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ThisprojecthasreceivedfundingfromtheEuropeanUnion’sSeventhFrameworkProgramme(FP7)forresearch,technologicaldevelopmentanddemonstrationundergrantagreementno.613034.
BARRIERS
COMPARATIVE REPORT 1/2016
LearningfromEurope:Reportonthirdsectorenablinganddisablingfactors
BarrierscoordinatorAnnetteZimmer
AuthorsAnnetteZimmerBenediktPahl
Recommendedcitationinformation:
Zimmer, A. & Pahl, B.(2016)Learning from Europe: Report on third sector enabling and disabling factors,TSIComparative Report No.1,SeventhFrameworkProgramme(grantagreement613034),EuropeanUnion.Brussels:ThirdsectorImpact.
BARRIERS
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TABLEOFCONTENTS
1 Introduction.............................................................................................................2
2 CommonBarriers.....................................................................................................3
2.1 BetweenIndividualizationandNeoliberalism.............................................................3
2.2 ManagedVolunteering:Individualizedvolunteerpatterns........................................4
2.3 Downbybureaucratization:Increasingreportingobligationsandbureaucraticrequirements.......................................................................................................................7
2.4 Scarceresources:Changingmodesoffinancingandbudgetarycuts.........................9
2.5 TheWorkingPoor:riseofprecariousemploymentpatterns....................................10
3 OrganizationalFields..............................................................................................12
3.1 ArtsandCulture:afragmentedfield.........................................................................12
3.2 SocialServices:betweenbusinessandmissionorientation.....................................13
3.3 SportsClubs:betweeninclusionandexclusiveness..................................................13
4 ThirdsectorRegimes..............................................................................................15
4.1 Catchingupontheedge:EasternEurope(PL,HRV).................................................15
4.2 Toobigtofail:CentralEurope(NL,AU,D)................................................................16
4.3 Survivingunderausterity:SouthernEurope(ES;F)..................................................18
4.4 FromThirdWaytoBigSociety:UK............................................................................19
5 FirstMovers:StrategiesofResilience.....................................................................20
6 AppendixI-Methodologicalprocedureforconductingastakeholdersurveyandsemi-structuredinterviews..........................................................................................23
7 Bibliography...........................................................................................................26
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1 IntroductionTheEuropeancountriesunderstudyexperienceddifferentpoliticallegaciesrangingfromauthoritariancommunistruletoconservativeliberalmodeloftheNetherlandswherethethirdsectorformsanintegralpartofthesocialfabricofthecountryandisdeeplyembeddedintheinstitutionaldesignofthewelfarestate.Thefavorablepositionofthethirdsectorincorporatistcountriescontrastswiththesituationinpost-communistcountrieswhereTSOswererepressedbyanauthoritarianstatewhichkeptthethirdsectorverysmall.Thus,thesectordepartedfromdifferentstartingpoints:IntheEasternEuropeancountriesthesectordepartedfromscratchagainstthebackgroundofanauthoritarianstatewithlowsocialanchorageincontrasttothetraditionofthethirdsectorincorporatistcountrieswhereitenjoyedaprivilegedpositionasserviceprovideranditsdeeprootednessinsociety.AlthoughweregardhistoryasanindependentvariableshapingthedifferentconfigurationofthethirdsectorweobservetrendsofconvergencethroughoutEurope.Firstofall,thepolicyenvironmentofthirdsectororganizationschangedinfavorofneo-liberalapproachesfavoringmarketsolutionsforpublicproblemsinsteadofsubsidiarity.TheintroductionofnewpublicmanagementpracticesandemergingsocialmarketsinducedcostandefficiencypressuresonTSOs.Secondly,individualizationthreatensthesocietaltiesofthethirdsectororganizationsasideologicalbondstoTSOsareeroding.Consequently,TSOscannotcountonanaturalstreamofvolunteers.Additionally,thecharacterofvolunteeringchangesinfavoroftemporaryengagementandacontinuousfluctuationofmembers`needstobemanaged.Notably,volunteergovernancestructurescannotbemaintained.Thus,thecurrentorganizationalmodelofthethirdsectorislosingitsbasis.Thirdsectororganizationshaveadaptedtotheincreasinghostileenvironmentbybecomingmorebusiness-liketosurviveinacompetitivemarket.Secondly,organizationsincreasingly“manage”volunteerswhilethegovernancestructuresarethoroughlyprofessionalized.Bothdevelopmentscontestedthepositionofthesectorandchangedthewaythesectorfunctions.
ThefirstpartofthereportprovidesanoverviewofthecommonbarriersthirdsectororganizationsfaceacrossEurope.Inthesecondpartwehighlightsomeofthespecificchallengesofthirdsectororganizationsintheorganizationalfieldsweinvestigated:sports,socialservicesandartsandculture.InthethirdpartwescrutinizesomeofthespecificchallengesofTSOsinparticularcountryregimes.InthelastpartofthereportwesummarizetheorganizationalstrategiesthatcontributetotheresilienceofTSOsthat
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haveproventobeoutstandinglysuccessfulagainstmountingchallenges(Bežovanetal.2016,Brandsenetal.2016,Chaves-Avilaetal.2016,Zimmeretal.2016,Mohanetal.2016,Leśetal.2016,Petrella/Richez-Battestietal.2016,Simsaetal.2016).
2 CommonBarriers
2.1 BetweenIndividualizationandNeoliberalism
Despitetheoverallthirdsectorgrowth,TSOshavetosurviveinanincreasinglyhostileenvironment.thirdsectororganizationsarecomingunderheavycrossfirefromtwosides:OnthehandtheriseofneoliberalismsetinmotiontheproliferatingofmarketsinareasofatraditionalpublicandthirdsectordominancewhichleadstoefficiencyandcostpressuresforTSOs(Crouch2011).Ontheotherhand,individualizationleadstogrowinghorizontalandverticalmobilityofcitizens.Aheterogenizationofclassesnourishedthedissolutionofmilieus,neighborhoodsandfamilystructures.Thesetofavailablechoices,normsandvaluesisdiversifyingwhichisalsoreflectedinincreasinglyindividualizedneedsofcitizens(Beck1983,1986,Scheuregger2011).AgainstthisbackgroundtheconceptofvolunteeringandclassicalmembershipwithahighvoluntarycommitmentisthoroughlychangingasvolunteeringbecomesmorefluidandoftemporarynaturewhichchallengedtheportfoliostructureofTSOsandthetraditionalvoluntarybasedgovernancemodel.
