JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, G.R. NO. 142509JR.,cralawPetitioner,Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.(Chairperson)

YNARES-SANTIAGO,AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,- versus -CALLEJO, SR., andCHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

THE PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES and ATTY. JOSEJ. PIERAZ,Promulgated:cralawRespondents.March 24, 2006x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x  

D E C I S I O N 

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:  Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Jose Alemania Buatis, Jr. (petitioner) seeking to set aside the Decision dated January 18, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 20988 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 167 of Pasig City, convicting him of the crime of libel.Also assailed is the appellate court's Resolution dated March 13, 2000 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The facts of the case, as summarized by the appellate court, are as follows:

cralawOn August 18, 1995, the wife of private-complainant Atty. JoseJ. Pieraz (Atty. Pieraz), retrieved a letter from their mailbox addressed to her husband. The letter was open, not contained in an envelope, and Atty. Pieraz wife put it on her husband's desk. On that same day, Atty. Pieraz came upon the letter and made out its content. It reads:

 DON HERMOGENES RODRIGUEZ Y REYES ESTATEOffice of the Asst. Court Administrator No. 1063 Kamias St., Bgy. Manggahan, PasigCity,Metro ManilaAugust 18, 1995ATTY. JOSE J. PIERAZCounsel for Benjamin A. Monroy#8 Quirino St., Life Homes SubdivisionRosario , PasigCity, Metro ManilaSubject:Anent your letter dated August 18, 1995 addressed to one Mrs. Teresita QuingcoAtty. Pieraz:This has reference to your lousy but inutile threatening letter dated August 18, 1995, addressed to our client; using carabao English.  May we remind you that any attempt on your part to continue harassing the person of Mrs. Teresita Quingco of No. 1582 Mngo St., Bgy. Manggahan, PasigCity, Metro Manila---undersigned much to his regrets shall be constrained/compelled to file the necessary complaint for disbarment against you.  You may proceed then with your stupidity and suffer the full consequence of the law. Needless for you to cite specific provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as the same is irrelevant to the present case. As a matter of fact, the same shall be used by no other than the person of Mrs. Quingco in filing administrative charge against you and all persons behind these nefarious activities. Finally, it is a welcome opportunity for the undersigned to face you squarely in any courts of justice, so as we can prove 'who is who once and for all.

 Trusting that you are properly inform (sic) regarding these matters, I remain. Yours in Satan name;(Signed)JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR.Atty-in- Fact of the presentCourt Administrator of the entireIntestate Estate of Don HermogenesRodriguez Y. Reyes.Copy furnished:All concerned.

Not personally knowing who the sender was, Atty. Pieraz, nevertheless, responded and sent a communication by registered mail to said Buatis, Jr., accused-appellant. In reply, Buatis, Jr. dispatched a second letter dated August 24, 1995 to Atty. Pieraz. Reacting to the insulting words used by Buatis, Jr., particularly: 'Satan, senile, stupid, [E]nglish carabao, Atty. Pieraz filed a complaint for libel against accused-appellant. Subject letter and its contents came to the knowledge not only of his wife but of his children as well and they all chided him telling him: 'Ginagawa ka lang gago dito. Aside from the monetary expenses he incurred as aresult of the filing of the instant case, Atty Pieraz frail health was likewise affected and aggravated by the letter of accused-appellant. The defense forwarded by accused-appellant Buatis, Jr. was denial. According to him, it was at the behest of the president of the organization 'Nagkakaisang Samahan Ng Mga Taga Manggahan or NASATAMA, and of a member, Teresita Quingco, that he had dictated to one of his secretaries, a comment to the letter of private-complainant in the second week of August 1995. Initially during his testimony, Buatis, Jr. could not recall whether he had signed that letter-comment

or if it was even addressed to Atty. Pieraz. Neither could he remember if he had made and sent another letter, this time dated August 24, 1995, to Atty. Pieraz. Confronted in court with the counter-affidavit which he filed before the Pasig City Prosecutor's Office, however, Buatis, Jr. could not deny its contents, among which was his admission that indeed, he had sent subject letter of August 18 and the letter dated August 24, 1995 to Atty. Pieraz.

 cralawAfter trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision dated April 30, 1997 finding petitioner guilty of the crime of libel, the dispositive portion of which reads:

cralawWHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Jose Alemania Buatis, Jr. GUILTY of the crime of LIBEL defined in Art. 353 and penalized under Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day, as minimum, to Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Ten (10) Days, as maximum; to indemnify the offended party in theamount of P20,000.00, by way of compensatory damages; the amount of P10,000.00, as and for moral damages, and another amount of P10,000.00, for exemplary damages; to suffer all accessory penalties provided for by law; and, to pay the costs.

The trial court ruled that: calling a lawyer 'inutil', stupid and capable of using only carabao English, is intended not only for the consumption of respondent but similarly for others as a copy of the libelous letter was furnished all concerned; the letter was prejudicial to the good name of respondent and an affront to his standing as a lawyer, who, at the time the letter was addressed to him, was representing a client in whose favor he sent a demand letter to the person represented by petitioner; the letter is libelous per se since a defect or vice imputed is plainly understood as set against the entire message sought to be conveyed; petitioner failed to reverse the presumption of malice from the defamatory imputation contained in the letter; the letter could have been couched in a civil and respectful manner, as the intention of petitioner was only to advice respondent that demand was not proper and legal but instead petitioner was seething with hate and contempt and even influenced by satanic intention.The RTC also found that since the letter was made known or brought to the attention and notice ofother persons other than the offended party, there was publication; and that the element of identity was also established since the letter was intended for respondent. It rejected petitioner's stance that the libelous letter resulted from mistake or negligence since petitioner boldly admitted that he had to reply to respondent's letter to Mrs. Quingco, it being his duty to do as the latter is a member of petitioner's association. The RTC found respondent entitled to recover compensatory damages as the immediate tendency of the defamatory imputation was to impair respondent's reputation although no actual pecuniary loss has in fact resulted. It also awarded moral damages as well as exemplary damages since the publication of the libelous letter was made with special ill will, bad faith or in a reckless disregard for the rights of respondent. Subsequently, petitioner appealed the RTC's decision to the CA which, in a Decision dated January 18, 2000, affirmed in its entirety the decision of the trial court.  The CA found that the words used in the letter are uncalled for and defamatory in character as they impeached the good

