Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge

Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge-1

Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge-1Introduction:

As I was studying and trying to understand Vedanta Paribhaasha (VP) ofDharmarajaAdvarindra (DA) that Micheal constantly refers to, Dennisji brought to myattention thebook, “Methods of Knowledge” by Swami Satprakashanda, and in my discussions onSaaskhiiswaruupam, Shree Devanathanji also brought to my attention about the Chapter onKuuTastadiipaH in Panchadasi by Shree Vidyaranya. I feel I am blessed fromdifferentdirections to make me understand how the knowledge takes place as per advaitaVedanta.As usual, I tend to put my understanding in writing for my own benefit, and (asusual) Iam posting it as well. The writing helps me to crystallize my understanding andalso forothers to see. I request those who are interested to feel free to comment on myunderstanding. Of course as usual, I try to be stubborn in defending my rationalignorance! These series may be considered as add-on to the Analysis of the Mindseriessince mind is obviously involved in gaining the knowledge - whether objectiveknowledgeor knowledge of the subject. I will be following closely Vedanta Paribhaasha butexplaining in the way I understand and interpret. I will try to point out whereI maydeviate from the concepts presented in VP. DA was around 1600AD. There wereseveralothers before him who formulated the epistemological issues in Advaita Vedanta.SwamiSatprakashananda notes that there are some differences in the interpretations ofhowKnowledge takes place in VP and in other texts. Epistemological issues are atvyavahaarika level and therefore any of these differences do not compromise theadvaitictruths in Vedanta.

The purpose of the inquiry into the Epistemological issues, as DA emphasizes inthisintroduction to VP, is to gain the knowledge of Brahman, knowing which there isno returnback to the transitory world. Hence understanding of the process of howknowledge takesplace in the mind is essential to separate what is transitory and what ispermanent –essentially nitha-anitya vastu viveka essential for Vedantins. This will helpinmeditation to shift from that which is transitory to that which is permanent,

when we tryto ‘visualize’ that because of which we have the capacity to visualize.

Everyone has some understanding of what knowledge means. When we come to knowthings thatwe did not know before, we say that we now have the knowledge of them. To putthis moretechnically, ignorance that is covering the knowledge of those objects is nowremoved andwe have now dis-covered the existence of those objects. Implication of this isthatknowledge is eternal and self-evident, but gets revealed when the ignorance thatappearsto cover the object of knowledge is removed. That is the discovery of the truthaboutthose objects. Scientists only ‘discover’ the laws and do not invent them.Essentiallythey are removing the covering of ignorance of the objects or laws. It is notthat‘ignorance’ is some kind of shield coving the knowledge, but it is more like apitchdarkness covering the knowledge of all the objects in that dark room. When Iturn thelight switch on, assuming that electric power is behind the switch,instantaneouslyknowledge of all objects that are illumined by that light takes place. Until thelight isturned on, the knowledge of objects is ‘as though’ covered by the darkness inthat room.This analogy is used extensively to appreciate how knowledge takes place. Wewill followthis through out our discussion. Interestingly, I say there is no light and itis toodark for me to see anything. I need a light to illumine the objects that I wantto see.Without turning the light switch on, I could not see any objects since darknessisenveloping all objects. This is our normal experience.

In spite of pitch darkness I could still ‘see’ two ‘things’ in that room! Forone thing,I could see darkness because of which I could not see anything else. The secondis Icould see myself since I am aware of my own existence, wherever I am. Darknessis anobject of my awareness. In what light I could see darkness? In fact, I cannotturn thelight switch on to see the darkness, can I? The darkness disappears as soon as Iturn thelight switch on. The darkness and external light are opposite to each other. Since I

need light to see anything, in what light I could see darkness? Since I know itis darkimplies that I could see the darkness or I am aware of darkness. That lightbecause ofwhich I can see even the darkness, that light is not opposite to darkness. Thatis thelight of consciousness that illumines the darkness too so that I am aware of thedarknessin the room. That it is dark in the room is also an object of knowledge. It willbeinteresting to enquire later how the object of knowledge of darkness takes placein themind. Besides the darkness, in the same light of consciousness, I could seemyself tooto say that I am there in that dark room, where I cannot see ‘anything’ else.Darknesscan cover everything but I can never be covered by the darkness outside. I am aself-effulgent, self-existent entity. I do not need light also to be aware ofmyself. Iam always aware of myself except in the deep sleep state. What covers theknowledge ofmyself in the deep sleep is also an interesting question to be explored. I amthe lightof consciousness not only that illumines myself since I am aware of myself allthe time,but also illumines the darkness as well as the light in that room, since I seethat theroom that was dark is now lighted. That light, in whose brilliance I could seethedarkness as well as the light in the room, is the called the ‘light of alllights’(jyotir jyotiH), the light of consciousness. Understanding of this forms thebasis of allknowledge. We arrive some important conclusions from the above analysis.1) Knowledge is eternal2) Ignorance appear to cover the knowledge of objects3) knowledge of objects takes place by dis-covery process or removing theignorancecovering the knowledge of the object.4) To know the object we need a means or instruments like eyes to see, etc.5) Knowledge can be gained only by a conscious entity- essentially the light ofconsciousness has to illumine the thought related to the object for knowledge oftheobject to take place.6) I am that self-existing self-effulgent being in whose light all things getrevealed orilluminated.7). I am self-effulgent, self-revealing and self-conscious being. I know myselfimmediately and directly (without any medium required) by myself. I do notneed tothink or meditate or contemplate to know that I am a conscious-existent being.

(Vedantasays neither sun or moon or the starts or the electricity is needed to illumineme for meto see myself. In fact the light of my consciousness illumine every thing thatis knownby me). Some of these aspects become clear as we analyze further the mechanicsof howthe knowledge takes place.8)Therefore, the self-knowledge is direct and immediate (aparoksha jnaanam)where thesubject and object merge into one. Knowledge without any specific object (wheresubject-object merges into one) is then self-knowledge or self-awareness orobjectlessawareness – which is direct and immediate.

Before we proceed further let us review some basics. First, we should know that‘knowledge’ itself cannot be defined. Whenever we say we have knowledge, weonly referto ‘knowledge of things and beings’ or to be more accurately, objectiveknowledge; insimple terms knowledge of ‘this’. Knowledge that we are familiar is alwaysknowledgeof…. ; all objective knowledge. All objective knowledge is qualified knowledge;chemistry-knowledge, physics-knowledge, or knowledge of ‘this’ or ‘that’, etc.We do notknow if there is anything as pure ‘unqualified knowledge’. If I knew, I cannoteven sayI have the knowledge of ‘that’, since the very ‘that’ qualifies the unqualified.I remainsilent or communicate in the words that take one to that silence.

When we say we have knowledge of something, what we mean is we are aware of thatsomething or we are conscious of it. Hence ‘knowledge of..’ is same thing asbeing‘conscious of..’. Pure knowledge, then, is pure consciousness – and here wemean as‘objectless awareness’ since any objective knowledge is a qualified knowledge. In thepitch darkness example, we mentioned that I am aware of not only the darkness,but myselftoo. I know myself that I am existent entity and conscious entity. I neversearch formyself anytime since I have to be there even to search. Since subject is neveran object,objectless awareness is the same thing as self-awareness. Hence pure knowledgeandself-awareness or self-consciousness means the same. Pure Knowledge cannot bedefinedsince it is the same as self-knowledge or consciousness that I am. Besides, alldefinitions belong to the realm of objects. Two things cannot be defined, sincethey are

not objects. One is Braham since being infinite it cannot be defined todifferentiate itfrom the rest of the objects in the world; as there cannot be anything otherthan Brahmanfor Brahman to be Brahman (infiniteness). The second is the subject, myself.Since I amnot an object, I cannot be defined. We just mentioned that pure knowledge alsocannot bedefined. In fact, we arrive at the fundamental equation of Vedanta that advaitaemphasizes. Brahman and I am are identically the same, since essential natureof both isthe same. In addition that Brahman that I am is also the same as unqualifiedpureknowledge. ‘I am’, therefore, is of the nature of pure knowledge and knowledgeof anobject therefore involves illumination of the object by the light ofconsciousness that Iam.

In the above dark room example, we cannot have the knowledge of the objects inthe room,unless the external light illumines them. According to Vedanta, that is notsufficient.For me to gain the knowledge of an object that is lighted in the room, severalotherthings are also needed. First and foremost is that the sense organs should haveadequatecapacity to ‘grasp’ the objects. Or appropriate tools (microscopes ortelescopes, etc)are required to augment the capacity of the sense organs to ‘grasp’ thoseobjects for usto perceive them. This is about the objects out side – outside referring tooutside themind. We can know the objects ‘in side’ the mind by process of re-collection,since wehave ‘collected’ that knowledge already and is stored in the memory. To know anobject weneed an appropriate means to know. Means of knowledge or appropriate tool toknow iscalled ‘pramaaNa’, where ‘prama’ means knowledge or more accurately validknowledge. Thetool to be used depends on the nature of the object that is to be known. To seeforms andcolors, eyes are needed, to hear sounds ears, etc. Eyes cannot hear and earcannot see–thus each sense organ has its field of knowledge specified. Thus each pramaaNaor meansof knowledge is very specific in its field of operation.

Besides the sense organs, we need the mind to collect the information from thesenses.

Hence we say, ‘out of mind is out of sight’. Besides the mind, there isconsciousnessenlivening the mind, making the mind to be conscious of the world of objects. Thusconsciousness operates similar to the light that illumines the objects to revealtheobjects. It is called light of consciousness. We have in the sequence - sensesgraspingthe object lighted by the outside light, the mind that collects the sense inputandintegrates into an image of the object in the mind, and consciousness thatlights thatimage, for me to see. Object of knowledge is called ‘prameya’ or known, theknowledge ofthe object is called ‘pramiti’, and the means that is operating for theknowledge to takeplace is ‘pramaaNa’. Hence in any knowledge that is involved we have thesethree(tripuTi) operating. When the knowledge takes place, there is obviously asubject whoowns that knowledge – he is called knower or ‘pramaata’.

So far, the analysis seems to be simple for us to understand. However, we needto knowhow exactly this knowledge takes place, and in particular, the role ofconsciousness inacquiring the knowledge of an object. In this respect, we will follow theunderstandingof advaitic masters in terms of how the epistemological issues were treated inthedoctrine. Following VP, we provide a formal definition of a ‘pramaaNa’.

Definition of PamaaNa: – pramaakaraNam pramaaNam – that which is an instrumentofknowledge (pramaa). There are many instruments that are helpful for theknowledge to takeplace. Hence ‘pramaaNa’ stands for that which is essential cause or means fortheknowledge to take place, all other causes being only secondary. If we excludethe‘recollection’ from the memory (which is part of stored knowledge from thepast), thepramaaNa is defined as ‘anadhigata, abaadhitam, arthavishyayaka jnaanatvam –pramaaNam’- means of knowledge is that which is (a) not known before (since recollectionisexcluded here), (b) non-negatable, and (c) objectifiable (arthavishya impliesalso‘meaningful’, may not mean ‘useful’, although Ramanuja in his definition ofpramaaNaincludes ‘vyavahaara anuguNam’ or ‘transactability’ as a qualifier for valid

knowledge).If recollection is included, then pramaaNa is only (a) ‘non-negatable’ and (b)objectifiable entity. According to the commentator (Swami Madhavananda),‘non-negatable’ means that it is not negated directly by a contradictoryexperience. Ex.Rope experience is contradictory to the previous snake knowledge of the sameobject atsame place where the rope is. Implication is that if the pramaata (knower) doesnot havean experience that is contradictory to the previous ‘knowledge’ gained (say,that it is asnake where the rope is), even though that knowledge is erroneous from the pointof anindependent referee, it is still considered as ‘valid’ knowledge for thatknower. It isimportant to recognize that unlike other philosophers who believe thatvalidation is doneby an independent ‘saakshii’, the validation rests with the knower only. If hedoes notencounter any experience that is contradictory to the previous knowledge in hislifetime, then that knowledge stays with him as valid knowledge.

This non-negatability for valid knowledge brings us interesting definitions, afoundationof advaitic doctrine – absolute knowledge is defined is that which can never benegatedor contradicted at any time and that advaita defines as real (trikaalaabaadhitamsatyam). That can only be the pure knowledge with out any qualifications. Sinceallobjects have qualifications and unqualified knowledge, as discussed above isknowledge ofmyself or knowledge of Brahman. Hence the pure unqualified non-negatableabsoluteknowledge can only be self-knowledge which should be the same as Brahman’sknowledge,since Vedanta defines Brahman as pure consciousness – prajnaanam brahma.

Non-negatability in the absolute sense corresponds to pure knowledge. In thedefinitionof pramaaNa, non-negatability remains valid in the relative sense, even thoughit isnegated in the absolute sense. Hence, for example, the knowledge ‘this is a jar’remainsvalid with in the realm of transactional reality (vyavahaara satyam). However,even inthe absolute sense, what is negated is not the relative knowledge, but absoluterealityassumed for the relative knowledge. Just as knowledge of the pot remains validat

transactional level, even after knowing its substantive is nothing but clayonly, allknowledge revealed by pramaaNa remains valid at the transactional level, evenwhen onerealizes that ‘all this is Brahman’ (sarvam khulu idam brahma). Objectiveknowledge orarthaviShayaka pramaaNa, by definition, operates only at the transactionallevel. Hencethe definition of pramaaNa is not compromised.Next we will deal with the cognition of time.

Knowledge and Means of Knowledge-2

2. What about Time and Space?

[We are following the Vedanta ParibhASha (VP) text and are presenting the topicsin theorder described by Dharmaraja Adhvarindra (DA), but in the way that Iunderstand. Thebook is concerned about the epistemological issues in advaita Vedanta. ]

Cognition of time: Here VP follows the Meemaansaka’s view of cognition of time. DAstates that even though time is formless (also includes color less, tasteless,soundless, etc - essentially beyond the field of five senses), it is perceivedby thesenses, in the sense that perception of ‘this is a jar’ involves ‘I see a jarNOW’, since‘is’ denotes the present tense. VP does not discuss the perception of spacehere. Toinclude space, cognition should be ‘I see a jar, NOW and HERE’. VP states thataccordingto tenants of Vedanta, when there is continuous cognition of the same object,there isactually a sequence of successive cognitions of the object (no reference isgiven forthis, also not sure if this assumption is required –looks like digitization ofananalogue signal). Each cognition depends on the present perception and not ontheprevious one. Hence in the cognition, ‘I see the jar, NOW’ involving theperception ofthe present tense is not violated for the case of continuous cognitions of thesameobject. (The above conclusion can be arrived at without the need of digitization

of thecontinuous cognition).

From my understanding, Meemamsaka’s view of time is not appropriate as pramaaNalakshaNafor advaita. We can state few objections and discuss the time aspects later. Imust saythat we have now the benefit of modern science which DA did not have access athis time.Hence these objections are intended to arrive at correct definitions rather thananycriticism of VP.

1. In the cognition ‘This is a jar’, the is-ness denotes the existence aspect,which isbeyond time, since existence can never cease to exist.2. If ‘is’ denotes the present tense ‘Now’ the ‘now’ is also beyond the timeconcept,since it ever remains ‘now’. To define time we need two sequential cognitionsinvolving‘now’ and ‘then’ – ‘then’ involving memory.3. At any time, senses can perceive only things progressing in NOW- Hence VPaccount ofthe tenants of Vedanta in terms of digitization of the continuous signal,although notnecessary, can still be applicable not for defining time but for validating theperception at any time.4. Time cannot be perceived by the sense organs, as their fields of operation isfixedand they do not include the past or the future as senses operate only in ‘NOW’,which isbeyond time. Therefore Meemaansaka’s view that sense organs perceive the time isfundamentally not correct. Mind with memory is required to define time, based ontwosequential perceptions. The gap between the two sequential perceptions by thesamepramaata (knower) is the time gap. If each perception is related to vRitti orthought inthe mind, two sequential thoughts are required to measure the gap. When thereare nothoughts in the mind as in deep sleep state, then there is no concept of time. Inaddition if the mind does not look back but move continuously on a singleintenseexperience, I do not ‘feel’ time, since I am all the time in ‘now’ state, in

thatcontinuous experience. (I recognize that we have problem with words here.Continuous is aconcept of time –but the one who is riding on ‘now’ even the continuity is alsonotrecognized since past is not recognized, without bringing in memory). I ride on‘now’,when I am fully engaged in some serious action or enjoying some happy hours, andloosetrack of time (track can be followed only with the memory). These experiences,where onelooses the track of time, show that it is not just the sequence of thoughtsalone thatdefines the time. Mind has to track back previous and the current thoughts orexperiences to arrive at time. Since only past and present are experienced,mind canmeasure the time with reference to these two. Future, of course, is neverexperienced.Sometimes one feels that time flies fast while other times, particularly whenone issuffering, time moves slow, even though chronologically there is no change inpace.Implication is cognition of time is not direct and immediate like perception. Itis amental projection.

We conclude, therefore, that time is not measured by senses as assumed byMeemansakas,but by the mind. Inherently, it is subjective. This is the reason why I canhave atranscendental experience when I am always in Now –since ‘I am’ is neither pastnorfuture but is a continuous presence in the present. PRESENT ALONE IS ETERNAL. Presentcan be thought of a thin line where past meets the future. The gap can be madeas smallas possible – second – micro second- nano second .. till no gap is left, wherein thetrue present there is really no time either – what is there is only NOW. Thereis ofcourse my presence since I am the one who is dividing these seconds. Hencepresent isjust the presence of myself. That is the transcendental state since time is notthere.

One can make an objective definition for time by taking a discrete objectifiableprocess,such as earth rotating around itself or around the sun, as a measure of timethateverybody can agree by convention. We are making a subjective notion toobjectifiablemeasure by convention, as chronological time. There is no objective timeotherwise. Eventhe so-called objective events have to be measured or recorded by the mind. Experimentsinvolving isolation of an individual for days in a tunnel where no objectifiablereference is available to compare with showed that a person looses thechronologicaltime. He slowly relays on his biological mechanisms to determine time. Due tophase lagbetween the two, he slowly shifts from day to night and night to day, andsubjectivelydetermines when to sleep and when to get up, since there is no objectifiablereferencefor him.

We can formally define time as a gap between two sequential experiences. This isbetterthan Einstein’s definition where time is defined as two sequential eventsmeasured by anobserver who does not change with the event. Observer observing an event isactually anexperience by the observer – His mind should observe the events. When we bringexperiencewe are introducing subjectivity in the definition. When we have one singleexperience asin deep sleep state, we have no measure of time. Some philosophers assume thatsaakshiimeasures the time in deep sleep state. From advaita point, saakshii is puresaakshii,self-illuminating consciousness and is not involved in any activity. It does notdo thejob of even illuminating any thing, but things get illumined in its presence. Itis likethe Sun who does not really illumine any object, but objects get illumined inits light.

Conclusion we can draw from this analysis is that the time is measured by themind by

bringing past event and present event as two sequential experiences. Continuousflow ofvRittis or thoughts itself does not guaranty the cognition of time. In thecontinuousflow of thoughts, Mind may be riding at any instance on ‘now’. ‘Now’ is beyondthe timeconcept. Mind has to stop and look back to note the time. Cognition of Space islittletricky since we have stereographic vision and stereo sound provided by nature byhavingtwo eyes and two ears that are separated. Even the sense of touch can feel thespecialdistribution if the sense signals come from spatially separated different partsof thebody. Simultaneous perception of spatially distributed objects provides theperception ofspace too. It is again mental cognition and not directly by senses. Each senseorganinput is mono or unidirectional. Of course, beyond the sense and mindperceptions,Vedanta provides an independent means of knowledge in terms of creation of spaceas firstof the five primordial elements that are created. There is no mention ofcreation oftime, as for as I know. The fact remains that time is not measured by senses,and isprojected by the mind requiring the memory. It is subjective.

3. Knowledge is Continuous

{we are discussing the topics as they appear in the Vedanta paribhASha ofDharmarajaAdvarindra}

Continuity of the Knowledge: According to advaita Vedanta, knowledge of anobjectperceived via the senses is considered as ‘vRitti’ or mental state’ in the mind,whichgets illumined by the consciousness. Similar to the idea that an object outsideis seendue to the reflection of some light falling on the object, the mental state isalso‘seen’ , when it is illuminated by the light of consciousness. These statementsare madeintentionally in passive voice, since consciousness while it is self-luminous,

does notactively illumine anything. On the other hand, objects in its presence getillumined.It is similar to moon getting illumined by the Sun, while the self-shining Sundoes notactively do illumination of anything. Knowledge of the object ‘out there’ iscomplete,when the associated ‘mental state’ gets illuminated. That constitutes theobjectiveknowledge. When we are knowledgeable, we say, ‘I am conscious of the object’. Henceobjective knowledge is defined as being ‘(a) conscious of object’s existence and(b)conscious of the attributes of the object that are perceived through senseinput’.Objective knowledge is only attributive knowledge since senses can measure onlytheattributes of the object and not substantive. Substantive for all objectsaccording toVedanta is Brahman only. Objects are only naama and ruupa (ruupa includes allother senseperceptions) projected on Brahman. In fact, it is important to recognize thattheexistence of an object is also confirmed by the knowledge of its existence. Until aconscious entity establishes the existence of an object, object’s existence isnotestablished. Object is not a self-existent entity, since it is notself-conscious. Doesthe object exist if I am not conscious of it or if I have no knowledge of it?Who isgoing to establish its existence if no conscious entity is conscious of it?Hence we cansay existence of such an object is anirvachaniiyam or mathematically aninderminateproblem. The reason is simple. We have already defined that knowledge of anobjectinvolves removal of ignorance that is coving it. Until the ignorance is removed,theknowledge of its existence is also not established. Ignorance is removed onlywhen it isillumined by the light of consciousness. Hence conscious entity has to be theretorecognize its existence and have its knowledge. Ignorance is anirvachaniiyam orindeterminate. It is again similar to the pitch dark room case where the

existence of anyobject is not established until one turns the light on and see. Existence ofany objectin a dark room is an indeterminate problem until one turns the light on to seeandestablish its existence.

Hence, the perception of an object external to the mind is the same as theilluminationof the resulting ‘mental state, vRitti’. The illumination of an object continuesuntilanother object is perceived or its ‘mental state’ is known. Perception of nextobjectbrings in its associated ‘mental state’ into the light of consciousness. Thus,the lightof consciousness continues to illumine the sequential objects or more correctlythesequential mental states, that come in its preview. It is similar to the lightshiningon the stage continuously as the scenes continue to change. The objects are insequencebut the illuminating consciousness is continuous. Knowledge and consciousnessareconsidered identical in Advaita Vedanta. Knowledge is therefore continuous andhenceeternal too. If it becomes discontinuous, it absence, for it to be known, has tobeillumined by consciousness. That is I have knowledge of the absence of objectstoo. Thelast statement will have a bearing when we examine the deep sleep state. Whenthere is noobjects to be perceived, either darkness is perceived as in the case of a pitchdark roomor ignorance that covers the knowledge of the objects is perceived, since wehave alreadystated that knowledge of every object is covered by ignorance. Knowledgecontinues asknowledge of objects or knowledge of darkness or knowledge of ignorance. EvenwhenObjects change, the vRittis assocated with the objects change, but knowledgeremains thesame and continuous. As discussed before continuity is not a concept of time, itisbeyond the time concept. It is ever present, eternal ‘NOW’. Knowledge is ever

existentNow.


4. What you perceive is Brahman!

Six means of Knowledge: Advaita accepts six means of knowledge or pramaaNas.They are 1)direct perception (Pratyaksha), 2) Inference (anumaana), 3) comparison(upamaana), 4)verbal testimony (generally trust worthy word, but DP uses aagama meaningscriptures, asour interest is in spiritual knowledge), 5) presumption (arthaapatti) 6)non-apprehension(anupalabdhi). These will be described in turn.

Concerning the direct perceptual knowledge, DA says: ‘Pratyaksha pramaayaaHkaraNamPratyaksha pramaaNam’ - the instrument for knowing the objects directly isdirectperception. Next, DA makes a revealing statement that baffles the intellect.‘Pratyakshapramaa ca atra caitanyam eva’ – atra, meaning in the direct perceptualknowledge, what isreally revealed as the knowledge is the pure consciousness itself (He used heword ‘eva’,meaning consciousness alone). We may need to meditate on the statement tounderstand thesignificance, but what the statement says is direct and immediate perceptualknowledge isthe Brahman- no need to meditate since meditation is mediate and not immediate. This isa daring statement since Brahman cannot be perceived, yet he says what isperceived isBrahman. He provides the reference to Br. Up. III-4-1 that states that Brahmanisdirectly and immediately revealed. Let us look at this little carefully. TheUpanishadmantras contain the conversation between UShasta and Yajnavalkya. Theirconversation endswith:

UShasta: ‘You are providing me some indirect descriptions of Brahman like cow issuch andsuch, or horse is such and such, etc. Explain to me the Brahman that isimmediate anddirect not through indirect descriptions – Explain to me the Brahman, the selfthat iswith in all’.

Yagnavalkya: ‘You can not witness that which is witnessing self, you cannot hearthatwhich is hearer of hearing, you cannot think that which is thinker of thinking,youcannot know that which is knower of knowledge – that is yourself that is with inall; andeverything else except this is perishable’ – with that answer, UShasta had nofurtherquestions.

Upanishad says that which is directly and immediately known without any mediumisBrahman, that is your self, which is the pure consciousness because of which weareconscious of everything else. We cannot be conscious of consciousness since thatwilllead to infinite regress since we need to bring in series of consciousness(es)to beconscious of the preceding one. Other than the consciousness which is theknower of allknowledge, Upanishad says everything else is ultimately perishable, meaningnegatable.Real is that which is not negatable and Upanishad declares that 1) consciousnessis nevernegatable, 2) you are that consciousness and 3) you are that Brahman and 4) Thatalone isreal. Pure advaitic truth. How is this related to perceptual knowledge?

Knowledge can be thought of as two types – (a) direct and immediate called inSanskrit‘aparoksha jnaanam’ (Shankara wrote a book “aparokshaanubhuuti”) and (b) mediateknowledge (paroksha jnaanam) which is not immediate. Pratyaska pramaaNa comesunderdirect and immediate knowledge because as soon as I open my eyes I cannot butsee theobject right in front of me. The knowledge of the object is not purusha tantrathat is tosee or not to see does not depend on my will to see. It is vastu tantra that isitdepends on the nature of the object – it is assumed that my sense of sight isfunctioningproperly and all other secondary causes (light etc) are operating properly.Hence allperceptual knowledge is direct and immediate – immediate in the sense that I donot haveto do any analysis, thinking, meditation etc for me to grasp the knowledge ofthe objectright in front of me. In contrast the knowledge gained by other pramaaNas suchasanumaana etc is not direct. It is called mediate knowledge, since one has tosort it out

the knowledge through vyaapti or cause-effect reasoning. Shabda pramANa is basedonwords. Words normally give only indirect knowledge, similar to learning abouthow Indraloka or Niagara Falls looks like by reading books. However, when it comes toVedanta,the words CAN give immediate and direct knowledge if what is pointed out isright theredirectly and immediately, like the story of missing 10th man. You are that -Tattvam asi– Yagnavalkya in his answer says the direct and immediate knowledge is yourselfsincethat is the most direct and immediate. In Yagnavalkya’s answer, when he says youcannotwitness that which is witness of everything or hear that which is hearer ofhearing – heis implying that no Pratyaksha pramANa can reveal Brahman. In fact none of thepramAnAscan give the knowledge of Brahman or about of myself. Hence Brahman is calledaprameyam,unknowable. Similar statements are made in Kenopanishad. Yet Yagnyavalkya saysBrahman isyourself as the self in all and knowledge of that which is direct and immediate.Thestatement that Brahman is yourself that is the self in all – is shaastra pramANa– thiswe cannot know without the help of shaastra. Also the statement of bothYagnavalkya andUShasta is knowledge of that is direct and immediate; similar to perceptualknowledge. Tounderstand this let us go back to our dark room.

When we gave an example of pitch dark room, not only I can perceive darkness inthe room,I can perceive myself as existent and conscious entity. I do not need any meansfor meto know that I am there and I am conscious. In fact I have to be there even tovalidateany pramANa. Hence Yagnavalkya says what one knows directly and immediately(herewithout any pramANa) at any time is oneself. By equating that self that I am,which is,as we discussed before is pure knowledge that I am, which I am constantly awareof asmyself as self-conscious entity, to Brahman, scripture says that Brahman is alsoknownimmediately and directly as pure knowledge that is present all the time. Brahman beinginfinite cannot be known by any pramANa; it can be known by itself as it has tobeself-revealing or self-conscious entity. Hence Yangavalkya’s declaration that

it is yourown self which has to be direct and immediate. Hence the knowledge of myselfis same asthe knowledge of Brahman, which is direct and immediate. The immediate anddirect impliesthat I do not have to think or meditate for hours to realize that I am existentandconscious entity. I am there before I can even think or sometimes without eventhinking.According to Vedanta, Brahman is also defined as is pure consciousness –prajnaanamBrahman and hence is known directly and immediately. Yagnavalkya’s statement isstill apramANa since he is equating the two as mahaavakya – ‘I am’ is equated withBrahman,since both are directly and immediately know. To realize the scripturalidentitydeclaration that I am = Brahman requires Vedantic inquiry involving what iseternal andwhat is ephemeral – nitya anitya vastu vicAra. This requires bhAgatyAga lakshaNadiscussed in advaita Vedanta texts.

However, DP is making another equation with his statement, giving Br. Upreference thatdoes not fully justify his statement. He is equating the perceptual knowledgegained bypratyaksha pramANa which is direct and immediate is nothing but pure knowledgethat I amwhich is also direct and immediate. Thus, the total equation combining the Br.Up.statement is:

Perceptual knowledge (of objects) = pure Knowledge that I am (consciousness thatI am) =Brahman, which is pure consciousness.

The Br. Up quote only provides the justification of the second equation but notfor thefirst. Justification for his first part of the equation is only the commonfactor andthat is direct and immediate perceptibility of both the objects throughperception andthe conscious self that I am. Pure consciousness that I am, the self in all andhenceBrahman, is known directly and immediately. Similarly the perceptual knowledgeis directand immediate. Prof. T.P. Mahadevan, a great advaitic scholar, makes thefollowingstatement in his introduction to Methods of Knowledge: “The knowledge of theself that issaid to liberate the soul from bondage is direct knowledge which is unto

perceptualknowledge. Only, even perceptual knowledge not so immediate as self-knowledge. Insense-perception there is the intervention of a sense-organ between subject andobject”.In stating that knowledge that occurs in perception is direct and immediate andBrahmanknowledge based on the Br. Up statement is also direct and immediate, andequating bothon the basis of direct and immediate perceptibility of the two, DP makes thestatementthat perceptual knowledge is nothing but pure consciousness. How that equationispossible had to be resolved by proper inquiry. But if it is true, there is noneed toseek Brahman – since whatever we see, hear, touch, taste, etc is ‘pureconsciousness’only. The implication of the statement is very profound. We may have tomeditate andunravel the statement to recognize that there is no reason to meditate orunravel to seeBrahman, since Braham is directly and immediately visible! Personally, when Iread thatstatement I was baffled and lost in the beauty of that statement, since itactuallyglorifies the scriptural statements – sarvam khalu idam brahma and nehanaanaasti kincana– all that this (this corresponds to objects) is nothing but Brahman and thereis nothingelse other than Brahman, as well as Gita’s statement – brahmArpaNam brahma haviH..Everything is Brahman. Further justification of the DP statement will occur inthesubsequent chapters. But for me that was a million dollar statement – what youperceiveis nothing but Brahman – the more I see the truth of this statement the more Isee thebeauty or vibhUti of Brahman spread all over in whatever I perceive!

Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge - 5

5-More on Perception

We now go into more detailed aspect of perceptual knowledge noting that VPprovides somegeneral aspects but not in so much detail; Details are mostly based on myunderstanding,so you can take it with a grain of salt! Knowledge of an object occurs when theperception by the senses is projected in the mind as vRitti – VRitti is athought and the

contents of the thought are sense-data of the object to the degree perceived bythesenses. Senses gather the attributes as they see, not necessarily what they are.Whatthey are and what they see could be matching, if all the conditions for thesenses towork are met. For example if the light illuminating the object is dim, or ifthe senseorgans are defective (like the absence of 20:20 vision) the attributes that thesensegather could deviate from what it is. This could contribute to possibility forerror inperception. The point I would like emphasize is that the senses can only gathertheattributes of the object – colors, forms, sounds, smells, tastes, etc. and notsubstantives. Although VP discusses later in terms of the all pervadingconsciousnessBrahman being the substantive for all since according to Vedanta, Brahman is thematerialcause for the universe including - for the objects to be known (prameya) – forthe meansof knowledge (pramANa) and for the knower (pramAta). We need to have clearunderstandingof the processes of perception, since we do not ‘see’ Brahman when we see theobjects.In fact what we see is only inert things, since Brahman, pure consciousnesscannot be anobject of perception; in fact cannot be an object of any pramANa. Consideringthatconsciousness is indivisible what we see as a finite object is consciousness ‘asthough’constrained by the finitization as an object. We use the word ‘as though’throughout ourdiscussions, since that which is indivisible and part-less appears to be dividedjust asindivisible space is ‘as though’ divided into many compartments by boundingwalls.

Let us pose the question – what do we really see when we see an object? We needthesenses to see – eyes can only see the forms and colors, ears the sounds if theobjectemanates some, nose the smell, etc. Each has its field of operation withoutoverlappingeach other. But all are attributes of the object. Hence senses can only measuretheattributes of the object. Senses do not create the attributes but only measuresthem asthey ‘grasp’ the object. Looking from the object point, object is defined onlyby itsattributes. All definitions are attributive. The more precisely the attributes

arespecified the more concisely the object is defined. All the attributesdifferentiate oneobject from the rest of the objects in the universe. Attributes are not thesubstantive.Substantive in that form and a name (with all its attributes) is the object –likebangle, ring, necklace, bracelet etc. All are names for different forms, eachwith itsown attributes – the ID, the OD, the length, the thickness, etc. If we examinetheattributes of each object, say ring, bangle, necklace and bracelet, they make usdistinguish one from the other as well as from other forms in the universe. Butnone ofthem really belong to the substantive Gold. In fact, attributes of Gold are itsatomicmass, atomic structure, luster, non-corrosablility, ductility, density, or anyotherphysical and chemical attributes (which chemists use to identify gold from say,silver orcopper, etc), which are nothing to do with any of the forms in which gold canexist.These attributes of the gold are not helpful in differentiating ring, bangle,necklaceand bracelet, etc., although the substantive of all these forms and names is thesame,namely gold. Hence when we see the ring, bangle, necklace and bracelet, we seetwo typesof attributes. First the attributes of the superficial forms associated withtheir namesfor their forms i.e. ring, bangle, etc, and second some of the attributes of thesubstantive gold that can be immediately grasped by the senses, such as metalliclustier,etc . Without going into too much in details, since some of these were discussedelsewhere (see introduction to Vedanta), we can state in general that:

1. Senses grasp only the attributes, of those superficial names and forms, aswell asthose of the substantive that can perceive directly by the senses. Senses havenocapacity to gather substantive itself. Let us thank God for that, since if I seea goldring, not only the attributes of ring and the gold, if the substantive gold alsohas toenter in my mind and there won’t be any gold ring left on the table for othersto use!

2. If attributes of the substantive are non-graspable by the senses then sensescan onlygather the attributes of only the superficial name and forms. This is the caseif we say

Brahman is the material cause or substantive which does not have attributes ofits own,then senses can only gather the attributes of those superimposed names and formsonBrahman. Knowledge of the substantive can only be gained by Shastra pramANa. Bystatements like sarvam khalu idam Brahmna and neha nAnAsti kincana – all thatthis isBrahman and there is nothing or no thing other than Brahman.

Appearance of name and form from subtle to gross is creation. In accounting howBrahmanappears to become many names and forms, Upanishads describe appearance of subtleelements(tanmAtras) first, which subsequently undergo transformationless transformationinvolvingdivisions and recombinations to form the apparent grosser objects that we canqualify.Vedanta indicates that every object that we see is nothing but assemblage offiner orsubtler elements and they have no substantive of their own. Just as there is noringlysubstance or bangly substance, every object in this universe has no substantiveof itsown and is an assemblage of finer parts which can be further and further divideduntilall the grossness of the material object disappears. Ultimately only theconsciousentity that is doing the division remains. This appears to be where the currentscienceis also heading, but slowly. They do not end up with consciousness since it isneverconsidered as a factor in the appearance of objects.

Thus what we see when we see objects is only their superficial attributes sincetheultimate substantive is nothing but Brahman whose nature isexistence-consciousness andlimitless. Since consciousness and limitless cannot be seen, what we see in theobjectare its attributes plus existence as perceived as limiting adjunct of the object– thatis as ‘object is’ –or actually existence as an object or existent object, sincenon-existent object cannot be perceived. We can formally write an equation foran object:Object = Brahman + superimposed names and formsNames and forms cannot be counted as separate, just as we cannot count gold one,tworing, three bangle, etc. Since ring, bangle, necklace, are just superimpositionon gold.Knowledge of a ring involves two aspects – knowledge of name and form (ring) andknowledge of substantive (gold). Since gold knowledge is more substantial

knowledge, whatcounts is that knowledge. Similarly when we know Brahman, it is not that wewill knoweach name and form, but what we know is more substantial than any otherknowledge, sinceBrahman is the material cause for the Universe. Hence scripture declare – ekavijnaanenasarva vijnAnam bhavati – knowing that ONE (substantive or cause), knowledge ofeveryproduct (effect) is ‘as though’ gained. Since senses do not grasp thesubstantive, theshAstra alone becomes the source of that knowledge of the material cause fromall objectsin the universe.

Let us look more closely the mechanics of perception as we understand now.Althoughaccording to tradition, the senses along with the mind go out and ‘grasp’ theattributesof the object, we now know that the reflected light from the objects thatcontain theinformation of forms and colors, the sound and the smells etc reach therespective senseorgans in the body. They are evaluated by the senses (depending on theircapability) andthe corresponding information is fed in on a first come first serve basis to themind.Since light travels faster than sound, the colors and forms are recognizedbefore sounds,etc. For the sense of touch, the physical contact with the object is required.Mindintegrates all the information that comes in and forms an image on its ‘mentalscreen’with all the attributes gathered up to that point. Thus we have an image withcompositeattributes which gets updated as more information is fed in by the senses. Thiscorresponds to vRitti or thought of the object. The moment thought forms, itgetsillumined by the consciousness that is ever present. Ever present consciousnessis calledsAkshii chaitanyam or witnessing consciousness and what gets illumined in itsbrillianceis sAkshyam or witnessed. In this case, the sAkshyam is the vRitti or thethought whosecontents are the attributes of the object. The illuminated consciousness forms‘asthough’ reflection in or by the VRitti or thought. Formation of vRitti in themind isindicated as if the mind enveloping the object presented to it by senses. Henceit isrepresentative of the object outside. Its truthfulness to the object depends

actually onthe truthfulness of the attributes that the senses have gathered.

As the vRitti forms it is immediately illuminated by the witnessingconsciousness. It islike as soon as an actor enters onto the stage the actor is seen by the everpresentillumination of the stage lights. When the lights shed on the object, theobject isillumined and the reflected illumination by the object is seen by the eyes. Sameway thevRitti gets illumined in the presence of ever brilliant saakshii or witnessingconsciousness and the illuminated light gets reflected by the vRitti and that isseen bysubject (we will address who that subject is slowly). The consciousness that isreflectedfrom the vRitti is the knowledge itself since I become conscious of the vRitti.Thatreflected limiting consciousness (limited by the VRitti which in turn is limitedby theattributes of the object outside) is the knowledge of the object perceived. Justas thereflected light (sun light or room light) by an object makes me to see theobject, thereflected consciousness of the vRitti makes me conscious of the vRitti which isthe sameas knowledge of the vRitti. Just as the sun light is as though ‘lend’ to theobject forthe object to become visible, the consciousness from the sAkshi or witnessingconsciousness is as though ‘lend’ to the vRitti for it to become witnessed or tobeknown. Up to this is the process of cognition. The information up to this pointis –there is an object out there with the gathered attributes. We have knowledge oftheexistence of the object and also its attributes, since object is defined onlythrough itsattributes. Up to this is immediate and direct as all this process takes fasterthan thespeed of communication by the nervous system. Some times we see before we hearas in thecase of lightening and thunder. Once the object is cognized, it is stored in thememoryimmediately.

Recognition process: The process of recognition involves memory. This is notnecessarilyimmediate. All though we now know that mind processes the information using theparallelprocessing mode, it is not necessarily immediate. As the person ages, thecognition can

occur immediately but recognition takes its own time, sometimes for ever. Whenwe areseeing the object for the first time (such as when mother is teaching a childpointing tovarious objects), the VRittis related to the objects are cognized and stored inthememory along with a name tag – this is apple, that is a cow, etc. When the childsees thesame or similar objects, he cognizes them, mother may reinforce that storedknowledge asthe child re-cognizes the object. In the process of acquisition of knowledge,child’smind also sorts out the generic characters of similar objects as well as specialcharacteristics of particular objects. A cow is re-cognized as a cow and not asa horsebased on the generic characteristics (called in Sanskrit as jAti) while stilldifferentiating its specific characteristics (vyakti) as red cow or small cow incontrastto previous white, black, brown, big cows, etc.

Error in cognition and Error in recognition: When the information that was fedin by thesenses are not accurate due to various other factors that are involved in thecognitiveprocess, such as proper light to illumine the object, etc, the cognized vRittimay or maynot represent the object in question. Based on incomplete or inaccurate sensedata,cognition as well as recognition could be erroneous. Hence we say there is anerror incognition and the knowledge gained is erroneous knowledge – bhramaa instead ofpramaa. Ifthe perceiver is aware of the possibility of error that is there is a doubtabout thecognition and further experimentation may be required to establish the validityorinvalidity of the previous knowledge of the object. Thus if a perceiver sees asnakewhere there is a rope, if he has a doubt about his perception, he would expressthedoubtful knowledge as ‘I do not know if it is a rope or a snake’ or I see – itlooks likea snake but I am not sure, etc. If the perceiver has no doubt in hisperception, eventhough the perception is erroneous from point of an independent referee, hewouldconsider it as a valid knowledge and not erroneous knowledge; until heencounters acontradictory experience related to the object, which could cause a doubt in hispriorcognition. Many have no doubts about their knowledge, even though others see

that thereis a problem in their knowledge. Philosophies based on Vedanta are no exceptionsto this.

With this background, we are now ready to address some specific objections andanswersprovided in VP. Some of the questions and answers may appear to be irrelevantbut we willgo through them for completeness.

Q: Consciousness has no beginning. How can one say that knowledge, which hasbeen equatedto consciousness alone, can have a beginning?

A: It is not the consciousness but consciousness reflected in the VRitti has thebeginning, since the vRitti has a beginning and therefore its reflection too.Thelimiting reflected consciousness is figuratively called knowledge as arising inthe mind.

Without going into details about Vivarana vs Bhamati schools, in terms of whosays what,we note that all knowledge takes place in the mind only. Consciousness reflectedin themind is called chidAbhAsa which is also called ego. Knowledge of an object isrepresentedby a thought or vRitti and thought is illumined by consciousness as it rises.Sinceobject is limited, the vRitti is also limited. Illumination and reflection ofthe vRittimake me conscious of the vRitti and thus conscious of the object. This isfigurativelycalled knowledge – but it is knowledge of.. rather than pure knowledge itself. Pureknowledge has no beginning and therefore no end, as already been established bysayingthat knowledge is continuous. We have also made the distinction between pureknowledgeand knowledge of an object in the beginning itself.

Q: Mind is considered as having no parts. If vRitti or mental state, which islimited,rises in the mind, mind will be considered as having parts. It violates thefirststatement.

A: Yes, because the first statement that mind is having no parts is not correct,since itis a substance and substance has a beginning according to sRiShTi prakaraNa. The

reflected consciousness is considered as attributive knowledge (knowledge of ..)which isa mental state. There are other mental states like ‘desire, resolve, doubt,faith, wantof faith, steadiness, unsteadiness, shame, intelligence, and fear – all theseconstitutethe mind – says the Shruti (Br. I-5-3). All the above listed ones are calledmentalstates and are considered as attributes of the mind.

Q: If desire, etc are attributes of the mind, it contradicts the statements thatwenormally make; ‘I want, I know, I am afraid, etc about experiences that areattributednot to the mind but to the self that I am. I do not say mind wants or mind knowsor mindis afraid but always say I want, etc. – How can these experiences of the self beexplained, if you argue that they are attributes of the mind?

A: Looking at the red hot iron ball, we say that the iron ball is burning. Butburning isnot the property of iron ball. Iron ball just remains as black wrought ironball. Thered hotness is not the property of the iron ball. When it is put in fire, itbecomes redhot. Iron ball provides a locus for the fire. Because of association, propertiesof thefire are being superimposed on iron ball, and we falsely make a statement that‘iron ballis burning’. Similarly the self that I am is the substratum on which mentalmoods aresuperimposed. The moods belong to the mind not to the self. The self is alwaysfree fromthese changing moods. We use the expressions; I am happy, I am miserable, etcdue tofalse identification of myself with the mind and its attributes.

Hence, I am happy or I am miserable are only modifications of the mind and theydo notbelong to the self that I am. Due to this false identification, I take myself asI amhappy or I am miserable, etc. The false identification arises since I do notknow who Iam – Hence ignorance of myself is the root cause of the problem of thissuperimposition.

Q: Since mind being a sense organ it is imperceptible? However, you say themoods of theminds are seen, how can mind see the mind, since it is a sense organ?

Note: Here the question perhaps is raised from Bhamati point – where mind is

alsoconsidered as one of the sense organs. Sense organs cannot perceive themselves –likeeyes cannot see the eyes, tongue cannot taste itself – we need a mirror to seethe eyes.Question therefore has implied assumption that mind is also a sense organ.InterestinglyKena says in pointing to the Self – it is the eye of the eye, ear of the ear,etc. Aborn blind man says – I cannot see, I am blind. To him a Vedantin will ask – Canyou seethat you are blind? – Blind man has to say ‘Yes, I can see that I cannot see’ –with whateye I can see that my eyes cannot see – that is the eye of the eye.

A: There is nothing to prove that mind is one of the sense organs. Hence thequestion isnot valid.

Q: The proof comes from the B. Gita Ch.15-7. The second part of the sloka is:manaH ShaTAnIdriyANi prakRitishAni karShati|| - From prakRiti (the five) senseorgans andthe sixth, the mind, are gathered or attracted by jiiva.

A: That is not a proof that mind is the sixth sense organ. It only counts fiveindriyasand the sixth one, the mind, together are attracted by jiiva. Mind is separatedfrom theindriyas and is not included with it. {VP provides several example wherecounting is donein a group which includes other categories as well. Similarly, in the abovesloka mind iscounted as the sixth but not as the sixth sense organ. Hence mind does notbelong to thecategory of sense organs. – Look at the following statement ‘He taught VedasandMahabharata as the fifth’ – where Mahabharata is also counted, not as part ofthe Vedassince we know there are only four Vedas, but something significant that iscountable inlist of things that were taught.}

It may be argued that if mind is not considered as one of the sense organs, thenthecognition of happiness will not be direct and immediate in the mind. If onemakes such anargument, then that argument is also not correct. Immediacy is not necessarilyrest onmind being considered as a sense organ. If mind is considered as sense organ,and if thatis the necessary and sufficient requirement for immediacy, then even inference

(logicaldeduction) which is mediate will become immediate (involving no deduction).However, weknow that it is not the case. Sometimes one has to think deeply perhaps forseveral hoursto arrive at the inferential knowledge. Hence requirement that the mind has tobe a senseorgan for immediacy of mental moods of happiness, etc, is not necessary. Inaddition, ifwe push this argument further and say that for God to know everythinginstantaneously, wehave to provide him also some sense organs to facilitate that immediateknowledge. Hencemind is not considered as the sixth sense organ. Mind can have a sixth sense(that isinformation not fed by the five sense organs) which could be intuitive knowledgebut herethe discussion only pertains to about mind to be categorized as one of the senseorgansand not mind having a sixth sensibility.Next we will discuss about internal perceptions in contrast perceptions ofobjectsoutside.


(We are discussing perceptual knowledge based on Vedanta ParibhASha ofDharmarajaAdhvarindra, topics in the order that is presented, but in the way as Iunderstand it).

6. Internal perceptions

Internal perception:

Here we need to discuss how an internal perception occurs. Under this topic, weare notconcerned here about the recollection from the memory as internal perception. Internalperception we mean is the knowledge of the mental moods – happy, unhappy,desire, anger,fear etc that arise in the mind. When I say I am happy – it is an experienceandknowledge that I am happy – When one is happy, the statement is immediate anddirect –one does not have to say – let me think whether I am happy or not, or let memeditate onit to see if I am happy or look at some cause-effect relationship to deduce thatI mustbe happy for this reason. I am happy, I am unhappy, I feel bad, I am afraid, etc

theseemotions are also mental moods which are immediately and directly illuminated bythewitnessing consciousness. Hence the mental mood – happy mood of the mind – isilluminedand the reflected limiting consciousness is cognized as I am conscious of thehappy moodof the mind. ‘I am happy’ is not a recollection from memory although I can behappy byrecollecting some pleasurable experience happened in the past. However thatrecollectionof past experience can make me happy or even unhappy in the present. (Manypeople live inthe past, particularly if they are sorrowful experiences, by continuouslyrecollectingthose experiences again and again like continuous re-runs on the TV – those wecall asattachments). The negative mental moods, anger, joulousy, sorrow, causesignificant drainof mental energies resulting in mental depressions and other neurotic problems.Sometimes the root cause for these is desires or extreme dependency on something onthingsand beings for their happiness or survival. These, when they are unsatisfied,result infrustrations and anger. Mental depressions can occur when they have no controlof theirminds or the control of the external situations. Krishna gives how a mind candown thedrain starting from intense desire to anger to delusion causing loss ofdiscriminativepower, etc.

All vRittis that arise in the mind are immediately illuminated and the resultingreflected consciousness from these is known. That means we are conscious ofthemimmediately as they arise in the mind. It also follows that there cannot be avRittiwithout it being recognized immediately. What that means is I cannot think orbe happy,unhappy or angry without my knowing it! Therefore all vRittis or mental moodsareillumined and reflected immediately by the ever present witnessingconsciousness.

A comment: Here we can raise the question whether ‘I am happy’, I am unhappy, Iam angry,etc are thoughts or mental moods separate from thoughts, although both are putunder onecategory as mental moods or vRittis. From experience, we find that thesevRittis are not

of ‘thought forms’, but just simple mental moods.**********Recently I had an extensive discussion with Swami Paramarthanadaji about threeaspectswhich are pertinent here. 1) Concerning vRitti – VRitti is a mental mood, andthought isalso a mental mood – hence translation of vRiiti as a thought is notinappropriate (notethe double negative). We have idam vRitti – thoughts about this and aham vRitti– ‘I am’thought’. vRitti is also a feeling which need not be expressed as thought, asconceptualization of that feeling. Hence translation of vRitti as thought isdifficulthere. – looks like it is as difficult as translating the feelings into thoughtforms!-Hence sometimes it is better to stick to the words vRittis as mental moods or asfeelings, particularly when it comes to internal perceptions. 2) Second aspectIdiscussed was about my statement – Existence of an object can be establishedonly by theknowledge of existence. Otherwise it is indeterminate. Swamiji said that it isexactlycorrect provided I clarify that it is the knowledge in the minds of someconsciousentity, which Shree Sastriji also endorsed. 3) Third about the biological time –From thesecond item it follows that it has to be in minds of some one that includesIswara, aswell, as conscious entity. He agreed with my statement about vaiswaanara in theoperationof biological clocks. Anyway these are clarifications from Shree Swamiji forthose whoare interested. In the present context, we are now dealing with feelings ofhappiness,angry, etc. as mental moods. These need not be the same as thoughts involvingconceptualizations, but one can consider them as mental moods expressed asthoughts andnot after the fact thoughts. I would prefer to be called as just mental moods orfeelings, rather than thoughts of the feelings.************Hence, ‘I am happy’ as a thought is different from the mental mood ofhappiness. Iconsider thought as a conceptualized entity while happy mood does not involveconceptualization of that state. Similarly ‘I am angry’, ‘I am frustrated’ etc. Theseemotional moods are experienced directly and immediately. Hence when I expressmy happystate of my mind with a thought or vRitti as ‘I am happy’ thought, I am actuallyno morehappy, since I am now busy cognizing the thought than being happy. VP says thatmental

moods are known immediately as they rise in the mind – when we formulate thosemoods interms of thoughts, we are now describing the moods than cognizing the moods.Hence ‘I amhappy’ statement or thought is different from being in happy mood. Cognition ofthe moodis different from the expression of the mood as thought and its cognition. Theseexpressions are after the fact. (This happens also when we cognize the objectthroughperception. If there is jar in front and I see the jar, and cognize it as ‘Hereis ajar’. That part is immediate. This cognition can follow with, ‘I know here isa jar’,which is an after the fact or cognition of the knowledge of cognition). Hencewhen onetries express the feelings in terms of thoughts, one fails. Words and thoughtscannotexpress those feelings although words (some time facial or other bodilygestures) areneeded to express those feelings to others. In fact, in case of fear, etc., thebody alsoreacts to the feelings, in terms of adrenal reactions – high blood pressure,acceleratedheart beat, etc. Thus, we can also state that mental moods of anger, jealousy,frustration, etc., the negative moods cause perturbations in the mind asresponse to thesituations that are being faced. These mental perturbations will trickle down toperturbations at the body level in terms of physical and/or chemical reactions. On theother hand, the positive emotions are mental moods that make the mind calm andquiet withall mental perturbations become quiet, at least momentarily. That results inapparentperception of happiness that associated with my intrinsic nature, since I amanandaswaruupa or of the nature of pure bliss, which is non-dual. It appears fromthis thatthe positive mental moods are actually more close to absence of normal mentalmoods sinceunder these conditions, the witnessing consciousness beams forth in its trueglory –which is felt as ‘I am happy’, etc.

