Knowledge is Power: Investigating China’s ICT Power to

Knowledge is Power: Investigating China’s ICT Power to reshape

Global Internet Governance

Frederic Augustin

S2569310

[email protected]

03 July 2020

MA Thesis Global Political Economy (5184VGP01Y)

Word Count (incl. bibliography): 14848

Supervisor:

Dr. Rizal Shidiq

mailto:[email protected]

Student number: S2569310

Contents

1. Chapter: Introduction ............................................................................................................. 3

2. Chapter: Background: China’s Emerging ICT Capabilities .................................................. 5

3. Chapter: Methodology .......................................................................................................... 9

3.1. Analytical framework: Knowledge Structures ................................................................ 9

3.2 Empirical Strategy: Content & Discourse Analysis....................................................... 12

4. Chapter: Empirical Analysis ................................................................................................ 17

4.1. Analytical Baseline: Chinese Cyber Norms & ICT strategy ........................................ 17

4.1.1. Normative Priorities .............................................................................................. 17

4.1.2. National ICT Strategy ........................................................................................... 19

4.2. Knowledge-Legitimation: China & Norms in Global Internet Governance ................. 21

4.2.1. Norms in Global Cyberspace up until 2017 ........................................................... 21

4.2.2. Norms in Global Cyberspace after 2017 ................................................................ 22

4.3. Knowledge Regulation: China & Institutionalized Power over Knowledge in Global

Internet Governance ............................................................................................................. 25

4.4. China & Benefits from Rules and Definitions in Global Internet Governance ............ 28

5. Chapter: Conclusion............................................................................................................. 31

Bibliography ............................................................................................................................ 33


1. Chapter: Introduction

The rising power of the Chinese state is almost a truism in modern-day public debate. In 2018,

the Vice President of the United States, Mike Pence declared China’s rising power as one of

the main threats to the United States of America (US)1. Goldman Sachs and the Economist

have both predicted that China will surpass the US economically by 20252. Furthermore, the

narrative of “China buying the world”, has become extremely popular in western media,

especially with regards to the Information and Communications Technology (‘ICT’) sector3.

Fittingly, the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Xi Jinping has outlined that

China’s international policy goal should be to reshape international institutions towards

Chinese values and priorities4. However, a growing body of international relations and Area

Studies literature on China have empirically questioned China’s ability to influence the global

political economy 5 . This conundrum begs the question as to whether Chinese economic

capabilities, whatever they may be, necessarily translate into actual power. What kind of power

allows an actor to reshape global structures and how can economic capabilities influence it?

One of the sectors in which such questions may find answers is global internet

governance. The internet and its governance structures have only recently emerged in the

modern world. On an institutional level it is therefore highly susceptible to influence—as the

emergence of new global governing institutions between 2016 and 2017 has emphasized6.

Beijing also sees an enormous potential in internet governance as well as the ICT sector.

Through national ICT strategies like the Digital Silk Road and Internet Plus, it seeks to

accelerate the “promotion of China’s global discourse power and rule-making in cyberspace",

with the goal of becoming a cyber superpower (wangluo qiangguo)7. Therefore, this paper

investigates whether China’s use of its ICT capabilities has allowed it to reshape the

configuration of global internet governance in pursuance of its overarching national goal of

reshaping the global political economy.

Present academic literature on the matter so far has discussed this question to a limited

extent and application. While authorities on the matter like Adam Segal and Nigel Inkster, have

1 Pence, 2018 2 Nuruzzaman, 2016, 193 3 Shen, 2017, 4 4 Huang et. al, E.d. 5 Ferchen, 2016a; Ferchen, 2016b; Ferchen, 2018; Goh, 2015; Scobell and Nathan, 2014; Chung, 2018; Goh,

2014; Fitriani, 2018; Friedberg, 2018; Oh, 2018 6 Soesanto & D'Incau, 2017; Robinson, 2016 7 Kania, Sacks, Triolo & Webster, 2017


outlined their respective definitions of cyber power and the degree to which China possesses

it, they restrict themself to a simply descriptive historical analysis of ICT capabilities and

China’s internet governance approach as opposed to a causative one8. A similar picture has

also been presented in the broader literature on China’s rise and influence in the global political

economy. Although the implications and evidence for China’s rise find considerable academic

attention9, there is little empirical evidence in these discussions that may suggest that the

Chinese rise has any actual effect on Beijing’s power. This paper therefore adds necessary

empirical insights to a growing body of literature that operates at the academic forefront of

understanding China in international relations.

In order to the answer the research question at hand, Chapter 2 firstly provides a

historical background reflecting on China’s ICT capabilities. Chapter 3 then introduces the

theory of knowledge structures by Blayne Haggart to offer insight into the concept of power in

international relations that theorises both capabilities and influence10. The theory is translated

into three sub-questions establishing the link between China’s ICT capabilities and their

influence on its ability to reshape global internet governance. The sub-questions cover China’s

ability to reshape what is firstly regarded as important in cyberspace governance, secondly,

how the global internet is regulated, and thirdly, whether China benefits from the outcomes of

the structures of global cyberspace. Finally, Chapter 4 offers an empirical analysis of the causal

effect between Chinese ICT capabilities and China’s ability to reshape global internet

governance by conducting a content and discourse analysis of the United Nations Group of

Governmental Experts (UNGGE) and Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers

(ICANN)—which is to say, global internet-governing institutions that recently went through a

transition phase.

8 Segal, 2017, Inkster, 2015 9 Breslin, 2008; Blackwill & Harris, 2016; Cardenal & Araujo, 2013; Jacques, 2012; Subramanian, 2012 10 See Haggart, 2017, and Haggart, 2019


2. Chapter: Background: China’s Emerging ICT Capabilities

Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) broadly include companies that produce

and sell computers, communication equipment, consumer electronics and other electronic

equipment. Some of the most prominent examples of ICT companies include the US-American

GAFA companies (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon)11 and the Chinese equivalent BATX

(Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, Xiaomi). As in any other sector, the global economic strength of the

Chinese ICT sector can be measured by standard benchmarks such as foreign direct

investments (FDI), mergers and acquisitions (M&A), and its research and development (R&D)

capabilities. Advancements in new technology, which in this case include ventures such as

artificial intelligence (AI), fifth generation technology standards for cellular networks (5G),

and the Internet of Things (IoT), are further indicators for the emerging strength and

capabilities of the sector. This chapter provides insights into China’s international ranking in

the above mentioned benchmarks, allowing for an analytical estimate as to whether Chinese

ICT capabilities should even be considered important enough for a study of their potential

impacts on global structures.

Since the ‘going out strategy’ in the early 2000s, China’s ICT sector has grown from

one competitor among many to a dominating global presence. Along with the United States,

China today hosts the largest number of web users and competitive technology companies12.

In terms of e-commerce capabilities, China has increased its share of global transactions from

0.6% in 2005 to 42% in 2016, making its market greater than that of the US, Japan, France,

Germany, and the United Kingdom combined. While American mobile payments accounted

for $112 billion US-Dollars (USD) in 2016, China has been transitioning towards a cashless

economy for the past decade, leading up to $9 trillion USD in transactions13. Moreover, with

the value of ICT goods exported by China reaching $500bn USD in 2015—making up for 55%

of total ICT exports—China has emerged as the leading ICT exporter14. This is in line with the

2015 World Investment Report, indicating a stark rise in outward FDI stock from 2000 to

2014—surging from $27 billion to $729 billion USD15 . This has ranked China’s overall

outward FDI in 2014 to be the third largest in the world after the US and Japan16. In terms of

11 Sometimes also referred to as FANG, i.e. Facebook, Amazon, Netflix, and Google 12 Segal, 2017, 40 13 IISS, 2018 14 OECD, 2017a 15 UNCTAD, 2015, A8 16 Ibid


trend prediction, the report also estimated that China would shift from overall net FDI recipient

to net FDI supplier over the next few years17. Nevertheless, China still experiences large

dependencies on foreign technology. ICT imports in value terms from China have increased by

60% from 2008 to 2015, while overall OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development) imports remained relatively stable18. The danger in such an exponential rise lies

in unexpected cut offs and disruptions from imports—as has already happened in the cases of

ZTE or Huawei. When the access to chips or other high-tech ICT components from abroad

suddenly experiences a cut, China’s ICT companies struggle to maintain their production

levels19.