reputation of respondent as a lawyer and that it is malicious. It rejected petitioner's claim that the letter is a privileged communication which would exculpate him from liability since he failed to come up with a valid explanation as to why he had to resort to name calling and downgrading a lawyer to the extent of ridiculing him when he could have discharged his so called 'duty in a more toned down fashion. It found also that there was publication of the letter, thus, it cannot be classified as privileged. The CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated March 13, 2000. Hence the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner, raising the following issues:

A.                 CAN THERE BE MALICE IN FACT, AS ONE OF THE ELEMENTS OF LIBEL, ATTRIBUTED TO A RESPONDING URBAN POOR LEADER ACTING AS COUNSEL, DEFENDING A MEMBER OF AN ASSOCIATION UNDER THREAT OF EJECTMENT FROM HER DWELLING PLACE? B.                 WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT ERREDIN NOT FINDING THE ALLEGED LIBELOUS LETTER AS ONE OF THOSE FALLING UNDER THE PURVIEW OF PRIVILEGE (sic) COMMUNICATION?

 C.                 WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT:THE PETITIONER CAN NOT BE MADE TO ACCEPT FULL RESPONSIBILITY THAT WHAT HE DID IS A CRIME?

 The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment in behalf of the People and respondent filed his own Comment praying for the affirmance of the CA decision. As required by us, the parties submitted their respective memoranda. The principal issue for resolution is whether or not petitioner is guilty of the crime of libel. In his Memorandum, petitioner claims that: the CA failed to apply the ruling in People v. Velasco that 'if the act/matter charged as libelous is only an incident in [an] act which has

another objective, the crime is not libel; when he made his reply to respondent's letter to Mrs. Quingco making a demand for her to vacate the premises, his objective was to inform respondent that Mrs. Quingco is one of the recognized tenants of the Rodriguez estate which is claiming ownership over the area of Brgy. Manggahan, Pasig City, and petitioner is the attorney-in-fact of the administrator of the Rodriquez estate; communication in whatever language, either verbal or written ofa lawyer under obligation to defend a client's cause is but a privileged communication; the instant case is a qualified privileged communication which is lost only by proof of malice, however, respondent failed to present actual proof of malice; the existence of malice in fact may be shown by extrinsic evidence that petitioner bore a grudge against the offended party, or there was ill will or ill feeling between them which existed at the time of the publication of the defamatory imputation which were not at all indicated by respondent in his complaint; contrary to the findings of the CA, there was justifiablemotive in sending such a letter which was to defend the vested interest of the estate and to abate any move of respondent to eject Mrs. Quingco.  Petitioner further argues that if the words used in the libelous letter-reply would be fully scrutinized, there is justification for the use of those words, to wit: 'lousy but inutile threatening letterusing carabao English was due to the fact that the demand letter was indeed a threatening letter as it does not serve its purpose as respondent's client has no legal right over the property and respondent did not file the ejectment suit; that respondent is just making a mockery out of Mrs. Quingco, thus he is stupid; that the words 'Yours in Satan name is only a complementary greeting used in an ordinary communication letter, which is reflected to the sender but not to the person being communicatedand which is just the reverse of saying 'Yours in Christ.We deny the petition.Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. 

For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur:(a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity;and (d) the victim must be identifiable. The last two elements have been duly established by the prosecution.There is publication in this case.In libel, publication means making the defamatory matter, after it is written, known to someone other than the person against whom it has been written.Petitioner's subject letter-reply itself states that the same was copy furnished to all concerned. Also, petitioner had dictated the letter to his secretary.It is enough that the author of the libel complained of has communicated it to a third person. Furthermore, the letter, when found in the mailbox, was open, not contained in an envelope thus, open to public. The victim of the libelous letter was identifiable as the subject letter-reply was addressed to respondent himself.  We shall then resolve the issues raised by petitioner as to whether the imputation is defamatory and malicious. In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense.

 

For the purpose of determining the meaning of any publication alleged to be libelous, we laid down the rule in Jimenez v. Reyes, to wit:

In Tawney vs. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co. (109 Minn., 341), the court had the following to say on this point:In determining whether the specified matter is libelous per se, two rules of construction are conspicuously applicable:(1)That construction must be adopted which will give to the matter such a meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in which the public would naturally understand what was uttered.(2)The published matter alleged to be libelous must be construed as a whole.