Expression of love is also similar wherein the duality ceases between lover andtheloved. The negative moods of hate, anger, etc take the mind away from myself,whereduality gets exemplified. Fear arises from the second. Cognition of thesemental moodsof happiness, unhappiness, anger, fear, etc., do not need to be expressed via

thoughts.Hence internal cognition of the mental moods is direct and immediate cognitionof themental states, when those states that arise in the mind. Similarly, the state ofrealization, that is the realization of my original nature – I am – assat-chit-anandaswaruupa– is called akhanDa AkAra vRitti - unbroken formless form of mentalmood - hereagain vRitti is not a thought form but similar to a mental mood involvingunbrokencognition of myself as the self that I am. It is not like other moods that comeand go,but this mood is a constant awareness of ever present self-illuminatingconsciousnessthat I am– that intense feeling of self recognition is in the mind only. It isnotrecognition of the reflected consciousness (as in reflected light) but cognitionof theoriginal consciousness (as in original light in the room or sunlight) which iseverpresent which is unrelated to any reflections that may or may not occur – thatis statedas akhanda AkAra vRitti in the mind, since that recognition is in the mind onlylike theroom light or sunlight falling in the room. When that realization arises thereis nomore feeling of understanding that I am the limiting reflected consciousness. Here it isnot that there are no more vRittis that are getting reflected as limitingconsciousness(es). Those are cognized as such without the notion that ‘I amthis’. Thatis – the vRittis – this, this and this – are getting reflected as they rise inthe mind,but no more identification with those vRittis as I am this, since I have nowrealizedthat I am the background ever present witnessing consciousness that I am, andnot thelimiting reflecting consciousness ‘this’. Once I have known who I am and abidein thatknowledge of who I am, then, I can still take the role of ‘I am this’ fortransactionalpurposes, but with clear understanding of who I am. That is, I am not thelimitingconsciousness, as ‘I am this’ stands, but I am the limitless consciousness thatI am,which was referred to earlier as sAkshI chaitanyam or witnessing consciousness inrelation to sAkshyam, witnessed limiting consciousness. We can state that thedifferencebetween state of realization and the state of ignorance is only this. We havefor all

our cognitions – the sAkshI, or the witnessing consciousness in whose light themind andits moods are being illumined and the reflected limiting consciousnesses fromtheseilluminations are cognized. When I am ignorant, that is, when I do not know mytrueidentity, I take myself as a constant reflecting limiting consciousness as ‘I amthis’ –where ‘this’ keeps changing as the reflecting limiting consciousness of themental vRittichanges with body, mind (including memory) and intellect thoughts. Thatidentification ofI am with ‘this’, this being a reflected limiting consciousness is called EGO.Withchanging ‘this’ my identification also shifts. In the state of realization, Irecognizethat I am that akhanDa AkAra vRitti – a continuous original consciousness that Iam andnot the reflecting consciousness that I used to think that I am. ‘I’ is stillcalledvRitti but unbroken vRitti since my attention is shifted from specificreflections to theoriginal general light of consciousness. The localized reflections andcognitions willcontinue as part of the metal moods but my identification is now shifted fromthereflected limiting consciousness to that which is continuous ever present, theevershining original consciousness –which still illumines as before the moods thatarise inthe mind. Nothing has changed except for my shifting of my attention of who Iam – Iused to think that I am reflected consciousness and now I realize that I am theoriginalconsciousness. Since the original consciousness is ever present, there is noconfusionin terms of understanding who that ‘I’ stands for. It is like recognizing I amtheoriginal light that is beaming all the time than the reflected light of theoriginallight from the vRittis or mental moods that still continue as before. Thecontents ofthe limiting vRittis may also change now since there is no more ego-centricdesires andtheir resulting thoughts. All vRittis now will be centered towards the totalitythat Iam – that is that which benefits the totality that is vRittis are for lokakalyAnam.

Actually the language fails to express properly the correct understanding, asthe

scripture says the words return back. From the point of ignorance, there is aknowledgein the sense I now know who I am - therefore I do not take myself what I am notas I am.The vRitti knowledge eleminates the ignorance of who I am - As Shankara say thatisduring realization - kRitvaa jnaanam swayam nasyet - having eliminated theignorace thisis also gets eliminated. What it means is it no more like knowledge as athought butknowledge as a fact. Once I shift myself from what I think I am to what I am,theknowledge or self knowledge is 'I am' period without any qualification of this.BhagavanRamana says - aham aham taya - I am - I am- etc spontaneously rising in one'smind -that is pure knowledge that we discussed earlier - which is also expressed asakhandaaakaara vRitti. Better to leave it with that, than try to explain anymore withwords.


7. The Criteria for Cognition

‘What is the criterion for perceptual knowledge’, that is, how or when theperceptualknowledge is said to be complete. Here we first provide the conventionalunderstandingand then adopt it from our current understanding of how sense perceptions occur.I muststate that in adopting the current understanding of the process, the fundamentaladvaiticunderstanding is not compromised.

VP says one can think of limiting consciousness as three fold. We understandfirst thatconsciousness is unlimited, indivisible and eternal. Just as space which isinfinite isdivided by limiting equipments and expressed as jar space, room space, etc.consciousnessexpressed by the limiting adjuncts is called limiting consciousness. With thatunderstanding we can now look at the process of perception.

From the point of perception, there are three things that have to come togetherforknowledge to take place. One is an object; the other is the subject and thirdis themeans of knowledge, bridging the first two. We can say that no knowledge cantakes place

until all the three come together. In this, object is not subject (in factcannot becomea subject) and subject is not an object (cannot become one either) and means isconnecting link between these two dissimilar things. Since Vedanta says that theallpervading consciousness, Brahman, is the material cause for everything, thedistinctionsof subject, object and the means are only superficial and are valid withinvyavahaara ortransactional reality. Since knowledge is related to consciousness, theperceptualknowledge of an object by a subject through a means involves some kind oftransgressingthe transactional to transcendental reality, since I, a conscious entity, becomeconscious of an object, in my mind via reflected consciousness. Hence thestatement ‘whatI perceive is nothing but consciousness itself which is nothing but Brahman’follows. Howthis happens can be described as follows:

Since Brahman is the material cause for everything, we can say Brahman, in theform of alimiting adjunct called object, comes in contact with limiting consciousnesscalledsubject though a limiting consciousness called means of knowledge, forperceptualknowledge to take place. It is exemplified by Gita sloka – brahmaarpaNam brahmahaviH … .Let us take an example of a perception of a jar. We can say thatconsciousness in theform of jar (jar is a name and a form for the substantive Brahman), comes incontact withthe consciousness in the form of mind, through consciousness in the form ofmeans ofknowledge. When all three become ‘as though’ united into one when a consciousentity, I,becomes conscious of the object, jar.

How does this process occur? To explain this process VP provides simple analogythat isfamiliar to even a lay man - water from a tank that is being channeled to thevariousfarm-fields takes the shape of the fields – rectangular in rectangular fieldsandcircular in circular fields, etc., similarly the mind supported by consciousnessgoes outthrough the sense organs and makes a contact with the object and envelopes theobject,jar, modifying itself taking the shape of the jar. At this juncture, themodified mindand the object are occupying the same place at the same time. That very

modification iscalled vRitti. Mind running to the object and taking the object shape for it toperceiveis conventional understanding how the mind through sense organs ‘grasps’ theobject. Wenote that in the ‘Methods of Knowledge –According to Advaita Vedanta’, SwamiSatprakashananda says that only in the visual and auditory perceptions the mindgoes outthrough the corresponding senses while in tactile, gustatory, as well as inolfactoryexperiences the sense organs, in association with the mind, makes contact withthe objectwhile remaining in its own location. In principle, it appears that it is notnecessarythat mind has to go out and engulf the object – information can come to thesenses andvia senses to the mind – for object to be cognized as is. The important point isin theperceptual knowledge; the vRitti that is formed is representative of the objectperceived. The correspondence is imperative for perceptual knowledge to beimmediate anddirect, which is not the case for interferential knowledge.

We now know that light reflected from the object reaches the lenses of the eye,providingan image of the object on the retina. Since we are blessed with two eyes thatseparate byseven degrees, the two images stereographically rotated to give a depth ofvision. Thisis exploited in making 3-D movies using polarized lights, which is viewed bywearingpolarized glasses. If you remove the glasses you only see plane projection. The threedimensional view of the world is transmitted to the brain. Up to this is clear.Signal istransformed as vRitti in the mind – this conversion software is intrinsic to themind.That this happens is obvious but how this happens is not known. The defects canoccur dueto distortion of the eye, which to a large extent can be corrected byspectacles. Thedefect can also occur when in the transmittal of the image in the retina to thebrain.Subsequent transmittal of this image to the mind in terms of neuralreorganization(compiler and programming code with which the mind operates) is not yetunderstood.

Here the mind integrates the input from all the senses as they come forming theimage orvRitti. Only difference from the conventional understanding is instead of mind

rushingthrough the sense organs, the information is brought to the subtle equipment,mind.Either way the end product is the formation of the vRitti, which isrepresentative of thesense data that is collected. That is, the image formed is representative of thesensedata that is perceived. If the sense data is erroneous or distorted, the imagethat isformed is not true representation of the object seen. This leads to error inperception.The ultimate mechanism involves the formation of vRitti representative of theobjectperceived or more correctly representative of the sense data received.

Thus every vRitti has a corresponding object that it represents in perception. On theother hand, in the case of inference where the object is not perceived butinferred, thevRitti has no direct representation to the sense data and thus to the objectthat isperceived. In the inference, senses data correspond to only the ‘hetu’ orcause part.For example, for the case, ‘I see the smoke on a distant hill’ where the smokeand thedistant hill are perceived and the corresponding vRittis have objects associatedwith it.But when we deduce using vyaapti (a concomitant relation between the cause andeffect)that the hill is on fire, where the fire is not perceived but inferred, thevRittiassociated with it has no direct object to relate to since there is nocorrespondingsense data on fire. Hence the knowledge that is arrived at – that the hill ison fire –is not direct and immediate – it is indirect and mediate knowledge, since mindhas to usethe sense data and analyze that information using relations and arrive at someconclusion, which is considered as deductive knowledge. Hence knowledge ismediate andindirect. This will be analyzed more clearly when we discuss the anumAnapramANa. Herethe point VP makes is that the perception passed on sense data provides a directcorrespondence between the mental vRitti and the object of perception. In theconventional explanation wherein the mind is rushing through the sense organsandenveloping the object at the same place and time, insures one to onecorrespondencebetween the vRitti and the object perceived. That VP says insures that thelimitingconsciousness of the object present corresponds to the limiting consciousness of

thevRitti formed in the mind.

We can now state that one of the essential criteria for perceptual knowledge isthecorrespondence between the object perceived and the associated vRitti that isformed viasense input. In the internal perception of feelings this happens automaticallysincemetal moods formed correspond to those particular emotions – happy, unhappy,fear, etc.Hence their perception is also direct and immediate. This correspondencebetween theobject and its vRitti formed in the mind – this one to one correspondence - isviewed byVP as the unity in the limiting consciousness of the object and that of vRitti.Toappreciate this concept correctly let us looks at space analogy, which isanalogous toconsciousness, as both are indivisible, all pervading and infinite. Let usconsider ajar sitting on the ground in a monastery. There is no difference in the spaceinside thejar and space inside the monastery. Space is limitless although the limitingadjunctsthat define the limiting spaces ‘as though’ are different, but intrinsicallythey are thesame, one indivisible space. Even the dividers, jar or walls of monastery are inspaceonly.

The same analogy applies in perception, although it is not obvious. Thatconsciousness isall pervading is not obvious to us. That knowledge comes from the scriptures,althoughone can deduce logically that consciousness cannot have boundaries, space-wiseortime-wise. It is inside and outside and thus everywhere. In each object theconsciousness is expressed as limiting consciousness. Hence object is defined asBrahman+ form with a name, since Brahman is the material cause for the universe. Thetransformation of Brahman into forms, scriptures say, is like gold transformingintoornaments – a transformationless transformation called vivarta vikaara, or anapparentmodification. Just as gold remains as gold while forming verities of ornamentswithdifferent names and forms, without itself undergoing any vikaara or realmodification,Brahman, whose nature is pure consciousness, remains as such but appears to belimiting

objects, with a name and form or attributes. Therefore all objects are limitingconsciousnesses, limited by the upaadhiis which are bounded. Although upaadhiisarebounded, Brahman is not, since the space between the upaadhiis is also Brahman.HenceBrahman as limitless is not compromised.

Unity of limiting consciousnesses for perception:

From the above analysis, the jar out side is nothing but limitless Brahman,whose natureis existence-consciousness but appearing as limiting consciousness (actually aslimitingexistence) in the form of a jar (form here stands for attributes of the jar,which aredifferent from those of mug or vessel) with the name associated with it as‘jar’. Namedefines the attributes with generic attribute that jar has jar-ness or jar-hoodassociated with it. Senses measure attributes, since substantive Brahman is notattributive. Existence is not an attribute. (If existence is attribute then weneedanother substantive for the attributive existence, that is, we need anotherBrahman whosenature is existence – thus we run into infinite regress. In addition ifexistence is anattribute and attribute should be different from substantive. Only thingdifferent fromexistence is non-existence. Now we run into self-contradiction. Thenon-existence whichis different from existence becomes a substantive for the attributive existence.That isexistence is an attribute for non-existence. Non-existent substantive is nosubstantive.Hence, existence cannot be an attributes as some philosophers argue. Hence,advaita saysexistence-consciousness is swaruupa or inherent nature of Brahman – here thelanguage islimited in expressing the swaruupa lakshaNa of Brahman, as the scriptures sayswordscannot reach there!). When the sense-input forms a vRitti in the mind whoseattributesare the same as that of the jar, the one to one correspondence between theexistent-attributive vRitti and existent-attributive jar is established. This isstatedin VP as the limiting consciousness of the object jar is united with thelimitingconsciousness of the vRitti, the mental mood for the completion of theperception.

The truth of this becomes clear, since Brahman is all pervading and limitless.The only

difference between one object and the other is attributes that define theobjects. In theperception of ‘this is jar’ – the attributes of the jar are measured and carriedto themind where VRitti is formed consisting of the same attributes that weremeasured.Brahman in the form of jar is now Brahman in the form of vRitti in the mind,sinceeverything is nothing but Brahman. The same statement is expressed as thelimitingconsciousness of the Brahman in the form of jar is now united with the limitingconsciousness of Brahman in the form of vRitti – since attributives of both theobjectoutside and the vRitti inside are the same. The substantives for both jaroutside and thevRitti inside are also the same since Brahman is limitless and indivisible.

To be more exact, expression of Brahman is different in different limitingadjuncts.Brahman expression depends on the nature of the adjuncts. In the case of verygrossproducts or gross world, the inertness is obvious. In all these, the allpervadingBrahman is expressed as just the existence – sat swaruupam. Hence we say jar ISwhere theis-ness is the expression of its existence. Hence the object jar outside isBrahmanexpressed as existence with name jar and form – all the attributes -superimposed on thatexistence. In the case of jar or any other tangible object, the existence existsin agrosser form. All gross forms consist of panca bhuutas transformed byrecombinationprocess (pancIkaraNa) keeping Brahman as their substantive. If the object issubtle asin the case of the mind, Brahman can then express as existence and consciousentity,since mind can reflect the light of consciousness much better than grossobjects. It islike a mirror that can reflect the light better than a stone. The degree ofreflectiondepends on the reflecting medium. Perception of jar therefore involvesperception ofBrahman in the limiting existence in the form of a jar with its attributes. During theprocess of perception, the attributes are gathered by senses and are projectedin themind as vRitti. Although the attributes are the same in both the jar and in thevRitti,mind is a subtler expression of Brahman in contrast to jar which is grosserexpression.

Hence in the vRitti, Brahman is expressed not only as existence similar to thatin thejar but also as reflected consciousness since the vRitti which is nothing butmental moodcan reflect the light of consciousness better than the gross material of thejar. Hence,considering all this, we can state that perception is said to be complete, ifexistenceof the jar with its attributes unites with the existence of the vRitti with thesameattributes as sensed by senses. Since existence is all pervading, only thingthatrequires to be carried by the senses are attributes of the object to the vRitti.It isalso a fact that the senses can carry only attributes and not substantive. Henceperception is complete as soon as attributes are projected on to Vritti or imageormental mood that is formed in the mind. VRitti is illumined as it forms, sincemind hasthe capacity to reflect the illuminating consciousness. The limiting reflectedconsciousness by the vRitti is the knowledge of the vRitti, which is the same astheknowledge of the object. VRitti is nothing but existence with the attributesthat aregathered by the senses and those attributes are the same as the attributes ofthe jar,which is also nothing but existence with the attributes. Thus there is anidentity in thetwo – object jar and the vRitti as both are existence with the attributes of thejar.Only difference is existence is expressed in the jar in grosser form while it isexpressed in subtle form in the vRitti. The other difference would depend on howfar thesenses could gather the attributes from the jar and carry them to the vRitti. In somecases the senses can be trained to pick up finer differences in tastes,different shadesin colors or finer differences in forms which may not be possible for untrainedsenses.There are professional wine tasters and tea tasters who can distinguish finerdifferencesin tastes to know which is better or more easily sellable!

In the case of internal perceptions that is the perception of happiness orunhappiness,fear, anger etc, the metal moods are directly perceived since the mental moodsare theemotions directly. As the emotions rise, they express as perturbations in themind asmental moods and they are illumined and cognized as they form. Senses are not

involvedhere. Attributes of the mood are the specific feelings themselves and thereforefurthermeans is not required for knowledge of those feelings. VP says since thelimitingconsciousness in the form mental moods and the limiting consciousness in theform offeelings of happiness, anger, fear, etc are identical or occupy the same spaceand time,the reflected consciousness or the knowledge which is immediate and direct isinvariablya perception.

Hence there are fundamentally two criteria that need to be met for perception tobecomplete.a) For the vRitti that is formed either via sense input for the objects outsideor forthe vRitti that is formed for the internal perceptions of the emotions, theremust be oneto one correspondence between the object of perception and the vRitti that isformed.This insures that every vRitti that is formed there is an object that itcorresponds to;be the object of perception is outside or inside the mind.b) The vRitti as it forms is illumined directly and immediately by the everpresentconsciousness, sAkshI or the witnessing consciousness. Hence direct andimmediateknowledge of the object perceived is the nature of the perceptual knowledge. Incomplexcases, as in the case of fire on the distant hill, the immediate perceptions areonly thesmoke and the hill. From this, the knowledge that the hill is on fire is deducedusinglogic using cause-effect relationships. This part of the deductive knowledge isnotimmediate and direct. Hence we have mixture of both direct and immediateknowledge ofsmoke and hill, and mediate and indirect knowledge of fire on the hill.

The limiting consciousness of the object, the limiting consciousness of thesubject, andthe limiting consciousness of the means, all combining to form – pureconsciousness butexpressed figuratively as the consciousness of the object or the knowledge ofthe object.

We can raise the question – how is it possible that the limiting reflectedconsciousness,

that is the knowledge of .. is the same as the pure absolute knowledge ororiginalconsciousness? Although the answer is obvious, it becomes a very pertinentquestion formany advaitic students – since the same question trickles down as who reallyrealizeswhen I say I am not this, or I am not the ego, which is nothing but thereflectedlimiting consciousness, since it is the ego that is making statement that I amnot theego, and not the sAkshI chaitanyam. The reflected consciousness will remain asreflectedconsciousness as long as there is medium for reflection. It is like as long asthere isa mirror there is always the image in the mirror, if there is an object in itsvicinityand there is enough light around, whether I pay attention to the image or not.(The humanpsychology is always to look at their images if there are any. Everybody wantsto knowhow one looks either in the mirror, in the others eyes). The originalconsciousnessremains as pure, ever present, ever shining consciousness, whether there is amirror toreflect or not. Self Realization is then recognizing the reflected limitingconsciousness(ego) is not separate from the original consciousness. These analogies ofmirror andreflection are only for purposes of illustration. Actually if we say theoriginalconsciousness is all pervading and mind is reflecting the consciousness – suchstatementsare for purpose of understanding. According Advaita Vedanta, mind, the reflectedmediumas well as the reflection are not and cannot be separate from the all pervadingconsciousness. Hence in Advaita it is technically called adhyaasa or just asuperimposition, like ring is superimposed on gold. Gold is called adhiShTAnamorsubstantive. Hence it is the all pervading consciousness itself ‘as though’appears asthe mind as well the reflection in the mind, for the knowledge of an object thatitselfappears as one. It is similar to entering bright sunlit room. Now sun light isall overbut what I actually see is the sunlight reflected by the objects all around, andsay Isee the sunlight everywhere. What I am seeing is only the reflected sunlighteverywhereas it falls on the objects or walls around. However, I recognize that thereflectedsunlight is not different from the original sunlight although I may not be able

to seethat original sunlight directly. If there are no objects, no walls, or none toreflectthe sunlight, will my eyes able to recognize the presence of sunlight? If I amthesunlight itself and there is nothing to reflect, how would that be? Hence, itis saidthat mind is essential for self-realization to recognize that I am not thereflectedlight in the mind but the original one that lights the mind to reflect. In factI am themind too to mind. It is said that in order to see myself I became many – thisis alsoreferred to in many ways as Liilaa Vibhuuti or Aiswaryam or as GouDapAda puts it–swAbhAvikam – that is my natural state.

Hence VP’s declaration in the beginning itself: ‘Pratyaksha pramaa ca atracaitanyameva’ meaning in the direct perceptual knowledge, what is really revealed as theknowledgeas reflected consciousness is the pure consciousness itself. That is theidentity ofreflected consciousness with the original consciousness. One is adhyaasa and theother isadhiShTAnam, a superimposition on a substratum, like ring on Gold. It is likesaying ringis nothing but gold, which is its adhiShTAnam or substratum. In the case ofconsciousness, without that superimposition one cannot see the adhiShTAnam, likelightcannot be seen without its reflections. One can now see the beauty in themillion dollarstatement as one reflects more and more on the truth behind all reflections.Thiscompletes the analysis by establishing what was proposed in the beginning. Therest ofthe analysis deals with some details and related things pertaining to directperceptionas pramANa.Now we address some of the objections and responses, a standard format commonlyused toclarify the concepts presented.

Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge -8

[We are covering the Vedanta ParibhASha text by Dharmaraja Adhvarindra, based onmyunderstanding.]

8. Some Clarifications Regarding Internal Perceptions

Q. If happiness is a mental mood that is perceived directly, then therecollectionof that happiness, etc., from one’s own memory should also be considered asperception of happiness directly and immediately.

If we recall the definition of a pramANa when recollection is allowed – it says‘abAdhita arthaviShayaka jnAnatvam’ (a) ‘non-negatable’ and (b) objectifiableentity. However the question here is, does this recollection of happiness comeunderdirect and immediate perception, since there is no object out side andrecollectioninvolves some kind of mental mood or vRitti which is perceived as it forms. Itissomewhat similar to the original vRitti that is formed when we perceive thehappiness. Since the original mental mood of happiness that was perceived isstoredin the memory, question pertains to the recollection of that also involves avRittijnaanam or knowledge of mental mood, although this vRitti is recollection of theprecious mental mood or to say correctly it involves knowledge of recollectedmentalmood.

A. VP says that is not so. The recollection of the mental mood is not the sameasthe experience of the original mental mood. The recollection involvesrecollectionof previously collected event. Recollection is occurring in the present whiletheobject of recollection is from the past. There is no corresponding‘object’(state ofhappy mental mood) for the recollected vRitti. The recollection is always ‘Iwashappy’ than ‘I am happy’. To state clearly, the limiting adjuncts for therecollected mental vRitti and the limiting adjunct of the happy mental mood whenitwas experienced belong to two different times. Hence the corresponding limitingconsciousnesses of two vRittis are different. Therefore, the criterion forperception is the two limiting consciousnesses must occupy the same space andtime,for the union of the two to take place.

As we discussed before, the experience of happiness as a mental mood isimmediateand direct. The vRitti that is formed is lllumined and the limiting reflectedconsciousness is the knowledge of that vRitti – contents of the vRitti isattributive for anger and hatred etc the contents are those emotional feelingthemselves. For happiness which is conditional happiness – where I am happybecause.. conditional happiness is limiting happiness as reflected consciousnessorreflected happiness itself at its attribute. Expression of these feelings in

thoughtforms is different from that the feelings themselves. That is, being happy isdifferent from stating or thinking that I am happy. The recollection ofhappinesscan only be a vRitti in the thought form since one cannot regenerate the samementalmood via recollection. This is viewed by VP as non-unity of the limitingconsciousnesses of the two vRittis, the past and the present since unity oflimitingconsciousness is the criterion for direct perceptual knowledge.

Here we raise an important issue – If we consider that emotions are some kind ofmental perturbations expressed as vRittis in a general sense, then how theseemotional feelings in terms of vRittis are stored in the memory, for one torecollect back in the future? I recognize that some of the discussions canborder tospeculation since I do not know if we know how mind stores the information inthememory that it can recollect later. The same problem how the genetic informationiscoded in genes and stored to pass on to the next generation. We just marvel attheprogrammer and bow down at this intelligence and speculate how it is done. Forthecase of perception of objects outside – this is jar –that is a cow, theattributiveknowledge is stored as information in the memory stamped along with time andspaceas conceived by the mind (in relation to previous or subsequent events). Intermsof emotions of happiness, fear, anger, etc, it is our experience that we storenotthose mental perturbations directly but thoughts associated with those feelings.However, thoughts are not feeling per sec. Hence the thought that I am happy isnotthe same as being happy. It is our experience that we cannot be happy byrecollecting I was happy since recollection of I was happy does not generate thesame mental emotional happiness that I was at that time. The same is true forangerand other emotions. Hence it appears what is stored in the memory is not theexactcontents of emotional moods of the mind as such but knowledge as a subsequentthought of those moods. The recollection therefore involves the recollection ofthethought of happiness and not the state of happiness experienced in the past. Hencewe can say that the contents of ‘I was happy’ thought and the mental mood ofhappiness that existed when I was happy are different – there is no unity incontents. Essentially VP says is that by recollecting that I was angry, I cannotbeangry now. I can again be angry now, if I recapitulate all the thoughts or

situations that caused that original anger and still feel that those accountshavenot been settled. This time the anger could be even more or less intensedependingon how strong the rekindled emotions are. Negative emotions like anger, hatred,orfrustrations etc can be stronger since they are intense and continuousrecollectionwould only reinforce those emotions. One can get cocooned in those repeatedemotionsand frustrations that one can become neurotic or mentally depressed. In suchcases,it is not the recollection of the emotions but recreation of those emotions,whichare perceived immediately as they rise in the mind.

Question related to dharma and adharma:

Q. What about then the merits and demerits, dharma or adharma or righteous andunrighteous. One may be righteous and unrighteous in himself as his character,butconsciously become aware of it only through other’s verbal testimony as- “youarerighteous,” or “you are unrighteous,” - or by subsequent reactions that therighteousness or unrighteousness cause in terms of pleasant or unpleasantsituationsin one’s life. In these cases, the verbal testimony of others occurs atdifferenttimes and places in relation to the acts of righteousness or unrighteousness.Similarly, the reactions in terms of good and bad occur at different times andplaces. Thus in relation to the mental moods of righteousness andunrighteousnessand the verbal testimony or its reactions in terms of good and bad, there is aunityin the limiting consciousnesses of the past and present since one becomeconsciousof these only by the testimonies and reactions. There the requirement ofperceptionis being fulfilled – that is the requirement of the unity in the limitingconsciousnesses – yet there is no direct and immediate perception ofrighteousnessor unrighteousness. Hence the objection is that requirement of unity of limitingconsciousnesses is not sufficient for perceptual knowledge or unduly extensiveforperceptual knowledge.

Note: Questions involved extension of the concept of perception to abstractideas or‘objects’ whose attributes are not well defined, but normally known throughAgamapramANa or shabda pramANa or through moral established codes of conduct. They

arenot tangible like objects or experienced like emotions. That righteousness orunrighteousness form mental moods need to be established first before oneinquiresof the unity of limiting consciousness of these with that of verbal testimony orgood and bad effects in life.

A. VP answers in specifying what constitutes the perception in more solidground.For perception, the object perceived must have attributes that qualify theobject –hence we stated before that all objective knowledge is attributive knowledge andthat is formulated on firmer grounds here. Those attributes must also beperceptibleeither through the senses or through the mind. Even if one considers therighteousness and unrighteousness are attributes of the mind, they are notperceptible. They can be known only though their effects or by verbaltestimony.VP says certain attributes are perceptible and certain others are not and thatdepends on the intrinsic nature of the object they qualify. For example, welearn inChemistry that water is colorless, odorless, tasteless, liquid which areactuallynon-perceptible attributes that do not identify what water is but identify whatisnot water. Vedanta uses the similar language in indicating Brahman, startingfromimperceptible, infinite, non-dual, unthinkable, etc. Nyaaya system of philosophyconsiders that righteousness and unrighteousness are attributes of the self,similarto happiness. In Advaita, Self has no attributes, and happiness is not attributeofthe self but its intrinsic nature – which is limitless; and limitlessness ishappiness, anatam eva anandam.

However, the verbal testimony can lead to direct perceptual knowledge undercertaincases, says VP, if the object that is being indicated is right there beingexperienced. For example when one is happy and if another says, ‘you arehappy’,the knowledge arising from the verbal statement coincides with the knowledge ofthemental mood that is present. This becomes clearer in the example of the missingtenth man story, where the verbal testimony can lead to direct perceptualknowledgeof the tenth man, who is experienced right there. When ten people crossed theriverand each one counted to make sure everyone in the group has crossed the river. Eachone came up with only nine when he counted, and everyone concluded that thetenth

man is missing. A wise man came to their rescue and asked them to count againandwhen the counting stopped at nine, the wise man said – ‘you are the tenth man’ –Thus although all the ten were there, each one was missing to count himself andtherefore coming up one short. Here the verbal statement – you are the tenth man–immediately and directly leads to perceptual knowledge, since the object that ispointed is right there in front, which is immediately accessible ether to thesensesand/or to the mind. Hence verbal testimony can lead to direct and immediateperceptual knowledge if the object of perception is direct and immediatelyperceptible.

We already discussed about the composite perceptual and inferential knowledgeinvolved in the knowledge taking the example of -there is fire on the distanthill.The hill and the smoke are directly perceived by the senses, while the fire isinferred using logic of cause (hetu) and effect (sAdhya) relationship (vyaaptijnaanam). The hill is on fire is an inferential knowledge while that the hillandthe smoke on the hill are direct perceptual knowledge. Thus there is acombinationof mediate and immediate knowledge.

In many instances the inferential knowledge is based partly on perceptions. Takethe example of a statement after seeing a piece of sandal wood from a distance –‘that is a fragrant piece of Sandal wood’ - in this statement what is perceivedisonly the sandal wood and based on prior experience one is making the statementthatthe sandal wood has fragrance, although the fragrance is currently not perceivedbythe nose. Here we have both immediate knowledge – which is the perception ofthesandal wood and mediate knowledge that it is fragrant based on previous memoryinvolving experience of the connecting link - sandal wood and its fragrance.Thus weknow from the past experiences that if it is sandal wood it must have fragrance–That is the concomitant relation between sandal wood and its fragrance isalreadyestablished before using past experiences. If one never had that experience,thenhe cannot make a statement ‘that is a fragrant piece of sandal wood’ – all hecansay is ‘that is a piece of sandal wood’. If he does not know that how sandalwoodlooks like, then he can say ‘that is the piece of wood’. VP makes a distinctionhere of imperceptible attributes which are different from the above cause wherethe

fragrance is not perceptible, not because it is imperceptible but because theobjectis too far for the ocular knowledge to take place. In contrast there are certainimperceptible attributes. Imperceptibles are when they are beyond the capabilityofthe instruments of perception – like eyes can see only the visible spectrum,etc. –X-rays cannot be seen by the eyes, they are imperceptible.

Question related to Jaati:

In the example of ‘this is a fragrant piece of a sandal wood’ – there is mixtureofboth immediate and direct as well as mediate and indirect knowledge. That isconsidered in Nyaaya philosophy as defective and is called ‘sankara’ – a crossbetween two diagonally opposite entities – direct and immediate on one side andindirect and mediate on the other. Hence the next objection is based onposition ofNyaaya philosophy.

Q. If we admit the cross between immediate knowledge and mediate knowledge as intheexample above then we have problem of discarding or rejecting jaati or genus asdistinct category.

The objection is based on the philosophical position of Nyaaya which admits thatjaati as fundamental and eternal category which does not allow co-existence ofmutually opposite characteristics – in our case the immediate on one side andmediate on the other related to objective knowledge. We discussed jaati beforeasgeneral characteristics of given species like jaati of cows is different fromthatof horses. Jaati corresponds to generic characteristics that are common for allcows which make a cow a cow and not a horse. Hence jaati of cow is differentfromthat of horse. Suppose we find an animal that has some of the cowcharacteristicsand some of the horse characteristics, then it can be called cow and horsesimultaneously or neither a cow nor a horse. We are now violating the jaatis ofboth. That is we are putting mutually exclusive characteristics in one locus,i.e.jaati of cow excludes jaati of horse. More importantly, we have a problem ofseparating cow jaati from horse jaati. If we have animals that have gradesbetweenthe cow and horse, the naming of cow jaati separate form horse jaati becomesmeaningless. Hence this cross between diagonally opposite entities makes jaatianon fundamental and non-eternal category. There is a problem and hence anobjection.

A. A simple answer by a Vedantin is – So What? – The reason is advaitin does not

admit jaati as fundamental and eternal category. He is only concerned about theattributes and if they form into a class or jaati, let that be so, but if theydonot form then there is no violation. The necessity or requirement for theattributes to fall into categories (jaatis), for perception to be valid is theproblem. Adviata take the attributes as they exist – we cannot force theattributesto fall into categories that we have set a priory. Hence if the objection isthatjaati as fundamental category is being compromised, the answer is that is good.Itonly shows that jaati is not a fundamental eternal category. VP says in theperception of an object ‘this is a jar’ there is already proof of existence ofanattribute ‘jarhood’ which makes a jar a jar and not a flower vase. We have nopreset jarhood category into which all jar have to belong. There is norequirementthat for the perception to be valid there has to be also some generic attributeforit to be a jar. Hence generic attribute as an entity itself is a fictitious. Notonly such a generic attribute cannot be perceived but it can not be inferredeither.

Relation between an attribute and its substantive:

At this juncture VP addresses another philosophical aspect that concerns abouttherelation between attribute and it substantive. Here I am providing somebackground,although this will be discussed in detail again. Suppose we say this is a bluelotus. General understanding is blue is an attribute or visheShaNa and lotus issubstantive or visheshya. A question is posed in philosophy – how is theattribute,blue, related to its substantive, lotus. The first assertion is they areinseparable. I cannot remove blue from the lotus. If they are two separateobjects,the relation between the attribute and the substantive is called samyoga – thatistemporarily joining together which are separable. For example, consider a ‘bookonthe table’. The table qualifies the book since book on the table is differentfromthe book on the floor. In this case even the book qualifies the table too astablewith a book on it compare to another table without a book on it. They havesamaanaadhikaraNa – each equally qualifies the other and therefore separable. samyogabrings two dravyas or substantives together. These are called incidentalqualifications or taTastha lakshaNa. However if we talk about blue lotus, Icannot

remove blue color from lotus. In addition blue cannot exist without a locus foritsexistence while lotus can exist without being blue although we cannot call itanymore as blue lotus. Hence for blue lotus to be blue lotus, the two areinseparable. Also blue is not the same as lotus and lotus is not the same asblueness. Although they are mutually exclusive, one depends on the other andtheyremain inseparable. How are the two related, that is how is blue connected tothelotus, since they are two distinct entities? (We are using the term ‘entity’loosely, since blue cannot be a substantive of its own and always need a locus.Thatis blue color cannot exist separately without being associated with some noun orsubstantive like blue powder, blue pencil, blue car, blue sky, etc. One is adependent entity while the other is independent entity) According to Nyaayavaiseshikas or tarkikas (Indian logicians), the two – the inseparable butdistinctattribute and substantive - are related by what they call samavaaya, meaninginherence. The blue color is inherent in the blue lotus since they areinseparable.Like jaati that we discussed above, this ‘inherence’ or samavAya’ is consideredbyLogicians as fundamental eternal relation relating visheShaNa and visheShya orattribute and its locus. Other philosophers criticize this concept heavily usingdialectic arguments. The normal objection is that bringing a separate relationtorelate attribute and substantive would result in infinite regress, since we needtobring in another samavaaya to relate this samavaaya relation, and so on, whiletheNayyayikas claim we do not need another samavaaya to relate samavaaya. Then howdothe other philosophies address this relation between attribute and its noun orsubstantive? VishiShTAdvaita contends that there is no need to have a separaterelation to relate the two – since they are inseparable –and that is how theyarerelated - they call it as apRitak siddhi – essentially means inseparablerelationship. Actually this is not saying much other than stating the fact. Butthe problem comes if we ask a more pertinent question – what is a lotus or howonedefines a lotus. Blue lotus can be defined a lotus with a blue color. However,theterm blue lotus becomes relevant only if there are other lotuses that are notblue.If there is no other lotus that has color different from blue, then calling itasblue lotus is more or less unnecessary – like calling my daughter as my firstdaughter when I have only one daughter. The definition of any object should besuchthat it distinguishes uniquely from all other objects in the world. All

definitionsare only attributive in the sense we define an object using its attributes. Thisimplies that without those distinguishing attributes one cannot define an objectuniquely to separate it from others. Here we arrive at attributes that areswAbhAvikam or inherent – that is attributes that are inherent with the objectincontrast to tatasta lakshaNas which are incidental attributes, like book on thetable, etc. These inherent attributes cannot be separated from the object thattheydefine. Even in these inherent attributes, swAbhAvika, we can make furtherdistinctions – those that are necessary and those that are necessary andsufficient.Since both are necessary to define the object, they are swAbhAvikam but amongthese,there are those that are necessary and sufficient to define the objectunambiguously. This can be illustrated by taking example of Sugar. We knowthatSugar is sweet; the sweetness is its attribute. Hence sweetness is its inherentqualification or swAbhAvika lakshaNa. It is also a necessary qualificationsince ifit is not sweet it cannot be sugar, even if it looks like one. Yet, sweetness isnecessary but not sufficient qualification to define sugar. To qualify it asnecessary and sufficient qualification, it has to satisfy a converse statement.Converse of ‘sugar is sweet’ is ‘sweet is sugar’. The converse statement statesthatif something is sweet, it has to be sugar – if that is applicable at all timesthensweetness becomes both necessary and sufficient qualification to define sugar.Thenecessary and sufficient qualification is called swarUpa lakshaNa. SwarUpalakshaNaforms a very rigorous definition for any object to distinguish uniquely thatobjectfrom the rest of the objects in the universe. We find that sweetness is not aswarUpalakshaNa for sugar, since if something is sweet it could be many otherthingsas well, besides sugar – like glucose, fructose, aspartame, etc. Hence sweetnessisnot swarUpa lakshaNa although it is swAbhAvika lakshaNa. Then what is theswaruupalakshaNa of sugar? According to Chemistry the unique definition of sugar orsucroseis C12H22O11 – the chemical structure, perhaps to be written in correct formattodistinguish it from its isomers. Sugar is C12H22O11; and C12H22O11 is sugar,andthere are no two ways about it. It is necessary and sufficient condition toqualifyas swarUpa lakshaNa of sugar. SwarUpam also means its intrinsic structure andrightly its chemical structure defines it swarUpam. In fact in any chemicalanalysis, if an unknown compound is given, chemists arrive its chemical

structure orswarUpa lakshaNa by evaluating all its physical and chemical properties alongwithits molecular weight. Once the structure is determined, all its intrinsicqualitiesare known. To recapitulate again, the swarUpa lakshaNa is determined by applyingaconverse statement – In the case of sugar example the direct statement is ‘sugarisC12H22O11’ and the converse statement is ‘C12H22O11 is sugar’. Similarly H2O iswater, NH3 is ammonia, etc.

Looking at swarUpa lakshaNa or intrinsic structure, it is also clear now thateveryobject is made up of components arranged in a particular order. In the case ofsugar, the components are Hydrogen, Carbon, and Oxygen. Further examinationrevealsthat each one of them is again made up of smaller components but arranged ineach insome fixed order. For example, the constituents of sugar, Carbon, hydrogen, andOxygen are made up of electrons, protons and neutrons, but organized in aparticularorder. This is true for any object. Since each object is divisible into finercomponents and each component has its own swarUpa lakshaNa – it implies thateveryobject is only relevant with its intrinsic structure until is further divideditsconstituent objects. Hence no object is final or in philosophical terms isabsolutely real. They have only validity in their sphere of application ortransaction. The relative realities are called vyaavahaarika satyam ortransactionalreality.

Hence every object in the universe is made of finer components. If so, what isthefundamental basis or material cause for the whole Universe? Science has yet tofindthe ultimate particles. According to Vedanta, consciousness alone is theultimateand it is part-less that is it is not made of any further components. That isdefined as Brahman. Interestingly Vedanta defines Brahman using the conversestatement ‘consciousness is Brahman’, prajnaanam brahma, instead of statingdirectlythat Brahman is a conscious entity. Converse statement is rigorous statement andasdiscussed above it defines the intrinsic structure or swarUpa lakshaNa, that is,both necessary and sufficient qualification for the object defined. It means notonly Brahman is consciousness, consciousness is Brahman and there are no twowaysabout it. Implication is that if there is consciousness anywhere, by definitionit

has to be Brahman – similar to the fact that if there is H2O anywhere it has tobewater. Vedanta defines Brahman using three converse statements – Satyam,jnaanam,anantam brahma –existence-consciousness or knowledge and limitless is Brahman.Sincethey are defined conversely they form the swarUpa lakshaNas for Brahman. Hencewherever there is existence – that existence part is Brahman. Wherever there isknowledge, that knowledge part is Brahman – a statement that parallels to the VPdeclarative statement related to perceptual knowledge is pure consciousness.Finally, wherever there is limitless which expresses as happiness, that isBrahman.

All this discussion is intended to arrive at fundamental level that thesubstantivefor any object in this universe is nothing other than Brahman. If thesubstantiveis Brahman and attributes belong to the object, then the question is how theattribute is related to its substantive? Hence according to Advaita Vedanta,therecannot be any valid relation. One can talk about relation only for entities thatareontologically the same. But for objects where there is no fundamentalsubstantiveother than Brahman, and there cannot be any valid relation between Brahman andtheattributes of the objects that I perceive. Taking the example of snake that isprojected where there is a rope, what is the relation between the rope that isthreeand snake that I see? There cannot be any valid relation between the two –otherthan saying it is an error of superimposition or adhyaasa. When all pervadingexistence-consciousness Brahman is seen as varieties of objects just as gold isseenas verities of objects, the relation between the forms and the names is onlyadhyaasa, an error of superimposition. What is the relation between ring andthegold? Gold has nothing to do with ring or bangle, since it exists just as Goldallthe time without undergoing any mutations. Ring is just form for a name; therelation is adhyaasa, a superimposed form on gold and name for that form.

Coming back to topic, NyayavaisheShikas consider samavAya that relates anattributeto its substantive as fundamental eternal entity. VP dismisses this asbaseless. VPsays the whole universe is transitory, that is, it keeps changing continuously. Ifsomething is changing continuously, then there has to be some substantive thatremains changeless in the changing things. If ring changes into bangle, andbangle

into necklace, there has to be a substantive that is different from a ring ornecklace that remain as changeless in all these changes. In this case goldremainschangeless as the ring changes to bangle and bangle to necklace, etc. Hence iftheworld is continuously changing as we can see, then there has to be a changelessentity in the changing things. Hence Brahman alone can be changeless substantiveforthe transient universe. Given the transitory nature of the universe, to talkaboutjaati and samavAya as eternal and inherent entities is meaningless. To talkaboutthe generic attributes like jarhood or cowness or horseness, etc., as eternalentities, when the whole universe itself is transient, also has little meaning.Similarly all attributes and their knowledge are valid only at vyaavahaarikaleveland other than Brahman nothing else is fundamental and eternal. Hence objectionthatjaati is being compromised by admitting simultaneously both mediate andimmediateknowledge has no relevance. In fact, if we examine closely it is not the sameknowledge that is simultaneously categorized as mediate and immediate knowledge.Inthe statement – ‘that is fragrant piece of sandal wood’ – immediate part ofknowledge and mediate part of knowledge are different. Hence both mediate andimmediate knowledge do not corresponds to the same attributive knowledge, tocauseany contradiction. They correspond to two different sense inputs which do notoverlap.

In a statement ‘the hill is on fire’, the mental states or vRittis are differentforthe hill and for the fire. Hill is directly and immediately perceived. Fire isnotdirectly and immediately cognized. Fire is inferred since we can see smoke onthehill, since there cannot be smoke without a fire. We conclude that hill is onfire.Knowledge of fire is deduced based on the perceptual knowledge of both the hillandthe smoke. The Vritties associated with hill and smoke have their attributesgrasped by the senses. Hence cognition of hill and smoke is direct andimmediate.The mind has to go through the deductive reasoning to arrive that the hill is onfire. This vRitti is different from that of hill or smoke. For the fire vRitti,there are no corresponding attributes of the fire, since there is no sense dataoffire on the hill. The knowledge that the hill is on fire therefore is onlymediateand indirect. Hence there is no contradiction involved with respect mediate andimmediate knowledge occurring simultaneously regarding the same limiting

consciousness. In fact knowledge of the fire could be debatable, since it is adeductive knowledge, which can be faulty if the vyaapti (relation between causeandeffect) is defective. That is if the logic is not fool proof, the deduction(thathill is on fire) based on the observed perceived fact (hill and smoke) could beerroneous. There are many theories in science which were proved wrong bysubsequentdata. Hence not only we have valid knowledge about the presence of hill andsmokebut also possibility of invalid knowledge of fire if vyaapti (related to smokeandfire) is not fully established. With this example, VP summarizes the criterionforperceptual knowledge.

Perceptual knowledge which is direct and immediate occurs when the vRitti ormentalmood arises in the form of an object. i.e. in the form containing all theattributesof the object, thus establishing one to one correspondence between the objectandthe vRitti formed. That insures the limiting consciousness (existence) in theformof an object coincides with the limiting consciousness in the form of vRitti inthemind. In both the object and the vRitti – two things are same. One is thesubstantive that is the existence is the same in both the VRitti and the object(itcould manifest also as reflected consciousness in the Vritti since vRitti ispart ofthe mind which as a subtle matter can reflect consciousness much more than theinertobject outside). Second, the attributes are also same in both the object and thevRitti to the degree that the senses could measure. Hence as long as theattributesare measurable by the appropriate senses and to the degree they are measured,thevRitti of the object is formed. The vRitti thus formed is immediately illuminedasit forms and the reflected consciousness reveals the object to the subject,insuringthe direct and immediate perceptual knowledge of the object.


(We are discussing Vedanta ParibhASha(VP) of Dharmaraja Adhvarindra, the way Iunderstand)

9. Perceptuality of Objects; Definition vindicated.

Here VP provides the basis for immediate and direct nature of perception. Itdefines the perceptuality of an object or an object’s immediate perception in‘notbeing different from the consciousness associated with the subject’. Essentiallythestatement says, for a subject (knower or pramAta) to be conscious of an object(prameya), consciousness associated with the subject cannot be different fromtheobject that is being perceived. It is a statement that baffles the intellect atfirst. Because we have learned all along that subject is different from theobject,and subject can never become an object, and object can never become a subject.Subject is a conscious entity and object is an unconscious entity. The statementofVP is carefully worded which does not deny the superficial differences while notaccepting any substantial difference between the two. In addition the statementactually relates the object perceived to the subject that perceives the object. Itsays that the consciousness underlying the subject is not different from theobject,for the object perceived. This understanding comes from the fundamentals ofAdvaita. In dRik dRisya viveka, Vidyaranya says – antardRik dRisyayoH bhedambihischa brahma sargayoH| AvRiNosya paraashaktiH sA samsArasya kAraNam|| Thedifference between the seer (subject) and the seen (object) in the mind, and thedifference between Brahman and the creation (world) outside, is due to theveilingpower of maaya. It is this perceived difference is the root cause for all humansuffering. Maayaa is that which appears to be there, but is not really therewhenone starts inquiring about its nature. Hence the difference between the seerandthe seen arises due to maaya; therefore only apparent and not real.

The important point here is VP states this as the criterion for perceptuality ofanobject. Requirement for perceptuality is taking one step beyond a simplestatementthat consciousness is underlying substantive for everything in the universe thatincludes the perceiving subject and perceived object. The requirement forperceptuality of an object is the subject consciousness not be different fromtheobject perceived. If it is different, the object is non-perceptual. Now arethereany cases where this requirement is not met? This will be elucidated by VP tojustify the statement, through questions and answers.

Q. When I see a jar, I say, ‘I see a jar’. I am the subject, seer, and the jaris anobject, seen. I am different from the jar, for me to see. In fact whatever Isee, I

am not that. If that is the case, how can a jar or any object that I see is thesameas the consciousness that I am, or more accurately be one with the limitingreflected consciousness, the perceiver that I am? The objection is that thisequation of the subject with the object contradicts our experience.

A. Stating that the consciousness of the subject not be different from theperceivedobject is not the same as the subject is identical with the object. It onlymeansperceptual object having no independent existence apart from the existence oftheknower, ‘pramAtRisattA atirikta sattAkatva abhAvaH, (other than the existence ofknower, there is no other existence for perceptual objects)’. I can stretch thisstatement to relate to the one I have been making, that the existence of anobjectis established by the knowledge of its existence. Here VP puts it in slightlydifferent form that the perceptuality of an object is having no independentexistence apart from the existence of the subject. That becomes a criterion forallperceptions being immediate and direct. If it is not perceptible, does it haveindependent existence? – This question is not raised.

Let us illustrate this with an example of a perception of a jar. We havediscussedthis aspect before. It was stated that Brahman, pure consciousness, is thematerialcause for the universe. Existence-consciousness-limitless is its intrinsicnature.Since Vedanta says Brahman is one without a second, there cannot be anythingotherthan Brahman. From this it follows that all objects in this universe, withoutexception, are nothing but Brahman alone but with different names and forms –justas all golden ornaments are nothing but gold alone with different names andforms.Gold remains as gold but appears as varieties of ornaments each with its ownattributes that are different from the other. Hence all the ornaments are justgoldwith superimposed differing attributes. As VP clarifies, superimposition(adhyAsa)does not mean one on top of the other. It is like ring’s attributes aresuperimposed on gold to be named as ring which differs from the attributes ofbanglethat are superimposed on another piece of gold. Similarly Brahman being thesubstantive of all objects, the differences between object A from object B isonlydue to differences in the superimposed attributes of A from B. Hence objects Aand Bdiffer only in terms of their attributes than in their substantives. Ringdiffers

from bangle only in terms of their attributes while the substantives for bothremainthe same, namely gold. Knowledge of A should involve discriminative knowledgeof Afrom the other objects in the universe. Similarly is the knowledge of B. Henceknowledge of any object, since all objects have the same substantive, involvesonlyknowledge of its attributes. The substantive of all objects being Brahman, it isexpressed as existence itself. Hence every object is existence + its attributes.Theperception involves grasping the attributes of the object by the senses.Existencebeing all pervading, everything is in existence only. As discussed before,existenceis not an attribute to be grasped by senses.

So far we have been examining the perception from the point of objects. We needtoraise the question now in terms of who is the subject, since the statement of VPisthe perceptuality of object involves consciousness of the subject not beingdifferent from the object. When I see the object, I say I am the seer and theobject is seen. But who is this ‘I am’, the seer or the knower of the object.Obviously when I say I am the knower, unlike the object, I have to be aconsciousentity since unconscious entity cannot see or know. Object cannot know itselfnorcan establish its existence by itself. I have to be there to say ‘the objectis’. Onthe other hand, object need not have to be there to establish my existence. Thatimplies my existence, or to be more general, existence of a conscious entity isindependent of the existence of the inert object. On the other hand, the inertobject’s existence cannot be established independent of existence of knower, aconscious entity. (This logic is called anvyaya-vyatireka used to establishdependent and independent relationship between two entities – the two entitiesherebeing object and the knower of the object). Existence of an object is thereforeestablished by knowledge of its existence by a knower. Hence VP statementfollows:The perceptuality of an object depends on its having no independent existenceapartfrom the existence of the knower of the object. Based on our recentdiscussions, wecaution here that the statement only applies to the perceptuality of the objectandnot its independent existence on its own. Whether it has independent existenceornot can never be known if there is no knower or pramAta to establish itsexistenceby perception. Can one establish its existence by inference? By inference one

canonly establish the possibility of its existence and not its existence. Forvalidation of object’s existence, inference also rests on perception thoughcause-effect relationships or vyaapti. If there is no knower, the existence oftheobject, then, becomes indeterminate or anirvacanIyam.

