grey, pp. 160–2.3 Castlereagh, Memoirs and Correspondence, vol. VII, p. 321. J. Street, Gran

Bretaña, p. 97; P. Mackesy, ‘Strategic Problems’, p. 163.4 Castlereagh, Memoirs and Correspondence, vol. VII, p. 98.5 J. Street, Gran Bretaña, note p. 89.

Notes 171

6 ibid. note p. 99.7 Castlereagh to Major James Burke, 4 August 1808, PRO, FO, 72/91.8 DNB, vol. XVIII, pp. 571–4.9 ibid., pp. 603–4.

10 ibid.11 J. Street, ‘Lord Strangford’, p. 481.12 Castlereagh to Smith, 4 August 1808, PRO, FO 72/91. J. Street, ‘Lord

Strangford’, p. 482.13 Smith to Liniers, 18 March 1808, AGN, Sala 7, 17–6–2.14 ibid.15 C. Roberts, Las Invasiones Inglesas, p. 336.16 ibid., p. 329.17 ibid., p. 328.18 J. Street, Gran Bretaña, p. 121.19 R.A. Humphreys, Liberation in South America 1806–1827. The Career of James

Paroissien, London, 1952, p. 26.20 ibid., pp. 28–9.21 J. Street, Gran Bretaña, pp. 122–3.22 ibid., pp. 122–4.23 J. Street, ‘Lord Strangford’, p. 214. 24 W.W. Kauffmann, British Policy, p. 39.25 For this particular subject the recent book by J.E. Rodríguez, The

Independence of Spanish America, Cambridge, 1998, particularly Chapter 2, ismost useful.

26 T. Halperín Donghi, Revolución y Guerra, pp. 169–74.27 ibid.28 J. Street, Gran Bretaña, pp. 169–70.29 ibid., p. 170.30 ibid., p. 172.31 M. Irigoyen to C. Saavedra, September 1810. AGN, Misiones Diplomáticas,

Buenos Aires, 1937, pp. 32–3.32 ibid.33 J. Street, Gran Bretaña, p. 173. The most interesting books on Spanish policy

towards their former colonies in America are; M. Costeloe, Response toRevolution. Imperial Spain and the Spanish American Revolutions 1810–1840,Cambridge, 1986; and also B. Hamnett, La Política Española en una EpocaRevolucionaria, México, 1985.

34 ibid., p. 176.35 E. Fitte, El Precio de la Libertad, Buenos Aires, 1965, p. 181.36 ibid., p. 216.37 J. Street, Gran Bretaña, pp. 179–94.38 Strangford to Wellesley, 28 September 1810. AGN Sala 7, 2–5–4.39 ibid.40 Street, Gran Bretaña, p. 197.41 ibid., p. 199.42 ibid.43 Moreno to Saavedra, 21 August 1811. AGN, Misiones Diplomaticas,

pp. 218–19.44 L. Mitchell, Holland House, p. 229.

172 Notes

45 T. Halperín Donghi, Revolución y Guerra, pp. 179–86.46 J. Street, Gran Bretaña, p. 209. 47 C. Roberts, Las Invasiones Inglesas, p. 40.48 W.W. Kaufmann, British Policy, p. 66.49 J. Street, Gran Bretaña, p. 202.50 ibid., p. 199. See also, M. Murphy, Blanco White. Self Banished Spaniard,

New Haven, 1989.51 W.W. Kaufmann, British Policy, p. 69.52 M. Moreno to Saavedra, 19 February 1812. AGN, Misiones Diplomáticas,

pp. 258–9.53 J. Street, Gran Bretaña, p. 206.54 ibid., p. 205.55 ibid., p. 209.56 Castlereagh to Strangford, 13 July 1812. C. Webster, Independence of Latin

America, 2 vols, Oxford, 1937, vol. 1, p. 83.57 J. Street, Gran Bretaña, p. 216.58 W.S. Robertson, Life of Miranda, vol. I, p. 199.59 T. Halperín Donghi, Revolución y Guerra, pp. 239–42. J. Street, Gran Bretaña,

p. 229.60 T. Halperín Donghi, n. 59 Supra, pp. 242–4.61 ibid.62 ibid., p. 229.63 Staples to Hamilton, 18 November 1813. AGN, Sala 7 17–6–2.64 Strangford to Castlereagh, 18 December 1813, in C. Webster, Independence of

Latin America, vol. I, pp. 85–6. 65 J. Street, Gran Bretaña, p. 237.66 Strangford to Castlereagh, 20 April 1814, in C. Webster, Independence of

Latin America, vol. I, p. 91.67 T. Halperín Donghi, Historia Argentina. De la Revolución de Independencia a la

Confederación Rosista, Buenos Aires, 1993 4rta, reimpresión, p. 96; J. Street,Gran Bretaña, p. 239.

68 T. Halperín Donghi, Historia Argentina, p. 76; J. Street, Gran Bretaña, p. 242.69 J. Street, ibid.70 ibid., pp. 243–4.71 T. Halperín Donghi, Historia Argentina, pp. 96–7; R. Piccirilli, Rivadavia y su

Tiempo, 2 vols, Buenos Aires, 1943, p. 262.72 T. Halperín Donghi, n. 71 Supra.73 B. Mitre, Historia de Belgrano, Buenos Aires, 1887, 4 vols, vol. III,

pp. 264–342.74 Strangford to Castlereagh, 30 November 1814. C. Webster, Independence of

Latin America, vol. I, p. 93. 75 J. Street, Gran Bretaña, p. 246.76 T. Davis, Carlos de Alvear. Man of Revolution, New Haven, 1955, p. 60.77 Rivadavia to Alvear, 28 February 1815, Universidad de Buenos Aires,

Comisión de Bernardino Rivadavia (1814–1820), Buenos Aires, 1933–36, p. 116.

78 J. Street, Gran Bretaña, p. 249.79 B. Mitre, Historia de Belgrano, vol. VII, p. 347. In one of the most dramatic

passages of this letter Alvear exclaimed: ‘Estas Provincias desean pertenecer

Notes 173

á la Gran Bretaña, obedecer su gobierno, y vivir bajo su influjo poderoso.Ellas se abandonan sin condición alguna á la generosidad y buena fe delpueblo Inglés, y yo estoy resuelto á sostener tan justa solicitud para librarlade los males que la afligen.’ ibid.

80 ibid.81 ibid. pp. 348–9. A curious anecdote surrounds the story of this letter. García

handed it to Rivadavia, who also feared what it contained and the conse-quences it might produce. He therefore decided not to open it and kept itclosed until 1842. While in exile in Rio de Janeiro, he came across it whenhe was clasifying his personal papers.