In applying these rules to the language of an alleged libel, the court will disregard any subtle or ingenious explanation offered by the publisher on being called to account.The whole question being the effect the publication had upon the minds of the readers, and they not having been assisted by the offered explanation in reading the article, it comes too late to have the effect of removing the sting, if any there be, from the words used in the publication.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

 Gauging from the abovementioned tests, the words used in the letter dated August 18, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent is defamatory. In using words such as 'lousy', 'inutile', 'carabao English', 'stupidity', and 'satan', the letter, as it was written, casts aspersion on the character, integrity and reputation of respondent as a lawyer which exposed him to ridicule. No evidence aliunde need be adduced to prove it.As the CA said, these very words of petitioner have caused respondent to public ridicule as even his own family have told him: 'Ginagawa ka lang gago dito.  Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 is defamatory; and, under the general rule laid down in Article 354, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. Thus, when the imputation is defamatory, the prosecution need not prove malice on the part of petitioner (malice in fact), for the law already presumes that petitioner's imputation is malicious (malice in law). A reading of petitioner's subject letter-reply showed that he malevolently castigated respondent for writing such a demand letter to Mrs. Quingco. There was nothing in the said letter which showed petitioner's good intention and justifiable motive for writing the same in order to overcome the legal inference of malice.  Petitioner, however, insists that his letter was a private communication made in the performance of his moral and social duty as the attorney-in-fact of the administrator of the Rodriguez estate where Mrs. Quingco is a recognized tenant and to whom respondent had written the demand letter to vacate, thus in the nature of a privileged communication and not libelous.

We are not persuaded.Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 354.cralawRequirement for publicity.─ Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:1.cralawA private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and2.cralawA fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performedby public officers in the exercise of their functions.

 Clearly, the presumption of malice is done away with when the defamatory imputation is a qualified privileged communication.  In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified privileged communication under Article 354, No. 1, as claimed by petitioner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice. While it would appear that the letter was written by petitioner out of his social duty to a member of the association which he heads, and was written to respondent as a reply to the latter's demand letter sent to a member, however, a reading of the subject letter-reply addressed to respondent does not show any explanation concerning the status of Mrs. Quingco and why she is entitled to the premises as against the claim of respondent's client. The letter merely contained insulting words, i.e, 'lousy and 'inutile letter using carabao English', 'stupidity', and 'satan', which are totally irrelevant to his defense of Mrs. Quingco's right over the premises. The words as written had

only the effect of maligning respondent's integrity as a lawyer, a lawyer who had served as legal officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for so many years until his retirement and afterwards as consultant of the same agency and also a notary public. The letter was crafted in an injurious way than what is necessary in answering a demand letter which exposed respondent to public ridicule thus negating good faith and showing malicious intent on petitioner's part.Moreover, the law requires that for a defamatory imputation made out of a legal, moral or social duty to be privileged, such statement must be communicated only to the person or persons who have some interest or duty in the matter alleged, and who have the power to furnish the protection sought by the author of the statement. A written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged when it is published and circulated among the public. In this case, petitioner admitted that he dictated the letter to one of her secretaries who typed the same and made a print out of the computer. While petitioner addressed the reply-letter to respondent, the same letter showed that it was copy furnished to all concerned. His lack of selectivity is indicative of malice and is anathema to his claim of privileged communication. Such publication had already created upon the minds of the readers a circumstance which brought discredit and shame to respondent's reputation. Since the letter is not a privileged communication, malice is presumed under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code. The presumption was not successfully rebutted by petitioner as discussed above. Thus, we find that the CA did not commit any error in affirming the findings of the trial court that petitioner is guilty of the crime of libel.An appeal in a criminal case throws the entire case for review and it becomes our duty to correct any error, as may be found in the appealed judgment, whether assigned as an error or not.We find that the award of P20,000.00 as compensatory damages should be deleted for lack of factual basis.  To be entitled to actual and compensatory damages, there must be competent proof constituting evidence of the actual amount thereof. Respondent had not presented evidence in support thereof.  Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes libel by means of writings or similar means with prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to

6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party.  The courts are given the discretion to choose whether to impose a single penalty or conjunctive penalties; that is, whether to impose a penalty of fine, or a penalty of imprisonment only, or a penalty of both fine and imprisonment. 

In Vaca v. Court of Appeals, where petitioners therein were convicted of B.P. 22 which provides for alternative penalties of fine or imprisonment or both fine and imprisonment, we deleted the prison sentence imposed upon petitioners and instead ordered them only to pay a fine equivalent to double the amount of the check. We held:

Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are Filipino entrepreneurs who presumably contribute to the national economy. Apparently, they brought this appeal, believing in all good faith, although mistakenly, that they had not committed a violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise, they could simply have accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade prison term.It would best serve the ends of criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within the range of discretion allowed by '1, par. 1, the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, namely, that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

 In the subsequent case of Lim v. People, we did the same and deleted the penalty of imprisonment and merely imposed a fine for violation of B.P. 22, concluding that such would best serve the ends of criminal justice. Adopting these cases, we issued Administrative Circular No. 12-2000. On February 14, 2001, we issued Administrative Circular 13-2001 which modified Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 by stressing that the clear tenor of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. 22. 

While Vaca case is for violation of B.P. 22, we find the reasons behind the imposition of fine instead of imprisonment applicable to petitioner's case of libel. We note that this is petitioner's first offense of this nature. He never knew respondent prior to the demand letter sentby the latter to Mrs. Quingco who then sought his assistance thereto. He appealed from the decision of the RTC and the CA in his belief that he was merely exercising a civil or moral duty in writing the letter to private complainant. In fact, petitioner could have applied for probation to evade prison term but he did not do so believing that he did not commit a crime thus, he appealed his case. We believe that the State is concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the social organization against the criminal acts of destructive individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and other social ends. Consequently, we delete the prison sentence imposed on petitioner and instead impose a fine of six thousand pesos.  This is not the first time that we removed the penalty of imprisonment and imposed a fine instead in the crime of libel. In Sazon v. Court of Appeals,petitioner was convicted of libel and was meted a penalty of imprisonment and fine; and upon a petition filed with us, we affirmed the findings of libel but changed the penalty imposed to a mere fine.  WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that, in lieu of imprisonment, the penalty to be imposed upon the petitioner shall be a fine of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The award of compensatory damages is DELETED.SO ORDERED.   