Then the next question is who is that ‘I am’, the knower, the pramaata. Whilethisaspect will be address in detail again, it is sufficient here to realize thattheever present witnessing consciousness, sAkshI can not be a pramaata or theknower.Knower involves a modification or vikaara. According to Advaita, the everpresentwitnessing consciousness, sAkshI is all pervading infinite Brahman who does/cannotundergo any modification. However, in his presence one can say prameya, pramaataandpramaaNa - the tripuTi – the three fold division can exist. If sAkshii is notpramaata can the mind be the pramaata, the knower. Mind is also an inertentity,and by itself cannot be a knower. Knower has to be a conscious entity. Then, whoisthe knower? According to Adviata Vedanta, pramaata, subject or knower is a everpresent consciousness, sAkshI chaitanyam, but reflected in the mind as reflectedconsciousness – called cidAbhAsa –commonly known as Ego or ahankaara – which hasthenotion of ‘I am the doer’ or ‘I am the knower’ or ‘I am the enjoyer’ – etc, theheroof everybody’s autobiography. As discussed before mind being a subtle matter, ithascapacity to reflect the light of consciousness of sAkshI and the degree of itsreflection depends on its purity. It is analogous to the degree of reflection oflight depends on the cleanliness of the mirror. To eliminate anymisunderstandingthat can arise that the mind is separate from sAkshI, the pure consciousness, weneed to recognize that like all other objects, mind is also a superimposition ontheall pervading consciousness, like ring on gold. The substantive of the mind issAkshI caitanyam or witnessing consciousness only. In contrast to the inertobjectswhich are grosser forms, mind being subtle can express Brahman not only asexistencebut also as ‘reflected consciousness’. Hence pramaata, the knower, is thereflectedconsciousness in the mind.

Now we can bring all the three factors – pramaata, prameya and pramANa togethertocomplete the perception. When the pramANa operates through the senses forming a

vRitti or mental state in the mind, it is also reflected in the light ofconsciousness. Now we have two reflected consciousnesses – one directly the mindaspramaata or knower, and the other reflection of the vRitti. Since consciousnessisall pervading, it pervades the mind too. In contrast to the grosser (bhoutika)elements superimposed on consciousness Brahman, mind corresponds to subtlerelement(bhUta). Being subtle, the mind can ‘reflect’ the all illuminating consciousnessandthat reflected limiting consciousness is called cidAbhAsa or ahankaara or Ego.Inthe case of mental states or vRitti that corresponds to external or internalperceptions, its illumination is when it forms in the mind. Thus when an objectisperceived its mental state is formed and illumined. When the next object isseen,the next mental sate is formed and illumined. vRittis are formed sequentiallyandthe associated thoughts are also sequential in the mind. However, in forming EgoorcidAbhAsa, the mind itself is an object of illumination with its attributes.Hencethe illumination and reflection occurs as long as mind and its attributes arethere;that is, all the time when the mind is operating. That includes both the wakingstate and deep sleep state. Hence cidAbhAsa or ahankaara or Ego is formed allthetime when the mind is there.

We are using the words superimposed or reflection like a mirror etc, only forthepurpose of illustration. Mind is superimposition on Brahman like a ring ongold,while consciousness is adhiShTAnam or substratum for the mind. Hence the mind isconsciousness alone but appears as inert but subtle object. Since it is subtle,itcan reflect the light of consciousness much better than gross elements. Theillumination and reflection occurs all the time as long as mind is there. Thusegowill be there all the time as long as mind is there. This is true even forjnAni,except jnaani is the one who realizes that I am not the ego, and knows that egoisjust a superimposed entity (adhyAsa) like ring on gold, but I am the substantiveoradhiShTAnam or the absolute eternal consciousness. Hence mind of jnaani is freefrom egotistical notions that I am this or that etc. He will use the ego, as heuses the mind and the body for transactional purposes. Life itself pulsatesthrough the mind as a subtle body. The reflected light of consciousness(cidAbhAsa)

in turn illumines the gross body, the five praNas or physiological functions,fivesense organs and five organs of action. It is like sun illuminating the moonandmoon in turn illuming the others. The reflected consciousness, cidAbhAsa, forallpractical purposes (or transactional purposes or vyAvahArika) acts as theconsciousentity, although it is borrowed consciousness from the original – sAkshIchaitanya.Mind is there during waking and dream sleep states and in potential form in thedeepsleep state, while sAkshI is there as adhiShTAnam or substratum all the time.HencecidAbhAsa or Ego is there in the waking and dream states and in potential forminthe deep sleep state. We understand from this analysis that as long as mind isoperating that is during the perceptual process, it is getting illumined bysAkshIchaitanyam and therefore Ego is there as bankground reflecting limitingconsciousness for all transactions with the mind. It is this Ego that acts as aknower or pramAta during perception. The reflection is the reflection of lightofillumination of consciousness that is all pervading – it isexistence-consciousness.There cannot be any divisions in consciousness, just like there are no divisionsinspace. Any divisions in space or in consciousness are therefore only fortransactional purposes. Since perception is a transaction, it is said to becomplete when the consciousness reflected as knower, pramaata, unites with theconsciousness reflected in the VRitti formed via the operation of pramANa, thatisthe sense input.

Thus, existence-consciousness all pervading Brahman remains as substantive forall,the knower, knowledge and the means of knowledge. Consciousness expresses itselfbyits reflection as both the knower or the subject and known or vRitti that isformedin the mind via the sense input. Both reflected consciousnesses as a knower andtheknown are in the mind only. The former can be considered as general reflectioninthe mind as a knower (Ego or ahankaara) while the other as particular reflectioninthe vRitti as known. That is both the subject and the object are in the mind. Thesubstantive for both is expressed as consciousness or existence. Perception issaidto be complete when reflected limiting consciousness in the subject is united

withthe reflected limiting consciousness of the object. This is stated in two waysby VPin term of consciousness and existence. The perceptuality of the object is whentheconsciousness of the subject is not different from the substantiality of theobject.‘pramAtRi caitanyaH Eva ghaTa adhiShTAnam ..’, ‘the consciousness of the subjectalone forms the substantive of the pot etc.’ Here VP uses as the word‘substantive’or adhiShTAnam, instead of ‘consciousness’ of the pot, since pot is inert. Forperception, we are uniting in terms of reflected consciousness of the subjectandthe object. VP also states this in terms of existence as – ‘perceptual objecthas noindependent existence apart from the existence of the subject’, ‘pramAtRi sattaEvaghaTAdhi satta, na anyaH’ (VP makes an emphatic statement here that existence oftheknower alone is expressed as the existence of the pots, etc). Hence the abovetwocriteria forms the basis of the immediate and direct perception of an object byasubject. The above conditions are expressed in terms of subject, since subjectisindependent while the object has dependent existence, as discussed above. Hencetheperceptuality of objects such as pots etc is established as direct and immediatemeans of knowledge– ‘siddham ghaTAdeH aparokshatvam’. VP says the definition ofperceptuality of an object is vindicated. Hence perceptuality of an object isdefined as its being the same as consciousness or existence of the subject, theknower. This can be viewed as subject’s consciousness forms the substantive oftheobject perceived or subject’s existence forms the basis for the existence of theobject perceived. I am there the whole universe is perceived and I am there theexistence of the whole universe established. Without me present who canestablishthe existence of the universe or its awareness. Ultimately I alone form thetruth ofthe Universe – where I am stands for pure existence-consciousness, Brahman thatIam. That is advaita Vedanta.

In the case of inference – as in ‘the distance hill is on fire because I see thesmoke’- VP says, since the mind does not go to the space covered by the fire,etc.,the limiting consciousness of the fire is not united with the limitingconsciousnessof the knower, the existence of the fire is not directly established. It isdistinct from the existence of the subject. Hence the definition ofperceptuality in

terms of immediate and direct knowledge of the object is not violated. In termsofour understanding it is the same as the VRitti of the fire that is formed has noattributive knowledge from the sense input to establish the existence of theobject,fire. Hence fire is only a mental deduction. Whether there is really fire in thedistant hill or not depends on the efficacy of the deductive logic, hence it ismediate and indirect.

Before we discuss about the structure of the mind, VP presents some discussioninterms of questions and answers, which we will take up next.


We are discussing Vedanta ParibhASha(VP) of Dharmaraja Adhvarindra - as Iunderstand.

10. Questions related to Perceptuality

VP established the criteria for perceptuality is that the subject consciousnessis the same as the object. Object is nothing but consciousness (Brahman) withname and form, i.e., attributes of the object. Perceptuality of the object inthe mind then is when the consciousness underlying the subject becomes one withthe consciousness that is substantive of the object, the attributes of theobject being only superimpositions on the substantive, consciousness. That ‘Iam conscious’ is direct and immediate knowledge as no means is required to knowthat I am a conscious entity. Criterion of perceptuality therefore demands theunity in the consciousness of the subject and that of the object. We can saythat perception of an object is direct and immediate since substantive of boththe subject and the object in the mind is consciousness alone, playing aduality- a unity at substantive level and duality at the transactional level.

Additional requirement and implication of the criteria of perception areillustrated using question and answer format.

On Dharma and Adharma:

Q. If the criterion for perceptuality is that the subject consciousness is thesame as the object, then one should perceive righteous and unrighteous (dharmaand adharma) instead of inferring them based on the good and bad results thatthey generate. The criteria for perceptuality have been met since theconsciousness limited by them is not different from the subject consciousnessand existence of righteousness etc is not apart from that of the subject.

A. That is not so. Here the VP reminds us besides the above criteria atsubstantial level, there is also a requirement at transactional level that themental mood should have attributes as its contents. In fact, to put moreexact, the attributes of the mental moods should be perceptible attributes.For righteous and unrighteousness the attributes are imperceptible as was

discussed before.

Hence we can restate the criteria of perceptuality of an object. The criteriainvolve both at substantial level and at transactional level (object has tohave attributes at transactional level which are superimposed on theirsubstantive Brahman). At the substantive level, the consciousness andexistence of the subject should not be different from the object. Attransactional level the mental mood or vRitti that corresponds to the objectshould have contents – attributes of the object. The complete perception of anobject involves - Brahman + the attributes of the object. Brahman issubstantial and attributes are superimpositions or adhyaasa. VP establishes thecriteria for perceptuality in terms of both. In the case of dharma and adharma,righteous and unrighteous, the attributes are imperceptible. Even if we meetthe substantial part, the transactional part is not met. Because of theimperceptibility of their attributes the knowledge of dharma and adharma isdifficult and has to be known only through shaastras.Can perception of one attribute cause perception of the other?

Q. If an object has two attributes say color and size, the perception of one,say color, should also lead to perception of the other, the size. Since bothattributes are locussed on one object, the substantive, the limitingconsciousness is the same for both. When mind through senses perceive oneattribute and VRitti is formed. We are meeting all the criteria forperception; the consciousness and existence of the knower, subject, is the sameas that of the object and object has perceptible attribute. Since object ismeeting all the perceptuality criteria, one should perceive the object with thecolor and the size. Hence, perception of one attribute should lead to theperception of the other.

A. No. when one perceives only one attribute, say color, the vRitti associatedwith it will have only that attribute. The consciousness and the existence ofthe subject with the object only extend to that attributive existence. Forperception of the size, the VRitti has to have the associated attribute, thesize – for perception of the size of the object. Perception of one does notlead to the other. A vRitti associated with other attributes have to be formedfor complete or unambiguous cognition of the object.

What is implied in the perceptuality criteria is the perception is limited tothe vRitti of the object formed. If the sense data is incomplete, the objectperception is also incomplete to that extent. We defined object as limitingconsciousness-existence (Brahman) + A + B + C + D + …. attributes. Forperceptuality, the limiting consciousness-existence of the subject extends tothe limiting consciousness-existence of the object + whatever attributes thesenses have gathered up to the point, say A and B but not C and D. Then theimmediate and direct knowledge of the object involves object with A and Battributes but not with C and D. If C and D are imperceptible for differentreasons, the object devoid of C and D are perceived. In the subsequentrecognition process if A and B are not sufficiently discriminative to recognizethe object from other similar object based on memory, then knowledge could beerroneous. Hence VP says the definition of perceptuality is not wronglyextended.

Perceptuality of internal perceptions:

Q. If we accept the perceptibility criteria as stated above then we cannotextend this to internal perceptions. If we extend it to internal perceptionsinvolving mental states then we may run to infinite regress of mental statehaving a mental state. Since that is not admitted, the perceptuality criteriacannot be validated for internal perceptions. The internal perception involveshaving a mental state itself as an object of perceptions. For perceptuality,object should be the same as the consciousness-existence of the subject,knower, with a vRitti consisting of attributes of the object. vRitti is amental state and the situation for internal perception reduces to mental statehaving a mental state as an object and thus it leads to infinite regress.

A: That is not so, says VP. Even though we avoid infinite regress by notadmitting a metal state to be an object of another mental state, mental stateis allowed to be its own object. Hence the object is not separate from themental state itself. We have consciousness-existence of the subject notdifferent from the object, which is consciousness-existence as a mental state.The contents of the mental state are the attributes of itself as an object –such as, happiness, anger, compassion, etc. The mental state itself is theobject of perception and there is no need of a separate object. Either way theend result is the same. Subject or knower perceives these emotions directly andimmediately as these mental moods arise in the mind. VP states that thecriteria for perceptuality are validated even in internal perceptions ofemotions; happiness, anger, love, etc.

Further explanation about the mental states:

Here VP extends the definition of a mental state. Up to now we have considereda mental state is vRitti, a perturbation in the mind which has its substantialcontent as existence and consciousness of the knower and its transactionalcontent, the attributes of the object. One can think of vRitti as wave in theocean which when it rises is illumined in the light of consciousness of thesAkshI. The reflected light of consciousness from the illumination is theknowledge of the vRitti or the mental state. Hence all mental states areillumined by sAkshI, witnessing consciousness and known because of thereflection, in analogy of light falling on a body and the reflected lightrevealing the object. We have extended next the mental state to includeinternal perceptions, the contents of the vRitti being emotions such ashappiness, anger, etc. Mental state itself is an object of perception sinceunlike in the external perceptions there is no object external to the mind.This concept is now extended further to include even the mind with itsattributes as an object of perception.

The mind, as we know, is matter and thus an inert entity. It is notself-effulgent to know itself. For it to be known, it has to be illumined bythe light of illuminating consciousness of the sAkshI and the reflected lightof consciousness forms the knowledge of the mind. Hence mind itself is anobject of knowledge. Thus mind is a peculiar entity – which acts as both thesubject as well as an object. (Because of this reason only there is lot of

confusion, particularly in the western philosophies, to consider mind as theconscious entity, a subject, at the same time considering it as an object foranalysis by both philosophers and psychologists). Mind can act both as asubject and an object. When I say I know my mind or I changed my mind, I amtreating the mind as an object that I know and that I can change. Thus the mindand its attributes are directly illumined and cognized as such. VP says inconsidering the mind with its attributes as objective knowledge, we canconsider the mind as though it is also a mental state with its attributes asthe contents. Hence, perceptuality criteria can now be applied in the cognitionof the total mind and its attributes, thus the definition of perceptually isquite broad or is not narrow.

Mind as a subject:

In perceptuality of objects, we stated that once perceptuality criteria aremet, the objects are known directly and immediately. We can ask the question,‘who is that ‘I’, the subject or the knower, who comes to know the objects,this and that’? It is the experience of everyone that he, the individual, isthe knower. ‘I am a knower’ – pramAta - is also appears to be a mental statethat arises when the knowledge of ‘this’ takes place. It involves a vRitti thattries to own that knowledge that has taken place (called pramANa phalam orfruit of the knowing process). Thus we have two mental states – ‘this is a pot’followed by ‘I know the pot’. They are called idam vRitti and aham vRitti,‘this thought and I thought’. Thus mind itself seem to act as though it is botha subject and an object. But we know that mind is a matter and cannot be thesubject, knower, since knower has to be a conscious entity. Theconsciousness-existence that is all pervading ever present is SAkshI orwitnessing-consciousness. In advaita Vedanta, witnessing consciousness doesnot play any active role, even witnessing that includes witnessing of vRittisthat arise in the mind. It is self-shining ever present entity; yet in whoselight all things get illumined or witnessed or become known. Hence, it doesnot do any witnessing action but in its light things get witnessed. Thus, mindand its attributes are known because of the light of consciousness from sAkshIthat illumines them. When the illuminated consciousness gets reflected by mindand its attributes, they become known. Hence Krishna says – under mypresidentship, the prakRiti manifests itself as the whole creation – I am notthe doer but things are done in my presence – It is in that sense witnessing isimplied for sAkshI, as witnessing consciousness.

Therefore, when I say ‘I know this’, I am the knower; the knower ‘I am’ is notthe sAkshii the witnessing consciousness, since knowing is a process thatinvolves modification and sAkshI does not or cannot (being infinite) undergoany transformation. Before the knowledge took place, I was ignorant of ‘this’;and now I am knowledgeable of ‘this’. Ignorant individual has been transformedinto a knowledgeable individual (with reference to ‘this’). That constitutes amodification or vikaara. Hence subject or knower, ‘I am’ can not be the sAkshI,since sAkshI cannot undergo any modification. At the same time, knower has tobe a conscious entity, since unconscious entity cannot know. Then who is theknower? A short answer is it is jiiva or ego who is the knower, since it isthat who claims as ‘I am the knower’, ‘I am a doer’ and ‘I am an enjoyer’, etc.Then the next question is who is jiiva or ego, in relation to the mind and its

moods. According to Advaita Vedanta, jiiva or ego is also a mental state thatarises constantly, particularly in the waking and dream states. It isconsciousness-existence that I am, identifying with reflected limitingconsciousness in the mind called cidAbhAsa is jiiva. Generally, when anymental mood arises, it is immediately illumined, and the reflected illuminationconstitutes the consciousness of the mood or knowledge of the mood (We areusing mental mood and metal state interchangeably). The contents of the mentalmood is ‘this’. That is, ‘this’ can be variable depending on the mental moodthat arises at that time – it could be intellect or mind or the body.

The reflected consciousness with the identification of the mental mood as ‘I amthis’ – constitutes cidAbhAsa or ahankaara or Ego, or the one who takes therole of the subject in relation to an object. Thus ego always manifests inrelationships – Otherwise it is pure reflecting consciousness in the mind – asknower, I am. This is called ‘aham vRitti’ – a mental modification of ‘I am’.It is a vRitti, mental mood, but rises in the mind which is illumined directlyand immediately by sAkshI as the knowledge of the object vRitti takes place.Here the whole mind is considered as mental state, in contrast to objectgenerated mental states. Illumination of the whole mind by sAkshI is likegeneral light falling in the room everywhere or stage lights illuminating thewhole stage. As long as the mind is functioning, mind as mental mood iscontinuously present and it gets illumined in the presence of witnessingconsciousness. The reflected consciousness (same as knowledge) of the mind asmental state takes the form as ‘I am’ – as existence-consciousness, since thatis the substantive for everything in the universe. The subject ‘I am’ cannotjust remain without having a tangible object that it can identify with - thatis mind cannot remain without thinking. Other mental states that arise in themind are like actors coming and leaving the stage who also get illumined by thestage lights as well as the reflected light from the stage. When other vRittisstart associated with intellect, or subjective feelings of emotions or physicalbody along with physiological function etc, the general reflectingconsciousness in the mind as ‘I am’ now identifies with ‘this’ – this beingrelated to vRittis that are locussed on objects starting from intellect,emotions, memory, and to gross physical body. These translate as ‘I am this’,‘I am this’, ‘I am this’, etc where ‘this’ keeps changing, or ‘this is mine’,etc, since perceptuality criteria involves unity in the existence-consciousnessof the subject with object. This constitutes the formation of ego, where ‘I am’is the general reflecting consciousness in the mind (which can be considered asvRitti itself as an object) now identifying with particular vRittis generallyassociated BMI (body, mind and intellect).In the language of VP the reflected consciousness of the Vritti is theknowledge of myself as ‘I am this’. That ‘this’ can be starting from theintellect, the emotional mind or physical body – to all that contained in thepages and pages of one’s autobiography or bio-data. Thus, when mind and itsattributes get directly illumined by sAkshI chaitanyam, cidAbhAsa or reflectedlimiting consciousness that is formed is ahankaara or jiiva or the ego. Thereflected light of illumination can illumine subsequent objects just as thereflected light from the moon can illumine the objects. Because of itscapacity to illumine further ahankaara or Ego also assumes that it is theknower or subject, although it is actually ‘borrowed light of consciousnessesfrom the sAkshI.

Self Realization:

We can now appreciate what is meant by self-realization involving the mind.Self or sAkshI does not need self realization since it is ever shining allpervading pure consciousness. Mind being inert cannot have self-realization,yet without mind there cannot be any self-realization. As VP says mind itselfcan constitute a vRitti. All vRittis are illumined by sAkshI and the reflectedlight of illumination is knowledge that includes self-knowledge. Henceself-knowledge is due to reflection of the pure consciousness by the mind. Thegeneral reflection of the light of consciousness in the mind is knowledge of ‘Iam’. When the mind is ignorant, it identifies ‘I am’ vRitti, which is morepermanent, with other vRittis which are variables, whose contents keep changingwith BMI, body or mind or intellect. Hence a combined (united reflectedconsciousness of subject and object) mental state ‘I am this’, which is neededfor all transactions, forms the current understanding of I am, since I amignorant of my true nature. When Vedanta teaches – you are not ‘this’ –‘neti –neti – not this, not this’ guiding us to drop the identification of ‘I am’ with‘this’. What is involved is not dropping ‘this’ by going into ‘this-less statesuch as nirvikalpa samAdhi or deep-sleep’, but by dropping identification with‘this’. When the identification is dropped, what is left then is purereflecting consciousness or knowledge of I am. This ‘I am’ is pure reflectedlight of consciousness without any identifications, that is, the reflection ofsAkshI, the all pervading consciousness. Hence self knowledge is the knowledge(in the mind) that the reflected light is nothing but pure light alone. This issimilar to knowing that the reflected sunlight in the room from all corners isnothing but sunlight only. That reflected light of consciousness includes notonly the general reflections all around in the mind but even the localizedreflections by vRittis that keep forming due to perception of the world ofobjects, involving ‘this’, ‘this’ and ‘this’. That is the unity in theconsciousness of the subject with the object, which is a criterion forperceptuality. Realization, therefore, is an understanding that I am not onlysAkshI but sAkshyam too, that is I am not only the witnessing consciousness butwitnessed reflected consciousness also. That is I am beyond both sAkshI andsAkshyam that ever present pure consciousness that I am. This knowledge takesplace in the mind only as reflected consciousness. Interesting aspect is weneed a reflected consciousness to recognize that I am not the reflectedconsciousness but the pure consciousness that is getting reflected because ofthe presence of upAdhis. That is we need a mind to say I am not the mind. Weneed body to say I am not the body. We need speech to say I am not the speaker.Thus we need upAdhis to say I am not the upAdhis. Without the upAdhis there isno realization – since without upAdhis who is there to realize what? Hence VP’sdeclarative statement in the beginning itself that all perceptual knowledge isnothing but pure consciousness alone.

As long as the mind is there, the reflection will be there. Hence for a jnaani,who has understood that I am that light of consciousness beyond any reflections(that understanding is by the reflected consciousness only like reflected roomlight realizing that even while reflection is occurring I am actually theoriginal light without which no reflection is possible), can still enjoy allthe reflections and uses upAdhis identifying with them, for the purpose of

transactions. Hence jnaani, even while identifying with upAdhis does not takehimself to be the upAdhis – that is identifying with the intellect knows thathe is not the intellect, identifying with the mind and its emotions knows thathe is not the mind and the emotions, and identifying with the body knows thathe is not the body with its problems. He is considered as JIvan mukta,liberated while residing in the limited upAdhis. The upAdhis drop out due toexhaustion of even the prArabda karma, when there is no compelling reason tomaintain them. Since that includes the subtle body, which is mind with all itscomponents, all transactions cease including jiiva-hood. There is no more causefor transmigration or rebirth. He is now pure consciousness itself even withoutany reflections – that is called videha mukti. We will address this issue againwhen we discuss about jiiva and jiiva sAkshI.

Coming back to the mind, VP states here that the mind and its attributesincluding the ego can be considered as mental states, which are illumined andthe reflected limiting consciousness forms the knowledge of these states. Theperceptuality criteria can be applied by considering the mind and itsattributes also as vRittis. Just because we are considering the mind and itsattributes are also vRitties with associated attributive objects for thepurpose of direct and immediate perception, we are not contradicting ourassumption that they are directly illuminated by sAkshI chaitanyam. To becognized by direct illumination by sAkshI chaitanyam does not mean that theobjects of witness cannot be vRittis or mental states. It only means that fortheir cognition we do not need help from any sense organs. In addition, it alsomeans that the other means of knowledge such as inference is not needed sincecognition of the mind and its attributes are direct and immediate. Hence VPsays that the advaitic masters have admitted ego or cidAbhAsa as a mental statewhich can be cognized directly and immediately, since the criteria forperceptuality are met.

Application to illusions:

The question next addressed is concerning the prAtibhAsika objects – such asnake where there is a rope or silver in a shell. Because of the limited datafrom the senses, the attributive knowledge of the object is not sufficient forcorrect cognition of the object. The perceptuality condition of the object aremet and therefore even when there are errors in the cognition, the cognizedobject is recognized based on the attributes available for the mind. The erroroccurs in the recognition process from the memory. Cognitive condition orperceptuality criteria have been applicable even in the case of illusoryperceptions and therefore VP says they are not restrictive or narrow.Hence in summary, an object is said to be cognized by perception, when (1) itis cable of being perceived, (2) it has no independent existence apart from theconsciousness associated with the subject or knower, and (3) which has thelimiting adjunct a mental state or vRitti in the form of the object(attributive content of the object).

In forming the vRittis or mental states Nyaaya philosophers have consideredvarious other relations between the substantives and the attributes, and howthe sense organs relate to these in grasping and forming mental states. Wehave discussed already some aspects of these, such as samyoga and samavaaya.

Additional relations are considered such as samyukta-tAdAtmya, samyuktaabhinna-tAdAtmya, sannikarSha, etc. These are involved in the production ofmental states of objects with attributes that are revealed by reflectedconsciousness. From advaita point all are superimpositions on the allpervading conscious existent entity, Brahman.

Next we will consider the components of the mind.


(We are discussing Vedanta ParibhASha (VP) of Dharmaraja Adhvarindra,based on my understanding.)

11. Determinate and indeterminate perceptions

Components of the mind:

The mind itself, if considered as mental state with its attributes, hasfour components. They can be considered as four states of the mind; (a)a doubting mind, (b) a determinate mind, (c) egoism, and (d) memory.Because of the diversity of their functions, mind, although is one, isconsidered as having four components, collectively referred also asjust the mind. These are designated as 1) manas, or (emotional) mind,2) the intellect or buddhi, 3) the ego or ahankaara, and 4) memory orchitta. Since we can think of them as mental states or vRittis, thecorresponding objects of the vRittis respectively are (a) doubts andemotions (b) concepts, knowledge or certitude (c) egoism and (d) memoryor smRiti.

Determinate and indeterminate perceptions:

The direct perception is of two types: (a) determinate or savikalpakaand (b) indeterminate or nirvikalpaka. In the case of determinateperception, the knowledge gained is directly relatable in terms of thesubstantive and its attributes. The knowledge of the object perceivedhas determinism associated with it. Consider perception of ‘This jar’.When the knowledge occurs through perception, we have a determinateknowledge as ‘I know the jar’ – a relation between the subject and theobject is immediately established. That is a determinate knowledge,according to Advaita.

In the indeterminate perception, knowledge gained is not directlyrelatable to the subject. That is a determinism that ‘I know this’ isnot discretely present. Let us take a classic example – ‘This is thatDevadatta (sOyam dEvadattaH)’. In this case – we have two components –‘this is Devadatta’ and ‘that was Devadatta’ – but combined into aunitary statement ‘this is that Devadatta’. Here ‘this’ refers to thepresent and here, and ‘that’ refers to the past and there. Thereforethe knowledge of ‘that Devadatta’ has to come from memory. ‘ThisDevadatta’ is directly perceived since object is right in frontavailable for pratyaksha pramANa, where the criteria for perceptualityare directly fulfilled. There is no problem in just perceiving this

Devadatta in front since that is determinate perception. But thestatement ‘this is that Devadatta’ involves an equation of this mentalstate corresponding to the present with the recollection of thatDevadatta from the memory. The attributes of this Devadatta and thatDevadatta are different since they belong to different times and space.Hence the equation gives only indeterminate knowledge. (Technically itis called bhAgatyAga lakshaNa – wherein the contradictory attributes ofthis Devadatta and that Devadatta are to be discarded equating only theessentials that are common to both). Similarly the Upanishadicstatement ‘That Thou art’ or ‘tat tvam asi’ – The ‘Thou (tvam)’ part ofthe statement is directly perceivable but ‘That (tat)’ part thatdesignates the absolute reality is not deterministic, since it is notfinite. One has to discard the dissimilar attributes of both ‘That,tat’ and ‘Thou, tvam’ to arrive at the knowledge. Hence in these casesthe knowledge is called indeterminate. Further clarification of thisaspect is done through questions and answers.

Q. In the statement ‘This is that Devadatta’- the knowledge is based onverbal comprehension and should not be considered as perception, sinceit is not through sense organs.

A. It is not so. We have already established that for a thing to beperceived, its sense data are not the criterion. The criteria statedare consciousness associated with the subject is not different from theobject when the object is present and perceivable. The object shouldhave attributes, but not necessarily gathered by senses. In the caseof internal perceptions there are no tangible objects ‘out there’, andtherefore no sense-data. Yet, for internal perceptions like anger etcthe attributes of the vRitti are internal and not by sense-input. Inthe case of ‘this Devadatta’ who is right in front and is perceivablethrough senses, the knowledge due to the sentence ‘this is thatDevadatta’ has for its object something connected with the sense organsand the associated mental state formed has a limiting consciousness ofthe object, Devadatta. In addition to the perceptual knowledge of thisDevadatta, the prior knowledge of ‘that Devadatta’ is also brought infor the purpose of recognition of ‘this Devadatta’. Cognition processinvolving ‘this Devadatta’, and recognition process involving ‘thatDevadatta’ are both involved in the recognition of ‘this is thatDevadatta’. The perceptual limiting consciousness of this Devadattawhere all the conditions of perceptuality are met is identified withthe information from memory for the purpose of recognition. It is therecognition part that makes the perception indeterminate.

Here we need to recognize that the cognition and recognition play insequence together. When I say this is a jar, looking at the jar infront, two aspects are playing a role. One is the cognition whereperceptuality condition is being met and I perceive the object jar withits attributes as immediate and direct. That this is a jar and not avase comes by the association with the knowledge in the memory. Thememory involves the names and forms of a jar as well as a vase.Recognition that the cognized object is jar and not a vase comes by

process of matching the attributive content of the present vRitti withthe past knowledge of a jar and a vase to conclude that this is a jarand not a vase. Mind has the capacity for codifying the attributes asit sees and uses it for recognition. Suppose if I do not have theknowledge of what a jar or a vase is, and when I see a jar for thefirst time, there is only cognition but not recognition. Since thememory is blank, as there no knowledge of jar or vase, I have knowledgeof only the cognized object. If I now learn that it is a jar, thatinformation with its attributes is stored in the memory. Hence the nexttime I see the same or similar object, not only cognition butrecognition also occurs immediately. Here the cognition part is directand immediate and recognition part has to come from memory. It is acommon experience that we see some people and even recognize them, butwe do not remember the name of the person. That is because it is saidthat the brain stores the information of names, words and language inone side and figures and pictures on the other. Hence recognition ofthe form is immediate but name has to come from different location. Itis also said that language that is pictorial (Chinese and Japanese) thenames and forms are stored in the same side of the brain, and for themrecognition is faster. This aspect is exploited in the early childhoodeducation, where language is taught with pictures; and pictures speakthousand words.

In the statement ‘this is that Devadatta’, the cognition part is directand immediate since the object perceived is right in front. But therecognition part becomes a problem particularly if the attributivecontent of this Devadatta and that Devadatta are unrecognizablydifferent. The indeterminacy comes from recognition process than fromthe cognitive process. Hence VP says cognition is perceptual. The sameapplies to ‘Thou art That’. The perception of ‘Thou’ is direct andimmediate since the subject itself is the object for cognition. Butthe indeterminacy comes from the recognition process where theattributive content of ‘Thou’ is much different from the attributivecontent of ‘That’, where ‘That’ stands for Brahman.

If one is closely familiar with ‘that Devadatta’ and showing thisDevadatta in front, if the teacher says ‘this is that Devadatta’,because of the full faith in the teacher’s words, even though theattributive knowledge of this and that Devadattas are different, thestudent gains immediate and direct knowledge. He may wonder and say ‘Oh! My God! What a change in Devadatta!’. In the recognition, thestudent is able to discard the contradictory qualifications of thepresent and the past Devadatta, and still equate the essence to arriveat the knowledge. With the full faith in the teacher’s words, thecontradictory qualifications in this and that Devadattas are strippedout to arrive at the unique knowledge. The knowledge occurs directlyand immediately as one sees this Devadatta while hearing the statementby the teacher. The same is the case with ‘tat tvam asi or That thouart’ statement. Faith in the teacher’s words (words of the scripturesexpressed by a teacher who is trustworthy) as the student listens(shravaNam) forms the basis for the direct and immediate knowledge as

Shankara says, ‘like the perception of fruit in the hand’ – indicatingthe knowledge is perceptual and immediate.

In contrast to ‘this is that Devadatta’, the difficulties here,however, are compounded and more so when there is lack of completefaith in the words of the teacher. The difficulties arise, since‘That’ has no attributes and whatever they are come from scriptures.The attributes are of indicative (lakshaNas) than cognitive. Theknowledge is still considered as direct perception for two reasons.From the point of ‘Thou’ it is immediate and ever present subject; andthe perceptuality criteria that consciousness of the subject is thesame as the object is immediately satisfied, since here subject is theobject and the identity is established. From the point of ‘That’ isalso direct in the sense that the same consciousness is the content of‘That’, since ‘that’ stands for Brahman, which is pure consciousness,which is indivisible. Hence ‘tat tvam asi’ or ‘Thou art That’ has tobe direct and immediate. The reason the knowledge does not take placedirectly and immediately is erroneous and misconceived attributes areplaced on both ‘Thou’ and ‘That’, making the knowledge of the identityseems impossible. The spiritual study and practices involve the mind intrying to get rid of these preconceived attributes assigned to bothterms ‘Thou’ and ‘That’. This getting rid of preconceived notions iscalled ‘chitta suddhi’ or purification of the mind, where wrong notionsplaced on both ‘Thou’ and That’ are dropped. If one thinks thatlearning is difficult, the unlearning is even more difficult. All thespiritual practices are centered on unlearning process so that theequation ‘Thou art That’ is understood or realized.

Although ‘That art Thou’ involves immediate and direct knowledge,realization that I am brahman does not occur for many. There are twoobstacles that prevent from the seeing the truth as the truth. Theyare called samshaya and viparya. Samshaye means doubt that can ariseif there is no faith in the word of the scriptural statement – That artThou. To remove this, mananam or reflection on the Vedantic truth isrecommended. The second obstacle is the viparya that is habitualthinking of deep rooted notions that I am this body, mind andintellect. The day to day transactions essentially endorse this notion.For that contemplation on the truth – That art Thou – is recommended.Both mananam and nidhidhyaasanam do not produce new knowledge buteliminate the obstacles that prevent the assimilation of the truth thatI am. Hence fundamentally the statement ‘That art Thou’ inderminatebut comes under direct perception since subject is the object ofknowledge.

The other philosophers view the determinate and inderminate perceptionsdifferently and we will examine them to see clearly why advaiticposition is correct. This will be done as we address additionalquestions raised related to the topic.Q. ‘Thou art That’ is verbal instructional statement. In any verbalcommunication, for knowledge to take place, one has to understand therelationship implied between the words based on the sentence structure.

In Sanskrit the declensions of the words provide immediaterelationships – the subject and its qualifications and the object andits qualifications and the action verb relating the two. When therelationships between the words are obvious how can the verbalcommunication be indeterminate?

A. VP says to understand the intended meaning of the sentence, therelationships between words alone is not sufficient. There are simplesentences where direct meaning is obvious and makes sense. In that casethe verbal communication with the word relationships provide the directmeaning. Take for example, ‘Rama is Dhasaratha’s son’ – The meaning isstraight forward that can be obtained from word relationship. In thestatements – ‘This is that Devadatta’ or ‘That Thou art’ – the directmeaning using the relationship between the words would not make sense.One has to look for the intended meaning. In some cases, if oneconsiders just relationships between the words without understandingthe proper context in which the verbal statement is made, there isevery possibility to reach unintended meaning. Take for example acricketer saying to his friend, ‘please bring me a bat’. Looking atthe sentence and observing the word meaning and the relationshipbetween the words, if his friend brings him a flying quadruped bat, hemissed the intended meaning. Contextual understanding is also veryimportant in verbal communication. In the statements ‘this is thatDevadatta’ – to understand the sentence one has to have prior knowledgeof that Devadatta, otherwise the intended identity of this Devadattaand that Devadatta is not understood. If one has no knowledge of thatDevadatta, ‘this is that Devadatta’ would not make any sense.

In relation to the sentence ‘Thou art That’ – the verbal instructionalstatement by a teacher to his student comes after many passagesstarting with preposition that ‘by knowing one thing everything else isas though known- Eka vijnAnEna sarva vijnAnam bhavati’ – particularlyknowing the material cause, all the effects produced by that cause areknown. This is similar to saying that by knowing gold all theornaments of gold are ‘as though’ known, since all the ornaments arenothing but gold alone with different names and forms. In extendingthis application, the teacher first establishes that the material causefor the entire universe is Existence, Brahman, alone. Hence the teachersays – ‘this universe, my dear, was but existence alone in thebeginning’. Thus existence is the material cause for the universe likegold for ornaments. The whole world is nothing but existence alone butwith different names and forms perceived as objects. Hence if we know‘Existence’ everything in the universe is as good as known. Hence thequestion arises, where is that existence for us to know. The teachingterminates with the instructional statement – that is the truth, thatis real, and that is the self, and ‘Thou art That’ O’ Swetaketu. Hencethe intended purport of ‘That’ in the sentence is the Brahman, thematerial cause for the universe which is of the nature of pureconsciousness-existence. And ‘That’ Brahman you are. The intendedmeaning relays on the correct understanding of what ‘That’ stands for.In addition, the context of what ‘Thou’ stands for also has to be

understood. If contextually ‘That’ includes the substantive of all thisuniverse of names and forms which includes the subtle as well as grossbodies as the teacher explains, then ‘Thou’ that stands for self orAtma which appears to be different from the universe of names andforms. The sentence ‘Thou art That’ equates these two apparentlydissimilar entities. Hence to make sense of this equation, one has todrop all dissimilarities or contradictory qualifications of ‘That’ and‘Thou’ and equate the essence of both, the process known as bhAga TyAgalakshaNa – that is renouncing the unnecessary or superficial parts ofboth and equating only the substantial parts. Since the intendedmeaning of the sentence has to be understood than the direct meaning,it is called indeterminate knowledge.

VP quotes a sloka from Tatva pradIpikA of Citsukhi Acharya, whichstates that in the sentences that convey identity relations, one has totake the substantive meanings for the words than the superficialmeanings to recognize or realize the identity that is conveyed by thesentences. In the sentence ‘this is that Devadatta’ the identity ofthis Devadatta and that Devadatta is implied in the sentence. Based onCitsukhi’s statement, we recognize that we need to equate thesubstantiality of this Devadatta and that Devadatta and not thesuperficial attributive qualities. The identity is therefore only withrespect to the essence of this and that Devadatta and not the externalchanging non-substantive qualities. Within the vyavahaara, the essenceof both this Devadatta and that Devadatta is individual, who is jiivaand is changeless in spite of changing BMI with age. Similar identityis implied in the relation ‘Thou art That’. The substantiality of both‘Thou’ as well as ‘That’ is ‘existence-consciousness’ and therefore theidentity is only with respect to the substantives and not in terms ofadjectives. The contradictory attributes prevent the recognition of theidentity unless one can strip out the contradictory qualifications of‘Thou’ and ‘That’. In the case of ‘this is that Devadatta’ thestripping process is easier since Devadatta is object detached from thesubject. However in the case of ‘Thou art That’, the stripping of thequalifications are difficult due to deep-rooted habitual association ofthe attributes with the locus. Hence, the indeterminacy in all verbalstatements involving identity comes due to difficulties in overlookingthe obvious adjectives of both relata to identify the identity only inthe substantives.

The VishiShTAdvaitic Position:

We present here some aspects of other philosophical positions relatedto determinate and indeterminate perceptions, for purpose ofcomparison. It is also interesting to view how advaitic position isviewed by vishiShTadvaitin. In tatva muktA kalApa, Vedanta Desika(13th Century) states Advaitic position as puurvapaksha, as reported byS.M. Sreenivasa Chari, in Fundamentals of VishiShTAdviata Vedanta.According to Vedanta Deshika, Advaitin’s position is that the firstcontact of the sense organs with the object reveals the mere existence(SAT) devoid of all attributes, while subsequent contact reveals

objects with attributes. Former is indeterminate and the later isdeterminate perceptions. Hence according their understanding, Advaitahas two stage perception the first involves the perception which isindeterminate, implying non-attributive involving the perception ofmere existence and the second stage of perception involves attributive.Stating their understanding, they criticize that understanding. VedantaDeshika says that perception of an object devoid of attributes is apsychological myth. Ramanuja also points out that apprehension of mere‘being’ or existence without any attributes does not takes place anytime and such an experience is impossible since all cognitions are interms of ‘this is such and such’. Nothing can be perceived withoutattributes. Hence even indeterminate perception has to be attributive.If both determinate and indeterminate perceptions are attributive thenwhere is the distinction between the two, asks VishiShTadvaitin? If wepose the question the other way that if both determinate andindeterminate perceptions are attributive then what is the differencebetween the two? Ramanuja accounts that indeterminate perception is thefirst time perception of an object – For example, when the child sees acow and mother says ‘that is a cow’. He grasps the object and theattributes and store in his memory – since this is the first time a cowhas been seen, he stores that attributive knowledge in his mind. Whenhe sees another cow and third cow, he slowly recognizes the genericfeatures of the cow that makes a cow a cow and not a horse. Henceaccording to vishiShTaadvaitic position, the first time perception thatinvolves no recognition process is an indeterminate perception, whilethe subsequent perceptions that involves not only cognition butrecognition based on memory is determinate perception. Although bothcognitions are attributive in the first one there is no recognitionwhile in the subsequent perceptions there is one. The cognition,recognition and generic attributes (jAti) of Cow in contrast to that ofa horse, etc are involved in the inderminate vs determinate perception.This is the vishiShTaadvaitic position.

There is nothing wrong with the vishiShTaadvaitic position inclassifying the first time vs the subsequent perceptions respectivelyas indeterminate vs determinate, but clearly their criticism ofAdvaitic position is unfounded. According to the foot note provided byS.M.S Chari – ‘This is the view criticized by Ramanuja’. S.M.S. Charisays, according to later advaitin, as stated in Vedanta ParibhASha,indeterminate perception is non-relational knowledge of the perceivedobject and determinate perception is relational knowledge. As anexample of the former, the verbal statement – ‘this is that Devadatta’where indicated identity of substantive is to be understood discardingthe differences in attributive knowledge of this and that Devadatta.S.M.S. Chari says this view is also rejected by Vedanta Deshika on theground that memory involving prior perception (pratyabhijna) of thatDevadatta is also determinate in character and therefore does not referto identify of the essentials. Reference is given to Vedanata Deshika’s‘Sarvartha Siddhi’. We note that Vedanta Deshika also has writtenSatadhUShani, hundred defects in Advaita Vedanta, and one of them isrelated to the inderminate perceptions.

The criticism of Vedanta Deshika related to indicative meaning impliedin the statement ‘this is that Devadatta’ is also not justified. Theindeterminacy is not from the pratyabhijna or deterministic aspect ofprior cognition of ‘that Devadatta’. The problem in the identitystatement is ‘this is that Devadatta’, the identity is not exact. Eachcognition by itself, i.e. ‘that Devadatta’ and ‘this Devadataa’independently are deterministic. The problem arises in the identity ofthese two, implied in the statement, ‘this is that Devadatta’. Thereason is that Devadatta that was cognized long time ago who was socute and handsome looking boy is this Devadatta who is ugly looking fatindividual. Hence attributes of the two do not match and thereforethere is no identity in the attributive knowledge of the twoDevadattas, even though the perception is determinate by itself. Hencethe identity of the two is not obvious to have deterministic cognitionof the identity. When the teacher says ‘this is that Devadatta’ – whatis involved is a faith in the knowledge of the teacher who made thatstatement that it is true and to cognize the identity using bhAgatyAgam or discarding the contradictory qualifications of this and thatDevadattas and unifying only the essentials. Those who knew thatDevadatta and now seeing this Devadatta, and with the verbal statementthat this is that Devadatta, the identity is immediate and direct. Therecognition process requires rejection of contradictions in theattributive knowledge. This is normal experience and thereforecriticism of advaitic position is baseless.

The above criticism has lot more bearing in the analysis of the Vedicstatement ‘That art Thou’ , wherein the identity involves discardingthe contradictory qualifications of ‘Thou’ and ‘That’ and unifying onlythe essentials. Before the statement was made, Upanishad itselfprovides the justification for the rejection of the superimposed namesand forms to see the identity by saying all objects are their causeitself in different forms- vAchArambhanam vikArO nAmadhEyam – Thedifferences are only at the level of words or speech involvingattributes and not in substantives. It is similar to the statement ‘Allornaments in essence are the same and therefore ring is necklace’referring to gold ring and gold necklace. The attributes of the ringand the necklace are different and therefore implied identity is not atthat level. Deterministically ring is different from necklace.Therefore the identity is only at the substantive level since both arenothing but gold. As Citsukhi stated that in the verbal statementsinvolving identity relations the identity is implied only atsubstantial level and not at attributive level. The indeterminacy isinherent due to differences in the attributive knowledge. Therefore thecriticism of Advaitic position by Vedanta Deshika is also baseless.

If one closely examines the VishiShTAdvaitic doctrine involved in theanalysis of ‘That art Thou’ statement, it also uses some kind of bhAgatyAga to arrive at the identity relation (although they do not say so),and there is indeterminacy involved in the understanding. They use thesamAnAdhikarana between the attribute and the substantive as indicative

of the implied identity. The attributes of Thou, jiiva, and those of‘That’, parabrahma, are entirely different and distinct. Since,according to them, ‘parabrahman pervades the whole universe of movableand immovable as indweller or antaryAmin, in the implied identitystatement, one has to discard all the attributes of the ‘thou’ and onlyequate the essence in all ‘thou’ as an indweller that pervades all‘Thou-s’, since ‘Thou’ is part of ‘That’. According to VishiShTAdviatathe indwelling part is only to be involved in the identity relation and‘Thou’ itself constitutes an attribute of Parabrahman. Since attributeis inseparable from substantive, identity is to establish the onenessin terms of substantive. Taking the blue lotus as an example andaddressing the blue – ‘Thou art Lotus’, since blue is an inseparableattribute of Lotus and depends on Lotus for its existence, referring toan attribute is then to refer to its substantive; that is what theyimply as samAnAdhikaraNa. Without going into the validity of theiranalysis and conclusion, we note that they are adopting a proceduresomewhat similar to bhAga tyAga that is discarding some parts to arriveat the implied identity relation. They are discarding the individualattributes of the jiiva in identifying with Parabrahman, since jiiva isthe part of the later and depends on him, while being pervaded by it asindweller. They are in essence following Citsukhi’s guidelines whilecriticizing Advaitic stand. Hence their criticism of Advaitic positionis unwarranted.

Hari Om!Sadananda

PS - I will be on travel from tomorrow returning to States and may takefew days to get access to internet. There will be some delay in myresponses, if they are needed.

Knowledge and The Means of Knowledge - 12

We are discussing the Vedanta ParibhASha of Dharmaraja Adhvarindra, asI understand.

12. Perception at Individual and Global levels

We now examine the perception from two levels: one is from the point ofindividual or jiiva’s level and the other from the point of totality orIswara or God’s level, i.e. individual and global levels. In theprocess we also define individual, jiiva and Iswara or God. VP saysperception is again two fold. One is the perception due to witnessingconsciousness in the individual level (jiiva - sAkshin) and the otherfrom the witnessing consciousness at God’s level (Iswara - sAkshin) orglobal level.

Jiiva and Jiiva-sAkshI:

At individual level, we differentiate two things – one is individual,

jiiva and the other is witnessing consciousness of the individual(jiiva-sAkshin). These two can be referred as two aspects of jiiva, onefrom the transactional level and the other from the transcendentallevel. Ontologically they are not the same. Jiiva or individual isdefined as the consciousness limited by the mind and through the mind,the body, etc., the BMI. When jiiva does not know his transcendentalnature, we say that he is covered by ignorance about his true nature.Since knowledge is eternal, it gets revealed only when the vial ofignorance is removed through appropriate pramANa. Ignorance isbeginningless (anaadi) but ends when vial of ignorance is removed andthe knowledge takes place. Self-ignorance can be removed byself-knowledge alone, since they are opposite to each other, just aschemistry ignorance is removed by chemistry knowledge. Chemistryknowledge cannot remove physics ignorance. On the same token, noamount of scientific objective investigation and reasoning can removethe ignorance of the subject, the self. Objective investigation revealsonly objective knowledge. The pramANa that can remove the ignorance ofone’s own self alone can reveal self-knowledge.In the state of ignorance, consciousness as though (a) reflected in themind and (b) identified with it constitutes empirical self ortransactional self, jiiva. Any reflected consciousness is, in general,constitutes the knowledge of thing that is reflecting, since we nowbecome conscious of the thing that is reflecting, just as the reflectedlight from an object reveals that object that is reflecting the light.Jiiva involves two aspects. One is the formation of the reflectedconsciousness in the mind (actually intellect part of the mind which isthe locus for knowledge in the mind), and the second aspect is theidentification with that as ‘I am this’ where this stand for intellectto start with.

Vedanta discusses how the all pervading Brahman became a jiiva. Afterthe creation of both subtle and gross bodies, Upanishads declare thatBrahman entered into it (the statements are referred to as‘anupravesha’ shruti statements). Since Brahman is all pervadingconsciousness, it cannot enter into anything other than itself sincethere is nothing other than itself; nor one can say it entered intoitself as it makes no sense to say I enter into myself. Hence AdvaitaVedanta explains the so-called ‘entering’ as when the gross and subtlebodies that are formed are conducive to express life, the Brahmanitself manifests as jiiva. Anupravesha shruti declares the fact thatBrahman himself became multiple jiiva-s by identifying with the localupandhis, thus establishing the identity of Brahman with jiiva-s, asillustrated later by mahavaakyas. Here the formation of the reflectedconsciousness in the intellect constitutes the entering of Brahman –this is also called formation of ‘pratibimba’ (reflection of theoriginal bimba) or cidAbhAsa. The reflecting medium (purity of theintellect) determines the quality of the reflection. Formation of thereflected limiting consciousness is only one part. The second partinvolves identification with the Upaadhis as ‘I am this’. Theidentification involves ownership, as ‘I am this’ and ‘this is mine’etc. With the identification, ‘I am’ ‘as though’ gets qualified by

‘this’, ‘this’ being intellect, mind (the emotional part) or the grossbody as well as all physiological functions associated with it. HenceVP says ‘jjiva’ is a qualifying attributive limiting reflectedconsciousness of the mind along with notion of ownership of thosequalifications as mine. All the above verbiage really means that theupAdhis (BMI) are limited and the reflection therefore is limited, eventhough Brahman is limitless. All pervading consciousness gets reflectedin the mind, and hence the reflected or formed pratibimba is limited;it is like the Sun getting reflected in mirrors or pools of water. Thisis termed as limiting reflected consciousness in the mind. When itidentifies with the attributive mind (mind includes BMI – sinceidentification is a thought in the mind as ‘I am this’), it becomes theowner of the BMI attributes as my attributes. Hence, body is short, Iam short; body is weak, I am weak; intellect is dull, I am dull; andmind is depressed, I am depressed, etc. The ownership crystallizes thejiiva notion. Looking back at VP statement now, Jiiva constitutes thequalifying attributive limiting reflected consciousness in the mindalong with the ownership of these attributes.

