LAND 400 LAND COMBAT VEHICLE SYSTEM CONCEPT OF · PDF fileLAND COMBAT VEHICLE SYSTEM . CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS . ... Operational Guidance ... appropriate force to threaten or attack

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LAND 400

LAND COMBAT VEHICLE SYSTEM

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

PROJECT DESTRIER

Uncontrolled if Printed Current Version as at 1 December 2011

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DOCUMENTATION AND APPROVALS

Document Location The master soft copy of this document is held in the following location: Original paper copy is held on file by: Revision History

Revision Date Version Summary of Changes 30 Mar 11 1.9 Initial working draft for

consideration by ACMC Jun 11 2.0 Draft Restricted version Nov 11 3.0 UNRESTRICTED Modified for public release Date of this revision: Date of Next revision: Endorsement This document was endorsed by: J.G. CALIGARI Major General Head Military Strategic Planning - Army Nov 11 POC: COL A.R. Meacham DDG CAFS / Director Land 400 R1-03-B143 PO Box 7901 CANBERRA ACT 2600 0419219523 [email protected]


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Documentation And Approvals ......................................................................... 2

Table Of Contents ............................................................................................... 3

Glossary ................................................................................................................ 4

Executive Summary ............................................................................................ 8

References: ......................................................................................................... 10

Introduction ....................................................................................................... 10

Situation ............................................................................................................. 11

Strategic Guidance ............................................................................................ 11

Operational Guidance ....................................................................................... 12

Land 400 Guidance ........................................................................................... 14

AOF Operating Context ................................................................................... 14

Land 400 Capability Context ........................................................................... 18

Land 400 Description ........................................................................................ 18

Operational Construct ...................................................................................... 22

Lcvs Operational Use Overview....................................................................... 22

Mission ................................................................................................................ 23

Intent ................................................................................................................... 23

Scheme Of Manoeuvre ...................................................................................... 23

Supporting Battlespace Operating System (BOS) Concepts ........................ 27

Other Supporting Concepts .............................................................................. 28

Annexes: ............................................................................................................. 29


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GLOSSARY

Battlegroup A combined arms grouping based on a manoeuvre unit

headquarters

Battlespace The area of influence and the area of interest. It includes

the traditional domains of land, air and sea, space, the

electromagnetic spectrum and cyberspace. Note: Also

embraces the social, political and temporal contexts in

which conflict is waged.

Battlespace Operating System Battlespace operating systems represent the combination

of personnel, collective training, major systems,

supplies, facilities and command and control, organised,

supported and employed to perform a designated

function as part of a whole.

Combined Arms Fighting System

The Combined Arms Fighting System (CAFS) includes

those force elements, systems and platforms, that are

necessary to work together to realise Australia’s Task

Organisation principles. CAFS will deliver integrated

combined arms teams (CAT) capable of conducting

Close Combat and of enabling Joint Land Combat by

2030. The CAFS Project Management Steering

Group is the authority that guides this realisation of

combined arms and CAFS.

Cavalry Cavalry is a multi-role combat capability that combines

integral firepower, mobility, protection and network

communications to achieve effects on the battlefield.

Cavalry fights as an integral element of a combined

arms team.

Close Combat – Dismounted Combat carried out with direct fire weapons, against

identifiable individuals, supported by indirect fire, air-

delivered fires and non-lethal engagement means by

soldiers on foot

Close Combat – Mounted Combat carried out with direct fire weapons, against

identifiable individuals, supported by indirect fire, air-

delivered fires and non-lethal engagement means

(doctrine) by soldiers mounted in mobility platforms

during the assault and subsequently dismounted at a

specified point from the objective in order to fight.

Close Combat, High Survivable lift The capacity to manoeuvre within the range of direct

fire weapons while operating in complex terrain that

includes complicated obstacles and ambush weapons

systems.


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Close Combat Reconnaissance The capacity to find and identify threat capabilities in

complex terrain while under direct and indirect fire.

Combat Team A combined-arms grouping based upon a manoeuvre

sub-unit headquarters.

Combined Arms Team A case-by-case mix of combat, combat support, combat

service support and command support elements selected

on the basis of a specific combination of task, terrain

and threat.

Common Operational Picture A single identical display of relevant information shared

by more than one command. A common operational

picture facilitates collaborative planning and assists all

echelons to achieve situational awareness.

Core Land Integration

Primary Systems (CLIPS) An AOF concept derived and evolved from the BOS

approach but designed to reflect the core systems of an

army and the way they need to integrate.

Decisive Manoeuvre The conduct of synchronised operations, using assets

from and within any or all environments, to defeat the

adversary by positioning in time and space the most

appropriate force to threaten or attack critical

vulnerabilities, thereby, unhinging the centre of gravity

and obtaining maximum leverage.

Intimate and Direct Fire Support The capacity to effectively and precisely engage

adversary personnel, vehicle and fortifications with

integral direct fire weapon systems by day and night and

in extreme weather conditions; and

Land Vehicle Combat System

(LCVS) The LCVS will provide the mounted close combat

capability within the Combined Arms Fighting System

(CAFS) . The LCVS will be able to be employed across

the full spectrum of conflict in all environments up to

and including close combat as part of the combined

arms team (CAT). LCVS will be capable of integration

with legacy and new equipments in order to contribute

to the overall commanders’ situational awareness and

combat power as part of a networked capability. LCVS

will be characterised by precision lethality, land combat

survivability, situational awareness and combat

capability integration to deliver a system that enables the


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successful conduct of sustained close combat against

emerging and future threats.

LCVS Operational Tasks The LCVS operational tasks are those functional tasks

that are required to execute close combat operations.

Each of these tasks has a discreet set of characteristics

and requirements. LCVS vehicles/platforms will be

development to perform either an individual task or a

collection of tasks. The aggregation of tasks that an

LCVS vehicle/platform may be required to perform is

largely guided by the commonality of characteristics.

Further definition can be found at annex B.

Littoral That area defined by the close proximity of the land,

sea and air, where the operational effects of land, sea

and aerospace power would overlap. It encompasses

areas on land that can be influenced by JTF elements

operating at or from the sea and those areas of sea that

can be influenced by JTF elements operating on or from

the land. The distances involved will be determined by

technology, but the littoral currently spans 200

kilometres offshore to 200 kilometres inland.

Mobility – Tactical A quality or capability of military forces which permits

them to move from place to place while retaining the

ability to fulfil their primary mission.

Military Of The Self (MOTS) Military Off The Shelf equipment is equipment that is

already established in-service with the armed force of

another country or Australia; is sourced from an

established production facility (not just a Military Off

The Shelf design); and has at most minor modifications

to deliver interoperability with existing ADF

and/or allied assets.

Reconnaissance – Dismounted An enabling activity undertaken to obtain, by visual

observation or other detection methods, information

about the activities and resources of an enemy or

potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the

meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic

characteristics of a particular area by a soldier on foot.

Reconnaissance – Mounted An enabling activity undertaken to obtain, by visual

observation or other detection methods, information

about the activities and resources of an enemy or

potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the

meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic

characteristics of a particular area by soldiers mounted

in mobility platforms.


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Survivability All aspects of protecting personnel, weapons, and

supplies, including frequent movement, while

simultaneously deceiving the enemy.


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The Land 400 Land Combat Vehicle System (LCVS) will be acquired to fulfil an

identified strategic capability need for a mounted close combat system for future warfighting.

The broad capability need, IAW strategic guidance, is set out in the User Requirement.

Fidelity in the user requirements for the LCVS will be developed as this Concept of

Operations (CONOPS) is tested through wargaming and experimentation of the planned

future mounted close combat system and increased definition of the enabling capability

solutions.

2. The conceptual way in which the LCVS will be operated is set out under the Adaptive

Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept (AC-FLOC) and other core concepts. The

LCVS CONOPS is responsive to the specific sub-concepts of joint land combat as part of the

future mounted close combat system of Army Objective Force (AOF) 2030.

3. The LCVS will be required to operate across the full spectrum of threats and

environments which may be encountered by the AOF. This will include hybrid enemy

capabilities. The LCVS will be capable of defeating comparable enemy combat systems. The

AOF operating context necessitates a combat force capable of amphibious and expeditionary

operations. The LCVS must be capable of being projected for sustained operations against an

adaptive enemy in complex terrain.

4. The LCVS will be part of the wider Combined Arms Fighting System (CAFS), which

will include legacy, parallel and future capabilities. These will include: the M1A1 Main

Battle Tank; Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter; the communications and battle management

systems; Land 121 Field Vehicles, Modules and Trailers; the Land 125 soldier combat

system, offensive fire support systems; and ADF strategic and tactical lift assets. CAFS will

deliver integration of legacy and new equipments. The LCVS will allow the close combat

force elements to develop clear situational awareness of the battlespace by drawing from, and

connecting with, the future CAFS network architecture. The close combat force elements will

be able to use the sensors and systems of the LCVS to target enemy personnel, platforms,

weapon systems and installations with either the integral weaponry or by real time integration

with other offensive fire support (sea, land and air based weapon systems). The LCVS may

operate with both manned and unmanned sensor systems that can be deployed to extend the

knowledge and strike range of the Combined Arms Team.

5. Land 400 is to equip the mounted close combat force and those CS and CSS assets

that are required to provide direct support within the close combat zone. The size and

structure of these force elements will be determined by Army under the AOF and Army

Funded Force (AFF). LCVS will be introduced into service during the period from 2025,

spanning the current AFF and AOF planning periods. IAW PLAN BEERSHEBA the LCVS

will equip designated manoeuvre forces and be used in the functional tasks of close combat

reconnaissance, intimate and direct fire support in combined arms offensive and defensive

operations and close combat high survivable lift. Land 400 will also include the required

Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) land mobility platforms for close

combat that will close the gap with legacy and parallel capabilities. These in addition to

rotary wing assets will support the required close combat CS and CSS tasks in the direct fire

zone, whilst seeking the greatest commonality and interoperability to make sustainment,

transportability and support practical and affordable.


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6. The LCVS will enable the combat functions and battlespace effects through the

system components, and will be characterised by precision lethality, survivability, integration

and sustainability to enable an effective combined arms close combat capability. Specific

characteristics for LCVS components will be defined as the User Requirement is further

developed. The LCVS will be able to be flexibly configured based on threat, environment

and mission profile.

7. The Scheme of Manoeuvre sets out specific examples of how an AFF/AOF combat

force might be organised when equipped with the LCVS. This is supported by Annexes

containing mission profiles, scenarios and vignettes to further develop a framework for how

the future close fight utilising the LCVS may occur. The Battlespace Operating System

(BOS) and other concepts and operational risks are set out in support of the exemplar scheme

of manoeuvre and broader LCVS CONOPS. The development of this section of the

CONOPS is currently constrained by the parallel development of the future force under

PLAN BEERSHEBA and the AOF, which means that fundamental changes being considered

for force structures under the manoeuvre brigades are yet to be confirmed or supported by

doctrine.