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURTManila

FIRST DIVISION OGIE DIAZ,

Petitioner, 

   

-         versus-     PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondent.

G.R. No. 159787 Present:

 PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,*CORONA,AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ.

   

Promulgated: 

May 25, 2007x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N 

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: 

cralawFor our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals (Eleventh Division) dated March 15, 2002, in CA-G.R. CR No. 22545.cralawcralawOn October 16, 1992, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Manila an Information for libel against Manny Pichel and Ogie Diaz (Ogie Frias in real life), petitioner.The Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 92-1113377, reads:

cralawThat on or about December 28, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused being then the Managing Editor and writer, respectively of Bandera, a newspaper

of general circulation, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, with the malicious purpose of impeaching the integrity, honor and reputation of one FLORINDA BAGAY, and with the evident intent of exposing her to public interest, hatred, contempt, and ridicule, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously write and publish, or cause to be written and published in the movie section of said newspaper an article which reads in part as follows:

cralawIlang beses na nakaladkad ang pangalan ng isang Miss S sa buhay ni Philip Henson ang lalaking mahilig makipagsex sa asawa. Nasulat na sa ibang tabloid na limang beses diumanong ginalaw ni Philip ang babaing kine-claim na nabuntis ako ni Philip.cralawDahil sa pahayag na yon ay nagpaliwanang at nagbigay pa ng detalye si Philip. Nagpa-interbyu siya sa ilang piling reporters.cralawAt muli, babanggitin lang namin ang kanyang mga pahayag tungkol sa pagkakasangkot niya sa buhay ni Miss S.cralawInamin ni Philip na limang beses niyang ginalaw si Miss S.Pero hindi ko pinasok ang akin sa ano niya dahil siya rin ang may ayaw.cralawAng sabi niya kasi sa akin, isa siyang malinis na babae at hindi siya basta-basta nagpapaganuon. So ang ginawa namin, ipit method.cralawYung ipitin niya iyong akin sa dalawa niyang hita kunwari sa ano niya nakapasok habang nagpa-pump ako.

cralawSiya pa nga ang nagturo sa akin ng ibat ibang posisyon, e yung helicopter at saka ang galing niyang bumlow job. Sanay na sanay siya.cralawKahit itanong nyo pa kay Ray Ravelo. Nagalaw din siya ni Rey, pahayag ni Philip at kami mismo ang nakarining ng mga linyang iyon sa isa naming pag-uusap sa Jaloux Disco.

cralawIn which words and phrases, which were used by many people, the said accused meant and intended to convey as in fact, they meant and conveyed false and malicious imputations that the said Florinda Bagay is a sexual pervert and possesses lascivious and immoral habits, the accused well knowing that said imputations are devoid of truth and without foundation in fact whatsoever, highly libelous and offensive to the good name, character, and reputation of the said Florinda Bagay.cralawContrary to law.

cralawUpon being arraigned on June 8, 1993, petitioner Ogie Diaz and his co-accused Pichel, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty.After the pre-trial, the case was heard on the merits. cralawcralawFlorinda Bagay, complaining witness, testified that she is a graduate of medical secretarial course.She tried her luck in the movies under the guidance of her godmother, Mila Parawan, a writer covering the entertainment industry.Florinda adopted and used Patricia Santillan as her screen name. cralawcralawDuring her brief stint in the movies, she met Philip Henson, an aspiring bit player.A whirlwind romance between them followed and on June 16, 1988, they started living together.On March 9, 1991, she gave birth to a girl she named Maria Briana Bagay.By that time, her relationship with Philip Henson ended.

 cralawFlorinda claimed she was the Miss S alluded to in petitioners column Pakurot considering that her screen name is Patricia Santillan. cralawcralawOne Nonette Lim called her attention to the article and she felt embarrassed.Mila Parawan showed her the item.Her family and neighbors also read it.As a result, she was forced to stop her studies as a medical technology student at the United Doctors MedicalCenter.  Florinda further testified that at the time the article came out, she and Philip were no longer living together.cralawcralawMila Parawan also took the witness stand and corroborated Florindas testimony.She further testified that after Philip and Florinda parted ways, her former press relations officer, who used the nom de plume Isko Peta, wrote an item entitled Ibinulgar namin ang babaeng inanakan ni Philip Henson which appeared in the December 2, 1991 issue of Artista Magazine. Philip believed that Florinda released their story to the press.He then caused the publication of the libelous article against her.

Mila Parawan added that Florinda came from a well respected family in their community. Thus, she could not have done the acts being imputed to her.

 On cross-examination, Mila Parawan stated she was

certain the Miss S referred to in the article is Florinda because petitioner and Pichel, her good friends, told her that Miss S is her alaga (ward).

 Pichel testified that he had been a journalist covering

show business for the past 21 years. He denied having met or known the complaining witness.He also denied being the editor of Bandera.He was only its lay-out artist, a part time job.

 Petitioner Ogie Diaz admitted that while he wrote the

column Pakurot where the alleged libelous statements appeared, however, he did not know the complaining

witness or Miss S.The source of his article was Philip Henson.

 The defense also presented as witness two movie

journalists Ernie Pecho and Mario Bautista.Both had more than 50 years covering the entertainment industry.

 Pecho testified that he has never heard the screen

name Patricia Santillan; that reading the article in question would not give the reader any idea that Miss S is Patricia Santillan; and that in the movie world, the letter S refers to shabu, not to a person.

 Bautista, for his part, stated that he has never heard

of any actress or starlet named Patricia Santillan.After reading the article, it never came to his mind that Miss S is one Patricia Santillan.