Chinese ICT companies are also in the spotlight for their advances in Western states.

The European Commission, out of fear that Chinese ICT companies might acquire too many

strategically relevant European companies, have undercut Chinese investments into region as

well as abroad20. The Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) finds that due to this

increased scrutiny, there has been a clear trend towards an overall decrease in Chinese

investments since 201621. Despite this decline, Chinese ICT in Europe maintained itself as the

top investment sector as of 2019, in terms of single transactions—constituting 20% of all

transactions—placing second in terms of investment volume at an evaluation of €2.4 billion

Euros22. This persistence of ICT as a top target for Chinese investment shows the Chinese firms’

continued interest in European technology companies and know-how.

Hong Shen finds that ICT plays a similarly important role in the United States. More

than half of China’s FDI to the US in 2014 was poured into the ICT sector23. Large-scale

Chinese overseas acquisitions through ICT firms have become more frequent with companies

like Tencent, Alibaba or Baidu investing hundreds of millions into acquisitions24. Uber, one of

the largest multinational ride-hailing companies, for example, received a $600 million USD

investment from Baidu in 2014—a sum not easily spent, even for technology companies25.

These continued investments show not only a commitment for expansion, but also that Chinese

ICT companies, as they have accumulated large amounts of capital, seek profitable outlets for

reinvestment outside of China.

17 UNCTAD, 2014, 47. 18 OECD, 2017a, 57 19 See Davies, 2019, 39; and Mengting & Lee, 2019 20 The Economist, 2018; The Economist, 2020 21 Hanemann, Huotari, & Kratz, 2020, 3 22 Ibid, 13 23 Shen, 2017, 131 24 Shen, 2017, 26 25 Ibid


This is also why China has shown interest in developing markets that host large

consumer bases and newly developing structures. The ASEAN Investment Report in 2018

shows China ranking third in ICT Greenfield FDIs—investments into new environments

without pre-existing systems—between the years of 2013 and 2017, with especially

competitive investments into mobile phone manufacturing operations 26 . Notable Chinese

investments in ASEAN ICT firms include a $1.1 billion USD investment by Alibaba in the

Indonesian online marketplace Tokopedia, as well as its purchase of the controlling stake in

Southeast Asia’s largest e-commerce operator Lazada27. In several African countries ‘Made in

China’ technology from Huawei, ZTE and China Telecom serve as the backbone of local

network infrastructure28. ZTE and Huawei, for example, secured a $1.6 billion USD deal with

Ethiopia in 2013 to expand mobile phone infrastructure, introducing a high-speed 4G

broadband network in its capital Addis Ababa and rolling out a 3G service across the rest of

the country29. As a young and growing consumer base the targeted early investment is predicted

to make the African market as a whole one of the most dynamic ones in the decades to come30,

with Chinese ownership of over half of Africa’s smartphone market providing a competitive

advantage to Chinese ICT companies31.

On top of its investment efforts, China consistently works towards becoming the

world’s key ICT innovator. It is the world’s most specialized economy for ICT products, with

ICT-related goods accounting for over 60% of its patent portfolio32. In the field of artificial

intelligence, China is the second largest producer of scientific documents on machine learning

behind the United States33. A recent 2020 study by Macro Polo suggests that Chinese AI talent,

although mostly working in the United States, makes up for the second largest talent pool in

the world.34 Chinese AI capabilities are therefore well positioned to make a difference not only

in AI labs at Google or Stanford University, but also in the Chinese market. Moreover, Daniel

Nepelski and Giuditta De Prato find that “Chinese [ICT] companies frequently seek R&D

opportunities overseas”, placing China 5th globally in terms of interlinkages between national

innovation networks35.

26 ASEAN Secretariat and UNCTAD, 2018 27 Shen, 2017, 177 28 Chimbelu, May 3, 2015 29 Olander, January 20, 2019 30 The Economist, 2015 31 Telecomlead, 2020 32 OECD, 2017b 33 OEDC, 2017a, 20 34 Macro Polo, E.d., a 35 Nepelski & De Prato, 2018, 950


China’s drive for innovation may have also led the country to dominate in 5G and IoT

technology. Spearheaded by Huawei, which launched its commercial services in 2019, Chinese

companies hold “one-third of the worldwide 5G-related Standard Essential Patents” 36 ,

engaging in 80 telecommunications projects worldwide37. This is also why Henry Farrell and

Abraham Newman argue that the United States, challenged in its dominance of global

communications networks, banned Huawei from selling 5G equipment to US technology

companies38. As China also accounts for 44% of worldwide machine-to-machine (M2M) sim

card subscriptions—three times the share of the United States—it is furthermore put at an

advantage for emerging IoT technology39. IoT development and international cross-sector

partnerships are generally seen as much more feasible in China, leading to many observers to

conclude it will enable China to engage much faster in the mass commercialization of IoT

technology through reaching scale. The experience of catering to the world’s largest domestic

market for IoT-enabled services therefore works in an effective combination with a uniquely

favorable policy environment for ICT growth. The question now is, do these apparent

capabilities translate into power?

36 IPlytics, 2019; McGregor, 2019, also see Kim, Lee & Kwak, 2020, 1 37 Adee, 2019 38 Farrell & Newman, 2019 39 OECD, 2017a, 19


3. Chapter: Methodology

3.1. Analytical framework: Knowledge Structures

Before exploring a suitable theory that can lead us to an empirical understanding of China’s

actual power through its ICT capabilities, we must look at the concept of power itself. In

international relations power is often seen as the ability of one actor to modify another actor’s

behaviour despite their opposition40. Although power is often treated as an exclusively realist

concept41, international relations thinkers have recognized the need to conceptualize different

forms of power. This includes the Gramscian notion of military power, economic power42, soft

power43, as well as normative power, often connected to the European Union44. As this array

of definitions, however, only describe aspects, types, or tools of power—the United States, for

example might have both normative and military power—they, however, do not provide an

answer to what some international relations scholars have termed the ‘paradoxes of power’45.

This idea suggests that capabilities such as the number of tanks, diplomatic or cultural

institutions are often falsely assumed to be synonymous to power. Capabilities, no matter their

nature, must be employed in the form of influence with an actual effect on the actor’s behavior

to truly qualify as power. Influence, not capabilities, counts as power.

The essence of what provides actors with power in international relations have

furthermore shifted. Since the millennium, the control over information has moved to the

forefront of states’ ambitions to increase their power. “’Unprecedented transnational

communication capacities’”46, driven by the exponential growth in collection, processing, and

storage of digitized information47, point towards a trend in shifting global priorities to the

possession of data as a strategic resource48. Other than oil or cheap labour, intellectual property

(IP) and consumer data function outside the laws of comparative advantage. The collection of

IPs comes at minimum cost to overall market power. That is why technology companies like

40 Building on Weber and Cox et. al, 1973 41 Carr, 1964, in Barnett & Duvall, 2004, 40 42 Hill, 2016 43 Ikenberry & Nye, 2004 44 Manners, 2002 45 Baldwin, 1989; Maoz, 1990 46 Comor, 1996, 1 47 See Valenduc & Vendramin, 2017, 124 for the effects Big Data and Cloud Computing had on the production

and possession of data, 48 Valenduc & Vendramin, 2017, 122-124; also see Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2015; Cardon, 2015; Escande and

Cassini, 2015


Uber can afford to run at an overall loss—they bet to win a near monopoly position in their

market by building business models around network effects and acquiring strategic consumer

data49. This is also why international trade agreements since the 1990s focus strongly on

intellectual property goods like copyrights, patents, and trademarks50. The more strategic data

or information a company or country possesses, the better—there is no upper limit.