The original consciousness that gets conditioned in the BMI is calledsAkshI or witnessing consciousness. Even though Brahman is limitlessor unbounded, the condition of the BMI makes it appear as though sAkshIis bounded. To illustrate this, let us consider clay forming into pot.When a pot is formed we now have pot space. When we move the pot fromplace A to place B, the space relative to the pot also moves, eventhough space is immovable and all pervading and limitless. It issimilar to a fly that is flying inside the train compartment as thoughmoves along with the passenger at the same speed of the train. Potspace appears to be constrained by the walls of the pot, but attributesof the pot do not belong to the pot space. Hence VP says the differencebetween a jiiva and jiiva-saakshii can be described simply as thefarmer is its transactional nature and the later is its transcendentalnature. In the former case the mind that is limiting the consciousnessbecomes a qualifying attribute as Jiiva says ‘I am this’. Hence Jiivais called qualifying attributive limiting reflected consciousness. Inthe case of sAkshI the mind is only a limiting adjunct but notqualifying adjunct. It is a witnessing consciousness untainted by thewitnessed mind. In the jiiva’s case the mind with its attributes due tosAtvic, rajasic and tamasic guNas forms the attributive content ofjiiva because of its identification with the mind. This identificationoccurs, Vedanta says, because of not knowing my true nature which is oftranscendental nature. A conscious entity getting identified withlimiting inert entity, mind, is jiiva as reflected consciousness. Theconscious entity just witnessing the limiting mind (BMI) is sAkshIchaitanyam.To illustrate the difference, VP gives two examples. For jiiva – theexample given is ‘the colored jar is transitory’. Here the color is thequalifying attribute of the jar. Jar identifying itself as ‘I am acolored jar’ – identification with a limiting name and form withattribute of color is the notion of ‘jar-jiiva’ and it considers itselfas transitory since the name, form and attributes are transitory. This

is the transactional view of the jar. Suppose if the jar recognizesthat I am clay in the form of a jar with a color, then jar hastranscendental understanding. It has no identification or ownershipwith the form or color, and therefore does not feel it is transitoryether. It realizes that now I am in the form jar, I can be in otherforms, the forms are only for transactions and my nature is pureformless colorless clay. VP gives another example of sAkshI – it isconditioned by the upAdhis but without identification – it is likespace in the inner ear. Space is nothing to do with ear but constrainedspace within the walls of the inner ear constitutes part of the ear. Inthe same way witnessing consciousness is although all pervading, thelimiting constraints of the mind (BMI) constitutes the sAkshIchaitanyam which illumines the particular mind that it is associatedwith it. It is like saying that the space in the jar is limited,although the space is all pervading and the pot-space is connected toouter space.

Shree Vidyaranya says in AnubhutiprakaSha the jiiva, jiiva-sAkshii andBrahman can be considered as consciousness as though expressed in threedifferent ways: (a) vishiShTa caitanyam (b) upahita caitanyam and (c)nirupAdhika caitanyam. Limiting reflected consciousness identified withattributes (visheShaNa) of the upAdhi is jiiva caitanyam or vishiShTacaitanyam. Limiting illuminating consciousness (it is actually notdoing the illumination also) constrained by uaPadhis (with noidentification with the qualities of the upaAdhis) is upahita caitanyaor sAkshI caitanya. The lost one is without any upAdhis, that is, whenjiivanmukta drops his upaadhis during videha mukti. There is nodifference in last two other than the constraints of the upAdhis, justas there is no difference between pot-space and the outer-space otherthan constraining pot walls. Self-realization is the recognition byjiiva that I am the illuminating consciousness, sAkshI, than thereflected qualified or attributive conscious entity as ‘I am this’.sAskhI ‘as though’ constrained by the upAdhis, is called jiiva-sAkshI,since it can witness or illumine the upAdhis that it appears to beconstrained – just as we say, space in our house is limited, eventhough space is limitless. VP says this jiiva-sAkshI in each individualis different, for the limiting upAdhis are different, just as spaces indifferent pots are different due to constraining walls of the pots.Hence for this reason, what one individual, Caitra, knows, anotherindividual, Maitra, cannot recollect. Similarly if one individualrealizes the other individual does not, since as we discussed before,realization involves recognition that the limiting reflectedattributive consciousness is nothing but the original unqualified orattributeless conscious that is causing illumination and reflection.That is vishiShTa caitanya is the same as upahita caitanya, in thelanguage of Shree Vidyaranya.

Iswara and Iswara-sAkshI:

Just as jiiva-sAkshI is consciousness with upAdhi-s as limitingadjunct, Iswara-sAkshI or witness in God is the consciousness with mAya

as the limiting adjunct (mAya has been translated as cosmic illusion.Since it is not an illusion for those who do not know that it is anillusion, we retain the word mAya itself). Unlike in the jiiva’s case,since mAya is singular, the limiting adjunct is also singular. Hence,witnessing consciousness in God is also singular. In shruti texts sometimes plurality is used. For example – it is said “The supreme Lord isperceived as having manifold forms through His powers of mAya(mAyAbhiH)” – Here the plurality corresponds to the diversity of powersthat are in the mAya (mAyAbhiH). Or the plurality can also be withreference to three guNas – serenity (sattva), activity (rajas) andinertia (tamas) that mAya comprises. The unity of mAya can be inferredfrom the use of singular number, supported by the simplicity of theexplanation of shruti and smRiti statements such as – ‘one should knowthe mAya is nothing but prakRiti or nature (mAyAntu prakRitim vidyAtmAyinantu maheswaram and the ruler of that to be Great Lord – Sve. Up.IV-10), ‘Salutations to that unknowable Embodiment of Knowledge whobeing established in the heart, a yogin transcends the mAya, the allpervasive nescience – tarati avidyAm vititAm hRidi yasmin nivEshitE|yogI mAyAmamEyAma tasmai vidyAtmanE namaH|| - Vishnu PuraNa V-27-15),similarly the other shruti’s statements.

Thus, in all the statements in both shruti and smRiti, singularity hasto be understood for simplicity and there are no pluralities of mAya.The apparent plurality in mAya is implied and not plurality of mAya.Iswara-sAkshI is the upahita caitanyam or limiting consciousness withlimiting adjunct of mAya just as jiiva-sAkshI is upahita caitanyam orlimiting consciousness with jiiva-upAdhi as its limiting adjunct. It isbeginningless, since the limiting adjunct mAya is beginningless. Havingdefined the Iswara-sAkshI, VP now defines the Iswara. The definitionfollows in parallel to jiiva caitanyam. Just as jiiva is the limitingconsciousness identified with the limiting adjunct, upAdhi, Iswara orLord is defined as limiting consciousness identified with the limitingadjunct mAya. Thus with qualifying attribute of mAya it is Iswara orGod or Godhead and without the qualifying attribute but just with thelimiting adjunct, mAya, it is Iswara-sAkshI. Otherwise there is noother difference between the two in terms of having differentattributes. One is vishiShTa caitanya and the other is upahitacaitanya.

Since mAya is triguNAtmikam that is possessing three guNas – sattva,rajas and tomo guNas – the supreme Lord, although one, is designated bythe terms such as BrahmA (four-headed), ViShNu and Maheswara or Shiva,according to the dominating guNas present – activity (rajas), serenity(satva) and inertia (tamas), which are the limiting qualifyingattributes of the mAya.

Q: If the witness in God is beginningless, then how is one to explainthe beginning of the reflection on the part of the Supreme Lord justbefore projecting the universe, mentioned in the texts like, “Itvisualized, let me become many, Let me be born (as many) – tad aikshatabahu syAm, prajAyeya” (Ch. Up. VI-2-3). There seems to be a beginning

for Iswara sAkhitvam or the witness in God.

A: The parallelism with jiiva-sAkshi is used to explain. Just as owingto the sense organs and the mind in contact with the objects, differentmental states or vRittis arise in the mind, which forms the limitingadjunct of the individual jiiva or self, similarly, owing to the pastkarma or actions of all beings that are ready to germinate, theprojection in the order of priorities based on karma of those beings,particular states (in analogy with vRittis at individual level) ariseat the cosmic level. “Now this has to be projected or originated(brahma), now this has to be maintained (Vishnu) and now this has to bedestroyed (Shiva)” etc, arise in mAya, which is the limiting adjunct ofthe Supreme Lord. Since these states have beginning, the consciousnessreflected in them is also described as having a beginning.

Creation, sustenance and annihilation are in fact a cyclic process.When the cosmic sleep occurs, all the beings and the world go intopotential form or unmanifested form. One can say that Iswara is in yoganidra, just as when jiiva goes to deep sleep all the world of objectsand the attributive knowledge goes into potential form or unmanifestedform or pure vAsanas state. Vasanas which are nothing but consolidatedignorance is illuminated and hence ‘I do not know’ is the onlyknowledge without any place-wise, time-wise or object-wisediscriminative attributive knowledge. mAya at the cosmic level andignorance at the individual level with names and forms in potential orunmanifested form constitute deep sleep states at each level. WhenIswara and jiiva get up they start projecting, Iswara at cosmic leveland jiiva at the individual level forms the waking state with theunmanifested forms manifesting based on previous knowledge before theywent into unmanifested forms. Thus micro and macro levels operate inparallel. Only difference is jiiva has ignorance as the cause forprojection with his own vAsanas forming the basis for projection whilefor Iswara he does not have his own vAsanas – only the collectivevAsanas of all beings form the basis for projection. Hence Iswara isnot affected by the projection and is called mAyAvi or wielder of mAyaas his power of projection. Jiiva is ignorant of his own nature andtherefore he gets affected by the projection when that projection istaken as real.

Knowledge reveals itself:

When there an object ‘pot’ right in front of me and when I open myeyes, I cannot but see the object, if the mind is not preoccupied.Sense input is immediate and vRitti of the object formed based on thesense input is also immediate. When vRitti is illumined by the lightof consciousness and reflection of that light by vRitti constitute theknowledge of the vRitti. Now not only I know that ‘this is pot’ and Ialso know that ‘I know that this is pot’. That is besides having theknowledge of the pot, I also know that I have the knowledge of the pot.Pot knowledge is known by the limiting reflecting consciousness of thepot-vRitti. If we ask what reveals knowledge of the pot knowledge, we

can only say that knowledge is self-revealing. Knowledge of an objectrequires illumination by the light of consciousness, but we do not needto illumine the illuminated knowledge. What it means is knowledge is ofthe nature of illumination and one does need illumine anotherillumination. We do not need a light to see the light. That is, it isthe very nature of the knowledge to reveal the nature of the object andalso reveal itself. Knowledge is self-revealing and does not needanother knowledge to reveal it, besides the fact that it leads toinfinite regress. Hence Citsukaachaarya says that knowledge isimmediately apprehended without being objectified since it isself-luminous. Hence when I say, ‘here is a pot’ the pot knowledge isapprehended along with the knowledge ‘I know here is a pot’ – here weare essentially separating the knowledge of an object and cognition ofthe object.

We will next address the nature of the errors in perception.


We are continuing after a long break, the series on Vedanta ParibhASha (VP) ofDharmaraja Advarindra (DA), based on my understanding. We are still dealing withpratyaksha pramaaNa or direct perceptual means of knowledge. Here I am going tosummarize the essence of what we have learned so far.

The fundamental statement of VP is that perceptual knowledge is nothing but pureconsciousness. Immediacy follows from the condition of perceptuality which isstated as oneness of the consciousness of the subject that perceives the objectand conditioned consciousness expressed through vRitti of the object in themind. This was accounted as follows: The object that is perceived manifests asvRitti or a thought in the mind of perceiver. Brahman, the all-pervadingconsciousness is the material cause for the object and therefore manifests (asthough) as limiting consciousness in the form and name of object, where the formincludes all the associated attributes of that particular object (shabda,sparsha, ruupa, rasa, gandha- sound, touch, form, taste and smell) that isperceived. The perception through the senses involves perception of only theattributes of the object since Brahman, the substantive cannot be perceived asseparate from the perceiver. Theattributive sense input forms vRitti, which is reflected by the saakshiicaitanyam or witnessing consciousness. The knowledge is complete when the lightof consciousness reflected by the mind as the subject who is perceiving theobject, and the reflected consciousness of the vRitti, the contents of theobjects in terms of sense input, become one â€“ expressed as the identity ofsubject consciousness and the object consciousness. The sense input provides thequalifying attributes of the object perceived â€“ as this a pot. Similarly thereflected consciousness of the mind (cidAbhaasa) with its own attributes formsthe subject, the knower of the object as I am the knower. The perceptualknowledge said to be complete when the reflected consciousness of the subject(weare only dealing with reflected consciousness since absolute consciousness isall pervading and has no differences of any kind â€“ no sajaati, vijaati andswagata bhedaas) and the reflected

consciousness of the object become one. The statement of VP follows thatperceptual knowledge is the same as pure consciousness and this forms the basisfor the perceptuality condition. Immediacy of the perception of the objectfollows since the associated vRitti of that object that is reflecting the lightof consciousness has the attributes of the object perceived as its contents.

The process of perception can be understood if we look at the processobjectively. The mind that is perceiving the object through the senses is alsoan object in the sense that it is jadam or inert. According to Vedanta it isnothing but matter only â€“ â€ãnnamayam hi manaHâ€™ â€“ mind is made up ofmatterâ€™ â€“ Ch. Up 6-5-4. Mind becomes dynamic due to the reflection ofconsciousness in it or by it. Any object becomes known by the reflection oflight. Similarly the mind becomes known by the consciousness reflected by it andthe reflection depends on the purity of the reflecting medium. When theattributes of the external object (external to the mind) are brought in by thesenses, they form vRitti, a perturbation or a thought in the mind. The vRitti,as it forms in the mind, also get reflected in the light of consciousness thatis ever present. We have now two reflections: one, the mind itself as an objectthat constitutes the subject since it hascapacity to learn and store the information, and the vRitti of the object whichis a local perturbation of the mind. These two reflections constitute thesubject and the objects in terms of perception. Both reflections are arisingfrom the same source, witnessing consciousness that I am. The connectionbetween the two is established via perceptual knowledge and that is stated asperceptuality condition where consciousness of the subject is united with theconsciousness of the object. Interesting point is the knowledge is complete whenthe reflected consciousness as the subject unites with the reflectedconsciousness as the object. There is no specific â€˜matterâ€™ here, other thanthe fact the quality of the reflection depends on the purity of the reflectingmedium. When I say â€“ I see a pot there, what is seen therefore is reflectingconsciousness of vRitti that is formed in the mind containing the attributes ofthe object brought in by the senses,seen by the reflecting consciousness in the mind. â€˜Is there really aâ€˜potâ€™ out there?â€™ if one asks, then we can say that at the transactionallevel, yes there is pot out there. But if one wants the truth behind thatstatement, what is seen is only the vRitti of the mind and â€˜pot is thereâ€™only when vRitti is there and vRitti is there only when the mind is there orawake. Hence without the mind and the vRitti that is formed (vRitti of theobject will not form if all the senses do not bring in the attributiveknowledge), presence of a pot cannot be established out there. It is there ornot therefore becomes an indeterminate problem â€“ just as in the deep sleepwhen the mind is not there to reflect consciousness; the world including pot isnot established. Pot is there, only because I see it. If I do not see it, is itthere? â€“ I do not know and therefore I cannot tell if it is there or not.Others can tell when they see it but I shouldhave faith in their statements and that becomes a separate means of knowledgeor indirect knowledge or hear-say and not direct knowledge. When I do see thepot through the sense input, the attributes of the pot that senses bring in arenot my creation. Hence there is no real pot out there for me to see, when I see.The pot is as real as the mind that sees. But neither the pot nor the mind cansee each other to establish their existence. Seeing takes place when the

consciousness reflected in the mind unites with the consciousness reflected byvRitti of the object in the mind. Thus both subject and the object ofperception are reflected consciousness of that witnessing consciousness. Pureconsciousness can not be seen since seeing involves duality of seer and theseen. Hence at the level of perception, perceptual knowledge has to beunderstood as pure consciousness alone but perceived as the subject, perceiverand object, perceived.

In the case of internal perceptions that is the objects perception are notexternal but internal to the mind - that is they are emotions like fear,pleasure, anger, desire, etc and also include conceptualized objects by the mindâ€“ the attributes are there with their corresponding vRittis. Only differencebetween them and the external objects is that their attributive content does notarise from external sources via the senses. These internal perceptions also comeunder direct perceptions as we experience them directly and immediately whichare characteristics of perceptual knowledge. They fulfill the criteria ofperceptuality established earlier by VP.

Knowledge reveals itself: (This segment was posted last time but reposted forcontinuity)

When there an object â€˜potâ€™ right in front of me and when I open my eyes, Icannot but see the object, if the mind is not preoccupied. Sense input isimmediate and vRitti of the object formed based on the sense input is alsoimmediate. When vRitti is illumined by the light of consciousness andreflection of that light by vRitti constitute the knowledge of the vRitti. Nownot only I know that â€˜this is potâ€™ and I also know that â€˜I know that thisis potâ€™. That is besides having the knowledge of the pot(cognition of thepot), I also know that I have the knowledge of the pot (knowledge of thecognition of the pot). Pot knowledge is known by the limiting reflectingconsciousness of the pot-vRitti. If we ask what reveals knowledge of the potknowledge, we can only say that knowledge is self-revealing. Knowledge of anobject (cognition of the pot) requires illumination by the light ofconsciousness, but we do not need to illumine the illuminatedknowledge. What it means is knowledge is of the nature of illumination and onedoes need illumine another illumination. We do not need a light to see thelight. It is similar to if an object is seen by its reflection of sun lightfalling on it, I do not need to another light to see the reflected light fromthe object. That is, it is the very nature of the knowledge to reveal thenature of the object and also reveal itself. Knowledge is self-revealing anddoes not need another knowledge to reveal it, besides the fact that it leads toinfinite regress. Hence Citsukaachaarya says that knowledge is immediatelyapprehended without being objectified, since it is self-luminous. Hence when Isay, â€˜here is a potâ€™ the pot knowledge is apprehended along with theknowledge â€˜I know here is a potâ€™ â€“ here, we are essentially separating theknowledge of an object and cognition of the object as two separate aspectsalthough the cognition of the object andthe knowledge of that cognition follow immediately.

Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge -14Part-1

In view of the recent stimulating discussions on the post 13, I am going tore-examine in detail the essence of the perceptual process, as I understand,taking some of the comments and objections that were raised during thediscussion. Beforehand, I want to thank particularly reverend Shree Sastrijiand others who participated in the discussion starting from Shree -Michael,Srinivas, Putram, and Ananda Wood. The comments span from paaramaarthika tovyaavahaarika and several epistemological issues that are related to substance,object and attributes, and perceptual process in the mind or by the mind. HereI recognize the philosophical position on one side and understanding of theperceptual process from science on the other, as they get fused in, to arrive aself-consistent understanding. As shree Ananda Wood put it gently, scientificthought only goes only up to some point, and beyond that philosophical positionhas to take over in understanding theknower, known and knowing process â€“ kshetra and kshetrajna â€“ involvingconsciousness on one side and inert object on the other â€“ resulting insubject-object relationships. I request forgiveness beforehand if I differ fromothers, but I have to present what I clearly understand. I am going to presentin very detailed account since there seems to be lot of confusion of whatexactly VP says, what exactly is understood as VP says, and what exactly thecorrect epistemological position of advaita Vedanta is.

Coming from a science background, I strongly subscribe to the understanding thatphilosophical position cannot violate the objective science, but can go beyondit where objective science fails to provide a clear understanding of themechanics of the process involving consciousness because of which one isconscious of the objects. Consciousness and mechanics of the cognitive processcannot be separated. Yet, we do have now clearer understanding of the mechanicsof wave propagation and image formation as well as communication of the senseinput via sense organs to the brain. Jumping from the physical process ofperception to metal cognition involves (using computer terminology) jumping fromhardware to software where we know we need a programming language to interpretneural input into cognitive process. This is currently a black box. Therefore,in understanding the perceptual process we take whatever physics or biophysicsprovides us and withoutviolating these physical principles jump to philosophical principles. Shastrabecomes pramaaNa only for the later part. As Shankara states clearly, Shaastrais valid only where pratyaksha and anumaana fail to reveal the facts. With thisas the basis we proceed addressing some of the comments and objections that wereraised. The purpose of this post is not meant for continuing the same discussionfurther, but for clarification the extent of our understanding, or lack of it,of the perceptual process based on the current state of science on one side andphilosophical position on the other, without, of course, compromisingfundamental advaitic stand: brahma satyam, jagat mithyaa, jiivobrahmaivanaaparaH â€“ the Brahman alone is the real or the truth and the world is mithyaaor apparent, and jiiva is none other than Brahman itself.

1. Comments on the substance object and attributes:

Objection: In the example of a ring, which is an object that is made of gold,ring has its attributes; â€õbject-ringâ€™ is different from the substance gold

that the ring is made up of. Thus we have three things â€“ object-ring,attributes of ring (ID, OD, width, ellipticity, etc), and material substance,that it is made of Gold. When Vedanta ParibhaaSha says â€“ object is perceivedâ€“ it is the ring that is perceived, along with its attributes and not theattributes alone by the senses, since according to advaita the object andattributes have taadaatmya sambhandha. VP does not say that attributes alone aregathered by the senses. It says object is perceived.

Response: The response comes from two sides â€“ from objective scientificanalysis and the other from philosophical side, since perception involves therole of consciousness which is beyond objectification. First, I recall theintroductory statement I made in the first post - The purpose of the inquiryinto the epistemological issues, as DA (Dharmaraja Adhvarindra), emphasizes inthis introduction to VP, is to gain the knowledge of Brahman, knowing whichthere is no return back to the transitory world. Hence understanding of theprocess of how knowledge takes place in the mind is essential to separate whatis transitory and what is permanent â€“ essentially nithya-anitya vastu vivekaessential for Vedantins. Hence the text does not loose sight of paaramaarthikawhile discussing the knowledge and the means of knowledge. VP follows closelyvivarana school of advaita Vedanta.

Now - Let us ask first the question - What is an object? There are two aspectsthat are involved in defining an object. Just from epistemological point, objectcan only be defined in terms of attributes. In chemistry, we learn to identifya chemical substance by stating its physical and chemical properties â€“ whichare all attributes. The more precise the definitions are the more discriminativethe object becomes from the rest of the objects in the world. Only throughproperties we identify the chemical compound. Hence objective science relaysheavily on the precise definition of any objectifiable entity only through itsattributes. That is the only way to communicate knowledge for transactionalpurposes or vyavahaara. This is the first fundamental aspect of the object thatcannot be violated. For example, if I want to meet Mr. Gaagaabuubu in thestation, whom I have never met, I need to have his precise definition ordescription in terms of hisattributes; the attributes that differentiate him from rest of the masses inthe station. The object, Mr. Gaagaabuubu, therefore, is the one who is the locusof all the attributes, collectively. Each one of the attribute may not beprecise enough to locate him but all attributes collectively will define who Mr.Gaagaabuubu is. Is Mr. Gaagaabuubu just a bunch of attributes? No. Attributescannot exist without a locus and the locus of the attributes we call it as anobject. Do the senses perceive the locus or the attributes? Senses can onlyperceive the form, the color and other attributes that can be measurable by thesenses â€“ that includes â€“ roopa, shabda, sparsha, rasa and gandha â€“ form,sound, touch, taste and smell â€“ all collectively referred to as roopa, sincevisual perception is most direct and immediate, since light travels fast. Hencefrom the point of our discussion, when we say roopa or form and color, inprinciple, it stands forall the five sense input, if the object has attributes that all the senses cangather.

The second aspect that we need to understand clearly is there is no particular

attribute that an object has that can uniquely characterize it. This was statedbefore in the discussions that no object has swaruupa lakshaNa that can definethe object singly and uniquely (in mathematics we call the swaruupa lakshaNa asnecessary and sufficient qualification). The fundamental reason for this is allobjects in the universe are made up parts or assemblage of parts. This, infact, forms a basis for an error, as we will discuss later. Since no singleattribute can uniquely define the object, perception of incomplete set canresult in errors in recognition of the object due to inherent ambiguity. OnlyBrahman has swaruupa lakshaNa, since he being infinite is part-less. Satyam,jnaanam, anantam Brahma, as Shankara clearly describes, are swaruupa lakshaNasof Brahman. There are not really three, are only one, but expressed from threedifferent perspectives.Implication of this is that objects are distinguishable not by one attributesbut sum total of all essential attributes (swaabhaavika lakshaNas) put together.That implies collective attributes together makes the object distinguishablefrom others in the universe, provided they are asaadhaaraNa, that is thecombination of all attributes together make the object uniquely and preciselydistinguishable. In summary, since 1) senses can only measure attributes andnot substantive (substantive, say gold material, is too gross for the senses tocarry), 2) there is no single attribute that can uniquely define an object, 3)all essential (asaadhaaraNa) attributes are needed for object knowledge to becomplete, 4) errors in perception can occur since objective knowledge is onlyattributive knowledge and not substantive knowledge. If one argues that VP says(although VP does not say this) senses can also bring in the object, thenquestion arises which senseinput brings in the object, as there is no one unique attribute or single senseinput that defines the object precisely. If so, then any sense input about theobject should give us precise knowledge of the object and there is nopossibility for any errors in perception. We will examine this aspect further. What VP says is the object is perceived by the mind riding on the senses. Thatdoes not mean senses bring in the object or mind grasps the object independentof the sense input. The rest is interpretation, and should be based on the lawsof physics where they apply.

Coming back to the object, let us find out that besides attributes what else isthere that defines the object? Attributes should have a locus and what is thatlocus? Is locus an attribute? No, it is not. Is form a locus, no it is anattribute along with color that the sense of sight can see. Only the otherthing that the object has besides the attributes is its contents or substancethat provides the locus for the attributes. Matter, locussed as an object, hasattributes. Gold locussed as an object is a ring with its attributes. Withoutmater, there cannot be attributes. If I say water is colorless, odorless andtasteless, there has to be some matter contents which are nothing but assemblageof water molecules that form the locus for the colorless, odorless and tastelessattributes â€“ besides other physical and chemical properties like specificgravity, viscosity and ability to decompose into hydrogen and oxygen etc, whichmay not be directlyperceived by senses. Vidyaaranya calls the knowledge of any object as adhaaraand adheya jnaanam â€“ substantive and superimposed attributive knowledge. Hencewhen I say it is a ring object â€“ there is no ring object per sec, it is goldin the form of a ring, where form constitutes its attribute. Ring is a name or

naama or â€˜padamâ€™ or word with no â€˜padaarthamâ€™ or a noun or a substantiveassociated with it. That is why it is called mithyaa. There is no ringlymaterial to substantiate it and differentiate it from bangly material. Is ringan object separate from bangle? Yes, they are separate because the attributes ofthe ring are not the same as that of bangle. Yet there are no substance ring andsubstance bangle to separate them apart at substantive level. Both are made ofup the same substance â€“ gold. Ring with its attributes cannot be thought ofwithout having adhaara or a support just as we said attributes cannot be thoughtof without alocus. Ring is only a name for a form and so is bangle or bracelet; naama fora ruupa. Hence the statement â€˜vaachaarambhanam vikaaro naamadheyamâ€™ â€“name for a product; and product is not different from the material (cause) indifferent form.Hence Gold forms the adheya or substantive support for the existence of ringâ€™sattributes as well as bangle attributes. Gold with the attributes of a ring is aring, and gold with the attributes of a bangle is a bangle. There is no otherring or bangle otherwise â€“ they are only names for forms. Form is an attributeperceived by the senses. It is gold alone in the ring form or ring attributessince form, as we said before is representative of all associated attributes.Thus gold is the locus or substantive for the ring and gold is the locus or thesubstantive for the bangle too; and there are no ring and bangle separate fromgold.Objection: Perceptual knowledge pertains to vyavahaara. The above discussiontransgresses to paaramaarthika. In vyavahaara the objects are real. Hence ring,as an object, is real. When VP says when we perceive an object ring, we perceiveboth the object ring with its attributes. That it is made up of gold is notimportant here in the perception of the ring as an object. For paaramaarthika,shabda is pramaaNa and it is discussed separately in VP.

Response: At the outset theses comments appear to be correct. But we need to golittle deeper to unravel the truth- Even at empirical level or vyavahaara, thereis no object ring other than form and color and other related attributes thatcan be perceived. This is precisely the reason why that Upanishad takes loukikaor vyavahaara not aloukika examples to illustrate the fact that material causeitself is the products in verities of forms. Here scripture is not pramaaNa forthe illustration that product is cause itself in different form. Scripture isusing vyavahaara example to prove the point, which later it extends topaaramaarthika. It proves the point using three examples that there are noseparate objects other than ruupa, form and naama, name â€“ the first oneconstitute the attributive set and the later constituting the knowledge of itsexistence since name can be given only when there is knowledge â€“ as we saidbefore existence of an object isestablished by the knowledge of its existence. Hence objects are nothing butmaterial cause itself in different forms. By knowing material cause, one knowsall the objects formed out of that material. Hence ring, bangle, necklace,bracelet are â€ãs well knownâ€™ since we have adhaara jnaanam. We will haveadheya jnaanam, when we perceive through the sense the attributes of the object,ring which are different form the attributes of the bangle, etc. Only afterestablishing the fact at transactional level, Upanishad goes into the discussionof paaramaarthika to apply the same logic â€“ knowing the material cause for thewhole universe, one knows essentially all the objects in the world. Hence from

the perception point also there is no object or objects other than the materialcause and the attributive aspects of the products which differentiate one objectfrom the other, ex: ring from bangle.Question: In the gold ring example, do we perceive the substance at any time?How do we know that it is gold ring and not iron ring â€“ if we do not perceivethe substantive?

Answer: In these vyavahaara examples, the substantives of the two rings aredifferent in the sense that they have their own attributes that distinguishesthem as separate. Hence senses when gathering the attributes of the ring, alsogather in the process the attributes of the substantive too, since the twosubstantives have their own attributes. Thus gold attributes are different fromiron attributes and the locus of the attributes is the matter gold vs. matteriron â€“ which are again assemblage of electron-proton-neutrons and as well aspackage of their atoms (gold is fcc and iron is bcc â€“ for those who want toknow). Senses again gather those attributes that they can measure. By using moresophisticated instruments such as electron microscope one can boost up thesensitivity of the senses. Suppose iron is gold plated and the iron ring isindistinguishable from the pure gold ring. Senses, if they measure externalattributes such as luster, etc,may not be able to distinguish the gold from gold plated iron, and concludethat both rings are golden-rings â€“ one may be small and other large due todifference in their ringly attributes. This further proves again the point thatsenses can only bring in the attributes but not substantives.

After discussing the worldly examples, scripture then goes into paaramaarthikaor at absolute level to point out that the substantive for the whole world isonly Sat or Brahman, which has no attributes that the senses can gather. Hencewe get only the attributes of the transactional realities not absolute realitymaking up the knowledge of the worldly objects â€“ hence the scriptures says tolearn about the substantive of the world â€ãachaaryavan purusho vedaâ€™ â€“learn from a teacher who teaches the scriptures.

To complete the process, the sense input forms vRitti in the mind. VRitti can bethought of as image in the mental screen consisting of attributes of the objectstarting from â€˜formâ€™ which includes all the 3-D form since as we discussedbefore we have two eyes that are seven degrees apart to provide thestereographic projection. The image is the electrical or neural signal whichgets transformed into the subtler image or VRitti. That it occurs is definitebut how it occurs is anybodyâ€™s guess. The contents of the vRitti are theattributive knowledge about the object. Recognition follows after cognition, bycomparing the object perception with the stored information from the memory bankto see if the attributive knowledge matches with any other object in the memory.If the memory is damaged, the recognition process can be affected even whencognitive process is complete. The witnessing consciousness illumines the vRittias it forms in the mind andthe reflected consciousness constitutes the attributive knowledge of the objectâ€õut thereâ€™. For perception to complete, VP has discussed the perceptualityrequirements that need to be met.

There are some epistemological issues that were raised which will be addressed

now. I am paraphrasing some of the questions raised in relation to abovedescription of attributive knowledge of an object. Some of the objections havealready been addressed before, but they are being emphasized to focus on theissues involved.

Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge -14Part-II

Objections

1. Objection: The mind through vRitti has only attributive knowledge and notsubstantial knowledge is similar to Vijnaana vaadins of Buddhism and WesternIdealism. For them also there are no objects out there. Object knowledge isonly attributive knowledge is against Vedanta.Response: Absolutely not. There is difference between attributive-objectknowledge vs. Vijnaana vaada or Idealism of the West. When senses gatherattributes when an object is perceived, the attributes are not created by theseer or seerâ€™s mind. There is an objective reality or empirical reality orvyaavahaarika satyam. The objects with their attributes are the creation of theIswara. Jiivaâ€™s creation manifests only in dream states. Iswara creation is inthe waking state. According to Advaita Vedanta, the Iswara himself became manyâ€“ bahusyam, let me become many. The different objects with divergentattributes that distinguishes them are based on creation that occurs based onprevious karma. Every object is an assemblage of the basic elements, the panchabhuutas, the five primordial elements that come from Iswara. Iswara creationincludes the minds of beings that perceive the objects through their senses. The minds and the objects they perceiveand the attributive knowledge of the objects through senses and the mind areontologically in par. Only difference is mind is made up subtle elements whilethe objects are made with gross elements (i.e. after pancheekaraNam). That isone of the reasons why physical objects do not enter into the mind.2. Objection: How do we know that senses bring in only attributes and notsubstance, since substance and attributes are inseparable?Response: It is well known that when I see an object, the image of the object isformed on retina which gets transmitted in terms of electrical signal to thebrain. The projection of three-D form occurs due to the presence of two eyes.Object remains outside while the image is formed inside the retina first, whichis transmitted to the brain. This is where physics ends â€“ the electrical inputis transformed (through, how is not yet understood by anybody), into whatVedanta calls as vRitti in the mind. Hence, only those attributes that can bemeasured by the senses are fed into the brain and through brain to the mind. The mind being subtle and object being gross, it is good that substance does notenter into the brain and therefore into the mind. These are facts that weunderstood so far.

3. Objection: Form and color are not the only attributes, there are other senseinput â€“shabda, sparsha, rasa, gandha, etc. Image formation is only at opticallevel. Hence the above explanation is not valid.Response: The optical signal processing is very clear and faster compared to theprocessing of other signals. All sense-inputs follow through electrical inputsto the brain. If the nerves system fails and electrical signal input fails, the

input from that senses fails. If all senses fail no knowledge of the externalworld occurs. These are facts that we know. There are no assumptions involvedhere. Having more than one type of attributes does not make the processdifferent. All signal processing are the same. There may be parallel processingin stead of series processing, that is, simultaneous information feed ratherthan sequential feed. However at VRitti level, the thought in the mind appearsto be sequential not parallel. One does not have two simultaneous thoughts.

4. Objection: The mind is not two dimensional screen for projection, as theanalysis implies.

Response: The analysis does not assume that mind is two-dimensional screen.Virtual images of 3-D can be made easily and can be seen. Conceptually, theprocess is the same. The above analysis is valid even if one considers mind is3-D or even multi-D. Mind remains subtle even if it is multi-dimensional. Matteroutside is gross. According to Vedanta, mind as a part of subtle body is formedby the subtle elements before panciikaraNam. The matter (bhoutika) outside isgross and formed after panciikaraNam. The objects are made up of gross matterand attributes are subtle for senses to communicate, since sense input istransmitted as signal with codes imbedded in them. Senses form part of thesubtle body only.

5. Objection: Object is not a substance, but it is an object with attributeswhose attributes may differ from attributes of the substance. Ring is differentfrom gold, the material substance. When VP says object ring is perceived, ringobject is perceived by the mind not necessarily the attributes of the ring only.Response: No. There are only two things â€“ it is the substance in the form ofan object, where form constitutes an attributes of an object along with otherattributes. Object is notional, since it is the material or substantive itselfin that form. When attributes are perceived, for perceived attributes a locus isformed and that is the vRitti in the mind. That vRitti is the object ring thatis perceived. Object ring perceived is as real as the mind that perceives.Within vyavahaara ontologically both are equally real or equally unreal,depending on oneâ€™s vision or understanding.

6. Objection: According advaita there is a taadatmya sambandha between objectand the attributes. Hence advaita does not say one can only perceive theattributes and not the object. VP says clearly object is perceived, and neversays only attributes are perceived and the object is real within vyavahaara.

Response: taadaatma sambandha has to be understood correctly. Attributive locusis an object that is perceived â€“ matter say gold, remaining out there, when Iperceive the object ring, ring being a notional (a padam with no padaartham ofits own â€“ even at vyavahaara level) the attributes of the ring that sensesperceive are â€ãs thoughâ€™ now locussed into the vRitti to form an object ringthat is perceived. It could be semantics here. The taadaatma sambandha betweenthe locus and its attributes remain during the perceptual process since notionalring outside is now notional ring inside â€“ only the difference is the ringoutside has its attributes while the ring inside the mind has to be based on theattributive knowledge gathered by the senses. Defects in the sense â€“ and inthe associated signal processing can reflect in the ring object seen in the

mind, even though the outside ring is perfect. Neither ring outside nor the ringinside has matterof its own, since objects are notional. Ring matter outside is gold and ringmatter inside is the existence itself as part of vRitti, a subtle matter.taadaatmaya Sambhadha remains for both ring outside and ring inside sinceattributes perceived and object seen have avinaabhaava sambandha ornon-separatability relationship of the object outside and object inside. This isaccomplished without the matter or substance transfer â€“ only because theobjects are notional. This is not paaramaarthika; it is vyaavahaarika only.

7. Objection: This is an important objection that was not clearly addressedbefore. If we do not perceive the substance how do we ever know that there issuch a thing as substance. In fact, how do we ever know that there are twothings â€“ substance and attributes if all objective knowledge is attributive?

Response: Here we need to differentiate between knowledge and experience tounderstand clearly. Knowledge involves mental process which is subtle. Thisincludes perception. If there is a ring on the table, I perceive the ringthrough the process described above. Now when I pick up the ring and ware it,there is transaction that is involved that is not just a perceptual transaction.For others who are witnessing it may be, but for not the one who is transacting.There is an experience of wearing the ring that goes with the transaction. Sambhadha is now established between what is perceived and what is transacted.If the object cannot be transacted but only perceived, it will remain only asthe perceived object. VP defines pramaaNa clearly as â€ãnadhigata, abhaadita,arthavishayaka jnaanatvamâ€™ â€“ That which is not known before, that which isnot contradicted and that which has a meaning in the sense that it hastransactional reality. Thetransactional reality is established by transaction. Bhagavan Ramanuja puts itas utility or usage. Transactablity establishes the reality of what is perceivedand what is transacted. Hence the error or bhrama in advaita Vedanta is clearlyrelated to negatability by contradictory experience. If I see a snake and laterdiscover that it is a rope via transaction (say by beating the snake/rope by astick), what was perceived before is recognized as error. If there is nocontradictory transaction (that is transaction that contradicts the perceptionof a snake) involved the perception of the snake of a rope remain as a snake inthe mind of the perceiver.Whoever comes to our house feels like touching the flowers displayed on ourcoffee-table to find out if they are real or those made in Japan. By the feelingthe texture, they discriminate real vs. Japanese flowers, because by perceptualprocess or just by looking at the flowers the attributes are not discriminativeenough to differentiate. If one can make the texture also identical, then theymay venture to do further tests to differentiate them. The example furtherproves that attributive knowledge is not substantial knowledge. Advaita Vedantais self-consistent, logical in its analysis and also is in tune with the currentstate of understanding of science.

As a child grows to gain knowledge of the world, perception and the associatedtransaction establishes the validity of perceptions. Both are within vyavahaaraor transactional realities. We are not bringing paaramaarthika here, although inthe perceptuality requirement VP does address the paarmaarthika aspect too.

There is no other vyaapti required to establish the concomitant relation betweenthe vRitti in the mind and the object out there â€“ since perception isimmediate and direct. We are also not violating any epistemological issueseither. That one perceives through the subtle mind, the substantive that isgross, along with attributes that are subtle is indeed an assumption that isunscientific and illogical. We do not want our minds clogged by all thesubstantives that we perceive.

8. Objection: If there are two things A and B, and if A is perceived and not B,two things are sure: 1. either B is known to exist apriori, and not perceived inthis specific instance. 2. Or B is totally unknown apiori and not perceived inthis specific instance too. So which case of the above is true when perceptionof substance is denied? If it is former then what is the source of our knowledgeabout â€˜substanceâ€™? If memory is not pramaaNa, such apriori knowledge ofabout the substance can not be summed in the current denial of perception of thesubstance.

Response: First the above statements are confusing. The objector starts with astatement â€“ â€˜if there are two things A and Bâ€™ â€“ and in that verystatement there is an inherent assumption of the conditional existence of twothings A and B and also the existence of difference between A and B, based,obviously, on the differences in the attributive knowledge of A and B. Thesubsequent discussion involving vikalpas (choices) only deny what has alreadybeen assumed. ( I am just having some fun with dialectics, since the objectorenjoys the dialectics). Let us examine the objection more seriously. 1. If B isknown to exist apriori but not perceived now in this specific instance onlyimplies that object B, was perceived through the vRitti and is now stored in thememory. Whatever objects B, C, D etc that were perceived before is stored in thememory. The substantive knowledge is established for B only through transactionwith B. If perception of B isbrahma like a snake perception and was not negated as bhrama by contradictorytransaction, then it will remain as snake perception only in the memory. Thereis no problem in that either, since perceptual process is only attributive. Letus take the next choice â€“ â€˜2. Or B is totally unknown apiori and notperceived in this specific instance tooâ€™. This statement denies the firstconditional statement that there are A and B. B is, means B exists and existenceof B cannot be established without the knowledge of its existence. That meansits existence is known but not perceived now (it can be known through by otherpramaaNa too). Since there is no object now with its attributes that mindthrough the senses can perceive, one has no cognition of B now, even if it isknown to exist in the memory because of the assumption made.

The objector asks: So which case of the above is true when perception ofsubstance is denied? The current absence of the existence of object B is truesince it is not perceived now, even though existence of B and its attributiveknowledge is there in the memory. If I do not see cow in my office right now,although I knows cows exists in the world with their characteristic attributes, then non-existence of cow now in my office is true. Attributes do need a locusand vRitti that formed locussed the attributes when the object is perceived andis now stored as VRitti or its impression in the memory. I do not see cow nowbecause the attributes of the cow that are locussed in cow is not currently

perceived through senses in any object that I see in my office. In this casethere is no source for the substance or its attributes. Cow is only VRittistored in the memory.Objector says, â€˜if memory is not a pramaaNa, such apriori knowledge of aboutthe substance can not be summed in the current denial of perception of thesubstanceâ€™. The statement of the objector is somewhat confusing. If I recallthat I saw a snake yesterday based on the attributive knowledge that the sensesgathered, and now say I do not see a snake here in my office, there is no reasonfor substance snake to be there for me to deny its existence now. It is notthere now because I do not see any attributes of the snake in my office. I canrecall the snake that I saw yesterday sitting in my office now, since in my mindwhat I saw as a snake based on the attributes that I could gather at that time.There is no confusion in understanding of perception described above. The aboveobjection has no relevance.

Memory as pramaaNa is accounted by the VP as abhaadita arthavishayaka jnaanatvamwhere anadhigata is removed since one knows based on past perception.Non-negatability and transactability remain as means of knowledge. Recall theexample of trying to meet Mr. Gaagaabuubu in the station for the first time,based on the attributive knowledge that I have gathered in the past. Since nowI know how he looks etc based on the hear-say knowledge (aapta vakyam), I canlook for Mr. Gaagaabuubu and find him there. I will find that the attributiveGaagaabuubu in my mind matches with the attributes of the Mr. Gaagaabuubu outthere in the station. Suppose I do not find any one that matches thedescription of Gaagaabuubu in the station, all it means is that attributes ofall the people that see in the station do not match with the attributes ofGaagaabuubu that I have stored as a VRitti in my mind When I shake hands withthe Mr. real Gaagaabuubu â€“ He becomestransactable entity â€“ vyaavahaarika satyam - if it is just attributive he mayremain as pratibhaasika like our good old snake.None of the objections raised above contradicts the perceptual processdescribed.

9. Objection: If the very notion called `substance' is ever unknown apriori,how can one say substance of all things is Brahman, for Brahman is not at allperceived to be the substance of thethings in any acts of perception?Response: Through transactions that one knows that ring that I see is real attransactional level. Also the snake that I saw was not real when my subsequenttransaction proved that it is rope. Brahman is known as substantive not byperceptual process but by Shruti statements â€“ â€˜sadeva souma idam agraasiitâ€™ â€“ â€ãatma eva idam agra asiitâ€™ and is further confirmed by â€ñehanaanaasti kincanaâ€™ and â€˜sarvam khalu idam brahmaâ€™, etc.In my commentary of VP, none of the basic principles of perception are violated.Only disagreements are mind running to the object rather than senses bringing inthe attributive info to the mind and the concept to time. As for as I am know,both have no bearing in terms of the perception of the objects, now.

With these statements I will continue with the analysis of VP. I want to thankall the discussers for their stimulating discussions on the issues raised. My

special thanks to Shree Srinivas to force me to think deeply on the relationbetween the substance and its attributes.

Knowledge and the Means of knowledge 15

We discussed in the post 12, Jiiva and Jiiva Saakshii, Iswara and IswaraSaakshii. In the subsequent posts we deviated from the main topic to addresssome of the issues that were raised during the discussion. Now we return backto the main theme. Jiiva and Jiiva Saakshii have to be understood clearly forself-realization. Shree Sureswara spends the whole chapter discussing aboutsaakshii in the Naishkarmya siddhi. Jiiva Saakshii is the limiting witnessingconsciousness, limited by the upaadhiis. Example given is like a pot spacelimited by the pot walls, although space is limitless and indivisible andpot-space is connected to the total space as one. Even the pot-walls are inspace only. The notion of pot-jiiva-hood arises when the pot identifying withthe upaadhiis thinks that I am a small pot with a limited pot-space. Herebesides the limitations, there is identification with the upaadhiis or potwalls, and taking the limitations of the pot asits limitations as I am a small-pot, and I wish I am also a big pot like thenext door neighbor pot.

Pure consciousness is all pervading, similar to space. Similar to pot-spacelimited by the pot-walls, the consciousness (as-though) limited by the upaadhiis(Body-mind-intellect, BMI) is witnessing consciousness, saakshii, calledâ€˜upahita caitanyaâ€™. The consciousness is of the nature of eternalself-illumining entity. Just as the pot-space is not separate from the totalspace, the jiiva-saakshii or upahita caitanya is not separate from the totalconsciousness. Yet pot space is different from the total space in the sense thatit appears to be limited by the pot walls. Similarly jiiva saakshii of A isdifferent from Jiiva-saakshii B. In the presence of this self-illuminingwitnessing consciousness, jiiva saakshii, the BMI upaadhiis get illumined andthe reflected consciousness in the mind forms the knowledge of the mind. Up tothis is common, for all including the jnaani. Ignorance of jiiva comes intoplay, when I, the consciousentity,identifying with the reflecting consciousness in the intellect, takemyself to be this intellect that is getting reflected in my presence. Thisnotion that â€˜I am thisâ€™ is a thought or vRitti in the intellect only. Thisidentification with reflected consciousness is jiiva and is called cidaabhaasaor reflected consciousness.

Ego:

The formation of a jiiva therefore involves two entities â€“ one is thereflection of the consciousness by the upaadhiis â€“ here starting fromintellect and then the mind and then the body. This reflection occurs as longas upaadhiis are there, since illuminating consciousness is always there. Egoor Jiiva-hood arises, not knowing that I am pure consciousness, when I identifymyself with the limiting reflecting consciousness as I am this, where â€˜thisâ€™stands first for the intellect then the mind and then the gross body. Thatidentification includes then any modification of the body, mind and intellect.Thus jiiva is the limiting reflecting consciousness, cidaabhaasa, but

identifying or qualifying itself as I am this where this stands for BMI. Hencejiiva is called vishiShTa caitanya, in contrast to the upahita caitanya ofsaakshii. VishiShTa means qualifying or attributive consciousness where I,subject consciousness identifies myself withâ€˜thisâ€™, the object that I am conscious of. This identification also resultsin ownership as â€˜this is mineâ€™ â€“ thus both ahankaara (I am this) andmamakaara (this is mine) get crystallized with the jiiva notion, which togetheris called ego. Inclusion of â€˜this is mineâ€™ involves exclusion of â€˜that isnot mineâ€™, and â€˜that is not Iâ€™ and thus space-wise, time-wise andobject-wise limitations get superimposed with the jiiva notion, by thesuperimposed identifications - addhaasa.

Self-realization:

Self realization is therefore recognition that I am not this â€“ this beingupaadhiis (BMI)- but I am the Saakshii which is the illuminating consciousnessof the upaadhiis. Saakshii does not really illumine anything and it is justself-shining ever effulgent all pervading entity. However, in the presence ofsaakshii, upaadhiis get illumined. Hence I am â€ñot thisâ€™ since I am thesubject and this is an object of my consciousness, but I am pureexistence-consciousness, that is ever present. By dropping all visheShaNas orqualifications, I shift my identification from vishiShTa caitanya to upahitacaitanya. This shift is done in the buddhi only. I, a conscious entity,currently identifying myself with the BMI, drop that identification andrecognize that I am the self-existing ever present saakshii or upahita caitanya.When I shift my understanding that I am the saakshii, even the notion that I amsaakshii also drops out (saakshii is there withreference to saakshyam or witness is there with reference to witnessed) and Irecognize that I am pure eternal all pervading consciousness with noqualifications or limitations. I become jiivan mukta. Since the upaadhiis(BMI) are there, I can play the role of a jiiva knowing very well I am pureconsciousness that illumines the upaadhiis. When the upaadhiis drop out, theupahita caitanya (saakshii) becomes one with the nirupaadhika caitanya (allpervading consciousness). It is like saying when the pot walls break thepot-space merges with the total space. In reality pot-space is never separatefrom the total space and there is no real merger either. When the walls arebroken, the limiting adjuncts are dropped out leaving all notions of divisionsin the space. Thus as long as the mind and intellect (subtle-body) remain, thelimiting reflecting consciousness will take place and jiiva-hood remains, whenthere is no self-knowledge. Meditation thereforeinvolves shifting my attention from the identification that I am this to thewitnessing consciousness, jiiva saakshii, because of which I am conscious of orhave the knowledge of this (BMI). Since saaskhii is not an object for me to see(since I am the seer saakshii), I cannot objectify as I am not this but that. All I can do is negate all my identifications as I am this by negating I am notthis but I am the one who is the negator, who cannot be negated nor objectified.I am the knower, the pramaataa and this is known, prameyam. I am the pramaata orI am the subject knower, only when there is prameyam or object, separate fromme, for me to know. Recognition that this duality is superficial or adhyaasaimposed by the working of the mind and I am pure consciousness where there isneither pramaata, prameya nor pramaaNa is self-realization. The world is nothing

but an assemblage of objects and they are known only when the perceptualityconditions aremet. Perceptuality condition is the subject consciousness is identified withthe object-consciousness in the form of existence. Shifting attention from thesuperficial names and forms, objects, to that identifying consciousness that Iam (subject) is the essence of meditation.

Iswara and Iswara saakshii

In the realization of that I am upahita caitanya or jiiva saakshii, there isalso recognition that I am upahita caitanya only because of the presence of theupaadhiis. But my real nature is I am the all pervading consciousness that isone without a second. This knowledge arises from the vedantic knowledge that Iam not only the existing-consciousness, but that existence-consciousness is onewithout a second. Thus aham brahmaasmi teaching will sink in. It is likerecognition that I am the pot-space also lead to an understanding that I am thetotal space too since space is part-less or division-less. This teaching comesfrom Vedanta. Significance of this is also understood, since even the saaskhyamthat I am conscious of is not separate from me. In the perceptual process theobject consciousness is identified with the subject consciousness forperceptuality to occur as discussed by VP. Hence VP says in the beginning of theanalysis of perception thatperceptual knowledge is nothing but pure consciousness. In that understanding,jiiva, jiiva saakshii, Iswara and Iswara saakshii are merge into pureundifferentiated consciousness that I am. With that understanding, the verylife existence is fulfilled. Even the scriptures glorify such a realized person.Presence of such realized master is glorified as â€˜kulam pavitram, jananiikRitaarthaa, vishvambharaa punyavatii ca tenaâ€™ â€“ the whole family or lineageis blessed by his presence, his mother is fulfilled by having such a son, naythe whole country where he is born is blessed by this presence.

Perceptuality of cognition:

We discussed before that when the perception of an object arises through theformation of vRitti, there is an immediate cognition of the object as â€˜this isa potâ€™, when the vRitti is reflected by the light of consciousness of thesaakshii, since reflected light is knowledge. Along with it, there is alsoknowledge of the cognition â€“ that is I know this is pot also arisesimmediately. For this knowledge of the cognition, no further reflection isrequired since knowledge reveals itself or it is self-revealing. It is similarto the fact that we do not need a light to see the light since light is selfrevealing. Similarly the reflected illumination of the consciousness of theobject-vRitti becomes a self-revealing cognition of the knowledge of thatvRitti. Thus the two fold nature of the perceptual knowledge is understoodâ€“it involves perception of the object â€“ like this is a pot - and perceptionof the cognition of the perception as I know thisis a pot. Thus we have two fold nature of the perception â€“ perception of theobject and the perception of the cognition of the object. With regards to thefirst â€“ the perception of the object, we have discussed exhaustively theperceptuality condition and how vRitti forms in the mind based on attributiveknowledge of the object as perceived by the senses. With regards to the second,

that is perceptuality of the cognition, VP says it is just consciousness alone.This is because when I say I know this is pot, pot is an object, which is inertand I am the knowing principle, the caitanya vastu. Inert entity cannot know.Since I say I am the knower of the pot, the knower I, or the subject I, cannotbe different from the conscious entity. Hence VP declares that theperceptuality of the cognition is nothing but pure consciousness that I am. When I cognize an object, say pot, I am knower and this is known â€“ the dualityof subject-object sets in withreference to the object known. When there is no cognition of any object, Ijust remain as witnessing consciousness, without any qualification.Objectless-awareness is pure consciousness.