 Douglas Quijano, a long-time line producer and talent

manager, testified that in his many years of managing movie and TV stars, he could not recall an actress named Miss S.He has never heard of Patricia Santillan.

 On May 12, 1998, the trial court rendered its

judgment convicting petitioner and Pichel of the crime charged.The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the above discussion and findings, the Court finds both accused Manny Pichel and Ogie Diaz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of libel, defined in Article 353 and penalized under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY as minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correcional in its Minimum and Medium Periods, as maximum and to pay a fine of P3,000.00 each.

SO ORDERED.  

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision, sustained the conviction of petitioner but acquitted Pichel.

 Petitioner timely filed a motion for reconsideration,

but it was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution dated August 29, 2003.

 Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.  The sole issue for our resolution is whether the

subject article is libelous.  Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,

provides:ART. 353. Definition of libel. A libel is a

public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice, or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.

  

This provision should be read in relation with Article 355 of the same Code which states:

ART. 355. Libel by means of writings or similar means. A libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party. Thus, for an imputation to be libelous, the following

requisites must be present: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable.Absent one of these elements, a case for libel will not prosper.

 We find the first element present. In determining

whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by the persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense.In the instant case, the article in question details the sexual activities of a certain Miss S and one Philip Henson who had a romantic liaison.In their ordinary sense, the words used cast aspersion upon the character, integrity, and reputation of Miss S.The words convey that Miss S is a sexual libertine with unusually wanton proclivities in the bedroom.In a society such as ours, where modesty is still highly prized among young ladies, the behavior attributed to Miss S by the article in question had besmirched both her character and reputation.

 As to the element of malice, we find that since on its

face the article is defamatory, there is a presumption that the offender acted with malice. In Article 354 of the same Code, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown.There is malice when the author of the imputation is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person who claims to have been defamed.We agree with the Court of Appeals that there was neither good reason nor motive why the subject article was written except to embarrass Miss S and injure her reputation.

 On the element of publication, there can be no

question that the article appeared in the December 28, 1991 issue of Bandera, a local tabloid.

 The last element of libel is that the victim is identified

or identifiable from the contents of the libelous article.In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable, although it is not necessary that the person be named.It is enough if by intrinsic reference the allusion is apparent or if the publication contains matters of

description or reference to facts and circumstances from which others reading the article may know the person alluded to, or if the latter is pointed out by extraneous circumstances so that those knowing such person could and did understand that he was the person referred to.Kunkle v. Cablenews-American and Lyons laid the rule that this requirement is complied with where a third person recognized or could identify the party vilified in the article.

 The libelous article, while referring to Miss S, does

not give a sufficient description or other indications which identify Miss S.In short, the article fails to show that Miss S and Florinda Bagay are one and the same person.

 Although the article is libelous, we find that Florinda

Bagay could not have been the person defamed therein.In Uy Tioco v. Yang Shu Wen, we held that where the requirement for an identified or identifiable victim has not been complied with, the case for libel must be dismissed.

 WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The

challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22545 is REVERSED.Petitioner Ogie Diaz is ACQUITTED of the crime of libel.The bail on appeal posted for his temporary liberty is ordered CANCELLED.

SO ORDERED.  

FIRST DIVISION NICASIO I. ALCANTARA,G.R. No. 156183cralawPetitioner,

Present:PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

cralawSANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, - v e r s u s -CORONA,

AZCUNA* andGARCIA, JJ.VICENTE C. PONCE and thePEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,cralawcralawRespondents.Promulgated:

 February 28, 2007

 x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x D E C I S I O N CORONA, J.: cralawThis is a petition for review on certiorari from a decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA). cralawIn 1997, respondent Vicente C. Ponce filed a string of criminal complaints against petitioner Nicasio I. Alcantara and his family, hereafter the Alcantaras, including one for estafa against petitioner in the Makati Prosecutors Office docketed as I.S. No. 97-39547. In essence, respondent Ponce alleged that petitioner had swindled him out of 3,000,000 shares of Floro Cement Corporation.  It was in the course of the preliminary investigation of the complaint for estafa that respondent Ponce, shortly after giving his sur-rejoinder affidavit, submitted to the investigating prosecutor a newsletter purporting to be a belated annex to the affidavit.It was prefaced with the quotation For every extraordinary fortune there is a great crime and the text:

 An example is Marcos. We need not discuss this.Second example is the Alcantaras.cralawa)Overshipment of log;b) Land grabbing;cralawc)Corruption of public office;cralawd) Corporate grabbing.

  The newsletter then went on to discuss SEC Case No. 2507 which, in the sur-rejoinder affidavit, respondent Ponce described as being the forefather of all the cases he had filed against the Alcantaras.In SEC Case No. 2507 which the Securities and Exchange Commission en banc decided against him, Ponce accused the Alcantaras of defrauding him of his shares in Iligan Cement Corporation. On December 3, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for libel against respondent Ponce with the Makati Prosecutors Office in connection with the aforesaid newsletter. He claimed that: (1)