8. The desired Land 400 LCVS endstate will be a future professional, multi-purpose

combat force equipped with a LCVS integrated into the CAFS providing enhanced land

combat lethality, survivability, situational awareness, close combat mobility and combat

power in order to win the land battle over time.


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LAND 400 – LAND COMBAT VEHICLE SYSTEM (LCVS)

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

References:

A. Land 400 LCVS User Requirement dated 30 Mar 11

B. PLAN BEERSHEBA

C. The Army Objective Force 2030, 10 Nov 11

D. Australia’s Amphibious Concept, Version 5 dated 9 Mar 10

E. Adaptive Campaigning AFLOC-C

F. Defence White Paper, Force 2030

G. Army Simulation Plan, 10 Nov 11

INTRODUCTION

1. The Land 400 LCVS will provide a mounted close combat system that enables an

effective close combat capability for the Army Funded Force (AFF) and the Army Objective

Force (AOF) combat system. The LCVS represents both a generational replacement of the

Protected Mobility Vehicle (PMV), Australian Light Armoured Vehicle (ASLAV) and

Armoured Personnel Carrier (M113) fleets; and filling the current mounted close combat

capability gap, for the future combat system. The LCVS is to be able to defeat developing

threat capabilities during future complex warfighting that cannot be defeated utilising current

vehicle variants. The LCVS will enhance existing capability, or remove current and future

close combat gaps, through the employment of precision lethality, survivability, integration,

mobility and sustainability.

2. This Concept of Operations (CONOPS) outlines strategic and operational guidance,

operating contexts, system description, operational construct and the anticipated use and

necessary support of the LCVS as part of the future combined arms capability of the

Australian Army. The purpose of the CONOPS is to align the LCVS with future Army

planning, and define the way the LCVS will be used on future operations. The CONOPS will

also inform the LCVS capability acquisition process and inter-dependant capabilities.

3. The LCVS will be an enabler for the future wider Combined Arms Fighting System

(CAFS). The CAFS is yet to be defined by Army, but is anticipated to be characterised by the

integration of legacy and new equipments in order to contribute to the overall commanders’

situational awareness and the flexible and precise application of combat power as part of a

networked capability.

4. The LCVS will be acquired and introduced into service to meet the endorsed User

Requirement (Ref A), including the approved Basis of Provisioning (BOP). The LCVS will

be operated within the force structures established by PLAN BEERSHEBA and the AOF (Ref

B and C). These plans have been determined in response to strategic guidance, Adaptive

Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept (AC-FLOC), the environment, the emerging

threat and other key factors in the operating context. These References, in combination with

current and emerging concepts and doctrine, specify the way the Army will organise and fight

utilising the LCVS as part of the future combat system.


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SITUATION

STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

5. Defence White Paper. The Defence White Paper 09, (DWP09) determined that

Australia needed a force that will meet the requirement for self-reliance for our direct defence

and our unique strategic interests, with a capacity to selectively do more in relation to our

wider strategic interests1. The DWP09 followed the force structure review which examined

plausible defence planning contingencies, the capabilities required for successful operations in

those contingencies, and the systems and equipment that would deliver the necessary

capabilities. The DWP09 specified the basis for pursuing the future development of the ADF

in a strategic manner to create the future force and remediate the most important gaps and

deficiencies in the current and projected force2. Part of the future development identified by

the DWP09 was the requirement for a new LCVS of approximately 1100 deployable

protected vehicles in response to the increasing complexity and lethality of land operations3.

6. The DWP09 also specified a requirement for tailored operations avoiding high rates of

attrition and mass casualties among our forces. To achieve this, battle on unfavourable terms

is to be avoided, force is to be applied in a precise manner, in a way that the adversary is not

expecting, and overmatch at decisive points in battle is to be sought4. The DWP09 specified a

requirement for the Army to be able to combine its combat and combat support units to

generate 10 battalion-sized battlegroups (BG) tailored for a wide range of operations5.

7. To guide the development of Force 2030, the Government identified a number of force

attributes and capability development principles relevant to the LCVS, which are described

below6:

a. Precise Force Application. Achieve precise effects, especially in the

discriminate application of kinetic and non-kinetic force with enhanced precision

targeting and discrimination assisted by technologies, systems and processes.

b. Networked Capability. Achieve information technology to link sensors,

weapons systems and commanders and their personnel in a networked

environment with common battlespace awareness and information superiority

over an adversary.

c. Operational Flexibility. Achieve operational flexibility and multirole

employment in the ADF's systems, platforms and organisations. This might

involve achieving greater platform flexibility by way of inter-changeable modular

design and construction techniques.

d. Fully Developed Capability. While mission-specific capability enhancements

will be applied where necessary, as a capability development principle the ADF

will acquire fully developed capabilities, which are fully deployable and effective

within readiness warning times.

1 DWP09, 8.4 2 Ibid, 8.2 – 8.3 3 Ibid, 9.38 4 Ibid, 7.5 5 Ibid, 9.3. Note, in the Australian context, a BG is defined as combined arms grouping based on a manoeuvre

unit headquarters. (LWD 3-0-2 Battlegroup Tactics, 1.1) 6 DWP09, 8.58


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e. Capability Advantage. The ADF will acquire the most capable platforms and

systems we can afford within our policy settings, in order to offset the relatively

small size of our forces and give them a war-winning edge. Exploiting and

applying new advanced technologies will be crucial to achieve this.

f. Survivable and Robust Capability. Achieve protection against the range of

existing and evolving threats including investments in lower signatures and stealth

for our capabilities and systems, force protection, countermeasures, protective

security and systems redundancy.

g. Interoperable Capability. Sensible and cost-effective capabilities and systems

should be designed to be interoperable from conception.

h. Cost-Effective Capability. Defence will continue to drive down the costs of

ownership of military capability. This will include greater use of simulation, a

more active role for ADF Reserves, smarter maintenance and leaner logistics

systems, improved information management and, where appropriate, a bias

towards military- and commercial-off-the shelf capabilities.

OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE

8. AC-FLOC. AC-FLOC establishes the core land warfighting concept of ‘adaptive

campaigning’ which comprises five mutually supporting and interdependent lines of operation

(LOO); joint land combat, population protection, information actions, population support, and

indigenous capacity-building. These LOO relate to the generic concepts considered during

the planning campaigns for war amongst the people and are prosecuted in a Whole of

Government (WoG) and joint framework, often as part of a coalition.

9. The AOF 2030 is optimised for the LOO joint land combat, although it has the capacity

to contribute to each of the other LOO as required. This recognises that joint land combat is a

prerequisite for the conduct of the other LOO. Within the joint land combat LOO there are

six sub-concepts; distributed manoeuvre, dynamic sensor-shooter coupling, isolation of the

battlespace, dominant response, focused understanding and mission oriented force protection.

The LCVS CONOPS is responsive to these specific sub-concepts of joint land combat as part

of the future combat system of AOF 2030.

10. Core Combat System Concepts. The AOF core combat system concepts are7:

a. Combined Arms. The AOF will deal with a complex environment through the

employment of Combined Arms Teams (CAT)8. These are credible, professional

multi-purpose forces with flexible combat power. AOF elements need to foster

habitual relationships between the elements contributing to the CAT both within,

and external to, the manoeuvre brigades.

b. Network Enabled Warfare. The use of networking to link all elements of the

AOF to enable automated information sharing to support situational awareness

and decision superiority. The system is supported by the right levels of human

7 AOF 2030 Handbook Version 2.0, 6.10 outlines the core concepts, sub-paras a – c(4) 8 DWP09, 8.20 states ‘…forces which are able to operate as combined-arms teams and undertake combat in our

littoral environment and territory, are necessary to secure offshore territories and facilities, defeat incursions onto

Australian territory and potentially deny adversaries access to staging bases from which they could attack us.


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cognition in order to operate during uncertainty and when network functionality is

degraded. This is envisaged to occur under CAFS9, supported by AOF force

structures. Better communications allow commanders to pass on decisions more

efficiently, enabling smaller, dispersed forces to operate to a disproportionately

greater effect. Increased connectivity underpins the ADF’s goal for network-

centric warfare. The dividend sought is highly responsive and tailored effects

within the framework of the commander's intent to facilitate network-enabled

operations10

.

c. Manoeuvre Warfare. The philosophy that underpins the way in which the

combat system will fight by destroying the enemy’s will to fight11

. At the tactical

level, to shatter enemy physical cohesion, this will include:

(1) Tactical Manoeuvre. The purpose of tactical manoeuvre is to destroy the

enemy's cohesion and cause their capitulation by the coordinated use of

speed, shock action and lethal force. It requires the integration of joint and

coalition force elements and the effects they generate with land force CAT.

Tactical manoeuvre will usually be conducted within the framework of

operational manoeuvre to position forces for decisive engagement. This is

done in order to reinforce the potential disruption or dislocation of the

enemy's centre of gravity (COG) achieved through operational manoeuvre12

.

(2) Littoral13

Manoeuvre. To achieve a disproportionate effect through the

employment of scalable, flexible and agile forces from over the horizon

directly to objectives inland. This will require all combat elements to

possess sufficient combat power to conduct immediate surface manoeuvre,

including riverine and estuarine operations.

(3) Ship to Objective Manoeuvre (STOM). STOM emphasises focus on the

projection of force by both surface and air means directly to the objective

from the sea, to dislocate the adversary in time and space. STOM balances

high impact with a smaller footprint and offers freedom of manoeuvre to

achieve surprise and maintain tempo. The commander is provided with

agility in timing and force application to sustain a range of concurrent tasks

and avoid an implied loss of tempo and initiative when establishing a

traditional beachhead. The Amphibious Deployment and Sustainment

(ADAS) STOM concept is for the insertion of two company groups by air in

two waves and concurrent insertion of another two company groups by

surface means in multiple waves. Embarked aviation offers quick, flexible

insertion and extraction of combat forces with air deployable fire support,

vehicles and logistics. Landing craft provide the capability to insert and

9 For CAFS definition see glossary 10 LWD 3-0 Operations, Para 27 11 LWD 3-0-3 Land Tactics, 1.13 12 LWD 3-0-1 Formation Tactics, 1.25 13

The littoral environment is defined as ‘ ..that area defined by the close proximity of the land,

sea and air, where the operational effects of land, sea and aerospace power would overlap. It encompasses areas

on land that can be influenced by JTF elements operating at or from the sea and those areas of sea that can be

influenced by JTF elements operating on or from the land. The distances involved will be determined by

technology, but the littoral currently spans 200 kilometres offshore to 200 kilometres inland. LWD 3-0-0

Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment, 1.18


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extract the heavy elements of the landing force14

. STOM is characterised by

the speed and agility of air and surface manoeuvre to achieve surprise,

increase tempo and employ discrimination in target selection. The AOF

requires STOM capabilities that are both marine capable15

and air portable,

and that possess sufficient firepower and protection to enable an effective

‘first wave’ to secure its objectives. Combat elements involved in STOM

need to retain sufficient mobility and firepower to manoeuvre once

deployed.