82 T. Halperín Donghi, Historia Argentina, p. 97.83 R. Pichirilli, Rivadavia y su tiempo, vol. I, p. 267.84 T. Halperín Donghi, Revolución y Guerra, p. 366; J. Street, Gran Bretaña p.

256.85 R. Piccirilli, Rivadavia y su Tiempo, vol. I, pp. 268–9. Mitre, Historia de

Belgrano, vol. III, p. 349.86 H. Chamberlain to Castlereagh, 10 February 1816, in C. Webster, Great

Britain and the Independence of Latin America, p. 99

5 Rivadavia and the British Attitude towards Recognition

1 J. Lynch, Spanish American Revolutions, 2nd edition, London, 1986, p. 209.2 Kauffmann, British Policy, pp. 81–933 ibid.4 H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina, p. 90; M. Belgrano, ‘La política extranjera

en los Estados de Europa (1813–1816)’; in Academia Nacional de la Historia;Historia de la Nación Argentina, vol. VI, pp. 577–611.

5 H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina, p. 90.6 J. Lynch, Spanish American Revolutions, p. 66; H.S. Ferns, Britain and

Argentina, p. 73.7 P. Ferré, Memorias, Buenos Aires, 1921, p. 21; H.S. Ferns, Britain and

Argentina, p. 74.8 H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina, p. 84; F.Crouzet, ‘The Impact of the

French Wars on the British Economy’, in Britain and the French, p. 192.9 Ferns; n. 8 Supra.

10 J.P. and W.P. Robertson, Letters on South America: Comprising Travels on theBanks of the Parana and the Río de la Plata, 3 vols, London, 1843.

11 J. Lynch, Spanish American Revolutions, p. 68; T. Halperín Donghi, Revolucióny Guerra, p. 249. On the much debated topic regarding the origins of theformation of a true Argentine identity see J.C. Chiaramonte, Ciudades,Provincias, Estados, Particularly pp. 111–77.

12 T. Halperín Donghi, Revolución y Guerra, p. 269.13 The Times, 18 December 1817.14 For more information on the Venezuelan diplomatic mission in London at

this time, see P. Grases, Tiempo de Bello en Londres y Otros Ensayos, Caracas,1962.

15 R. Piccirilli, Rivadavia y su Tiempo, vol. I, p. 271.16 ibid.

174 Notes

17 W.S. Robertson, France and Latin American Independence, Baltimore, 1939, p. 158.

18 Rivadavia to Pueyrredón, 18 December 1816, published in Comisión deBernardino Rivadavia ante España y Otras Potencias de Europa (1814–1820),Buenos Aires, 1933–36, p. 178.

19 Chamberlain to Castlereagh, 17 February 1817, In C. Webster, Independenceof Latin America, vol. I pp. 101–2.

20 B. Mitre, Historia de Belgrano, vol. III, p. 66.21 ibid.22 Rivadavia to Pueyrredón, 22 March 1817 Museo Mitre 7–10–6; also in

Comisión de Bernardino Rivadavia, p. 178.23 Rivadavia to Pueyrredón, n. 22 Supra.24 ibid.25 J. Lynch,’Great Britain and Spanish American Independence 1810–1830’,

in J. Lynch (Ed.), Andrés Bello. The London Years, London, 1982; pp. 15–16.

26 For more references on this subject, see B.M. Fontana, Rethinking the Politicsof Commercial Society. The Edinburgh Review,1802–1832, Cambridge, 1985;and R. Stewart, Henry Brougham. His Public Career 1778–1868, London, 1986.

27 P. Grases, Tiempo de Bello, pp. 43–60; M. Murphy, Blanco White, p. 98. Anexhaustive analysis of the contacts between South American emmisariesand these London circles can be found in M.T. Berruezo León, La Lucha deHispanoamérica por su Independencia en Inglaterra, Madrid, 1989.

28 W. W. Kauffmann, British Policy, p. 78.29 ibid., p. 93; also, M. Belgrano, ‘La Santa Alianza. las evidencias al exterior’,

in A.N. de la Historia, Historia Argentina, vol. VI. pp. 949–1001.30 C. Webster, Independence of Latin America, vol. I, p. 14.31 D.A.G. Waddel, ‘International Politics and Latin American Independence’,

in L. Bethell(Ed.), The Independence of Latin America, Cambridge, 1987, p. 205.

32 Chamberlain to Castlereagh, 14 July 1818, in C. Webster, Independence ofLatin America, vol. I, p. 104.

33 San Martín to Castlereagh, 11 April 1818, in C. Webster, Britain and theIndependence of Latin America, vol. I, p. 554.

34 M. Williford, Jeremy Bentham on Spanish America, Baton Rouge, 1980, p. 36.

35 For more details of Bentham’s relationship with Bolívar, see P. Schwartz andC. Rodríguez Braun, ‘Las Relaciones entre Jeremías Bentham y S. Bolívar’ inA. Filippi, Bolívar y Europa, vol. 1, Caracas, 1986.

36 Kauffmann, Britain Policy, p. 103.37 For more information on the careers of these British legionaries see, A.

Hasbrouck, Foreign Legionaries in the Liberation of Spanish America, New York,1969.

38 D.A.G. Waddell, ‘Intrnational Politics and Latin America’, p. 207.39 H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina, p. 91.40 ibid., p. 91.41 ibid., p. 93.42 Rivadavia to Pueyrredón, 28 November 1818, AGN Sección 1, 2–1–6.43 R. Piccirilli, Rivadavia y su tiempo, vol. I, p. 276.

Notes 175

44 M. Williford, Jeremy Bentham on Spanish America, Baton Rogue, 1980, p. 20.

45 ibid., p. 14. The articles written by Mill and Miranda were: ‘Emancipation ofSpanish America’ which appeared in January 1809, and ‘Molina’s accountof Chile’, which appeared in July 1809, both in the The Edinburgh Review.For full details of these publications see J. Rodríguez, ‘William Burke’ andFrancisco Miranda, Chapter 6.