In light of these structural changes through new technologies, several International

Political Economy (IPE) scholars have argued for new ways to theorize international relations

incorporating a more structural, constructivist angle to the study of power in international

relations51. Moreover, unlike other definitions of power, structural power also offers a direct

link between capabilities and outcomes, as it means controlling sources, mediums, or

institutions that allow any actor to hold power to begin with. Structural power means defining

the rulebook by which everyone else plays and thus having influence—or power—over the

system itself.

This paper, therefore, uses Haggart’s (2019) adapted version of Susan Strange’s

definition of power over knowledge structures. Under this definition, power means holding the

key to what information is collected, communicated, used, and accepted as true. It allows its

holder to perpetuate, (in-) formally institutionalize, and legitimize asymmetries of power in the

global political economy52. Through its focus on the structurally underlying dynamics, power

over knowledge structures therefore precedes and pre-determines all other sources of power

and should be given ontological primacy53. From a policy perspective, it is also highly suitable

as a similar idea of ‘discourse power’ (huayuquan) is commonly used in the Chinese foreign

policy lingua. For the CCP “enhancing its discourse power internationally” means elevating

China’s ability to influence global governance and values54.

The power over knowledge structures allow an actor to structurally control knowledge

through the legitimation and regulation of knowledge55. On the one hand, the knowledge-

legitimation aspect governs which truths are accepted as known56. What counts as legitimate

and acceptable knowledge shapes how we interact with the world around us. It shapes who and

what is prone to have advantages and disadvantages in any given structural relationship,

49 Cardon and Casilli, 2015; Huws, 2013 50 Halbert, 2016; Halbert, 2017; Haggart & Jablonski, 2017 51 Constantinou, Richmond & Watson, 2008, 7; Haggart, 2017 52 Holzscheiter, 2013, 150, essentializing one tenet of Foucaultian thought on power, for further reference see

Foucault, 1970, 1972, and 1990 53 Langley, 2009, 131 54 Kania, 2018 55 Haggart, 2019, 26 56 Ibid


because it shapes reality according to whoever determines what counts and does not count as

accepted truth57. Traces of this aspect are found in actors’ expressions of priorities, norms, and

moral benchmarks that they intend to achieve with their actions. If their comprehension of truth

is found legitimate by other actors, these traces may also express a relationship of influence.

On the other hand, the regulatory aspect governs how, to whom, and on what terms

knowledge is created, communicated, and used58. As there are many different beliefs and ideas

that could potentially develop into accepted knowledge, there is a constant ontological and

epistemological contestation between them59. Regulating or governing knowledge, therefore,

means having the power to decide these contestations. Naturally, the regulatory aspect of

knowledge structures often expresses itself in the setup and acceptance of (in-)formal rules.

Laws, regulations, and (in-)formal networks that are linked to the creation, dissemination or

use of knowledge, can thus be measurable traces of the power over knowledge structures.

Underlying the idea of knowledge structures is furthermore the concept of knowledge.

While there is considerable philosophical debate about the nature of knowledge60, this paper

defines it as a socially constructed “approximation of an underlying reality—or phenomena—

that we can think of as information” 61 . As this information must always be collected,

communicated, or used by social actors, it can never be fully objective—or in other words,

“’raw data is an oxymoron’: it is knowledge, not information”62. This nature of knowledge

itself not only explains the underlying link between power and knowledge, but it also indicates

another important consideration for an effective research framework of power over knowledge

structures. It suggests that any research conducted around knowledge structures will always be

to some extent interpretive in nature. Therefore, research applying knowledge structures must

recognize that we live in a ‘world of our making’63 , always constrained by the double-

hermeneutics of social science research64 . Only through acceptance of this reality, future

research may be able to build on this research’s findings without falling for its (hopefully

minimal) interpretive biases.

Lastly, as Haggart definition builds on Susan Strange’s theory, the relation between

knowledge structures and other structural powers requires definition. While Strange regards

57 Ibid 58 Ibid, 32 59 See Strange, 2016 60 One of questions that remain unresolved is the Gettier problem challenging the notion of knowledge as

justified true belief, see for example Turri, 2012 61 Haggart, 2019, 27 62 Gitelman and Jackson, 2013 63 Onuf, 1989 64 See Flyvbjerg, 2001


knowledge structures as one of four sources of structural power—with the others including

finance, production, and security structures—Haggart shows how the power over knowledge

structures fundamentally determines the strength of all other structural powers. The power over

production structures, for example, encapsulates the idea that power is gained through

controlling “what is produced, by whom, for whom and on what terms”65. Whoever defines

what is accepted as valuable to produce, however, also controls what is ultimately produced.

Transitionally the same logic applies to the power over security and finance structures.

Therefore, all structural sources of power as outlined by Strange are necessarily dependent on

knowledge structures.

Tying all these aspects of knowledge structures together, three observable implications

showcasing power can be measured66. If China has used its ICT capabilities to reshape the

configuration of global internet governance, we would see that China:

1. ... defines what knowledge is important in global internet governance—despite

facing considerable definitional contestation. (knowledge-legitimation aspect);

2. ... has (in-)formally institutionalized power over the creation, communication, and

use of knowledge in global internet governance. (regulatory aspect); and

3. ... asymmetrically benefits from these rules and definitions in global internet

governance.

3.2 Empirical Strategy: Content & Discourse Analysis

In order to offer a suitable method for both the nature of the research question and the

theoretical framework of power, this paper principally combines conventional content analysis

with document analysis. As knowledge is often expressed through language, ideas, and framing

of the world, tracing it requires a flexible and interpretive, yet precise approach to measuring

it. As content analysis combines inductive categorization to the discursive comprehension of

power expressed through linguistic means, the tandem of these two methods is highly suitable

to operationalize an answer to this paper’s research question.

As the overarching research goal is to measure the effect of Chinese ICT capabilities

on China’s ability to reshape global internet governance, the empirical chapter firstly provides

65 May, 1996, 179 66 Quoting & paraphrasing Haggart, 2019, 35, 42


a content analysis of China’s internet governance priorities and national ICT strategies.

Thereby an analytical base line of categories such as the employed framing and set policy

priorities is established. As China has one of the most extensive governance regimes for

cyberspace and ICT, emphasis is put on the Cybersecurity Law (CSL) which functions as the

corner stones of Chinese cyber space jurisdiction67. For a holistic picture of China’s ICT

strategy, the paper analyzes Made in China 2025, Internet Plus, Digital Silk Road, the 13th

Five-Year Plan for National Informatization, and the 2017 State Council’s New Generation

Artificial Intelligence Development Plan. To allow for a conclusive, triangulated picture, the

findings are then cross-referenced with area studies specific secondary literature on the history

and culture around Chinese internet governance.

Content analysis, following Hsieh and Shannon’s definition, principally relies on an

inductive approach 68 . “Translation device[s]” such as ideas, expressions, framings, and

concepts are directly derived from the data to codify them into categories69 . These build

relational center points for consecutive information, antecedents, and concurrences. Content

analysis therefore goes beyond simple categorization strategies of counting words, but

explicitly considers inferred communication to gain a contextual understanding of the analyzed

material70. This type of analysis is especially useful in fields where existing research is limited

and many, potentially messy data points are available. Due to its relatively recent emergence

and the therefore limited existing research available, an inductive approach to Chinese

influence on global internet governance is therefore highly suitable. Moreover, it prevents

preconceived notions and biases to interfere with research outcomes. Through a process of

breaking data points down into smaller, comprehendible categories based on apparent patterns,

it ultimately allows for the consideration of findings in a more holistic manner, also including

data points that might otherwise be overlooked71.