(4) Distributed Manoeuvre16

. In order to achieve a persistent, pervasive and

proportionate presence in complex terrain, the AOF may need to employ

large numbers of small CAT in distributed manoeuvre. These CAT will

close with and destroy the enemy without presenting a targetable mass. The

AOF needs to generate modular, robust CAT capable of ‘burrowing’ into

complex terrain and conducting semi-independent operations17

.

11. Other Core Warfighting Concepts. Joint Land Combat will encompass campaigns

planned under emerging operational concepts that will impact on operations undertaken

utilising the LCVS, including Decisive Manoeuvre18

.

LAND 400 GUIDANCE

12. Australia’s Military Strategy includes operating across the full spectrum of threats in

complex terrain, both on land and within the littoral environment. The future LCVS must be

able of operating in the combined arms team as part of amphibious operations and be capable

of insertion by strategic sea and air lift assets. The LCVS is to be developed as an integrated

combat capable system and is to include the use of simulation. The LCVS BOP is to address

both preparedness and concurrency requirements. The BOP should enable the WP09

requirements and remain consistent with the 10 x BG design. This includes enabling

Command and Control (C2), Combat Support (CS), Combat Service Support (CSS) and

Raise, Train and Sustain (RTS) functions.

AOF OPERATING CONTEXT

13. The strategic guidance, together with AC-FLOC, the environment, technology, the

enemy, legacy capability, the human dimension, and joint and inter-agency partners shapes

the context of the AOF 203019

. The AOF describes the way Army operates and thus should

provide the context against which all future land-focused capability development activities

can be conducted20

. The operating context defined by AOF 2030 is outlined below:

14 ADDP 3-2 Amphibious Operations, 1.23 15 Army has specified that the LCVS was not to have the capability to swim (directed by DGDP-A at L400 IPT

meeting Oct 10 (date TBC)) but requires review in light of the development of this CONOPS. 16 AC-FLOC 2009, 5.45 17 Land Warfare Studies Centre 134, Distributed Manoeuvre: 21st Century Offensive Tactics 18 Decisive Manoeuvre is defined as the conduct of synchronised operations using assets from and within any or

all environments to defeat the adversary by positioning in time and space the most appropriate force to threaten

or attack critical vulnerabilities thereby unhinging the centre of gravity and obtaining maximum leverage.

Australian warfighting concepts to guide campaign planning, Chap 3 19 AOF 2030 Handbook Version 2.0 20 Ibid, Para 2


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a. Environment. Australia’s Primary Operating Environment (POE) is illustrated in

Figure 2 below. The POE is focused on the Asia-Pacific region characterised by

complex physical, human and information terrain.

(1) Physical Terrain. The physical terrain of the POE is largely littoral, with a

combination of jungle, mountain and urban terrain. It is likely to experience

further urbanisation and to continue to have poor infrastructure21

. Almost

all strategic infrastructure and population centres are located within 25

kilometres of the coast22

.

(2) Human Terrain. The human terrain is a mix of cultures, ethnicity,

religions and political views, both between and within nations. An extreme

range of population densities occur within POE.

(3) Information Terrain. The information terrain will continue to be

influenced by language barriers and cultural norms at the micro level. The

information terrain is being modified by the influx of communications

technologies and media influences. This modification is more prevalent in

urban areas.

21 Doctrine on operations in specific environments is contained in LWD 3-0-0 Manoeuvre Operations in the

Littoral Environment and LWD 3-9-1 Operations in Specific Environments. 22 AOF 2030 Handbook Version Version 2.0


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Figure 1: Primary Operating Environment

b. The POE environment will not be dissimilar to the global environment, becoming

increasingly complex and interconnected over time. Land operations in the

complex terrain of the POE will be characterised by23

;

(1) their manpower-intensive nature,

(2) the degraded performance of stand-off sensors and communications,

(3) reduced detection and engagement ranges,

(4) restricted mobility, and

(5) the attenuation of weapon effects.

c. Land operations beyond the Australian mainland will be reliant on strategic air-

sea force projection assets. Operations are likely in the littoral environment and

this, in combination with jungle, mountain and urban terrain, will impact on future

operations utilising the LCVS.

23 AOF 2030 Handbook Version 2.0, 2.12


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14. Technology and Future Trends. AOF 2030 outlines 15 key areas of technology

development of relevance to future force design.24

However, it was assessed that the scope of

future enhancements are unlikely to drive a fundamental change to the way the AOF operates.

Legacy capabilities will also exist within the AOF. For the LCVS, there will be a requirement

to accept the development of emerging technologies during LOT and to operate effectively

with legacy capabilities including the M1A1 Main Battle Tank (MBT), Land 200 Battle

Management System and Land 121 Field Vehicles, Trailers and Modules (FVT&M).

15. Threat. The AOF 2030 broadly adheres to the concepts of hybrid threats and

unrestricted warfare in undertaking force design25

.

a. Enemy force structures. Potential adversaries can range from a major power to a

collection of ad-hoc and irregular forces. It should be expected that an enemy can

and will operate within populations and below the detection threshold, negating

much of the AOF’s technological advantage. Complete or partial enemy force

elements may deliberately merge with local populations to avoid identification,

exploit the potential for civilian casualties and deliberately engage ADF on

ground of their choosing. Enemy forces should be expected to range from a

sophisticated, intelligent and lethal force through to elements that are rudimentary

utilising legacy systems. However, enemy elements across the capability spectrum

will be capable of achieving operational and/or tactical superiority for periods of

time.

b. Enemy force technical capabilities. LCVS operational test and evaluation

(OT&E) will be evaluated against a range of enemies of differing capabilities

likely to be encountered in the future context.

16. Identified impacts of enemy and terrain for the combat system of the AOF26

will require

the AOF to:

a. conduct close combat within range of enemy threat systems as ISTAR

effectiveness can be degraded by terrain and an adaptive enemy.

b. continue to fight for and collect information in close contact with the enemy and

civilian population.

c. win the close fight which will require mobility, lethality and protection to close

with and defeat the enemy in the POE.

d. be able to manoeuvre to a position of advantage, both strategically and tactically,

while avoiding or overcoming enemy denial capabilities.

e. be capable of conducting area security operations over broad swathes of terrain in

order to deny the enemy sanctuary and to protect civilian populations, friendly

forces, installations, routes, borders and friendly actions such as reconstruction.

24 AOF 2030 Handbook, Version 2.0, 2.17 25 Ibid, 2.23 26 Ibid, 6.9


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f. provide security to local populations in order to set the conditions for

reconstruction and transition to indigenous control.

17. The AOF 2030 operating context necessitates a combat force capable of amphibious,

expeditionary operations. The LCVS will be utilised within this context and must be capable

of being projected for sustained operations against an adaptive enemy in complex terrain.

Future land operations will require modular, highly educated and skilled forces with a

capacity for network-enabled operations, optimised for close combat in CAT.

LAND 400 CAPABILITY CONTEXT

18. Land 400 is the project that will introduce the LCVS as a capability. The LCVS is the

platform that will form the centre piece of the mounted close combat capability. There will be

key interfaces and development friction between the LCVS and other capabilities. Land 400

will aim to deliver a system that is functionally integrated with legacy systems, is, or makes

provision for, integration with CAFS27

equipments and has capacity to absorb technological

change within Life of Type (LOT).

19. An initial scan of legacy and parallel equipment acquisitions shows that there are some

key limitations and constraints that may impact upon the capability solutions considered in

order to place Land 400 within the CAFS, these include:

a. The requirement to operate with the key legacy systems including M1A1 MBT,

ARH, Land 121 FVT&M fleets, communications and battle management systems

(L200/JP2072), Land 125 Soldier Combat System, Land 146 Combat

Identification and Land 19 Ph 7 Ground-based Air and Munitions Defence

(GBAMD).

b. The ability to achieve transition between mission profiles and tasks.

c. Compatibility with strategic lift assets. Ref D, Australia’s Amphibious Concept

(AAC) states ‘the force projection capabilities (utilising air and surface

manoeuvre) of available amphibious platforms will shape the Landing Force (LF)

scheme of manoeuvre.’ This will impact the numbers, weight and size of the

LCVS platforms in relation to overall carrying capacity and the ship to shore

connectors. Air 8000 Ph 2 will impact the type and number of available strategic

air lift platforms.

d. Key technology development timeframes (especially integration, power packs,

scalable armour and modularised components).

LAND 400 DESCRIPTION

20. Land 400 Land Combat Vehicle System. The LCVS will provide the mounted close

combat capability within the CAFS. The LCVS will be able to be employed across the full

spectrum of conflict in all environments up to and including close combat as part of the CAT.

LCVS will be capable of integration with legacy and new equipments in order to contribute to

the overall commanders’ situational awareness and combat power as part of a networked

capability. LCVS will be characterised by precision lethality, land combat survivability,

27 As defined in the Glossary


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situational awareness and combat capability integration to deliver a system that enables the

successful conduct of sustained close combat against emerging and future threats.

21. Functional Roles. The LCVS will be introduced into service within the future MMB.

The LCVS will enable each of the brigades to perform the following roles:

a. Close Combat Reconnaissance – the capacity to find and identify threat

capabilities in complex terrain while under direct and indirect fire;

b. Intimate and Direct Fire Support in combined arms offensive and defensive

operations - the capacity to effectively and precisely engage adversary personnel,

vehicle and fortifications with integral direct fire weapon systems by day and

night and in extreme weather conditions; and

c. Close Combat, High Survivable lift – the capacity to manoeuvre within the

range of direct fire weapons while operating in complex terrain that includes

complicated obstacles and ambush weapons systems.

22. Land 400 will also equip CS and CSS elements within the three regular manoeuvre

brigades, specifically:

a. Mounted Joint Fires Team (JFT) capability to support all mounted Combat Teams

within the Manoeuvre Brigades.

b. A mobility and survivability capability.

c. A repair, recovery and evacuation capability to support all mounted Combat

Teams within the Manoeuvre Brigades.

23. Future Combat System. The LCVS will be deployed in the battlespace28

as part of the

future combat system29

as defined for the AOF. The future combat system is to be optimised

to detect and defeat the adversary in complex terrain and support the central soldier system.

LCVS will provide options for the future combat system to balance firepower, mobility and

protection in order to maximise mounted close combat capability in the direct fire zone. The

CS and CSS core systems are the future combat system enablers.