46 M. Williford, Bentham on Spanish America, p. 12.47 J. Dinwiddy, ‘Liberal and Benthamite Circles in London 1810–1829’, in

J. Lynch (ed.), Andrés Bello. The London Years, p. 134.48 ibid., p. 34.49 R. Piccirilli, Rivadavia y su tiempo, p. 284.50 M. Belgrano, La Francia y la Monarquía en el Plata, Buenos Aires, 1933, p. 66.51 W.S. Robertson, France and Latin American Independence, Baltimore, 1939,

p. 17.52 ibid., pp. 36–47.53 W.S. Robetson, France and Latin American, pp. 157–76; M. Belgrano, La

Francia, p. 69.54 The Times, 3 July 1820.55 W.S. Robertson, France and Latin America, p. 174; C. Webster, Independence

of Latin America, vol I, p. 16; and W.W. Kauffmann, British Policy, p. 125.56 T. Halperín Donghi, Revolución y Guerra, p. 352.57 ibid. Also useful for this period is R. Levene, La Anarquía del Año 20,

Buenos Aires, 1954.58 T. Halperín Donghi, n. 56 Supra, p. 364.59 W.W. Kauffmann, British Policy, p. 126. J. Derry, Castlereagh, London, 1976,

p. 226.60 J. Lynch, Spanish American Revolutions, p. 76.61 For the Rioplatense foreign policy in this period see M. Belgrano, ‘La política

exterior de Martín Rodríguez, el resurgimiento de la independencia’,Academia Nacional, Historia Argentina; vol. VI, pp. 521–569.

62 For the reforms inspired by Rivadavia in the 1820s, see: R. Piccirilli,Rivadavia y su Tiempo; D. Bushnell, Reform and Reaction in the PlatineProvinces, Gainsville, 1983, pp. 20–9; M. Williford, Bentham on SpanishAmerica, p. 39; L.A. Romero, La Felíz Experiencia 1820–1824, Buenos Aires,1976, pp. 191–211; S. Bagú, El Plan Económico del Grupo Rivadaviano, BuenosAires, 1966; M. Ternavasio, ‘Nueva Régimen Representativo y Expansión dela Frontera Política. Las Elecciones en el Estado de Buenos Aires: 1820–1840,in A. Annino (ed.), Historia de la Elecciones en Iberoamérica, Siglo XIX,Mexico, 1995; J.C. Chiaramonte, Ciudades, Provincias, Estados; J. Myers, ‘LaCultura Literaria del Período Rivadaviano: Saber Ilustrado y DiscursoRepublicano’, in F. Aliata y L. Munilla Lacasa, Carlo Zucchi y el Neoclasicismoen el Río de la Plata, Buenos Aires, 1998.

63 J. Dinwiddy, Bentham, Oxford, 1989, pp. 16–17. Also, R. Stewart, HenryBrougham, pp. 88–9; and T.A. Jenkins, Sir Robert Peel, London, 1999, pp. 32–3.

64 The exact degree of Bentham’s influence over Rivadavia has recently beendebated by J. Harris, ‘Bernardino Rivadavia and Benthamite Discipleship’,in Latin American Research Review, vol. 33, no. 1, 1998, pp. 137–58.

176 Notes

65 S. Bagú, El Plan Económico, pp. 15–110.66 Anonymous, A Five Years Residence in Buenos Aires During the Years 1820 to

1825. By an Englishman, London, 1825; Argentine translation, Un Inglés.Cinco Años en Buenos Aires. 1820–1825, Buenos Aires, 1986, pp. 54–7.

67 J.A. Droz, Europe Between Revolutions 1815–1848, London, 1985, pp. 219–20.68 J. Derry, Castlereagh, p. 199.69 C. Webster, Independence of Latin America, vol. I, p. 16.70 ibid., p. 16.71 ibid., p. 16.72 ibid., p. 16.73 G.K. Clark, Peel and the Conservative Party, London 1969, p. 41.74 C. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh 1815–1822, London, 1908.75 J. Derry, Castlereagh, p. 218.76 ibid., p. 128, from C.Webster The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, p. 436.77 C. Petrie, Canning, p. 182.79 C. Webster, Independence of Latin America, p. 104.80 W.W. Kaufmann, British Policy, p. 139.81 C. Webster, Independence of Latin America, p. 18.82 ibid., p. 19.83 D.A.G. Waddell, ‘International Politics’, p. 209.84 W.W. Kaufmann, British Policy, p. 144.

6 Great Britain and the Recognition of the River Plate

1 W.W. Kauffmann, British Policy, p. 148.2 J. Lynch, ‘Great Britain’, p. 17.3 ibid., p. 17.4 ibid., p. 17.5 Earl of Stanhope, Notes of Conversations with The Duke of Wellington, Oxford,

1888, p. 69.6 D.A.G. Waddell, ‘International Politics’, p. 211.7 Sir C. Webster, Independence of Latin America, Vol. I, p. 20.8 D.A.G.Waddell, ‘International Politics’, p. 212.9 W.W. Kauffmann, British Policy, p. 157.

10 ibid.; H. Peterson, Argentina and the United States 1810–1960, New York,1964, pp. 83–91.

11 W.W. Kauffmann, n. 9 Supra.12 ibid.13 Un Inglés, Cinco Años, p. 61.14 H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina, p. 114; W. Hinde, George Canning, London,

1973, p. 349.15 H.S. Ferns, Supra.16 ibid., p. 116.17 L.A. Romero, La Feliz Experiencia, p. 244.18 Parish to Canning, PRO, FO 6/4; also in R.A. Humphreys; British Consular

reports, pp. 1–26.19 Parish to Canning, 27 April 1824, AGN Sala 7, 17–6–2.20 H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina, p. 119.

Notes 177

21 Canning to Parish, 19 November 1824, PRO, FO 6/3; also in H. Ferns,Britain and Argentina, p. 117.

22 Parish to Canning, 12 April 1824, P.R.O., F. O. 6/3; also in Sir C. Webster,Independence of Latin America, vol. I, pp. 110–14.

23 T. Davis, Man of Revolution, p. 31.24 ibid., pp. 23–26.25 ibid.26 ibid., p. 37. Parish to Canning, 25 April 1824, P.R.O. , F.O. 6/3; also

published in Sir C. Webster, Independence of Latin America, vol. I, pp. 110–12.