After establishing the analytical baseline, a discourse analysis of the effect of Chinese

ICT capabilities on the three aspects of power over knowledge structures is conducted. Firstly,

to measure the knowledge-legitimation aspect, the paper compares the analytical base line to

the norms and preferences of states in two separate time periods—pre-2017 and post-2017.

This separation is due to the 2017 collapse of the governing body of the global internet since

67 Sacks, E.d. 68 Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, 1279; see also Kondracki & Wellman, 2002 69 Poole & Folger, 1981, in Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, 1285 70 Hsieh & Shannon, 2005 71 Ibid


2004, the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Information Security (UNGGE)72.

Although it was re-established in 2018, it now runs in parallel to a second body, the Open-

Ended Working Group on Developments in the Field of ICTs in the Context of International

Security (OEWG). The difference between the two institutions is twofold. Firstly, the UNGGE

only allows for 25 selected experts, the OEWG includes all UN member states. Secondly, the

OEWG looks to be broader in scope, looking into “existing and potential threats; international

law; rules, norms and principles; regular institutional dialogue; confidence building measures;

and capacity building”73.

The pre-2017 documents are accessed through the Carnegie’s Cyber Norms Index

(CCNI), which offers a collection of all UNGGE and all related multilateral documents

between 2007 and 201774. The post-2017 documents are accessed through the United Nations

Library and the OEWG website75. They include a total number of 12 documents from the

UNGGE, OWEG, and the UN General Assembly 76 . All findings are consistently cross-

referenced with the Digital Deciders Data (DDD) by New America and secondary area studies

specific literature to allow for a more conclusive and holistic understanding of the results77.

The DDD, in particular, offers additional empirical insights into individual states’ position on

global cyber norms beyond multilateral forums. The consultation of this additional literature

and data therefore allows for an effective triangulation of the findings on three levels of

governance, i.e. on a global, inter-state, and state level.

The paper’s choice for a discourse analysis is justified in that it allows the research to

engage with "intersubjective meaning and the linguistic and communicative processes through

which social reality is constructed" 78 . This interpretive method "broadly understood as

'meaning in use'79 or 'talk and text in context'80 is particularly useful to comprehend power

expressed through linguistic means because it uncovers the context in which language finds

social meaning. For discourse to become dominant, Hajer describes two different stages it

needs to attain, the discourse structuration stage and discourse institutionalization stage81.

72 Osula, Rõigas 2016, 13; Soesanto & D'Incau, 2017 73 DWO, E.d. 74 CNNI, E.d. 75 OEWG, E.d. 76 It is important to note however, that the OEWG’s mandate only began in 2019 with results being expected at

the end of 2020. Analyzed OEWG documents will thus only include drafts and are not final 77 Morgus, Woolbright, & Sherman, 2018 78 Holzscheiter, 2013, 144 79 Wiener, 2009 80 van Dijk, 1997, 3; Holzscheiter, 2013, 143 81 Hajer, 1993; Hajer, 2006


Discourse structuration entails the idea that important actors begin to accept the discourse in

question and use it for the conceptualization of the world around them. The more important

actors rely on the same discourse, the more meaningful and thus powerful it becomes.

Discourse institutionalization occurs when the discourse in question is actively used in the

policy process. If a certain idea, image, or framing is apparent within policy documents or even

statues and institutional trainings, it may therefore constitute as powerful, dominant discourse82.

Secondly, to measure the knowledge regulation aspect, the paper conducts a discourse

analysis of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) transition

process. Founded in 1998, ICANN has since overseen the root zone of the internet (IANA) and

the Domain Name System (DNS) that allows for a globally connected internet83. The United

States government announced in 2014 that IANA and ICANN at large should be transformed.

Many states had issued their concerns over ICANN’s relations to the US department of

Commerce, to which it was technically accountable84. One of the states strongly advocating for

an overhaul towards a more state-centric institution was China. Officials in Beijing saw too

much power in the hands of the United States and even left the institution out of protest in 2001,

only joining again in 200985.

Following Haggart’s definition of the regulatory aspect of knowledge, the structural

importance of ICANN as a network governing the root administrative system of the global

internet is not to be understated. It governs the system that allows for the global internet to

function—for example, it administrates the Internet Protocol address spaces (IP addresses) and

the allocation of addresses to regional internet registries. Whoever controls ICANN, regulates

the technical root core of the internet, and can perpetuate their conception of how the internet

is supposed to run on a foundational level. The ICANN transition process between 2014 to

2016 is therefore an ideal proxy for an analysis of the relation between Chinese ICT capabilities

and China’s ability to shape knowledge regulation in global internet governance.

The data analyzed comes from three different sources: official ICANN transition

documents and Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) meetings between 2014 to 2016.

The first allows for a discursive look into the outcomes of the transition, while the later gives

insights into the language used throughout the transition process. The GAC, while only giving

non-binding advice to the ICANN board86, is the only body in ICANN’s structure that is

82 Ibid, 71 83 Liu, 2012, 47 84 Ibid; Robinson, 2016, 198, 201 85 Creemers, 2020, Liu, 2012, 51 86 ICANN, E.d.


intergovernmental. Therefore it was also the forum in which states would state their interests

about the transition process most openly. In total, three IANA transition documents and a dozen

GAC documents from nine international ICANN events have been accessed—all through the

ICANN website, which makes all its meeting notes and results openly available87. Additionally,

as in the sections beforehand, secondary literature offering further insights through interviews

and area specific expertise is consulted to allow for a more conclusive picture of the power

realities throughout ICANN’s transition process.

Lastly, to finish the empirical chapter, the paper analytically weighs whether China

benefits from the outcomes of knowledge structures in global internet governance. Power over

knowledge-legitimation and knowledge regulation are to an extent only useful if they produce

outcomes that are beneficial for the actor that controls them. In reverse, actors do not

necessarily need to have direct influence over structures if the outcomes from those structures

benefit them. Therefore, if actors gain from the outcomes of knowledge structures, they do not

need to actively change them, giving them a third alley of power over knowledge structures.

The last part of the analytical chapter thus offers insights into the outcomes of global internet

governance norms and the ICANN transition process and whether they benefit China. As the

paper follows an inductive analytical approach, the results are taken from preceding chapters

and triangulated with secondary literature evaluating if China benefits from knowledge

structures in global internet governance.

87 ICANN meetings accessed through https://meetings.icann.org/en/calendar

https://meetings.icann.org/en/calendar


4. Chapter: Empirical Analysis

4.1. Analytical Baseline: Chinese Cyber Norms & ICT strategy

4.1.1. Normative Priorities

China governs cyber space through six regulations, of which the Cyber Security Law (CSL)

lays out the core normative foundation88. Several institutions utilise these legislative documents

in order to function as regulatory bodies. Three are particularly relevant: The Cyberspace

Administration of China (CAC)—the central institution for internet governance—; the

Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), which has significant partaking in

the elaboration of ICT strategies89; as well as the Central Commission for cybersecurity and

Informatization which is chaired by Xi Jinping himself90.

