Lessons Learned for REDD+ from PES and Conservation Incentive Programs

8/3/2019 Lessons Learned for REDD+ from PES and Conservation Incentive Programs

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Lessons Learned for REDD+ from PES

and Conservation Incentive ProgramsExamples from Costa Rica, Mexico, and Ecuador


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and Conservation Incentive Programs

Examples from Costa Rica, Mexico, and Ecuador


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Cover photo: Ranjith Ranjith/World Bank


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Contents

Background ..............................................................................................................................1

Brie synopsis o the country programs .........................................................................1

PES and conservation incentive programs as building blocks or

national REDD+ ...................................................................................................................2

1. Participation agreements ...............................................................................................3

2. Equity or social objectives .............................................................................................4

3. Trade-os and synergies between multiple (ecosystem) benets ..................7

4. Eective measuring, verication and reporting ....................................................9

5. Sustainable nance and administrative costs ......................................................11

The way ahead ..................................................................................................................... 13

PES to REDD+ connections ..............................................................................................14


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Background

This Policy Brie originates rom discussions at the 16th Conerence o the

Parties o the UNFCCC in Cancun in December 2010 between representatives

o Costa Rica, Ecuador and Mexico, the World Bank and Forest Trends. These

discussions ocused around learning or REDD+ rom these countries pay-

ments or environmental services (PES) programs and, in the case o Ecuador,

its conservation incentives program Socio Bosque. This Policy Brie is dawn

rom a paper (Forest Trends 2011) combining lessons rom the country expe-

riences with observations rom the wider literature.

Brie synopsis o the country programs

Costa Rica and Mexico have been pioneers in the creation o PES mecha-

nisms. Costa Rica started its PES Program (PSA) scheme in 1997, coordinated

by the National Forestry Financing Fund (FONAFIFO) with unds rom a tax

on ossil uels. By 2009, there were 671,000 hectares under the PSA. This

helped increase national orest cover rom 44% in 1998 to 51% in 2005. Costa

Ricas experience is also notable as regards establishing an enabling policy,

legal and institutional ramework or PES.

Mexico started its Hydrological Environmental Services Program (PSAH)

in 2003 with earmarked unds rom national water ees. The PSAH involves

Whats it about?





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payments to landowning ejidoand agrarian communities, as well as indi-

vidual landowners, or maintaining orest in hydrologically important areas.

In 2004, the Payments or Carbon and Biodiversity Services Program (PSA-

CABSA), which includes agroorestry systems, was added. These programs,

managed by the National Forest Commission (CONAFOR), have now beenintegrated into the Program o Payments or Environmental Services (PSAB).

PSAB currently covers 2.2 million hectares o orest.

More recently, Ecuador created the Socio Bosque program o con-

servation incentives in 2008. In addition, in June 2009 the Ministry o

Environment established the Pramo Chapter o Socio Bosque resulting in

the additional conservation o about 18,000 hectares o this Andean eco-

system o great importance or protecting and regulating water resources.

By 2011 about 868,000 hectares o native orest and other priority ecosys-

tems were protected.

PES and conservation incentive programs asbuilding blocks or national REDD+

Reducing Emissions rom Deorestation and Forest Degradationplus con-

servation o orest carbon stocks, sustainable management o orests, and

enhancement o orest carbon stocks (REDD+) aims to create incentives

or developing countries to invest in orest based reduction o greenhouse

gases. Three common provisions o PES programs are particularly relevant

to REDD+: payments are conditional on perormance (or at least on realizing

conservation activities), they require well-established legal and policy rame-

works, and they need eective monitoring.

Based on the three national experiences and the wider PES literature,

Costa Rica, Mexico and Ecuador, supported by Forest Trends (2011), The

World Bank and several experts, have identied key lessons (some o themoverlapping and most o them interrelated) or inorming the transition to

REDD+ or incorporation o the current national program as a sub-program o

the national REDD+ program. Table 1 lists a set o lessons grouped into ve

main areas.


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1. Participation agreements

Participation agreements in national programs:

challenges and synergies

Contracting or conservation incentives and PES raises complex issues or

participants and government regulators alike. For example, the contract

scope must be careully and clearly delineated to avoid conusion, to prevent

raud and abuse, and to create robust rameworks or rewarding conserva-

tion actions or outcomes. A key challenge is how to make complex legaldocuments more accessible to less literate participants. Experiences with

participation agreements in conservation incentive programs in Costa Rica,

Mexico, and Ecuador are instructive or developing REDD+ generic contracts.