27 T. Davis, Man of Revolution, pp. 33–4.28 H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina, p. 123.29 Alvear to Rivadavia, 15 June 1824; published in G. Rodríguez, Contribución

Histórica y Documental, Buenos Aires, 1921, pp. 14–17. 30 T. Davis, Man of Revolution, p. 36. 31 Alvear to Rivadavia, 29 June 1824, in G. Rodríguez, Contribución Histórica,

pp. 32–33.32 T. Davis, Man of Revolution, p. 37.33 F. G. Dawson, The First Latin American Debt Crisis. The City of London and the

1822–25 Loan Bubble, New Haven, 1990, pp. 79–80.34 T. Davis, Man of Revolution, pp. 37–8.35 ibid., pp. 39–42; G. Rodríguez, Contribución Histórica, pp. 44–9.36 ibid.37 ibid.38 ibid.39 A. Mitchell, Whigs in Opposition 1815–1830, Oxford, 1967, pp. 175–6.40 F.G. Dawson, Latin American Debt Crisis, p. 76.41 P. O’Leary, Sir James Mackintosh. The Whig Cicero, Aberdeen, 1989, p. 159.42 ibid., p. 158.43 The Times, 29 June 1824.44 A. Mitchell, Whigs in Opposition, p. 176.45 W.W. Kauffmann, British Policy, p. 214; W. Hinde, Canning, p. 349.46 W.W. Kauffmann, Supra, pp. 176–8.47 ibid., p. 174.48 F.G. Dawson, Latin American Debt Crisis, p. 77.49 Canning to Parish, 23 August 1824, PRO, FO 6/2; also in C. Webster,

Independence of Latin America, vol. I, pp. 114–16, and in H.S. Ferns, Britainand Argentina, p. 124.

50 ibid.51 ibid.52 J. Lynch, Spanish American Revolutions, p. 77.53 Parish to Canning, 20 June 1824, AGN, Sección 7, 17–6–2.54 ibid.55 Canning to Parish, 29 September 1824, AGN, Sección 7, 17–6–2.56 H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina, pp. 134–7. Also on this subject, the

very critical reports of an English traveller specially commisioned to give more information about this project are most revealing; F.B. Head,Reports Relating to the Failure of the Río de la Plata Mining Association, London,1827.

178 Notes

57 ibid., pp. 138–9; L.A. Romero, La Felíz Experiencia, p. 251; S. Bagú, El PlanEconómico; and, on the subject of immigration, the extremely criticalaccount of this whole enterprise written by the British agent who wasresponsible for this enterprise along with Rivadavia: J.A.B. Beaumont,Travels in Buenos Aires and the Adjacent Provinces of the Río de La Plata,London, 1828.

58 H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina, pp. 141–7; F. Griffith Dawson, LatinAmerican Debt Crisis, pp. 77–80; S. Amaral, ‘El Empréstito de Londres de1824’, in Desarrollo Ecinómico, vol. 23, no. 92, Enero-Marzo, 1984; E. Fitte,Historia de un Empréstito: La Emisión de Baring Brothers en 1824, Buenos Aires,1962.

59 G. Canning to W. Parish, 26 September 1824, AGN, Sección 7.60 Sir C. Webster, Independence of Latin America, vol. I, p. 23.61 W.W. Kauffmann, British Policy, p. 176; W. Hinde, Canning, pp. 357–8;

Annonymous, Un Inglés, p. 45.62 Sir C. Webster, Independence of Latin America, vol. I, p. 23. 63 ibid., H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina, p. 125.64 ibid.65 ibid., p. 127.66 ibid., p. 126.67 ibid.68 ibid.69 Parish to Canning, 24 October 1824, PRO, FO 6/5; Also in Sir C. Webster,

Independence of Latin America, vol. I, pp. 116–19. The most exhaustive workon this congress is still E. Ravignani, ‘El Congreso Nacional de 1824–1827.La Convención Nacional de 1828–1829. Investigación y régimen de Pactos’.Academia Nacional de la Historia, Historia de la Nación Argentina, BuenosAires, 1949, vol. VII, pp. 10–129.

70 Parish to Canning, Supra.71 Canning to Parish, 26 December 1824, PRO, FO 6/5; also in Sir C. Webster,

Independence of Latin America, vol. I, p. 119.72 An Englishman, A Five Years Residence, p. 162.73 W.W. Kauffmann, British Policy, pp. 176–9.74 J. Lynch, ‘Great Britain’, p. 19.75 W.W. Kauffmann, British Policy, p. 220; W. Hinde, Canning, pp. 372–4.76 Canning to Parish, 24 May 1825, PR O, FO; 6/7; Also in Sir C. Webster,

Independence of Latin America, vol. I, pp. 121–3. 77 H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina, p. 159.78 Canning to Parish, 19 October 1825, PRO , FO 6/7, AGN, Seccion 7; also in

C. Webster, Independence of Latin America, vol. I, pp. 130–4. 79 ibid.80 G. Canning to L. Ponsonby, 28 February 1826, PRO, FO 6/12; also in Sir C.

Webster, independence of Latin America, vol. I, pp. 138–9.

Notes 179

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Index

Abercromby, Ralph, 23, 24, 35Adams, John Quincy, 140Addington, Henry, Viscount

Sidmouth, 26, 28, 47, 51, 52,59, 63, 65, 66, 103

Addingtonians, 51, 52Admiralty Office, 34, 36, 37, 54, 55,

59Aguirre, José Agustín, 96Aix-La-Chapelle, 124, 129Alcalde Mayor, 76Alexander I, Tsar, 31, 122, 129Alvarez Jonte, Antonio, 105, 126Alvear, Carlos María General, 86,

105, 108, 110–12, 118, 132,144–9, 151

Alvear, Diego de, 110Alzaga, Martín de, 13, 14, 73, 76, 79,

84, 92, 95American War of Independence, 17Amiens, Peace of, 26, 51Anchorena, Manuel de, 13Anglo-American relations, 139Anglo-Argentine Treaty, 147Anson, Admiral George, 15Antwerp, 35Archivo General de la Nación, 73Argentina, 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, 44,

49, 73, 98, 126, 159, 164Arribeños, 76Artigas, José Gervasio, 100, 108,

111, 116, 130Asia, 29Asunción del Paraguay, 9, 10Atlantic Ocean, 10, 61, 67Auchmuty, Samuel, 40, 43–5, 49,

61, 62, 79, 80Auckland, William Eden, 1st Baron,

56, 69Audiencia, 10, 77

Austerlitz, 32, 37, 51, 53Austria, 22, 25, 32, 115, 122, 123,

126, 133, 137Ayacucho, 157

Baird, General David, 33, 34, 40, 53,55

Bank of Buenos Aires, 147Bath, 141Bathurst, Henry 3rd Earl, 103Bayona, 89, 93, 128Belgium, 20, 22, 87, 127Belgrano, Manuel, 13, 73, 75, 76,