Conducting a content analysis of the CSL as well as cross-referencing the material with

secondary academic sources, a clear normative emphasis on public security and sovereignty in

cyber space can be detected. When the CSL addresses data protection, for example, it

emphasises the importance of public security over other ideas such as personal privacy91. This

is meant to foster consumer trust in the digital economy while ensuring central governmental

control of cyber space92. Secondary literature suggests that this is due to the idea of privacy

having taken significantly longer to develop in China than in “the West”. Local communities

and the adherence to “strict moral and behavioral social norms” have created an unfavorable

environment for privacy protection to emerge93. While Western societies democratized after

World War II by balancing power-dynamics between states and individuals, political

circumstances in China hindered such developments. Data protection only became relevant

when a vast problem of online fraud lead to a public outcry in 201694. Nevertheless, Chinese

88 Triolo, Sacks, Webster & Creemers, 2017; Creemers, Triolo & Webster, 2018 89 Triolo, Sacks, Webster & Creemers, 2017 90 Creemers, 2020 91 Creemers, Triolo & Webster, 2018, Art. 8, 14, 28; Wang Han & Munir, 2018, 535; Sacks, 2018 92 Creemers, Triolo & Webster, 2018, Art. 16; Sacks, 2018; 11, 34-35 93 Pernot-Leplay, 2020, 65 94 After a college student died in 2016 as a consequence of being a victim to online fraud, the Chinese public

vocally expressed their anger about the rampant problem. Chinese consumers were at the time estimated to have

lost 1.5 billion USD in the timespan between 2011 and 2014 from online fraud already; on this also see Inkster,

2015, 42; Pernot-Leplay, 2020, 110; Wang Han & Munir, 2018, 535


data protection laws are built around norms of public security, reinforcing traditional Chinese

policy priorities95.

A second idea that is prevalent in the CSL is that of cyber sovereignty (wangluo

zhuquan). Mentioned in Art. 1, cyber sovereignty is understood as the application of the

classical 1648 Peace of Westphalia idea of sovereignty to cyber space 96 . Although the

document leaves definitional room for interpretation, it suggests that states, as much as they

have exclusive authority within their territory, also have such rights within their cyber territory.

In the words of Xi Jinping, states should therefore refrain from “interfering in other countries’

internal affairs, and engaging in, tolerating or supporting online activities harming the national

security of other countries”97. Rogier Creemers finds that reference to the term first appeared

in a 2010 national White Paper98, then in 2011 and 2015 in the United Nations99, at the 2012

Budapest Conference on Cyberspace100, at China’s World Internet Conference in 2014101, as

well as in China’s international cyber strategy102. This wide use of the term highlights its central

importance in China’s priorities for cyber governance.

Although Chinese regulatory documents make no direct reference to the reasons

underlying the employment of this term, Chinese lingua suggests a defensive purpose, referred

to as information security. Since the historic imperialist invasion of the China in the 18th

century, Chinese officials have long feared foreign interference and have thus been inclined to

securitize cyber space103. Rogier Creemers underlines this idea, suggesting that China employs

cyber sovereignty as a defensive mechanism against US cyber hegemony (wangluo baquan)104.

When the Snowden revelations (lengjingmen) and the United States’ ban of Huawei and ZTE

revealed vulnerability towards US technology, cyber sovereignty became a normative tool to

advocate for national security in cyber space105. Despite this framing, it is also often regarded

as a way for Beijing to justify a controlling government censoring domestic and international

95 Pernot-Leplay, 2020 96 Triolo, Sacks, Webster & Creemers, 2017 97 Xi, 2015 98 SCIO, 2010 99 UN, 2011; UN, 2015 100 Creemers, 2020 101 Ibid 102 Ibid 103 Schell and Delury, 2014 104 Harold, Libicki & Cevallos, 2016, 8-9 105 Creemers, 2020; Shen Yi, 2016; Inkster, 2015, 129-130; Shen, 2016, 91


cyber content. Through the Great Firewall of China, for example, “internet architecture, content,

and data flows” in China are systematically isolated from international cyberspace106.

4.1.2. National ICT Strategy

Five national ICT strategies lay the foundation for China’s approach towards becoming a cyber

superpower. The Made in China 2025 strategy seeks to engineer a shift for China from being

a low-end manufacturer to becoming a high-end producer of goods107. The goal is to tap into

its increasingly wealthy domestic consumer base as well as the value-added global sourcing

segment. This requires a transitioning of the country’s existing manufacturing infrastructure

and labour market towards producing more specialized output—with targeted investments in

research and development and an emphasis on technological innovation. Among its various

goals, the program seeks to raise the domestic content of core components and materials to 40%

by 2020 and 70% by 2025. The plan explicitly refers to how much of China’s technology

market should be controlled by Chinese companies and how many component parts in different

products need to be ‘Made in China’. These goals could be summarized as fostering indigenous

production without foreign interference and promoting investments abroad.

The former is also present in the Internet Plus initiative108. In July 2015, the State

Council released the ‘Guiding Opinions on Actively Promoting the Internet Plus Action Plan’,

strongly advocating for Chinese Internet firms to join traditional industries, such as

manufacturing and finance, in their overseas expansion109. It also encouraged those firms to

build globally competitive application platforms to offer Internet service such as cloud

computing and big data analysis, to both Chinese and global businesses. Moreover, Hong Shen

explains that a growing and complex alliance has been formed between the state and its

homegrown Internet companies in building a Digital Silk Road. It has the multifaceted aim to

mitigate industrial overcapacity, facilitate corporate China’s global expansion, support the

internationalization of the renminbi, construct a China-centred transnational network

infrastructure, and promote an Internet-enabled inclusive globalization110. In combination with

targeted ICT investments, for example, in internet infrastructure in Africa, the Digital Silk

106 The Great Firewall is a reference to the Great Wall of China and effectively stops foreign online traffic to

Chinese cyberspace; see Creemers, Triolo & Webster, 2018 107Zenglein & Holzmann, 2019 108 Xinhua News Agency, 2015 109 Shen, 2017, 129; State Council, 2015 110 Shen, 2018


Road has therefore allowed for a framework in which Chinese companies have had an easy

time flourishing and expanding to new countries111.

In 2016, the Chinese State Council published the 13th Five-Year Plan for National

Informatization, devoting a specific section to the construction of an ‘Online Silk Road’ and

encouraging the full participation of Chinese Internet companies112. In the plan the Chinese

government explains the importance of the internet in chapter 6 which is called “Broaden the

Internet’s economic space”113. It states that the overall goal is to “constantly have a firm grip

on the developments within the change of IT; realize the strategy of becoming a strong internet

power; speed up the instalment of Digital China; further push the fusion of IT and economic

and social development; and speed up the push for robust IT economic development”114. The

chapter further recognizes four key areas of attention, being: Establishing an extensive network

of high-efficiency IT, developing a modern internet industrial system, implementing a national

big data strategy, and strengthening assurance of cyber sovereignty as well as information

security. Given the wording, this strategy is the closest and most explicit about Chinese cyber

norms, thus showing how the growth of ICT capabilities and the achievement of norms like

cyber sovereignty are seen as part of the same overarching strategy.

Lastly, in the 2017 State Council’s New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development

Plan, the CCP formulated its intention to turn China into “the world’s primary AI innovation

centre” by 2030115. While Macro Polo points out the lack of a clear roadmap towards the

achievement of this goal, they also highlight the signalling function that statements like these

often have for Chinese domestic politics. It functions as a “high-profile signal to local

government officials—mayors, university presidents, and provincial transportation chiefs—

that they would be rewarded for promoting AI in their jurisdiction” 116 . Similar to other

strategies, there is thus a dual goal with China’s AI strategy. On the one hand, it seeks to foster

indigenous growth by creating strong economic and structural incentives. On the other hand, it

employs the growing ICT capabilities to expand abroad.