24. Combat Functions. The future combat system, equipped with LCVS, is pivotal to

three of the six combat functions that are derived directly from combat; ‘know’, ‘strike’ and

‘shield’. The future combat system will also contribute to the other combat functions;

‘shape’, ‘adapt’ and ‘sustain’. The land force will require a LCVS as part of the CAFS to

perform these functions for the close combatant in future complex warfighting.

a. Know. The AOF requires the combat system to fight for information as a unique

contribution to the ‘know’ function as a product of reconnaissance. The ACR

multi-role sub-units, as part of a combined arms grouping, will conduct this task

utilising the LCVS. The LCVS will use integral systems and sensors in

combination with the networked and integrated CAFS to predict, detect,

28 The battlespace encompasses the area of influence and the area of interest. It includes the traditional domains

of land, air and sea, space, the electromagnetic spectrum and cyberspace. Note: Also embraces the social,

political and temporal contexts in which conflict is waged. LWD 3-0-3 Land Tactics, Glossary 29 A Core Land Integration Primary System (CLIPS) as defined in AOF 2030 Handbook Version 1.3, Para 63


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recognise, understand and determine strengths, vulnerabilities and opportunities

within the battlespace. The exploitation of knowledge, as a part of decision

superiority, provides forces with a distinct advantage over the enemy. The LCVS

will be able to share information as part of CAFS.

b. Strike. The conduct of close combat will contribute to the ‘strike’ function. The

LCVS will enable the close combatant to orient, organise, move and apply

appropriate levels of combat power through mounted close combat and intimate

support to the CAT. Manoeuvre elements equipped with LCVS will be able to

strike through integral direct fire and to integrate offensive support indirect fire

effects.

c. Shield. The combat system will contribute to the ‘shield’ function through a

variable combination of close combat, reconnaissance and security operations.

The LCVS will enable this through integration as part of CAFS and survivability

measures, shown at Figure 2. The LCVS survivability measures will comprise

networked resources and sensors, signature management, electronic counter-

measures, active protection, armour, tactical mobility and system redundancy.

The priorities for shielding are30

;

(1) survivability of combat system personnel,

(2) survivability of the LCVS, and

(3) survivability of the CAT.

Figure 2: Survivability

30 ACND Ground Fighting Mobility Draft, undated, Para 25


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25. LCVS Components. Whilst the capability solution is yet to be determined, the LCVS

components are expected to comprise:

a. Mounted close combat platforms fitted with:

(1) A range of firepower effects achieving precision overmatch of a

technologically advanced near peer enemy within complex terrain. This

may include main armament direct fire weapon systems capable of precision

and varied ammunition effects.

(2) Active and passive defensive aid suites, survivability systems and scalable

armour.

(3) Networking and a range of fitted and deployable sensors that are integrated

within the CAFS.

(4) Non-kinetic threat defences such as stealth, counter Electronic Attack and

Improvised Explosive Devices measures.

(5) Redundancy within, and between, sub-systems.

(6) Support equipment for the soldier system.

(7) CS and CSS variants as within the LCVS, or more broadly funded by Land

400 within legacy combat platforms, including specialised equipments

required for CS and CSS tasks.

(8) A sustainment and support system based on the principles of commonality,

predictive and diagnostic analysis, modularity and operational durability.

(9) A simulation environment within the Defence Simulation Network capable

of experimentation, development and dispersed individual and collective

training.

26. The LCVS will be an adaptable equipment solution, with design capable of ready

upgrades to key components such as battle management systems and defensive aid suites

during Life of Type (LOT). This will maintain a buffer against obsolescence and support the

integration of technologies with a shorter life span than the hulls and major systems.

27. LCVS Variant Characteristics. Generic variant characteristics and attributes in

cascading priorities and sub-priorities will be refined by subsequent versions of the User

Requirement. Integration and networking remains as a fixed requirement across the LCVS to

enable the CAFS effect.

28. The LCVS will not replace the MBT, nor will it have the ability to swim31

.

29. Battlespace Effects. The LCVS, as part of the CAT within the future CAFS will

enable the battlespace effects of suppression, neutralisation and destruction of the enemy; and

the seizure and retention of ground in all seasons, weather and terrain32

.

31 Army has specified that the LCVS was not to have the ability to swim (directed by DGDP-A at L400 IPT

meeting Oct 10 (date TBC)) but requires review in light of the development of this CONOPS.


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30. Characteristics. The LCVS will enhance the characteristics of the manoeuvre brigade

as part of the future combat system through the following characteristics in the direct fight:

a. Firepower. The LCVS firepower will either be synchronised with manoeuvre,

where CAT elements can either fire on the move, or in mutual support of other

manoeuvre elements. This gives balance to the CAT weapon systems and allows

each to be employed to its best effect while providing time for manoeuvre. Or

LCVS firepower will be used in shaping and strike, where weapon systems are

used to destroy, neutralise or suppress specific targets and limit the enemy’s

ability to manoeuvre. Enemy forces are delayed, disrupted and engaged in depth

or while uncommitted to the close battle. The aim of employing firepower in this

way is to limit the time spent in close combat or to shape the enemy prior to the

close fight.

b. Mobility. LCVS will be the means of concentrating combat force at the decisive

point to achieve surprise, shock action, physical momentum and dominance as

part of ground manoeuvre. Mobility will be used to gain positional advantage in

either the battlespace or time. The LCVS will be able to be synchronised with air

manoeuvre as part of CAFS.

c. Protection. The LCVS will provide part of the networking, reconnaissance and

sensors required to enable early detection, fixing and destruction of the enemy

before it can attack effectively. The LCVS will also provide physical hardening

through platform material and defensive aid suite solutions.

OPERATIONAL CONSTRUCT

LCVS Operational Use Overview

31. The LCVS will maximise the most advance proven technologies available in both the

combat system and the network enabled warfare capability for the close combat force. It

provides an enhanced platform for the traditional cavalry roles; it provides protected close

combat support for the Land 125 equipped infantry soldier and lightens the soldier’s load. It

will also provide platforms for those CS and CSS elements required to prosecute the close

fight.

32. The LCVS will allow the close combat force elements to develop clear situational

awareness of the battlespace by drawing from, and connecting with, the future CAFS network

architecture. The close combat force elements will be able use the sensors and systems of the

LCVS to target enemy personnel, platforms, weapon systems and installations with either the

integral weapons or by real time integration with other offensive fire support (sea, land and air

based weapon systems). The LCVS will also use integral systems to increase survivability by

seeing and striking first, avoiding detection, avoiding acquisition, avoiding the hit, avoiding

penetration and surviving the hit. The LCVS may incorporate both manned and unmanned

sensors systems that can be deployed to extend the knowledge and strike range of the CAT.

The LCVS will be capable of defeating comparable future enemy close combat systems.

33. The LCVS will be able to be flexibly configured based on risk and mission profile.

This includes the use of scalable armour solutions to vary survivability profiles. The LCVS

32 LWD 3-0-1 Formation Tactics, 1.20


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will include variants that support the required roles and tasks, whilst seeking greatest

commonality and interoperability to make sustainment, transportability and support practical

and affordable.

34. Annex B provides a detailed description of the LCVS roles and tasks, outlining how it

will generate, organise and fight given likely scenarios and mission profiles. To support

understanding and consideration of function requirements, these scenarios and mission

profiles are set within a strategic campaigning framework. Importantly, this allows

consideration of force generation and concurrency implications.

MISSION

35. Land 400 LCVS Mission. The Mission of Land 400 LCVS is to provide enhanced

land combat survivability and lethality to the combined arms team through the provision of an

integrated combat vehicle system with superior mobility, firepower, protection, situational

awareness and command and control which can fight and win sustained close combat

engagements in open and complex terrain.

INTENT

36. Purpose. The purpose of the Land 400 LCVS is to provide a mounted close combat

system for the future combat force in order to win the land battle.

37. Method. Land 400 seeks to deliver this requirement by:

a. Providing a LCVS that is capable of employment on multi-role tasking,

encompassing modularity, scalability, and versatile and agile configuration and

employment options for the commander IAW Army’s capability requirement.

b. Introducing the LCVS into service and integrating the LCVS into the CAFS.

c. Supporting the force generation of the future combat system, equipped with

LCVS, to meet future threats.

d. Supporting the adaption and sustainment of the future combat system, including

development of the LCVS during LOT, to maintain flexibility and the capability

advantage over time.

38. Endstate. The future combat force will be equipped with a LCVS integrated into the

CAFS providing enhanced land combat survivability, situational awareness, close combat

mobility and combat power in order to win the land battle over time.

Scheme of Manoeuvre

39. Force Generation (FORGEN). PLAN BEERSHEBA is the Raise, Train and Sustain

(RTS) structure that will be equipped with LCVS. The focus for the employment of LCVS

will be in the Multi-role Manoeuvre Brigades (MMB). The MMB RTS structure contains

Combat, CS and CSS force elements (FE). The Combat FE consists of an ACR and two

infantry battalions; CS consists of Offensive Support (OS), Mobility and Survivability (MS)

and C2; CSS is based on the Combat Service Support Battalion (CSSB). The LCVS will

equip the ACR of each of the MMB. The focus of the PLAN BEERSHEBA RTS structure is


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the FORGEN of all force elements of the MMB that will be grouped with FE from the

Supporting Brigades IOT form the tailored BG and Taskforce (TF) required to meet

operational and strategic needs.

40. Operational Employment. The LCVS will fight as part of the CAFS. In this future

system integration will be achieved between the dismounted close combatant and the mounted

close combatant. LCVS will also integrate with all elements of CS and CSS. LCVS will be

the network node around which mounted and dismounted combatants will operate in close

combat. This will enable close combat33

in complex terrain by mounted and dismounted

forces with the ability to fight for information and close with, and defeat, a lethal threat. It

will have a high degree of individual platform-soldier networked integration allowing the

coordination effects at the lowest level to enable fire and movement in the contested direct

fire zone.

41. Current and evolving threats have reduced the utility of unprotected and lightly

protected close combat mobility and have led to an increase in reliance on detection,

recognition and identification systems in the CAT. LCVS will enable the concentration of

combat effects to achieve a Main Effort (in time and space) without compromising Supporting

Effort actions and survivability. This demands increased terrain accessibility by LCVS and

will enhance the combatant’s ability to manoeuvre to points of advantage. This will mitigate

shaping by threat fires, obstacles and complex terrain. The increased soldier-platform

integration, freedom of manoeuvre and access to networked effects (sensor-shooter) will

generate combat force multipliers within the direct fire zone.