Question: Is the above statement true for direct and immediate perception ortrue for other means of knowledge such as inference? For direct perception likethis is pot, the perception of the pot is immediate and direct. The resultingknowledge is also cognized immediately as I know this is pot. When there is anindirect knowledge like the distant hill is on fire, does the cognition that thedistant hill is on fire, is immediate and is due to subject consciousness, I am?

Answer: Yes it applies to indirect perceptions too. When I say that distanthill is on fire because I see the smoke, the cognition of the fire is notimmediate. Only the cognition of the hill, cognition of the smoke areimmediate. But that the hill is on fire is based on the logical inference sincewe know from the past that wherever there is smoke, there is a fire that causedthe smoke. Hence when I conclude that the distant hill is on fire, the vRittithat is formed has no attributive content of the fire. Hence it is indirect andmediate, not immediate. When the vRitti that the hill is on fire is formed byinferential process, the knowledge of the vRitti is immediate as it forms, sinceit gets illumined by the witnessing consciousness, saakshii. Then the cognitionof that knowledge is also immediate since knowledge is self-revealing. Whateverthat is self-revealing is pure consciousness. Hence the above statements areapplicable even forindirect knowledge.

Question: Then the definition of perceptuality of the cognition is too broadsince it can be extended to illusory knowledge also; for example for thecognition of silver where there is actually nacre.

Answer: It is not unduly broad since it extends even to the case of erroneouscognitions. When I see silver erroneously since it is a nacre and not silver,cognition of silver is immediate since attributes of the silver alone aregathered by the senses and consequently vRitti with the silver attributivecontent is formed in the mind. The knowledge that it is silver then isimmediate. The cognition of that knowledge that â€˜I know it is silverâ€™ isalso immediate. Hence the above definition is not unduly broad and applies evenfor erroneous perceptions.

We have defined the perception as pramaaNa if it is not negated by subsequenttransmigratory experience or transactional experience. That is, it is silver isvalid knowledge unless it is contradicted by the subsequent transactioninvolving picking up the piece of silver and finding that is not silver but

nacre. The knowledge that it is nacre is gained by sense input of theattributes of the nacre that are different from the pure silver piece. Theknowledge that it is nacre negates the previous knowledge that it is silver. Inthe perception of nacre, that it is nacre and not silver is cognized along withthe cognition of that perception â€“ I know that is nacre and not silver. Thusthe definition applies to illusory knowledge as well, since when the illusoryknowledge (that it is silver) was a valid knowledge based on the attributivecontent cognized at that time. It was negated only by subsequent perception.

In the final analysis, even the perceptual knowledge of the objects and thus theperception of world are negated when we move from transmigratory experience totranscendental experience. Within transmigratory experience, the relativevalidity of perceptual knowledge of objects is assumed to be valid since thereis no transcendental experience to invalidate it. Thus vyaavahaarika satyam issatyam until satyasya satyam is recognized.

In the above example VP brought the example of the error in cognition when weperceive silver where there is nacre. The reason that we are seeing silver andnot nacre is that when I see the shining object on the floor, there is onlyattributive knowledge of â€˜silvery-shiningâ€™ by the sense of sight. Therefore based on the limited attributes of the object, the VRitti that formedcontains only the limited attributes perceived by the sense. The cognition andthe recognition based on the matching attributes of the silver are immediate,giving rise to the knowledge that it is a piece of silver out there. Only whenI bend and pick up the piece, I gather additional attributes by the senses basedon which I negate that it is not silver (since the attributes are contradictoryto silver attributes), but it is nacre since the attributes matches with that ofnacre. This is intrinsic in the limitation of the attributive knowledge ofobjects that errors arepossible even when I am seeing the object since attributes that are gathered bythe senses are incomplete, if not erroneous.

Finally because I am getting carried away with the attributive knowledge of theworld and not substantive knowledge, I can never gain the knowledge of absolutereality by perceptual process since absolute has no attributive content â€“nirguNa or guNaatiitaH. Hence negatability of the world as mithya or erroneousperception cannot be accomplished by any pramaaNa other than shabda pramaaNa orshaastra pramaaNa.

We will discuss more about the erroneous perceptions through objections in thenext post.

Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge â€“ 16

Error Analysis

In the following we will present some general analysis of error in perceptionbefore we take up the VPâ€™s presentation of the subject in terms of objections,puurvapaksha and responses, siddhanta.

If one considers valid knowledge (pramaa) that is affirmative knowledge that is

not contradicted by any subsequent experience, there can be two forms ofknowledge that do are affirmative knowledge (apramaa). One is doubt and theother is error. Seeing a tree or stamp of a tree out there in semidarkness andthe seer is not sure whether it is a man standing there or a tree, then it iscalled as doubtful knowledge â€“ samshaya. The doubt could propel the seer toinvestigate further to determine the validity of his knowledge; that is to findout whether it is the tree that he is seeing or a man, standing to get him! Hemay get the knowledge from a bystander who can confirm (by aapta vaakyam)whether it is a tree or a man standing. He must have faith in the words of hisbystander. Doubts are eliminated by further inquiry. When he sees the tree asthe tree, of course, all the doubts about the truth are eliminated. When ajnaani knows the absolute truth asclearly as he knows that fruit in his hands, shruti says all his doubts getdispelled â€“ chidyante sarva samsamshayaaH. Mu. Up II-2-8. Hence doubts are theresult of ajnaanam or ignorance about the truth of the object.

If the seer is definite that it is a tree and not man, then his knowledge ispramaa or valid since subsequent transactions, if there is any, will not negatethe knowledge he has gained. On the other hand, if a seer is also definite thatit is man that is standing there, and then the knowledge is in error (viparyayaor bhrama), since subsequent transaction would prove that it is not a man but atree. Since he is definite about his knowledge that it is a man that is standingthere and he has no doubt about it and therefore makes no attempt to investigatefurther about the truth behind his perceptual knowledge. If he happens to try totransact with that knowledge and find to his surprise that he was mistaken thenhe would recognize that his earlier cognition was mistake. We do operate withmany mistaken notions without knowing that they are mistakes â€“ the biggestmistake we do is taking the world as we see is real. We are so convinced sinceit istransactionally real, it is very difficult to get rid of this notion even whenthe scripture says all this that you see is Brahman, which cannot be seen. Hencethe error is called vipariita bhaavana and requires constant contemplation(nidhidhyaasana) to affirm or firmly abide in the scriptural knowledge.

In defining an object, a tree, a rope, a snake or a man, there are inherent orintrinsic attributes (swaabhaavika laxanaas) that differentiate each object fromthe other objects in the world. Thus tree is different from man and snake isdifferent from a rope. We have two words in Sanskrit â€“ one is visheShaNa andthe other is lakshaNa. Both are normally translated as attribute, although theyare somewhat different. Broadly, visheShaNas are those attributes thatdistinguish objects in their own genus or family, as in white cow is differentfrom a brown cow or big cow is different from a short cow, etc. Both cows havesome generic or inherent attributes that make them cows and not horses ordonkeys. Those generic qualities that define a cow from a horse or tree from aman are called lakshaNas. They are also called asaadhaaraNa lakshaNas ordifferentiating attributes of the object. If one asks; Is there one specific andunique lakshaNa that differentiateone object of the other? The answer is a definite NO. If there is one, then wecall that as necessary and sufficient qualification for the object â€“ calledsimply swaruupa lakshana. Tarkikaas or logicians tried to come up with aswaruupa lakshNa, that is necessary and sufficient qualification, say for a cow,

by stating that cow is that which has cow-ness (gotvam) and tree is that whichhas tree-ness and rope is that which has rope-ness and snake is that which hassnake-ness. Obviously rope-ness is different from snake-ness, and tree-ness isdifferent from man-ness. They appear to be necessary and sufficientqualifications or swaruupa lakshNas. However there is an inherent problem inthese definitions, because one is trying to define a swaruupa lakshana for anobject that it does not have. If we ask what is the cow-ness that cow has, thenone can only restate the definition as cow-ness is that which cow has, since cowis that object which has cow-nessthat is different from horse-ness that horse has. We have not become any wiser.Inherently the problem lies in the fact that there is no specific lakshaNa thatI can identify as its necessary and sufficient qualification or swaruupalakshaNa of any object in this universe. All definitions including cow-ness ofthe cow etc become circular definitions (cakraka dosha), only operational fortransactional purposes. In addition, none of the five senses can gather thatcow-ness of the cow and horse-ness of the horse. Cow is recognized as a cow withall its inherent attributes of the cow that the senses can gather together. Cowmay have a specific distinguishing organ that distinguishes it from a horse or adonkey, but that distinguishing organ is only part of the cow and not cow itselfto qualify as swaruupa lakshaNa.

Because of lack of any specific attributes that distinguishes an object from therest of the objects in the universe, doubts and errors are possible in theperceptual processes. Basis for the error lies in the fact that some of theattributes are somewhat similar for the error to arise. This is calledsaadRisyam. Rope is taken for a snake only because there are some commonattributes between the two. Rope is not mistaken for an elephant or mountain butmistaken for a snake since the senses are gathering only those attributes thatare common for both. Similarly man is taken for a stump for the tree, due tolimited or incomplete attributes of the object gathered by the sense due tosemidarkness. Tree is immovable (acara) while man can move (cara), but in thetime span the observation is made man can remain without movement. Thereforedoubts and errors can arise during perception, since knowledge of the objectsare based purely on the attributes that thesenses gather during the observation.

In the case of error, there is vagueness in the attributive knowledge since theattributes gained by the senses are not discriminative enough to differentiatebetween man and the tree. It could be a man or it could be tree. When the seermakes a definitive judgment- call that it is a man, based on the attributes thathis mind has gathered from his senses, it becomes a pramaa from his point. It isbhramaa from the point of the reality, defined from the point of a referee, ordiscovered by his own subsequent transaction.

In advaita Vedanta error is generally classified as adhyaasa or superimposition.Shankara provides an exhaustive analysis as adhyaasa bhaashya before he beginshis bhaashya on Brahmasuutra. The adhyaasa bhaashya of Shankara has beenexhaustively explained in the Notes on Brahmasuutra stored in the files sectionof advaitin list archives. Here we discuss some aspects of it with reference tothe errors in perceptions. Shankara defines adhyaasa as â€ãtasmin tatbuddhiHâ€™as â€ãpprehension of something as something elseâ€™. In adhyaasa also, two

types of errors could be possible: 1) perceiving something other than what itis. That involves a false assertion of one thing for another; ex: perception ofsnake where there is a rope. Here the attributes of the object perceived areincomplete, for whatever the reason. 2) Perceiving as something with attributesthat do not belong to it, that is assigning falsely attribute of one thing tothe other; Ex. redness toa clear crystal because of its proximity to the red cloth. Here the attributeof the red cloth are falsely superimposed on the clear crystal. The mistakenfalse perception of ghost for the post, silver for nacre, mirage water, world ofplurality for Brahman are of the first type of error wherein one is mistaken forthe other. Movement of trees in opposite direction when the train is moving,sunrise and sunset, changeless self appearing as changing, crystal appearing redin the presence of red cloth are example of the second, wherein the attributesthat do not belong to it are superimposed on it . In both cases the substantiveis unaffected by the perceptual knowledge, fundamentally because the knowledgeis attributive.

In adhyaasa involving superimposition, there is no physical or mentalsuperimposition of objects, nor does it involve perception of some imaginaryobject such as hallucinations or mental projections as in dream state. Hence itis not praatibhaasika error. When one sees a snake out there where there is arope, there is an object present out there. It is not an imagination or a dreamthat there is a snake there. Same is the case when one sees a man standing wherethere is only stem of a tree, standing. Hence Shankara defines adhyaasa also asâ€“ satyaanRita mithuniikaraNam adhyaasam â€“ superimposition of true and falsetogether to arrive at a unitary perception. That there is an object out thereâ€“ vastu jnaanam â€“ is there which is real at perceptual level. The vastujnaanma is gained by perception via attributes only as attributes areinseparable from the objects. What exactly the substantive of the vastu orobject is not known since attributiveknowledge cannot bring in substantive knowledge. The assertion that there is anobject out there that is being seen comes with the knowledge that attributesthat are being perceived cannot exist without a substantive. Hence that there isan object is ascertained by the perception only. But based on the attributesgathered, cognition of the object is different from what it is â€“ thus a falseobject is perceived in place of a real object. A fellow may see stump of treeout there while the other fellow may see real man out there. Thus for the samesubstantive, one sees a tree and the other sees a man as standing. â€Õut thereis an objectâ€™ is the knowledge from the point of both perceivers. From theirindividual points both are valid perceptions as per advaita. But thesubstantives that they associate for the object they perceive are different. Letus say there is an independent knowledgeable person, whom we can call as areferee, knows experientiallythat it is indeed a tree and not a man. He would characterize one perception isreal and the other as false. The refereeâ€™s knowledge is substantial since hehas transactual knowledge with the tree in some form or the other. From thepoint of perceivers both have perceived the objects since their senses havebrought attributes that they could see (measure) within the external constraints(dim light, etc) present, and know that there is an object out there and basedon the information they have one says it is a man and the other says it is atree. If they senses cannot gather any attributes because it is too dark or the

person is blindâ€“ then there is no error since no object is perceived. There isan ignorance of the existence of the object out there. At the same token, iflight is bright enough that the senses could gather all the attributes of theobject, then the possibility for an error is reduced, since the attributivecontent of the vRitti issufficient to distinguish man from a stump of a tree or snake from a rope.Hence partial knowledge (or partial ignorance) contributes to a mixture of real(that there is an object out there) and unreal (that the object is a snake)giving rise to errors in perception. Hence Shankara defines adhyaasa assatyaanRita mithuniikaraNam adhyaasam â€“ mixing of real and unreal parts toarrive at a unitary perception of snake out there or man out there, etc. Sincefrom their perceivers their intellects have made definitive conclusions of theperceived objects, from their reference their knowledge is definitive and notdoubtful errors. Even though the perceptions are unreal (from the point of areferee), the reactions that arise as a consequence of their definitiveperceptions can be real â€“ such as fear associated with the cognition of snakeout there, and the reactions of the body such as increased blood pressure,sweating, etc are all real.

As a part of the background, we will address next some of khyaati vaadas â€“ oranalysis of errors from different philosophical doctrines.

KhyAti vAdas

Before I proceed further, Shree Sastriji has just pointed out to us that he hasdiscussed the various theories about the errors in perception from the point ofdifferent doctrines. These are called khyAti vaadas. In view of the exhaustivedetails that he has already provided in his web site(http://www.geocities.com/snsastri/ khyati.pdf ) I will only provide a briefdescription for continuity. Excellent discussion of this topic is also providedin â€˜Methods of Knowledgeâ€™ by Swami Satprakashananda. These discussions arefrom the advaitic stand point. Analysis of error is fundamental to Vedanta andtherefore has been addressed by all aachaaryas, each criticizing the otherphilosophical positions and establishing their own view point. The examplesthey take for analysis is perception of silver for nacre, and address how theerror in perception occurs. Listed below are prominent theories of erroranalysis.1. aatma khyAti2. asat khyAti3. akhyAti4. anyathA khyAti5. sadasat khyAti6. sat khyAti7. anirvacanIya khyAti

1. aatma khyAti or subjective cognition is an idealistic theory that negates theexternal objects since perception involves mental vRitti as internal subjectivethought. Falsity involves in externalization of internal thoughts. Thus innercognition is apprehended as external object. This yogachaara-theory is rejectedon the basis that falsity cannot be separated from the truth, since in bothcases the internal thoughts are projected as external objects, whether it is

http://www.geocities.com/snsastri/

silver or nacre.2. asat khyAti involves perception of non-existent entities. In the case ofperception of silver for nacre, according to this theory, not only the silverhas no existence in the place where it is seen, even the nacre has no existenceeither. Thus both are dismissed as false (one may be more false than theother). Non-existence or suunyam forms the basis for all apparent perceptionsas per their suunya vaada. All Vedantic masters reject this maadhyamikaphilosophy as baseless (suunyam).3. akhyAti â€“ according to this theory of PrabhAkara school of mImAmsa, erroris not in perception but in the lack of appropriate discrimination at the memorylevel. Thus in the case of perception of silver for nacre, there is a lack ofproper discrimination to differentiate input from memory of nacre from silver.Thus neither of them is unreal, but falsity arises in relating remote silverwith current nacre. Advaitin dismisses this theory on the ground that silver isperceived here and now, not remote silver is perceived. Object should be therein front to see and not due to recollection of silver seen somewhere to mistakenacre as silver due to lack of discrimination. That â€˜this is silverâ€™ is thenature of perception.4. anyathA khyAti â€“ according to this NyAya theory, silver and nacre both arereal and the perception of brightness of nacre is seen as silver that perceivedat some other place at some other time due to some supernormal connection inknowledge (aloukika sannikarSha). Falsity consists in relating silver with nacrewhere it does not exist, but neither of the two is unreal. Advaitin dismissesthese arguments that perception of silver now and here should be based oncurrent sense input through organ of vision. Without acknowledging theperception of silver in some form in the object in front, the knowledge thatâ€˜this is silverâ€™ cannot be occurring.5. sadasat khyAti â€“ this theory due to sAnkhya is based on perception of real(sat) and unreal (asat) object. Silver that is real (in silversmithâ€™s shop) isperceived here as unreal superimposition on nacre. Hence it is the cognition ofreal silver as unreal in the nacre. Thus it is a conjoint perception of realand unreal object as â€˜this is silverâ€™ where nacre is. It is dismissed on theground that something non-existent cannot be perceived in front, just because itis existent somewhere in silversmith's shop. The object perceived must bepresent in front for its perception, since perception is immediate and direct.6. sat khyAti â€“ the theory due to Ramanuja â€“ who argues that there must bereal silver present in the nacre for one to see. Since all objects arefundamentally made of the same five elements, everything is there in everythingelse. Hence perception of silver in the nacre is due to the presence of realsilver there. This theory is dismissed, since it allows perception of anythingin every object perceived, since everything is there in everything else. Thediscrimination of one object from the other becomes impossible.7. AnirvacanIya khyAti â€“ This is advaitic theory of error. That â€˜this issilverâ€™ is immediate and direct perception. Non-existent silver cannot givedirect and immediate perception as â€˜this is silverâ€™. The silver is perceivedas â€˜here and nowâ€™. This knowledge comes from direct sense input by theobservation of silveryness of the object perceived. This knowledge is notsublated until the perceiver goes out to pick up that silver that he sees. Thussubstantiality of the silver is negated when one tries to pick up and observeclosely. Hence, perception of silver is recognized as false, only when hepicks-up the object and discovers that it is nacre and not silver. Silver is

now recognized as false. Does the silver existed before â€“ yes from the pointof perceiver hence silver is not unreal as its existence was experienced duringperception. No one would go after false silver. Hence in the perceivers mind,silver is not unreal and it isâ€õut thereâ€™. He discovered later that silver that he saw was not real sinceit is nacre and not silver. Hence illusion or false is neither real nor unrealâ€“ sat asat vilakshaNam â€“ is defined as mithyA. It is some what similar toprAtibhAsika satyatvam but not exactly in the sense that is perceived by theperceiverâ€™s mind, but at the same time it is not like mental projection as indream. The object silver is â€õut thereâ€™ for him to see and thus external tohim like any other vyaavahaarika satyam. It propelled him to act, in order toacquire that silver that he sees. Vyaavahaarika objects exists for vyavahaara,that is before and after perception, and are available for transactions duringtransmigratory existence. Since the belong to Iswara sRiShTi. On the other hand,illusory objects exist only as long as they are perceived. They do notdisappear by themselves. Negation of them requires an experience that iscontradictory to theirperception. They are not unreal like son of a barren woman, who cannot beexperienced. At the same time they are not real for transactions; I can notmake silver ornament out of the silver that I see where nacre is. Since it isneither real nor unreal it is called anirvacanIyam or inexplicable.

With this background we will now take up Vedanta ParibhASha analysis of thiserror.


We are examining the analysis of error, taking the example of perception ofsilver where there is a nacre. As we have addressed different khyAti vAdas,according to NayyAyikas the error is called anyathA kyAti (knowledge of silverexisting in the memory that was perceived in the past is recognized here in theobject, nacre. Thus both nacre and silver are real but that real silver that wasseen at some other place and time is now seen in the wrong place where it is notthere and that constitutes an error), while the advaitin ascribes the error asanirvacanIyam, inexplicable. When I perceive the silvery shining-ness of anobject, based on the attributive content of the vRitti formed, the object isperceived as â€˜I see Silver and is out there- nowâ€™. The perception of thesilver out there is direct and immediate as my eyes fall on that shining object.Direct and immediate perception occurs like any other perception, since all theperceptualityconditions are met. Hence advaitin rejects NyAyaâ€™s theory of anyathA khyAtisaying that the perception of silver is right now and right here as â€˜here issilverâ€™, and not â€˜I am seeing that silver here that was perceived some othertime and placeâ€™. The direct and immediate perception of silver is based on thecurrent sense input, resulting in vRitti with the contents of the silverattributes.

As I bend down and pick up the silvery object, I discover that it is a nacre andnot a silver. By that subsequent transmigratory experience, knowledge of â€˜thisis silverâ€™ is negated by the knowledge â€˜this is nacreâ€™. â€˜This issilverâ€™ knowledge existed as definite knowledge until it was contradicted by

transmigratory experience involving perception of nacre. Thus the subsequenttransmigratory experience resulted in the knowledge that the silver I saw wasnot real. Even though the knowledge of the silver is negated, the experience ofsilver that I saw is not negated. This is because experience is different fromknowledge. One can have experience with out having knowledge. From Vedanticpoint, we are experiencing Brahman all the time since everything is Brahman, butwe have no knowledge that what we are experiencing is nothing but Brahman. Sincethe silver was experienced as existing out there, the silver is not unreal. Unreal cannot beexperienced. Thus we have a situation, wherein silver is not unreal since itis experienced and it is not real since it is negated by the subsequenceknowledge that is nacre. Hence it comes under a new category called mithyA orfalseâ€“ which is neither real nor unreal. That is neither sat nor asat.Madhusuudana Saraswati in Advaita Siddhi discusses five definitions of falsity.The first definition of falsity or mityA comes from PancapAdika of Padmapaada as â€˜sat asat vilakshaNam, mityAtvamâ€™ The nature of mithyA that it isdifferent from existence, sat, and non-existence, asat; or sat asatanadhikaraNatvarUpam anircanIyatvam or its inexplicability arise since it isbased on neither existence nor non-existence. Many philosophers, includingvedantins like Ramanuja and Madhva, reject this category saying that sat andasat are mutually exclusive sets. That is, what is not sat has to be asat andwhat is not asat has to be sat and there is no set thatis exclusive or inclusive of both; that is there cannot be anything is both notsat or not asat; or fall under the category of both sat and asat. Advaita doesnot subscribe to these demarcations. There is no set that is inclusive of bothbut there is one that is exclusive of both. The reason is simple - They definereal or sat is that which remains the same all the time â€“ trikAla abhAditamsatyam. The unreal or asat is defined as that which has no locus of existence atany time. Classical example for asat is vandhyA putraH or son of a barren womenâ€“ there is no locus for existence of such an entity at any time for us to haveany experience. Hence unreal cannot be experienced. Therefore one cannot haveboth sat and asat at the same time. But there can be a third category which isexperienced but does not remain the same all the time. It undergoes change withtime, hence it cannot be real, since the definition of real is restrictive anddoes notallow any change. Since it is experienced, at least momentarily, it cannot becalled unreal, like a son of a barren woman. In fact, the whole world comesunder this category, as per advaita Vedanta, since the whole world iscontinuously changing without ever remaining the same, yet it is experienced. Scripture supports this view saying that creation of the universe of names andforms involves transformation involving vivarta, that is, the material causeremaining the same during transformation while the products vikAra, arecontinuously changing. It is like gold transforming into verities of ornaments,while remaining as gold. Given the gold and its ornaments, scripture says goldalone is real (loham iti eva satyam), implying that ontologically the ornamentshave only a temporal existence and gold alone is real with respect to ornaments.Since ornament is not permanent like gold, it does not fulfill the definition ofreal yet it has transactionalutility (one can decorate oneself with a ring, bangle, etc), it is not unreal. Hence advaitic stand that there is mithyA that is sat asat vilakshNam issupported by scriptural statement.

In the silver/nacre example the realities are relative. For example, silver thatI saw does not come under the category of asat or unreal since it isexperienced. When it is negated by the knowledge that it is nacre, â€˜silverthat I sawâ€™ is recognized as not real. Therefore it is mithyA in relation tonacre. While nacre itself is mithyA, in relation to the absolute since it ispart of the world, created by Iswara â€“ hence there was time when it was notthere. Nacre is not created by me or by my individual mind. Hence nacre iscalled vyaavahaarika satyam or real within the realm of transmigratoryexperience.

There is no need of bringing any metaphysical sinnikarsha (relation) that NyAyainvokes to explain the error as due to confusion in the mind between the silverseen somewhere else with nacre that is there in front. What was seen in frontwas initially recognized as silver, since nobody attempts to go after to get afalse silver. Silver seen was recognized as false only after the object ispicked up and carefully examined. This also brings to the point that when I donot have complete knowledge of the object that I see, that partial ignorance cancontribute to the error in cognition.

Let us analyze now the silver that I saw where the nacre is? If we say that weexperienced silver, therefore it is not unreal, the question that arises is howcan we experience that which is not there. It is similar to experiencing a snakeout there where there is really no snake out there but a rope. If snake andsilver we experienced come under vyaavahaarika satyam then it should betransactionally experiencable. VyavahAra implies transaction. What happed tothe silver when I picked up the object and discovered that it is nacre? Should Isay it disappeared from where it came? It is like snake disappearing when I findthat it is rope. Where did the snake go, when I found it is a rope? Of course,we know that snake was never there other than in the mind of the perceiver. However the experience of the perceiver is not like that - He would not saysnake or silver is in my mind only. For him â€˜the snake is out there (whererope is, since rope onlyis seen as snake) or silver is out there where nacre is. One can say it islike prAtibhAsika, a mental projection of an object. But that word â€“prAtibhAsika is normally reserved to the objects created by the mentalprojection as in dream state. Since we see the silver â€õut thereâ€™ wherenacre is, it is not similar to inner mental projection as in dream objects. Inthe dream objects, which we call purely prAtibhAsika, both the seer and the seenare in the mind only. But here, when I say there is a snake or there is asilver, the object is perceived as external to the mind as the perceptualknowledge. Because of that reason only I was motivated to go and try to pick itup, since silver is of value to me. If it is external, then it cannot disappearinto thin air. This is the fundamental problem is all mithyA object which isneither real nor unreal. Hence advaita Vedanta says it is anirvacanIyam,inexplicable, since any characterization of silveror snake as prAtibhAsika or vyaavahaarika also becomes a problem. Ontologically, the status of silver is different from nacre, since one isconsidered as real, or more real, than the other. Silver could disappearbecause there is no silver substantive there. But without the substantivesilver, I could perceive the silver only because the perception is based on

attributive content. The senses picked up the silvery-ness of the object by itsshining and based on the attributive content of the vRitti it was concluded thatit is silver. Only when I picked up the object, other attributes correspondingto nacre are grasped by the senses to negate prior perception of silver aserror. Now we address some of the issues that were raised and answered in theform of objections in VP.

Objection (by tArkikas): Yes. By bending and picking up the object andobserving, one recognizes that it is nacre and not silver. Thus knowledge thatwas gained before â€˜that it was silverâ€™ is falsified in the subsequent effortto gain that silver in the current object seen. Up to this point we also agree.However how can one prove that the silver that was seen before falsification wasnot due to the real object silver seen in the past at some other place and someother time? How can you see silver now, if you have not seen the silver beforeat some other time? That silver that you have seen before must have been a realsilver and not a false silver. That real silver which existed before at someother place and time, you are seeing now when you perceive the nacre. Hence theerror is mistaken identity of that real silver perceived somewhere else, but nowperceiving here where the nacre is, and therefore the error is anyathA khyAti. As we couldeasily explain the error, there is nothing inexplicable or anirvachanIyam aboutit. Both nacre and the silver that we saw before are real. Error arose onlybecause of the confusion in the mind by associating the past real silver withthe nacre, here. That association occurs, we believe, is due to someextraordinary relationship at knowledge level (jnaana-lakshaNa-sannikarSha)between nacre knowledge and silver-knowledge. It is similar to seeing a sandalwood out there and concluding that it is a fragrant sandal wood, although one isseeing the sandal wood and not able to smell its fragrance now from a distance.Association of fragrancy with the sandal wood that is being seen comes from thememory of the previous knowledge that the particular sandal wood type is afragrant-type.

Response: Not so. One cannot bring some arbitrary silver seen before forperception here without being associated with the current sense input. Theperception is direct and immediate because it involves sensory input from theobject that is directly in front, not remote in the memory. The attribute ofthe silvery-ness is seen directly here and now, as one sees the object. This isthe direct sense input. When the vRitti is formed based on the attributivecontent, the perception that it is silver based on the silvery-ness noted by theorgan of vision. Only when one tried to pick up the object, substantive silverwas not found in the object seen, negating the validity of the silverperception. Silvery-ness is still noted in the object nacre but along with thatsilvery-ness which is superficial and unsubstantive; other attributes thatbelong to nacre are also perceived to negate to give new direct and immediateknowledge that is nacre and not silver.

When the perception that â€˜this is silverâ€™ occurred because of directsense-input of the silvery-ness of the object; the perception was direct andimmediate. We do not agree with NayyAyikas position that the attributes of thesilver seen in the current object are based on the perception of silver at someother time and place. If, without direct sense input in the present, one can

perceive the silver object based on the knowledge of the past that occurred atsome other time and place, then by extension of this logic, we could perceivefire directly and immediately just by seeing smoke, without having any senseinput of fire attributes. That makes inference as well as other means ofknowledge obliterate as separate pramANas.-----------NayyAyikas now question the validity of direct perception of silver as peradvaitic position. The question again boils down to substantive vs. attributiveknowledge.

Objection: In the absence of any substantive parts of the silver in nacre, howis it possible for one to say that â€˜this is silverâ€™ and that the perceptionof silver is direct and immediate. How is silver produced in the nacre, wherethere is no silver whatsoever? How can one say silver is directly andimmediately perceived without any silver present in the object? Therefore silverhas to come from the past knowledge only.

Response: Normally for complete perceptual knowledge of an object all theasAdhAraNa or specific attributes are required to uniquely identify an object asthis and not that. Some Objects sometimes have one or two unique or specificoutstanding attributes that makes it stand out for identification of thatobject. Shining aspect of silvery-ness is striking identification of all silverobjects to the extent that any thing that is shining like silver is takenimmediately as silver, unless it is proved other wise by subsequent observation.Similarly striking yellow gold color as an attribute of the gold is a dominantattribute to cognize the object as gold and not silver. It could be asilver-plated object with very little substantiality of silver or gold platedobject with very little substantiality of the gold. But based on the dominantattributes that the sense of vision perceives, the vRitti that is formedcontains that attribute for immediateidentification of the object as silver or gold, etc. These errors are thereforepossible since knowledge is attributive and not substantive. Existence of partsof silver is not necessary as long as the objects shines like silver for one toperceive it as silvery object. Artificial diamonds can be perceived as realones, except by a trained eye.

Thus silvery shining of the nacre when seen from a distance, due to presence ofthat dominant attribute and lack of observation of any other attributes ofnacre, the vRitti that is formed immediately has the attribute of silveryshining aspect of the object perceived and when the knowledge of the vRittiarises due to the normal process discussed before (i.e. involving illuminationof the vRitti by the reflected consciousness and unity of the subjectconsciousness with the reflected consciousness of the object in the vRitti â€“ when the perceptuality conditions are met, etc.), cognition of the object silverand knowledge of the cognition occur.-----------We will discuss next the topic from the point of vivarta (apparenttransformation) in contrast to pariNAma (irreversible transformations) inrelation to consciousness and the object of consciousness.

Knowledge and the Means of knowledge -19

Creation as a transformation:

Vedanta says Brahman is one without a second â€“ ekam, eva, advitiiyam. One,alone, without a second, and Shankara comments on the use of these threeseparate words â€“ ekam, eva and advitiiyam â€“ to negate differences of anykind. Three kinds of differences can exist; vijaati, sajaati and swagata bhedasand hence Shankara says three separate words are used by the scripture only tonegate all these three types of differences. Differences between different genus(says trees different from stones â€“ vijaati bheda), differences within thesame genus or family (among the trees say mango tree is different from coconuttree, etc â€“ sajaati bhedas) and differences within a unit or vyakti (in a treethe roots, branches, leaves, fruits, etc are different- swagata bhedas). Thedifferences exist because all objects are made up of parts. In Brahman, since itis one without a second, there is nothing else to differentiate it from. Hencescriptures also callBrahman as agotram â€“ meaning it does not belong to any family or genus sinceit is one without a second. It is undifferentiated homogeneous mass ofconsciousness defined by Vedas as prajnaanam brahma. We have discussed thisbefore that it is a swaruupa lakshaNam of Brahman implying that consciousness isBrahman and Brahman is consciousness. Since consciousness has to exist, Brahmanis also defined as pure existence. Being one without a second Brahman has to belimitless or anantam which also means that it is of the nature of pure aanandaswaruupam. Implication of all this is that there cannot be anything other thanBrahman, and therefore there cannot be anything other than pure undifferentiatedinfinite existence-consciousness.

The question then arises as to how to explain the universe of things and beingsconsisting of many conscious and inert entities. Brahman, a conscious entitywithout a second appear to transform itself into many things and beings as theShruti says â€“ bahusyaam, prajaayeya â€“ let me become many and it became many.How does one become many? Here two prominent theories exist â€“ one is pariNAmavAda and the other is vivarta vAda. VP discusses the difference between thetwo. Advaita subscribes to vivarta vAda.

PariNAma involves complete transformation of one thing to the other â€“ likemilk becoming a yogurt or curds. In science, we call this as irreversibletransformation â€“ in this transformation of one thing to the other, the causeis destroyed in the formation of the product. VP says in this kind oftransformation, pariNAma, both cause and effects are ontologically in par â€“pariNAmo nAma upAdAna samasattAkakAryApattiH â€“ the material cause, upAdAnakAraNa, ontologically has the same existence as the product. Another example ofpariNAma is when a ring is changed into a bangle. Both ring and bangle has thesame degree of reality. VishishTAdvaita, following SAnkhya, subscribes to thistype of transformation for creation. In doing so one gives the product the samedegree of reality as the material cause. Hence jiiva and jagat become equallyreal as Brahman from which they form just as milk and the yogurt or curds.

In contrast, vivarta involves a transformation of the cause into productswithout the cause getting destroyed during the transformation. Hence, it is

called an apparent transformation. Scriptures give three examples to illustratethis transformation â€“ just as clay becoming many types of clay-vessels, justas gold becoming many golden ornaments, just as iron becoming many iron-toolsâ€“ Ch. Up 6-1-3. In all these cases of vivarta transformation material causepervades the effects without itself undergoing any transformation. Hence VP saysâ€“ vivarto nAma upAdAnaviShamasattAkakAryApattiH â€“ in the production of aproduct, the upAdAna kAraNa or material cause has different degree of reality orexistence than the product. That is, ontologically the cause and the effects aredifferent. In the case of formation of a ring from gold, gold remains as goldand ring is produced by this vivarta or transformation-less transformation. Isit gold or a ring? Wenormally call it as golden ring. But that is a misnomer as we are giving moreimportance to the name and form than to the substantive. It should be rightlycalled ringly gold. That is, it is gold with the quality of being in the ringform. Although the word ring is a noun, it has no substantive of its own. Thatis, ring cannot exist independent of gold while gold can exist independent of aring. These are expressed in anvaya-vyatireka (co-existence and co-absence)logic in tarka shaastra. This logic is used to establish the relation betweentwo entities that exist together, whether they are interdependent or independentof each other â€“ that is their ontological status with respect to each other. anvaya implies one is, the other isthat is, both exist simultaneously.Starting from a ring â€“ ring is, gold is â€“ implying that wherever ring isgold has to be there, without gold present ring cannot be there. At this stagewe do not know which isindependent and which is dependent. Now we apply vyatireka. vyatireka involvestheir absence â€“ ring is not but gold is â€“ that is even if ring is destroyedby melting, gold still remains. That proves the gold is relatively has moreindependent existence. Gold transforming into a ring is vivarta type. Thematerial cause and the product, VP says, have different degrees of existence.One is more real than the other.

Let us apply this anvaya-vyatireka logic to milk and yogurt. Applying anvayaâ€“ milk is, yogurt is not. And vyatireka says milk is not, yogurt is. Thusthey both are independent of each other. In the language of VP they have thesame degree of existence or reality. That is the nature of pariNAma.

Coming back to vivarta transformation - in relation to ring and gold â€“existence of ring is of lower reality since ring can be negated without goldgetting negated by changing ring into bangle. Gold remains as gold while ringcan be changing from one form/name to the other. With respect to gold,transformation is vivarta, but with regard to ring transforming into a bangle,it is pariNAma. According to Advaita Vedanta all objects in the universe comeunder this category. Every object is relatively more real than the other. Relative realities are called vyavahaara satyam. Absolute reality remains withBrahman as it is one without a second and part-less. Also it remains as Brahmanwithout undergoing any transformation during the creation of the universe, sinceit is infinite. Infinite cannot undergo any transformation. Just as goldappear to transform into ornaments without itself undergoing any transformation,Brahman transforms intospace-air-fire-water-earth as per Vedantic declarative statement â€“ let mebecome many and he became many. Because of vivarta or transformation-less

transformation, Brahman remains as Brahman, while there are verities of productsby their combinations and permutations. It expresses as existence in all, andonly as consciousness and happiness also in subtle products depending on thesubtleness or the purity of the objects. Just as it is ringly gold, substantiveof every object is Brahman only. Hence the famous Gita sloka â€“ brahmaarpaNambrahma haviH â€¦everything is nothing but Brahman and there is nothing otherthan Brahman, neha nAnAsti kincana.

Question: If Brahman is undifferentiated pure consciousness, how can oneundifferentiable entity become many differentiable entities? In the creation ofring, bangle, etc, there is an intelligent cause, the gold smith, andinstrumental cause; his tools which help him make intelligently the beautifulring, bangle, necklace, etc, i.e. varieties of forms. Similarly in the creationof universe of names and forms, there must be material cause and instrumentalcause. If these causes are separate from Brahman, then Brahman is not onewithout a second. If they are the same as Brahman then Brahman has internalparts â€“ material, instruments and intelligent causes constituting Brahman.Either way the fundamental postulate that Brahman has no internal divisions isviolated.

Answer: Not so. Since Brahman is without second, all causes rest in Brahman.Since Brahman is pure consciousness, there cannot be anything other than pureconsciousness â€“ Since there is a creation, advaita considers it as an apparentcreation or transformation less transformation or vivarta. The intelligent, thematerial as well as instrumental causes are also apparent for the apparentcreation. From the point of Brahman, there is really no creation from theabsolute point, and one cannot count apparent entities as parts of Brahman sincethey are not real. Ontologically they do not have the same degree of reality. Ring, bangle, etc are different from each other but from the gold point there isno difference. It is ringly gold and bangly gold etc. Hence ontologically, goldhas different degree of existence in relation to ring, bangle, bracelet, etc. Ring, bangle, bracelet, etc are not parts of gold; they are gold that appears tohave differentforms. Same way all objects in the universe are existence in differentapparent forms with different names. From the point of existence, it remains asindivisible and undifferentiable and thus part-less in spite of differentiableattributive universe.

Question: Even so, attributes of ring are different from attributes of bangle,etc. Since it is an intelligent and ordered creation, there have to be causesfor these attributive differences in order for the objects to be created, evenif they are apparent. Thus, even if there are no specific objects other thanringly gold, bracelety gold, etc, they are attributive and have sajaati, vijaatiand swagata bhedaas, as rings are different from bangles etc and one ringdiffers from the other and within the ring inside is different from outside.Similarly each individual is different from one another and they are notrandomly created. There must be some cause for this order. If that cause isdifferent from Brahman we have a duality and if that cause same as Brahman thenwe have internal differences in Brahman. Since cause for each product isdifferent, attributes are different.

Answer: Yes, there are causes for the attributive differences in the products. In the vivarta transformation theses causes are also of the same degree of orderas the products. This source for all these causes, according to advaita Vedanta,is called mAyA. mAyA is defined as yaa maa saa mAyA, that which appears to bethere but is not there. Creation is not random. The attributive differences inthe products of creation come from karma, the subtle impressions or samskArareminiscent from the previous creation, which is also called vAsanas ofjiivaâ€™s from previous creation. The cause for the previous creation againcomes from the previous to previous creation. Thus, there is no beginning orend for this cycle of creation, sustenance and annihilation. Hence Krishnadeclares there is no reason for one to cry that some one is going to die asthere was never a time the jiivas were not there (na tvevAham jAtu nAsam â€¦).

Objections: 1. There is no proof for introducing mAyA for the creation. 2.Scripture says that Brahman is that from which all beings are born, by whichthey are sustained and into which they go back â€“ a). yatova imAni bhUtAnijAyante â€¦Tit. Up b). yat bhUta yonim paripasyanti dhIrAH â€“(Brahman is thesource for all beings). Mun. UP. c) janmaadyasya yataH (Br. Su.2). Finally, thewhole doctrine is self-contradictory. Brahman is infinite and part-less and atthe same time there is a mAyA that is the cause for creation. mAyA cannot beseparate from Brahman since it violates the infiniteness of Brahman â€“ he cannot be the same as Brahman. MAyA has to be inert as it is different fromBrahman since Brahman is defined as homogeneous mass of consciousness. MAyAcannot be conscious entity then we end up with two entities which areconsciousness. Brahman cannot create even using mAyA then be becomes a kartaa. The homogeneous all pervading consciousnesscannot have mAyA, inert entity, either as separate or as an integral part. Thewhole philosophy seems to be based on shaky foundation.

Answer: Several objections have been bundled together in the above. First, thereis scriptural reference to mAyA â€“ maayantu prakRitim vidyaat| Sw. Up. -â€˜mayaa adhyaksheNa prakRitiH suuyate caraacaramâ€™,Gita. â€˜Know that mayaa isPrakRiti and prakRiti creates the whole universe of movable and immovable undermy president-shipâ€™. Hence mAyA is not advaitic interpretation. Brahman isconsciousness as it swaruupam and by definition Brahman is infiniteness.Existence -consciousness has to be infinite by logic too. Infinite cannotcreate since creation involves an action and therefore involves a modification.Yet there seems to be creation. Scripture also says that knowing Brahman one canknow everything â€“ this can be true only if everything is nothing but Brahman.And that Brahman you are â€“ tat tvam asi â€“ since you are a conscious-existententity being swaruupa lakshaNam, by definition you are Brahman â€“ ahambrahaasmi is the absolute truththat the scriptures declare. Hence creation has to be looked at two differentperspectives. From absolute point, Brahman alone is â€“ as pure homogeneousconsciousness without any attributes, whatsoever since only finite objects canhave attributes that differentiate them from other finite objects. MAyA can onlybe of the nature of mAyA, that is, it only an apparent factor that is the causefor the creation. The wielder of mAyA or who is the adhyaksha is Iswara, asKrishna declares following the upanishadic statement â€“ maayinantu maheswaram(Sw. Up.). Thus Iswara, a conscious entity, using mAyA as his shakti or powercreates the world of plurality using karma of the precious lives of the jiivas

as basis for creation. Since it is born of mAyA shakti, the product is also ofthe nature of mAyA â€“ that is one cannot say it is real or it is unreal â€“similar to ring and bangle that are created out of gold. Is ring real â€“ no itis actually gold. Ringcan undergo destructive transformation in becoming a bangle but Gold does notchange in this transformation â€“ From gold point the transformation is vivartaand from the ring point which is of lower order of reality, the transformationinto bangle is pariNAma. Hence scriptural statements â€“ let me become many(bahushyaam) and became many (prajaayeya) (where prefix pra- as Vidyaaranya saysimplies a peculiar transformation involving mAyA keeping Brahman intact oruntouched during the transformation) and sarvam khalu idam brahma â€“ all this(that we see) is nothing but Brahman and nehanaanaasti kincana (there is nothingother than Brahman). Hence the creation has to be of the vivarta from Brahmanpoint preserving the absolute reality while the creation at apparent level cancontinue at transactional level. Thus analysis of the scriptural statementsself-consistent and indicates the absolute nature of the reality in spite ofapparent plurality. Hencethe truth is advaitam.-----------------VP next addresses this ontological differnces between the cause-effects tosilver seen at the place of nacre.


In the last post, we have introduced some fundamental concepts of advaita basedon Vedanta pramaaNa. We will continue here some aspects this in understandingthe perceptual knowledge in relation to the absolute knowledge. The truth is;Brahman is absolute undifferentiable, infinite existence-consciousness. Fromthe Brahman point or absolute reference there is nothing other than Brahman.This is called paaramaarthika satyam. If and when I see the creation consistingof various objects and beings, we are coming down to vyaavahaarika satyam ortransactional reality where creation, creator, yoga, yogi, self-realization,saadhana, jnaani and ajnaani as well as perception of plurality along withmistaken notion that what is perceived is real, etc., including Vedas, allappear to exist. Since scripture says Brahman alone is real, the vyaavahaarikasatyam is mithyaa; that is, it is neither real nor unreal. It is apparently realbut not really real. Hencescriptures say â€“ there is nothing apart from Brahman- neha naanaasti kincana.Therefore all the objects that I see, as well as the seer that I am, are nothingbut Brahman, sarvam khalu idam brahma. Note the word â€˜idamâ€™ meaningâ€˜thisâ€™ which refers to an object that is perceived and which, by the abovedeclarative statement of the scripture, is nothing other than Brahman. Lookingclosely, â€˜idamâ€™ has a reference only when there is idam that is separatefrom aham. But â€˜idamâ€™ by definition is inert, and by the use of the wordâ€˜isâ€™ it implies that it is existing. Brahman is consciousness and byâ€˜is-nessâ€™ associated with it (as â€˜Brahman isâ€™) it is also existence. Ifeverything is Brahman, as the statement â€˜sarvam khalu idam brahmaâ€™ascertains, and since idam is inert, we conclude that Brahman expresses in theâ€˜idamâ€™ as existence only. Thus Brahman whose intrinsic nature isexistence-consciousness expresses ineverything fundamentally as â€˜existenceâ€™. It expresses as both existence and

consciousness in the conscious beings.

In addition, â€˜idamâ€™s existence, or existence of â€˜thisâ€™ is recognized bya conscious entity only. In the very recognition, involving knowledge ofâ€˜thisâ€™, the perceptuality condition is met, wherein the limiting existencein the form of â€˜thisâ€™ becomes one with the subjectâ€™s limitingâ€˜existence-consciousnessâ€™ in the form of â€˜I amâ€™ â€“ to have theknowledge of -â€˜this is an objectâ€™ â€“and- â€˜I am a knower of thisobjectâ€™. This is true for all objects that are perceived via the mind and thesenses. Hence in the perception of â€˜thisâ€™, the â€˜existenceâ€™ expressed asthe limiting adjunct in â€˜thisâ€™ is linked with consciousness that â€˜I amâ€™,to establish the knowledge of â€˜this object isâ€™, and cognition of thatknowledge as â€˜I know this object isâ€™. In essence, consciousness-existence ofthe subject-object expressed as in the limiting adjuncts of â€˜I amâ€™ andâ€˜this isâ€™ are involved in the perceptualknowledge involving perceiver and perceived. Knowledge of every objecttherefore involves unity of the existence-consciousness, which is of the natureof Brahman, in the form of subject-object relation. Hence Yagnyavalkya says toGaargi in Br. Up. 3-8-11, â€ñaanyadatosti draShTRi, naanyadatosti shrotRi,naanyadastosti mantRi, naanyadatosti vijnAtre..â€™ Withoutconsciousness-existence present, there is nothing other to see, there is nothingother to hear, there is nothing other to think and there is nothing other toknow.

Hence Brahman is the substantive for everything including â€˜thisâ€™ that isseen and â€˜I amâ€™ that is the seer. Creation is only apparent or mithyaa.Seer-seen duality is also part of that mityaa. Mithyaa is defined as sat-asatvilakshaNam â€“ that which is neither sat nor asat â€“ neither real nor unreal. Real is that which does not undergo any transformation and unreal is that whichhas no locus for existence at any time. Since the world of objects continuouslyundergoes mutations they cannot be absolutely real; and since they are there toexperience, they are not unreal. Hence they come under mityaa, or as apparent.

From the point of Iswara, the power by which one can become many is defined asmaayaa. It forms the basis for creation. Creation being apparent and maayaabeing apparent they are at the same degree of reality. Thus the apparent causeand the apparent effects are of the same degree of reality â€“ and this type oftransformation is defined as pariNAma in VP. From the point of substantiveBrahman, the existence-consciousness, there is no transformation or it is onlyapparent transformation appearing as many yet remaining as Brahman only. Thistransformation is called vivarta. Having defined both, VP now addresses theontological status of the silver that we see, in fact, the status of any objectthat we see.

Since we see an object â€õut thereâ€™, it is apparent that there is an objectâ€õut thereâ€™, which appears to be there for us to see. Here seeing includesall sense perceptions. We see an object â€“ the associated vRitti that forms inthe mind, which in-turn is seen in the reflected light of illuminatingconsciousness, saakshii. Nothing can appear in this universe without having asubstantive to support that appearance. Hence, any appearance must have asubstantive, which in-turn cannot be another apparent, since any further

apparent-one should have again its own substantive that is not apparent. Theonly substantive that is non-sublatable is Brahman â€“ existence-consciousness. Existence itself cannot undergo any transformation or pariNAma. Hence VP says,when I perceive silver as â€˜this is silverâ€™ â€“ there are two types oftransformations involved in that perception. There is an object, prameya, asâ€˜thisâ€™; and there is a subject,pramaata, the knower, I am â€“ resulting in the knowledge and cognition of thatknowledge â€“ as â€˜I know thisâ€™.

The perceptuality requirement involves therefore two transformations; one at thelevel of prameya- this, and the other at level of pramaata, the subject I am. The perception of silver, which is mithyaa, by sense input of its silvery-nessis transformed into vRitti as â€˜thisâ€™, which is also mithyaa. The objectâ€õut thereâ€™, and the vRitti of the object as â€˜this isâ€™ that formed inthe mind associated with that object, both are ontologically in par since bothare mithyaa. The existence, as the limiting adjunct in the object â€õutthereâ€™, is now existence as the liming adjunct in the object â€˜thisâ€™ in theform of vRitti. Since both are neither real nor unreal, both are of the natureof ignorance or nescience only, and in both cases substantive is not revealed. This is called maayaa at the level of Iswara and avidyaa at the level of jiiva,since Iswara knows and jiiva does not know. From both perspectives it ismithyaa only. (Krishnasays it is difficult to unlock His maayaa â€˜daiviim eshaa guNamayii mamamaayaa duratyayaa..â€™ â€“ maayaa of mine is of divine origin and cannot beeasily overcome. Only way to overcome is complete surrenderance â€“ and thatsurrenderance occurs only with the knowledge of the substantive, Brahman.) Hence, the transformation, as per the above definition, is pariNAma sinceontologically same degree of reality of existence in the form of limitingadjuncts is maintained. The substantive for the object â€õut thereâ€™ isBrahman as existence in the limiting adjunct of an object â€˜isâ€™. This isrevealed by the scriptures by the statement â€˜sarvam idam brahmaâ€™, all thisis Brahman. Likewise, the substantive for the vRitti in the mind, as perceptionof the object as â€˜thisâ€™, is also existence as the limiting adjunct ofâ€˜this isâ€™. Since neither the substantive knowledge of the object â€õutthereâ€™, nor the substantive of the object perceived asâ€˜thisâ€™ are known by perceptual process, due to ignorance or nesciencecoving both, the knowledge remain as knowledge of the object as â€˜thisâ€™- notas the substantive existence-consciousness, Brahman. The ignorance of thesubstantive knowledge of the object out there is now transferred into ignoranceof the substantive knowledge of â€˜thisâ€™ when the vRitti is formed. All thisverbiage really means is the Brahman that is the substantive of object out thereand the Brahman that is the substantive of the vRitti in the mind â€“ both arenot know to have the vision of Brahman when the object is perceived via themind. The substantive as though covered by ignorance or nescience is notperceived since objective knowledge is only attributive and not substantive atany time. Perception as a pramaaNa cannot uncover that ignorance or nescience.

The important point to note is the when we perceiver an object out there we sayit is an existent object not existence as object (it is like golden ring ratherthan ringly gold) â€“ existence as substantive is not recognized in the objectthere. Similarly when the object is perceived through the vRitti â€“ the

knowledge is â€˜this is an objectâ€™ and again not as this object as existencebut only existent object. Since knowledge involves consciousness â€“ the subjectexistent-consciousness is united with the existence vRitti of the object asâ€˜this isâ€™ for the perception to take place. Ignorance of the substantivepervades in the object out there and the vRitti of the object as â€˜thisâ€™ â€“although all the process are occurring on the unifying substantive â€“consciousness-existence of the subject-object.