92, 93, 95, 105, 108–12, 118,119, 130, 132

Bello, Andrés, 95, 105, 118, 122Bengal, 16, 17Bentham, Jeremy, 124, 126, 127,

132Beresford, General William Carr, 33,

38–44, 46, 48, 49, 55, 61, 62,67, 72, 75, 77–9, 88, 91

Berlin Decrees, 62Birmingham, 145Blanco White, José María, 102, 122Board of Trade, 56Bolívar, Simón, 95, 118, 123–5, 127,

147, 157Bolivia, 11Bonaparte, Joseph, 85Bonaparte, Napoleon, 4, 6, 22, 23,

28, 32, 37, 53, 62, 85–8, 90, 92,112, 115, 116, 128, 150

Bourbons, 10–12, 116, 118, 133Brazil, 5, 85, 89, 97, 102, 103,

105–7, 111, 142, 147, 159, 160,161

Brissot, Jacques, 128Britain–Argentine relations, 3, 7, 49,

94, 161, 164

187

British Channel, 61British commerce, 6, 11, 18, 19, 23,

25, 26, 28, 30, 47, 54, 56, 58,59, 62, 87, 88, 94, 95, 98, 101,116, 117, 122, 125, 132,

135–9, 143, 149, 155, 157, 161, 162,164

British educational system, 164British forces, 22, 28, 33, 38, 41–6,

49, 56, 57, 66, 75, 77, 78, 80,82, 83, 85, 105, 124, 161

Brtitish immigration, 154, 164British Library, 2British merchants, 6, 11, 39, 56, 61,

65, 83, 92, 97, 99, 116, 117,125, 132, 143, 144, 145, 148,164

British Navy, 21, 32, 35, 36, 65, 125,161

Brooke, Governor, 21Brougham, Henry, 121, 131, 149,

158Brown, Admiral William, 108Buenos Aires, 1, 3, 5, 7, 9–14, 21–3,

27, 29, 30, 35, 36, 38, 41, 43,44, 46, 53–6, 60–2, 64–70, 72–7,79, 81, 82, 85, 89–92, 95–8, 100,102, 103–6, 108, 110, 116–18,120, 123, 125, 127, 129, 130,133, 141–4, 147–9, 151–7, 159,160, 162–4

Burke, Edmund, 19, 52, 63Burke, James Colonel, 74, 88, 93Burke, William (James Mill), 70Bute, John Stuart, Lord, 15Byron, Commodore John, 16Byron, George Gordon, Lord, 16,

124

Cabarrus, Count, 116Cabildo, 77, 94, 132Cabot, Sebastian, 9Cádiz, 73, 94, 95, 101, 159Calcutta, 35Cambridge, 35Campbell, Archibald, 20Canada, 58

Canning, George, 6, 61, 64, 68, 71,86, 90, 93, 125, 134–42, 145–61,163, 164

Cape of Good Hope, 27, 32, 33, 36,37, 42, 53

Caracas, 21, 22, 32, 35, 47, 53, 59,86, 95, 96, 98, 106

Carbonaris, 133Carlota Joaquina, Infanta, 90–4,

109, 119, 161Carlotino, 119Carrera, José Antonio, 144Castelli, Juan José, 73–5, 78, 82, 84,

92, 95Castilla, Mariano, 73, 74, 87Castlereagh, Robert Stewart,

Viscount, 2nd Marquiss ofLondonderry, 6, 34, 38, 40, 49,61, 64, 68, 71–3, 79, 86–8, 90,93, 102–4, 106, 107, 112, 116,118, 121–5, 127, 129, 131,133–5, 138, 141, 150, 153, 162,163

Castro, Félix, 147Catamarca, 10Catholic Emancipation, 26, 52, 68Caudillos, 130Cepeda, 130Cevallos, Pedro de, 11, 73, 110Chacabuco, 123Chamberlain, Henry, 118, 123Chancellor, Valerie, 53Charcas, 10, 11Charles III, 4, 10, 17Charles IV, 85, 112Chathamite Whigs, 18Chiclana, Manuel, 101Chile, 10, 15, 16, 20, 21, 26, 30, 45,

59, 61, 120, 123, 126, 130, 134,144, 162

China, 35Chuquisaca, 14Church of Buenos Aires, 77, 129Cisneros, Baltasar de, 86, 93, 94Cochrane, Admiral Alexander, 125Cochrane, Admiral Lord Thomas,

47, 54, 125

188 Index

Colombia, 10, 134, 141, 157Colonia de Sacramento, 11, 15, 46Colonial Office, 70Concepción del Bermejo, 10Congress of Tucumán, 113, 115–17,

119, 123, 130Congrees of Vienna, 115, 116, 118,

124, 125Congress System, 7Constituent Assembly, 105Contucci, Felipe, 93Córdoba, 10, 11, 31, 41, 76, 95, 117,

130Cork, 87Corrientes, 10, 12, 31, 116, 117Crauford, Colonel Robert, 45, 62,

64, 70Crompton, Thomas, 96Cromwell, Oliver, 15Cumana, 22

D’Osmond, Marquis, 127Dalrymple, Colonel William, 20Davison, Alexander, 27De Courcy, Admiral, 91, 97De Paula, Prince Francisco, 112, 118De Pons, Francois, 128De Pradt, Abbé Dominique, 126De Tracy, Destutt, 126Decazes, Elie, 127Del Pino, Viceroy Joaquín, 109Dessolle, Marquis Augustin, 127,

129Díaz de Solís, Juan, 9Director Supremo, 86, 108, 110–12,

117–20, 129–30, 144Dublin, 89Dumouriez, General Charles, 22, 23,

87, 101, 128Dundas, Henry, Viscount Melville,

5, 20–2, 24–9, 31, 32, 34, 36, 38,42, 47, 53, 57, 59, 63, 103, 161

Dutch War, 17

East India, 16, 23East India Company, 16, 17, 19, 36Ecuador, 10

Egypt, 23, 35Ehrman, John, 20El Español, 102Elío, General Francisco, 100, 101Ellenborough, Edward, 56 Elliott, Captain, 97Emphyteusis system, 133, 154England, 6, 11, 22, 26, 29, 30, 39,

41–4, 50, 61, 71, 75, 77, 79, 80,86–9, 92–6, 98, 99, 103, 106,109–12, 117–19, 121–3, 126,128, 132, 134, 137, 138, 141–3,145, 146, 148–50, 152–5, 159,162, 164

Enlightenment, 14Entre Ríos, 116, 130Esteve y Llach, Gerardo, 76Eton, 141Europe, 4, 6, 7, 13, 15, 17, 21, 27,