TheforcesofthemarketandthenotionofefficiencyhaveintrudedmostareasofmodernEuropeansocieties.Neo-liberalismfavorsalean,minimalstatethatshouldrefrainfrominterferinginsocialandeconomicmattersandleaveittothemarketwhichpossessesthemosteligibleinstrumentstotacklesocio-economicchallenges.Throughmoreefficiencywelfaregainsaresupposedtobeachieved.Inthiscontext,publictasksareincreasinglyorganizedviathemarketfollowingasocial-investment-logic.Marketinstrumentsareappliedtopursuesocialgoals.Moreover,publictasksthatweretraditionallyconsideredtofallwithintheresponsibilityofthestateareprivatized.Againstthisbackground,structuresofpublicadministrationhavebeenmarketized.Theconceptofnewpublicmanagementhasbeenimplementedwhichstipulatestheadoptionofmanagementinstrumentsfromtheprivatesectorforthepublicadministration.Inthiscontext,competitivetenderingprocedureswhereintroducedwhereTSOsarecompetingagainsteachotherandcommercialproviders(Crouch2011).Additionally,theconceptofconsumerchoicehasgainedpopularityamongsocialpolicymakers.Here,citizensare
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vestedwithconsumerrightsandbuytheserviceonthesocialmarket.Oftenthepriceisadecisivefactortobe“bought”bythepublicadministrationorindividualcitizens.
Themarketizationofsocialpolicieshasbeenaccompaniedbyrigidregulationensuringtransparency,qualityand(cost)effectivenessoftheactivitiesofheterogeneoussetofproviders.ThetermsofdeliveryarestrictlydefinedbypublicauthoritiesforcingTSOsunderrigidreportingobligationswhichleadtobureaucraticpressuresforTSOs.
ThechallengesTSOsfacecanbederivedfromthesetwomegatrends,individualizationandneoliberalism,whichthreatenthedominantorganizationalmodelofthethirdsector.
2.2 ManagedVolunteering:Individualizedvolunteerpatterns
Traditionally,citizenshavebeenintegratedintospecificsocialmilieuswhichwerethoroughlystructuredbythirdsectorOrganizations.Theprocessofindividualizationdescribedaboveleadtoanerosionofexistingsocialstructuresandgnawedawaythesocialbaseofthirdsectororganizations.Volunteersormembersarenotbornintoanorganizationanddonotinheritanengagementanymore.Stakeholderreportedthattheirmemberorganizations(e.g.associations)wereoftenmanagedasafamilybusiness.Theyweremaintainedbytheoffspringofthefounderandthemembershipattheboardlevelwaspassedonfromgenerationtogeneration.However,theupcominggenerationismoremobilewithfrequentmovesandjobtransitionswhichleadstoanaveragingofthemembershipandinparticularofthecompositionofboards.
Asthebondstothirdsectororganizationshaveerodedacontinuoussupplyofvolunteersandmembersdoesnotautomaticallyoccuranymoreasvolunteershavetobeactivelyretained.Additionally,themobilityofcitizensincreased.Hence,volunteersareincreasinglyengagedonatemporarybasisandpersonalgoalsplayadecisiverolefortakingupavolunteerjobratherthanthecommitmenttoanorganization.Astheengagementhasbecomemorefluidandflexibleacontinuousinfluxofvolunteersandmembershastobemanagedandintegratedintotheworkflow.TSOsincreasinglydevoteresourcestoavolunteermanagementsysteminordertocopewiththegrowingfluctuation.
Againstthebackgroundofdecliningsocialanchoragethirdsectororganizationshavetocreateawarenessoftheirmissionandselltheimagetopotentialmembersandvolunteers.Thus,73%ofthesurveyedorganizationsregardedlimitedpublicawarenessoftheirorganizationasaseriousproblem.Asaconsequence,organizationsincreasingly
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engagethemselvesinestablishingauniquesellingpropositionandinvestheavilyinprofessionalizedmarketingcampaignstogainfootholdonthevolunteers`anddonors`market.Themissionoftheorganizationisprofessionallymarketedinordertobeattractive.LobbyingandthesensitizationfortopicsasoneofthecorefunctionsofTSOsareincreasinglyoutsourcedtocommercialagencies.Publicaffairsmanagementandcampaigninginparticularareprogressivelycarriedoutbyforprofitpublicaffairsagencies(Speth/Zimmer2015).
Similarmechanismsareobservablefortherecruitmentofmembers.Potentialmembershavetobeactivelyrecruitedoftenwiththeassistanceofspecializedagencies.Principallyorganizationsthatheavilyrelyonmembersoutsourcethememberrecruitment.Insomeinstances,theyoutsourcethoseactivitiestolimitedliabilitycompanieskeepingafullshareofthenewlycreatedbody.InothercasesTSOscommissionfor-profitagenciestocarryoutthememberrecruitment.Thoseforprofitagenciesworkforverydifferent,evendirectlycompetingTSOsregardlessoftheirpolicyorideologicalorientation.Lobbyingfortheorganizationalmissionandrecruitingmembers,widelyconsideredcorefunctionsofTSOs,hasbecomeaninterestingbusinessfieldforcommercialactors.
Additionally,thetimebudgetsofcitizensarebecomingmoreconstrainedandrestrictedwhichstandinawayofalongtermandtimeconsumingcommitment.ThelimitedavailabilityofvolunteersisparticularlychallengingfortheinstitutionallogicsforthoseTSOswheremembersarenotonlyconsumersbutproducers,organizersanddecisionmakersintheirownright.Itbecomesincreasinglydifficulttoappointvolunteerboardmembersaspotentialvolunteersarehesitanttotakeupresponsibilityandcommitthemselvesforalongerperiodoftime.Insteadmembersareincreasinglyserviceorientedand“consume”activitiesofTSOs.
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Figure1:RecruitmentofVolunteers
Theproblempressureisexacerbatedbythefactthataccountabilityandtransparencyrequirementsexceedthetimeandknowledgecapacitiesofvolunteerboardmembers.Consequently,governancestructuresareprofessionalized(seefollowingsection).ThecontributionTSOsmaketoaparticipativeanddemocraticsocietybyprovidinganopen,participativespacewhereonecanlearndemocraticbehaviorinthesenseofdeTocquevilles“schoolsfordemocracy”seemstobejeopardized:
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Figure2:RecruitmentofBoardMembers
Inanutshell,volunteerworkisreportedtobemoreflexible,informal,projectbasedandnotdirectlylinkedtoorganizations.Longtermcommitmentisontheretreatwhichisbestexemplifiedbythedifficultyofrecruitingboardmemberswhileengagement,whichisoftemporarynature,enjoysahighpopularity,e.g.organizingsingleevents(Bežovanetal.2016,Brandsenetal.2016,Chaves-Avilaetal.2016,Zimmeretal.2016,Mohanetal.2016,Leśetal.2016,Petrella/Richez-Battestietal.2016,Simsaetal.2016).
2.3 Downbybureaucratization:Increasingreportingobligationsandbureaucratic
requirements
ThroughoutEuropeweobserveariseofNeoliberalismwhichfavorsmarketsolutionsforpublicproblemsandlikewiseaculturalshiftfromatrust-metoaprove-me-culturewhichdemandsfromTSOstodemonstratetheireffectivenessandefficiency.ConsequentlyTSOsareunderpermanentbureaucraticstresstoreporttotheirfunders.InallEuropeancountriesunderstudynewpublicmanagementreformswerecarriedoutandcontractbasedmanagementprocedureswereintroducedwherethetermsofdeliveryarestrictlydefinedbypublicagencies.ExtensivereportingobligationsforceTSOsunderstricterscrutinyofpublicauthorities.HightransparencyandaccountabilityrequirementsleadtoabureaucraticburdenforTSOs.Alsoprivatedonorsdemandmoreaccountabilityabouthowthemoneyisspentintermsofefficiencyandeffectiveness.Inthefaceofincreasingreportingandefficiencypressures,market-compatiblestructureswereintroduced.