The political and institutional contexts or these agreements are very

important. Good coordination among relevant regulatory bodies is essential

or keeping REDD+ administrative costs down and enhancing success. Access

to technical support and training are also essential or increasing program

reach and efcacy. In terms o their content, PES or conservation incentive

participation agreements provide a useul ramework or REDD+ participation

Table 1. Summary of lessons learned for REDD+ from PES/Conservaton incentve programs

Areas of lesson learning Lesson titles

1. Participation agreements Participationagreementsinnationalprograms:challengesandsynergies

2. Equity or social objectives Progresstowardsenablingalegal,policyandgovernanceframework

Goodgovernanceandappropriateinstitutionsatmultiplelevels Adoptingarights-basedapproach

Tacklingobstaclestoparticipationofthepoor

Crediblemonitoringofsocialoutcomesandimpacts

3. Trade-os and synergies between

multiple (ecosystem) benets

Accountingformultiplebenetsintargetingpaymentsorincentives

Explicitlyconsideringmultiplebenetsinevaluatingoutcomes

Evaluatingsynergiesandtrade-oswithotherprograms

Designingpaymentsorincentivesthatrewardmultiplebenets

4. Measuring, reporting, and

verication (MRV)

Measuringindicatorsandtechnologies:synergiesbetweenPESandREDD+

Measuringeectiveness:quanticationandattributionofprogramimpacts

Addressingleakagethroughprogramdesignandmonitoring

Cost-eectiveMRVandpotentialtrade-os

HumancapitalinvestmentsforeectiveMRV

5. Sustainable nance and

administrative costs

Diversiedfundingsourcesandnancialsustainability

Engagingtheprivatesectorwithpublicprograms

Fundingowscontextmatters

Controllingadministrativecosts

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agreementstheyarestandardizedandshort,andreferencemoredetailed

program guidelines and procedural details. There are however key dierences

when considering emission reductions or removals. REDD+ participation

agreements will need to borrow experience rom the emission reduction pur-

chase agreements (ERPAs) used in carbon markets other than PES programs.

2. Equity or social objectives

A central concern o PES and REDD+ is a possible trade-o between social

and environmental objectives. In the country programs there is little evi-

dence o a trade-o in the sense that social objectives are losing out to

environmental objectives, but there is evidence that the latter have been

aected by the strong social objectives resulting rom social and political

pressures (e.g., or PES to meet wider government development objectives).

The challenge in the context o REDD+ is how to increase carbon addition-

ality without sacricing positive social outcomes; the ideal is to achieve

win-win outcomes, but these have historically proved very elusive.

Progress towards an enabling legal, policy and institutional

ramework

It is essential to combine direct incentives with progress towards an enabling

policy legal, policy and governance ramework. A key area includes prop-

erty rights and tenure: the wider evidence is that communities tend to

protect orests better than governments; that more secure or clearer tenure

can encourage conservation, but is not by itsel a sufcient condition

when opportunity costs are high; and that tree or orest tenure is critical to

resource user incentives. The three countries have made good progress in

building an enabling ramework, but also ace some challenges:

Costa Rica has recognized carbon and other ecosystem service rights

as belonging to landowners, and has a clear legal and institutional

ramework or PES under Forestry Law No. 7575, but under hal o orest

owners have clear land title.

InEcuador, other REDD+ components (apart rom Socio Bosque)

include land tenure and titling, establishing the legal, nancial and

institutional ramework, and inter-sectoral planning, but carbon prop-

erty rights are currently unclear.

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InMexico, tenure is clear with ejidos and agrarian communities owning

70% o orest area, while almost all the rest are small area properties

ownbysinglefamiliesbuttherearesomeinter-sectoralpolicyconicts:

agricultural subsidy programs promote high value crops and basic

grain production resulting in orest clearance in some areas.

Good governance and appropriate institutions at all levels

Goodgovernanceandappropriateinstitutionsareessentialatalllevelsfor

eective and equitable program management, supportive local governance

arrangements, lower transaction and implementation costs and benet

sharing mechanisms, and because they aect the opportunity costs o SFM

and conservation. It is possible to identiy some win-win opportunities, or

example, in Mexico weak community governance oten coincides with high

deorestation threats. In addition, strong community institutions, like in the

case o Mexico, have avored positive social and environmental outcomes.