29, 32, 37, 42, 50, 51, 53, 60,62, 65, 85, 90, 101, 104, 105,108, 112, 113, 115–20, 122,125, 126, 129–33, 136–40, 144,145, 148–51, 156, 158–60, 162,164

Ezquiaga, Miguel, 76

Fabian, Captain, 97Falkland Islands, 16Famatina, 154Ferdinand VII, 85, 90, 93, 95, 97, 98,

104, 106, 108, 122, 128, 131,133, 137, 141

Ferns, Henry, 2, 35, 42, 49, 125,143, 161, 164

Foreign Office, 25, 86, 90, 99, 102,103, 104, 106, 136, 151

Fortescue, John, 38, 41, 45, 47, 62,67

Fox, Charles James, 18, 19, 28, 51,52, 53, 54, 59, 60, 63, 70, 103,121

Foxites, 19, 51, 52, 65, 66, 69, 135France, 1, 5, 11, 13, 16–28, 31, 32,

37, 41, 51, 53, 57, 59, 60, 71,73, 74, 80, 81, 85–92, 96–8, 101,105, 116, 120, 124, 126,

Index 189

127–30, 133, 134, 137–9, 141,142, 144, 148, 149–51, 158,159, 162

Francis, Philip, 60Franco-Portuguese agreement, 16Franco-Spanish agreement, 16French Army, 85, 89, 105, 108, 110,

127, 137, 138, 139, 144French Revolution, 19, 52, 87, 121,

127French Wars, 19Fullarton, Colonel William, 16, 17, 28Funes, Gregorio, 93

García del Río, Juan, 147García, Manuel, 111, 155, 156, 157Gauchos, 117, 120George III, 18, 26, 28, 34, 41, 43, 44,

51, 52, 54, 55, 63, 64, 67, 68,75, 77, 83, 91, 100, 102, 131

George IV (Prince Regent), 52, 99,100, 102, 103, 131, 136, 138,150, 152, 158

Gibraltar, 89Gillespie, Captain Alexander, 77, 81Gómez, José Valentín, 129, 130Goodwin Keates, Admiral Richard,

36Gorriti, island of, 43Great Britain, 1–7, 11, 13, 15–24, 27,

28, 30–3, 35, 40, 41, 42, 44, 46,47, 49–54, 59, 62, 63, 67, 72–5,77, 78, 82, 84–98, 101–13,115–21, 123–5, 129, 131–4, 136,137, 139–41, 143–5, 150, 151,155–7, 162, 163

Grenville, Tom, 52, 53, 56, 65Grenville, William Wyndham,

Baron, 19, 20, 22, 24, 25, 26, 28,51–3, 57, 59–61, 63, 64, 66, 69,71, 110

Grey, Charles, 2nd Earl, 52–4, 60,64–7, 71, 100, 103, 110, 121,131, 150

Guayaquil, 123Güemes, Martín de, 120Guido, Tomás, 99

Halperín Donghi, Tulio, 13, 109Hamilton, William, 99, 106Hanseatic Towns, 160Harley, Robert, Earl of Oxford, 15Harvey, A.D., 62Hastings, Francis Rawdon Hastings,

2nd Earl of Moira, 65, 68Hastings, Warren, 17, 19Hawkesbury, Lord, see Lord

LiverpoolHerbert, Captain Charles, 31Heywood, Captain, 104Hippisley, John, 17, 21, 58Hispanic–Mexican groups, 17Hispanic–Peruvian groups, 17Hobhouse, Charles, 18Holy Alliance, 4, 6, 86, 112, 115,

116, 122, 126, 129, 131, 133,136, 137, 139, 144, 149, 150,151, 160

Holland, 20, 22, 35, 87, Holland, Henry Fox, 3rd Baron, 52,

63–70, 100, 122, 125Holland House, 100, 102, 122, 127,

150Hood, Admiral Samuel, 17, 36House of Commons, 19, 20, 61, 64,

65, 86, 87, 121, 149, 151, 158House of Lords, 58, 71, 146, 151Howick, Lord, see GreyHullett Company, 143, 154Hullett, John, 143, 144, 147, 154Humphreys, Robin, 1Hurtado, José Manuel, 146, 147Huskisson, William, 22, 27, 36, 42,

135

Incas, 9, 120India, 17, 25, 28, 35, 59, 61Indians, 9, 21, 154Intendencias, 11Irigoyen Matías, 95, 99Italy, 22, 112, 142

Jacob, William, 30, 31, 58, 59, 61,68

Jacobins, 23, 66, 87, 98

190 Index

Jamaica, 15Jefferson, Thomas, 140Jervis, John, Earl of St.Vincent, 35,

36, 42Jena, 62Jesuits, 10, 12, 17, 21Joao VI, 85, 89, 91Johnson, Samuel, 63Jujuy, 10

Kauffmann, William, 31, 122, 139

La Paz, 11La Rioja, 10, 154Lafayette, Marie Joseph du Motier,

Marquiss de, 126, 127Lancashire, 59Larrea, Juan, 13Las Heras, General Gregorio de, 152Latin America, 1, 6, 7, 29, 57, 85,

122, 160, 162, 163Lauderdale, James Maitland, 8th

Earl of Maitland, 53, 60Lawndsdowne, Lord, see PettyLe Moyne, Hilaire, 127, 128, 129Letters on South America, 117Leveson Gower, General, 46Liberal Tories, 135Lima, 11Lincolnshire, 141Liniers, Santiago de, 41, 43, 44, 73,

76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 84, 86, 91,92, 93, 95, 128

Litoral area, 10, 108, 111, 112, 116,117

Liverpool, 145Liverpool merchants, 125, 145, 163Liverpool, Robert Jenkinson, 2nd

Earl, 6, 86, 103, 112, 121–3, 125,127, 129, 131, 134, 135, 146,149, 151, 152, 155, 158, 163

Logia Lautaro, 105London, 5, 16, 27, 34, 35, 47, 56,

59, 64, 73, 74, 91, 95, 101, 105,109, 110, 111, 112, 116, 118,126, 127, 131, 139, 145, 149,153, 154, 155, 158, 162

London merchants, 149López, Estanislao, 130, 144López Méndez, Luis, 95, 105, 118,

127, 138Louis of Parma, 129Louis XVIII, 127Louisiana, 20Lucca, Duke of, 129Luján, 78, 79Lynch, John, 1, 18, 21, 32, 54, 117Lloyd’s Patriotic Fund Committee,