42. Within the direct fire zone, there will be the combatants and enablers required to win the

close battle. Both the close combatant and the enabler systems will need to operate within the

direct fire zone but their role and task will determine the level of firepower, mobility and

protection that they require. For those forces that are part of the future combat system

required to survive and fight consistently in the direct fire zone, the LCVS will be the close

combat platform. Those enablers that transit the direct fire zone will be mounted in protected

mobility platforms provided by L121 and legacy fleets34

. Figure 4 shows the relationship

between LCVS (close combatant) and protected mobility (enablers).

33 Close Combat is defined as – combat carried out with direct fire weapons, supported by indirect fire, air

delivered fires and non-lethal engagements. Close combat focuses on the defeat or destruction of enemy forces. 34 M113, ASLAV and PMV


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Figure 3. The elements of the CAFS that operate within the direct fire zone.

43. There will be an increased reliance on L121, legacy fleet protected mobility and rotary

wing assets to transport dismounted systems (e.g. personnel, weapons, sensors) to support

LCVS based Schemes of Manoeuvre. Without this supporting mobility it will not be possible

to achieve synchronised effects at the BG and TF level. It will also impact on the ability to

sustain combat power in the direct fire zone, with protected CS and CSS assets capable of

supporting dismounted and mounted combat elements in contact.

44. Task Organisation. The RTS MMB can be organised into a number of groupings that

can be tailored to suit specific operational needs. These groups are built from the available

FE to achieve specific effects over a specified period of time. At the higher level they will

include organic and non organic effects. This is shown in Figure 4.

MOUNTED CLOSE COMBAT

Combat enablers

CAFS

Legacy Fleets

DISMOUNTED CLOSE COMBAT

LCVS

MOUNTED CLOSE COMBAT

Combat enablers

CAFS

Legacy Fleets

DISMOUNTED CLOSE COMBAT

LCVSDirect fire/ Close Combat Zone

Combat Zone

AO / Battlespace


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Figure 4: Groupings for Task Organisation

45. At the highest level, the MMB HQ will combine with other specialised Command,

Control, Communications, Computing, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

(C4ISR) capabilities to create a TF HQ. This HQ will be designed to be able to command and

integrate all FE allocated for an operation. There will be elements of the Support Brigades

grouped to this TF HQ. TF HQ will also be the tactical level that interfaces with joint and

coalition effects and enablers. These effects may be allocated to the BG of the TF or

coordinated at TG HQ level.

46. From within each MMB there is the potential to generate three BG HQ and 10 Combat

Team (CT) HQ. Using this construct the ACR and one infantry battalion HQ will each form a

Mounted BG HQ based on respective HQ staff. The ACR will provide the LCVS required for

the TAC HQ of both BG HQ. HQ Main and Rear will operate from other protected mobility

platforms.

47. A CT is a tactical grouping of combined arms and services. This will include FE from

the ACR, each of the battalions and other CS and CSS FE as required. The groupings at this

level will be dependent on the specific mission and task of the CT. The CT is the smallest

self contained tactical unit within a TF. It can be tasked as an independent organisation for

extended periods with the ability to access enabling effects. The duration of tasking will be

limited to a specific tactical mission and series of tasks.

48. The smallest CAT is the platoon/troop. Each CAT is a grouping of combat bricks taken

from the CT and is the lowest level with appropriate C2 to coordinate the effects. Task

organisation can occur at this level through the combination of a series of combat bricks, but

each brick can not be broken down. Each brick is the smallest tactical element for a specific

element of the force. As an example, four dismounted combatants is the minimum combat

brick for the effective tactical employment of infantry.

TF BG

Cbt Team

Pl/ Tp

Bricks

Combined Arms Team

Combined Arms Team

Grouped Cbt Teams

and TF effects

Grouped BG and Joint effects

Smallest Tac F

E

Coord effects of the TF and Cb

t Teams. Grouped to achieve operational effects Min self sustaining FE. Inc Cbt/CS/CS

S . Grouped for specific msn and tasks Min Ta

c grouping. Inc Cbt / CS.

Grouped for specific msn and tasks Basic teams grouped to achieve specific tasks.

TF BG

Cbt Team

Pl/ Tp

Bricks

Combined Arms Team

Grouped Cbt Teams

and TF effects

Grouped BG and Joint effects

Smallest Tac F

E

Coord effects of the TF and Cb

t Teams. Grouped to achieve operational effects Min self sustaining FE. Inc Cbt/CS/CS

S .

Min Tac grouping. Inc

specific tasks.

Coord Coalition and Joint Effects with BG for the duration of the operation


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49. Main Effort. The Main Effort for the LCVS is the successful conduct of Close

Combat.

SUPPORTING BATTLESPACE OPERATING SYSTEM (BOS) CONCEPTS

50. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). The LCVS will contribute to

the C4ISR situational awareness function by being capable of gathering, using and

distributing information as part of an integrated network. Land 400 will form part of the

Army Future Network (AFN) and the Network After Next (NAN).

51. Offensive Support. The LCVS will be capable of operating within the integrated fire

effects of offensive support capabilities in the combined arms and joint environment. It will

employ effects from manned and unmanned fire systems, and ISTAR platforms including

ARH and Shadow 200 as part of dynamic sensor-shooting coupling. LCVS precision and

responsiveness will be enhanced under the CAFS to enable target identification, target

clearance, targeting precision, and target acquisition in real, or near real, time. The JFT will

be mounted in LCVS for compatible combat mobility and protection.

52. Mobility and Survivability (MS). The Combat Engineer (CE) FE will be equipped

with engineer platforms in order to provide protected mobility, counter mobility, survivability

and sustainability support to the MMB. These MS effects will enable the future combat

system to conduct full-spectrum complex warfighting operations. The CE platforms

supporting the combat system will provide protected assault gap crossing, obstacle breaching

and route clearance capability with a commensurate level of protection and combat mobility.

Subject to acquisition strategy for the LCVS, and the most appropriate means of deploying

specialised MS equipments, some, or all, of the CE may, or may not, be mounted in LCVS

variants.

53. CSS. The MMBs will have integral CSS FE equipped with task specific variants of

LCVS (repair and recovery, evacuation) to provide CSS effects to the close combat force.

Only those CSS elements required to be grouped at CT level and below will be equipped with

LCVS. All other CSS FE will be in L121 fleets. During distributed manoeuvre this will

necessitate semi-independent supply operations over a sustained period. CSS variants will

interface with L121 Field Vehicles, Trailers and Modules (FVT&M). The FVT&M will

utilise the Integrated Load Handling System (ILHS) including for modules such as bulk fuel.

The ILHS will enable greater speed in sustainment activities.

54. C3. HQ (TAC) will be equipped with LCVS for compatible close combat capability and

visual uniformity. All LCVS variants will be fitted for access to the CAFS Common

Operational Picture (COP) and will be able to maintain a Local Operational Picture (LOP)

internal to the appropriate C2 level (CT, BG, TF). As part of the CAFS, the LCVS will be

able to deploy and access manned and unmanned sensor systems to maintain the

commanders’ situational awareness. BG HQ (MAIN) will be equipped with L121 or legacy

fleet command and liaison variants35

. The LCVS will operate with communications and

battle management equipments acquired under L200/JP 2072.

35 Ibid, Para 114 states that ‘Land 400 may introduce additional variants but this is not yet determined’. The IPT

of 15 Mar 11 directed that Army conduct a gap analysis of Land 400 and Land 121 to ensure that no operational

gaps occur.


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55. Key Timings. Development of the LCVS is to be in parallel with the progress of

PLAN BEERSHEBA. Delivery of the LCVS is to be matched to the Army Force Generation

Cycle. The following are key dates:

a. Initial Operational Capability (IOC). IOC is defined as one MMB equipped

with LCVS – 2025; and

b. Final Operational Capability (FOC). FOC is defined as three MMB equipped

with LCVS ready to enable CAFS - 2032.

OTHER SUPPORTING CONCEPTS

56. Force Generation Cycle (FGC). The LCVS introduction into service and BOP will

need to support the FGC. FORGEN involves the preparation of land force capabilities against

a series of requirements that Army is tasked to be prepared to respond to on specified warning

times (preparing for ‘a war’). FORGEN is conducted by Forces Command. In contrast,

Operations Generation (OPGEN) prepares forces for a specific directed operation that they

have been tasked to conduct. OPGEN is conducted by Headquarters 1st Division based on

the force assignment of capability to Joint Operations Command (preparing for ‘the war’).

57. The FORGEN of land force capabilities to be ready for the widest range of

contingencies possible enables Army to provide land forces on a minimum of OPGEN time.

The maintenance of this readiness requires a FGC to be implemented, allowing capabilities to

cycle through (at minimum) a Reset, Readying and Ready phase.

58. FORGEN is therefore to be the key force structure determinant36

for all of Army’s

capabilities. The changes to force structure under the AFF and AOF will be based on the

FGC and will ensure that land force reforms are prepared with the most efficient management

and expenditure of the resources provided by Government for that task. The FGC is shown at

figure 5.

36 A force structure determinant is those tasks or activities for the conduct of which a force element (FE) is

structured. Force Elements are also able to conduct other tasks and activities given their structure, but they are

not provided resources on the basis of those alternate tasks. At the highest level, the Army is structured for

warfighting, but can conduct “lower intensity” tasks such as peace keeping and aid to the civil community.


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• BRIGADE

BASED TASK

FORCE

• ONE

DEPLOYABLE

MAJOR JTF

• FOUR

DEPLOYABLE

MINOR JTF

• THREE LIKE

DEPLOYABLE

MANOEUVRE

BRIGADES

• SPECIAL

FORCES TASK

GROUPS

• SPECIALIST

BRIGADES AND COMMANDS

Like Manoeuvre Formations

EnablingFormations &

Commands

Training Formations

FE

FE

FE

FE

AB

INIT

IO

SK

ILL

S A

ND

CA

RE

ER

IET

/ RO

BC

Force Preparation

Figure 5: Force Generation as the Key Force Structure Determinant

59. Simulation and Training. Individual and collective training is to maximise the use of

simulation (including immersive and virtual training areas) and decentralised training. Land

400 is to develop the future mounted close combat simulation system for LCVS. This

simulation system is to be the foundation of future CAFS simulation requirements. LCVS

integration and training is to be tested and enhanced through the use of simulation. The

simulation solution is to operate within the Defence Simulation Network being established by

JP3028. LCVS platforms should also be able to operate directly with the synthetic

environment to allow in-field, pre-deployment, planning and mission rehearsal training to

occur. Potential for simulated collective training with allies is to be considered.

60. Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. Army has a large array of concepts

and doctrine that support the conduct of training (both individual and collective) and

ultimately standardise the way Army units conduct operations. The simplification of the

MMB will mean that doctrine related to the specifics of each particular capability will be

simplified and easier to review and update, whilst more effort will be required to provide

doctrine in support of battle grouping and the way combined arms force generate and operate

together utilising LCVS.