The country programs also reveal good adaptive management capacity

asreectedinthefrequentreforms.Theyhavetendedtobringinthird

parties such as orestry consultants (in Costa Rica) and civil society organiza-

tions (in Mexico) or compliance monitoring, but some observers note that

the perormance o these parties is insufciently monitored. Looking ahead

to REDD+, the ull paper sets out some well-established institutional design

principles that are associated with success, promote accountability via easy

tounderstandrulesthatcoversanctions,conictmanagementandadjudica-

tion, and can be monitored and enorced locally.

Adopting a rights-based approach

A rights-based approach ties in closely with the social saeguards agreed in

Cancun and international legislation. It includes land and carbon propertyrights, as well as a more general set o human rights associated with orest

peoples rights to make decisions and live a peaceul and secure lie. The

right to ree, prior and inormed consent (FPIC) is being incorporated into

national procedures, but as yet there does not appear to have been a signi-

cant project application o FPIC in these countries.

It has been noted that a rights-based approach to REDD+ should

include inter alia the training o orestry ofcials in their rights-related

responsibilities, increased transparency o data and decision-making, and

the reorm o laws, regulations and administrative and judicial mechanisms


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to recognize and protect orest peoples rights. Also as FPIC emerges, coun-

tries can promote good practice through national standards or norms or

conducting FPIC.

Obstacles to participation o the poor

A lesson rom PES and other programs is that high transaction costs, eligi-

bility criteria associated with land titles, and other entry barriers, such as

educational levels and poor understanding o a program can make it di-

cult or the poor to participate. Transaction costs relate to the complexity

o application procedures and the quality o program outreach with

poorer applicants.

The country programs have responded to these challenges, or example,

by simpliying application procedures, recognizing possessory rights short

o a ormal land title (Costa Rica) and making alliances with civil society and

NGOs to socialize and expand the program (Ecuador); in Mexico, transaction

costs are relatively low since contracts are with community authorities.

Credible monitoring o social outcomes and impacts

One reason why it is hard to nd evidence which supports or contradicts

views about the social eects o PES is the paucity o credible data. Either

social impacts are not measured at all or monitoring systems do use

methods that actor in attribution or cause and eect. This causes contested

views on social benets and trade-os, prevents clear lesson learning or

project and program design (via ex-ante social impact assessment), and

inhibits adaptive management.

There is little experience with monitoring social impacts in these or other

countries. Under REDD+ there will be increasing pressure on countries to

show that the social and biodiversity co-benets o carbon are real andadditionalespeciallyifthereisapricepremiumforequitableREDD+.There

is thereore an urgent need or practical guidance in cost-eective social

impact assessment o REDD+. This need is being met at the project level,

but progress at the national level is slightly slower. This is however a key

objective o both the Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment (SESA)

process o the World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and the recently

established Learning Initiative or Social Assessment o REDD+ (LISA-REDD).


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3. Trade-os and synergies between multiple(ecosystem) benefts

The close inter-relationship between biodiversity and environmental services

provides opportunities or multiple (ecosystem) benets, but also includesthe potential or trade-os. Very ew assessments have been made o how a

PES ocus on one environmental service can impact other environmental ser-

vices. Given the potential o REDD+ to aect land management over larger

areas and leverage urther nance, explicit consideration o environmental

trade-os and synergies is critical.

Accounting or multiple benets in targeting payments or

incentives

Most PES programs struggle to account or outcomes or the targeted

environmental service, let alone account or outcomes in terms o multiple

benets. REDD+ programs will ace similar challenges in accounting or

multiple benets due to the inherent high variability in biodiversity and envi-

ronmental services; lack o data on the relationships between specic land

management actions, and the types, quantity and quality o environmental

services provided; and weak denition o (and metrics or measuring) the

environmental services provided.

To account or environmental service outcomes, most PES programs use

simple proxies (e.g. orest or non-orest area). Although orest conservation

can be assumed to provide multiple benets, it will be important to assess

how REDD+ carbon sequestration options aect other services.