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Toaddressincreasedadministrativeandefficiencyrequirementsmanagerialbusinesspracticeswereadopted,whichamongothers,includefinancingmethods(suchascontrolling,costandactivityaccounting),performancemeasurement(suchasqualitymanagementandbenchmarking)aswellaspersonnelinstruments(suchasperformancebasedpayandtargetagreements).Thus,havingabackgroundinbusinessadministrationbecomesasinequanonconditionformanagingTSOs.Additionally,thegovernancestructureisprofessionalizedwithapowershiftfromtheboardtowardsthemanagementlevel.Oftenadualgovernancestructureisinstalledwithavoluntaryboardthatassumesanadvisoryfunctionandaprofessionalizedmanagingboard.Byimplementingaprofessionalizedmanagingboard,decisionmakingprocessesareacceleratedwhichenablestheorganizationtoreactfasterandmoreflexibleinturbulentmarkets(Bežovanetal.2016,Brandsenetal.2016,Chaves-Avilaetal.2016,Zimmeretal.2016,Mohanetal.2016,Leśetal.2016,Petrella/Richez-Battestietal.2016,Simsaetal.2016).
Figure3:Bureaucratization
Theproliferatingaccountabilityenvironmentprovokestworisksforthethirdsector:Firstly,asmostevaluationproceduresandimpactmeasurementaremoresensitivetomarketactivities,manyofthefunctionsTSOsperformwhicharenotmeasurableareneglectedbyfunders.ThissituationcarriestheriskthatTSOswillfocusonthoseactivitiesandgoalsthatareeducibleinmonetarytermsandultimatelylosesomeoftheircomparativeadvantages,inrelationtoe.g.communitybuildingoradvocacy.Secondly,small,voluntarybasedTSOsareparticularlydisadvantagedastheylackthecapacitytoprocessdifferentiatedbillingsystemsandevaluationprocedureswhichisindicatedby
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massiverecruitmentproblemsofvoluntaryboardmembers.Researchhaslongpointedout,thatbeingbusiness-likeleaveslittleroomfororganizationaldemocracy(Hvenmark2013)andself-organizationatthegrassrootslevel(Eizenberg2012).
2.4 Scarceresources:Changingmodesoffinancingandbudgetarycuts
ParticularlyintheareasofmajorTSOsactivitybudgetarycostshavebeenimplemented,suchas“internationalaid”intheNetherlands,“artsandculture”and“sports”inotherprojectcountries.Expensesintheseareasareconsideredofvoluntarynaturebypublicofficials.Secondly,themodesoffinancinghavechanged.Untilthenineties,publicfundsgrantedfullcostcoverage.Sincethen,themodesofpublicfinancingchangedsubstantially.Inthecontextofnewpublic,managementapproachesperformancebudgetingwasintroducedwhichopenedthewayofcompetitivetendering.ThetargetsaredefinedinadvanceandTSOscompetewithotherproviderstowinthebidwithregardtoqualityandprice.
Overall,theseverecompetitionhasinducedcostandefficiencypressuresonTSOsasthepricefortheservicesisadecisivefactortowinthebidagainstothercompetitors,whichprovokedextensivecostcontainmentmeasuresamongTSOs.Furthermore,somemissioncriticalfunctionsarehardtomaintainasmissionrelatedactivitiesaremostlynotcoveredbyreimbursementschemeswhichfocusonlyonaparticularservice.Thus,TSOsreportthatthereincreasedneedtoraiserevenuesfrombusinessactivitiesiskeepingthemawaytoservetheirrealpurposeoftenneglectingcommunitybuildingandtheadvocacyfunctionofTSOs.Ultimately,TSOsmightlosetheircivil-societyadd-onthatmakestheirservicesoprecious.
Furthermore,inhighlymarktetizedareasTSOsareincreasinglycrowdedoutbycommercialproviders.For-profitcompaniesenjoymajorcomparativeadvantagesovernonprofitswhenitcomestomarketactivity:Nonprofitsoftenlacktheaccountabilitymechanismsofforprofitsandmeasuresofprofitability,theself-interestofowners,andfocusoncompetition(ReginaHerzlinger1996,ascitiedinSalamon2015:64).Consequently,forprofitcorporationshaveincreasinglygainedmarketshares.Duetotheprojectnatureofpublicgrants,TSOsthathighlydependonpublicfundsareconfrontedwithshortplanningintervalsandoftenlacktheresourcestoinvestinasustainableinfrastructure.Ontheaccountofscarceresources,TSOaretappingnewfinancialresourcesanddiversifytheirportfolio.InthiscontextmarketingandsocialsponsoringaregainingimportanceandinallcountriesunderstudyTSOsreportthattheyallocatemore
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resourcestofundraising.ThediversificationoffinancialresourcescarriestherisksthatmanagingTSOsbecomesmoredemandingasaccountabilityrequirementsofdifferentfundershavetobetakenintoaccount.Thus,thebureaucraticpressuresoutlinedinthepreviouschapter2.3haveintensified(Bežovanetal.2016,Brandsenetal.2016,Chaves-Avilaetal.2016,Zimmeretal.2016,Mohanetal.2016,Leśetal.2016,Petrella/Richez-Battestietal.2016,Simsaetal.2016).
Figure4:ScarcityofResources
2.5 TheWorkingPoor:riseofprecariousemploymentpatterns
Personnelcostsloomparticularlylargeinthirdsectororganizations.Hence,thecostandefficiencypressuresandthefinancialinstabilityoutlinedbeforeweretranslatedintoprecariousemploymentspatterns.Personnelperserviceunitisdownsized,theworkloadofemployeesintensified,thesalariesareloweredandatypicalemploymentpatternslikefixedtermcontracts,parttimeandmarginalparttimejobsareontherise.ExceptinSpain,whereunemploymentishighandworkingconditionshaveworsened,workinginthesectorbecomesincreasinglyunattractive.ParticularlyinareaswherethementalandphysicalstressishighTSOsfaceseriousproblemstorecruitpersonnel.ThesecircumstancescarrytheriskthatthequalityofservicedeliverywilldeteriorateasTSOsmighthavetoemploylessprofessionalcompetentpersonnelandfurtherengageinreducingpersonnelcostsperserviceunitinordertofillagrowingstaffinggap(Bežovan
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etal.2016,Brandsenetal.2016,Chaves-Avilaetal.2016,Zimmeretal.2016,Mohanetal.2016,Leśetal.2016,Petrella/Richez-Battestietal.2016,Simsaetal.2016).
Figure5:PrecariousEmploymentPatterns
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3 OrganizationalFieldsWhileTSOsfacesimilarchallengesthroughoutthesectorandseemtoadaptsimilarstrategiestocopewiththosechallenges,otherobstaclesarespecifictocertainpolicyfields.