61. Further Wargaming and Experimentation. This CONOPS will be further refined by

PLAN BEERSHEBA wargaming/experimentation and capability solution experimentation

and rapid prototype demonstrations.

ANNEXES:

A. Multi-Role Manoeuvre Brigade CONOPS on a page

B. Operational Concepts

C. Support Concept


Shape / KnowCavalry CT conducts recon of threat defensive dispositions IOT inform COMD’s SOM

Shape / Shield / Know/ StrikeNetworked and ISR capable Cavalry BG with an expanded footprint and close combat survivability conducts economy of force operations (Guard/Screen/Escort/Limited Offensive Action) to enhance security and SA across the AOR

Shape / Shield / KnowBG with protected mobility conducts supported by LCVS, Population Protection/Spt, Info Actions and Capacity Building in the population centres

StrikeBG with Close Cbt Mobility, Intimate Fire Spt and breaching assets prepares to conduct sustained close combat

Sustain / AdaptAdaptive C2 with networked capability and reach back; robust Log systems to sustain TF across concurrent lines of operation

Adaptive CampaigningJoint Land Combat

Population ProtectionInformation ActionsPopulation SupportCapacity Building

X

Future Threats:Hybrid/Near Peer forces

that seek to engage simultaneously across the

spectrum of conflict

Multi-role Manoeuvre Brigade - Task Force

Shape / Shield / Know/ StrikeIntegrated joint force & enabling capabilities

AN

NE

X A

LCV

S C

ON

OP

SD

AT

ED

JUN

11


ANNEX B

LCVS CONOPS DATED NOV 11

LCVS Operational Concepts

Overview 1. Introduction. This annex provides a detailed description of the LCVS roles and tasks against a range of strategic, operational and tactical considerations. Each of the operational tasks required to conduct close combat are defined. LCVS force elements are indicatively task-organised into combined arms, combat teams and battle groups within a range of strategic, operational and tactical contexts. This part includes an overarching campaigning framework, with a number of force generation and manoeuvre scenarios and mission profiles. 2. Roles and Tasks. The roles and tasks that will be required to be performed by the LCVS are as follows:

a. Close Combat – Command and Control (CC-C2). This task needs a decision support system, providing near real-time situational awareness and collaborative tools for tactical decision making, planning, mission rehearsals, and execution management for commanders at Battlegroup and Combat Team Tactical HQ. This task requires associated FE to operate in the direct fire zone.

b. Close Combat – Communications (CC-COMMS). This task involves the transfer of

information between various network services— including Coalition partners. It will provide a hub for the support and exploitation of wireless communications to dismounted force elements. This task supports operations that are conducted in the direct fire zone and within complex human and physical terrain, including urban intra-space, subsurface and close terrain.

c. Close Combat – Ground Manoeuvre Reconnaissance (CC-GMR). This task requires the

ability to fight for information in a contested, lethal and complex environment. It allows mounted Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) and manoeuvre operations to be conducted across a wide area and in the presence of a capable threat.

d. Close Combat – Protected Mobility (CC-PM). This task involves enhanced mobility and

protection for dismounted close combatants. LCVS will remain intimate in most situations, enabling sustained fighting in the direct fire zone and capability to close and survive against a highly lethal threat.

e. Close Combat – Direct Fire (CC-DF). This task involves agile, protected, intimate fire

support within the direct fire zone to dismounted and mounted force elements as part of a CAFS operating in contested, lethal and complex environments. Direct Fire also includes Overwatch (OW). This task provides commanders with an organic capability to destroy a range of threats (including armoured, non-armoured and point targets) at long range.

f. Close Combat – Joint Fires Control (CC-JFC). This task co-ordinates the provision of

Joint Fires; provides dedicated Line of Sight observation; and supports the effective engagement of targeting intelligence throughout the spectrum of conflict. It must be capable of operating in the direct fire zone, intimately with manoeuvre forces.


g. Close Combat – Manoeuvre Support Reconnaissance (CC-MSR). This task allows the manoeuvre force elements to gain timely, accurate and relevant information about threat engineering activities and terrain.

h. Close Combat – Manoeuvre Support (MS). Task involves combat engineers providing

close engineer support to manoeuvre force elements. It includes explosive hazard reduction, broader counter explosive hazard tasking, limited earthmoving, reconnaissance, general mobility, counter-mobility and survivability support. It will support engineer actions in the direct fire zone.

i. Close Combat – Recovery (CC-REC). This task is based on the principles of forward

recovery. It must be capable of supporting and recovering equipment other than LCVS.

j. Close Combat – Ambulance (CC-AMB). This task enables the timely and effective recovery of combat casualties from the direct fire zone. This allows the provision of a level of medical care as close to Australian peacetime standards as is practicable on the battlefield. This will be conducted while manoeuvre forces are operating in the direct fire zone.

k. Command and Control (C2). This task must serve as a decision support system, providing

near real-time situational awareness and collaborative tools for tactical decision making, planning, mission rehearsals, and execution management for commanders and staff at battlegroup and Brigade/Task Force Headquarters. It occurs outside the direct fire zone.

l. Communications (COMMS). This task allows the manipulation of information amongst

and between various networks— including those of Coalition partners. The system will form an essential part of the core battlespace Communications and Information System network infrastructure and the provision of Information Communication Services. It will provide a hub for the support and exploitation of wireless communications to dismounted force elements. Communications may be into and out of the direct fire zone.

m. Ground Based Surveillance (GBS). This task provides the essential day/night, all weather,

long-range surveillance overwatch role. It is an enhanced surveillance capability to complement LCVS manoeuvre functions.

n. Repair (REP). This task will continue to be based on the principles of forward repair,

repair in echelons and sustainability. It must be capable of supporting equipment other than LCVS, particularly equipment that does not have its own dedicated equipment support package.

3. Indicative Platform Types/Variants by Force Element. It is recognised that LCVS will seek to deploy platforms that are capable of performing multiple roles and tasks thereby reducing the number of vehicle platforms and or variants required. Campaigning Framework 4. The LCVS CONOPS campaigning framework provides a strategic and operational construct that interprets strategic requirements and guidance into an operational framework. It is nested to the AOF Campaign Narrative1. The narrative provides sufficient information to allow a tangible link and association between scenarios and mission profiles, ensuring traceability against strategic requirements as well as providing a central reference for the development of the CAFS capability and the integration of systems. It should be used to inform the operational analysis and framework that derives and 1 AOF v3.1, Campaign Narrative, Chapter 3, pg31


validates user, functional and system requirements, as part of the Capability Definition Documentation, specifically the Operational Concept Document. 5. Operational Context. The LCVS campaigning framework is based on an enduring deployment of a JTF, initially as an Australian independent JTF and subsequently as an Australian Led JIATF. It includes a range of scenarios that allow an appropriate mix of operational variables, ensuring a wide range of mission, threats and terrain are considered. It covers the full spectrum of conflict and follows the generic campaign phases of the AOF narrative: Shaping and Preliminary Operations; Entry Operations, including Amphibious Operations by the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG); Joint Land Combat; Stabilisation and Transition Operations. The threat is predominately hybrid in nature allowing multiple and different layers, relationships and capabilities to be considered at different phases of the campaign. The allocation of force elements follows an initial deployment of a deployable BG, as part of the ARG, increasing to a JTF of three BGs. 6. LCVS Scenarios and Mission Profiles. To understand and describe the conduct of operations and employment of the LCVS, a series of scenarios and associated mission profiles have been developed, within the campaigning framework. The scenarios provide more refined contextual information, with the mission profiles articulating the indicative task-organisation of LCVS force elements with other combat force elements of the Land Force. The scenarios are directly nested to the campaign framework, and thereby are consistent with military strategic guidance. This allows understanding of how the LCVS will operate in different and likely tasks, threat and terrain. 7. Assumption. The scenarios and mission profiles are set in the 2020-2030 timeframe. It is recognised that further development of supporting threat profiles is needed to increase the precision of the scenarios and allow more thorough use during force structure modelling, war gaming and validation activities2. 8. Framework. Within the framework the scenarios are constructed within the following operational phases:

a. Entry Operations. Entry operations comprise those operations necessary to deploy the force into the AO. The initial conduct of entry operations and deployment of force elements will be as part of an amphibious task group3. CATs will be lodged by air and sea. All variants will need to be lifted as part of the entry force. Subject to the threat and securing of an air point of disembarkation (APOD), additional FE may air-land during this phase. Amphibious lodgement requires flexible forces as well as forces capable of decisive manoeuvre to follow-on from the entry. Follow-on FE will be deployed with organic LCVS. However, the LCVS is not likely to be capable of swimming ashore and must be landed. It may however have the need to ford to breach archipelagic obstacles as part of landing operations. As soon as it is on land, all vehicle systems should be operational. This phase of campaigning will be examined as part of LCVS Scenario 1A, appendix three. It includes the following mission profiles:

(1) LCVS CT: STOM: Move and Seize APOD (amphibious operations) (2) LCVS CT STOM: Maintain Lines of Communications (sustainment operations)

b. Joint Land Combat. Encompasses those actions designed to defeat all resistance and

secure the environment in order to set and sustain the conditions required for other LOOs.

2 Liaison and cooperation between the L400 IPT and DIO is ongoing and threat profiles will be updated as assessments are made available. The current primary source for assessment is IAW DIO Land Battle Space 2035. It is anticipated that future assessments will include input from relevant DIO country desk officers. 3 Doctrine on manoeuvre operations is described in LWD 3-0-0, Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment, 2004


These actions represent the decisive phase of the operations and may include offensive, defensive and enabling operations such as reconnaissance and passage of lines. The LCVS will be employed by the CAT in the full range of roles required to prosecute close combat. This phase of campaigning will also be examined as part of LCVS Scenario 1B, appendix three. It includes the following mission profiles:

(1) LCVS BG: Isolate (reconnaissance and economy of force ops) (2) LCVS BG: Urban Attack to Destroy/Defeat (decisive operations)

c. Security as a Prerequisite for Stabilisation. The creation of a secure environment to all

WoG elements to establish longer term stability. The LCVS will be used during decreasing efforts under Joint Land Combat, and contributing to other LOO through physical presence, security operations, reconnaissance, surveillance, sensing and networking. This phase of campaigning will be examined as part of LCVS Scenario Two, appendix four. It will include the following mission profiles:

(1) LCVS CT: Convoy Protection/Defeat IED (force protection operations) (2) LCVS BG: Close country attack to destroy (decisive operations)

Appendices 1. General Situation - UNRESTRICTED 2. Scenario One: Entry Operations - RESTRICTED 3. Scenario Two: Joint Land Combat - RESTRICTED 4. Scenario Three: Security Operations - RESTRICTED


APPENDIX 1 ANNEX B

GENERAL SITUATION

Road to War

1. Island ‘F’ is located IVO of Country ‘G’. Island ‘F’ is comprised of both Australian Territory and Country ‘G’ territory. There is increasing tension with Country ‘G’ regarding disputed natural resource rights. The majority of natural resources are found along the disputed boarder. Country ‘G’ is linked to support for a breakaway militia and insurgent activities on Island ‘F’. Natural resource finds in the disputed region along the boarder have led to a fledgling primary industry mainly funded and operated by western resource companies based in both Australian and Country ‘G’ territory. Facilities are being developed within the region to support industry.