Taken all strategies together, two analytical reference points can be drawn. Firstly, and

most importantly, as China ties its ICT strategies closely to its cyber norms, any reference of

norms such as (cyber) sovereignty, national security, public security or public order, and

111 Ibid 112 State Council, 2016 113 Ibid 114 State Council, 2016 115 Macro Polo, E.d., b 116 Macro Polo, E.d. a


information security should be considered as potential traces of China’s influence. Secondly,

China ties its norm promotion to economic incentives at large. Access to digital infrastructure

and new technologies like cloud computing are specifically promoted and offered as an

incentive for other states to consider. China also emphasises indigenous growth, which

necessarily includes the exclusion of foreign interference in its national markets. Therefore, if

other actors’ reference any of these economic reasons for their choices, this paper regards them

as an indicators for potential influence of Chinese ICT capabilities.

4.2. Knowledge-Legitimation: China & Norms in Global Internet Governance

4.2.1. Norms in Global Cyberspace up until 2017

The discursive analysis of Carnegie’s Cyber Norm Index (2007-2017) indicates an

international divide along the spectrum of two opposing fronts on norms for cyberspace. On

the one hand, China and Russia can be categorized as advocates for an internet that balances

the rights of individuals with the sovereignty of states as well as the need of states to be able to

defend themselves against the US in cyber space. Firstly, on the idea of balance, Chinese and

Russian documents frame the idea of national security as one fundamentally is trade-off to the

adherence to human rights117. They officially agree to the importance of human rights in

general but state that they must be in accordance with a states’ national law, as well as their

means to protect them and national security. Secondly, on the defensive needs with regards to

US power in cyber space, China and Russia reference the Snowden revelations and emphasise

the threat of mass surveillance through cyber space118. However, there is no further reference

by other states or international bodies to these norms. This indicates an unsuccessful discourse

structuration.

On the other hand, states closely associated with the EU, the US and “the West”

advocate for human rights norms. They structure their framing around the universality of

human rights and the obligatory nature of international resolutions that make human rights an

international norm. Firstly, on the universality of human rights, the EU-US Cyber Dialogues,

conducted annually between 2014 and 2016, put repeating emphasis on human rights norms.

In nearly the exact same wording they conclude after each dialogue that the “same rights people

117 CEI, 2017i; CEI, 2017f; CEI, 2017j; CEI, 2017k; CEI, 2017h 118 CEI, 2017g; CEI, 2017a


have offline must also be protected online”119. This framing also appears nearly word-for-word

in the Group of Seven (G7) and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa),

indicating the emergence of discourse structuration120.

Secondly, on the obligatory nature of international resolutions, the EU-US Cyber

Dialogue references the freedom of expression online as well as individual privacy rights as

agreed upon norms for international cyber space. They uphold the Human Rights Council

resolutions in particular. Other states again show signs of discourse structuration, by repeating

this codification of norms into their official statements. As human rights norms are already

noted as obligatory under international resolutions as well as accepted by other states, there is

even indication for an institutionalization of the discourse around human rights norms. While

human rights might not be fully acted upon, they can therefore be regarded as legitimate

knowledge, that is accepted as truth in global internet governance. This also indicates that the

EU and the US—the core advocates for these norms—are at an advantage when it comes to

internet governance. Any other actor can be hold to these standards, giving the EU and the US

power over knowledge structures—at least up until 2017.

Cross-referencing these findings with the Digital Deciders Data by New America, a

similar picture emerges, although with the additional emergence of a third group. The DDD’s

Internet Value Score categorises states on a scale from authoritarian to free and open in attitude

towards internet governance. Results match the CCNI in that China, Russia, and states like

Egypt and Turkey categorize as authoritarian, while Western countries, including the EU and

the US are found on the free and open side of the spectrum121. However, the data also indicates

that approximately 50 states—including states like India and Brazil—are undecided, siding

somewhere in between the two extremes. This group is coined the digital deciders. Following

the DDD’s semantic emphasis, it is this group that is the most important for the future of global

internet governance.

4.2.2. Norms in Global Cyberspace after 2017

The discursive analysis of the UN OEWG and General Assembly (GA) indicate that human

rights norms are still institutionalized, but that Chinese norms of information security and cyber

sovereignty have become more prominent. Firstly, regarding the human rights norm, all three

119 CEI, 2017b; CEI, 2017c; CEI, 2017d 120 CEI, 2017e; CEI, 2017a; CEI, 2017f 121 Morgus, Woolbright & Sherman, 2018, 20-21


officially published drafts of the OEWG show a clear “commitment to promote respect for

human rights and fundamental freedoms”122. The GA further reaffirms this by employing the

same framing around offline-online rights that the EU and the US had used before 2017123. As

this discourse was already institutionalized before 2017 and continues to be prevalent in the

documents published by all UN member states, one can conclude that this norm remains

institutionalized.

Secondly, regarding Chinese norms for cyber space, there is greater mention of the

norms by actors other than China, Russia, and their associated allies. The OEWG has a separate

agenda point on information security124 . The pre-draft further outlines the importance of

preserving states ability to act as sovereigns, however, also emphasizing the need to uphold

fundamental human rights (point 23, 27)125. This dual stance is underlined in the second pre-

draft and in some of the comments by states commonly associated as digital deciders such as

Ecuador 126 . In terms of the General Assembly, particularly the documents A/73/505 and

A/73/505 stand out127. They emphasis the need to “continue to study, with a view to promoting

common understandings, existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security”128.

However, closer inspection of the context in which it is used indicate that while states begin to

see information security as relevant, they do not conclude national measures are necessarily

the best way to ensure it. To protect critical infrastructure, countries like India or Canada see

international cooperation as a better choice instead129. Therefore, states generally call for more

action to ensure and study measures for information security130, but refrain from following

Chinese norms. France even explicitly states that as an advocate for freedom of expression

online, it “first [wishes] to reiterate that it does not use the term ‘information security’’,

preferring other terms instead131. Information security is thus moving up the agenda, but not

fully according to the Chinese definition.

The clearest trace of Chinese norms however can be found in a 2018 Chinese and

Russian-led GA resolution on Countering the Use of Information and Communication

122 OEWG, 2020c, 1; OEWG, 2020b, OEWG, 2020a 123 GA, 2019c, 3, a similar commitment can be found in GA, 2019d 124 GA, 2019b 125 OEWG, 2020c 126 GA, 2017 127 GA, 2019c; GA, 2019e 128 GA, 2019c 129 OEWG, 2020b, 4; GA, 2018c 130 GA, 2019a, 2 131 Ibid


Technologies for Criminal Purposes132. It highlights both the right of states to be the sovereign

of their cyberspace and the public security norm. While this emphasis is most often present in

Chinese and Russian resolutions, this time, the resolution found additional support and was

eventually adopted. Some of the digital deciders—for example, India, Brazil, Nigeria, and

states in China’s neighborhood—backed the resolution. In total half of the digital deciders

votes yes133.

Secondary literature also suggests that sovereignty finds more frequent mention in the

EU’s regulatory context of data protection regulation. Internet governance conferences, as well

as policy proposals, and even speeches of EU country leaders refer to the need to regain

sovereignty as states in cyberspace134. Since the formulation of the European Union’s General

Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), stronger restrictions on the free flow of data have been

imposed in Europe. They de facto operate through a localization requirement, usually

associated with controlled and sovereign norms for cyberspace135. Occasionally, European

officials even mention the need to protect against US power in cyberspace136. However, the

term employed in the European context is not cyber sovereignty, but digital sovereignty, which

describes the ability for both individuals and states to stay self-determined in cyberspace137.

France’s answer to the report of the UN Secretary General working on cybersecurity highlights

this in particular. Although the country states that “sovereignty applies to cyberspace”, it does

not refer to cyber sovereignty, but specifically differentiates it as digital sovereignty 138 .