65

Mackinnon, Alexander, 97Mackintosh, James, 121, 149, 150,

158Madeira, 72Madras, 16, 17Madrid, 31, 138Magallanes, Fernando de, 9Maipú, 123Maldonado, 43Malta, 35, 73Mar Dulce, 9Marsden, William, 34, 39, 40, 65Masonic Lodges, 105May Revolution, 113Mediterranean, 22, 25Melville, Viscount, see DundasMendoza, Pedro de, 9Metternich, Klemens Von, Prince, 4,

115, 116, 139Mexico, 16, 20, 21, 30, 31, 63, 64,

105, 134, 141, 157, 162Michelena, José Mariano, 146Middle East, 25Mier, Fray Servando Teresa de, 105Mill, James, 126Miller, Rory, 1Ministry of all the Talents, 2, 5, 34,

45, 51–4, 56, 57, 59, 61–3, 65,68, 69, 71, 86

Miranda, General Francisco, 5, 16,19–24, 26–30, 32, 34, 35, 47, 53,54, 57, 59, 62, 64, 74, 83, 87,91–3, 95, 96, 105, 118, 119,126–8

Index 191

Misiones, 12Mitchell, Leslie, 70Mitre, Bartolomé, 109 Moira, Lord, see F.R. HastingsMoldes, José, 91Monroe Doctrine, 140, 148Monroe, James, 140, 145Monteagudo, Bernardo de, 105Montevideo, 23, 38, 41, 43–6, 79,

80, 93, 97, 100, 101, 104, 108,123, 128, 144, 159, 160

Moreno faction, 101Moreno, Mariano, 13, 14, 76, 92, 94,

95, 99, 109, 132Moreno, Manuel, 99, 100, 101, 102,

103Morillo, General Pablo, 115Murat, General Joachim, 128Museo Mitre, 73

Naples, 89, 133Napoleonic wars, 71National Congress, 156Netherlands, 128New Granada, 10, 30, 74New Orleans, 26Niort, 73Nootka Sound, 19, 20Norfolk, 67North America, 17, 18, 19, 45, 48,

111, 140North, Lord Frederick, 16, 18Northern Army, 109Northumberland, Duke of, 69

O’Leary, David Florence, 124O’Higgins, Bernardo de, 123Orinoco river, 26Orleans, Louis Phillipe, Duc de, 87,

128, 129Ostend, 35

Pacific Ocean, 29Pack, Colonel Denis, 78Padilla, Manuel Aniceto, 79, 83, 84,

88, 91, 97, 101, 103Panama, 30

Paraguay river, 10Paraguay, 9, 10–12, 21Paraná river, 10, 12Paris, 20, 23, 53, 54, 110, 118, 126,

129Parish, John, 141Parish, Woodbine, 141–5, 147,

151–3, 155–9Parliament, 6, 21, 36, 64, 88, 99, 121,

125, 140, 146, 149, 151, 158, 163Paroissien, James, 92, 93Paso, Juan José, 93, 101, 105Patagonia, 9Patricios, 76Pavia, Joseph, 30Pedro Carlos, 92 Peel, Robert, 133, 135Pelham, Lord Thomas, 27Perceval, Spencer, 86, 93, 103Peru, 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, 20, 123, 124,

147Protector of, 126

Petrie, Charles, 135Petty, Lord Henry, 3rd Marquess of

Landsowne, 56, 121, 146, 149,150

Picton, Thomas, 22Pinto, Manuel, 91Pitt, William (the younger), 5, 15,

16, 18–20, 22–4, 26, 28, 29, 31,32, 34, 36, 37, 42, 47, 48, 52,53, 57, 59, 63, 66, 119, 133

Pittites, 64, 69, 71, 86, 87, 134, 135,160

Place, Francis, 132Planta, Joseph, 141Polignac Memorandum, 139, 140,

145Polignac, Auguste Jules, Prince de,

138, 147Popham, Admiral Home, 5, 27–9,

32–43, 46–9, 53, 57, 59, 60, 64,65, 71, 74, 75, 161, 164

Popham, Stephen, 35Portland, William Bentinck-

Cavendish, 3rd Duke of, 24, 86,91, 93, 125

192 Index

Portugal, 5, 6, 11, 23, 89, 93, 97,100, 103, 104, 110, 116, 147,159

Portuguese Court, 79, 85, 89, 91,104, 161

Portuguese forces, 112, 117, 121,123, 142, 148, 163

Portuguese–British expedition, 15Posadas, Gervasio, 86, 108, 110Potosí, 11, 12Presas, José, 93Primera Junta, 86, 94–7, 99, 100, 101Prussia, 32, 62, 115, 122, 137public opinion, 5, 47, 54, 84, 121,

129, 145, 164Public Records Office (PRO), 2Pueyrredón, General Juan Martín

de, 40, 41, 73, 75, 84, 91,117–19, 121, 126–8, 130–3, 144

Pullen, Governor, 15

Queen Anne, 15Queen Caroline, 131

Rademaker, John, 104Ramírez, Francisco, 130Ramsay, Captain, 97Red Sea, 36Reform Bill, 52Representación de los Hacendados, 14Richelieu, Armand du Plessis, Duc

de, 127Riego, General Rafael de, 131, 133Rio de Janeiro, 5, 74, 79, 85, 88, 89,

91, 92, 93, 97, 100, 104, 110,111, 112, 118, 123, 142, 144,163

Río de La Plata Mining Company,154

Río de la Plata river, 12Rivadavia, Bernardino, 6, 108–12,

118, 120–2, 126, 129, 130, 132,141–5, 147, 149, 151, 153–6,158, 159, 162–4

River Plate, United Provinces of the(Provincias Unidas del Río de LaPlata), 1, 2, 4–7, 9, 11–14, 33–5,

37, 40–2, 44–7, 49, 50, 55, 59,61, 68, 69, 71, 73, 77, 83, 85,86, 88–93, 95–101, 103–12,115–21, 123, 125, 127–34, 136,141–3, 145, 147, 151–9, 161–4

River Plate economy, 11–14, 21, 92,94, 116, 117, 130, 133, 147,153, 154, 156, 157, 163

River Plate educational system, 14Roberts, Carlos, 1, 2, 26, 71, 73, 74,

77Robertson, John Parish, 117, 141,

147Robertson, William Parish, 117, 141,

147Robertson, William Spence, 1, 26Rodríguez Peña, Saturnino, 78, 79,

82–4, 91–3Rodríguez Peña, Nicolás, 14, 73, 77,

82, 92, 105Rodríguez, General Martín, 92, 131,

132, 142, 144Rojas, Diego de, 9Rondeau, General José, 108, 112,

130Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 14Rush, Richard, 139, 140Russia, 1, 31, 37, 59, 115, 122, 129,