There are three main ways that PES programs can account or trade-os

and synergies across multiple benets in the targeting o payments:

aligningPEStargetingwithnationalorregionallanduseorconserva-tion priorities;

evaluatingthespatialoverlapamongmultiplebenetsintargeting

payments; and

usingmultiplecriteriaforscoringorrankingeligibleprojects.

Each approach involves data and cost challenges. However, explicitly

addressing trade-os and synergies in targeting can increase the ecological

eectiveness and economic efciency o PES programs. Ecuador, Costa Rica

and Guatemala have begun developing spatially explicit inormation and

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maps o the overlap among areas important or carbon, biodiversity, and

water-related services. This approach establishes a basis or evaluating how

PES can enhance (or detract rom) provision o multiple services, or achieve

other conservation goals such as expanding protected areas. Mexico and

Costa Rica have rened and adapted their eligibility criteria and ranking oprojects based on experience in early phases o their PES programs, and can

target areas where multiple benets anddeorestation risks are greater. The

emerging spatial analyses will provide vital data to help REDD+ programs

support other conservation priorities.

Evaluating synergies and trade-os

PES or REDD+ programs can compete with other environmental goals and

priorities or be undermined by competing programs and priorities (e.g.,

agricultural expansion, biouels, and major roads). Only by understanding

positive and negative impacts on other services will it be possible to

design REDD+ programs that integrate multiple goals or development and

conservation.

Few PES programs explicitly consider trade-os and synergies with other

programs. REDD+ strategies need to evaluate and manage synergies and

trade-os, and engage with multiple stakeholders to align REDD+ with other

policies. For example, REDD+ strategies should support programs promoting

the sustainable production o high-value crops (e.g., the Roundtables or

Sustainable Soy and Sustainable Palm Oil), and strengthen environmental

impact assessment (EIA) regulations.

Designing payments or incentives that reward multiple benets

In theory, PES programs that reward multiple benets have several advan-

tages over programs that pay or a single service. A lesson o Mexicos PSABis that successul programs are linked to a clear perception o the relation-

ship between orest conservation and multiple benets. Multiple payments

would provide stronger incentives or conservation, whereas payment or

a single service may not cover opportunity costs. PES programs have more

chance o success i unds rom dierent services can be combined. For

example, in Bolivia an initial biodiversity payment or orest conservation

provided the start-up costs to allow a watershed payment services program

to be designed and implemented, with long-term unding rom water users.

But the challenges associated with multiple ecosystem service payments


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(additionality, metrics, accounting and relationships between management

activities and service provision) will substantially increase transaction costs.

Despite these challenges, PES programs have explored several ways or

rewarding multiple benets: payments or dierent services over time in

Bolivia; tiered payments based on the importance o areas or particularservices in Mexico and Costa Rica; and payments tied to a points system in

the above-mentioned Silvopastoral Project. Monitoring data rom the latter

suggest that it has resulted in greater environmental benets and addition-

ality than some other PES programs in the region. Payments that reward

multiple services can also help ensure that a narrow ocus on carbon in

REDD+ does not result in a trade-o with other vital ecosystem services such

as biodiversity and water.

4. Eective measuring, verifcation and reporting

To benet rom results-based REDD+ nancing, countries must use robust

measuring, reporting, and verication (MRV) systems. Eorts to develop and

implement these systems can benet rom the experiences o conservation

incentive programs, which have been developing and testing MRV systems

or years. At the same time, new MRV systems and data collected or REDD+

can strengthen these programs and could even allow them to benet rom

REDD+ nance.

Monitoring indicators and technologies: synergies between PES

and REDD+

Emerging REDD+ programs can benet rom the monitoring eorts o

the conservation incentive programs. Existing data and systems or moni-

toringforestcoverthedominantmonitoringindicatorcaninformREDD+ data sets i the methods, protocols, and denitions are consis-

tent. Moreover, REDD+ programs can explore synergies with ongoing

site visits in the national programs to monitor land use changes that are

more difcult to track than deorestation, but are real opportunities or

REDD+namelyforestdegradation,improvedforestmanagement,and

carbon stock enhancement.

REDD+ monitoring, on the other hand, can help conservation incentive

programs by identiying signicant deorestation events on incentive prop-

erties or highlighting areas experiencing increased deorestation, and which

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need more support and/or compliance enorcement. There are however

distinctions in the general requirements or REDD+ (e.g., specic project

activities, land uses, and vegetation types) that preclude direct MRV syner-

gies with incentive programs.