Following Hajer’s definition for dominant discourse, this indicates that Chinese discourse

around sovereignty and national security has reached the discourse structuration phase but has

yet to institutionalize its position. Important actors, such as the digital deciders and European

states, traditionally opposed to Chinese norms, are more prone to use China’s discourse, but

they are yet to reach its full acceptance.

Finally, when it comes to the second indicator showing influence of Chinese ICT’s

economic incentives, states generally tend to be vaguely responsive. India, the Netherlands,

Germany, Argentina, Columbia the United Kingdom all recognize that critical infrastructure is

connected to reaping the economic benefits from information and communications

132 Sherman & Morgus, 2018 133 see GA, 2018a, and GA, 2018b 134 IGF, 2019a; IGF, 2019b; IGF, 2019c; IGF, 2019d; EIT, 2020; Creemers, 2020 135 Daskal, & Sherman, 2020, 3 136 Segal, 2017, 21-22 137 IGF, 2019a 138 GA, 2019a


technologies139. Infrastructure should therefore be protected, in particular from cybercrimes

and malicious intent. The UK even states that national security is necessarily linked to

economic prosperity. However, there is never a direct reference to any particular ICT

technology or the need to indigenize ICT production. Moreover, all countries state their explicit

unwillingness to compromise on individual freedoms. Sometimes they state this in the same

sentence in which they refer to economic benefits, other times, as in the case of France, they

explicitly state that it is part of a broader goal in which protectionism is not an option—there

has to be a balance between security, economic growth, and individual freedoms140. Adding

these findings to the results on cyber norms, ICT capabilities can only be considered partially

impactful for China’s power over knowledge-legitimation. While norms like information

security and sovereignty have in part reached the discourse structuration stage, economic

incentives do not leave any empirical traces. China thus only partially or even minimally

defines what knowledge is important in global internet governance.

4.3. Knowledge Regulation: China & Institutionalized Power over Knowledge in Global

Internet Governance

As in the previous section, Chinese norms for cyberspace and expressed economic incentives

are traced throughout a variety of documents from the ICANN transition process. Adding to

the framings established in the content analysis in section 4.1., the inductive research of

Carnegie’s Cyber Norms Index has shown that Chinese officials also employ the notions of

balance as well as the need to defend against an hegemonic US power in cyber space. Moreover,

it introduced the notions of a free and open internet adhering to human rights as a framing

employed by states that sided with “the West” on internet governance.

Against this backdrop, the IANA and GAC documents suggest moderate to low

influence of Chinese ICT capabilities on China’s ability to shape the ICANN transition process.

Although secondary literature highlights Chinese officials openly advocating for a more state-

centric, sovereign version of ICANN under UN oversight since 2003, there is limited trace of

this affecting other states141. Firstly, considering the linguistic representation of Chinese norms

for cyberspace, only few norms find relevant mention. Although, national security is one of the

139 Ibid, 2-11, GA, 2017, 12, 18, 25 140 GA, 2019a 141 Ibid, 51; Creemers, 2020


most important concepts in the Chinese understanding of global cyberspace142, there is no

direct mention of the term. Public order and information security are also left unmentioned.

The only reference point that indicates direct concern about these norms can be found in a GAC

High Level Governmental Meeting in Marrakech (2016). Russia, a close ally to China, as the

research into Carnegie’s Cyber Norms Index has shown, issued its doubts over whether the

United States was truthful in its promises to aid the transition process away from ICANN’s

relation to the US government. For evidence, they pointed towards a letter by Ted Cruz, a US

Senator, warning of giving away the internet to the Chinese143.

Another important Chinese norm often promoted through Chinese officials and ICT

companies is the idea of (cyber) sovereignty. Although, the Chinese government again showed

the intention to make it an absolute priority in the ICANN transition process, it only finds direct

mention in one of the GAC meetings and in none of the IANA documents. After the Chinese

official mentions the issue at the beginning of the meeting, Iran, a Chinese ally in cyberspace

governance, as well as Peru and representatives of .AFRICA, an independent non-governmental

regional organization speaking on behalf of the interest of African internet consumers, voiced

their desire to have sovereignty be regarded in the ICANN transition process144. While this

does indicate that sovereignty plays an important part in the discourse employed by the actors

involved in the transition process, the single mention of the issue also shows that the notion did

not persist throughout the entire transition process. Moreover, the fact that other states only

mentioned it once it was raised by a Chinese official in the same meeting first, indicates that

ICT capabilities probably played less of a role in the behavior of other states. Instead, they are

likely to have been more concerned about immediate reference points raised in the meeting.

Economic incentives also play a marginal role in the considerations of states in the GAC

and the final IANA documents. There is no mention of the economic role in the IANA final

documents and only two countries mention economic incentives in the GAC meeting in

Marrakech in 2016. While Canada refers to the economic benefits a multi-stakeholder model

would hold, Indonesia highlights that the development of the internet should be connected to a

beneficial environment for internet-related technologies145. The latter is a linguistic trace that

one might expect if there was any influence of Chinese ICT capabilities. However, Indonesia

is the only country to mention these intentions this explicitly and it formulates them vaguely

142 Creemers, 2020, Liu, 2012 143 GAC, 2016, 34-35 144 GAC, 2016, 86, 95, 106, 143, 167 145 Ibid, 19, 100


around the term of international cooperation leading to the development of local internet-

related technology146. Therefore, the language used in the analyzed documents suggests that

economic incentives paly a marginal role in other states’ considerations.

The notions that do stand out consistently in all documents, however, are the notions of

balance as well as the “western” notion of a free and open internet. The IANA Stewardship

Transition Proposal—notably just the initial proposal and under heavy international

scrutiny147—already stated the need “to find the right balance across the stakeholder equities

and operational requirements”148. In fact, the same proposal made direct reference to the need

to limit the power of the United States outlining that no single interested should be able to

capture IANA stewardship149. Several states participating in the GAC forum made similar

claims. Sometimes such balance is seen as a balance between the power of developed and

developing states, sometimes it is referenced as checks and balances that are fair for every actor

involved. Overall, the notion of balance appears to be an important notion throughout the

transition process, mentioned from actors on the entire spectrum from allies to China, to allies

to “the West”, and even the CEO of ICANN himself150.

Norms promoting a free and open internet structure are explicitly present in the IANA

transition documents. The IANA transition proposal, that outlines the United States’ idea as to

how the transition was supposed to function, states that “the transition proposal should

contribute to an open and interoperable internet”151. This clear promotion of the free and open

norms for cyberspace can also be traced in the IANA transition assessment report. There it

specifically refers to the new model being one representing a “neutral and judgement-free

administration of the technical DNS and IANA functions”, which will lead to a technical

structure that does not limit “free expression or the free flow of information”152. According to

the report, this is also in large parts due to the Obama Administration committing to the

preservation of a free and open global internet153. Given these open expressions of support

through a US administrative body, it is therefore likely that not China but in fact the United

States were able to influence the transition process to their liking. Following Hajer’s

146 Ibid 147 Robinson, 2016, 203 148 ICG, 2016a, 30 149 Ibid, 25 150 GAC, 2016, 15, 32, 91; GAC, 2015, 19, GAC, 2014, 45 151 ICG, 2016a, 87 152 ICG, 2016b, 7 153 Ibid, 25-26


conceptualization, this does therefore indicate institutionalized discourse, thus leading to a

dominant discourse in cyberspace along the free and open internet norms.