2. In recent months there has been a significant increase of insurgent-style attacks against Western interests, throughout the region. These were initially against the local industry security forces but, increasingly, are targeting western primary industry workers. There is also a significant likelihood that insurgent elements will overrun areas of Island ‘F’. Road communication links back to the Island ‘F’ coast are vulnerable to insurgent attack and the dirt airstrips have been subjected to mining. Australian response is to send military forces to Island ‘F’ to deter further aggression from Country ‘G’. This will be achieved by the projection of a Bde/TF into Island ‘F’. On re-establishing normalcy on Island ‘F’, the Bde/TF is then tasked to establish a FOB within the disputed boarder region IOT deter further aggression and prevent interdiction of regional SLOC.

Scenario Assumption/Pre-Conditions

3. The deployed JTF/JIATF has been appropriately prepared, equipped, trained and certified for the operation and tasks. The FORGEN and OPGEN requirements will be detailed in Scenario 3.

4. The Amphibious Task Force (ATF) has been able to effectively conducted preliminary operations (shaping and advance force) in order to establish joint operational conditions and allow Amphibious Operations by the Australian Amphibious forces. The force is now postured to allow the Landing Force to conduct Ship to Objective Manoeuvre (STOM) operations.

5. The subsequent JLC phases assumes the successful conduct of entry operations, including the build up of force through established SPODs and APODs using military and contracted air and sea strategic lift assets.

Situation

6. Terrain. Island ‘F’ is a tropical Island with low coastal areas interspersed with 3-4 major littoral rivers with steep cliffs limiting amphibious landing points. Major river deltas present complex littoral terrain. Inland terrain rises to highlands (restricted mobility) at approx 1000m. TAOR extends approx 150 km inland. The vegetation is mostly tropical bush with areas of savannah and cultivation.

a. Rural: 95%. Tropical bush interspersed with areas of open savannah grassland and cultivated fields close to rural communities. Rural settlements (popn 500+) spread 10km +.

b. Urban: 5%. Capital is a seaport (popn 50,000). 3-4 regional towns (popn 10,000). Centres of urban areas consist of old colonial buildings with the urban fringes consisting of poorly built single storey buildings and shanty towns. Some light industrial areas.


c. Infrastructure: Dirt/gravel track roads in rural areas between major population centres otherwise bush tracks. Poorly maintained hard roads in urban areas. Short dirt airstrips in rural areas mainly to serve natural resource exploration areas.

d. Key Considerations:

(1) The complex human terrain within urban areas will increase the threat detection threshold and require the forces equipped with LCVS to conduct reconnaissance. ISR force elements must be grouped to allow continuous access to protected mobility and precision fires.

(2) Whoever has gained the support of the local population will have greater freedom of action in urban areas. This combined with the complex physical terrain in the major population centres will give further advantage to the force that is conducting defensive operations. Precise fires will be required when conducting close combat in these areas.

(3) Rapid mobility to secure key terrain will be required in order to limit enemy defensive manoeuvre. Key terrain will include key river/road crossing points, movement corridors along approaches to threat locations, either in urban or isolated strongpoints and support bases. Urban infrastructure, institutions and government facilities will be key terrain throughout the operation, and securing these will be support ongoing stability operations.

(4) Major road systems will need to be cleared and where possible secured to allow uninterrupted line of communications to be maintained.

(5) Communications infrastructure is limited and LCVS will be required to provide communication nodes to support an uninterrupted network.

7. Threat

a. Militia. Country ‘G’ can employ hybrid militia-style forces up to 1000 strong across the island, which can operate up to platoon - company level (30-120 people) using conventional and asymmetric attack (including suicide bombers). They are capable of executing small, complex attacks. These forces are lightly equipped: SA, MMG, RPG, mines & IED. Some ‘technical’ 4x4s with mounted HMG. Underpinning the more overt militia is a network of terror cells (3-4 personnel) operating covertly in urban areas throughout the Country ‘G’ (on principle routes between coast and inland areas) but will tend to focus on mine / IED laying and soft target ambushes.

b. Conventional. Country ‘G’ has reinforced the number of forces and combat ratios of its standard garrison in anticipation of a military response. Regular Bde: 1xMech Bn (BMP1/2), 1xTk Sqn (T80), 1xRecon Sqn (BRDM), 2xBn Motorised (Truck) Infantry with AD, IDF and ATGM elements. Reserve Bn: light infantry (some trucks, 4x4s with HMG etc).

c. Key Considerations:

(1) Militia threat forces are likely to be used to support information gathering and intelligence networks, reducing LCVS capacity for stealth in urban and rural areas. LCVS reconnaissance of threat forces in urban and rural areas will need to be overt and aggressive. In restricted non-urban and rural terrain areas Land Force elements may be largely dismounted allowing increased use of stealth and discreet movement, when time permits.


(2) Militia threat forces are likely to employ guerrilla style attacks and disrupt LCVS movement on established road networks. LCVS will need to maintain high levels of protection during advance operations and logistic support movement, until support of the population can be achieved. Once threat forces have been identified, LCVS will need to move rapidly to isolate and contain militia forces. LCVS cross country mobility and accessibility will allow non-routine movement, and enhance freedom of action.

(3) Conventional threat forces, given the operational conditions set, will need to ensure they remain undetected or well protected until a decisive opportunity exists, in order to prevent deep targeting.

(a) The threat may seek protection in urban/rural areas. Precision fires will be needed. To achieve decisive effects against these threat forces, the LCVS will need to remain flexible and agile to quickly re-organise, conduct offensive manoeuvre and achieve a decisive outcome. Access to joint fires and high operational mobility are critical. Aggressive ground reconnaissance will be required to ensure that, once detected, threat forces are able to be fixed, ensuring time for re-organisation and deliberate action. This will allow increased coordination and reduced collateral damage during close combat.

(b) The threat may seek protection through stand-off, and reduce detection by masking in close/marginal terrain. Persistent surveillance and wide area reconnaissance will be needed to ensure Target Areas of Interest are appropriately covered in order to trigger manoeuvre of LCVS to conduct block and strike actions. Precision and urban manoeuvre by these threat forces is likely to be limited until decisively engaged. The preferred method of engagement is through wide area ISR combined with robust senor-shooter links, utilising the network and access to joint fires. LCVS conducting reconnaissance actions will need to maintain high levels of protection, lethality, mobility and connectivity.

(4) Following decisive action against conventional forces, the LCVS must be able to support the JTF transition rapidly to stability operations, requiring the force to operate with other and non Government agencies, conduct engagement of leadership and civilian organisations, provide support the restoration of essential services, conduct population protection and support tasks. Concurrently, the LCVS must support JTF active targeting of hostile and threat force elements that may remain covert.

(5) To allow sustainment of operations, combat and protected logistics is needed. Access to secure Line of Communications will be needed. Given the terrain limitations, access to mobility support will be critical. Stocks on wheels will be high, allowing a minimal footprint and ability for a rapid withdrawal, if required.


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LCVS CONOPS DATED NOV 11

LAND 400 SUPPORT CONCEPT

Introduction 1. The LAND 400 Support System is to support the mission systems of Army’s LCVS Capability. The support system will directly effect how the Land Force generates and sustains a deployed capability and will impact how the Land Force fights. 2. The support system must generate the required quantity of LCVS and the essential/enabling items in the required location and condition, and at the appropriate time. It must sustain the LCVS capability at the operational level when deployed. Background 3. The capability solutions delivered may present opportunities for Army to re-shape the conduct of future Combat Service Support in the operating environment. At an operational and strategic level, Land 400 will seek to maximise the ADF’s logistic capabilities; particularly in the areas of engineering, maintenance, warehousing and distribution. Where individual capability support systems do not directly utilise the ADF logistic capabilities, interfaces with support arrangement will be developed to ensure cost efficient, effective and focused support outcomes are achieved. This may involve initiatives such as costed spares packages that will be implemented to ensure a sustainable capability throughout Life-of-Type. Given the size and scope of project Land400, LCVS will allow the exploration of new strategies for capability enhancement. This may include use of increased attrition, training and maintenance pools; and whole of fleet management. The Land 400 capability solution will deliver vehicles and associated equipment that will be capable of deployment utilising future ADF Strategic Lift Assets. Domestically, management of Defence fuels and State/Territory road, sea and air movement requirements will be coordinated to maximise the Raise/Train/Sustain effects and deliver flexibility for a deployable fleet of capabilities. Principles of Support 4. The LCVS support system needs to achieve the following:

a. Be aligned with Army operational needs and geared to support the Force Generation (FORGEN) and Operations Generation (OPGEN) cycles. For planning purposes this is represented by the extant FORCOMD FORGEN business rules and the LCVS CONOPS campaign narrative.

b. It needs to enable integration across legacy and future support systems,

maximising commonality and responding to opportunities for resource sharing.

c. Explore options for whole of fleet management for training, maintenance

and strategic storage.


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d. Components of the LCVS support system will need to be deployable and

relevant to the deployment force package. (This will be further informed by the specific support system option design)

e. Seek to optimise the logistic chain by utilising all available support

including OEM, support contractors and ADF organic resources, allowing more rapid adaptation.

f. Seek continuous improvement of the support system based on extant

knowledge and emerging opportunities to maximise capabilities and to maintain efficiencies through the life of type.

Army Force Generation Cycle 5. The LCVS support system is to be aligned with the Army’s FORGEN, thus ensuring the needs as articulated through the FORCOMD FORGEN Business Rules are enabled. The support system must remain responsive to strategic requirements, and when necessary have the capacity to increase output to meet contingency. 6. This approach will allow for enhanced Fleet Management as each stage will rotate priorities of effort and allow for planning of system usage. If we begin to look at the force in terms of the Ready Force we can build in a high degree of system readiness levels as the contingency force. The Readying Force will be primarily training focused with the Reset Force in a state of low availability undergoing deep maintenance and equipment storage, cross levelling, and pooling. Managing the priorities and availability of LCVS in conjunction with the FORGEN should occur routinely, minimising disruption to force deployment preparation and training.

a. Ready Force- HIGH Readiness levels. The Ready Force will be deployment ready and LCVS will need to be kept at high states of readiness during the year in rotation. This may include access to operational fleets.

b. Readying Force- MEDIUM Readiness levels. The Readying force will

be conducting increased levels and scales of collective training. Progressively through this cycle forces will require access to increased vehicle numbers and high states of readiness, including recent technology refreshes to ensure transition to Ready. This may include access to national training fleets and operational fleets for contingency.

c. Reset Force- LOW Readiness levels. The Reset Force will provide

opportunity for a true resetting of equipment with deep maintenance and strategic storage as the focus. It will take advantage of long term planning to seek cost saving and life extension approaches for the capabilities as follows:

(1) The Reset Force becomes the entry point for all new modernisations.