the statements therein were defamatory; (2) respondent had circulated it in the Makati Prosecutors Office and (3) the newsletter could not be considered an annex to the sur-rejoinder because respondent had not attached it to the said affidavit but had given it thereafter.  The preliminary investigation was conducted by City Prosecutor Imelda P. Saulog. On March 17, 1998, Prosecutor Saulog issued a resolution finding probable cause for libel and recommending the filing of an information in court. Thereafter, the case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati and raffled to Judge Tranquil Salvador of Branch 63. However, respondent Ponce filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice, who reversed the City Prosecutor in a resolution dated February 28, 2000. This reversal was based on the finding that the newsletter was a privileged communication, having been submitted to the investigating prosecutor Benjamin R. Bautista as an intended annex to respondents sur-rejoinder. The Secretary of Justice thus directed the withdrawal of the information. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Petitioner elevated the matter via petition for certiorari to the CA where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 61543. In a decision dated August 29, 2002, the CA found that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion, set aside the latters resolution and directed the reinstatement of the criminal case. After unsuccessfully moving for reconsideration in the Department of Justice, respondent Ponce attempted to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 157105. However, we denied respondent Ponces motion for extension for time to file his petition as well as his subsequent motions for reconsideration.  In the meantime, however, before CA-G.R. SP No. 61543 was decided, the Office of the Makati City Prosecutor, in deference to the resolution of the Justice Secretary, filed a motion to withdraw information, which the trial court granted on September 28, 2001. The trial court ruled that the absence of the essential element of publicity precluded the commission of

the crime of libel. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the withdrawal but the trial court denied the motion in an order dated March 21, 2002.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary On June 17, 2002, petitioner filed another petition for certiorari in the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71189. In this case, the CA rendered the assailed decision. The principal question for our consideration is whether or not the CA, in its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 71189, gravely erred in finding that Judge Salvador had not committed grave abuse of discretion for granting the withdrawal of the information for libel against respondent Ponce.The crime of libel, as defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, has the following elements:

(1) imputation of a crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance;

(2) publicity or publication; (3) malice; (4) direction of such imputation at a natural or

juridical person, or even a dead person and (5) tendency to cause the dishonor, discredit or

contempt of the person defamed.  The factual antecedents are undisputed. The only issue is whether or not the controversial newsletter constituted privileged communication, which would exempt it from libel. cralawAccording to the Special Fifth Division of the CA:cralaw

cralawIt is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged. This absolute privilege remains regardless of the defamatory tenor and the presence of malice if the same are relevant, pertinent or material to the cause in hand or subject of the inquiry. The lone requirement imposed to maintain the cloak of absolute privilege is the test of relevancy. cralawIn this case, a reading of the Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit, contrary to petitioners submission, instantly shows that there was sufficient

reference to the newsletter which justified the Justice Secretary and respondent Judge in holding that private respondent actually intended the said article to be included as an annex attached to said pleading and that the same was merely omitted and belatedly submitted to Prosecutor Bautista during the preliminary investigation. Such sufficient reference is shown by the fact that the newsletter is about SEC Case No. 2507 the very same case being discussed by private respondent in pages 8 to 12 of his Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit and hence, petitioners claim that Annex F mentioned together with Annex E, both articles showing the devious maneuvering of petitioner in the said case, refers to another article. And even if the supposed Exhibit F could refer also to that article So The Public May Know, such circumstance will not exclude the subject newsletter as an intended annex to the said pleading as in fact private respondent explicitly mentioned articles without stating that there were only two (2) particular articles being referred or which of those articles caused to be published by his counsel.  cralawAs the Justice Secretary opined and which position the respondent Judge adopted, the newsletter containing the defamatory statement is relevant and pertinent to the criminal complaint for estafa then under preliminary investigation. The crime of estafa involves deceit, dishonesty and other fraudulent acts. The inclusion in the Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit of the newsletter discussing the alleged corporate grabbing by petitioner will tend to support private respondents case of estafa against petitioner insofar as such alleged corporate grabbing will highlight or manifest petitioners propensity for dishonest dealing or fraudulent machinations. There is therefore no doubt that the subject newsletter is relevant and pertinent to the criminal complaint for estafa, and hence the same comes within the protective cloak of absolutely privileged communications as to exempt private respondent from liability for libel or damages.

 cralawIn determining the issue of relevancy of statements made in judicial proceedings, courts have adopted a liberal attitude by resolving all doubts in favor of relevancy. Thus, in People vs. Aquino, our Supreme Court has emphasized that it is the rule that what is relevant or pertinent should be liberally construed to favor the writer, and the words are not to be scrutinized with microscopic intensity. The doctrine of privileged communication has a practical purpose. 

xxxcralawxxxcralawxxx cralawPublication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after it has been written, known to someone other than the person to whom it has been written. There is publication if the material is communicated to a third person. What is material is that a third person has read or heard the libelous statement, for a mans reputation is the estimate in which others hold him, not the good opinion which he has of himself. Our Supreme Court has established the rule that when a public officer, in the discharge of his or her official duties, sends a communication to another officer or to a body of officers, who have a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter of the communication, such communication does not amount to publication. Applying this rule by analogy to the present case, private respondents submission of the newsletter intended as an annex to his Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit in I.S. No. 97-39547 to Prosecutor Bautista who was then conducting the preliminary investigation in said case, does not amount to publication for the reason that the sending of such material was made specifically for the purpose of including the same as evidence in the preliminary investigation. That such submission was belatedly made does not take out the material from the absolutely privileged communication rule. Prosecutor Bautista had a legal duty to perform with respect to the subject communication, which is to

consider the same along with the other evidence submitted by private respondent as complainant in I.S. no. 97-39547, in determining the existence of probable cause for the commission of the crime of estafa and that petitioner as accused-defendant therein should be tried for such offense. Under the circumstances and in the lawful exercise of private respondents right to present evidence in support of his accusations against petitioner in the criminal complaint for estafa, We fail to see how such submission of documentary evidence omitted from the annexes to the Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit, could amount to publication that would give rise to private respondents liability for a libel charge especially when there is no proof of the alleged circulation of copies of the subject newsletter except to the City Prosecutors Office of Makati wherein I.S. No. 97-39547 was then in the preliminary investigation stage. Petitioners feeble argument that Prosecutor Bautista remains a third person because the subject newsletter was never included or formally offered as evidence, hardly convinces Us to hold that there was actual publication for purpose of finding a prima facie case for libel against the private respondent. He must be reminded that the case for estafa was still at the preliminary investigation stage and there is no requirement of a formal offer of such documentary evidence or supporting documents to establish probable cause (citations omitted).