Taking all documents into consideration, China’s ICT capabilities can therefore be

identified as far from the discourse institutionalization that is required to qualify Chinese

discourse as dominant discourse. Moreover, they do not reach the discourse structuration level

either, indicating the lack of influence of Chinese ICT capabilities altogether. In fact,

considering the extent to which documents mention Chinese norms in comparison for China’s

vocal advocacy of the same norms in the early 2000s, there appears to be a gradual decline in

Chinese advocacy efforts. Two non-mutually exclusive explanations for this development

appear likely. Firstly, China accepted its low likelihood of success within the international

discourse that was already strongly influenced by the free and open idea of internet governance

for ICANN. Secondly, Chinese officials realized that the multi-stakeholder model without

direct US control over ICANN would achieve its goals of limiting US power without the

necessity for strong Chinese advocacy. Despite initial opposition to the multi-stakeholder

model in the early 2000s154, Gianluigi Negro finds that Chinese officials began to familiarize

themselves with the benefits of the multi-stakeholder model throughout the transition

process155. This ultimately led to their acceptance of the model and the consequent halt to its

advocacy efforts. Combining these alternative explanations with the discursive findings,

Chinese ICT capabilities can thus be considered non-influential towards China’s ability to

shape knowledge regulation in global internet governance. China does not possess

(in-)formally institutionalized power over the creation, communication, and use of knowledge

in global internet governance.

4.4. China & Benefits from Rules and Definitions in Global Internet Governance

Although the previous two sections have shown China to have limited power over the

knowledge-legitimation and knowledge regulation aspects of the power over knowledge

structures, the outcomes from knowledge structures in global internet governance show a trend

that is overall beneficial to China. In light of the analysis already provided in this chapter, two

aspects stand out specifically. Firstly, protectionism and national sovereignty is shifting

towards center stage in the discussion around how to govern global cyberspace. In particular

154 Creemers, 2020, also see ICANN, 2014, for access to Lu Wei’s speech 155 Ibid


the emergence of data protection legislation has played a large role in shifting states’ attention

towards more protection of their own cyberspaces. Despite considerable differences between

Europe’s definition of sovereignty as digital sovereignty and the Chinese idea of cyber

sovereignty, sovereignty, and data localization policies are in the minds of policy makers

around the world156.

This development is also in part due to the “the West” realizing the need to ensure

information security in cyberspace. As the Russian hack of the United States Democratic party

in 2016 and the Cambridge Analytica scandal have demonstrated the great impact cyberspace

can have on social, political and economic processes, policy makers have found social divisions,

fake news and filter bubbles to be of great concern157. States like China and Russia have long

seen information security as a policy priority, pushing for its consideration in the global

governance of cyberspace. As the issue becomes more important overall, Chinese, and Russian

arguments also gain attention that thus increasingly has the potential to shape the governance

of cyberspace. China therefore not only gains future potential to influence what is defined as

important knowledge (knowledge-legitimation aspect), but it is also more likely to find

acceptance for its protectionist cyberspace policies. The Great Firewall, for example, is less

likely to find international opposition. Although it is highly protectionist in nature and speaks

against free and open internet norms, officials in Beijing often argue that it hinders harmful

information from entering China, thus effectively providing information security. If

information security gains more acceptance, Beijing’s framing of the Great Firewall has a

greater potential to do so as well.

Moreover, as section 4.3. of this paper has argued that the multi-stakeholder model

benefits China in terms of outcomes. Although it does not have a direct say over the root zone

structure of the internet, one of its main policy goals has effectively been achieved through the

ICANN transition. The United States, the supposed cyber hegemon (wangluo baquan)158, no

longer has direct influence over the root zone system. Instead, the system is now accountable

to many different, non-state actors. Therefore, the Chinese fear of US interference through

ICANN has been drastically diminished. If considering these outcomes, China has therefore

gained from the development of knowledge structure in international cyberspace.

156 For more detail on the global trend towards what the authors call ‘data nationalism’ see Daskal & Sherman,

2020 157 Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018 158 Harold, Libicki & Cevallos, 2016, 8-9


The question remains however, to what extent these outcomes are necessarily

interlinked with Chinese ICT capabilities. Although some indicators in section 4.2. and 4.3.

suggest that Chinese ICT capabilities played a measurable role, it is unclear whether they were

the determining factor leading to the outcomes discussed. In fact, given the limited appearance

of the economic incentive within the discourse analyzed, it appears likely that Chinese ICT

capabilities were only partly influential in an already broader global trend of changing internet

structures. The Snowden revelations, for example, appear to have played a much more

significant role in reshaping global discussion than Chinese active use of its ICT capabilities,

as they made states in Europe aware of the need to protect against foreign interference and an

independent root file system (ICANN). Therefore, this section concludes that Chinese ICT

capabilities partially to minimally influenced beneficial outcomes for China. Beijing also only

partially and not asymmetrically benefits from the rules and definitions in global internet

governance. Given the trend, however, it remains to be seen if China can gain more from

knowledge structures in global cyberspace in the years to come.


5. Chapter: Conclusion

The influence of China in the global political economy has emerged as a hot topic in recent

years. Despite considerable amount of research, limited empirical studies on the interlinkage

between Chinese economic capabilities and its international influence have been conducted. In

light of this lack of literature, this paper has contributed to the academic debate on China’s rise

by analysing whether China’s ICT capabilities have allowed Beijing to reshape the

configuration of global internet governance—an emerging field of international governance

and one of Beijing prioritized sectors. Through a discursive analysis of global internet

governance documents and the conceptualization of power in international relations as power

over knowledge structures, the paper has found that China’s ICT capabilities do not possess

empirically provable influence on China’s ability to reshape global internet governance. On all

three analysed levels—what knowledge is defined as important, who regulates knowledge

structures, and who benefits from knowledge structures—China did either only partially gain

the power to reshape global internet governance, or none at all. As research sometimes falls

into the trap of confirmation bias, this paper is evidence for the need of an open-minded

approach to research. If a question of influence is asked, it must also be possible for the research

to conclude with finding a non-relation between the different variables studied.

Nonetheless, the paper also finds that certain values advocated by China on an

international stage find greater acceptance than in previous years. In particular, information

security and in part sovereignty play a greater role in the governance of global internet norms

and structures. The analysis of UN General Assembly documents, for example, clearly

highlights that information security and sovereignty are increasingly relevant in normative

discussions on an international stage. While this does not mean that states are willing to

sacrifice the norms around a free and open internet, which operates as institutionalized

discourse, these traditionally associated Chinese norms are entering centre stage in global

discussions. The analysis of the transition process of Internet Corporation for Assigned Names

and Numbers (ICANN) furthermore shows that the internet is moving away from US-centric

governance and towards a more globally accountable internet structure. While China had

limited influence on this transition, the multi-stakeholder model that ICANN transitioned

towards benefits Chinese interests more than officials in Beijing initially expected. Overall,

China is better positioned than ever to influence and benefit from global internet structures, but

it remains to be seen if this can translate into greater Chinese influence.


As the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) is set to finish its consultations in 2020,

further research could be conducted into whether the findings in this paper are also reflected

within the final conclusions of the working group. A particular focus should thereby be put on

the norms that are prevalent and whether Chinese norms of information security and

sovereignty are present. The research might also be able to reiterate this paper’s findings on

the influence of Chinese ICT capabilities by employing the framework provided in this paper.

The second alley of future research that could shed more light into the workings of China’s

ability to shape global internet governance might furthermore be found in an analysis of China

as an actor itself. Some observers have stated that China does not always act monolithic and is

even currently in the process of investigating its norms on data protection due to internal

pressures within China159. Such an approach may give deeper insights into who and what

controls the norms and structures of cyber governance within China and how these translate

into China’s overall international policy.

China’s economic capabilities, whether in information and communications

technologies, or other sectors of the economy, are undoubtedly rising. Its influence in global

internet governance, although only partially and to a limited extent, is rising as well. We should

not underestimate the power in international relations that may come as a result of Chinese

rising economic capabilities, but we should also remain nuanced in academic and public

discussions. Capability does not necessarily translate into power—China’s star is rising, but it

has yet to reach the overtly powerful position at the top.

159 Webster & Creemers, 2020


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