Measuring eectiveness: quantication and attribution o

program impacts

Attributing precise levels o conservation (or emissions reductions) to a

specic incentive (or REDD+) program is inherently difcult, since it requires

one to credibly describe a counteractual scenario, and it is even more di-

cult when program participants have very dierent socio-economic and

biophysical characteristics. While assessing program eectiveness requires

careul design, it need not be prohibitively expensive. A research design in

which impacts are attributed rom the start, and based on a sound counter-

actual or reerence scenario, rather than ex-postis ar more likely to generate

accurate and reliable data.

Addressing leakage through program design and monitoring

Although national REDD+ programs aim to account or leakage through

national systems o monitoring and accounting, preventing activity displace-

ment or market leakage is very challenging. To the extent that conservation

incentive mechanisms are used as tools or REDD+, specic leakage mitiga-

tionmeasuresareneededtheseincludearequirementstoenrollallforests

within a property to avoid intra-property activity shiting; a balanced system

o sanctions or deorestation in parallel with incentive payments; and the

careul design o agricultural or livestock intensication in non-orest lands

alongside incentives or orest conservation.

Cost-ecient MRV and potential trade-os

Emerging REDD+ programs need to be aware o the costs associated with

MRV, including the costs o acquiring remotely-sensed data, processing and

analyzing the data, ground-truthing it, assigning carbon densities through

site visits, and administrative costs. The MRV system may also require

population and socio-economic data in order to construct an accurate base-

linecollectingthiscanbecomplexandexpensive.Ingeneral,themore

precise that the data needs to be, the higher will be the cost. A reasonable


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cost o monitoring or REDD+ is 10% o total costs; the national incentive

programs have expended about 15% on monitoring costs.

Human capital investments or eective MRV

Mexico, Costa Rica, and Ecuador are taking advantage o REDD+ readiness

unding or investing in human and institutional capacity to create a timely,

accurate, and cost-eective MRV system. The country experiences suggest

that a cost-eective approach is to employ third-parties to undertake much

o the monitoring, especially the site visits. It may also be cost-eective to

engage community members and NGOs to monitor compliance and track

indicators that are difcult or program sta to monitor. This would help

increase community ownership and social capital.

5. Sustainable fnance and administrative costs

A key challenge or PES and REDD+ programs is nancial sustainability,

i.e., creation o a stable long-term unding path to achieve the desired out-

comes. The nancial success o PES and REDD+ hinges on integration at

various levels: integration o dierent sources o public and private nance;

o regional scales and duration o unds; and integration o administrative

processes or und disbursement, MRV, and registration. Designing PES

and REDD+ programs to complement certication programs, compliance

requirements, state unding, and agricultural project nance will acilitate

enrollment, maximize co-investment, and amortize transaction and adminis-

tration costs across programs.

Diversied unding sources and nancial sustainability

To secure sustainable land use changes, a PES program depends on a

predictable delivery o nancial incentives over time. PES and REDD+

programs require an incentive structure that delivers start-up unds or

rapid uptake o best practice, along with consistent payments to address

landowner nancial risk. As well as balancing short and long-term payment

solutions, combining unding sources and types can increase the nancial

security o PES and REDD+ programs. Recognizing these challenges, some

countries have included mechanisms such as environmental endowment

unds which acilitate long-term multiple investments. These have added

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to nancial sustainability as payments are made rom capital interest.

Advocates o national REDD+ approaches see advantages o unding

mechanisms that can leverage national, public, donor and market revenues

which can help address the unding gap in the early stages o program and

project development.

Engaging the private sector with public programs

While public unding has been prominent in the three programs, it may be

limited in the longer term. To ensure sustainable land use change, public

unding or conservation activities is best structured to leverage private

investment. This can be accomplished through tools such as loan guaran-

tees, guaranteed x priced payments, tax incentives and other mechanisms

that are already successully deployed to stimulate investment in the renew-

able energy sector. Using public nance to establish institutional rameworks

that reduce private sector risk and embed REDD+ in a broader development

vision is an important goal o readiness programs. Rather than crowding

out private sector nance by over-regulating ecosystem services provision,

public unds could be used to mitigate specic risks acing the private sector.

Public-private institutions oer a high potential strategy to leverage private

unding in national conservation initiatives.