  cralawSince the newsletter was presented during the preliminary investigation, it was vested with a privileged character. While Philippine law is silent on the question of whether the doctrine of absolute privilege extends to statements made in preliminary investigations or other proceedings preparatory to the actual trial, the U.S. case of Borg v. Boas makes a categorical declaration of the existence of such protection:

 cralawIt is hornbook learning that the actions and utterances in judicial proceedings so far as the actual participants therein are concerned and preliminary steps leading to judicial action of an

official nature have been given absolute privilege. Of particular interest are proceedings leading up to prosecutions or attempted prosecutions for crime xxx [A] written charge or information filed with the prosecutor or the court is not libelous although proved to be false and unfounded. Furthermore, the information given to a prosecutor by a private person for the purpose of initiating a prosecution is protected by the same cloak of immunity and cannot be used as a basis for an action for defamation. (Emphasis ours) 

 The ruling in Borg is persuasive in this jurisdiction. We see no reason why we should not adopt it. Furthermore, the newsletter qualified as a communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest . . . made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained [in]criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary While the doctrine of privileged communication can be abused, and its abuse can lead to great hardships, to allow libel suits to prosper strictly on this account will give rise to even greater hardships. The doctrine itself rests on public policy which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice. It is as a rule applied liberally.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The one obstacle that those pleading the defense of privileged communication must hurdle is the test of relevancy. Under this test, a matter alleged in the course of the proceedings need not be in every case material to the issues presented but should be legitimately related to the issues or be so pertinent to the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of trial.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary cralawHere, the controversial statements were made in the context of a criminal complaint against petitioner, albeit for other, separate acts involving greed and deceit, and were disclosed only to the official investigating the complaint. Liberally applying the privileged communication doctrine, these statements were still relevant to the complaint under

investigation because, like the averments therein, they also involved petitioners alleged rapacity and deceitfulness. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the September 13, 2002 decision and November 21, 2002 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71189 AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. FIRST DIVISION ANNIE FERMIN, a.k.a. G.R. No. 147977ANITA SAGACO, and AURELIO LEO KIGIS, Present:Petitioners,PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,cralawCARPIO,CORONA, - versus - AZCUNA, andcralaw LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.  HON. ANTONIO M. ESTEVES,in his capacity as Presiding Judgeof Branch 5, Regional Trial Court,Baguio City, and Promulgated:MARIANO TANENGLIAN,Respondents. March 26, 2008

 x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x   

D E C I S I O N  CARPIO, J.: 

The Case 

cralawBefore the Court is a petition for review[1] with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or the issuance of a temporary restraining order, assailing the 28 April 2000

Decision[2] and 24 April 2001 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48373.

The Antecedent Facts 

cralawOn 15 October 1986, Mariano Tanenglian (respondent) filed an action for quieting of title and damages against Anselmo Arizo, Fred Balusdan, Gregorio Carreon, Teodita Ceril, Corazon Dapnisan, Mario Dapnisan, Rogel Estrada, Aida Fermin, Marilou Fernandez, Michael Fernandez, Teofilo Fulmana, Andrew Herrero, Simeon Jastan, Rogelio (Rodolfo) Lachica, Naty Lachica, Manuel Lagartera, Juliano Landisen, Maximino Lapid, Silvestre Lorenzo, Timoteo Lubusan (Dapnisan), Helen Matale, Soledad Nabunat, Damian Peera, Eliseo Pidazo, Pablito Sacpa, Ananao Santos, Esteban Santos, Juanito Santos, and Samson Santos (Arizo, et al.). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 925-R. cralawIn a Decision[4] dated 28 June 1991, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5 (trial court) ruled: 

cralawWHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants as follows: cralaw(a) Ordering the defendants to respect and recognize plaintiffs ownership of the two (2) parcels of land in question; cralaw(b) Ordering the defendants to remove their houses/structures/constructions/improvements from the subject parcels of land and surrender the possession of the premises they are respectively occupying to the plaintiff; and cralaw(c) Ordering the defendants to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00 for and as attorneys fees plus the costs of the suit. 

SO ORDERED.[5]

 cralawOn appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts ruling in its Decision dated 18 February 1994. Arizo, et al. filed a petition for review before this Court, but it was denied in a Resolution dated 2 August 1995. This Court denied Arizo, et al.s first and second motions for reconsideration in its Resolutions dated 15 January 1996 and 4 March 1996, respectively. An Entry of Judgment was issued on 8 April 1996. cralawOn 16 December 1996, the trial court granted respondents motion for execution. In a Special Order of Demolition[6] dated 30 April 1998, the trial court ordered: 

cralawWHEREFORE, Defendants, their agents, assigns, representatives and/or successors-in-interest are hereby given a period of fifteen (15) days from notice within which to remove their improvements from the premises subject of this case. cralawThe Deputy Sheriff assigned to this Court is likewise hereby ordered to cause the demolition of all improvements which he may find within the premises immediately after the expiration of the abovesaid period with the survey report of the committee to be made as a parameter in compliance with this Order; and to simultaneously place Plaintiff in possession thereof. cralawExpenses of the demolition shall be borne by the Plaintiff. cralawSO ORDERED.[7]

 cralawThe trial court issued an Alias Writ of Execution[8] on even date.  cralawAnnie Fermin, a.k.a. Anita Sagaco, and Aurelio Leo Kigis (petitioners) filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary

restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals. They alleged that the deputy sheriff was poised to implement the Special Order of Demolition not only against Arizo, et al. but also against them. Petitioners alleged that they were deprived of their right to due process because they were never made defendants in Civil Case No. 925-R. Petitioners alleged that they entered into the possession and occupancy of the lands as members of an indigenous cultural community in the honest perception and belief that the lands formed part of their ancestral lands. Petitioners further alleged that their occupancy of the lands was not pursuant to any agreement entered into with anyone of the defendants in Civil Case No. 925-R or any of the defendants predecessors-in-interest. Further, they alleged that it was not even established that their residential structures were within the area subject of Civil Case No. 925-R. 