137Rydjord, John, 2, 31Rye, 30

Saavedra, Cornelio, 92, 93, 95, 99Saint Domingue, 24, 45, 66, 70Saint Helena, 21, 40Saladeros, 13Salamanca, University of, 13Salta, 10, 11San Carlos, Colegio de, 14San Carlos, Duke of, 126San Martín, General José de, 105, 109,

120, 123–5, 127, 130, 132, 144Sancti Spíritus Fort, 9Santa Coloma, Gaspar de, 13Santa Coloma, José Antonio, 92Santa Fe, 10, 12, 116, 117, 130, 144Santiago del Estero, 10

Index 193

Sarratea, Manuel de, 100, 101,106–8, 112, 118, 119, 131

Sassenay, Marquise de, 128Scotland, 26, 58, 117, 125Scott, Walter, 58Selkirk, Thomas Douglas 5th Earl of,

58, 59, 68Semanario de Agricultura y Comercio,

14Sentenach, Felipe, 76Seville, 11Shelburne, William Petty, 2nd Earl

of, 15, 18Shelley, Percy Bysshe, 124Sheridan, Richard Brinsley, 19, 69,

103Sidmouth, Lord, see Addingtonslave trade, 11, 52, 68Smith, Adam, 14, 19Smith, Admiral Sidney, 88–92Sobremonte, Marques de, 14, 41, 43,

76, 81, 86Sociedad Patriótica, 105South America, 1, 3, 5, 6, 11, 13,

15–18, 20–33, 36, 37, 42, 48, 49,53, 57–60, 62–6, 68, 70–2, 74,81, 85–7, 90, 91, 93, 94, 96, 98,100–2, 104–6, 115, 117–19,121–5, 127–9, 131, 134, 135,137–41, 144–50, 158, 160–4

Spain, 4–6, 9–20, 23–5, 27, 28, 30, 31,35, 37, 39, 41, 43–5, 50, 58, 67,69, 71–6, 80, 82, 83, 85–96, 98,100–2, 104, 106–10, 112, 113,115, 116, 121, 122, 125, 126,128, 129, 133, 134, 136–8, 141,142, 144, 146–8, 150, 158, 162

Spanish America, 1, 3–5, 11, 15, 17,19, 21, 23, 26–32, 50, 53, 55,57, 60, 65, 66, 70, 87, 88, 90–2,94, 96–8, 100–5, 107, 112, 115,116, 118, 120–2, 127, 131, 134,136–40, 145, 146, 149, 150,161, 164

Spanish Army, 77, 82, 105, 106,116, 117, 119, 123–26, 128–31,135, 149, 157

Spanish commerce, 11, 13, 16Spanish Constitution of 1812, 131,

133Spanish Cortes, 94, 95, 100, 101,

103Spanish Crown, 11, 42, 79, 82, 85,

91, 94, 108–10, 138Spanish liberals, 132, 133, 141Spanish merchants, 77Spencer, George John, Lord, 22, 56St.Vincent, Admiral, see JervisStaples, Robert, 106, 111, 116, 125Strangford, Percy Clinton Smythe,

6th Viscount, 2, 5, 85, 88–91,93–5, 97, 98, 101–9, 111, 116,118, 159, 161

Street, John, 2, 3, 26, 98, 99, 103Stuart Mill, John, 126Stuart, John, 67Sucre, General Antonio, 157Sullivan, General, 59Sussex, 30Sweden, 89

Talleyrand, Charles Maurice de, 53Temple, Lord, 69Tetuan, 35The Edinburgh Review, 89, 122, 126,

127The Morning Chronicle, 37, 47, 49,

54, 68, 100, 102The Times, 47, 56, 61, 117, 129, 147,

150Third Coalition, 31, 32, 51Tierra firme, 29Tories, 5, 18, 21, 30, 36, 52, 61, 64,

68, 71, 86, 87, 93, 98, 102, 103,122, 135, 150, 151

Trafalgar, 32, 128Treaty of Pilar, 130Treveleyan, George Macaulay, 53Trinidad, 22, 23Trinity College, 89Triunviratos, 86, 101, 108, 132Troppau, 131Tsar Alexander I, 122, 129Tucker, Benjamin, 35

194 Index

Tucumán, 9, 31, 119, 130Tupac Amaru, 17Turkey, 25, 89

Ultra-Tories, 134, 138United States of America, 7, 23, 24,

32, 53, 59, 120, 137, 139, 140,144, 145, 148, 149

Upper Peru (Alto Peru), 14, 79, 117,120, 157

Uruguay (Banda Oriental), 5, 6, 15,43, 89, 97, 100, 104, 108, 112,117, 130, 142, 148, 158, 159, 163

Uruguay river, 9, 10, 11US Congress, 140Utrecht Treaty, 1, 11

Vansittart, Nicholas, 21, 26, 27, 56,59, 59, 103

Vargas, Pedro Fermín de, 30, 74, 87 Vatican, 17Venezuela, 11, 22, 27, 29, 30, 53,

84, 95, 105, 115, 118, 122, 127,128, 162

Vernon, Admiral, 15Verona, 134, 144Versailles Treaty, 17, 18Vienna, 37, 115Viéytes, Hipólito, 13, 73, 82, 92Vigodet, General Gaspar, 108Villele, Jean Baptiste, comte de, 134Vindicae Galicae, 121

Waddell, D.A.G., 136Waine, Thomas, 37Walpole, Robert, 15Walton, William, 102War Office, 21, 25, 34, 49, 57, 63,

68, 78, 86, 103, 125Washington, 144Waterloo, 115Wealth of Nations, 19Webster, Charles, 1, 129, 135, 156Wellesley, Marquess of, 61, 63, 93,

95–7, 99, 101, 102, 110, 134Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke

of, 49, 61, 87, 101, 110, 134,138, 150, 155, 156

West Indies, 45, 53Westminister School, 35Whigs, 5, 6, 18, 19, 52, 53, 63, 68,

100, 103, 111, 121, 122, 125,127, 135, 149, 150, 151, 159,163

Whitelocke, General John, 45–8, 66,67, 69, 70, 82

Williams Alzaga, Enrique, 82Windham, William, 24, 40, 42, 43,

48, 49, 52, 54–9, 61–71, 73

Yerba mate, 12York, Duke of, 67, 70, 102Yorke, Charles, 27

Zapiola, Matías, 105

Index 195

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[Klaus Gallo] Great Britain and Argentina From in(BookFi.org)