Funding fowscontext matters

Incentives directed at nancing gaps can help PES programs become efcient

and catalytic. By linking PES with existing conservation or land use programs,

such as micro-credit nancing to armers and orest landowners, PES is not

the only way to nance a land use change, and the nancial sustainability o

the conservation activity can be enhanced. In the three national incentives

programs, landowners are paid to not deorest. This preventative approachimplies that payments need to continue indenitely, an unlikely scenario. In

REDD+ it will be important to move rom prevention to alternative sustainable

land use models. To date, national incentive programs have not experimented

sufciently with nancing alternative land uses apart rom orest conservation.

Controlling administrative costs

Eective environmental targeting is costly in terms o MRV and other

transaction costs, or example the costs associated with dierentiated pay-


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ments based on opportunity costs. Controlling administrative costs will be

a big challenge or national REDD+, or example, or eective application

o the REDD+ saeguards. The issues o how to incorporate the various

stakeholders that will both impact and be impacted by REDD+, and how

to ensure equitable benet distribution or all orest stewards are majorchallenges. The country experiences indicate that the costs can be kept

in check by using local technical expertise, appropriate technology and

strong administrative integration.

The way ahead

This review shows that national PES and conservation incentive programs are

versatile mechanisms that can evolve into dierent orms o positive incen-

tives, and providing a wealth o experience or inorming the development

o REDD+. As shown in the diagram on page 14, developing a well-estab-

lished PES program provides a valuable bridge with REDD+.

In the REDD+ preparation process, 54 countries have so ar expressed

interest in developing REDD+ strategies to be ready or the post-Kyoto

period, and at least one hal o those countries1, 2 have a readiness plan

approved or pending approval. Most o these plans mention the use o

positive incentives to achieve REDD+ objectives, and have specied PES as

the main driver o these strategies. Moreover, many countries have shown

a strong interest in the national programs, and several have made country

visits with the aim o establishing lines o collaboration or early action. Par-

ticular interest has been shown in aspects such as local governance, orest

inventories and monitoring systems.

A simple way o ensuring that REDD+ plans take account o the valuable

lessons o experience rom the national experiences is or the new countries

to work together with more experienced ones. Thus Costa Rica, Ecuador, andMexico could act as coaches with donor support to avoid such south-to-

south exchanges becoming a nancial burden.

1 November 2011. This policy brie has been prepared by Costa Rica, Mexico, and Ecuador withsupport rom Forest Trends and The World Bank,rom the paper and a workshop discussiononLessons Learned or REDD+ rom PES and Conservation Incentive Programs in Costa Rica,Mexico and Ecuador.

2 REDD+ Partnership, FCPF, UN REDD.

Conclusions


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PES to REDD+ connectionsAchievements

Obstacles

PES or conservation incentives systems

Provideincentivesforforestownersorlegalpossessorstostopormitigatedeforestation

and/or degradation.

Allows or the establishment o monitoring systems, improve governance structures, andencourage social involvement.

Contribute to emission reductions that can be acceptable as ast-start actions in the

REDD+ ramework.

Kindle the rural economy creating jobs by stimulating integrated management o orest

resources.

Contribute solving the problem o poverty thus avoiding migration to the cities, which

orest management, conservation policies and rural programs in most countries have

ailed to mitigate.

Formalize property rights by revising both land titling and property limits denitions.

Enhance conservation awareness and its contribution to mitigate climate change.

Identiy vulnerable ecosystems with deorestation risks and prioritize conservation

actions.

Obstacles in the REDD+ Process

Governments ailure to recognize the land rights o orest communities. Yet the

traditional knowledge and practices o these communities, including Indigenous Peoples,

have enabled the sustainable management and conservation o natural orest areas or

thousands o years. These communities have the right to occupy their ancestral lands and

reely access the resources there.

Lack o knowledge and capacities, and ineective communication.

Subsidy approaches are vulnerable to problems o, or example, additionality, leakage and

perverse incentives, all o which imply the need or strong governance.

Trade-o o multiple objectives (co-benets): equity and poverty alleviation as

undamental requirements versus no prioritizing such co-benets at the expense o

successul carbon storage.

PROVIDE INSTRUMENTS FOR SOLVING:


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Lessons Learned for REDD+ from PES and Conservation Incentive Programs