Objection: According to the description above, perception of the object involvesformation of vRitti which when identified with the consciousness of the subject;the knowledge that â€˜this is silverâ€™ takes place. How can the silver thatabides in the consciousness of the subject be identified as an object that isâ€õut thereâ€™ in front expressed as â€˜this is silverâ€™? Essentially, howcan the silver in the conscious mind becomes the silver out there in the front?One is the subtle thought in the mind and the other is the gross object outthere. How the subtle thought in the consciousness can form the basis toconclude that the object in front as â€˜this is silverâ€™?

Answer: Since the question is raised by Naiyaayikas, VP uses their own analysisof the perception of happiness to answer the question. He uses what is popularknown as proverb â€“ what is good for the goose is good for the gander. First,VP differentiates the pure consciousness from the limiting consciousness. In thediscussion of the jiiva, we have stated earlier that the jiiva is qualifiedlimiting consciousness and jiiva saakshii as just the limiting consciousness(without qualification or identification) or upahita caitanya, and pureconsciousness is unbound and infinite. According to Nyaaya, happiness abides inthe soul. Yet, it is experienced as abiding in the body, since one experienceshappiness at the body level, even though the soul is the substratum of thehappiness, etc. Thus the substratum for happiness is different from where it isexperienced. If Naiyaayikas have no problem in accepting this, they should nothave problem of theperceiving the silver abiding in the consciousness as an object silver â€õutthereâ€™ in front. This answer is only to show that Naiyaayikas have no basisto raise this objection.

VP next categorically states that unqualified pure consciousness is not thesubstratum of the silver but substratum only for the consciousness limited bythe meaning of the word â€˜thisâ€™ â€“ that is for the limiting consciousness inthe form â€˜thisâ€™. â€˜Thisâ€™ is the vRitti that is formed, which is illuminedby the witnessing consciousness; and therefore one is conscious of â€˜thisâ€™. Thus â€˜thisâ€™ is in the consciousness, for one to be conscious of â€˜thisâ€™. The contents of â€˜thisâ€™ is the attributive content perceived through thesense input, which in this case is the silvery-ness of the object. Thesubstantive of â€˜thisâ€™ is the limiting consciousness itself, established bythe unity of the subject-consciousness with the object â€˜thisâ€™ of the vRitti.Thus the cognition of â€˜this is silverâ€™ in the limiting consciousness isconnected to something object out there in front, which has silvery-ness as itsattribute. Since the wholeuniverse is nothing but Brahman, because of nescience or maayaa the worldappears to be out there for the senses to perceive. The substantive of thesilvery object out there is Brahman expressed as existence. Through the

formation of the VRitti, with the sense input attributive silvery-ness and itsunity with the subject consciousness, the object is now one with the limitingconsciousness that has the mind as its limiting instrument. The silver out thereis now â€ãs thoughâ€™ superimposed in the consciousness limited which is justthe illuminating consciousness of the saakshii. Thus, in essence, Brahman as anobject out there is now the Brahman as an object in the mind. There is anignorance associated with the existence of the object â€˜silverâ€™ out there(since it is taken as silver rather than Brahman) is now transferred as theignorance of the perception of silver abiding in the substantive consciousness. The substantive of the object silverout there and the substantive of the vRitti of the object silver in the mindâ€“ both are not recognized. But the truth remains that without the substantiveconsciousness limited by the mind, one cannot be conscious of the vRitti in themind and therefore conscious of the object silver out there. No other agency,other than limiting consciousness, can cognize the silver out there. Limitingconsciousness is nothing but witnessing consciousness. Hence Yagnyavalkyaâ€™sstatement to Gargi in Bru. Up. quoted above that other than the consciousnessnothing else is there to see, to hear, to think and to know - â€ñaanyadatostidraShTRi.. etc.--------------------We will take others objections raised by Naiyaayikas in the next post.

Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge -21

We are addressing the perception of silver where there is nacre, due tosilvery-ness observed by the senses. VP says there are two types oftransformations that occur in a perception of any object by a subject, knower. One transformation is at the level of the object or prameya, and the other is atthe level of the subject, pramaata. That there is an object â€õut thereâ€™itself is mityaa, since substantive of the object as per Vedanta is Brahman bythe statement â€˜sarvam khalu idam brahmaâ€™. Brahman is formless andattribute-less, while the object has a form with other attributes. What isperceived is only a form with a name, which is mithyaa. The vRitti that isformed is known as it gets illumined by the witnessing consciousness when theperceptuality conditions are met. That is, when the subject-consciousness isunited with the object-existence in the form of vRitti. By this process, notjust existence but consciousness-existence forms asubstantive for the vRitti. Since consciousness forms a basis for knowledge,â€˜thisâ€™ that is related to object-vRitti now (as though) abides in theconsciousness-existence of saakshii. A further identification of the object asâ€˜this is silverâ€™ occurs due to the attributive content of silvery-ness inthe vRitti that is formed. The cognition of that knowledge as â€˜I know this issilverâ€™, also follows. Essentially a mithyaa object out there is transformedby the perceptual process as mithyaa object in the limiting consciousness. Henceontologically, the object silver out there is now in par with the objectsilver-awareness in the mind â€“ since in the both cases the substantives arenot known. This transformation that preserves the ontological status of causeand the effect is called pariNAma. The substantive for the outside silver isBrahman as per Vedanta, and substantive for the object â€˜thisâ€™ inside themind is the limiting consciousnessdue to the perceptuality requirement. In essence, â€˜thisâ€™ is in my

consciousness for me to be conscious of â€˜thisâ€™. Since â€˜thisâ€™ can be anyobject, and â€ãll-thisâ€™ constitutes the world, I become conscious of theworld when the world in my consciousness. Instruments, mind and the senses, formbasis for this transformation process of the world of object out side to theconsciousness of the objects inside, while preserving their ontological status. Thus mind and the senses become â€˜pramANaâ€™ or the means of knowledge in thistransformation process. Thus it is clear that in the perceptual process, we arebringing together, the Iswara shRiShTi in the form of the world of objects andJiiiva shRiShTi in the form of vRittis to establish the perception of the worldâ€õut thereâ€™ by preserving the ontological status of the existing objects outthere with the objects in our consciousness. We are using the word â€õurconsciousnessesâ€™ inthe sense of limiting consciousness of the witness. We will now address somemore objections raised by Naiyaayikas.

Objection: In meeting the perceptuality condition, if â€˜thisâ€™ is an objectthat is superimposed on the limiting consciousness (which is called witness orupahita caitanya), the cognition should be â€˜I am silverâ€™ or â€˜I havesilverâ€™, similar to the cognition of â€˜I am happyâ€™. But the cognition isnot like that. It is â€˜I know that is silverâ€™ or â€˜I know that object overthere is silverâ€™.

Reply: In response to the objection, VP illustrates a universal rule relating tothe experience and the knowledge of that experience. In every experience, thereis an experiencer, experienced and experiencing â€“ similar to knower, known andknowing -pramaata, prameya and pramaaNa. Thus in every experience, there is anobject of experience which is localized in a particular form. Here we are usingthe word â€˜formâ€™ in generic sense and not necessarily related to physicaldimensions. The experience takes the form of a latent impression that is leftby that experience. This is also called sometimes as â€˜samskaaraâ€™. Actionsfor example leave subtle impressions called vaasanaas. Hence all experiencesleave a latent impression. When I see an object jar out there, this seeingconstitutes an experience. It leaves a latent impression in the form ofâ€˜thisâ€™. VP says impression â€˜thisâ€™ is the result of nescience, whichcovers the true orsubstantive knowledge of the object of â€˜thisâ€™, which is Brahman. Becauseof the nescience, the impression left is â€˜this, existent-jarâ€™ rather thanâ€˜Existence, as this-jarâ€™, since existence as such is formless. Theexperience of all objects, as a universal rule, is always â€“ â€˜thisâ€™ orâ€˜thatâ€™ with latent impressions, separating themselves from each other aswell as from other impressions that are left behind â€“ such as the experienceof body, mind or intellect. In the case of the experience of the mind,intellect or body, the impression is of two-fold nature. One is â€˜this ismindâ€™ and the other is â€˜I am the mindâ€™ due to nescience occurring at twolevels. When I say â€˜this is mindâ€™, it is similar to â€˜this is a jarâ€™Here the nescience is ignorance of Brahman, since any â€˜thisâ€™ according toVedanta is nothing but Brahman â€“ sarvam khalu idam brahma. Hence mind isillumined by the witnessing consciousness by whichthe knowledge of the mind, as â€˜this is mindâ€™ can occur. (At this levelâ€˜mindâ€™ is part of Iswara sRiShTi. This is one of the reason why when Ibecome jnaani only my notional mind which is jiiva sRiShTi gets destroyed, but

not the objective mind which is Iswara shRiShTi.) The second level of nesciencealso expresses as â€˜I am the mindâ€™, in contrast to â€˜this is mindâ€™. Thisis due to the ignorance of myself as â€˜I am the consciousness-existenceentityâ€™. Hence in the cognition of the mind â€“ â€˜this is mindâ€™ as well asâ€˜I am the mindâ€™ both happen due to two-fold ignorance. VP calls this as twotypes of experiences â€“ taking body as an example â€“ we have â€˜this is thebodyâ€™ and also â€˜I am the bodyâ€™. This two level experience is due to thenescience of â€˜Brahmanâ€™ as well as nescience of â€˜myself as brahmanâ€™. VPgives several examples to illustrate what Vedanta calls it as adhyaasa arisingfrom nescience. Someexamples are: This is eye and I am blind, this is ear, I am deaf. Similarly,â€˜I am happyâ€™ is due to the identification with the latent impression in themind due to attributive knowledge of happiness similar to I am angry, I amdepressed, etc. We have already discussed the internal perceptions of theseemotions where the contents of the vRittiâ€™s are the emotions directly. Theseemotions are perceived immediately as they rise in the mind.

Coming back to the example of perception of silver, even though the effect ofnescience abiding in the consciousness that is limited by â€˜thisâ€™ which isnot different from the consciousness associated with the subject, the experienceand the latent impression of that experience is in the form of â€˜thisâ€™ asâ€˜this is silverâ€™ and not â€˜I am silverâ€™. In essence there is noidentification of â€˜this is silverâ€™ with â€˜I am silverâ€™, since I amidentification does not extend to the object out side the body, mind andintellect. I can say â€“ this silver is mine and not this silver is me. Incontrast I do say â€“ this body is mine and this body is me. If the object hasno organic relation with the body, the latent impression will be â€˜this is anobjectâ€™ and not â€˜I am the objectâ€™. Taking the hand, for example, it isintegral part of my body, the latent impression extend to the hand as â€ãs I amthe handâ€™ as in â€˜I am the rest of thebodyâ€™. Hence when you touch my hand, or hurt my hand, you are touching me orhurting me. If for some reason my hand is amputated and left on the table, thenthe same hand becomes â€˜this is handâ€™ and no more identification as â€˜I amthe handâ€™. Hence when you cut that amputated hand on the table, I have nosense that you are hurting me. Hence based on the latent impression, â€˜thisâ€™is the object or â€˜I am the objectâ€™ occur due to two layer (or aspects of)nescience. One is world of objects is nothing but Brahman and the other is I amnone other than Brahman. Hence advaita Vedanta declares that Brahma satyam,jagat mithyaa, and jiivo brahmaiva naaparaH. The first statement establishes thenature of Brahman, the second eliminates the ignorance of the world of objectsand third eliminates ignorance of myself. The second and third are statedclearly to eliminate this two-layer nescience. It is also important torecognize that, contrary tothe claims, â€˜who am I?, who am I?â€™ inquiry itself does not eliminatecompletely this two-fold nescience, unless it is also supported by â€˜what isthis world that appears to be separate from me?â€™. Hence the purpose of inquiryinto the perceptual process by VP, as stated in the introduction to this seriesis recognize the world is recognized, when the existence of the world is unitedwith the consciousness-existence of the witnessing consciousness.

Objection: Even so, the object, â€˜this is silverâ€™ is cognized only when the

perception is directly connected with the witnessing consciousness, which isnothing but pure â€˜I amâ€™ â€“ the consciousness-existence. The vRitti has tobe abiding in that illuminating consciousness to have the knowledge of thatvRitti. If that is so, why assume a state of nescience involving an â€ãpparentknowledgeâ€™ or â€˜mityaa silverâ€™ as its object of perception and complicatethe issue?

Reply: The perception of an object requires not only the existence of an objectbut consciousness of the existence of the object. Existence of an object cannotbe established without the consciousness of its existence. Hence perception ofan object consists in not only having an existence of the object but thatexistence of the object has to be united with the consciousness of the subject,expressed in the form of perceptuality requirement. Hence any cognition requiresconsciousness and existence as unifying principle. But that is the nature ofBrahman as its swaruupa lakshaNam. Yet we do not gain the knowledge of Brahmanby the perception of â€˜idamâ€™ or this object even though scripture says allidams are Brahman only. Hence even though the â€˜idamâ€™ or â€˜thisâ€™ abidesin the consciousness-existence during the perceptual process, the nesciencepersists in the perception. Hence it is not an assumption but a statement offact.

Objection: However, the mental state or impression in the form of â€˜thisâ€™,and the state of ignorance of the â€˜Brahmanâ€™, due to nescience â€“ these twoare two distinct entities. According to PrabhAkara (who was a student ofKumArila Bhatta, but formed his own school of puurva mImAmsa different from histeacher), one should treat the perception of the object as â€˜thisâ€™ andrecognition of the object as â€˜silverâ€™, as two separate process. That is,cognition and recognition are two distinct processes and should not be combined.However, in the perception of illusory silver â€“ the perception of â€˜thisâ€™is getting mixed up with the recognition of real silver perceived elsewhere tohave a mixed-up perception that â€˜this is (that) silverâ€™. Hence the illusorysilver, as per PrabhAkara, is not an error in perception but an error inrecognition. A qualified perception as â€˜erroneous perceptionâ€™ is thereforenot permitted and your aboveanalysis violates that.

Reply: Not true. We do not accept PrabhAkaras analysis of error. In our view,error is taking something other than what it is â€“ atasmin tat buddhi â€“nescience also involves taking the substantive Brahman other than what it is â€“as object this or object that. This is the fundamental in all erroneousperceptions. The object that I am perceiving as â€˜thisâ€™, I am taking it assilver in stead of what it is â€“ nacre. This error is at vyavahaara level.There is an error at paaramaarthika level too. But the cause for both errorsare the same. One and the same consciousness is reflected in two statesinvolving real (the existence as object) and unreal (experiential â€˜thisâ€™ asa form with quality). When real is not recognized due to nescience, the unrealis taken to be real object out there. This is admitted as error in perception. The illuminating consciousness, saakshii, illumines the real and the unrealcomponents â€˜this isâ€™ andâ€˜silverâ€™; one is the substantive of is-ness, and the other the attributivecontent of vRitti in the form of silvery-ness. Thus error arises in every

perception and is accepted by advaita Vedanta where the real is ignored, andadheya, or superimposed attributive knowledge (based on the silvery-ness of theobject observed), forms the basis for its substantive knowledge that â€˜this issilverâ€™.

Objection: According to the tenants of Vedanta, the silver that is elsewhere (atdifferent place and time) observed or experienced is also the effect ofnescience. In that perception also there is the same superimposition, or adheyaknowledge of name and form, on the substantive Brahman. There also thesubstantive is not recognized as Brahman and the knowledge is only based on theattributes â€“ as silver. How does the perception of real silver elsewherediffer from the false silver perceived here, when we mistake nacre as silver?

Reply: According to Nyaaya, all are equally real. However both experientiallyas well as according to advaita Vedanta, even in vyavahaara there are degrees ofreality, even though from the absolute reference, all only transactionally realor vyavahaara satyam. Take for example gold and the ring. Which is real andwhich is false, even though the so- called real is false from the absolutepoint. That which remains the same or unchanging during a transformation is morereal than the one that changed. Hence of the tworing and gold, gold is morereal than the ring. Transformation of ring into bangle will be pariNAma wherethe cause is destroyed in becoming the effect, but from the point of gold, itremains the same in the cause and the effect. Hence ontological status of goldand ring or bangle is different. Similarly the ontological status of the silverthat was perceived at some other place and time through a pramaaNa is real sinceit remains assilver unless a contradictory experience occurs that negates the knowledge ofthat silver that was seen before. In the current example the object thatrecognized as silver as this is silver, is subsequently negated by acontradictory experience where the real knowledge of the object nacre occurs.Hence we have more permanent objects compared to others, establishing a range ofpermanency or impermanence and thus degree of reality of objects. Some objectsonly have fleeting presence, while others are more permanent. In the perceptionof the silver where there is nacre, the lighting conditions may not be ideal forthe eyes to see the complete and full set of attributes that define that objectas nacre. Since silvery-ness of the object is dominant and is visible withoutany doubt, the object based on the sense input of the silvery-ness of theobject, silver is immediately perceived. But this perception is negated when onehave a clear vision or if onecan pick up the object and observe to discover that it is not silver butnacre. We need all the necessary attributes to define or identify the objectwithout any ambiguity. If for some reason or the other, we get only partial,but dominant attributes, the error in perception is possible. The reason couldbe lack of light or even due to the defective eye (such as color-blindness) onecan perceive an object as different from what it is. Thus the criterion forerrors in perception or seeing illusory objects in perception is perception ofincomplete set or even incorrect attributes based on which the conclusion thatâ€˜the object is silverâ€™ is made. Sleep, for example, can form anadventitious defect for cognition of the objects in a dream state. Thus theobjects such as chariot etc experienced in a dream are illusory since theperception is covered by the adventitious defect called sleep. They are real as

long as the dream lasts, but become unrealwhen one gets up â€“ sa kale satyavat bhaati, prabhode satyasat bhavati â€“says Shankara in Atma bhoda.

The discussion now takes to ontological status of objects seen in the dream, andthis we will take in the next post.

Knowledge and the means of knowledge -22

Perception in Dream

Perceiving something other than what it is an error, and is called adhyaasa,error of superimposition. Thus the perception of silver when it is nacre is dueto adhyaasa. I am projecting silver on the object there where there is nosilver. The projection is done by my mind. In general, error arises due toignorance or nescience of the nature of the object that is being perceived.Since I do not know that it is nacre, I take it as silver based on the partialor dominant sense input of silvery shining-ness of the object. I do not knowthat it is nacre is due to what is called as adventitious defect. That is it isdue to defects in the auxiliary causes that are involved in the operation ofperception, such as insufficient light, etc. Because of these defects, sensesare unable to gather all the attributive knowledge of the nacre that would haverevealed the true nature of the object as nacre. I am gathering only apredominant attribute â€“ the silveryshining-ness of the object â€“ which is also the characteristic of silveryobjects. Thus there is some similarity in the attributive content of the objectthere and the object projected. This similarity is called â€˜saadRisyamâ€™.Hence the criterion for seeing something other than what it is comes fromauxiliary or adventitious factors that are involved in perception. Here VPgives an example of a dream projection of objects where one sees, say a chariot,which is not really there but projected by the mind and hence is illusory. Theadventitious cause of this projection is â€˜sleepâ€™ itself. Thus the discussionnaturally leads to the analysis of objects perceived in dream.

Objection: In the dream, one does not perceive the objects, but only recollectsthem from memory. There object like chariot, etc are those that were seen beforeand there is a memory associated with that previous perception. The recollectionis only in the form of words or associated with the words. One need not assumethat one is creating a chariot in the dream since dream is in the mind of thedreamer. Besides, the chariot is too big to fit in the mind of the dreamer; itis cumbrous. Hence there is no question of creation of an object, chariot, inthe dream, but it is only a recollection from the memory.

Reply: Not so. If the object chariot is only a recollection, then I would notmake a statement that â€˜I see a chariotâ€™ or â€˜I saw a chariot in my dream.In addition, it would violate the scriptural statements that establishes thecreation of the objects such as chariot in a dream. na tatra rathA na rathayogAna panthAnO bhavanti, atha rathAn rathayogAn pathassRijate .. Br. Up. IV-3-10.There (in the dream state) there are neither chariots, nor the horses to pullthose chariots nor the roads for them to go. Therefore the chariots, the horsesto pull those and the roads for them to travel are created (in the dream).

Therefore, like the silver appearing in the nacre, the chariot etc. areexperienced in a dream are also projection of the mind. They remain as real forthe perceiver as long as the dream lasts or the projection lasts. Generallythese projections are negated by subsequent knowledge arising from furtherperception. In the case of dreamobjects, the objects may exist as long as the dream lasts. In the case ofsilver projected on the nacre, it would last until subsequent experienceinvolving further attributive knowledge of that object establishes that theobject is nacre and not real silver.

Objection: If the real chariot is seen in the dream, there should be eyes to seeand the chariot should also be spatially located for the seeing eyes to see. Since there is no â€˜spaceâ€™ in side the mind, leave alone accommodating thewhole chariot, one has to assume some imaginary space where chariot in the dreamcan be located. Where is the substratum to support the chariot spatially, andalso object-wise? Essentially what is substantive of the chariot for itsexistence and for its perception, even if one argues that the chariot is asuperimposition, similar to silver being superimposed on nacre?

Replay: The objection is not valid. The infinite-consciousness which isself-effulgent is the substratum of the chariot, etc. Because in the dream, thechariot is experienced, it is not unreal like son of a barren woman. Sincechariot and the objects alike are experienced as existent in the dream, theconsciousness manifesting as existence forms a substratum for all. The spacewhere they are located is also part of that experience and hence is asuperimposition on the consciousness because of which one is conscious of thespace. The fact that one sees the chariot in the dream, even the eyes that seethe chariot are also of the same order of reality as the objects that are seenâ€“ all are projected as existent â€˜thisâ€™ and existent â€˜thatâ€™ on thesubstantive consciousness. Since the experience is in the subtle form asâ€˜thisâ€™, the knowledge of the experience will also be â€“ â€˜this is achariotâ€™ and not â€˜I am a chariotâ€™, even though thelimiting consciousness of the jiiva forms the substantive for all, as wasdiscussed before. Some are of the opinion that dream chariots and other objectsseen in the dream are transformation of maayaa preserving the same order ofreality as the cause (pariNAms of maayaa), while others are of the opinion thatthey are transformation (pariNAma) through the medium of mind. ManDukya presentsthe analysis more precisely which we will take it later.

Objection: According to the above interpretation that chariots and other objectsare superimposed on the pure consciousness for one to be conscious of them.Since this substantive, pure limiting existence-consciousness, saakshii, is notrecognized in the dream (tat saakshaatkaara abhaavena), the objector says theobjects projected in the dream will also remain in the waking state. The dreamstate may be gone; but according to your theory, the objects are not imagined inthe dream but are projected as real for the dreamer with the same substantive,the limiting consciousness-existence. The substantive does not change from dreamto waking. Hence, in principle, there is no difference between the objectsprojected in the waking state with substantive limiting witnessing consciousnessand objects projected in the dream state. States may change but objects shouldremain since the substantive remains the same. Therefore one should see all the

objects createdin the dream in the waking state also. The millions of dollars that we won inthe dream-lottery can now be cashed in the bank in the waking state; if yourtheory is valid.

Reply: In response to the objection, VP discusses two types of destructions thatare possible. One type of destruction involves destruction of perceived objectalong with the material cause and the other type is destruction of the objectperceived without the destruction of the material cause. The first is callednullification where the material cause is removed or completely eliminated(baadha) and the second is cessation or ending that particular perception wherethe material cause is not nullified. The nullification of the material causeoccurs only when the substantive is realized or recognized. The reality of thesuperimposed object arose only because of the non-recognition of the substantivedue to nescience. Since the substantive for the whole world is pureconsciousness, there is no other material for the objective world other thanmaayaa or nescience. Hence knowledge of the substantive which is pureconsciousness, the material cause which ismaayaa gets nullified. This is the first type of destruction involving theknowledge of the substantive. If I realize that it is clay, then I recognizethat there is no material pot other than its name and form. Knowledge of thesubstantive eliminated any reality attributed to the object pot other than nameand form of its substantive clay. It becomes potty-clay than clay pot. There isno substantive pot other than clay.There is a second type of perception due to adventitious defects. If one iscolor blind, due to the eye-defect one sees objects with colors which are notthere. If this defect is corrected, that correction does not eliminate theobject but only eliminates the wrong color assigned to the object. Similarlywhen there are double vision of objects due to defective eyes, correction of theeye-sight eliminates the vision of duality but not the object that wasperceived. Hence VP says, the substantive limiting consciousness-existence,saakshii, is not realized as substantive for the objects of the dream, andtherefore the objects may not be nullified because of that reason by awakeningfrom dream. There is, however, no reason why they cannot be destroyed by theelimination of the adventitious defects that produced them in the first place,just as double vision of objects is destroyed by correction of eye-sight, sincethe adventitious defect in the eye thatproduced the double perception of objects is removed. Just as jar can beeliminated by beating it with a club, even though we have not realized thesubstantive clay, what is there to prevent cessation of the object projected inthe dream by the elimination of the adventitious defect that caused the dreamprojection, namely the sleep?

We will continue further discussion on this topic in the next post.


Some additional objections on erroneous perceptions:

In the perception of silver where there is nacre, the error arose due toadventitious defect or auxiliary causes such as insufficient light because of

which only dominant attribute of silvery-ness was grasped by the senses. Basedon that limited attributive data, knowledge of the object that â€˜this issilverâ€™ took place. When that adventitious defect (poor illumination) isremoved, the senses could then gather more accurate attributive content of theobject for the mind to perceive it as nacre rather than the silver. Hence inthe knowledge of the true nature of the object as nacre, the previous knowledgethat â€˜this is silverâ€™ is recognized as error. VP says the object can beseen as it is, when the adventitious defects during perception are removed.

Hence VP ascertains that silver seen in nacre is the result of ignorance of thetrue nature of the object, namely that it is nacre. Expressed differently, theignorance of the substantive contributes to the error in perception where onething is taken for the other â€“atasmin tat buddhiH - which in Vedanticterminology is called adhyaasa.

Thus we have two levels of ignorance involving ignorance of the substantives. One is the ignorance of Brahman which is the substantive of all objects, whichis general ignorance or saamaanya avidya, or muula avidya, which is fundamentalin all perceptions of objects. Here, both the objects that are perceived andthe mind that perceives with the help of consciousness are in the same order ofreality. Perception of silver, where nacre is, is due to the second orderignorance. It arises due to ignorance of the substantive only, here thesubstantive in this relative frame is not Brahman directly but Brahman in theform of nacre. This ignorance is considered as visheSha avidya or specificignorance wherein we do not know that it is nacre and mistake it as silver. Whenadventitious defect is removed, knowledge that it is silver is sublated with therise of knowledge of the relative substantive, nacre. However, the perceptionthat it is nacre is also due toignorance and that false or mithyaa knowledge can be eliminated only when thesubstantive of nacre is known as nothing but Brahman, since at absolute levelthere is nothing other than Brahman or pure consciousness. Nacre is nothingbut consciousness limited by the form (with all other attributes) of nacre,since the scripture says there is nothing other than Brahman, neha naanaastikincana. At the relative level, the silver seen in the nacre is due tosecondary ignorance that is abiding in consciousness limited by nacre. Thismeans at relative level ignorance that it is â€ñacrey-consciousnessâ€™ (that isconsciousness in the form of a nacre as in â€˜ringly-goldâ€™ or gold in the formof a ring) contributes to the perception of â€˜silvery-consciousnessâ€™(consciousness in the form of silver). The relative knowledge will onlyeliminate the relative ignorance and not the absolute ignorance, i.e. theignorance of Brahman or ignorance that theexistence-consciousness that I am is Brahman).

When I see nacre as nacre, the silver that was seen is nullified, along with theignorance of nacre, by the knowledge that silver that was seen before is, infact, nacre only. This knowledge manifests as â€˜there is no silver thereâ€™ andâ€˜the silver that I saw was indeed nacre onlyâ€™. The ignorance of the firstkind, that everything is nothing but Brahman, will get nullified only with theknowledge of the substantive Brahman. Here ignorance of the second kind that itis silver gets nullified when the relative knowledge that it is nacre takesplace. As was pointed out above that it is not the destruction of the object but

destruction of the auxiliary causes which prevented the knowledge of therelative truth of the object. It was noted before that that â€˜this is silverâ€™is also formed due to the perception via sense input of the silvery-ness of theobject when the perceptuality condition is met. Implication is that substantivefor the silverperception in the mind is nothing but limiting consciousness-existence assaakshii. However in the perception of the silver as this is silver, there isonly knowledge of the mental impression of â€˜thisâ€™ and no knowledge of thissubstantive (consciousness-existence, saakshii) of the vRitti in the mind. Asthe knowledge of the substantive limiting-existence-consciousness is not thereeither in the dream perceptions or in the perception of silver where nacre is(that is the fundamental avidyaa related to all objects), the knowledge of therelative substantive nacre arises only by elimination of the adventitiousdefect, such as poor illumination. We will now address of the objectionsraised.

Objection: The objection is again from Naiyaayikas who consider the perceptionof silver where nacre is due to recollection of real silver existent somewhereand not perception of non-existent silver there. Hence the following question isframed from their perspective.

If we admit that the illusory existence for silver during the time that nacreappears as silver, there would never be a subsequent knowledge at any time(past, present or future) that can negate the illusory silver appearance in theform â€˜this is not silverâ€™ but only in the form, â€Ñow, it is not silverâ€™â€“ it is like â€Ñow, that is after baking, the jar is no more blackâ€™. Thatis blackness of the jar existing before is now removed due to baking. Blacknessof the jar was real until it is removed. Hence existence of black before and itsnon-existence after are of the same order of reality.

The objection is that the negation â€˜it is not silverâ€™ can be made only ifpreviously the silver that was perceived was real; and now we can dismiss thatperception by a realistic statement that there is no real silver. The argumentis simple; that there is no silver or the non-existence of silver now â€“ canonly be counter positive or opposite to the statement - there was real silverbefore. The non-existence of silver now is real, since it is nacre and notsilver. The objector says the non-existence of silver which is real can only becounter positive to or opposite to existence of real silver before. It cannotbe counter positive to existence of imaginary or illusory silver before.â€˜Illusory existenceâ€™ can be counter positive only to â€˜illusorynon-existenceâ€™. Similarly â€˜real non-existenceâ€™ can be counter positive toâ€˜real existenceâ€™ and not to â€˜illusory -existenceâ€™ as implied in thestatement â€˜it is not silverâ€™ as itnegates only the real existence not illusory existence.

Reply: That is not so. Here when we say â€˜it is not silverâ€™ when nacre isperceived as nacre, we are not negating real or a relative transactionalreality, silver, that is characterized by its silvery-ness. Therefore,non-existence that is denied by â€˜it is not silverâ€™ does not refer to real(within vyavahaara) silver anywhere, but only to the false silver that is seenin the object. Thus false silver is falsified by the statement â€˜this is not

silverâ€™ not the real silver that has silvery-ness associated with it.Technically, the counterpositive (pratiyogin) or opposite, of this non-existentâ€˜real-illusoryâ€™ silver, can never exists (if we say it exists, would implythat â€˜illusory silverâ€™ exists and that would lead to illusory silver is nomore illusory). It is similar to saying that â€˜there is no cloth existing asjarâ€™. Here jar-hood property is different from cloth-hood property. What isdenied is false attribute of jar-hood inthe cloth. Jar-hood is a distinguishing quality that is specific to a jar andnot to a cloth. Hence negation of a false â€˜jar-hoodâ€™ is always satisfied byany cloth, since there is never a jar-hood in any cloth. Similarly the negationof silvery-ness can always be fulfilled in any nacre. It may look like silverfrom a distance but it is never silver even when I am mistaking it as silver. Hence it is not denial of silver in the nacre when I say that it is not silverwhen I recognize that it is nacre, but denial of false silver that is attributedto the nacre due to adventitious defect. Hence once I know that it is nacre,even if I see shining attributive silvery-ness in the nacre, it will never bemistaken for silver since there is no â€˜silver-hoodâ€™ in the silver at anytime.

VP says false attribute (silvery-ness) abiding in a different substratum(nacre), where there is never an existence of the real object (silver) thatalways has silvery-ness as its real attribute, is permitted as vyadhikaraNa.When the silvery-ness is denied with the negation that â€˜there is no silverhere in the nacre that is seenâ€™, the negation applies not to the real silverbut to the false silver, which is illusory. It is similar to that there is nojar-hood in the cloth. The absence of silver in the nacre is always met in thepast, present and future, and also even when it is mistaken as silver. I caneven enjoy the silvery-attribute of nacre, even after denying that there is nosilver here but only a nacre. Similarly, I can enjoy the attributive objects inthe world, even after knowing that all objects are nothing but Brahman. Thefalse world gets falsified and not that â€ã real worldâ€™ is falsified (eventhough we mistake the false world asreal world) in the awakening of the knowledge that everything is nothing butBrahman. In fact only the false world that can get falsified by knowledge andnot any real world; and if there is such a real world it will never getfalsified since it is real (that is the definition of a real entity). Similarlyonly the false silver can get falsified when the true nature of the substantiveof the object, namely nacre, is known. We can say it is the vibhuuti of thenacre to have a silvery shining-ness without being silver. Similarly it is thevibhuuti of the Iswara or the Lord with attributes of variety of magnificentworld of objects without substantially becoming objects or while remaining asattribute-less and part-less Brahman. That is the essence of vibhuuti yoga inBhagawat Gita (Ch.10).

Objection: The next objection becomes little bit more technical here. Theobjector gives two choices. The objector asks that when one perceives theillusory silver in the nacre, whether the absolute existence as substratum ofthe illusory silver is known or unknown. As per Vedanta, when we say an objectâ€˜isâ€™, the Brahman, the absolute reality expresses as existence in theâ€˜is-nessâ€™ of the object, as its substantive. In the form of â€˜is-nessâ€™the absolute reality (as though) lends its existence or relative reality to the

object. Hence the objector asks, in the perception of the illusory silver, doesone have the knowledge of its absolute existence. If the answer is no, then itmeans that the absolute existence of illusory silver that has silvery-ness asits attributive content is not known (since existence of an object isestablished by the knowledge of its existence). If so, then the absence of ornon-existence of illusory silver cannot beperceived either. It means, if the existence is not perceived then itsnon-existence also cannot be perceived. Hence, one cannot make a statement thatthere is no illusory silver here. The objection is similar to saying that if theexistence of gaagaabuu is never known, then the statement that there is nogaagaabuu here also has any meaning, since absence of a non-existent object cannever be perceived.

Taking the second alternative, if the absolute existence of the illusory silveris known with the attribute of silveryness, since the perception depends on theexistence (perceptuality condition involves the existence of the object isunited with the subject consciousness), then it is not an illusory silver anymore, since it exists like nacre and is perceived by its silveryness. Thereforesilver that has silveryness will have to exist in the nacre or with the nacre.Therefore its existence cannot be denied by the statement â€˜there is no silverhereâ€™, as it is perceived and its existence is already known.

Reply: The above arguments are not correct from advaitic perspective. The pureexistence manifests in the nacre as â€ñacre isâ€™. The â€˜is-nessâ€™ or theabsolute existence forms the substantive for the nacre. This possibility comesfrom the scriptural statement that every thing is Brahman and Brahman is pureexistence without a second. If that possibility forms a basis for the existenceof the apparent nacre (first order) within vyavahaara, which is not absolutelyreal, then the same possibility forms the basis for (the second order)appearance of the illusory silver. We do not admit the first order silver (thereal silver) in the nacre since there is no silver-hood present in the nacre.Thus the pure existence in the form of â€˜silver-hood isâ€™ in the nacre is notadmitted since it is not there. Here we need to differentiate the vyavahaarasilver (relative reality that â€˜silver isâ€™) and illusory silver (prAtibhAsikaâ€˜silver isâ€™ as themental projection). Nacre forms the substantive for the prAtibhAsika and fornacre, in turn, pure existence forms the substantive. Hence indirectly pureexistence also forms the substantive for the illusory silver or prAtibhAsikasilver. The above objection is due to not clearly appreciating thevyaavahaarika and prAtibhAsika relative realities and their relative ontologicalstatus.

We do, however, admit â€˜transferâ€™ of attributes of one to the other (both ofthe same order of reality) constituting an error, where the thing that issuperimposed is not directly connected to the thing on which it is superimposed.That means they are relatively independent within the same order of reality. For example, we can perceive the redness associated with hibiscus flower on theclear crystal since redness of the flower is connected to the argon of thevision. That is, I can see the redness of the hibiscus of the flower as it isgetting reflected by the crystal nearby. I may mistake that the crystal is redwithout realizing that the superimposed attribute of redness of the crystal

comes from the nearby hibiscus flower. There is no origin of some imaginaryredness or unaccountable redness or illusory redness in the crystal.

Objection: Now the objector pushes the limit of the above example. The objectorsays, in the above example where redness associated with the clear crystal isknown to arise from the nearby hibiscus flower by the sense of vision. Hence theconnection between the redness in the crystal and the redness due to nearbyflower is established by the sense organ of vision. Hence redness in thecrystal is not created. Now suppose, if I cannot see the hibiscus flower due tosome obstruction, and therefore do not know that the redness is coming from anearby flower, then if I can still perceive or cognize the redness in thecrystal then one has to admit that the redness in the crystal is not real but isillusory (since we are ignorant of the source of redness).

Reply: There is no problem. We can accept that until the obstruction toperceive the flower is removed. We accept that it is illusory when we gain theknowledge or have the knowledge that crystal is always clear and all the colorsthat are seen are superimposition of attributes arising from objects elsewhere. The bottom line is the knowledge is taken as real until we have a contradictoryexperience to negate that knowledge. This forms the general definition forvalidity of all perceptions. Valid knowledge is that which is not contradictedby subsequent knowledge or experience. Absolute knowledge is that which remainsabsolutely real and never contradicted. Any other knowledge is relatively realuntil it is negated. Vedanta says the knowledge of the relative world is onlyrelative since from the absolute point they are nothing other than Brahman.Since the world is experience it is not unreal. Since it is neither real norunreal, it is mithyaa. TheprAtibhAsika is also comes under mithyaa like the silver that is experienced inthe nacre. It is not taken as illusory silver until one goes and pickup theobject and examines. No one goes after illusory silver, knowing that it isillusory. When silver is seen in the nacre, the silver seen is taken as real orvalid until subsequent knowledge negates the reality assumed for the illusorysilver. Similarly the world appears to be real but gets negated only when wehave the knowledge of Brahman, the substantive of the world. Then the apparentworld becomes apparent like the silver is apparent in the nacre. Hence we havepaaramaarthika satyam, vyaavahaarika satyam and praatibhaasika satyam.Perceptions at these three levels have to be understood.

We will next takeup the final topic in this section on â€˜perceptionâ€™.


In the conclusive part of the section on perception, VP summarizes the essenceof the perceptual knowledge. First, perceptual knowledge is direct andimmediate. There are two types of perceptual knowledge. One is based on thesense input forming the attributive content of the vRitti, which getsilluminated as it forms by the witnessing consciousness. All the objects thatare external are perceived through the sense input of their attributive content.The five senses, consisting of the sense of sight, the sense of sound, the senseof smell, the sense of taste, and the sense of touch, provide their input to themind in the form of vRitti. Each of the five senses, having its field of

operation specific, is connected to its respective sense organ. Thus eyes canonly see and ears can only hear, etc. The world is seen through these fivesenses hence it is called in Sanskrit, pra-panca. The second kind of perceptionthat was discussed by VP correspondsto the internal perceptions in the mind. Mind, however, is not a sense organ,in the Vivarana advaitic tradition. The mental imaginations or intuitions maybe considered as part of the sixth sense, but those do not come under directperceptual processes. The internal perceptions include the pleasures andpains, emotions of anger, love, jalousie, etc., which are also perceived andcognized as direct and immediate, as they rise in the mind. The attributivecontents of these emotions or internal perceptions are not from sense input,although sense input could give rise to these internal perceptions. Forexample, I may see an object of my love or hate in front of me, by perceptualprocess. However, that object may raise emotions of love or hate due to myattachments, and these emotions constitute internal perceptions, since theattributive content of the these emotions are not based on sense of vision, buton emotional attachments that I have. ThevRitti that is formed with attributive content of emotions are immediatelyillumined by witnessing consciousness as it rises in the mind. Perceptualitycondition is met when the existence of these emotions is united with theconsciousness of the subject.

VP also states here that the sense of smell, sense of taste, and the sense oftouch apprehend their respective objects while remaining where they are. Thesense of vision, the sense of sound have wider capacity to travel to the objectsthat are away. We have already pointed out that, as per the currentunderstanding of the science, the sound and light do travel by wave propagationand received by the eyes and ears forming the attributive content of the object.Without the loss of generality, we can say that eyes and ears do have a widervision, where the objects do not have to be in contact with the sense organ likethe case of the taste and touch. The objects of smell are somewhat tricky in thesense that we smell the fragrance emitted by the object out there away from thenose, but the emitting fragrant molecules from that object have to reach thenose for one to perceive the attributive smell of that object. However, in allcases, the vRitti thatforms should have the attributive content from the sense input for directperception of the object that is external to the mind. Here we are using themind as the reference for defining what is external and what is internal.

vyAvahArika vs. prAtibhAsika

We would like to make a distinction between the two aspects of perception beforewe go into other forms of pramaaNa, since VP has discussed about the perceptionof objects in the dream. The creation can be broadly classified as IswarasRiShTi and jiiva sRiShTi or creation by the Lord and creation by an individual.Creation by the Lord constitutes the total mind and creation by an individualconstitutes the individual mind, macro cosmic world and micro cosmic world,respectively. The two can also be stated from an individual perspective as â€˜itis there; therefore, I see itâ€™ and â€˜I see it; therefore, it is thereâ€™. Inboth cases there is a common theme â€“ â€˜I see itâ€™, that is, â€˜itâ€™ isestablished or its existence is established by my perception. This is similar

to the two descriptions of the creation; sRiShTi dRiShTi and dRiShTi sRiShTi.Vidyaranya says in Pancadasi that what is out there is Iswara sRiShTi and what Iexperience (of whatis there as well as what I project) is jiiva sRiShTi. Experience is at subjectlevel and what is there is objective world of plurality which is nothing butIswara sRiShTi. We need to understand the interrelation between the two thatplays a role in the perceptual process. The confusion can arise, as in manywestern philosophies, resulting in incorrect philosophical positions, if we donot separate the two entities involved in the perception.

Let us examine the macroscopic universe. Iswara is defined by all religions asâ€˜jagat kartaa IswaraHâ€™, the creator of this entire universe or â€˜TheCauseâ€™ for the whole universe, himself being a causeless cause or unborn (ajonityaH shAsvatoyam purAno ..). Most of the religions stop with that descriptionof the creator as pertaining to the intelligent cause for the universe. Vedantagoes one step further to define that Iswara is not only intelligent cause ornimitta kAraNa, but upAdAna kAraNa or the material cause as well. We have thusan improved definition for Iswara as â€˜jagat kAraNam IswaraHâ€™, where kAraNamor cause involves undifferentiable intelligent and material cause (abhinnanimitta upAdAna kAraNa). By defining that the material cause of the universe isalso Iswara, and since material cause has to pervade the effects (just as goldpervades the ornaments), Vedanta puts Iswara not up in the skies but right hereas the whole universeof objects. Thus Iswara pervades the universe as the very substantive for it.Ontologically, the cause and effects have different degrees of reality; Iswarais sentient and world is insentient. With this, Vedanta provides a thirddefinition for Iswara, to the contemplative students, as â€˜sarva adhiShTAnamIswaraHâ€™, that is, Iswara forming the substantive for all the sentient andinsentient entities in the universe. Implication of this in the perceptualprocess is very profound and is captured by Advaita Vedanta. This forms thebasis for the objective knowledge as attributive knowledge, since substantivefor all objects being Iswara, who is imperceptible. (I was listening to SwamiParamaarthanandaji talks on Saddarshan of Bhagavan Ramana this morning, whereSwamiji clearly endorses the above statements that Iswara (Brahman) is thesubstantive and because of this fact, all objective knowledge is onlyattributive knowledge, since sense cannot gathersubstantives). Because of the non-substantive or only attributive knowledge ofthe objects, errors in perception can also occur at an individual level due toincomplete attributive knowledge of the objects perceived by the senses due toadventitious defects, such as poor illumination, etc. Because of the lack ofsubstantive knowledge by the senses, the fundamental error that â€˜what I see(the world of objects) is realâ€™ also occurs. Even at a relative level, errorin perception occurs by the same reason. I take for granted that the silver thatI see is real based on the attributive silvery-ness gathered and due to lack ofthe substantive knowledge of nacre. Thus the error both at relative level and atabsolute level is due to lack of substantive knowledge of the object.

In addition, Iswara being substantive for all objects, objects do not havesubstance of their own. They also lack inherent quality that defines themuniquely and precisely as their swaruupa lakshaNam (necessary and sufficientqualification that defines the object uniquely to differentiate it from the rest

of the objects in the universe). They are only names for forms or attributivecontent. For the objects constituting the universe, the attributes of theobjects that differentiate one object from the other also come as part of theircreation, starting from the primordial cause â€“ maayaa. The blue prints for thecreation of universe of objects are provided by the karmas of jiivas in theprevious cycle; and for the previous cycle previous to previous cycle; thus thecreation becomes beginningless. Maaya is defined as the force which makes oneto appear as many, with each apparent object differentiable from others by itsattributive content. Any forceis always defined or recognized only by its effect, as illustrated by theNewtonâ€™s laws of force. Newton, for example, defines the force as that whichmoves an object at rest or that which changes the magnitude or direction of amoving object. Or conversely, the force is recognized or defined by the changesin the movement. Similarly maayaa is defined that which causes one to appear asmany, similar to gold appearing as many ornaments. Locus for the force isIswara, himself. Thus Vedanta provides the definition for maayaa as prakRiti(maayantu prakRitim vidyaat) that projects the world of plurality of movablesand immovables, starting from one, under the direction of Iswara. Thus IswarasRiShTi at the absolute level is nothing but Iswara himself appearing as manyobjects, with varieties of attributive content. Since senses cannot graspIswara, the substantive of all, they gather the attributive content of theobjects that are within the reach of thesenses. Since attributes are not the objects per sec, it appears that in theperceptual process the attributes are getting separated from the substantive. Attributes cannot exist without substantive. Since Iswara is all pervading orinfinite and being substantive, attributes cannot be separated from theinfinite, either. In the relative plane, each of the five senses measure theattributes of the objects â€õut thereâ€™ depending on their capabilities, andthe measured attributes gets locussed in the image â€˜vRittiâ€™ that forms inthe mind. Thus object â€õut thereâ€™ with the attributes and the associatedvRittiâ€™s in the mind with sense-measured attributes are inter related as thelater is the image of the former created by the individual jiiva, in his ownmind. We can consider that the objects â€õut thereâ€™ are Iswara sRiShTi andimage in the mind that forms is jiiva sRiShTi, although the mind of the jiivaand the capacity of the mind tocreate come from Iswara only. Thus perceptuality condition is stated by VP asthe existence of the object out there is imaged as the existence in form of thevRitti. This existence now in the form of vRitti is united with theconsciousness of the subject, for the subject to be conscious of the vRitti. Thus, through the vRitti, conscious of object â€õut thereâ€™, with theattributes of the object that the senses could gather, becomes perceptualknowledge of the object. The vRitti replicates in a subtle form the object outthere, only to the degree that the senses could capture the attributive contentof the object perceived. The errors can therefore arise if the attributivecontent of the vRitti do not completely replicate the original object. Thereasons could be defects in the senses or defects in the auxiliary causes suchas insufficient light, or some other obstructions, etc. Therefore what I see asthe world is limited by my senses.

At the individual level, jiiva also does exactly the same in the creation of thedream world, at micro cosmic level. He becomes Iswara for the creation of the

dream world of plurality. The intelligent and the material cause rests withjiiva for the dream. We can broadly define the vyaavahaarika satyam ortransactional or transmigrational reality corresponds to Iswara sRiShTi andprAtibhAsika as the individual mental projection of the world of plurality. When jiiva goes to sleep, the mind of the jiiva, supported by the samewitnessing consciousness, now forms the basis for the projection of the dreamworld of plurality. Interestingly, mind not only projects the inert objects,but even the sentient entities in the dream world along with jiiva now localizedas a separate subject who is experiencing the dream world of plurality. Thatjiiva in the dream is awake and has his own body, mind and intellect separatefrom the beings that have their own bodies,minds and intellects. Thus the analogy between the dream world as the jiivasRiShTi and waking world as the Iswara sRiShTi is exact. For the dreamer jiiva(who is actually awake in the dream) the dream world is real just as the wakerjiiva in the waking world sees the waking world as real, while concluding thatthe dream world that he saw in his dream was not real since it is sublated. This conclusion is by a waker not a dreamer. For a dreamer the dream world is asreal as the mind that sees and feels. Considering the dreamer subject, heperceives the objects of the dream world in front of him, through his senses,similar to the process in the waking world- so states the ManDukya Up. In factthe Upanishad uses a parallel statement for dream as in the waking world withâ€˜ekona vimshati mukhaH .. etc, describing the dreamerâ€™s outlook of the dreamworld in parallel to the wakerâ€™s out look of the waking world. Theperceptuality condition has to besatisfied in the dream world too. The dream world is external to the dreamer.His mind may project internal perceptions and vRittis in his mind â€“ which aredifferent from the minds of the other jiivas in his dream world. What isexternal and what is internal is now defined from the point of the dreamerâ€™stiny mind. The wakerâ€™s mind that went into sleep is now all pervading andforms the material cause for all the objects and beings, including theirbody-mind-intellect assemblies. Thus we have vyaavahaarika and prAtibhAsika inthe dream world too where vyaavahaarika is defined as Iswara sRiShTi andprAtibhAsika is jiiva sRiShTi. The relative planes have shifted relative to eachother â€“ The systems otherwise are exactly parallel. What is real and what isunreal in these projections therefore depends on the reference plane. Theabsolute reality independent of any frame of reference, as ManDukya declares inmantra 7 as turiiyam and is the pureexistence-consciousness which is advaitam, one without a second. That alone isthe absolute truth. In all other planes of reference, the limitingexistence-consciousness manifests as the relative knowledge through theperceptual process. The declaration of the scriptures is - you are that. Whenone is conscious of the object, the consciousness that beams through as thereflected consciousness as knowledge of the object is nothing but pureconsciousness alone, as declared by VP in the very introduction to the topic ofperception. Every perception of object is therefore soaked in my consciousnessfor me to be conscious of the object. Hence Bhagavan Ramana says in his Upadesasaara:

dRisya vAritam cittamAtmanAH|citta darshaNam tatva darshaNam||

In the perception of every object (dRisyam) there is existence-consciousnessreflected on it. Hence if we remove the attributive content (or look beyond theattributive content) what is there in every dRisyam is the pureexistence-consciousness alone. The existence of the object is united with theconsciousness of the subject to cause perceptual knowledge. The substantive forboth the object and the subject is pure existence-consciousness alone. Ramanastates that understanding of the substantive forms the inquiry of the nature ofthe reality of the jiiva-jagat or subject-object duality.

Hence VP statement in the beginning â€“ pratyakshapramaa ca atra caitanyam evaâ€“ knowledge of perception as â€˜conscious of the objectâ€™ is nothing but pureconsciousness alone - is justified by the detailed analysis of the perceptualprocess. Shifting from the attributing content of the vRitti to the illuminatingconsciousness that forms the basis for the knowledge of the object â€“ forms anessential saadhana to recognize that the substantive for the whole world ofobjects is nothing but consciousness alone. The scriptural declaration - Sarvamkhalu idam brahma - all this is nothing but Brahman - becomes evident throughthe inquiry of the perceptual process. When the objects are perceived with theattributive contents, along with the attributive knowledge which is representedas â€˜formâ€™, naming has to take place representing the knowledge. Naming isknowing, and perceptual knowledge therefore leads to name and form constitutingthe world ofobjects, since the substantive is Braham, which is beyond the name and form. Hence object is nothing but Brahman with name and form. The statement alsoimplies that world is as perceived by a conscious entity establishing itsexistence with names and forms. Hence world is established by the knowledge itsexistence. Without a conscious entity, world cannot be independentlyestablished.

We will now take up the analysis of Inference as pramaaNa.


We have discussed thus for the knowledge through perceptual process. This isdirect and immediate means of knowledge of objects and thus the world. Fivesenses forms the means through which the external world is perceived. Similarlythe perception of internal emotions also happens directly and immediately. Since it is immediate and direct, the perceptual knowledge occurs in thepresent. However, present is not in time, it is actually beyond the timeconcept as discussed earlier. One can â€˜rideâ€™ on the present, live in thepresent, work in the present and enjoy in the present only, but yet, there is noâ€˜timeâ€™ in the present. It is a dynamic present and not static. Life involvesmovement. Movement involves a reference. That which is static in the dynamic isoneâ€™s presence. For time to be conceptualized one needs two sequential eventsor sequential experiences, present and past, translated as â€ñowâ€™ andâ€˜thenâ€™. Hence living all the timein the present is same as going beyond the â€˜timeâ€™ concept, which requirestremendous discipline of the mind for it to get detached from attachments to thepast and anxieties about future. That can be done more easily if one surrendersthe past and the future at the alter of devotion, while acting in the present asan offering to that Lord. That forms the essence of surrender or sharaNAgati.