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals 

cralawIn its 28 April 2000 Decision, the Court of Appeals denied the petition and affirmed the Special Order of Demolition. cralawThe Court of Appeals ruled that respondents right to the subject parcels of land had already been settled with finality. The Court of Appeals ruled that had petitioners been in good faith regarding their possession of the land, they could have intervened in Civil Case No. 925-R under Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals further ruled that had petitioners been really unaware of the proceedings or aggrieved because of the damage posed by the Special Order of Demolition, they could just have apprised the trial court of their adverse claim and move for the issuance of the necessary terceria under Section 43, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals ruled that since petitioners failed to avail of these remedies or any other possible remedies in law, they could no longer prevent respondents exercise of his rights of ownership by belatedly complaining about their supposed property rights. 

cralawPetitioners filed a motion for reconsideration.  cralawIn its 24 April 2001 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion. cralawHence, the petition before this Court.  

The Issue 

cralawThe issue in this case is whether the Special Order of Demolition may be enforced against petitioners who were not party-defendants in Civil Case No. 925-R.

 The Ruling of this Court

 cralawThe petition has merit. cralawThe generally accepted principle is that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by a judgment rendered by the court.[9] Execution of a judgment can only be issued against one who is a party to the action, and not against one who, not being a party in the case, did not have his day in court.[10] Due process requires that a court decision can only bind a party to the litigation and not against one who did not have his day in court.[11] cralawIn this case, petitioners were not parties in Civil Case No. 925-R. Petitioners allegation that their possession did not arise from an agreement with the defendants or the predecessors-in-interest of the defendants in Civil Case No. 925-R remains unrebutted by respondent. The Special Order of Demolition only binds the defendants in Civil Case No. 925-R as well as their agents, assigns, representatives, or successors-in-interest. In the absence of proof that petitioners are agents, assigns, representatives, or successors-in-interest of the defendants in Civil Case No. 925-R, the Special Order of Demolition may not be enforced against them. 

cralawThe Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners could have intervened in Civil Case No. 925-R. Yet, there was no evidence that petitioners were aware of the pendency of Civil Case No. 925-R. We cannot accept respondents assertion that the pendency of Civil Case No. 925-R could not have escaped petitioners notice because it was frequently talked about in the community.  cralawThe Court of Appeals also ruled that petitioners could have availed themselves of the remedy under Section 43, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, thus: 

cralawSec. 43. Proceedings when indebtedness denied or another person claims the property. - If it appears that a person or corporation, alleged to have property of the judgment obligor or to be indebted to him, claims an interest in the property adverse to him or denies the debt, the court may authorize, by an order made to that effect, the judgment obligee to institute an action against such person or corporation for the recovery of such interest or debt, forbid a transfer or other disposition of such interest or debt within one hundred twenty (120) days from notice of the order, and may punish disobedience of such order as for contempt. Such order may be modified or vacated at any time by the court which issued it, or by the court in which the action is brought, upon such terms as may be just.

 cralawIn this case, Arizo, et al. are not judgment obligors as contemplated in Section 43, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Neither are petitioners indebted to Arizo, et al. It was not even established that petitioners are in possession of the property of Arizo, et al. In fact, petitioners alleged that it was not established that their residential structures are within the area subject of Civil Case No. 925-R. In other words, Section 43, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which would allow the judgment obligee to recover indebtedness due to the judgment obligor, does not apply in this case.

 cralawWhen the Court of Appeals referred to the remedy of terceria, it must be referring to Section 16, Rule 39, not Section 43, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,[12] which provides: 

cralawSec. 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. - If the property levied on is claimed by any person other than the judgment obligor or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves the same upon the officer making the levy and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment obligee, on demand of the officer, files a bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing the writ of execution. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond unless the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond. cralawThe officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the property, to any third-party claimant if such bond is filed. Nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property in a separate action, or prevent the judgment obligee from claiming damages in the same or separate action against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim. 

cralawThe remedy of terceria is available to a third person other than the judgment obligor or his agent who claims a property levied on. In this case, the property was not levied

on and put on auction. The implementation of the Special Order of Demolition would result in the destruction of petitioners property. Further, terceria is not a speedy and adequate remedy insofar as petitioners are concerned considering that the Special Order of Demolition ordered the Deputy Sheriff to cause the demolition of all the improvements immediately after the expiration of the 15-day period granted upon the defendants, their agents, assigns, representatives, or successors-in-interest to remove their improvements on the premises. cralawThe Court recognizes the finality of the trial courts Decision in Civil Case No. 925-R. However, petitioners are contesting whether their residential structures are within the area subject of Civil Case No. 925-R. Since petitioners are not parties to Civil Case No. 925-R, respondent has to file the proper action against petitioners to enforce his property rights within the bounds of the law and our rules.[13] Petitioners right to possession, if any, should be threshed out in a proper court proceeding. cralawWHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 28 April 2000 Decision and 24 April 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48373. We make permanent the temporary restraining order issued by this Court on 25 June 2001 enjoining the enforcement of the Special Order of Demolition dated 30 April 1998 against petitioners. cralawSO ORDERED.