This will allow for the least amount of disruptions and will give the force an entire year in the “Readying” phase to train on the new system prior to become the Ready force.


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(2) It will allow for major cost savings initiatives such as deep maintenance and storage for the Reset Force.

7. Operational Generation: The distinction between FORGEN and OPGEN cycles must be recognised by all LCVS support system providers. Importantly, the LCVS support system will need to remain flexible to respond to developing and changing OPGEN needs. This will require coordination at the force, divisional and formation levels ensuring force preparation, mission rehearsals and changing operational availability needs are met. Supportability 8. The LCVS campaigning framework outlines an indicative strategic and operational context, and should inform rate and level of effort required by the LCVS support system. Generally, the support system must ensure that all FORGEN needs are met concurrently with the deployment of up to two Joint Task Forces abroad. The specific size, construct and duration of JTF requirements will vary depending on the specific operational context. The aspiration is that the support system should not be a constraint to commitment and deployment of force to meet strategic requirement. The table in appendix 1outlines indicative minimum levels of LCVS needed during the FORGEN and OPGEN. An indicative support schedule is at Appendix 1

9. Interoperability. Interoperability remains an important consideration and the extent will be largely dependent on the capability solution. Areas of interoperability may include but are not limited to the following:

a. Joint. LCVS will need to synchronise support arrangements and key

integration functions with other key ADF systems and services. b. Strategic Lift. LCVS requires the ability to project nationally and

internationally using various civilian, coalition and military sea, air, rail and road assets.

c. Coalition/Allied. Considerations for coalition and/or allied

interoperability are as follows:

(1) What coalition supply chains are able to be accessed? (2) Will Australia be expected to provide lead nation support? (3) Will LCVS be capable of being deployed by Allied movement

assets? (4) Can coalition supply chain for bulk fuel be accessed? (5) Will coalition contractual arrangement be easily accessed?

10. Transition of capability. The introduction of LCVS and transition of capability will require a surge of legacy and new support systems. This increased effort will require robust management procedures such as: effective LCVS configuration


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management, adaptive operational support concepts and defined operational viability periods for supply class three, five seven and nine. Maintainability 11. The LCVS support system will maximise operational availability through the use of predictive technology, interchangeable systems, and reduce administrative downtime. This may include the following:

a. Increased commonality across fleets to allow increased flexibility and agility.

b. Reduced administrative down-time through optimisation of the supply

chain and implementation of provisioning guidance. c. Enhanced fourth line support and ADF maintenance capacity, through

initiatives such as the Defence Logistics Transformation Project. d. Fleet health monitoring maximise predictive maintenance, autonomic

logistics, diagnostics, pre-nostics. Whole of Fleet Management 12. The LCVS support system must consider Whole of Fleet Management (WFM) strategies to contribute to the overall enhancement of capability. Within the construct of FORGEN, WFM strategies will allow improved through life upgrade, technology refresh and configuration management, reduce the impact on the support system when meeting contingency operations, and facilitate efficient measures to be undertaken. The UK ‘BATUS’ and Singapore RSF models provide examples of WFM concepts. Supply Chain 13. Logistics is a key close combat enabler and the ability of integral and close CSS organisations to sustain the LCVS fleet during close combat operations is essential. Integration between LCVS and L121 systems in the conduct of CSS operations needs in order to ensure the seamless transfer of supplies and services. There remains opportunity for mutual support to broaden sustainment effects. The supply chain needs to be flexible to adapt to battle grouping on operations, during exercises and in barracks. Provisioning lead times from inventory controllers to end user will be achieved through the use of adaptive logistic information systems. Further supply chain considerations include the following

a. Modernisation Initiatives such as the Defence Logistics Transformation

Project. b. Doctrinal Concepts and Procedure, specifically LWD 4-0, Combat Service

Support. c. IIS and capability provided through L121.

d. Facilities including storage and mounting area requirements and

constraints.


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e. Modular load, asset identification and tracking considerations.

Training 14. LAND 400 will require a training system to support the force generation and sustainment of the LCVS capability. The training system for LAND 400 will focus upon the requirements of individual and crew collective training in order to operate and support the vehicle. The training system will form a major pillar of the overall support system for LAND 400. 15. Training Scope. The scope for LAND 400 training will include:

a. conversion training during introduction into service; and b. steady state training – to meet the trained manpower requirements to crew

and support LCVS.

16. Training Audience. The training audience for LCVS is as follows:

a. The vehicle commanders, gunners/operators, and drivers of all LCVS variants;

b. LCVS troop commanders; c. LCVS dismounted close combatants within the Multi-role Manoeuvre

Brigade (MMB);

d. LCVS Mounted Joint Fire Teams (JFT);

e. LCVS Mounted Combat Engineers;

f. LCVS instructors conducting training for the audience listed above; and

g. Education through the Army Training Continuum on the tactical capabilities and employment of LCVS.

17. Training Tasks. The Army will have two broad training tasks as follows:

a. Individual Training. The Army will need to conduct training for individual crew members to become qualified to operate LCVS. Individual training will also cover those soldiers responsible for the conduct of maintenance on the vehicle, as well as training for officers (as listed above in paragraph 4h).

b. Team Training. The Army will need the ability to conduct team training. Specifically this refers to the training of a team to act as a crew of an LCVS, up to the team training of those crews that constitute a troop of LCVS.

18. Training Methodologies. During the Offer Definition Activity (ODA) each of the competing tenderers will undertake a Training Needs Analysis (TNA) in order to


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identify costed training options to meet the requirement. During the conduct of the TNA consideration must be given to the use and modification of existing facilities, such as desk top trainers and the School of Armour’s Configurable Driver Trainer. The TNA should also consider the use and impact of the following items:

a. The employment of computer based training; b. The employment of high fidelity crew procedural trainers (virtual

simulation). This should include the networking of the simulators to conduct exercises up to troop level, or for the troop leaders of a subunit to be exercised simultaneously by the subunit commander;

c. The employment of sub-calibre devices to reduce the requirement for

firing full bore ammunition from LCVS weapon systems; d. The provision of live firing range targetry matched to LCVS surveillance

and target acquisition systems; e. The requirement for live firing range modifications required to fire LCVS

weapon systems; f. The ability to participate in Army Live simulation; g. The ability to conduct mission rehearsal training, both in transit to an

operational theatre (by sea deployment), as well as in theatre; and h. The ability to interface with other support systems ensuring a total

training view.

19. Training Integration. The LCVS training system will also be required to integrate with some existing training capabilities, such as Live Simulation. The elements it will be required to integrate with will be included in the Army’s mandatory requirements (to be defined by Army Simulation Group). 20. Training Environment. In order to conduct training the user will have specific needs to enable exercise building in both a constructive and virtual environment, and exercise monitoring and trainee assessment. 21. Exercise Building - in both a Constructive and Virtual Environment. In order to build an exercise in a constructive or virtual environment the instructor will require the following elements:

a. Terrain Databases. A variety of terrain databases will be required as

specified by Army’s mandatory requirements (to be defined by Army Simulation Group). The set of terrain databases is likely to include the littoral environment of the Principle Operating Environment (POE), as well as training areas within Australia. Terrain databases would also include specific training databases for individual training, such as an amphibious assault ship database in order to train drivers in driving on and off the ship.


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b. Vehicle Models. Vehicle models will be required to build scenarios with friendly force vehicles (including selected coalition vehicles) and vehicles representing the enemy force. In addition there is the requirement for civilian vehicles to assist in generating representation of the complex operating environment, asymmetric threat, as well as creating a pattern of life (POL), as a backdrop for an asymmetric exercise. This will enable soldiers to be exercised in making decisions on the legitimacy of targets.

c. Dismounted Models. Models of people will be required to replicate own

forces (including coalition forces) and a conventional regular enemy force. In addition an asymmetric force and civilians will be required.

d. Relocatable Models. The training system will require the ability to insert

inanimate objects onto the terrain database in order to build an exercise. The relocatable models would include, but not be limited to: (1) trenches; (2) bunkers; (3) obstacles (such as a ditch or barbed wire); (4) bridges (with a user defined bridge classification and length); (5) minefields; (6) improvised explosive devices (command and victim initiated); and (7) fences.

h. Mapping. The mapping of the terrain databases will be required to be

loaded either onto in service Battle Management Systems (BMS) or BMS emulations, if the real system is not used. There will also be a requirement to generate paper maps of the terrain databases in order to conduct exercise planning.

i. Weapon Effects. In order to conduct training all LCVS specific simulation systems will be required to replicate all weapon effects during an exercise. In addition to this during Live simulation the effects of LCVS weapon system in the battles will need to be replicated, as well as the effects of weapons upon LCVS.

22. Exercise Monitoring and Trainee Assessment. There is a need for each stage of progression to be monitored, as well as being able to monitor overall progress during a training course. At the end of each training activity and exercise the instructor will have the means to conduct a post training review. There should also be an electronic record of performance of the individual, crew or troop for future review or to act as a record of attainment.


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Personnel 23. The introduction of the LCVS will impact personnel across Defence and will require review of the total workforce and development of cross agency management policies. In due course a Capability Realisation Plan will be developed and detail how the workforce will be developed and prepared to form a critical component of the LCVS capability. Areas for consideration of personnel include the following:

a. Maintainers across all lines of support, and impact of predictive

maintenance information systems. b. DMO fleet management and ILS staff. c. Military and civilian trainers. d. Broader modernisation plans and force structure changes, such as Plan

BEERSHEBA. e. IIS, transition planning and Army’s Master Migration Plan. f. Human factors studies and understanding the impacts of changing

technology on system operators.

g. Centralised management of support through concepts such as a CAFS support centre.

Conclusion 24. The LCVS support systems will directly impact the capability effectiveness of the LCVS and close combat capability. It will provide opportunities for evolving methods for support to ensure the exploitation of technology to increase availability if systems and responsiveness to adaptive campaigning. Managers and commander at all levels must work to continue the development of the support system to ensure it remains relevant in a changing and ever complex and dangerous operation environment.


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LAND 400 LAND COMBAT VEHICLE SYSTEM CONCEPT OF · PDF fileLAND COMBAT VEHICLE SYSTEM . CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS . ... Operational Guidance ... appropriate force to threaten or attack