Perceptual process then becomes living with the world in the present. The staticthat is behind the dynamic present involves the conscious presence. In thatunderstanding, the Lord and the subject is understood as one and the same. Thenwhat is perceived, the means of perception, as well as the knowledge ofperception, all the three (tripuTi) are recognized as either His vibhuuti or theglory of the consciousness itself.

In the perceptual process we reduce the existence that which is one without asecond into a binary format. That is, there are only two things â€“ the subjectI, a conscious entity, who is present all the time and changing objects ofperception, that is the world. This reduces to â€˜I thoughtâ€™ aham vRitti andâ€˜this thoughtâ€™ idam vRitti; also as perception and apperception, in terms ofthe pot expressed as knowledge of â€˜this is a potâ€™ and cognition of thatknowledge as â€˜I know this is a potâ€™ â€“ knowledge of the known and knowledgeof the knower knowing known. Known keeps changing with changing â€˜thisâ€™ oridam, while the knower, the subject remains the same.

Coming back to the means of knowledge of â€˜thisâ€™, according to Advaita, whichfollows closely Bhatta Schollo of Miimaamsa, there are six means of knowledgeof which the perception is direct and immediate. The other means of knowledgeare anumaana (inference), shabda (verbal testimony), upamaana (simile),arthaapatti (postulation), and anupalabdi (non-apprehension). In contrast toperception, other pramANas are considered as indirect and mediate knowledge.According to Advaita, shabda can be also direct and immediate under certaincircumstances. That is when the object of knowledge is immediately available,and is being directly pointed out, as in the case of the 10th man story. Thatwhich is indirect and mediate knowledge rests on pratyaksha or direct perceptionfor its validation. In science, we follow closely the anumaana or inferentialknowledge based on perceptual data. Based on the effects that we perceive wededuce the cause for the effectswhere deductive and/or inductive reasoning is employed to arrive at theknowledge. Here, the perception of the data or observations is the directknowledge, and deductive cause for the observed effects perceived is indirectknowledge. Thus inferential knowledge follows the perceptual knowledge â€“Hence it is called anumaana meaning knowledge that follows perceptual knowledge.In understanding the inferential process, NaiyAyikas have taken the lead byproviding a systematic study of the inferential knowledge. Indian philosophersclosely follow NaiyAyikas in this regard, although they deviate from NaiyAyikasin details. VP discusses extensively the deviations from the Advaiticperspective.

The basic ingredients in anumaana are the effects that are perceived,technically called hetu, and based on which a conclusion that one arrives at,which is the inferential knowledge and is called saadhya. There has to be somebasis for the deduction and that is the relation between the effects and thecause; that relationship is called vyaapti, which must have been established apriory by previous direct perceptual process. Hence the inferential knowledgeis essentially based on the vyaapti, the relation between the cause and theeffects, which western epistemologists call it as invariable concomitance.Vyaapti means pervasion or inherence â€“ here it is the inherence of saadhyawith hetu. That is, wherever saadhya is there hetu should be there or universal

inherence of one with the other. This forms the core of inferential knowledge.The simple example is wherever there is smoke there must be fire. Here smoke isthe hetu and fire is saadhya. Thisvyaapti or concomitant relation between smoke and the fire is established byperceptual knowledge in the past, as in the kitchen. Here the relation betweenthe hetu and saadhya is direct, while the converse relation is not true, that iswherever there is fire there need not be smoke, as in red hot iron ball. Hencethe pervasiveness of hetu and saadhya are not necessarily reciprocal. This wewill establish later by logic called anvaya and vyatireka, which provides therelation between two things. Once this vyaapti jnaanam or the knowledge of theconcomitant relation between smoke and the fire is established, then whenever Isee smoke, I can infer that there must be fire, even if I do not see the fire.Hence vyaapti forms the basis of the interferential knowledge. Thus the basicingredients of the inferential knowledge are hetu, perceptual data based onwhich the inferential knowledge is drawn, saadhya, the inferential knowledge orconclusion that ismade and vyaapti, the basis on which this conclusion is made that is theinherent relation between the hetu and saadhya.

In the example of smoke and fire, the relation between them is not reciprocal.It is only unidirectional and not bidirectional â€“ this is called asama orunequal vyaapti. In establishing these relation NaiyAyikas have developed anvyaaand vyatireka relations between two entities. These logical deductions are basedon Navya Naaya developed extensively by Gangesha UpAdhyAya of 11th century.There are cases where reciprocity is valid. For example let us examine theproposition â€“ whatever is namable is knowable - and conversely, whatever isknowable is namable. Here the vyaapti is called sama vyaapti since reciprocityis valid means of knowledge. Coming to anvyaa, it refers to the affirmativerelation where one is, the other is. In the case of smoke and fire, we have thecase â€“ smoke is, the fire is. Here one is dependent and the other isindependent. Hence independent can exist independently of the other â€“ hencevyatireka vyaapti does not holdhere - this is expressed as smoke is not, but fire is. That is, fire can existindependent of having smoke â€“ and the example we have is Red hot iron ballwhere there is fire but no smoke. The independent variable is called vyaapakaor principle concomitant and in our example it is â€˜fireâ€™. The dependentvariable, in the example it is smoke, is called vyaapya or subordinateconcomitant.

According to Nyaaya, starting from a vyatireka vyApti or negative invariableconcomitance one can infer the presence of one thing due to the presence of theother. Negative invariable concomitance means their agreement in absence of onedue to the other. In the case of fire and smoke, the vyatireka vyaapti could beâ€“ If there is no fire there is no smoke, as on the lake. Adviatins do notsubscribe for this. For them the abover is a postulation (arthaapatti), whichwe will take up later, and not anumaana. Anumnaana is based on anvaya vyaaptior positive concomitant relation between saadhaka (hetu) and saadhya. That isknowledge of a positive entity, the perception of smoke from which the presenceof fire is inferred. It becomes round about to infer that when there is no firethere will not be smoke, and since there is smoke now there should be fire.Inference is not just cause â€“ effect relations either, as some Buddhists

subscribe. In thecause-effect relation there is taadatmya or identity in essence. That is theeffect is nothing but cause itself in different form. Hence perception of effectis perception of cause itself in a different form. However inference isdifferent in the sense that there is no taadaatmaya or indentity in theiressence between hetu and saadhya. For example, there is no identity in essencebetween smoke and fire. With this background, we are ready to examine theVedanta ParibhASha text on inference.

anumaana: VP defines anumaana as the instrument of inferential knowledge calledanumiti (anumiti karaNam anumAnam). Anumiti as we explained above is theknowledge that follows (anu = after and miti = knowledge). That is, it followsanother knowledge i.e. knowledge of data. The knowledge that follows has tohave a bearing with the knowledge that proceeded. Hence the later knowledge thatis gained is only because of the inherent relation with the former knowledge. Ifthe inherent relation is not known then the later knowledge will not take place.Hence the later knowledge is produced by the knowledge of the invariableconcomitance or vyaapti. The nature of the later knowledge therefore depends notonly on the knowledge of the data that is perceived but also on the exactknowledge of the vyaapti or the invariable concomitance. Hence the knowledgethat follows, anumiti, is not an attributive objective knowledge but knowledgethat is purely based on logicaldeduction, which in turn is based on the knowledge of the invariableconcomitance. Invariability involves the universality of the relation implyingthat there is no exception to the rule. Taking the example of smoke and thefire, perception of the smoke is direct objective knowledge which isattributive. That is the vRitti that is formed has in its contents theattributes of the smoke and smoke is recognized directly and immediately. Thatis the based on pratyaksha pramaaNa. anumiti follows if we have the knowledgeof vyaapti that relates smoke to the fire. That is, wherever there is smokethere must be fire, and is a universal invariable concomitance or vyaapti. Hence the inferential knowledge that follows depends on the exact knowledge ofthis invariable concomitance. We concluded based on the vyaapti that there mustbe fire. Fire is not an objective knowledge like that of smoke. Just as asupposition, if smoke is related to dust, we can saythere is dust there based on the invariable concomitance that wherever there issmoke there is dust. Thus the knowledge that it is fire or dust depends on thenature of vyaapti. These examples illustrate the fact that the inferentialknowledge is as good as or as valid as the knowledge of the invariableconcomitance and nothing more. Validity of the inferential knowledge depends onthe validity of vyaapti only. Hence vyaapti or the invariable concomitance formsthe core of the inferential knowledge.

When the perception of the smoke occurs, as we discussed before, a vRitti formsbased on perception of the attributes of the smoke. The resulting knowledge ofthe smoke is direct and immediate. Along with knowledge of the smoke there isimmediate cognition of the knowledge that â€˜I know this is smokeâ€™ â€“ thus wehave first â€˜this is smokeâ€™ through vRitti and followed by what is known asapperception that â€˜I know this is smokeâ€™ follows. We mentioned thataccording to Advaita apperceptual knowledge occurs because knowledge is selfrevealing. That is, we do not need another means to know that I know. If another

means is required then we will end up with infinite regress problem, sinceknowing that again we need another means, etc. Apperception is not aninferential knowledge, but it is self-revealing knowledge. VP says even in thecase of inferential knowledge that â€˜there is fire there since I see smokeâ€™,that inferential knowledge of thefire is self revealing and does not depend again on another vyaapti since itwill lead again to infinite regress. Hence, VP says once inferential knowledgethrough vyaapti is known that inferential knowledge is self-revealing and doesnot depend on another concomitant relation. Similarly the recollection of thevyaapti â€“ that wherever there is smoke there must be fire â€“ that vyaaptiagain is not based on another concomitant relation.

Vyaapti is based on previous experience of the cause effect relationshipestablished by pratyaksha pramaaNa only. That the vyaapti â€˜wherever there issmoke there must be fireâ€™ is established by direct observation of the relationbetween the smoke and fire. The knowledge of the vyaapti has to be known fromthe past observations. Now when I see smoke on a distant hill, the vyaapti orthe concomitant relation between the smoke and fire comes from recollection frommemory. VP says that recollection of the vyaapti between smoke and fire isagain not based on anther vyaapti or another relation, since such requirementwould lead again to infinite regress. Hence it is said that vyaapti is not basedon another vyaapti for operation.

We can however have a sequential logical deduction before inferential knowledgecan takes place. The vyaapti chain can be of the form A is related to B and Bis related to C and C is related to D and therefore A is related to D. Hereeach one is definite and precise relation. Ultimately A is related to D andthat vyaapti involves interlinking to B and C via secondary vyaaptis orconcomitant relationships, each being universally applicable in order for adoubt-free knowledge to take place. From hetu A to arrive at saadhya D, one hasto have complete knowledge of the vyaapti chain. If any missing link in thechain would not result in inferential knowledge of D. Ultimately A to Drelation forms one compound vyaapti involving interlinking logical deductionswhich are needed to arrive at the inferential knowledge of D from A. vyaapti isnot a postulation; but universal concomitant relation between two things. Inaddition ambiguity in the knowledgeresulting in doubt formation can arise if the concomitant relation is notuniversal. That means if there many exceptions to the relation then theinferential knowledge is not free from doubts. As we discussed before doubtsare different from errors. For example if I am not sure it is rope or a snakethen it is considered as doubt. However, if I am sure that is a snake wherethere is a rope, then it is an error. In the case of a doubt the knowledge issubject to verification by the doubter. However if one has concluded that erroris the truth, there is no desire to enquire about the real truth. We haveconcluded that what I perceive is real and therefore the world is real. Hencethere is no desire to inquire about the absolute the reality of the world.Scripture points out that our conclusion about the world is in error, which wewill discuss with reference to shabda pramaaNa.

Coming back to the anumaana, both Adviatins and NaiyAyikas agree that inferenceas a means of knowledge operates at two levels; a) swaartha, inferring for

oneself and b) paraartha, logically deducing for others. In inferring foroneself, he remembers the concomitant relation between what he sees and deduceswhat he does not see. When he sees the smoke, he remembers that smoke cannotexist without fire, and therefore infers that there is fire there although hecannot see the fire. But when presenting these facts to the others, he has toprovide a formal statement of reasoning (syllogism) in order to convince them ofthe fact there is fire even though they cannot see the fire. The syllogisminvolves three steps, according to Adviatins while Naiyayikas feel five stepsare required to convince the others. A detailed discussion of this can be foundin Methods of Knowledge by Swami Satprakashananda of Adviata Ashrama. The directand necessary parts consist ofa) proposition or pratijnaa as in, there is fire on the hill, although we donot see, b) the reason (hetu) this proposition is made â€“ Because we see smokeon the hill and c) justification with example â€“ vyaapti with dRiShTanta â€“wherever there is smoke there must be fire, as in the kitchen. Using the westernlogic, vyaapti is considered as major and current premise or observation iscalled minor based which a conclusion is made. That the major promise is â€“wherever there is smoke there must be fire - and the minor premise is that thehill has smoke and conclusion is therefore the hill is on fire. Naiyayikassubscribe to five step process and how they differ from Advaitins will bediscussed next. VP highlights these differences.


We are discussing the anumaana pramaaNa as the means of knowledge, where theknowledge follows another knowledge, anumiti. Inferential knowledge takes placebased on perceptual knowledge. The classical example is â€“ I see smoke on thedistant hill, and I infer that the hill on fire, even though I do not see fire.Here knowledge of smoke and the distant hill occurs by perceptual process. Hence they are objective knowledge based on attributive content. The knowledgeis immediate and direct as we discussed before. However fire is not immediateand direct since I do not perceive fire. I infer that the distant hill is onfire based on the concomitant relation between smoke and fire, which is calledvyaapti. The inference depends on this relation or vyaapti; and if I do not knowthe relation, I cannot infer that there is fire on the distant hill. Technically the terms used in formulating this means of knowledge are: hetu,linga, mark or middle term -refers to the smoke on the distant hill; the saadhya, character or majorpremise - refers to fire on the distant hill. The hill itself is called paksha,the minor term. The conclusion or inference however is based on the concomitantrelation between the smoke and the fire and is called vyaapti. Vyaapti in thiscase is, wherever there is smoke there is fire, as is observed in the kitchen.Kitchen example provides a dRiShTanta for establishing the concomitant relationbetween smoke and fire. We have mentioned that vyaapti is asama, meaning it isunidirectional, that is wherever there is smoke there is fire but not the otherway i.e. wherever there is fire there need not be smoke. For example we do notsee smoke with the red-hot iron ball.

The invariable concomitance or vyaapti between middle term or hetu (smoke) andthe major term, saadhya (fire) is the back bone of inferential knowledge orsyllogism. It provides a universal proposition showing the connection betweenthe two. It has to be acquired by observation and generalization. Observationin a kitchen (in olden days where fire wood is used generally for cooking) thatsmoke is there whenever fire is there; and this observation is now generalizedthat â€˜wherever there is smoke there must be fireâ€™. That forms the vyaapti orinvariable concomitant relation. As per Indian logic, the universal propositionis supported by at least one observation, if there are no contradictoryobservations. Hence inferential knowledge, according to India logic, involvesdeductive and inductive reasoning; and there is no separation between the two,as in western logic. Anumaana or inferential knowledge is therefore, aninductive generalization withdeductive particularization. Particular observation is, I see smoke when thereis fire in the kitchen. Deductive reasoning is whenever there is smoke in thekitchen there must be fire there. Generalization of this is to conclude whereverthere is smoke there must be fire â€“ that is independent of any condition. Thatgeneralization is by induction that smoke cannot exist independent of fire.

Advaitic position differs from NaiyAyikas in several aspects as outlined by VP. According NaiyAyikas the inferential knowledge involves several steps. Withreference to the fire example, the steps involved are as follows. First we seesmoke in a kitchen, etc. Second, we recollect that smoke is never without afire. Third, we consider that the smoke is on the distant hill where fire has tobe inferred by the process of what is known as paraamarsha. Thus this third stepthat involves paraamarsha is instrumental for the inferential knowledge. VPdismisses these procedural processes. It says we cannot establish that thisparaamarsha required for the inferential knowledge. Paraamarsha involvesbrooding over the observations and vyaapti to arrive at the conclusion that thedistant hill is on fire.

Then how does the inferential knowledge really takes place? VP says it is byvyaapaara and not paraamarsha. Vyaapaara is related to vyaapti. It involvesimmediate recollection or transaction with the concomitant relation between thehetu and saadhya. Hence as soon as I see the smoke on the distant hill, Iremember the universal relation that smoke cannot exist without a fire andtherefore infer that there is fire on the distant hill. The vyaapti is already auniversalized relation based on prior particular observation. Hence VP sayswhen vyaapti is available in the mind, then Vyaapaara (here connecting the smoketo the fire via the vyaapti) can take place in the mind without any paraamarshaneeded.

For the inferential knowledge to take place one should have the knowledge of theconcomitant relation. The knowledge should be available with the person as

latent impression in the mind for its immediate operation or vyaapaara or usewhen hetu is observed. Latent impression is not recollection, but is a sourcefor it. It is similar to saying that when I go to deep sleep state all theknowledge I have goes into latent form which can be materialized when I wake up.Hence recollection is not in the sense of what NaiyAyikas subscribe to. For theNaiyAyikas, recollection involves two aspects: its non-existent in the mindbefore a thing is recollected and its non-existence later after the operation ofinferential knowledge. That means the recollected information was not there inthe mind before or after. It is produced when it is needed and destroyed whenits function is over. These are called praak abhaava and pradhvamsa abhaava,that is itsnon-existence before and non-existence after. The reason they subscribe tothis is due to their belief in asat kaarya vaada that is existence comes fromits non-existenceâ€“ as the pot case â€“ it came into existence from itsnon-existence before and it goes into non-existence when it gets destroyed. Thusnon-existence of a thing forms the cause for its existence later. In thecurrent example, the recollection of vyaapti involves its coming into existencein my mind (so that I become aware of) from its non-existence and after theparaamarsha that is after the inferential knowledge has taken place, its goingback to its non-existent state.

VP rejects these arguments. If existence comes from non-existence it violatesthe fundamental law that non-existence can never become existence (naasatovidyate bhaavaH). Besides, there is no particular reason why a specific vyaaptithat is needed can come into existence since any vyaapti can arise from itsnon-existence. In addition, there is no reason to have a prior vyaapti to beestablished by dRiShTanta or observation. Advaita does not subscribe to asatkaarya vaada. Vyaapti is in potential form or latent form in the mind whichcomes into existence when needed. When there are many types of vyaaptis storedin a latent or potential form only that which is relevant will come forrecollection. In the example, it is the vyaapti that relates the smoke to fire.Latent impression means it exists as latent, just as pot exists in potentialform in the clay. This is called samskaara or latent impression in the mindabout the concomitant relation.

VP discusses how the processes of inferential knowledge take place. There is alatent impression in the mind formed previously by generalization of theparticular observation that smoke is there only when there is fire. This latentimpression is in unmanifested form However, when I have a perceptual knowledgeof smoke on a distant hill, the latent impression manifests in the form ofvyaapti, providing the concomitant relation between smoke and fire. Hence VPrules out the NaiyAyikas position that recollection arises from its priornon-existence state. Latent impression relating to vyaapti exists which forms abasis for recollection of the vyaapti. Similarly it dismisses their positionthat recollection destroys preexisting latent impression. In addition VP says

latent impression has to be awakened to form a basis for recollection. If it isnot awakened by the perception of the hetu and unawakened latent impressioncannot give rise to inferentialknowledge, since vyaapti is not materialized in the mind. Hence one canconsider awakening of the latent impression as an auxiliary cause since it formsa basis for recollection of vyaapti. Thus VP says, the inferential knowledge â€“â€˜the hill has fireâ€™- arises as soon as I see smoke on the distant hill,which triggers the latent impression to give rise to recollection of vyaapti.Vyaapaara takes place and the mind infers that there is a fire on the distanthill. There is no reason to have a third factor that involves paraamarsha asdiscussed above which is only a cumbersome addition not needed to arrive at theinferential knowledge. In the example, the inferential knowledge is only thatthere is a fire in the distant hill because I see smoke there. The smoke and thehill are objects of perceptual knowledge. The smoke and the hill are thereforeobjective knowledge based on their attributive content. The inferentialknowledge that there is fire isnot an objective knowledge with attributive content of fire. This aspect wehave discussed it earlier in relation to perception.

The vyaapti or invariable concomitance involves the coexistence of the saadhya,that is the thing that is inferred, in our fire case it must be valid for allsituations where the existence of hetu (in our example, smoke) is observed. Thisconcomitant relation between the two has been established by the observation ofboth and with out any exceptions, that is without observing any time smokewithout fire. VP says it does not matter whether this coexistence of the two isobserved once or many times as long as no violation of their coexistence isnoted. What counts is observation of the coexistence without any violation.Other philosophers say that the observations should be more than once, and themore the better. to establish the universality of the vyaapti, without anyviolations. Advaita and Nyaaya agree that one observation is enough sincevyaapti is both deductive and inductive as long as no exceptions are observed.

Types of inferences according to NaiyAyikas: Based on anvaya and vyatirekalogic, NaiyAyikas propose three different types of vyaaptis or invariableconcomitant relations.a) anvaya-vyatireka (affirmative-negative)b) kevala anvaya (purely affirmative)c) kevala vyatireka (purely negative)In the first case the concomitant relation between the hetu and saadhya arerelated to each other both affirmatively and negatively. This is determined byobservation of their co-presence and co-absence. In the case of smoke and firethe positive concomitant relation involves â€˜smoke is fire is, as in thekitchenâ€™. The negative concomitant relation involves â€˜smoke is not fire isnot, as on the lakeâ€™. That is, there is agreement in the presence as positiveor affirmative vyaapti and also there is agreement in their absence as negative

vyaapti. Both establish the relation between smoke and the fire. Advaitin donot subscribe for the requirement of both. They only subscribe for theaffirmative and not for the negative. When there is smoke there must be fire isthe affirmative and is sufficient for the inferential knowledge. I see the smokeon the distant hill and based on the anvaya vyaapti or affirmative invariableconcomitance that wheneverthere is smoke there must be fire. Therefore I can infer that there is fire onthe hill. NaiyAyikas say that even the negative concomitance can causeinferential knowledge. I see the smoke on the distant hill. Now applying thenegative concomitance we have to infer as, â€˜if there is no smoke there mustnot be fire, as on the lakeâ€™. Since there is smoke on the hill there must befire. First it is a round about logic. Second, the vyatireka or negative logicis faulty for many reasons. For one, if three is no smoke on the lake, manythings may not be there along with the absence of fire. Hence co-absence may notbe generic to smoke in relation to fire. Hence the inter relation between smokeand the fire is not invariable for the concomitance to work. Hence Advaitarejects this requirement of negative concomitant relation to arrive at theinferential knowledge. For adviatins, the negative concomitance discussed abovecomes under postulation thanvyaapti. In order to establish inferential knowledge between hetu and saadhya,all we need is positive concomitant relation between the two.

Purely affirmative concomitant relation is the second type according toNaiyAyikas. Purely affirmative concomitance involves saadhya, the thing to beinferred to be present everywhere or to put it technically, it is not counterpositive to non-existence. Counter positive to non-existence in simple terms isexistence, as it is opposite to non-existence. They give example for purelyaffirmative concomitance as â€“ â€˜the jar is nameable, because it isknowableâ€™; because nameability (saadhya or thing that is inferred) iseverywhere, since whatever is knowable is nameable. Since the absence ofknowability and nameability is no where to be observed, the knowledge ofnegative concomitance is not possible. Hence NaiyAyikas argue that this is thecase of pure affirmative concomitance. Advaitin obviously reject this. For themthat which is counter positive to non-existence is existence itself, which isBrahman, and which is non-dual and by definition cannothave any qualifications what so ever. There is no co-presence of anything elsewith Brahman. Hence they do not subscribe to kevala anvaya or purelyaffirmative concomitance.

Similarly there is also purely negative inference or kevala vyatireka,according to NaiyAyikas, inference is solely based on the negative invariableconcomitance. The example they give is â€“ â€˜God is Omnipresent, because He isthe creatorâ€™. The vyaapti for this is purely negative invariable concomitance,â€˜whoever is not Omnipresent is not the creatorâ€™. No knowledge of positive oraffirmative invariable concomitance is possible in this case â€“ if there is it

would read for example as He is Omnipresent, therefore He is the creatorâ€™-such statement is not possible since co-presence of â€Õmniscienceâ€™ andâ€˜creatorshipâ€™ is no where to be observed. Advaitins reject the purelynegative concomitance as the basis of inference, since such a knowledge is notpossible.

Hence Adviatins reject both purely affirmative (kevala anvaya) and purelynegative (kevala vyatireka) invariable concomitant relationships between twoentities â€“ hetu and saadhya. They only subscribe for positive (not purelypositive) or anvaya vyaapti or invariable concomitance. VP establishes this byrejecting the NaiyAyikas position. For more detailed discussion of the above,please refer to Methods of Knowledge by Swami Satprakashananda.


Inferential knowledge is classified into two types; inference for one self andfor others. We have discussed so far how the process occurs for oneself. Wehave vyaapti that provides the concomitant relation between the hetu, the mark,and saadhya, the inferred knowledge. The invariable concomitant relationship wasestablished by observation of co-existence of hetu and saadhya andnon-observation of any violation of their co-existence. It involves bothdeductive and inductive logic in generalization as invariable concomitance basedon particular observations. For example an invariable concomitant relationbetween the smoke and fire is established that states that â€˜wherever there issmoke there must be fireâ€™ â€“ which is a generalization of particularobservation that whenever there is smoke in the kitchen it is invariablyassociated with fire. The knowledge of this relation is stored in the memory aslatent knowledge. When I see smoke on a distanthill, immediately I remember the concomitant relation between the smoke andfire and infer that there must be fire on the distant hill. This is the processis defined as vyaapaara involving mental association between the smoke and thefire using the vyaapti that has been established.

In communicating this inferential knowledge to others and for them to reach thesame inference, a logical sequence of procedure is to be adopted and thesesequential steps are referred to in western logic as Syllogism. According toNyaaya School, there are five steps involved in convincing others so they alsoarrive at the same inferential knowledge. The steps involved are:(a)The proposition to be proved â€“ pratijnaa â€“ ex. The hill has fire.(b)Reason (hetu) for this conclusion --ex. Because I see smoke on the hill.(c)Vyaapti â€“ concomitant relation with- -ex. wherever there is smoke thereis supporting example (udaharaNa) fire, as in kitchen.(d) Application of vyaapti ex. Hill is smoky, smoke is alwayswith fire.(e) Conclusion reached (nigamana) ex. Therefore the hill has fire.

According to advaita all the five steps are not necessary. In principle, onecan reach the same conclusion by following either the first three steps or thelast three steps. The two additional components are therefore unnecessary, saysVP.

Establishment of Unreality (mthyaatvam) of the Universe through Inference:

Advaita establishes the unreality of the universe using (a) shaastra pramaaNa,(b) inference or anumaana based on shaastra called shaastriiya anumaana, and (c)inference based on loukika or worldly examples. For the third case, Advaitaestablishes a vyaapti or concomitant relation based on the worldly examples toarrive at the unreality of the Universe. The discussion of the first two ispostponed to later when we take up the verbal testimony.

Vedanta as pramaaNa establishes that Brahman is the absolute truth. The wordBrahman itself means infiniteness, which by its very definition is advitiiyam orone without a second. If there is a second that is different from Brahman itwould limit Brahman; violating the infinite nature of Brahman. Therefore therecannot be anything other than Brahman. Hence if one sees any thing or things oruniverse of objects, they cannot be real but only apparent. Thus whatever I see,it cannot be real, as per Vedanta. In addition, Brahman cannot be seen sinceBrahman is infinite or limitless, as seeing involves seer-seen duality, which,being mutually exclusive, limit each other. If there is a universe that I see,it cannot be different from Brahman, since there cannot be anything other thanBrahman. It cannot be the same as Brahman either since Brahman being infinite ispart-less. In addition, since I am seeing the universe, the substantive of theuniversecannot be different from Brahman. Vedanta also says that Brahman is thematerial cause for the universe that I see. Hence according to Vedanta thesubstantive of universe is nothing but Brahman. But my senses which are limitedcannot perceive Brahman, the substantive. Since I do not see the substantive ofthe universe, whatever I see and conclude need not be real. In addition, if theuniverse really does not exist then I cannot see the universe and transact withit. Since I am seeing and transacting with it, universe does not come under thecategory of non-existence either, like vandhyaa putraH or son of a barren woman.Hence Universe cannot come under real existent or cannot come undernon-existent; it is called apparently existent or mithyaa.

After establishing the nature of inference, in terms of the reason, hetu, thesaadhya, the conclusion and vyaapti the concomitant relation between the hetuand saadhya, one can use the inference to establish the unreality of theuniverse. What is seen as in the case of smoke forms the mark or hetu or reasonfor the inference. I see the smoke on the distant hill or I see the silver onnacre or I see the snake there on the path. Since these are perceptual knowledge

based on the attributes perceived. Similarly I see the universe of objects withattributive contents. Perception of universe similar to perception of silver orsnake forms the hetu or reason. In relation to perception of silver where thereis nacre, I take silver is real and in relation to perception of snake wherethere is rope, I take snake is real. The reason for the error, as we discussedbefore is that due to some adventitious cause I am unable to see the reality ofthe object there orthe substantive of the object there. In the worldly examples the substantiveof the silver is nacre and substantive of snake is the rope. Thus errors inperception are recognized only when the reality of the substantive becomes knownthat is when the adventitious defects have been removed. Here we haveinferential knowledge with hetu, saadhya and vyaapti â€“ hetu being what I see. The concomitant relation connecting hetu with saadhya should be universal. Based on these worldly (loukika) examples we establish a vyaapti that isuniversally applicable that â€˜whatever the object seen is unreal, when we donot see or know the substantive, as in silver on nacre or snake on ropeâ€™. Thuswe have a concomitant relation between what is seen vs what is real. Brahman isthe absolutely real and is substantive for the universe. But as Brahman cannotbe seen or known (as an object), whatever the object seen or known by perceptioncannot be real, using thevyaapti, that is established.

In the perception of snake where there is rope, it is not that I see a snake ontop of rope or I see snake as part of rope. I see the snake where the rope is. Thus I do not see snake and rope together. This error is called adhyaasa orerror of superimposition. The error arises only because I do not see the rope asrope. The reason I do not see the rope as a rope, because of some adventitiouscause (poor illumination) I am unable to perceive all the attributes of theobject that define the object precisely as rope and not as a snake. In the caseof nacre also I am unable to see all its attributes but only see its partialattribute of silvery shining-ness.

In the case of Brahman, being infiniteness, there is nothing other than Brahmanto differentiate it from other things. Hence Brahman cannot have anyattributes, since attributes are those that differentiate one object fromothers. Vedanta says Brahman is pure existence-consciousness-limitlessness â€“these are not attributes but they are its very nature or swaruupam, looking fromthe point of attributive universe. When we say Brahman is the material cause ofthe universe, it becomes the substantive for all objects in the universe. SinceBrahman cannot be seen or known as an object (adreshyam), the substantive of theuniverse cannot be known or seen. Hence when we do not see or know thesubstantive and only see the universe of objects, using the vyaapti thatwhenever the substantive is not seen, whatever that is seen will be unreal sinceit gets sublated when one sees or knows the substantive, just as silver onnacre. When once we know the

substantive nacre, the silver seen is recognized as not real. Similarly once Iknow Brahman as substantive of the universe, I recognize that the universe thatI see is not real. However, based on the vyaapti that whenever the substantiveis not known or seen, the objects that are seen are not real. Since they areseen, they are not non-existent either since non-existent things cannot be seen.With this background let us examine VP statements.

VP says we can prove the unreality of the universe, which appears to be otherthan Brahman. This is because Brahman being infinite and substantive of theuniverse, whatever that is seen is unreal and it is like seeing unreal silver innacre. The nature of this error has already been discussed and establishedbefore when we were discussing the errors in perception. How can we prove theuniverse is unreal? How can we prove that silver is unreal where nacre is? Howcan we prove the snake is unreal where there is rope? It is very simple; thefact that what we see is not what it is proves that what we see is in error.Similarly Brahman is the substantive for the whole universe. We are not seeingBrahman but universe with names and forms. That means, we are seeing somethingother than what it is. It is obvious then that the universe that we see is notreal since we are seeing something different from what it is. VP says thisargument is a simpler than anyother.

VP now provides a definition for unreal (mithyaa). Unreality is somethingopposite to absolute non-existence. It appears to abide in whatever is supposedto be its substratum. VP says, the term â€˜supposed to beâ€™ is used to guardagainst absence of any true substratum and the term â€˜whateverâ€™ is used toprotect any coexistence of the object and the substantive as two entities. WhenI see silver where nacre is, â€˜silver is supposed to abide in whateversubstantive that is there (nacre)â€™ as I have no knowledge of nacre when I amseeing silver. Similarly silver that I see is not separate from nacre for it toco-exist with nacre. Here there are no two objects silver and nacre for me tosee silver. It is silver alone I see where nacre is. Hence silver is mithyaasince what is there is not what I see. Hence VP uses the definition provided byCitsukhaachaarya in Citsukhii (I-7-39) that mithyaa is that which is counterpositive (opposite) to theabsolute non-existence and abides (or appear to exist) in whatever supposed tobe its substratum. In simple terms it is sat asat vilakshaNam, since it is seentherefore it is not absolute non-existence (asat) but not real (sat) since it isabiding in something other than itself, like silver in nacre.

In the case of seeing the snake where there is rope, we have adhyaasa or errorof taking something other than what it is due to incomplete attributive contentdue to adventitious defects. Here the inference involved the vyaapti thatwhatever (object) seen is mithyaa if we do not know the substantive of the seen.Since Brahman, the substantive of the universe is not seen or known, the

universe that we see is mithyaa. VP uses next another vyaapti or concomitantrelation to establish by inference that universe that we see is mithyaa. Thisinvolves establishing a vyaapti that whatever object has parts is mithyaa sincethe substantive Brahman has no parts and therefore cannot be broken into parts.

Let us examine the cloth that we see. When we say it is a cloth, it appears tobe real, since transactionally at relative level we use it as a cloth. Insteadof cloth, What are there are cotton threads seen as a cloth. Cloth can be partedinto threads that it is made up of. Hence cloth is not a non-existent entitybut an entity that abides in the threads. The cloth is there for us toexperience but the truth of the cloth-experience is that it is nothing otherthan threads, which form the substantive for the cloth. If threads are removed,cloth cannot exist independent of the threads, while threads can existindependent of cloth. Thus by anvaya logic we have, cloth is thread is, while byvyatireka, we have cloth is not but thread is. Thus cloth becomes a dependent onthreads while threads become independent of being a cloth. This is true for allobjects that is made of up of parts. All objects that are made up of parts canbe parted or de-assembled intotheir constituent entities which are more real than the assembled objects. Allthe qualities of the objects also come under the same category â€“ they are notabsolutely non-existent but exist as abiding in something other than themselves.We cannot say color abides in color; it abides in cloth while cloth itselfabides in threads. One can continue this process. The threads themselves arenot non-existent but they abide in something other than themselves, the finermolecules, etc. Ultimately all objects in the universe can be parted since theyare made up of parts. That which abides in something other than itself ismithyaa. Only â€˜thingâ€™ that is part-less and abide in itself is Brahman. Herewe are using a loukika anumaana or worldly inference to say that whatever thathas parts is mithyaa. Since it is not absolutely non-existent and at the sametime it exists abiding in something other than itself. Thus using inference oranumaana we canestablish using worldly examples that the universe is mithyaa or apparentlyreal but really real.

We address next some of the objections to the above inference.

I find this list at the bottom got mixed up - breaking things at wrong place.posting only this part.

Hari Om!Sadananda------------(a)The proposition to be proved â€“ pratijnaa â€“ ex. The hill has fire.(b)Reason (hetu) for this conclusion --ex. Because I see smoke on the hill.(c)Vyaapti â€“ concomitant relation with supporting example (udaharaNa)- -ex.

wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in kitchen.(d) Application of vyaapti ex. Hill is smoky, smoke is always with fire.(e) Conclusion reached (nigamana) ex. Therefore the hill has fire.

-----------------------The steps involved are:> (a)The proposition to be proved â€“ pratijnaa â€“ ex. The> hill has fire.> (b)Reason (hetu) for this conclusion --ex. Because I see> smoke on the hill.> (c)Vyaapti â€“ concomitant relation with- -ex. wherever> there is smoke there is supporting example (udaharaNa) fire,> as in kitchen.> (d) Application of vyaapti ex. Hill is smoky, smoke is> always> with fire.> (e) Conclusion reached (nigamana) ex. Therefore the hill> has fire.>>


In the last discussion, it was shown that using inference we can arrive atknowledge that the universe is mithyaa, that is, it is not absolutely real orabsolutely unreal. Two vyaaptis or concomitant relations have been used toarrive at this conclusion. 1. The first vyaapti is: Objects in the universe aremithyaa if they are counter positive to absolute non-existence (that is they arenot non-existent in the absolute sense but non-existent at the locus they areobserved) and abide in their substantive (which is different from them), as insilver in nacre or snake where rope is. 2. The second vyaapti is: All objects inthe universe are made of parts that form substantives for the object, as clothmade up of threads. Taking the first vyaapti which is based on an error inperception- we are seeing an object whose substantive we do not perceive orknow, just as silver where nacre is or snake where the rope is. Silver in nacreor snake, where rope is, aremithyaa or unreal. They are not absolutely unreal since they are experienced.They are not real also since they get sublated, when their substantives becomeknown. Therefore they are never present at the locus they are seen. Hence theyare called mithyaa, nether real nor unreal - sat asat vilakshaNam. Similarly,the universe is mithyaa, since it is being seen on a substantive that isdifferent from it, namely Brahman whose nature is pureexistence-consciousness-limitless. It is not unreal since it is experienced. Itis not real since it gets sublated when the substantive of the universe isknown.

In the case of second vyaapti, the relation is â€˜whatever that has parts ismithyaaâ€™, since it can be dissembled into parts, which form its substantive. The parts themselves can be parted as they are in turn are made of finer parts.Parts that are different from the object constitute its substantive. Taking theexample of cloth, it is not really real, and since it is made up of threadswhich form its substantive. Threads, in turn, are not really real, since theyare made of molecules, which in turn are not really real since they are made upsome other finer particles, etc. Hence Universe constituting of parts is counterpositive to absolute non-existence as it exists as assemblage of entities. Thatis, universe is not non-existent and at the same time does not have absoluteexistence, since it is made of parts. On the other hand, Brahman which issubstantive for the entire universe is real, since it is not made up of parts.Hence it cannot bedissembled into finer units. Thus inference, using the worldly examples toestablish the error in perception through vyaapti, can be extended to theperception of the universe, taking scriptural statement that attribute-lessBrahman is one without a second.

Objection: If objects are not real then it would contradict perception. No oneperceives non-existent jar, etc. The knowledge by perceptual process involves asin â€“ â€˜jar isâ€™ - that is, jar is existent. Therefore jar has to be real forit to be perceived. No one perceives unreal jar.

Response: True, when we say â€˜jar isâ€™, the existence of jar is implied.However jar to be existent; it borrows the existence from Brahman which is itssubstantive. If we say cloth is, that is, cloth is existent but the existence ofcloth is borrowed and it comes from the existence of its substantive, threads.If there are no threads, then cloth cannot exist. When I perceive the jar, theexistence of substratum of the jar, viz., Brahman is the â€õbjectâ€™ ofperception, since jar is name for a form. It is similar to perception of clothis due to the perception of the threads and their assemblage in a particularform. Hence existence of the cloth is due to the existence of its substantive,threads. Cloth is just a name for a form of assemblage of the threads. This istrue in a relative sense. However in the absolute sense, Brahman alone is thesubstantive for the entire universe of objects and every object is or exists, ifwe say, the existence ofevery object comes from Brahman, which is of the nature of existence itself. It is similar to the statement that the existence of cloth comes from theexistence of threads. What is real in the perception of Jar, etc., is itssubstantive, which is of the nature of Brahman. The reality of jar, on its own,otherwise, is unfounded.

Objection: When I perceive a jar, etc., how can one say I perceive Brahman, andexistence of the jar is due to existence of Brahman, since Brahman cannot be

perceived by the senses? The arguments imply that when one says jar exists, itamounts to saying jarâ€™s existence comes from existence Brahman. It will besimilar to saying â€˜colorâ€™ comes from â€˜colorâ€™ or color has color for itbe a colorful.â€™ This is against Nyaaya theory as they do not admit a qualityto be its own substantive, i.e. quality cannot be made of a quality. Jarâ€™sexistence cannot be made of existence for jar for it to exist.

In addition, Brahman has no qualities, but qualities are the ones that areperceived by the senses. Senses cannot perceive that which has no qualities. If I say, â€˜jar isâ€™ and argue that I am perceiving the existence of the jardue to the existence of its substantive Brahman, it amounts to saying my sensesare perceiving quality-less Brahman which seems to be saying senses areperceiving a sense-less object.

Furthermore, in our view, â€˜Brahman is the substance for the universe ofobjectsâ€™ is unfounded. Advaitins, however, admit that a substance is a locusfor qualities, and the qualities inherent with the locus, i.e. inseparable fromtheir locus. Then, Brahman, which is devoid of qualities, cannot be thesubstratum of qualities. It cannot be locus for inherence (samavaaya) eithersince samavaaya comes only to relate the quality to its substantive. (It wasdiscussed earlier that according to Nyaaya, quality and the substantive aredifferent and are related through what is known as samavaaya. There is no needof samavaaya when there are no qualities to relate to.). If Brahman is thecause, the objects become quality-less and therefore they are not sensible,since senses can only sense the qualities of the objects.

Thus NaiyAyikas put forth several objections to dismiss the arguments ofAdvaitins that Brahman, which is devoid of qualities, is the substratum for theuniverse. Since whatever the qualities of the substratum should persists in theproducts, the Universe of objects cannot be perceived since substratum, Brahmancannot be perceived by the senses. Even if one admits that Brahman, like time,as quality-less, can be perceived, then we have a situation that object isperceived along with the perception of Brahman similar to object perceptionalong with the perception of time. We have then a case of perception involvingperception of object plus the perception of Brahman even though Brahman isquality-less like time. (The perception of time comes from miimaamsakas view.According to their view, when I say, â€˜the object isâ€™, the perception ofâ€˜the object isâ€™ involves perception of time â€ñowâ€™. We have dismissedthese arguments in the beginningitself â€“ as there is no time in â€ñowâ€™. To define time we need â€ñowâ€™and â€˜thenâ€™, since time is the gap between two sequential events or moreprecisely two sequential experiences. â€Ñowâ€™ is only a single event. Todefine time we need â€ñowâ€™ and â€˜thenâ€™ from memory. Perception is throughthe mind and Psychological time is different from biological time, as has beennoted earlier.) Here the arguments of NaiyAyikas are that even if one admits the

perception of Brahman is like perception of time which is not a quality measuredby senses, we have a duality â€“ the perception of object plus the perception ofquality-less Brahman. We have a jar that exists and Brahman which is of thenature of existence; although it cannot be sensed since Brahman is quality-less.

Response: The above objections stem from not appreciating the relative vs.absolute. Hence VP clarifies the Advaitic position related to relative vs.absolute in order to remove confusion arising from quality-less Brahman assubstantive for the qualified universe of objects.

There are three levels of existence: absolute (paaramaarthika), conventional(vyAvahArika) and subjective (prAtibhAsika). (I am translating the prAtibhAsikaas subjective instead of illusory). Absolute existence is Brahman. Conventionalexistence is at the level of transactions, similar to the existence of space,etc. The subjective existence is similar to perceptual existence of silver wherethere is nacre, etc. Hence VP says, â€˜Jar is existentâ€™ is a valid knowledgeas it is expressed in the conventional or transactional existence. Negation ofthis knowledge that there is really no pot there since there is nothing otherthan Brahman, that negation is not at transactional level but at absolute level.One can have knowledge at the absolute level that â€õnly Brahman is and thereis really no pot thereâ€™, while still transacting with the pot at the relativeor conventional level. In addition, from this view point, in the definition ofmithyaa theabsolute non-existence has to be understood with proper qualification to givethe correct meaning. Its non-existence is from the point of absolute existence,that is, it is from the point of paaramaarthika satyam. Hence negation of theobject â€ãs there is no jarâ€™ is not at the conventional level but at theabsolute level. It is similar to saying that there is no pot, it is only clay. Clay, being the substantive for the pot, is of higher degree of reality comparedto pot. Hence when we say â€˜there is no pot thereâ€™; while transacting withthe pot, and â€˜what I see is only clay in a pot-formâ€™, the negation isunderstood as the negation is done from the point of substantive and not fromthe point of relative. Similarly there is no universe other than Brahman;negation is from the point of absolute and not from the point of relative.However, as long as I do not have the knowledge of the substantive, the relativeis taken to be absolutely real,just as silver is real or snake is real at the transactional level, when thesubstantives nacre or rope is not seen. The knowledge of the snake or silver isinvalided only when we have knowledge of the substantive. Similarly theknowledge of the universe as real subsists until the substantive Brahman isknown. The knowledge of Brahman is non-sublatable since it is absolutely real orpaaramaarthika satyam. I can have the knowledge of the paaramaarthika satyamwhile still transacting in the world of plurality. It is like knowing pot isnothing but its substantive, clay, while still transacting with the pot. Thuseach level of understanding should be clear. The confusion arises only when we

mix the paaramaarthika satyam with vyaavahaarika satyam.

This completes the section on anumaana pramaaNa or knowledge through inference.We will next take up the upamaana pramaaNa.


Note: In the previous two posts, there was discussion pertaining to the use ofinference to prove that the universe is mithyaa. The definition of mithyaa isprovided in the text (p.79) as â€“ mithyaatvamca svaashrayatvena abhimatayaavanniShTaa atyantaabhaava pratiyogitvam| - which was translated byMadhavanandaji as â€˜unreality consists in something being the counterpositiveof the absolute non-existence that abides in whatever is supposed to be itssubstratumâ€™. Applying to the example of silver seen on nacre, Madhavanandajiexplains in foot notes that words â€˜somethingâ€™ in the above definition refersto â€˜silver in nacreâ€™, â€ãbsolute non-existenceâ€™ refers to the denial ofsilver in nacre (at all times- atyantaabhaava), and â€˜whateverâ€™ refers to thesubstratum of the silver seen, namely nacre. In my explanation, I took a shortcut to explain the mithyaatva of the silver using the standard definition formithyaa as sat asat vilakshaNamâ€“ since silver is seen and therefore experienced â€“ hence it is not absolutenon-existence (not asat) and it is subsequently negated (at vyavahaara level),hence it is not absolutely real (not sat). Similarly the world is mithyaa â€“ itis seen and experienced, hence not asat; and it is sublated in the knowledge ofBrahman, one without a second, hence not sat.

Shreemaan S.N.Sastriji corrected me by pointing out that the specific definitionused above for mithyaa is in the language of Navya Nyaaya, and therefore shouldbe interpreted accordingly. There was some discussion in the advaitin listrelated to counterpositive and the abstract quality counterpositive-ness asdefined in Navya Nyaaya. A reference to the above definition for mithyaa is alsoprovided in Adviata Siddhi by Shree Madhusuudana. Shree Sastrijiâ€™s commentsforced me to go back to study the Navya Nyaaya in relation to the abovedefinitions. As we discussed before that basic foundation for the analysis ofinference or anumaana was provided by Nyaaya, which other philosophers haveadopted to some extent. Vedanta ParibhASha discusses inference taking Nyaaya'scontribution, while highlighting where advaita differs. Here I am providing somebackground of Navya Nyaaya and also some other aspects related to knowledge,based on my understanding. Iwelcome corrections from knowledgeable people who have studied Navya Nyaaya. The discussion below is mostly based on the analysis provided in HarvardOriental Series 40: â€˜Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyaaya Logicâ€™ byD.H.H. Ingalls.

Some Historical Background: Nyaaya and Vaisheshika philosophies are quite old

and have been listed as two of the six aastika philosophies that takes Vedas aspramaaNa. The other four being saankhya and yoga, puurva and uttara miimaamsaas,as pairs. Navya Nyaaya (new Nyaaya) owes its origin to Gangesha Upaadhyaaya of13th Century. Subsequent contributors include Jayadeva Pakshaadhara of 15thCentury, Raghunaatha Siromani of 15th-16th century (who believed to haverevitalized the system), Mathuraanaatha of 17th Century, besides many others.Many of the Indian philosophers have relied heavily on Navya Nyaaya for theanalysis of epistemological issues and for dialectic arguments. We will limitour discussion here to some basic concepts that are relevant in ourunderstanding of Inference as the means of knowledge as discussed in VedantaParibhASha. Shree Anand Hudli has presented some aspects of this in his AdvaitaSiddhi series.

For Inference, the invariable concomitance or vyaapti between middle term orhetu (smoke) and the major term, saadhya (fire) is the back bone of inferentialknowledge or syllogism. It provides a universal proposition showing theconnection between the two, hetu and saadhya. Nyaaya insists on the requirementof five steps in communicating the inferential knowledge to others, whileaccording to Advaita, first three or last three are enough to establishinferential knowledge.(a) pratijnaa or theory â€“ the mountain possess fire.(b) Reason, hetu â€“ because there is smoke on the mountain(c) Example, udaaharaNa â€“ wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in akitchen(d) Application (upanaya) â€“ Mountain is smoky and smoke is always with fire(e) Conclusion (nigamana) â€“ Therefore the mountain possesses fire.

Here Navya Nyaaya distinguishes between Ascripts, Assertions and Knowledge. Anascript is any predicate associated with subject that relates the terms. Ex.Dasharatha being a father of Rama, â€¦, where predicate ascribes a relationbetween the subject and the rest. In contrast, an assertions is, â€˜Dasarathais the father of Ramaâ€™, where the relation between the subject and thepredicate is ascertained. Knowledge, on the other hand, reveals the truth of theworld as it is, and is different from assertions and ascripts. In the abovelist, pratijnaa or theory is an assertion with a possibility of being true.While the conclusion, listed as five in the above, involves knowledge usingapplication of the concomitant relation between the reason or hetu and majorterm or saadhya. The locus of both smoke and the fire is the mountain and iscalled as a minor term or paksha.

The difference between the assertion and knowledge can be seen clearly since itis more difficult to hold consciously a false knowledge than to make a falseassertion. To put it differently, it is more difficult to misinform one selfthan to misinform others. Advaita dismisses the requirement of five above forinferential knowledge only because the vyaapti or the concomitant relation is

universal that is wherever there is smoke there must be fire, independent of thelocus. To communicate the inferential knowledge even to others, first three orthe last three are enough. If the listeners do not know vyaapti or theconcomitant relation, say between the smoke and fire, then knowledge will onlybe aapta vaakyam or verbal knowledge.

The seven categories: Navya Nyaaya assigns every entity in the universe to oneof the seven categories called padaarthas. Briefly they are:1) Substance (dravya) â€“There are nine of them â€“ that include five basicelements (space, air, fire, water, earth) and time, direction (dhik), soul(aatma) and mind. These are the only categories that can enter intoâ€˜contactâ€™ (samyoga) relations. Contact relation is like fire or smoke on thehill. The two entities, fire and the mountain or smoke and mountain are broughtinto contact (samyoga).2) Quality (guNa). 24 qualities are listed as fundamental. These qualitiesinhere only in substances. The qualities that are measured by senses inhere inthe substances which form locus for the qualities. According to Nyaaya, thequalities like pleasure, pain, etc inhere in the soul, while according toAdvaita these are called internal perceptions involving the mind.3) Action (Kriya).4) Generic Character (jaati)- jaati is normally translated as class or genusâ€“but for Nyaaya, jaati is that characteristic by which genus is recognized in theindividual â€“ that is, it connects the individual to the class. For example, aman is one who has man-ness (jaati) that all men (genus) have. Similarly jaatiof a horse is horse-ness that a horse has which makes the horse to belong tohorse-class. Generic characters inhere in substances, qualities and actions.

5) Ultimate difference (visheSha): This is one of the fundamental postulationsof Navya Nyaaya. Ultimate difference is that entity that differentiates one atomfrom another. Gross entities differ because they are made up parts (atoms) thatultimately differ. Atoms are indivisible. Therefore their differences areultimate as they are not made up of parts. We will address this aspect again inrelation to qualities and substances.

6) Inherence (samavaaya) â€“Inherence is that because of which (a) thesubstances are related to parts, (b) qualities and action to substances, (c)generic characteristics to substances, qualities and actions. Other philosopherscriticize this concept of inherence as it leads to infinite regress. Theyquestion â€“ How is inherence, which is not a substance, quality, action, orjaati, related to its locus? â€“ One has to bring in another inherence to relatethis inherence â€“ and such logic will lead to infinite regress. Navya Nyaayapostulates, however, that inherence is one of the fundamental categories andtherefore does not require another inherence for it to relate to entities.

7) Absence (abhaava). There are two types of absences. a) Mutual exclusion

(anyonyaabhaava) and b) relational absence. Mutual absence is mutual exclusionâ€“ Water is different from fire and vice versa. (water is used to put outfire). The statement is also expressed as absence of identity relation. waterâ‰ fire or in general A â‰ B. Here the identity of A to B and B to A isdenied.