Forinstance,newmodesoffinancingandausteritymeasuresofpublicauthoritiesconfrontedTSOswithenormouscostandefficiencypressuresleadingtoprecariousemploymentpatternsthroughoutthesector.However,thedeterioratedlaborstandardsdonotaffecttheattractivenessofworkinginthesectorequally.TSOsinthesocialservicesfacesevereproblemsrecruitingpaidstaffwhileTSOsactiveinthefieldof“sports”,and“artsandculture”benefitfromanoversupplyoflabor.
Thissectionofthereportwillbedevotedtodevelopmentsinthree(sub-)organizationalfields:ArtsandCulture,SportsandSocialServices.WeunderstandtheorganizationalenvironmentasanindependentvariablethatshapesthefunctioningofthirdsectorOrganizations.WeassumethatthespecificconfigurationofanorganizationalfieldleadstospecificchallengesTSOsareconfrontedwith.Hence,thirdsectororganizationsintheSocialServicesfacedifferentobstaclesthantheircounterpartsinSportsorArtsandCulture.
3.1 ArtsandCulture:afragmentedfield
TSOsinthefieldof“artsandculture”havetosurviveinaclimateofpermanentausterityasparticularlyinthisareapublicfundingisbeingscaledback.Workingintheareaofartsandcultureisveryprecariousandbelowthepovertyline.Mostorganizationsaresosmallthattheylacktheresourcestoemploypaidstaff.
Thefieldofartsandcultureiscomposedofmyriadsofsmallorganizations.Thefieldofartsandculturelacksanencompassingumbrellaorganizationandasub-sectoralinfrastructure.Duetothefragmentedcharacterofthefield,TSOsintheareaofArtsandCulturelacktheabilityofinterestrepresentationandareparticularlyendangeredbyrisingbureaucraticdemandsastheyarenotabletoprofessionalizetheirgovernancestructureduetotheirsmallsizeandlimitedhumanresourcecapacity.LikewiseTSOsdonotreceivetechnicalsupportorconsultingservicesduetotheabsenceofasectoralinfrastructure.Thelackofinfrastructurealsohampersresearchcapacitiesinthefieldsbecauseorganizationscannotbeaddressedviaumbrellaorganizations.Thus,wewere
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severelyconstrainedtocarryoutresearchbythelackofdata(Bežovanetal.2016,Brandsenetal.2016,Chaves-Avilaetal.2016,Zimmeretal.2016,Leśetal.2016,Petrella/Richez-Battestietal.2016,Simsaetal.2016).
3.2 SocialServices:betweenbusinessandmissionorientation
Inthesocialservicenewpublicmanagementpracticeshaveforgedaheadwhichledtotheemergenceofsocialmarkets.Incompetitivetenderingproceduresthepriceforaservicebecomesthecentralcriteriontowinthebid.Generallyspeaking,thefinancialriskofprovidingaservicewasshiftedtothedisadvantageofthirdsectorproviders.TSOsarenotreimbursedforprovidingasupplystructurebutonlyforprovidingtheserviceitself.
Beyond,insomeareasofsocialservicesavouchersystemhasbeenintroducedforindividualcitizens.Here,citizensarevestedwithconsumerrightsand“buy”theproductsonasocialmarket.Theirmixofacquiredservicemightincludecommercialorthirdsectorprovidersorinformalhelp.Besides,thereareagrowingnumberofconsumersthatarewillingtoinvestmoreinsocialservicesinordertoenhancetheirlifequality,e.g.intheareaofhealthandlongtermcarecertainproviderstargethigherincomegroupsandofferaboveaveragecomfortandcutting-edgemedicaltechnology.
TSOsreportthatrevenuesfrombusinessactivitieshavereplacedpublicgrants.Astheorganizationsareclosertothemarketmarket-compatiblestructureswereintroducedandmanagerialbusinesspracticessuchasaccountingandqualitymanagementwereadopted.Whatismore,manyoftheorganizationssurveyedreportedthattheirneedtoraiserevenuesfrombusinessactivitiesiskeepingthemfromservingtheirrealpurpose.However,inlightofitserodingsocialfoundationsanditssometimestoughbusinessoperationsdominatingthemission,thelegitimacyofthesectorasservingthepublicgoodisincreasinglyquestionedandtheremainingprivilegesofthesectorareheavilycontested(Bežovanetal.2016,Brandsenetal.2016,Chaves-Avilaetal.2016,Zimmeretal.2016,Mohanetal.2016,Leśetal.2016,Petrella/Richez-Battestietal.2016,Simsaetal.2016).
3.3 SportsClubs:betweeninclusionandexclusiveness
Europeansportsorganizationsprovideasocialinfrastructureforlocalcommunitiesandareacrystallizationpointforthesociallifeinneighborhoodswithahighactivityincommunallife,likeconvivialgatherings.Theyperformanimportantfunctionin
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communitybuildingbringingtogetherdifferentsegmentsofsociety.Sportsclubsarestillthemostpopularorganizationforvolunteercommitmentandthemostpopularproviderforphysicalactivities.However,inourresearchweobservedamajortransformationinthefieldofsports.Sportsclubshaveinsomeinstancesdevelopedauniquesellingpropositionasaproviderofhighqualityhealthandfitnesssportswhichareonlyaccessibleforhigherincomegroups.
Thereisagrowingdividebetweenthetopnationallevelofsportsandthevastmajorityofsmall,andfinanciallyweaklocalsportsclubs.Particularlyclubsinpopularsportdisciplineswithahighvisibilitystandoutfortheirmerchandisingandsponsoringactivity.Insomeinstancescorruptionisreportedinthedomainofsoccer.Hence,sportsassociationsareviewedasaffluentandeconomicallysuccessful.
Theoverallimageofsportsisshapedbythetopprofessionallevelandassociatedwithfinanciallystrongorganizationsand“bigmoney”.Thisdoesnotreflecttherealityofmostlocalsportsclubswhichhaveoftenonlylimitedaccesstosportsfacilitiesandstrugglewithdecliningfinancialcapacities.Theimageofsportsas“bigbusiness”exacerbatesthenegotiationonfundingwithpublicauthoritiesincomparisonwithothercivilsocietyactors.
Manylocalauthoritieshavecutexpensesinmaintaininganinfrastructuretopracticesports.Hence,sportsfacilitiesareofpoorconditionandonlyaccessibletoalimitedextent.Astheavailabilityofsportsgroundsisapreconditiontopracticesports,someTSOshaveinvestedintheirownsportsinfrastructureandequipment.Theinvestmentsandmaintenancecostinvolvingsportsfacilitiesloomparticularlylarge.Theprivatizationofsportsinfrastructurewastranslatedintohighermembershipfeesorpaidservicessuchashealthadviceandpersonalizedtrainingschemes.Sportsclubshavesuccessfullyaddressedagrowingdemandintop-notchhealthandfitnessrelatedsportsprograms.
Lowerincomegroupsareincreasinglyexcludedfrompracticingsportsassportclubstendtooccupyanicheasexclusivehealthandfitnessproviders.
Additionally,onthegroundsthatcitizensinterestedinpracticingsportsarebecomingmoreservicedemandingandlessinterestedincommunityorientedteamsports,sportsclubsfaceincreasinglydifficultiesinrecruitingmembersandvolunteerswhereasthesportsmarketbecomesmorediversified.Particularly,commercialfitnesscentersbenefitfromagrowinginterestinindividualizedfitnessandhealthactivities.Here,thefacilitiesarewellequippedandtheengagementisconfinedonlytothemembershiprate.
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Particularlythegovernancestructureoftraditionalsportsclubsisendangeredbythegrowingserviceorientationofsportsclubsmembers.Insportsclubsmembersweretraditionallynotonlyconsumersbutalsodecisionmakers,organizersandproducersofsportactivitiesintheirownright.However,membersareunwillingtotakeupaboardpositionwhichforcessportclubstoprofessionalizetheirgovernancestructuresprovokingfurtherpremiumadjustments.
Inanutshell,lowerincomegroupsareincreasinglyunderrepresentedinsportsclubsasindividualinvestmentsinequipmentandhighermembershipfeesarerising.Thus,accesstosportsclubsbecomeslimitedforunderprivilegedincomegroupsand“sportsforall”cannotbeachieved(Bežovanetal.2016,Brandsenetal.2016,Chaves-Avilaetal.2016,Zimmeretal.2016,Leśetal.2016,Petrella/Richez-Battestietal.2016,Simsaetal.2016).
4 ThirdsectorRegimes
4.1 Catchingupontheedge:EasternEurope(PL,HRV)
ThethirdsectorinEasternEuropewassubjectofanauthoritarianstateandwasassignedaresidualroleinthecommuniststate.TSOsintherealmofthechurch,sportsandTSOsinthesocialeconomy,suchascooperatives,werepartlyabletosurvive.Duringcommunismthethirdsectorwassuppressed.Conjointly,supportstructuresarescatteredorabsentasthesectorisfragmentedandsmall.ThehousingsectorinPoland,mainlycomposedbycooperatives,wasofparticularrelevancewhichdeclinedsteeplyafterthefallofthecommunistregimeduetoprivatizationpoliciesofdwellings.InCroatiaalargepartofthethirdsectorconsistsofhumanitarianTSOsthatweresupportedbyWesternfunderswhichnurturegeneralskepticismtowardsthesectorasbeingaproductofWesterninterventionintoCroatiansociety.Thestateapproachesthesectorwithapaternalisticattitude.Generally,TSOsstillfacedifficultiestogainfootholdonthemarketasasocialserviceproviderbecausethesectorislimitedbyalackofpublicawarenessandalackoftrustinitsprofessionalismandthequalityofitsservices.ContractingwithpublicauthoritiesisstilltroublesomeandTSOsarepartlydiscriminatedagainstpublicprovidersduetopracticesofclientelismandtheopaquenatureofcontractingprocedures.However,TSOsmanagedtocompensatethepost-communistwelfaregapinsocialandeducationprogramsandpartlyestablishedthemselvesasasocialserviceprovider.
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However,TSOsarestillsubjectofrigidcontrolproceduresandbookkeepingrequirementsareparticularlydemandingforTSOsalthoughtheproblemperceptionconcerninglawandlegalproceduresisdecreasing(Lesetal.2016).Inthiscontext,publicauthoritiesandparticularlylaborinspectionssuspectvolunteeringtobeexploitedasundeclaredwork.Overall,voluntaryactivityistraditionallylowandisconstrainedtofamilyorpersonnelnetworks.
ThelowsocialanchorageofTSOsisalsoreflectedintheminordegreeofprivategiving.Additionally,publicfundsarelimitedduetovastcostcontainmentstrategiesinpost-communistcountries.OnthegroundsthatalternativefinancialsourcesaremissingtocompensateforthetensesituationofthepublicpurseEU-fundsareofparticularsignificanceforTSOsinEasternEurope.Thus,EU-fundscontributedtothegrowthofthesector.AsEU-fundsareverycomplexandbureaucratichighlyprofessionalizedorganizationsinadministrativetermshaveevolvedaroundEU-fundedthemes.AgainstthebackgroundofhighbureaucraticrequirementsbyEUandnationalinstitutions,TSOsareconstrainedintheirabilitytoproduceinnovationsaslargepartoftheirorganizationalresourcesareboundtoprocessadministrativerequirements,toapplyforfunds,tomonitortendersandtomaintaincontactwithfundinginstitutions.
However,asthesectorstartedfromscratchbeingrepressedduringcommunisttimesthethirdsectorexperiencedasteadygrowthintermsofregisteredorganizations,revenuesandemployment.Besidesthegrowingscopeofactivitiesinthewelfaredomain,EUaccessionfundsandalsodecentralizationreformscontributedpositivelytothesectoralgrowth.Despitethegeneralupwardtrendintermsoforganizationalgrowththemembershipbasethoughisshrinkingandsocialanchorageofthethirdsectorisstilllimited(Bežovanetal.2016,Leśetal.2016).
4.2 Toobigtofail:CentralEurope(NL,AU,D)
Thethirdsectorenjoyedaprivilegedpositionasaserviceproviderandwasdeeplyembeddedintheinstitutionaldesignofthewelfarestate.TSOswereprivilegedovercommercialandpublicsuppliersinthesocialservicepositionandenjoyedatopdogpositioninthewelfaredomain.Thepolicyenvironmentshiftedfromsubsidiaritytoneoliberalismandtherelationshipwiththestatechangedfromapartnershipateyeleveltoacustomer-supplierrelationship.TosurviveinemergingmarketsTSOshadtobecomemoreefficient.
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DespitethemountingcostandefficiencypressuresTSOshavedefendedtheirpositionasacoreproviderofsocialservices.TheshareofTSOscomparedtoothersectorsisstable.InemergingsocialmarketsTSOssuccessfullyadaptedtoefficiencypressuresandbecomemorebusiness-like.Asthethirdsectorbuildsonprofoundresourcesandadministrativecapacitiesitwasabletocompetesuccessfullyagainstcommercialprovidersincompetitivetenderingprocedures.Additionally,itcanlockbackonmanyyearsofexpertiseasaserviceprovider.Theprofessionalismiswidelyacknowledgedbythepublic.Againstthisbackground,TSOscanrelyonanestablishedbrandasasocialserviceproviderwhichcomesasanorganizationalassetagainstnewcommercialcompetitorsthathavetocreateawarenessamongstcustomers.CorporatistmechanismsarestillinplacetosomedegreeandTSOscancountonestablishedrelationswithpolicymakerswhichenableTSOstoimprovetheirpositioninnegotiations.However,thesuccessfuladaptionofTSOsincompetitivemarketscomesatapriceasTSOsseemtolosesomeoftheirspecificqualitiesthatarecommonlyattributedtothesector.Themushroomingoflimitedliabilitycompanieswitnessestheincreasingmarketizationofgoverningpractices.
Generally,althoughTSOsstillofferimportantavenuesforcivicengagementandaccountformostofthevolunteeringinCentralEurope,theyhavelostattractivenessasaninstitutionforvolunteercommitment.Traditionally,thesocietiesofCentralEuropewerecharacterizedby“pillarization”intosocialmilieus.ThedifferentsocialgroupswereintegratedintomilieuspecificTSOs.Hence,anaturalinfluxofvolunteerswasguaranteedandTSOsrepresentedalargepartofthesocietyprovidingthemaininfrastructureforcivicengagement.Sincethen,theideologicalbondstoorganizationshaveerodedandmembershavetobeactivelyrecruitedonavolunteersmarketasoneisnotbornintoanorganizationanymore.ThemembershipbaseisconstantlydecliningandvolunteersareonlylooselycoupledtothirdsectorOrganizations.InlightoflimitedavailabilityofvolunteersandrisingprofessionalstandardsTSOsareincreasinglymanagedbyTSOs.Additionally,agrowingshareofvolunteeringtakesplaceoutsideformalthirdsectorOrganization.
Althoughthefeaturesofthesectorarechanging,thereisstillnoinstitutioninsightthatwouldbecapableofreplacingtheservicesandsocialinfrastructureforcommunityinvolvementwhichthesectorstillprovides(Brandsenetal.2016,Zimmeretal.2016,Simsaetal.2016).
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4.3 Survivingunderausterity:SouthernEurope(ES;F)
InSouthernEuropethesocialeconomyisanintegralpartofthethirdsectorandcooperativeandmutualsrepresentalargeshareofTSOs.Inbothcountriesvolunteeringislow.ParticularlyinSpainvolunteeringismoredirectedtowardsnextofkin.Besides,cooperativesandtheCatholicChurchplayedanimportantroleasasocialserviceprovider.
FrancefollowedthecorporatistmodelofintegratingTSOsintotheinstitutionalsettingofthewelfarestate.InFrance,thesectorbenefitedfromtheexpansionofthewelfarestate.InSpain,whichfollowsmorearesidualmodeloftheconservativewelfarestate;oftenreferredtoastheMediterraneanwelfarestate,socialexpendituresarerelativelylowandconcentrateonoldagepensions.Socialservicesareratherunderdevelopedandtheextendedfamilystillcompensatesforthelackofwelfareinstitutions.AfewprivilegedquangoorganizationsbenefitedfromamoderatewelfareexpansionsincethedemocratizationofSpainin1978.Themajorityofpublicfundstowardsthesectorconcentrateontheseorganizations.DuringthedictatorshiplargepartsofthesectorweresuppressedandtheSpanishthirdsectorisstillunderdevelopedcomparedtoFranceorCentralEurope.Inbothcountiesthesectorisfragmentedanddividedalongsocietalcleavagesbetweensecularandreligiousaswellasleftwingandrightwingorganizations.Againstthisbackgroundthesupportstructureisscatteredandunderdeveloped.WiththefinancialcrisisinSpainneworganizationshaveemergedinthecourseoftheanti-austerityprotestsin2008.TheseneworganizationsarenotlinkedtotheestablishedQuangoorganization.
ParticularlySpainwashithardbythefinancialcrisis.Publicfundingwascutduetovastausteritymeasures.Additionally,privatedonationsdecreasedmostlyduetothecollapseofsavingbanks.Likewise,thesocialneedsofthepopulationduetomassunemploymentandsocialdeprivationofthepopulationwererising.Thus,TSOsinSpainhavetosurviveinaparticularhostileenvironment“havingtoaddressmoreneedswithfewerresources”(Chavesetal.2016).
TSOsreactedtothecrisisbyloweringtheworkinghoursandextendingparttimework.DespitethefactthatitisdifficultforTSOstorecruitvolunteersinlightofarelativelylowsocialembeddednessandincreasinglyresourceintensivemanagementofvolunteerspaidemploymentissubstitutedbyvolunteers.Thus,workinghourspervolunteerhavebeenrising.Furthermore,sinceTSOshavetomanageanincreasingdeficit,debtsareincreasing(Chaves-Avilaetal.2016,Petrella/Richez-Battestietal.2016).
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4.4 FromThirdWaytoBigSociety:UK
IntheUKTSOsseetheirenvironmentasincreasinglymarketdrivenintermsofresourcesandgovernancepractices,whichoriginatedfromashiftofthepoliticalclimateandideologicaldiscoursesfromathirdsectortoaneoliberalmarketperspective.
ThesectorwasanintegralpartofthethirdWaypoliticalphilosophyoftheLabourgovernment,whichaimedatfindingsolutionsbeyondmarketandstatebystrengtheningthirdsectorengagement.Thestatewasassignedamorepassiveroleasenablerandnotasaproviderofwelfareactivities.Thethirdsectorpoliciesweremeanttobeachievedviaenablingtheemergenceofaquasi-marketwithpreferencesforstandardizingandlargescaleprovision.Thus,largeorganizationswereabletodealwiththechallengesregardingprocurement,commissioningandcontractingatthedetrimentofmorespecializedresponsestoneeds.
Furthermore,theLabourgovernmentmademajorinvestmentsintoathirdsectorinfrastructureandorganizationalcapacityofTSOs.
Furthermore,followingtheadviceoftheDeakincommissionaConcordatorcompactbetweenthegovernmentandthirdsectorwasinitiated.However,againstthebackgroundoftherequiredmarketizationandprofessionalizationbeingcontrarytothemissionofsomeTSOs,manyorganizationswerenotabletoordidnotwishtoworkwiththestateasapartner.
WiththeentryoftheCoalitionCamerongovernmentthephilosophyof“BigSociety”providedtheideologicalbackboneforanindependentlyfinancedthirdsectorandhostilitytowardsstateinvolvementintermsofpublicspending.Inanutshell,thegovernmentprogramenvisagedscalingbackofpublicexpenseswhichweretobereplacedbyvolunteers,orinotherwordsthe“BigSociety”substituting“BigGovernment”.Inpractice,quasi-marketswereextendedandwelfareserviceswereopenedtomarketforcesasfaraspossible.Forprofitagenciesweregranted(market)accesstoallpolicyfields,includingvoluntarismandworkwithvulnerablegroups.Besidesquasi-marketapproaches,theUKgovernments,mostlywiththenewlegislationin2016,havefosteredfinancingmodelsthatfollowasocial-investment-logic,suchasloanandbondfinanceinitiatives.Hence,thesesortsofschemeshavegainedrelevanceamongBritishTSOs.
Extensivebudgetarycutswenthandinhandwithmarketpromotioninallareasofwelfarespendingwiththefinancialcrisisprovingthelegitimacyforfarreachingausterity
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policies.Inparticular,thebudgetsoflocalauthorities,whichareacoresourceforthirdsectorfunding,weremassivelyreduced.Additionally,thethirdsectorinfrastructurewhichwassetuporfosteredundertheLaborgovernment,liketheCharityCommissionandtheOfficeforCivilSociety,wascutback.AsthesectoralinfrastructurehascollapsedandthefinancialsupportfromlocalauthoritieshasbeencutTSOsfacedifficultiestofunctionproperly.Especiallythecapacitytomobilizeandencouragevolunteercontributionisseverelydiminished.ThecaseoftheUKprovidesagoodexamplethatreplacingpublicservicewithvolunteersfailswhensupportstructuresarenotavailableastheprovisionofvolunteeringisnotfreeandasectoralinfrastructureisrequired.Furthermore,thecoalitiongovernmenttookahostilestanceoncampaigningandadvocacyworkofTSOsstatingthattheuseofpublicgrantsforcampaigningactivitieswillbeprohibited.Generally,theBritishthirdsector´sabilitytoperformitsmultiplerolesseemstobeincreasinglylimited(Mohanetal.2016).
5 FirstMovers:StrategiesofResilienceInourstudyweanalyzed“bestpractice”organizationsthatareparticularlysuccessfulindealingwiththechallengesoutlinedabove.Thus,weidentifiedstrategiesorganizationsadoptinthefaceofchallengesandchangingcircumstanceswhichallowthemtobecapableofwithstandingshocksandtoflourishinahostileenvironment.Someoftheidentifiedstrategiesinthenationalreportsaremoresuccessfulinspecificnationalcontexts.Forinstance,inEasternEuropegoodrelationswiththepublicsectorarecrucialforsurvivingunderconditionsinwhichclientelismdominatesthepoliticalsphereandacquiringfundsisparticularlytroublesome.Inthispartofthereportwefocusoncommonstrategieswhichorganizationsapplytodevelopresilienceagainstthechallengesinthefield.Aswehighlightthestrategiesof“firstmovers”wealsopointtotrendsthatwillbeofincreasingimportanceinthefuture.
Summarizingourresultswefirstlyidentifiedthatorganizationswithpermeable,openstructureswhichallownewimpulsestoentertheorganizationaremorelikelytokeepupwithnewtrends,managetoaddressnewdevelopmentsandconsequentlymaintainitsattractivenessformembers,volunteersorclients.Furthermorethedegreeofintegrationinapolicyfieldenhancesthelobbyingcapacity,whichallowstheorganizationtopositivelyshapeitsinstitutionalframework.Particularlyawiderangeofstakeholderscontributestosustainabilityandenablestheorganizationtobemoreflexibleintimesofcrisis.
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Secondly,organizationsthatachievetodiversifytheiractivitiesaremoreappealingtoincreasinglyindividualizedneeds,interestsandlifestylesofcitizens.
Additionally,theyaremoreresilienttowardrisksarisingfromrapidchangesinaturbulentpolicyenvironmentwhenresourcesareshiftedtothedisadvantagesoftheorganization,inparticularwithregardtoprojectnatureofpublicfunds(e.g.changingfundingstreams,interestsofvolunteers,needsofcitizensorattentionmarkets)astheyarelessdependentonparticularorganizationalassets.Inthiscontext,TSOsincreasinglyengagein“cashcow”operationstocross-subsidizesupportstructuresforvolunteeringandopenspacesforcommunityactivity.Asvolunteeringbecomesmoredemandingfororganizationsresource-intensivemeasuresof“managedvolunteering”areimplemented.Thegenerallyhighexpenditureburdenentailsfurtherexpansionsofactivities.E.g.socialserviceorganizationsexpandtheirrangeofservices,sportsclubsestablishservicesinthesocialservicesandhealthprovisionandcultureorganizationsspreadouttothefieldsofsocialhousing.Furthermore,inlightoflarge-scaletenderingproceduresagainstmulti-nationalcorporationsTSOsarerequiredtosecureeconomiesofscaleandscopetosurviveandprosperinthefaceofcompetition.Insomeinstances,TSOsmergeorpoolresourcestostaycompetitiveandtomeettheincreasingadministrativerequirements.
Thirdly,consideringthatTSOsaremoredependentonmarketincometocompensateforthelackofpublicgrantsTSOsprofessionalizedtheirgovernancestructuresandbecamebusiness-like:Managerialbusinessstrategieswereimplementedandthemanagementlevelstrengthenedwhilethevoluntaryself-governingbodieswereweakened(seesection2.2).Amongthestudiedorganizationsmanyarealsoabletomakeclaimsaboutthequalityandsocialimpactoftheiractivitiesasfundingincreasinglyfollowsasocial-investment-logic.Sometimes,TSOsoutsourcetheiractivitiestobodiesoutsidethenonprofitlaw.Astheorganizationsareclosertothemarket,legalformsthatarecompatiblewithmarketactivityareontherise.Weseeanupwardtrendoflimitedliabilitycompaniesandarevivalofcooperatives(withtheexceptionofPoland)inthecontextofcollaborativeconsumptione.g.intheareaofecologicalfoodproduction,multi-generationalhousingandrenewableenergies.
Fourthly,asorganizationsexpandcrossingtheboundariesofdifferentorganizationalfields,ahighlydifferentiatedandcomplexgovernancestructureisputinplacesincedifferentfunctionallogicshavetobecompliedwith.Hence,TSOsneedto“speak”manydifferentlanguagesofvariousfields.Tomanagethetensionbetweenmissionandmarketorientationlanguageandcommunicationstrategiesareprocessed.Theorganizationswe
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studiedwereabletomasterthe“businesstalk“andlikewisemanageamore“ideationalidiom”reflectingthecivilsocietyfoundationsandmilieu-specificlinks.
Fifthly,giventheincreasinglycomplexmulti-fieldenvironmentTSOsdevelopintoaninstitutionalamalgamcomprisingdifferentlogicsofactionsandachievetocombinethe“best”ofbusinessandthirdsector.Ontheonehand,organizationsareincreasinglyengaginginaprofessionalizedserviceoutputandoperatebusinessactivitieswhichprerequisitestheadaptationofbusinesspractices.Ontheotherhand,TSOsprovideenablingstructuresforcommunityinvolvementandofferavenuesofself-fulfillment.
Thusconcludingourfindings,thirdsectororganizationsdevelopintohybridorganizationsthatcomprisedifferentorganizationsundertheirroofwithvaryingorganizationalculturesandidentities.Lookingatthesectorasawhole,thecontoursofitssub-organizationalfieldsbecomeincreasinglyfuzzy(Bežovanetal.2016,Brandsenetal.2016,Chaves-Avilaetal.2016,Zimmeretal.2016,Mohanetal.2016,Leśetal.2016,Petrella/Richez-Battestietal.2016,Simsaetal.2016).
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6 AppendixI-Methodologicalprocedure:conductingastakeholdersurveyandsemi-structuredinterviews
Keysempiricalevidencetoidentifycommonbarriersdepictedundersection2inthisreportwasgatheredbycarryingoutanonlinestakeholdersurveyineachprojectcountry.Thesurveywassupplementedbynumeroussemi-structuredinterviewswiththirdsectorstakeholderstocompensateforalowresponseinsomeinstancesandtogainadeeperinsightintothedevelopmentsofthesector.
Inafirststepofourresearchweanalyzedtheliteratureregardingthethirdsectoringeneral.Weidentifiedthemostcommonproblemsthethirdsectorfacesandidentifiedfactorsthatallowthesectortodevelopitsfullpotential.Additionally,theanalysisofsecondaryquantitativedataallowedustoreachasystematicconfirmationofourfirstfindings.Recentlyconductedsurveyswiththefocusoncivilsocietyissues(e.g.surveysonvolunteering,giving,andcitizen’sparticipation)orsurveysassessingthegeneralsituationofTSOsprovideduswithfurtherinsightsonthedevelopmentofthethirdsectorandbarriersthataffecttheperformanceofTSOs.
WithsemistructuredinterviewsaddressingthirdsectorrepresentativesandindividualexpertswithprimeknowledgeonthirdsectordevelopmentsweaimedfirstlyatgraspingthechallengesTSOsareconfrontedwithinrelationtoe.g.newgovernancepractices,changingmodesoffinancing,societalchangesandsecondly,thestrategiesthatTSOsdeveloptoreacttothosechallenges.
Withthestakeholdersurveyasystematicconfirmationofthefindingsgainedbyanalyzingtheliterature,secondarydataandinterviewswasreached.Thestakeholdersurveywasconductedonline.
TheaddedvalueofthesurveyistoquantifytheperceptionsofbarriersandopportunitiesforthirdsectordevelopmentwithinthegroupsofTSOrepresentatives.Thesurveyreflectshowtherespondentsthatparticipatedinthesurveyassessthebarriersandopportunitiesoftheorganizationstheyrepresent.However,thedistributionsamongcertainanswerstothesurveyquestionsdonotnecessarilyreflectthedistributionoftheentirethirdsector.Despiteofthislimitation,theonlinesurveyreflectshowbarriersandopportunitiesareassessedamongthirdsectorrepresentatives.
Thesurveyisdividedintotwoparts.Inthefirstparttheproblemperceptionwithregardstofinance,personnelgovernance,publicattitudes/image,institutionalfacilities(e.g.Equipment),interorganizationallinkagesandtheoperatingcontext,thelegal
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environment,thesubsectoralinfrastructure(e.g.mediatinginstitutions)wereaddressed.ThesecondpartofthesurveyaimedatgraspingthetrendswithregardtothirdsectorDevelopment.Underthissectionthirdsectorrepresentativeswereaskedtoassessstatementsthatdealwithdevelopmentsofthethirdsectorwithregardtotheareasdescribedabove.
Weaddressedstakeholderswhoareworkingattheorganizationallevel.Weconvincedmanagers,headsofdepartmentsoflargeorganizations,boardmembersandchairmen(orchairwomen)totakepartinthesurvey.Whereasolidsectoralinfrastructureexistedweachievedtoaddressorganizationsviaumbrellasthatforwardedthesurveytotheirmemberorganizations.Incountriesororganizationalfieldsthatlackanencompassinginfrastructuretheresponseratewassubstantiallylower,asitresultedtobetroublesometogetintouchwithTSOs.Thus,insomeinstancesananalysisofthesurveywasnotpossibleinlightofthelowN.TheUKhadthehighestnumberofresponseswith1200organizationsansweringthesurveyfollowedbytheNetherlandswith372andGermanywith250responses.InCroatia171organizationsrespondedtothesurvey,followedbyAustriawith102responses.InSpainwith28responses,inFrancewith24responsesandinPolandwithonly8responsesthestatisticalanalysisresultedtobeproblematic.Thus,weaccompaniedthedatagatheringviathesurveywithavastnumberofsemi-structuredinterviewswithkeystakeholdersofthesectore.g.representativesofnationalumbrellasandindividualexperts.
InNetherlandsthewordingofthequestionswaschangedandtheresponsecategorieswereadaptedtotheDutchsituationinordertoachieveahigherresponserate.IntheUKalargescalestudywasconductedincorporationwiththeThirdSectorResearchCentre.ItwasadaptedtotheEnglishcontext,withre-wordingofquestionsandtheinclusionofthosespecificandrelevanttolocalcondition.Althoughthenecessaryadaptationregardingthedesignoftheonlinesurveymadeadirectcomparisonoftheresultsinangraphicmoredifficult,theresultsoftheonlinesurveyintheUKandTheNetherlandspointedinthesamedirectionasintheotherprojectcountriesthataredepictedundersection4.
Sincethesectorisveryheterogeneous,weaimedatcoveringabroadspectrumoffieldsofactivity,legalformsandfunctionsofTSOs.Amongtheinterviewedstakeholderswererepresentativesofumbrellaorganisationrelevantinthedifferentfields(e.g.representativesofwelfareassociations),chiefexecutivesofmajorfoundations,largeTSOsandpeakorganisationsrepresentingsupportorganisationlikevolunteeringagencies,researchersandpolicyexpertsworkingasconsultants.Theyrepresentdifferent
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policyfieldsrangingfromcultureorganisationstosports,andwelfareassociationscoveringthedifferentfunctionsthatarecommonlyattributedtothesector(e.g.community,advocacyandserviceorganisations).Wemanagedtoincludethevarietyoforganizationalandlegalformsthatarepresentinthesector,likemembershiporganizations(clubs),foundations,cooperatives,limitedliabilitycompanies.
Theresultsofthesurveyandtheinterviewswerepublishedinindividualworkingpapersperprojectcountryandmadeavailableonthewebsiteoftheproject.
Figure6:PictorialRepresentationTSIProjectBarriersResearchApproach
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sectorImpactTSINationalReportNo.5:IdentifyingExternalandInternalBarrierstoThirdsectorDevelopmentinCroatiahttp://thirdsectorimpact.eu/documentation/tsi-national-report-no-5-identifying-external-internal-barriers-third-sector-development-croatia/Brandsen,T./Pape,U./DuarteEbers,E./tenHulscher,E.(2016):IdentifyingexternalandinternalbarrierstothirdsectordevelopmentintheNetherlands,TSINationalReportSeriesNo.2.SeventhFrameworkProgramme(grantagreement613034),EuropeanUnion.Brussels:ThirdsectorImpact.http://thirdsectorimpact.eu/documentation/tsi-national-report-no-2-barriers-to-third-sector-development-in-the-netherlands/Chaves-Avila,R./Alguacil-Mari,P./GemmaFajardo-Garcia,I./Savall-Morera,T.(2016):NationalreportonthirdsectorbarriersinSpain,TSINationalReportSeriesNo.8.SeventhFrameworkProgramme(grantagreement613034),EuropeanUnion.Brussels:ThirdsectorImpact.http://thirdsectorimpact.eu/documentation/tsi-national-report-no-8-third-sector-barriers-spain/Leś,E./Nałęcz,S./Pieliński,B.(2016):ThirdsectorbarriersinPoland,TSINationalReportSeriesNo.7.SeventhFrameworkProgramme(grantagreement613034),EuropeanUnion.Brussels:ThirdsectorImpact.TSINationalReportNo.7:ThirdsectorbarriersinPoland.http://thirdsectorimpact.eu/documentation/tsi-national-report-no-7-third-sector-barriers-poland/Mohan,J./Kendall,J./Brookes,N.(2016):ThirdsectorImpact”TowardsamorenuancedunderstandingofbarriersandconstraintsTSINationalReportSeriesNo.1.SeventhFrameworkProgramme(grantagreement613034),EuropeanUnion.Brussels:ThirdsectorImpact.http://thirdsectorimpact.eu/documentation/tsi-barriers-briefing-no-2-towards-a-more-nuanced-understanding-of-barriers-and-constraints/Petrella,Francesca/Richez-Battesti,Nadine;etal(2016):NationalReportonthirdsectorbarriersinFrance,TSINationalReportSeriesNo.3.SeventhFrameworkProgramme(grantagreement613034),EuropeanUnion.Brussels:ThirdsectorImpact
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