Relational absence is the denial of the relations other than identity. These areof three types: a) prior absence (praag abhaava) - absence of a thing somewherebefore it is created. b) posterior absence (pradhvamsaabhaava) absence of athing somewhere after it has been destroyed and c) continuous absence orconstant absence (atyantaabhaava), absence of a thing somewhere when thisabsence is not limited to a portion of time. atyhantaabhaava is not absence inthe past, in the present or in the future, it is absent at any time or constantabsent. It is never present in the locus indicated. â€˜Somewhereâ€™ here meanssome locus that is being referenced. Somewhere does not mean anywhere oreverywhere.

There are some disagreements among Navya Nyaayins regarding the traditionalcategories, their definitions and their contents.

Qualifiers (visheShaNas): Objects or entities are distinguished from each otherby their qualities or visheShaNas. Navya Nyaaya distinguishes two types ofqualities. There are a) generic quality (jaati) that has been introduced aboveand b) imposed properties or individual qualities (upaadhi). The qualificand(the entity that is being qualified) must have at least one qualifier, if notmany, for its distinction from other entities in the universe. In the statementâ€˜The man is handsomeâ€™, both man-ness and handsome-ness are qualities of theman at the locus indicated. In the knowledge of a man, no matter what otherqualifications the man may have, he will always have the qualifier, man-ness.This is considered as generic qualification (jaati) for a man for him to belongto class called men â€“ genus. The generic characters that are broad based(since every one of this class must have man-ness qualification) is alwaysexpressed by addingâ€˜â€“nessâ€™ to the noun that is being qualified. The man-ness is thequalification by which any member of this genus is recognized. It must bepresent in all men â€“ or to be more precise, it inheres in manyâ€˜substancesâ€™. It is an inherent quality of all men. In contrast in astatementâ€“ â€˜this is Devadattaâ€™, the locus pointed will have an inherentman-ness that all men must have, but also he has another quality â€“Devadatta-ness â€“ which is a particular qualification that distinguishesDevadatta from other men. The relation of Devadatta-ness to Devadatta is notrelation of inherence but is called relation of Particular Qualification(visheShaNataa-visheSha sambandha). It is recognized only by it being aqualifier of the qualificand, Devadatta. It distinguishes him from rest of menwho also have man-ness but do not have Devadatta-ness. It is called a particular

qualification because of the doctrine that the relation between the imposedproperty and its locus is particular, differing from other particularrelations. It is also called peculiar relation (swaruupa sambandha), since therelation is peculiar to its locus.

We can also distinguish the qualifications as sensuous and abstract. Sensuousqualifications are based on the five senses that can be measured by the senseorgans or jnaanedriyas â€“ the five senses being sense of sight, sense ofhearing, sense of touch, sense of smell, and sense of taste. The forms andcolors are measured by the sense of sight using eyes as the instrument.Similarly the other senses. Mind through the five senses perceives the world ofobject. The qualities which are abstract that are both generic and particularcannot be measured by senses directly but inferred. Man-ness is a genericquality that all men have but is an abstract quality that cannot be measured byany particular sense. Man-ness is what man has and man is one that has man-ness.The definition, necessarily be circular, since it cannot be specifically definedâ€“All minimum essential qualities that are put-together or integrated togetherthat make up a man to be a man,constitute man-ness quality. Similarly Devadatta-ness although defined asswaruupa sambandha, it is an assemblage of all minimum essential qualities thatmake up Devadatta to be Devadatta and that distinguishes him from the rest ofthe men. Devadatta is one who has Devadatta-ness and Devadatta-ness is thatwhat Devadatta has. Thus we have particular quality and generic quality todistinguish an entity. As a rule a quality that further qualifies the genericquality is also treated as a particular quality. For example, pot-ness is ageneric quality of all pots. One can define pot-ness-ness further qualifying thepot-ness. This is a second order quality and is treated as particular or imposedqualification rather than generic one. One can make a statement, â€˜Thepot-ness-ness of these pots is different from the pot-ness-ness of the otherbatch of potsâ€™. Or â€˜Sweet-ness-ness of these laDDus is different from thesweet-ness-ness of the laDDus fromanother company. It is obvious that we are particularizing the generic qualityto specific units to differentiate one unit from the other, within the samegenus. To differentiate pot-ness-ness for individual units one should have theknowledge of the generic quality, pot-ness common to all pots.

How to know the pot-ness of the pot? It is only by observation of several pots,one can gather the general characteristics of the qualities that are common toall pots and also not present in the entities that are not-pots. Some of thecharacteristics or qualities that are there in pot that make up the genericcharacteristic of the pots may be there in non-pots, but for jaati of pot-nessto be defined; all the minimum characteristics have to be met. These genericqualities can be based on assemblage of the qualities that senses can measure;but since it is a combined package, it remains as abstract quality only. Potshave to be there to define pot-ness. It has to be inferred based on experience

of observation of say many pots. If there is one pot in the universe, then onecannot have jaati for the pot. This the reason why Brahman, being one of akind, does not have jaati characteristic (jaati niiti kula gotra duuragamâ€¦brahma tatvam asibhaavayaatmani -says Shankara in VevekachUDAmaNi).

All classifications in Science are essentially based on the principle ofcodifying and quantifying these generic qualities that differentiate one classfrom the other. The cognition and recognition even in perceptual processinvolves perception of the qualities of the object through senses andrecognition based on the prior knowledge of the jaati of the object. Thus if Isee an object on the table, I say it is pot, since the perceptual qualities thatI see match pot-ness of a pot based on memory. Thus I should have the knowledgeof pot-ness for me to say the one I see is a pot. If I see new object that I amnever familiar before, there is cognition but not recognition. I may be able torecognize that there are some qualities similar to the objects that I know, butalso other qualities that separate the object from the objects that I know. Imay say, it looks like that but it is not that. (Some aspects of these we willdiscuss when we analyze upamaanapramaaNa.). Hence any recognition of an entity involves prior memory of theobject or jaati of the objects.

Dominant property: There are certain dominant properties that some entities havethat distinguishes them from other. For example, the glitter ness of the gold orsilver-shining ness of the silver or brilliance of a diamond, etc, distinguishesgold, silver, diamond, all though all that glitters is not gold. Similarly allthat have silver-shining-ness is not silver and there are many look-alikediamond that sometimes experts are required to differentiate them. These aredominant properties are not obviously the generic qualities or jaatis but may bepart of the assemblage of qualities that constitutes their jaati. Thusglittery-ness is essential for it to be gold but not sufficient to say it isnothing but gold. We are reminded of the story of Eureka where Archimedes has tocome up density property to identify gold from apparent gold. These aredominant properties in the sense that they are immediately visible andconclusions are made about thesubstances based on these properties. This, in fact, leads to errors inperception, and therefore in inference as well, since inference is based onperception.

The fundamental limitation in all objective knowledge, as we stated before,comes from two aspects. One is the no object has necessary and sufficientquality to distinguish it from others. This we can state it as they haveswaabhaavika lakshaNam (dominant necessary qualifications as in sweetness forsugar) but not swaruupa lakshaNa (which is sufficient qualification â€“ forsufficiency the converse should apply. Ex. If it is sweet it must be sugar for

sweetness to be both necessary and sufficient qualification, which is not thecase.) Objects do not have swaruupa lakshaNa because they are made up of parts.Navya Nyaaya gets around this problem by stating that there is ultimatedifference between atoms that make up the part and atoms are not made up ofparts. But we know that properties or qualities also depend on how they arepacked. The same carbon atoms packed differently gives rise to brilliant diamondas well black charcoal. Lack of necessary andsufficient qualification is one aspect. The second aspect is perception relayson sense input. Whatever dominant or otherwise qualities that the senses cangrasp only are involved in the perceptual knowledge. In addition, senses canonly grasp qualities and not substantives. Hence if I do not have the knowledgeof the substantive and senses have grasped only limited qualities due toadventitious defects, erroneous knowledge can occur.

We will analyze the rest in the next post.

We are re-examining some of the VedantaparibhASha statements, as was suggested by Shree Sastriji, in the light of Navya Nyaaya. Some background of Navya-Nyaaya is being provided in the last and this post, based on my understanding of D.H.H. Ingalls,¡¦ Materials for the study of Navya-Nyaaya Logic¡¦, published by Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi.We are back to the series after a gap of several weeks.

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Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge ¡V 30

We are discussing some of the concepts of Navya Nyaaya in relation to Inferential knowledge. In the last post several Navya Nyaaya concepts are introduced starting from their seven fundamental categories (padaartha-s). Of these, descriptions of substances (dravya), generic character (jaati), ultimate difference (visheSha), and absence (abhaava) were provided. Jaati is generic abstract qualifier that inheres with the qualificand to make the qualificand to belong to a genus. For example, pot-ness in a pot is abstract qualifier qualifying the pot so that the pot belongs to a family of pots or pot-genus. Similarly, other examples are man-ness in man, horse-ness in a horse or cow-ness in a cow. In contrast to generic quality, there are particular abstract qualities qualifying a particular specimen (vyakti) of a genus. Thus in a statement ¡¥this is Devadatta¡¦ ¡V Devadatta has two qualifiers, one a generic qualifier that is man-ness since Devadatta is a man, and the other qualifier is Devadatta-ness. Man-ness will distinguish him to be different from say animals or inert objects, and Devadatta-ness distinguishes him from other men, who also have man-ness. The later is called relational qualifier. The generic characters, man-ness, pot-ness, etc are arrived at after observation of many men (and also many not-men) and many pots (and also many non-pots). Similarly Devadatta-ness is also abstract quality arrived observing him and his qualities in relation to other men who are not-Devadattas. Particular qualifiers are specific to a given specimen (as in Devadatta-ness) and require careful consideration in relation to other specimens of the same genus. We have also discussed that ¡¥absence¡¦ is also one of the fundamental category of Navya Nyaaya. We have mutual absence (anyonyaabhaava) where identity is denied as in A ¡Ú B and vice versa, and

relational absence consisting of (a) prior absence (praagaabhaava) involving absence of a thing before it is created, (b) posterior absence (pradhvamsaabhaava) involving absence of a thing after it is destroyed and (c) constant absence (atyantaabhaava) involving absence of a thing somewhere independent of time (ex. there is constant absence of fire in the lake). These absences are in relation to others.

Relations: Relation involves two entities. There are many types of relations that can exist between the two. The most common is ¡¥contact¡¦ relation or samyoga, where A is in contact with B. Fire or smoke on the mountain is a contact relation. Here fire or smoke is qualified by its contact with the mountain which is its locus. It is a fiery or smoky mountain. The other examples are pot which is on the table or table with a pot on it, where qualifier and qualificand keep changing depending on the subject. The another type of relation between two entities can be called samavaaya or relation of inherence. The generic characters, jaati, have inherent relations with their loci. Ex. man-ness in man or horse-ness in horse, etc. These are inherent characteristics that are not separable from their loci, unlike the case of smoke and mountain. Taking the example of ¡¥fire on the mountain¡¦ there are several relations embedded in the statement. We have fire-ness in the fire, mountain-ness in the mountain which inheres with their loci. In addition fire and mountain have contact relation since fire is in contact with the mountain; they do not inhere with each other. Similarly the relation between smoke and fire, but in this case one is dependent on the other. Existence of smoke depends on the existence of fire (not the other way), even though smoke does not inhere with the fire. Every object, being made up of parts, inheres in its parts. Thus cloth inheres on the threads, threads inhere on the cotton, and cotton inheres in its molecules, etc. Ultimately, according to Nyaaya, the atoms are self-dependent, and have ultimate qualities that differ for each atom.

Limiting relations: Another important technical terms in Navya Nyaaya are limited (avacchinna) and limiter (avacchedaka). All relations are limiting relations, because of which one locus can be differentiated from the other. Consider a generic qualifier, pot-ness. Obviously pot-ness is present in all pots but it is limited to only pots. Similarly the particular qualifiers like Devadatta-ness are limited to Devadatta, because of which Devadatta can be recognized from other men.

Adjunct (pratiyogi) and subjunct (anuyogi): The relations are expressed in terms these two terms ¡V adjunct (pratiyogi) and subjunct (anuyogi). Adjunct normally means something addition to substantive. In contact (samyoga) relations, adjunct is one wherein the relation is expressed as one is in or on the other. The superstratum is adjunct (pratiyogi) and the substratum is termed subjunct (anuyogi). In the case of smoke with fire, smoke is the adjunct and fire is the subjunct. For fiery mountain, fire is the adjunct and mountain is the subjunct. In the case of non-contact relations, the qualificand is adjunct and the qualifier is subjunct. The word pratiyogi is also used for absence, and since absence cannot be called contact, its meaning in that case will be different. Adjunct and subjunct are used to express relations while superstratum and substratum are expressed in contacts. The superstratum is called in Sanskrit as adheya and substratum is called adhaara. In the case of pot and clay, clay is adhaara and pot is adheya. In this case the relation is not of contact. Vidyaaranya uses these terms to denote the ontological difference between the two. Ontologically clay is more real than pot since pot can change while clay remains as changeless. In Navya Nyaaya it is expressed as pot inheres in clay as it is made up of clay. In the analysis of inference connecting hetu (smoke) to saadhya (fire) Navya Nyaaya is very specific in terms of the relations between the two. For example,

in the conclusion that the mountain possesses fire because it possesses smoke, it is to be understood that the relation between smoke and fire is not of inherence but only of contact. The smoke and fire have limiting relations in term of contact only. Similarly the relations between the smoke and mountain and fire and the mountain are limited by contact. On the other hand the relations between smoke-ness to smoke and fire-ness to fire and mountain-ness to mountain, as well as pot to clay and cloth to threads, etc are inherent relations.

Counterpositive-ness: We discussed about the use of adjunct, pratiyogi, and subjunct, anuyogi, in relations involving both contact (samyoga) and inherent (samavaaya) relations. In the knowledge involving contact relation, ¡¥Fire is on the mountain¡¦, fire is adjunct and mountain is subjunct, anuyogi. The knowledge can be expressed in negative format as in ¡¥there is constant absence of fire in a lake¡¦ ¡V the fire may be called here as absential adjunct (abhaaviiya pratiyogi) since fire is not there anytime in the lake ¡V this is in contrast to presence of fire on the mountain. This constant absential adjunct can be referred to as antyaataabhaava pratiyogini and can be called as ¡¥counterpositive adjunct¡¦. Thus absence of fire in a lake is counterpositive-ness of the fire in the locus, lake. In principle, any entity which is negated in a locus by the absence x is a counterpositive of absence x on the locus defined. We use this example later to state that absence of silver in nacre is a counterpositive of absence silver in the locus, nacre that is there. Simply, it means negation of the presence of silver in the shell in the past, present or future or its constant absences independent of time, even though momentarily I mistake its presence when I see from a distance. The mistake, of course, arises due to dominant quality of silvery-ness present in the nacre since knowledge is based on attributive content. The silvery-ness is necessary and dominant quality of silver but that is not sufficient quality to define the silver ¡V just as sweet-ness is necessary quality of sugar but not sufficient quality to define sugar. The reason is there are other objects that are not sugar but sweet like sugar (ex. aspartame). Similarly when I pick up the object thinking that it is silver based on the dominant attributive knowledge, I now gather other attributes that are counter to silver, negating the presence of silver in the object. This absence is counterpositive absence of silver (antyantaabhaava pratiyogi) since silver was constantly absent (in the past, present and future) in the locus, nacre.

We have used the term ¡¥counterpositive-ness¡¦ as an abstract quality of fire in a lake or of silver in nacre. In general the counterpositive-ness could be specific or generic absence of the thing in or on the locus specified. It could be absence of specific fire or silver in the locus specified or it could be generic absence of fire or silver in that locus. Similarly the locus could be specific or generic as in particular lake or particular nacre or in any lake or in any nacre. Thus counterpositive-ness of absence of silver-ness in any nacre-ness becomes generic statement that three is absence of silver in any nacre at all times. The generic absences have the effect of negating all particulars of given class. Thus the above generic statement implies that ¡¥for all x, if x is a silver is not in any y, if y is any nacre¡¦. We should note that it is not the absence of silvery-ness in any nacre, but absence of silver in any nacre. That is one can have silvery-ness without having silver since silvery-ness as in sweetness is only one of necessary qualifications of silver but not sufficient qualification of silver. That is it is not swaruupa lakshaNa of silver. Thus by changing from specific to generic one can change the limiting conditions for the counterpositive-ness ¡V that is whether a specific silver is absent at all times in a specific nacre, or silver in general is absent in that particular nacre, or silver in general is absent in any nacre, not necessarily in this particular one.

As discussed before the negation of previous knowledge ¡¥that there is silver¡¦ occurs only after additional attributive knowledge of the object perceived takes place ¡V that is when I picked up the object thinking that it is silver, I came to know that it is nacre and there is no silver there. In fact the silver is counterpositive (absent at any time) in the nacre and not that the silver that I saw was there before and now it disappeared. Similarly the snake is counterpositive adjunct or atantaabhaava pratiyogini in the rope that is there. This knowledge I recognize when I discover that it is rope. Likewise the world is counterpositive adjunct on the Brahman as the scripture says, like a ring on the gold. That is, there is never a world where Brahman is, even though I am seeing it.

With this background of Navya Nyaaya, we can reexamine now the VedantaparibhASha statement.

--------------

In the VedantaparibhAShA (VP) we are discussing how inference can be used to prove that the universe is mithyaa that is it is neither real nor unreal. Whatever that exists other than Brahman, that includes everything that can be objectified or perceived is mithyaa. We keep the word mithyaa without translating it as illusion since illusion implies that it is not real only, while mithyaa is both not real and not unreal. It is not unreal also since it is experienced unlike that of the son of barren woman. This aspect was discussed before with the example of the perception of silver where there is nacre.

VP defines mithyaa using the language of Navya Nyaaya that the ¡¥mithyaa consists in something being the counterpositive of the absolute nonexistence that abides in whatever is supposed to be in its substratum¡¦ ¡V mithyaatvamca svaashrayatvena abhimata yaavanniShTA athyantaabhAva pratiyogitvAt. In the case of the example of perception of silver where nacre is, silver is mithyaa since its counterpositive absence of its existence is in the place that it is seen, i.e. nacre. That is, there is absolutely no silver at the locus at any time. When the object was seen for the first time, due to dominant attributive silvery-ness of the object seen, it was cognized as silver. It is not the cognition of real silver but it is cognition of false silver, since cognitions are based on dominant attributive knowledge of silvery-ness of the object not the substantive of the object. However, the false or mithyaa silver is taken as real silver. Hence effort was made to pick up that silver seen. When the object was picked up, the object was recognized as nacre with the knowledge that ¡¥there is no silver here¡¦. This understanding involves not the absence of silver ¡¥now¡¦, leaving a doubt that it was silver before. It is absolute absence of silver all the times in the place where it was seen. In the terminology of Navya Nyaaya, it involves existence of the absolute non-existence of silver at all times in the place where nacre is. Hence it is counterpositive absence involving constant absence independent of time that includes even when it was originally seen as silver that prompted an action to pick it up. What is falsified is the false silver but was taken as real at that time, since there is no real silver at the locus at any time. This definition for mithyaa is effectively one of the five definitions of falsity that MadhusUdana Saraswati uses in his Advaita Siddhi.

We can apply now to the world seen. What ever seen is mithyaa but is taken as real just as silver is taken as real. The existence part of the world provides the basis for the falsity of the world since 'world is' meaning world exists ¡V just as the silvery-ness of the object provided the notion of existence of real silver at the locus. Since the object exists and therefore world exists. Hence all the

worldly transactions and samsaara or the resulting suffering associated with the notion of reality to the world follow. When I realize that I am not ¡¥this that I thought I am¡¦ but I am that Brahman, the substantive for all, including the world that I see and transact with, the reality associated with the world is falsified. It is recognized as mithyaa ¡V that is counterpositive of absolute nonexistence at any time at the locus where it is seen. Hence reality of the world was not there, is not there and will not be there and what is there always is Brahman that I am, which is ever present or eternal and never changing and infinite existence- consciousness. The false world that is seen is falsified or recognized as false. Just as the silvery-ness of the object nacre still remains but the wrong notion that there is silver is gone in the understanding that is nacre. Thus mithyaa attribute of silver remains without assigning substantive reality to the silver. It is also understood that the absence of silver is counterpositive absolute absence at all time that includes even in the past when I thought that it was real silver in the object seen. Similarly when I realize Brahman, the world is recognized as mithyaa and not real that I thought it was. Hence mityaatvam (unreality or illusory nature, although not proper translation) of the world is recognized only when I have the clear understanding that there is only Brahman and I am that Brahman. Knowledge of Brahman does not negate the world but negates the reality assigned to the world just as appearance of silver is not negated in the knowledge of nacre but only reality that this is silver is negated with the knowledge that there is no silver here in the object.

We will next take the objections also with the background of Navya-Nyaaya.

Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge – 32

Before we close the discussion on perception and inference, few points are of interest. It was stated that perception is direct and immediate. As soon as I open my eyes, I see the object in front of me, if there is sufficient light to illumine the object. Meemamsakaas and Nayyayikaas have theorized that mind goes out to the objects and engulfs the object like the water occupying the field, which leads to the formation of the vRitti or thought of the object. This concept also led to some philosophers to assume that when the senses gather attributes of the object they gather the substantive too. Justification for the latter comes from the fact that attributes are inseparable from their locus, substantives. If I say this is a blue lotus, I cannot separate blueness from lotus although I can see it is blue and it is lotus. This is called avinaabhaava sambandham or inseparable relationship. This inseparability formed one of the back bones of VishiShTa Advaita

where visheShaNas or attributes are inseparable from their locus, the object. Hence jiivas and jagat form attributes of the all pervading Lord, and hence they cannot have separate existence from the Lord. It is visheShaNa- sahita advaita where oneness of the Lord includes the multiple jiivas and jagat as part of His glory or vibhuuti. They have organic relation with the Lord, that is anga-angii (parts and the whole) or sheSha-sheShii (dependent-independ ent) relationship. He becomes antaryaamin or indweller of the whole universe of objects and beings. He is one (advaita) but his visheShaNas, that include jiivas and jagat, are many –the essence of vishiShTa advaita. According to them, recognition of this fundamental fact is the true knowledge.

Without going into the merits of this hypothesis, the fundamental fact lies in clearly understanding he visheShaNa-visheShy a sambandha, or the relation between the attributes and the substantive, and how exactly the perception of the world of objects occurs. It was stated also in Vedanta ParibhaaSha, following the Meemamsakaa’s position, that mind goes out and engulfs the object and perceives the object through the senses, along with the perception of space and time, without questioning its validity. We have raised this issue in the beginning of our analysis itself, and made a comment that those particular assumptions are not necessary, in order to understand the perceptual process. It is not metaphysics here, as some argue. These are based on some basic physics that we understand as of today dealing with the mechanics of physiological functions. The analysis of the pramaaNas from advaita perspective remains the same, as shown elaborately in the

previous discussions, without imposing the above unnecessary assumptions. Here, we highlight some more aspects related to the perceptual process on the same venue.

From modern science we now have a better understanding of how the perception occurs. Analysis of perception indicates that what I see is really is not the object but the light that gets reflected by the object. Most of the time we do not recognize the light that is getting reflected but pay more attention to the object that is reflecting the light. It is like watching the movie on TV. What we are actually watching is the TV screen with interplay of lights and shades. However our attention is totally immersed on the objectives displayed forgetting the truth that there are no real objects behind them. Thus perceptual process involves a formation of the image of the object with attributes of the object (such as form, etc) as measured by the senses, as the contents of the image. Hence, it is important to note that we never really ‘see’ the object per sec, but only the image of the light reflected by the object. Recognizing this aspect forms the very

basis for meditation too, which involves shifting the attention to the light getting reflected by the object-thought than to the contents of the though itself. Here the light that is reflected is the light of consciousness by which the thought is known. The mechanics of the process is the same. Can I shift my attention to the light that is getting reflected from the objects without getting lost in the objects that is reflecting the light? Then again, can I shift my attention to the reflected light of consciousness flashing on the mirror of my mind as I become conscious of each thought? That is the light of all lights, jyotirjyotiH.

Let us understand the facts without getting lost in the theories. During perception, what we see therefore is only that part of the reflected light that reaches our eyes. We do not see the light that is getting reflected by the back side of the object. This is similar to our seeing only our front side when we stand facing the mirror. Thus vRitti of thought of the object that forms in the mind is similar to the image of the object as the light that passes through our retina. In same way all other senses operate bringing only that part of the input (shabda, sparsha, ruupa, rasa, gandha; sound, touch, form, taste and smell) that can be sensed by them or that reach them for sensing. The photographic image of the object can never be the same as the original. Some darshanikas have defined

pramANam as ‘yathaartham pramANam’, knowledge of what it is. But the fact of the matter is ‘it is yathaa dRisyam pramANam and not yathaartham’, whatever is seen is

the knowledge of the object, implying ‘whatever it is’ may be different from ‘what is seen’. One can see the implication of this in terms of how errors in perception can arise. Since what is seen is not necessarily the truth, and the analysis, even scientifically, can easily lead to mithyaa aspect of the objective world, since the truth of the object is never seen. Hence to know the real truth of the objects or the world, scripture alone becomes a pramANa, since we can never see the truth of the world, as all perceptions are perceptions of the images and not the originals. Perceptual process is similar to the image formation and nothing more.

If we can gather through the senses the attributes of the object and not their substantive, are we not violating the statement that attributes of the object is inseparable from their substantive? It is not so, because it is the reflected image of the original only. It is just like the image formation in the mirror where although my form is inseparable from me, I can still see the image of my form in the mirror, although details depends on the quality of the mirror that is forming the image and the other subsidiary factors like the intensity of the light etc. The original attributes remain with the locus while image can still be formed depending on the quality of the medium forming the image that includes the purity of the mind and the capability of the senses (20-20 vision, etc). The analogy forms the basis for understanding that although ananda is one, the reflected anandas can be many, and their quality or intensity depends on the purity of the

reflecting medium. Thus manushya ananda is one while the ananda of hiranya garbha is 10 to the power of 23 times that of the manushya ananda. The original is only one but the reflections and their qualities are different, says the Upanishad. sa yaSchaayam puruShe| yaSchaasaavaaditye| sa ekaH| meaning, the ananda in human being and that in the Hiranya garbha is the same even though there is a huge difference between the reflected anandas of the two. Now we arrive at another important information – not only the substantives of objects are not ‘seen’, even the attributes of the objects are not ‘seen’. Perceptual process therefore involves only the image formation of the object in the pool of the mind without affecting the substantive or the attributes of the original. This in mathematics we call as ‘mapping’ involving a transformation of the original into an image with qualities reflecting the original depending on the mapping technique

and leaving the original unaffected. This forms very basis of the advaita principle. Original consciousness is the same and is never affected, while the reflected consciousness (es) are many depending on the reflecting media.

Coming back to the perceptual process, just as the movie on the flat screen gives perception of the movement as well as the 3-D vision of the objective space and time, the mind operates in the same fashion from the point of objective data. Just as the frames are in sequence with one at a time, the vRittis or thoughts also form one after the other in sequence, forming continuity. We can only think one thought at a time. There is really no multi tasking in terms of perception during cognitive process. In this connection, the following experiment was of interest. Two parallel stories were

recorded simultaneously on a cassette player and many people were asked to listen and report what they have learned. Interestingly seventy percent of men were able to follow one story or the other, leaving the second, while the rest of the thirty percent got thoroughly confused as they switched their attention from one story to the other. They only got the fragmented story

of each, which is thoroughly confusing. On the other hand, only 30 percent of women could follow one story or the other, while 70 percent could not. Although the conclusion reached out of these results was that men are capable of doing one task at a time, while the women are best for multitasking, the experiment only demonstrates the capacity of the human mind to focus only one aspect at a time and can be trained to concentrate on one task without getting distracted. As Krishana emphasizes this again and again that the mind can be trained to focus on the higher, in spite of many distracting avenues that mind can take, by what he calls as abhyaasa and vairaagya, dedicated practice and dispassion to reject the dissipating avenues. The success of any person in any field, and more so in the spiritual path, depends on the ability to pursue with single pointed devotion the goal he wants to achieve. For that only all the four fold qualifications are required.

With the movement of the vRittis or thoughts, the concept of time arises when one compares NOW with THEN from the memory. If I can ride only on NOW without looking back (or without projecting into future with wanting mind), I live only in the dynamic present where there is no ‘time’. Thus perceptual process is nothing but imaging process where what is ‘out there’ is mapped into image in the mind using senses as the input media and mind forming the photographic plate. Cognition and recognition are separate as the former occurs immediately while the later involves comparison of the image with the images stored in the memory. Some times the matching is fuzzy, and we cannot easily recognize the imaged object. The names and the associated images could be stored at different places in the brain making it difficult to match the form with the name, particularly when one gets older.

Inferential knowledge is different from perceptual knowledge in the sense that from what I see, I infer something that I can not directly see, using the relation, vyaapti, between what I see and what I infer. The process of inference involves a mental activity and therefore is not direct and immediate. I requires the knowledge of the previously established relation between the hetu (what I see) and saadhya (what I infer). This aspect has been exhaustively dealt from the point of both navya nayaa and advaita.

Now a question is raised in terms of the so-called perception itself. Is there inference involved in perception? Or how direct is the direct perceptual knowledge. We mentioned that when I see an object in front of me, the perceptual process is direct and immediate in the same way as the image formation when one stands in front of a mirror. The analogy is exact. However, just as in the image formation, what I see is not the object per sec but the frontal projection of the object in each frame. Unless the object rotates we will never see the image in complete perspective. Even here the mind has to integrate all the images or frames to arrive or to infer the perspective image of the object in front. However, even with lack of compete perspective projection, I can infer based on the

information stored in the memory. Thus there is some inference involved in the perceptual knowledge. Thus if I see a cow in front of me, although I see only the parts of the cow

that are exposed to my vision, I infer complete cow based on what I see. This inference comes from the previous knowledge of the cow in complete perspective. It is the same reason why we see only one side of the moon all the time due to synchronized orbits of the earth and the moon.

Is this inference different from the inferential knowledge or anumaana pramaaNa. Yes, says Annambhatta, the famous nayyayika. There is a distinction between the two inferences. In the direct perceptual case, what we see and what we infer refer to the same object, but now in complete detail. Thus if we see the frontal part of the cow due to perception, we infer the rest of the cow, even though we do not see directly now. In this case, the object of perception and the object of inference are both the same. Anumaana as separate means of knowledge comes in only when what we see is different from what we infer from what we see. What I see is the smoke and the mountain but what I infer is the fire on that mountain. I cannot see the fire directly but infer its presence using the concomitant relation between the smoke and the fire. Hence inferential knowledge is different from perceptual knowledge, although some degree of inference occurs even in perception.

In addition, based on the analysis presented, we know now that what we see is not the object per sec but its image as projected in the mind as vRitti. The correspondence between the image and the original has to be established to insure what I see is what is there. If not, what I see is assumed as what is there, and this lack of inquiry of one to one correspondence between what I see and what is there can lead to errors in perception. The vision of snake where there is a rope comes under this category. This is more a subjective error since it is the individual mind that makes the error. The photograph of the object does not show the presence of a snake where the rope is. There are also objective errors like mirage water since error arises since image formed in the mind is just based on reflection of the light. . A photographic image of it also will show the appearance of the water due to the reflected light. Transactions involving karmendriayas can

only confirm what I see is what is there or not. Hence the reality of the objects is established not by perception but by transaction. Hence the world of objects we transact with is called Vyaavahaarika satyam. With this we complete all the accounts related to perception and inference. We come back to the direct perception again when we discuss the aparokshaanubhuuti involved in shabda pramANa.

With this understanding we now proceed to analyze the next PramANa.

Namaste All,

What I have to write concerns the post of Sadananda-ji but of course

anyone other than himself, if he chooses to do so, is free to comment on

the ideas herein. I am not overcertain that anyone is interested in these

observations however I offer them as clarifications and an interpretation

of the basic material. However I welcome the clarity of his exposition as

it makes it easier to see where he has gone wrong.

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Sada-ji writes:

It was stated also in Vedanta ParibhaaSha, following the

Meemamsakaa position, that mind goes out and engulfs the object and

perceives the object through the senses, along with the perception of

space and

time, without questioning its validity. We have raised this issue in the

beginning of our analysis itself, and made a comment that those particular

assumptions are not necessary, in order to understand the perceptual

process. It

is not metaphysics here, as some argue. These are based on some basic

physics

that we understand as of today dealing with the mechanics of physiological

functions. The analysis of the pramaaNas from advaita perspective remains

the

same, as shown elaborately in the previous discussions, without imposing

the above unnecessary assumptions.

|||||||||||| ||||||||| ||||||||| ||||||

Comment:

Here there is a fundamental misapprehension of the nature of metaphysics

and how it differs from scientific description, theory and the like. It

is the science of first principles i.e. scientia (knowledge) of first

principles, and it can remain the same even though the empirical knowledge

changes over time. In connection with perception it is not about reaction

time, saccading and the rest of it but a statement of how neuronal

activity is consciousness. The statement of D.A. in V.P. about the mind

going out to take the form of the object is not a psychological theory but

a metaphysical one. What in essence he is saying is that the mental

modification (vritti) can be congruent with the object because they are

_essentially_ made of the same stuff viz. Consciousness. What Sada-ji is

saying is that the mental activity mediates knowledge, that there are

brain events which are interpreted by something else and that what we are

directly aware of is a state within the subject. From that state we may

infer the existence of an object which causes it.

This is the theory which is called Representative Realism or Indirect

Realism or Scientific Realism and it has been chiefly associated with the

thinking of the British Empiricist school of Locke, Berkeley and Hume.

http://www.philosop hyonline. co.uk/tok/ perception5. htm

There is not the slightest indication that D.A. holds anything like this

which of course Sada-ji recognises in that he offers an updated, as he

sees it, scientific account which ignores the metaphysics. Likewise when

Shankara offers a critique of the Buddhist version of the inference theory

in B.S.B. II.ii.28 he dismissed that. To complete the picture he might

offer his interpretation of Brh.III.iv.11 in which Shankara says that the

organs are of the same category as the objects, not of a different

category. For Sada-ji the organs are only in contact with the attributes

and not the substantive so they cannot be of the same category as the

objects.

Some people will consider these points abstruse and not significant for

the individuals sadhana. I don’t think so and I am reassured by the fact

that Shankara considered it important to clarify the metaphysical

fundamentals.

Best Wishes,

Michael.

P.S. Per Se means as such/in itself. (not per sec which is a measure of

velocity)

Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge – 33

Upamaana or Comparison

Upamaana or comparison is considered as a separate means of knowledge by advaitins and meemaasakas. It is considered as distinct from perception and inference. Here the means of knowledge is the similarity of two different objects A and B. What is being perceived currently is object B. In the perception of B, which is somewhat unknown to the perceiver, he notices some features that are similar to an object A that he is very much familiar. On examining further he recalls the many attributes of A that he can now notice in the perception of B. Thus the similarity of B to A is gained by comparing the observed attributes of B with those attributes of A that he could recall. Since all objective knowledge is only attributive knowledge, one is gaining the knowledge of B because of the similarities B has with A.

Vedanta ParibhASha provides an example. Consider a person who is very much familiar with a cow. Familiarity implies he has knowledge of the attributes of a cow based on which he can recognize or recall it in his mind. When he goes to a forest he sees a wild animal which looks like the domesticated cow in the town. The wild animal appears to be similar to a cow, at a first glance. As he examines further he learns that indeed the wild animal is very much like the cow that he is familiar since many of the attributes of the wild animal are comparable to the attributes of cow that he knows. Based on the attributive knowledge of the cow that he knows and the perceptual knowledge of the wild animal that he is seeing, he concludes that this wild animal is like the cow he has. He also sees some dissimilarities between the wild animal and the cow to conclude that it is not a cow but looks like the cow he has.

This is a common experience for everyone – when we look at new person and say he looks like the person I know. Here we are using comparison between the features of one with whom we are very much familiar with the new person whom we are meeting for the first time. When we meet a new baby we want to know how he looks like. The knowledge of the object in front is gained by comparing the similarities of the attributes of those with whom we are familiar. We can ask the question, what new knowledge are we gaining by this comparison? What we are seeing directly is an unknown person B. What we are familiar is the person A, whom we know intimately. At a first glance, the new person B seems to have some features that resemble the person A. Upon closer study, we find that many attributes of person A are in B. Upamaana as a means of knowledge should reveal something new that we do not know before. We have full knowledge of A but no knowledge of B. Upamaana

provides a means of knowledge to know B by comparing and concluding the existence of many qualities of A in B. Since any object is known only via its attributes, we now have the attributive knowledge of B, because of Upamaana pramANa.

In the example of the wild animal (gavaya, a wild cow) VP provides a sequence of thoughts that happen in the seer. The first immediate thought is ‘this animal looks like my cow’. At this stage it is a proposition in the mind that arises at the first look due to some semblance of the wild animal with the cow that he is familiar. Then, he examines further details and concludes that “my cow is like this animal”. Here by process of comparison of the similarities and dissimilarities one arrives at a conviction regarding the similarities of the cow that exists in the wild animal. What knowledge are we gaining by this comparison? It is not the knowledge of the cow, since one already knows the cow. Right now cow is not available for direct perception. What we do not know is the nature of the wild animal that is being seen right now. Since at the first glance, we say, it looks like a cow. At the same time, since there are certain dissimilarities which

make one not to recognize it as a cow, a further examination is required to establish the similarities and dissimilarities of the cow that one is familiar and the wild animal that one is not familiar. Only after detailed comparison, one learns that ‘the cow looks very much similar to this that I see’. Or one can say this wild animal is very close the cow that I am familiar with.

The great poet Kalidasa is well known as an expert in simile. Simile is the same as upamaana. All the heroes and heroines in his poetry are described using similes as she look like this or looks like that, etc. By these similes we come to know how his heroes and heroines look like, thus we are gaining the knowledge of them through similes or upamaanas or comparisons. My father describes in Telugu poetry the features of a lady of the house, whose complexion is very dark. He says her smile is like “kappum bimbamu lopala uppatilina chadrarekha mayin”, meaning it is like the crescent moon arising in the middle of dark clouds. Here what we are familiar are dark clouds in the sky and also how white the crescent moon looks like. Bringing these two together he compares her white teeth and dark face and also her smile. When she smiles, it is comparable to sudden appearance of a crescent moon arising in dark clouds. The reader gains the knowledge of the

features of the lady of the house, besides there is a poetic beauty embedded in it.

Two questions can arise in relation to upamaana as pramANa: Is upamaana any different from perception? Second, is it not an inferential knowledge, since some philosophers consider it as part of anumaana only and not a separate pramANa? These questions are addressed by Vedanta ParibhASha. It is not perception since the knowledge of the wild animal that one perceives is based on the similarities of attributes of the cow that one is familiar. One does not perceive the cow while perceiving the wild animal. During perceptual knowledge, when I see object cow, based on the attributes of the cow, a recognition that it is a cow is made by recalling from memory the attributes of the cow jaati that one has seen and known before. In contrast, here when I see the wild animal for the first time, there is no image stored in my memory to recall for me to know this is a wild animal. What I am recalling is not the image of the wild animal, but image of a similarly looking

animal, the cow that I am familiar. Hence cognitive object, the wild animal, is different from the recollected object the cow. Hence in this case, upamaana involves a recollection of a different animal altogether from what one perceives. The knowledge of the new animal takes place due to similarities in its attributes with that of different animal that is not being perceived. Hence upamaana pramANa does not come under direct perception.

In fact, whenever we see a new object, the mind goes back into memory to check if there any image that resembles the one that we are perceiving. If there is no identical image for us to identify the object that we see as we are seeing this new object for the first time, we scan through the memory to see any object that has close resemblance with the new object. Thus similarities and dissimilarities of new object and old known objects are categorized into families or phylums to arrive at an expanded version of the classification scheme. This is how the knowledge grows. Hence upamaana is used extensively in gaining the knowledge of new objects. It is a separate means of knowledge to know objects that I do not know before.

The next question is if upamaana the same as anumaana or inference. Recall anumaana pramANa has three components, if not five. We can write artificially the three components in upamaana, similar to anumaana:

My cow is like this wild animal.

Because it has similar attributes as this wild animal.

Whenever one has similar attributes to another, it will look similar to the other.

Let us compare the above statements with those in the example of anumaana.

The hill has fire.

Because it has smoke.

Whenever there is smoke, there must be fire, as in kitchen.

In the inference of fire where there is smoke there are no similarities between smoke and fire. What is there is its concomitant relation with smoke, as in kitchen. This relation between the fire and smoke is deduced by dRiShTAnta or prior observation in kitchen and is universally applicable.

In the knowledge of the wild animal that it is similar to the cow that we know, we are not really using any universal concomitant relation between any two objects that are similar. We do not come to the conclusion that this wild animal is like cow because of the universal relation that whenever one has similar attributes to another, it must look similar to the other. Without going through such syllogistic inference one arrives at the cognition that ‘my cow is like this wild animal’. This is a matter of common experience, says VP. There is a comparison of two things, not inference of one from the other because of vyaapti or concomitant relation between hetu and saadhya. We note here that anumaana or inference has very rigid structure to follow. It involves the knowledge of something that cannot be known directly by perception following a well established universal relation between what I see and what I conclude, as in smoke vs fire. There are no

similarities between smoke and fire. What is there is a concomitant relation or vyaapti between what is seen or hetu and what is concluded, saadhya. Also we need to bear in mind that every inference does not directly come under anumaana pramaaNa, as we noted in the last post that some degree of inference is involved even in the direct perceptual process. For example, we are gaining the knowledge of the complete object even though what we perceive is not a perspective vision but a projected vision of the object.

According to advaita, in upamaana or comparison, there is no immediate inference between two reciprocally related entities that western logic allows. Upamaana involves mediate knowledge unlike pratyaksha. There is a deliberate examination of the similarities between the wild animal and the cow before one comes to a conclusion or an assertion that my cow looks like that. No prior

reciprocal relation between cow and the wild animal is established for immediate knowledge to take place. Before the knowledge takes place there is an extensive observation in evaluating the similarities between the cow and the wild animal. Hence it is mediate and not immediate knowledge.

Swami Satprakashananda in his methods of knowledge says advaita does not dissent the Naiyayikas view that knowledge of dissimilarities can also be attained by upamaana. In the above example, dissimilarities involve a conclusion this wild animal is completely unlike my cow. Here, if the wild animal and the cow are completely dissimilar, the question arises why compare the two, to begin with, since what is being perceived is the wild animal and cow cannot enter into picture because it is dissimilar to the wild animal. In fact the wild animal may be dissimilar to many objects in the world, including the trees, lakes and human beings. Mind does not go through comparison of each and every animal to arrive that this wild animal is dissimilar to the all other objects that I know.

Hence for comparison to be made there must be some common ground or similarities between the two to justify further examination and conclusion that they are dissimilar in many other important aspects. Let us take another example. It is very common in comparing two twins. John and Harry, who look alike or they may be even two siblings. We are familiar with John, but we were told that Harry is completely opposite to him. In this example the dissimilarities are emphasized to provide the knowledge of Harry in relation to John with whom we are familiar. Here we are comparing the attributes of Harry in relation to the known attributes of John. Being twins, there are some similarities to justify comparison. We obtain knowledge of one from the dissimilar attributes of the other that we know. Hence Naiyyaayikas ascertain that even the dissimilarities can come under upamaana pramANa. That is, one gains new knowledge based on the dissimilarities. Advaita does not

dissent from this assertion.

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We will next analyze the application of upamaana in spiritual saadhana.

Upamaana PramANa – Its Application to Spirituality

We have discussed that there are two aspects involved in Upamaana pramANa. One is use of upamaana based on similarities and the other based on dissimilarities. It involves the comparison of two entities one that is known or whose attributes are familiar and the other is unknown which I am directly perceiving now or being informed about it through other pramANas. By comparing the unknown with the known based on similarities in attributes one can gain the knowledge of the

unknown. At times, it is also possible to know the unknown by comparing the dissimilarities to the known object. The statements will be this new unknown object is dissimilar or opposite to the object that we know.

All the examples we use to illustrate the unknown fall under upamaana only. The two objects that we are comparing are not identical but they are certain similarities which help to understand the unknown object. Vedanta is full of these examples. Atma bodha text of Adi Shankara contains in every sloka an illustrative example or upamaana that exemplifies one or more aspects of Brahman. All analogies or examples involve some kind of comparison involving saadRisyam or similarities to establish a fact. Since analogies are not identities, every upamaana will have limited application in understanding the unknown. Extending the example beyond the limited application will lead only to confusion. Hence one has to be very clear of the limitations of these examples in trying to know the unknown.

Advaita involves transcending the dvaita concepts. All the examples given being in the realm of dvaita, they have to be understood within their limited range of applications. Some of the critics of advaita (puurvapakshiies) apply the examples beyond the intended application and extract the unintended meanings to dismiss the philosophy. At most care, therefore, is required to understand the examples and their limitations in trying to realize what is to be known.

We mentioned that advaita does not dissent with the Nayyayika’s view that upamaana can also be used in comparing the dissimilar features between unknown and the known. In both cases, as we emphasized, the attributes of the new object that is being investigated are neither hundred percent similar or hundred percent dissimilar to other example provided. If all the attributes are hundred percent similar then it will reduce to pure cognition and recognition as pratyaksha pramaaNa only. In our classical exmaple, if I am perceiving cow only in the forest in stead of a wild animal, then to say that this cow is similar to the cow I have in town, although valid is not necessary. I will just say this is a cow. On the other hand, if the attributes are hundred percent dissimilar, the mind has no inclination to compare the known and the unknown. We do not have to compare the wild animal that I am seeing with river that I crossed saying that it is not like the

river. Hence the unknown object that I am trying to know the known object that I am comparing should have partially similar attributes and partially dissimilar attributes. Depending on the relative importance, the knowledge of the unknown is gained from the knowledge of the known by compare and contrast. In the traditional examinations knowledge of students were tested by asking them to compare and contrast two objects that they have learned, implication that such a comparative analysis provides a clear way of knowing the facts.

We now examine the role of upamaana as very important tool in gaining the spiritual knowledge. It is recognized at the outset that Brahman being one without a second, there cannot be any compare

and/or contrast with any other, since there is no other, by definition. However we apply many analogies in Vedanta to make us understand Brahman which cannot be known as an object. All analogies are upamaana only with some similarities and dissimilarities where emphasis is placed on one or the other to make us understand Brahman. Unless one is clear what aspect of the analogy (similarities or dissimilarities) is being emphasized in relation to Brahman, the teaching can become a source of confusion rather than clarification. This shows the importance of a proper teacher in whose hands the analogies become greatest vehicles to know Brahman. We take few examples here to illustrate the power of upamaana in gaining the knowledge of Brahman.

Akaasha or Space is Brahman: In Tai. Up. a meditation or upaasana wherein Space is taken as upaasana for Brahman. {Just as a side note, upaasana is different from knowledge. Upaasana involves invoking something higher on to the lower which is called aalambanam or idol. Jnaanam on the other hand involves knowing what it is. Thus seeing the Lord Vishnu in a stone or Ganesha in the turmeric piece is upaasana while seeing the stone as stone, turmeric as turmeric or Brahman as Brahman is knowledge.} Coming back in taking Akaasha as Brahman is upaasana. Akaasha, in many respects, is very close to Brahman. In the sequence of creation, space is the first subtle element that is born says the Upanishad. tasmaat va etasmaat atmanaH aakaaShaH sambhuutaH … and from space grosser elements are born. During the pralayam or final dissolution, the process reverses itself with all the elements merging back into space and space ultimately into Brahman. Krishna himself

uses the space upamaana to explain how all pervading Brahman, similar to the infinite space, is unaffected by the activities within the creation – yathaa sarvagatam soukshmyaat aakaasham nopalipyate .. B.G. 13:32. The similarities between space and Brahman are used to indicate the nature of Brahman. Space by itself cannot be conceived as it is infinite and so is Brahman. Conditioned space – pot space, room space, etc., where conditioning is done by the upaadhis (walls in the case of space) can be conceived and similarly Brahman as conditioned consciousness within the upaadhis of the mind and intellect. Pot-space can realize I am total space while still remaining as pot-space by knowing that space is indivisible. Space is very subtle and all pervading and so is Brahman. Space accommodates everything in it without getting affected. All the things mentioned about aatma or Brahman such as .. nainam chindanti shastraaNi nainam dahati paavakaH.. etc.,

that is, it cannot be cut, it cannot be burned, it cannot be wet or dried etc – all apply to space too. For the purpose of meditation, Tai Up says - yo veda nihitam guhaaayaam parame vyoman – Brahmna is in the very core of the inner SPACE of one’s own heart - says the Upanishad – Brahman being subtle like space is in the very core of one’s own personality (heart of ones individuality) , which cannot be objectified like space. Hence the analogy of space is very much used extensively to take the mind beyond all tangible or material entities that one is familiar. In Chidambaram Temple, the Lord is symbolized as space, where a chit itself forms an ambaram or clothing for the Lord – where space itself is idolized as God by garlanding the space (chidambara rahasyam). Hence for purpose of upaasana or worship, space analogy or upamaana is extensively used in Vedanta. That does not mean space is Brahman. Space is Brahman, since it is a product of

Brahman; at the same time Brahman is beyond space too. The dissimilarity that makes Brahman beyond space is Brahmna is a conscious entity while space is not. Space is inert or jadam. As mentioned that in upamaana pramaaNa, there has to be dissimilarities to differentiate one from the

other. Chaitanyatvam or being a conscious entity, Brahman differs from space, in spite of several similarities. In addition, Brahman is never a product but cause-less cause, unlike space.

To indicate that the Brahman is both material cause and the intelligent cause, Upanishads give several examples, and each example has limited application. Mundaka Up. says creation is like spider putting forth its net, indicating the spider is both the intelligent cause as well as material cause for the net. The example is limited since the spider is a conscious entity, the net is not, and it becomes separate from the spider. Hence the example cannot be extended beyond. In the next example the scripture says just as the earth putting forth the vegetable life – here the product is living entity while the cause, earth is inert. Thus every example that is pointed out has limitations due to similarities and dissimilarities since Brahman is one without a second. No other example will be completely fulfilling. Hence in the aatma vichaara, these examples have to be correctly applied to gain the underlying knowledge of Brahman.

Most quoted example of error or adhyaasa illustrated by advaita is the rope-snake example, where rope which is real is taken as snake due to ignorance of the rope or incomplete vision of the object, rope. But once light is shed on the rope, the knowledge of the rope is gained with complete dismissal of snake from the mind of the perceiver. The analogy is because of the ignorance of the truth, a false is projected and the projected false is taken as real. As a consequence of this error or adhyaasa, suffering follows, just as perceived snake due to the ignorance of the real (rope) causes the fear, rise in blood pressure, etc. However, once the truth is known there is no more false to cause fear. End of the analogy. Critics extend this analogy further to say that once one knows Brahman (brahma jnaana) there is no more world for him even to interact just as once one see the rope, there is no more snake to deal with. The argument implies that there is no more

teacher to teach ajnaanis. Hence no body else can know Brahman since no teacher is available. Hence all the teaching is false since there is no teacher to validate the truth. This is an clear illustration, where the application of the upamaana is done beyond its intended applicability. Perception of snake, where the rope is, is a subjective error and not an objective error. Hence realization of the truth removes all subject misconceptions only. Similarly knowing everything is Brahman removes the subjective misconceptions which is samasaara arising from one’s attachments and identifications.

Vedanta also provides another error adhyaasa which is an objective error – like mirage waters or shell-silver. Here unlike the snake case, everybody perceives the mirage waters or shell-silver. Understanding the truth that there is no water there or there is no silver there does not eliminate the perception of apparent water in the mirage-water or apparent silver in the shell-silver. After knowing the truth, the jnaani still sees the world of plurality but takes the world of plurality not as absolutely real but apparently real or as mithyaa. The snake-rope upamaana is given to remove the subjective misconceptions and mirage water or shell-silver upamaana is given to remove objective errors to recognize the Vyaavahaarika satyam as just Vyaavahaarika only- just as knowing everything

is gold and giving importance to names and forms, rings and bangles, not more than what they deserve. The point here with reference to upamaana is comparison is valid only up

to some point and taking beyond the limited application can result in incorrect understanding of the unknown. During the discussion of anumaana pramANa we have presented the errors in perception and inference. Here we are only highlighting the limitations of each analogy or upamaana in terms of understanding the unknown.

There are also many upamaanas or analogies provided to emphasize the dissimilarities as means of knowledge. Negation of I am not this involves rejecting any ‘this’ is not Brahman based on dissimilarities. This is an object, Brahman is not. This is limited, Brahman is not. This has qualities that distinguish this from that. Brahman being infinite has no qualities. Hence in the analysis of each of the koshaas as not aatma the dissimilarities are emphasized to show that anaatma is not aatma because each kosha is a product (kaaryam), and therefore only a name and a form with no substantive of its own, hence depends on something other than itself for existence, and thus they are all mithyaa unlike Brahma which is not a kaaryam, being infinite has no form, it is substantive of the jiiva, jagat and Iswara, and hence exists by itself and supports everything else in the universe including the universe. Hence vilakshaNa or dissimilarities are emphasized to

reject anything that is objectified or can be called as this, is not Brahman. Hence upamaana in terms of both similarities and dissimilarities are utilized in knowing what is unknown (Brahman) from what is known (jagat).

Thus comparison, upamaana is considered as distinct means of knowledge different from pratyaksha, perception and anumaana, logical inference.

With this we complete the analysis of upamaana and take up next the verbal testimony or shabda pramANa.

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Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge