Libro Ludlow

7/27/2019 Libro Ludlow

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There may also be ways o reduce hese axioms o a handful of indexical predicates, or even one. For example

'tomorrow might receive ruth conditions ikeVal(x, tomorrow ) iff x is one day after today In turn ,

'today

might be defined

by use of the indexical predicate now' .1Nor is it necessary hat this decomposition

take place n the truth conditions it might ust as well occur n thelexicon . The crucial point is that there must be at least one A-theory predicateto situate he described ituation n the speaker s egocentric pace

To llustrate let me return o the case discussed n chapter , when say I'm

glad that's over with" after a visit to the dentist . What I am glad about s that

my visit to the dentist culminated n the recent past i.e. , that t is no longer n

my present We don' t need o invoke token -reflexives or any other such devices

to get this result ; it falls out directly from the axioms ntroduced hus ar.

The two theorems hown n (3) display rather different senses and reflect semanticaknowledge of substantially ifferent character

(3)a.Val(T, [s PAST[(3e)(e s the event of my having a root canal and e culminates ])iff [][(3e)(e s the event of my having a root canal and e culminates ] [] was rue

b.

If u is an utterance at t

,of

[sPAST

[(3e

)(e is the event of

my havinga root

canal and e culminates ]], then Val(Tu ) iff (3e)(e is the event of my having a

root canal and e culminates nd e < t)

When am glad hat my visit to the dentist s over , what' m glad about s something

that has he truth conditions shown n (3a), since hose ruth conditions

effectively display he ndexical character f the described tate of affairs and

situate t in my past } I may be entirely indifferent to whether something hat

has he truth conditions shown n (3b) should obtain .

Now, it is certainly the case hat A-theory axioms ike those n (1) and (2)are "modest axioms n the sense iscussed n section 2.3 , and t is fair to ask

h th th el cidation of the axioms or these l

Chapter 798

b.Val(x, ~ ) iff x is true today

c.Val(x, tomorrow ) iff x will be true tomorrowd.

Val(x, ~ iff x is true now


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TheA -Theory Semantics

As Dumrnett 1969 has argued a semantic theory hat accounts or an agent ssemantic knowledge must show how portions of the language re earned rom

the evidence vailable o the language earner But now consider how we learnto use past-tense expressions uch as (4).

(4)Dinosaurs oamed he Earth.

We do not evaluate his sentence y imagining some ime earlier han now anddetennining whether at that ime (4) is true. Rather we evaluate 4) by right nowconducting he sort of investigation hat is appropriate or past -tense statements

like (4).

(For

example we

might study ossil records ) Likewise or anyother past-tense tatement We have certain procedures or detennining whethera past-tense proposition s true, and hese procedures o not involve he evaluation

of a proposition at some ime past rather we simply evaluate he propositionin a particular way- a way which is independent of how we evaluate

present tense and uture -tense propositionsConsider he future-tense proposition 5).

(5)

The economy will recover n the third quarterClearly we do not evaluate ucha proposition by picking some ime n the hirdquarter and detennining whether t is true at that time that the economy s recovering

. Rather we evaluate t by studying he currently available economicdata Crucially, our evaluation f (5) can proceed without our ever attending oa corresponding resent tense proposition at some uture ime ndex.

If this picture of the underlying obust heory s correct then t immediatelyleads o a second advantage or the A-

theory proposalnder discussion

in fact,a striking epistemological dvantage The B-theorist s in the untenable ositionof asserting hat here s actually eference o past and uture imes and or eventsHowever this flies in the face of everything we know about eference We arein neither a perceptual elation nor a causal elation with future events and ourcausal connection with most past events s tenuous at best. In regard o times,the idea hat there could be reference o such abstract objects surely requiresmajor adjustments o current epistemological hinking .

It is nogood

o take he standardodge

andargue hat he B

-theorist s using'reference in a loose and nonphilosophical ense Past and uture events and

times are quantified over with impunity n the B -theory ragment they serve as


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Chapter 7

metaphysical ommitment o these entities and with that commitment omes a

heavy epistemological urden hat the B-theorist simply must own up to.So ar

,I have been

alkingabout he A-

theoryand ts

advantages at a

prettyabstract evel. Perhaps t is time o go nto a ittle more detail about he semantics

A-theory semantics ftense recorrectly associated ith the work of Prior (19671968 , but Prior 's position s still widely misunderstood Ordinarily it is supposed

that Prior took 'past ,'present , and future

' to be quantifiers over past ,

present and uture imes. For

example it is

ordinarily supposedhat on Prior 's

theory PAST[S]' means hat S was rue at some ime earlier han now. But Priornever gave such a semantics or his tense ogic , nor could he. He didn

't believein future or past events He endorsed kind of presentism imilar to that discussed

in the ntroduction o this book .The source of the confusion may be that Prior never actually gave a semanticsfor his tense ogic . I will now do so, in a way hat s consistent with Priorean

metaphysics My basic strategy will be o develop semantics n which he enses

are ndexical predicates hat ake proposition like objectsas heir

argumentsIn chapter 5 we saw how the resources f event quantification and truth -

conditional semantics ould be exploited as a framework or a Reichenbachiansemantics or tense In this section we shall make use of some esources ntroduced

in chapter - namely interpreted ogical oODS. The dea will be hat ensecan be construed s a predicate hat takes l..Fs as ts arguments For examplewe can take he basic ense morphemes o have he simple axioms n (6), andwe can have he nontenninal axiom or ' sTNS S1 ]

' introduce he propositional

object (in this case an l..F) .(6)a.Val(x, rAm iff x was rueb.Val(x, :EUI iff x will be truec.Val(x, :EUI iff x will be trued.Val(T, [8TNS SI ]) iff, for some x, Val(x, TNS) and x = OSlO

100

7.2 The BasicA-Theory Semantics


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Semantics

the ensemorphemes ake lausal cope Presumably hese ense perators riginatedin S-Internal osition e.g., at nfl) and adjoined o Sat LF, so he epresentations

we willbe considering reassumed o be LF representations n thesense iscussed n appendix I .

It is sometimes rguedhat hecomplex enses allout naturally rom henestingof the primitive ense xpressionsPAST ' , 'PRES', and PUT' . For example

, it is natural o suppose hat he utureperfect ouldbe construed shavingthe syntax 7), that he pastperfectwould eceive he analysis 8), and hat hepresent erfectwould eceive he analysis 9).

(7)[sPUT sPASTS ])](8)[sPAST sPAST S]])

(9)[sPRES sPAST S])]If both he auxiliary had and he past tense morpheme ise and ake clausalscope the esult s the LF n (10.

(10[8had 8PAST 8Smith oes]]

Val(T, [881 ~ 82]) iffVal(T 81) whenVal(T, 82)b.Val(T, [881 :b~ 82]) iffVal(T 81) before al(T, 82)c.Val

(T,

[881

~82

])iffVal

(T

,81

)after

Val(T, 82)Temporal dverbs such as yesterday , are simplypredicates aking LFs asarg ments asn (12

TheA -Theory 101

(11)a.

As we will see a bit later, this proposal urns out to be inadequate It seems hatsome orm of temporal anaphora s necessary o account or genuine cases fpast perfect future perfect etc. The additional esources ecessary or temporal

anaphora will be ntroduced n chapter 8.If we ike, we can reat emporal onnectives uch as before and when dis-

quotationally as n (11).3


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In this section I will canvass some of the semantical arguments against the Atheory

semantics of tense in preparation for answering them in chapter 8. The

arguments to be considered involve some alleged problems surrounding the

nature of temporal anaphora and some alleged difficulties with the handling of

nested temporal operators .

(13Smitheftyesterday(14

[5PAST 5yesterday5Smitheaves]](15[5yesterday5PAST 5Smitheaves]]On a theory n which tenses re aken o be quantifiers the LF in (14) is interpreted

as asserting hat n the past t was rue that Smith departed n the previousday. This obviously does not yield the correct ruth conditions On the other

hand , (15) will be interpreted as saying hat yesterday t was rue that Smith

had eft - clearly not consistent with our understandingf

(13

).

The appearance f a problem here stems rom the questionable ssumptionthattense morphemes nd temporal adverbials are nested and herefore must

Chapter02

(12)a.Val(T,

~ADV(

temp) SID iff there s an x , suchthat Val(x,ADV) and x = []SI []

b.Val(x, ~esterday iff x was rue yesterday

This is just an nitial gloss of an A -theory semantics (I will flesh out the detailsin chapter 8 and n appendix T5.) Before developing he theory urther , 1

need o deal with a number of objections hat have been aised n the iteratureof semantics

7.3 Some Objections to the A-Theory Semantics

Embedded Tenses and Nested Temporal ModifiersHinrichs ( 1981 ) and Dowty ( 1982 ), considering earlier operator theories of tense

(principally that of Montague ( 1974 , observed that there are potential difficulties

with a simple sentence ike ( 13) and its two possible LFs , ( 14) and ( 15).


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TheA -TheorySemantics 103

Dowty (1982 notes it is equally plausible o suppose hat he adverb and ensemorphemes hould be sister nodes as n the following structure

S......... ......- //r"","....-.-DVTNS S6yesterdayASTmitheaves

The Apparent Need or Temporal ReferenceAt last we come o the central semantical bjection o Priorean heories of tenseIn the ntroduction we consideredhe l shown here as (17) (Partee

The axiom or this structure an be written as (16).4

(16)Val( T, sADV TNS S1 ) iff, for some ,Val(x,ADV),Val(x,TNS), and x = OS1 ]

The Unconstrained Nature of the A -TheoryAnother mportant objection o the A-theory has been hat t is "unconstrained "

meaning hat the device n Prior 's ogic of nesting emporal operators eems owildly over enerate he set of possible enses sTo see his, suppose hat he nesting

of tenses as n FUT [PAST [S]], could provide an account of the presentperfect (As we will see it doesnt even do that , but et us set his concern asidefor the moment ) If tenses an be nested n this way to generate ew complextenses then why can t we nest hem arbitrarily deep? For example why is thereno ense corresponding o PAST pAST pAST S]]]or to PAST FUT pAST S]]]?

This s of genuine oncern f we are nterested n an account f tense hat goessome way towards explaining inguistic competence It is altogether oo easyto construct heories hat overgenerate he set of possible sentences What we

would like to have s a theory that is constrained nough o generate he sentencesof our anguage nd only those sentencesUnfortunately despite he apparent nconstrained ature of the theory and

its propensity o overgenerate he possible natura1language entences the theoryappears o under enerate oo: it is allegedly unable o account or a broad

class of temporal phenomena In particular it has no apparent esources o accountfor temporal anaphora


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(17)1 urned off the stove

Clearly , (17) does not merely mean hat at some ime in the past 1 turned offthe stove. Without a doubt there have been many such episodes n my past .

According o Partee (17) is informative because here s implicit reference o(or quantification over) some specific ime or reference vent 1might equallywell have uttered I turned off the stove hen , with 'then serving as a temporalanaphor eferring o some segment f time or event n the past .

Similar considerations pply o (18) (Partee 1973 .

(18)Smith did not turn off the stove

If we think of negation and he past tense morpheme s simple sentential perators, then here are wo possible elative scopes or sentence 18):

(19)[ not [ PAST Smith urns off the stove ]]

(20)[PAST not [ Smith urns off the stove ]]

But neither of these ets he ruth conditions ight f we are utilizing the semanticswe supplied or theory A. The problem s that (19) would be given the truthconditions hat t is not the case hat [] [s Smith urns off the stove [] was rue -in other words that he has never urned off the stove (20) would be assigned hetruth conditions hat [][s t is not the case hat Smith turns off the stove [] wastrue (which could have been satisfied by any past ime when Smith refrainedfrom touching he stove. Clearly neither of these ruth conditions s what we are

after. Rather there s the sense n (18) that Smith failed to turn the stove off atsome crucial ime - for example when he eft the house his morning .

This problem seems o lie at the heart of another objection to Prioreantheories their alleged nability to account or complex enses The objectionis that , for example [ PAST [ PAST [ S ]]] simply collapses nto the simplepast . Recall hat n chapter 5 we called he minimum unit of time a

"chronon "

Then, at best , [ PAST [ S ]] is true iff S was rue at least one chronon ago. Butthen [ PAST [ PAST [ S ]]] is true iff S was true more than one chronon ago .

But this doesn t seem o capture what we intended o say by a past -perfectsentence ike 'I had eft ' .

One i htt to g t aroundhis diffic lt by talking about degrees f pastness

104 Chapter ?


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The A -Theory Semantics 105

tuition that here eally s a reference venthere- that we could very well continue'I had eft . . . ' with ' . . . when Smith arrived. How is that to be cashed ut

on a Priorean theory if there s no way to avail ourselves of temporal reference? Before we look for solutions we need o canvass ne more objection othe A-theory- this one a philosophical objection

7.4 The McTaggart Paradox: Is the A-Theory Contradictory ?

One of the earliest and most nfluential critiques of the A-theory s McTaggart s(1908 1927 .Arguing for the unreality of time, McTaggart egins with the observation

that certain pairs of properties are such hat t would be inconsistentfor one object o have both properties For example although a table can be bothround and ed, it cannot be both ound and square for roundness ndsquarenessare nconsistent roperties Likewise, according o McTaggart it would be nconsistent

for something o be both past and uture. Thus, for most cases whenwe affirm the truth of (21) we have stated something hat s inconsistent f notcontradictory 6

(21)future (cI & past(cI>But according o McTaggart his is exactly what the A-theory entails an eventE will at some point be past at some point present and at some point future}Thus, we have he conjunction 22).

(22)future( E) & past(E) & present E)The nitial reaction o this

partof the

arguments

often hat t is absurd Surelyone s not saying hat E is always uture and always past and always presentrather one s asserting hat E has been uture , that t will be past and hat it iscurrently present As intuitive as his answer may seem McTaggart 1927 argues

that t is illegitimate :

. . . what s meant y"has een and will be"?Andwhat s meant y"is," when ashereit is usedwitha emporal eaning andnotsimply or predication Whenwesay hatXhas een , weareasserting to be Y at a moment fpast ime Whenwesay hatX willbeY, weareasserting to beY at a moment f future ime Whenwesay hatX isY (inthe emporal ense f"is"), weareasserting to beY at a moment f present ime

According McTaggart s ine of analysis the problem with the t o iti


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Chapter ?06

moment of future ime, it will also hold at some ime ater han now hat X is pastat a moment of past ime. Thus , again here s a contradiction

One might ry to escape he contradiction y suggestinghat

(23

)and 24

)are

never rue simultaneously ut that (23) will be true and (24) has been rue.

(23)X is past at a moment of past ime.

(24)X is past at a moment of future time.

However McTaggart suggests hat this merely starts us upon an nfinite (and

vicious) regressBut there are other problems hat seem o stem rom the rejection of the B-

theory

The A-theory and the Myth of PassageAccording to Williams (1951 , there s a deep conceptual problem n any assumptio

that ime "passes or "flows ." Despite he natural appeal f metaphors

that make eference o "change"

change tself takes place n time . Thus , whether

one regards ime as a movement of an event along a time line or whether onethinks of the uture approaching s and lowing past us ike a river , the metaphorfails miserably

Williams ' s objection s aimed at a conception of the A-theory in which a

particular event s future , then present and hen past and n which the event s

thought of as undergoing kind of changeThis general objection was anticipated by a number of adherents o the Atheory

. Broad (1938 , for example argued hat one need not recoil from such

objections nce one gets clear on the rue nature of temporal becoming The raditionalphilosophical otion of temporal becoming s that t is a species f qualitative

change For example it might be thought hat there s a particular event

(say World War l ) that was uture , then was present and inally became astBut Broad hinks hat his is a confused way to think about emporal becoming

If temporal ecoming s reduced o qualitative hange Broad notes this changemust ake place at a certain ate (or must at least ake place n time ). And if it

takes place at a certain rate , it can hardly be maintained hat one has given a

sensible analysis of temporal becoming one has done so by appealing o thetemporal notion of change

t B d t d ' t h rom future to o t n


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becomes resent t becomes absolutely Accordingly World War n was not anevent hat was uture , then present then past ; it simply became absolutely

Whatever he merits of Broads suggestion it is clear hat the proposal as tstands oes not go ar enough - at east not ar enough o answer Williams 's concerns. If "become absolutely

"simply means pop into existence " then this

sort of becoming must also ake place n time. Initially, a thing ails to exist ; thenit comes nto existence then t ceases o exist. The problem s perhaps ot as obvious

as n the case of a fire poker which is initially hot, then warm, and hencool, but t is nevertheless problem of the same general haracter Broad mayhave something lse n mind by his use of the phrase become absolutely

" but

what t might be s difficult to see

The A-Theory Semantics 107

Prior 's Defense of the A -TheoryHere, then, is the problem The A-theory s allegedly committed o a notion ofchange n the temporal state of events Mellor (1981 p. 90) describes he commitment

as ollows:

Change for theA-theorist is basically hechanging ense A-series ocation of thingsand vents ovingrom uture opast . . . The ealityoftheclockhands movement onsistsultimatelyn theevents f itspassing he igures l ' and 2 ' becoming uccessively

present nd henpast andsimilarly or all other hanges

Clearly t will not do to introduce accounts hat tacitly appeal o change ofthis form. But what s the alternative? One possible olution s to simply maintain

that some propositions are past , some are present and some are uture ,and hat s that. When we say hat an object or an event underwent a temporalchange we are simply saying hat a proposition describing he object was uturebut s now past That s , we are saying hat he proposition has he properties wasfuture , and s past , and hat further analysis s impossible

This is essentially he proposal put forward by Prior (1968), who arguedthat or something o change s ust for it to fit the schema C).

(C)It was he case hat p , and s not now the case hat p .

Problems arise only if we slide from this schema o taking its accompanyingmetaphor eriously

"The flow of time ," Prior argued ibid., pp. 11- 12),is merelymetaphorical notonlybecause hat s meant y t isnt a genuine ovementbut urther ecause hat s meant y t isnt a genuine hange butdie orce f themetaphor

tillb h


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TheA -Theory Semantics 109

PresentismIf we follow Prior ' s solution to the A -series paradox es , what conception oftime does the above

proposalleave us with ? How

can we think about the Atheorymetaphysics once we have abandoned he notion of time as change fromfuture to present to past ? One plausible answer is that , borrowing a phrase fromDummett , we are "immersed in time " :

What he ealist would ike to do s to stand n thought outside he whole emporal rocessand describe he world from a point which has no temporal position at all , but surveysall temporal positions n a single glance from this standpoint the standpoint of thedescription which the realist wants o give- the different points of time have a relationof temporal precedence etween hemselves but no temporal elation o the

standpointof the description - i.e., they are not being considered s past present or as uture. Theantirealist takes more seriously he act hat we are mmersed n time: being so mmersedwe cannot rame any description of the world as t would appear o one who was not intime, but we can only describe t as t is, i.e. , as t is now. (Dummett 1969 p. 369)

Notice that this version of the A -theory shares a number of features with theantirealist position of Dummett . On both pictures we reject the reality of the future

and the past (construed as future and past events ). We nevertheless have anotion of temporality , albeit one that does not countenance a dynamic conception

of temporality as change . Notice also that we have come to this conclusionvia a rather different route than Dummett did. For him , the unreality of the pastfollowed from the rejection of bivalence in semantical theory .8Here we havefound our way to the conclusion in our effort to find a consistent version of theA-theory . Our path did not involve the rejection of bivalence.

All this having been said , we still have to rescue the A -theory of time . Inparticular it remains for us to show that the A -theory semantics is able to handle

temporal anaphora . We take up this issue in the next chapter .


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The main predicament or applying Priorean heories f tense o naturaI languageis that somehow neneeds o make sense ftemporal naphora ithout appealingto future and past events times , etc. Can this be done? On the face of it , thisdemand ooks mpossible or a true Priorean heory o meet The A -series approach

denies us access o past and uture events as well as o past and uturetimes. In effect , it denies us the resources hat are the building blocks of allcurrent esearch nto tense How can we have emporal anaphora o events n thefuture

and he past f there are no such events?One of my goals n this .chapter s to do the impossible - to build a semanticsof tense hat utilizes only A-series esources More specifically I shall try

to construct a semantics or tense hat satisfies he following conditions. It provides an account of temporal anaphora without reference o past andfuture events or times. It provides a way to build complex enses without the usual esources reference

events etc. ).

8.1 E -Type Temporal naphora

Basic StrategyThe basic strategy will be to treat temporal anaphors as a species of E-typetemporal anaphora The difference between hese cases ndE- type pronominalanaphora ill be hat pronominal naphors tand roxy or descriptions whereastemporal anaphors tand proxy for temporal conjunctions e.g., when-clausesthat might be extracted rom previous discourse For an example consider 1 ).

ChapterS

Temporal Anaphora withoutB -Series Resources

(1)


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ChapterS

Singular vs . General Propositions The basic idea here is that we shall wantto distinguish propositions that are about some object from general propositionsthat , strictly speaking , are not about anyone or anything .

)For example , we mightsuppose hat the utterance

'He is tall ' , accompanied by a demonstration of some

individual , would express a singular proposition about that individual . In contrast

, the utterance'No one lives forever ' , which is obviously not about anyone

, would express a general claim about the world .Other cases are disputed . Does an utterance of a sentence with a definite description

(for example , 'The tallest man in the room is tired ' ) express a singularproposition , or a general proposition ? According to Russell ( 1910 - 11), the

answer would be that it express es a general proposition - not a proposition about

some particular individual , but rather a general claim about the world (e. g .,that there is one tallest man in the room and that he is tall ) . Others have arguedthat such sentences n fact express singular propositions . How this and other

cases allout is not really important to the current discussion ; I just want to introduce

the distinction for later use.

112

Phllosophical reliminaries

Reference vs. Denotation A great deal of semantic iterature uses he terms' h f f i

Following Partee 1973 , one might hold that'then refers o a moment or period

of time ; however this is not necessary It is possible hat then is standing

proxy for a temporal conjunction For example in (2)'then could be standing

proxy for 'when left the house , or 'when you told me to ' .

(2)[s [s not [s PAST s turn off the stove [swhen . . .]]]]

Spinning out the strategy bit , the dea will be hat by having general propositionsas he bearers of tense we can avoid commitment o such B-series esourcesas imes and past and uture events Temporal anaphora an be achieved

by the ntroduction of when-clauses or, more generally temporal onjunctions ,

which express eneral propositions bout he world.If this gambit s to work,

'when cannot mean at the same ime" ; it must betaken as a kind of primitive, ust as he PAST PRES and PUT morphemes re.That is , 'when ' must be understood as being more fundamental han the B -

series onception f simultaneity ( Moreon this in a bit.)


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One useful way to understand he distinction between eferring and denoting- exploited by Evans 1982 , by Neale (1990 , and by Ludlow and Neale

(1991 - is to consider Russells theory of psychology Russell 1910 11 ) distinguishedknowledge y acquaintance rom knowledge y description arguing

that to have knowledge by acquaintance f a certain object , one must be directlyacquainted with the object . Alternatively to have knowledge by description

of a certain object one need not be acquainted ith the object; one need onlyknow the object as he unique satisfier of a certain description

On Russell s view , these wo species f knowledge are n fact quite different. A belief about some object known by acquaintance s a belief in a singular

proposition which has hat object as a constituent For example my belief thatmy neighbor ones s tall is a singular proposition having Jones s a constituentIt is a belief about Jones On the other hand I might believe hat the thief whostole my computer s tall , and he hief may even be Jones but unless know hatJones s the thief, or unless saw him stealing my computer my belief will notbe a singular proposition but rather a general proposition It will not be a beliefabout Jones or anyone else); rather the object of my belief will be a generalproposition about he world (essentially that the world is such hat there s aunique hief of my computer and hat he or she s tall).

The same oint can be extended asily o the semantics f natural anguageApplied here the question s whether here s a semantic ifference between asentence ontaining description hat uniquely determines ome ndividual e. g.,'the hird planet ) and a sentence ontaining referring expression e.g.,

'Earth ).Of course there have been mportant discussions s o whether descriptionscannot at times be referring expressions s well,2and claims o the effect hat anumber of names re n fact descriptions n disguise 3but these discussions eednot detain us here The mportant point s that genuine escriptions ndgenuinereferring expressions re wo entirely different hings . The distinction s introduced

here because t will play an mportant ole n our investigation f the woalternative models or tense On the one hand , there will be theories hat willintroduce eference o specific imes or events Obvious easons or the ntroduction

of temporal eference nclude expressions ike (3)--(5).

(3)I didnt know hat~esterday

the15th f December

Temporal Anaphora without B -Series Resources 113

(4)I leave n


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reference is compounded y he widespread ccurrence ftemporal naphoraas llusttated n (6)-{8).

(6)I didnt know hat ~ .

(7)I'll leavewhenSmithdoes(8)I left before Smithdid.

If anaphors resimply eferring xpressions theories hatprohibit emporal ef-

114 Chapter 8

(9)[Everydogt has tsjday

(10)

[Nomant hates isjdogUnbound anaphoric pronouns on the other hand are pronouns hat do not

(superficially appear o be bound variables et nevertheless ppear o get heircontent rom some antecedent oun phrase Consider 11) and (12).

(11)[A dog1 came nto the room. I~ bit me.

(12)[Some dogs1 came nto the room . TheYibarked

Evans 1977 offered several easons or supposing hat examples 11) and

On the other hand the particular version of A-theory semantics will be developingwill do without reference o future ime and events It will have o account

for what appears o be temporal eference y claiming that (3)-(5) merely appearto contain genuine eferring expressions

The problem for theories of tense hat cannot avail hemselves f temporal

erence are n a difficult position . However there s an alternative Temporalanaphors might be

"E-type ."

E-Type Anaphors One of the more hotly debated uestions n the recent iteratureof semantics as been he status f unbound anaphoric ronouns Bound

pronouns are n the scope of an operator and hey behave ike bound variablesin first-order ogic . Sentences 9) and (10) contain bound pronouns


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(14[No dogsl came nto he oom The Yibarked

Temporal naphora ithoutB-Series esources 115

bound he pronoun theYi, the truth conditions would simply come out wrong.Consider 13).

(13

)[Some x: dogs x](x came nto the room & xbarked

Notice that (13) does not have he same ruth conditions hat (12) has for (12)implies hat all the dogs barked whereas 13) merely states hat he ntersectionof the entering dogs and he barkers s nonzero

Another difficulty with the bound -variable analysis s that t asserts he possibilityof an operator s binding something outside of its scope One test for

this would be whether a quantifier ike'no x ' can bind a variable n the same

circumstances For example it is pretty clear hat the operator annot bind theco-indexed variable n (14), so one wonders why operators ike those n (13)should be exceptional n this regard

One possible alternative analysis of these anaphoric pronouns would be thatthey are actually referring expressions and that they refer to whatever object has

been raised to salience by the previous discourse. A view like this has beenproposed by Lewis ( 1979 , p . 243 ):

I may say'A cat s on the lawn ' under circumstances n which it is apparent o all parties

to the conversation hat here s some one particular at hat s responsible or the ruthof what I say and or my saying t . Perhaps am ooking out of the window , and yourightly presume hat I said what did because saw a cat ; and urther (since spoke nthe singular ) that I saw only one. What I said was an existential quantification ; hencestrictly speaking it involves no reference o any particular cat. Nevertheless t raises hesalience f the cat that made me say t . . . . Thus

althoughndefinite

descriptionsthat

is, idioms of existential quantification are not themselves eferring expressions theymay raise he salience f particular ndividuals n such a way as o pave he way for referring

expressions hat ollow.

One objection to this view , discussed in detail by Helm ( 1982 ), suggeststhat certain facts undermine Lewis ' s idea that pronouns refer to objects raisedto salience. As examples , Helm considers ( 15) and ( 16) , where # indicates

infelicity .

( 15)a.John hasa ; she s nice


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(16)a.I

droppeden marbles and ound hem all

exceptone; it must be under he

deskb.I dropped en marbles and ound only nine; #it must be under he desk

Similar examples are noted by Geach 1962 , who considers he contrast betweenpairs ike (17a and (17b , and by Evans 1977 , who notes he contrast

between 18a and (18b).

(17)a.Every man who owns a donkey beats t.b.#Every donkey owner beats t.

(18)a.John owns a donkey It is brown.

b.#John s a donkey owner It is brown.

According o Helm , (15a and (15b) are ruth -conditionally equivalent andan utterance of either would , on Lewis 's theory, result n Johns wife

's beingraised o salience Helm concludes hat he wo occurrences f the pronoun sheshould herefore be equally elicitous f salience were he relevant notion. 4

In any case it seems airly clear that the raised -to-salience picture cannotbe universally rue, since here are numerous ases n which we would want osay hat a pronoun s anaphoric n some expression et we would have no wayof identifying an object that is , we have no singular object-dependent houghtA sentence ike (19) would be a clear case of this.

(19)A man came n. & tripped over he chair.

One attractive alternative s that pronouns stand proxy for definite descriptions. The idea hat unbound anaphoric pronouns might stand proxy for definite

descriptions as been proposed y Evans 1977 , Parsons 1978 , Cooper(1979 , Davies 1981a , and Neale 1990 .5The basic dea s that the pronouni 19 t d f th d li d d fi it 20)

116 ChapterS


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The received view of these constructions s that the de re /de dicto distinctionis a reflex of a scope ambiguity with the de re reading corresponding o a

case of quantifying nto an ntensional environment and he de dicto readingcorresponding o a case of quantification within the scope of an intensionaloperator We can generalize his idea as n (22), where a OP is a determinerphrase or, if one prefers a quantified noun phrase and ej s a variable boundby the OP

(22)de e: [DP1 Operator . . . ej . .]]de dicto Operator [DP]j[. . . ej . .]]

8.2Development

ftheTheory

I beginby inttoducing what can be called"absolute ense " which is not to be


One of the key advantages f such an analysis would be that it avoids theunwelcome onclusion hat the anaphoric pronoun s either a bound variableor a referring expression More to the point , the theory allows that one mightunderstand sentence ontaining an anaphoric pronoun without there beingsome object hat is the referent of the pronoun

This is ust a surface gloss of the theory of descriptive pronouns of courseThere have been a number of important objections o it , and the theory hasbeen ubsequently eveloped n a varietyof interesting ways For now it is enoughthat we place he relevant machinery on the table so that we can explore waysin which it might be ncorporated nto the theory of temporal anaphora eveloped

later n this chapter

De Re/ De Dicto Distinction We will also need o make use of the celebratedde e/de dicto distinction Repeating ur earlier example rom Quine, a sentencelike (21) is ambiguous etween de e reading 211 and a de dicto reading 21 ).

(21)The number of planets s necessarily dd.

(21')de re: [the number of planetsi necessarily ej s odd ]

(21")de dicto: necessarily the number of planets s odd ]


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Let us take he absolute ense morphemes o be PAST PRES and PUT asthey are applied o a sentence clause in isolation. Thus we have he following

syntax or the occurrence f these morphemes basically as n Prior's scheme:

(23)Absolute resent PRESS ]Absolute ast PASTS ]Absolute uture FUT [S]

I theories as shown inuctionof the reference venttime n Reichenbachian

(24)-(26).

(24)Relative resenton Reichenbach nalysis E,R (simultaneoussyntax n his analysis [5] when . . . ]

(25)Relative aston Reichenbach nalysisERsyntax n his analysis [5] before . . . ]

(26)Relative utureon Reichenbach nalysis REsyntax n his analysis [5] after . . . ]

Complex Tenses

To get a handle on complex enses n natural anguage we need o make someconjectures bout he sbucture f tensed entences Let us begin with two working

hypotheses

(HI )

118 ChapterS

Relative Tense introduces the imnlicit when -clause. It narallel ~ the intrn -. .

All natural anguage entences ave possibly mplicit ) when-clauses

(82 )The structure f an mplicit when-clause s the same s an explicit when-clause

The basic ntuition driving ( H2 is that f we are o posit mplicit tensed lausesour theory must be as constrained s possible Ideally, we do not want to be n


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facie we should expect hem o be nternally structured ust like explicit when-clauses the principle exception being hat hey are unpronounced

If (H2) holds , we can extrapolate he structure ofimplicit

when-clausesymaking some observations bout heir explicit counterparts 1Wo observations

are particularly germane ere

(01 )All explicit when-clauses re ensed

(02 )All explicit when-clauses re coordinated with the tense of the matrix clause

Toillustrate (01 ), we would never ind an explicit construction of the form

'Ileft the room when John o be hungry

' . When-clauses are never nfinitival (atleast n English ). To llustrate (02 ), for example we don

' t find an English sentencelike 'I will have eft the room when John had arrived . The lead tenses

('will ' and had ) fail to match n this caseBy (H2), it follows that implicit when -clauses will have hese properties

too. Accordingly the ogical orm of these onstructions at a certain evel of abstraction) will be as ollows:

Pluperfecton Reichenbach nalysisERSLF on A -theory analysis PAST S] before PAST. . . ]

Future perfecton Reichenbach nalysisS - E- RLF on A -theory analysis FUT[S] before FUT[. . . ]

Future n future

on Reichenbach nalysisS - RELF on A -theory analysis FUT[S] after FUT[. . . ]

Future n paston Reichenbach nalysis RE - S or R - SE orLF on A -theory analysis PAST [S] when PAST [. . . ]

By (H 1) it should ollow that past present and uture enses n natural anguagedo not consist merely of the simple PAST PRES and FUT morphemes ut should

be more complex constructionsPast

R i h b h



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Presenton Reichenbach nalysisS ,E,R

LF on A-theory : PRESS ] whenas PRES. . . ]

Futureon Reichenbach nalysisS - E,RLF on A-theory : FUT [S] when FUT[. . . ]

The T theory axioms or the absolute enses re he following :

The axiom or the ense hrase s as ollows

(TP)Val

(T [TP

NSS], 0

)iff, for some ,

Val(x, TNS 0) andx = []S[]The semantics f the emporal onnectives reas ollows ?:

( WI)Val(T, [8TPI ~ TP2 , 0) iffVal(T TPl , 0) whenVal(T, TP2 0)

( W2Val(T, ~ TPI before P2 , 0) iffVal(T TPl , 0) beforeVal(T, TP2 0)

( W3Val(T, [8TPI ~ TP2 , 0) iffVal(T, TPl , 0) afterVal (T TP2 0)

Example'I hadeaten is true ff [][(3e)(eating e) & agent le )][] was rue before[] [ . . . ] [] was rue

Finally we will want o incorporate theory faspect nto he broader heory. 1have o quarrelwith alk about vents 1ammerely oncerned hatevents

notbe he bearers f tense Eventsmaywell be he bearers faspectual roperties(although ater we will see hat here re easons or avoiding his view).

Ineventbased hesosemantics see e Parsons 991Higgi b th

120 ChapterS

(Tl)Valx, PAST 0) iff xwas rue

(T2)Valx , PRES 0) iff xis rue

(T3)Valx , FUT 0) iff x will be rue


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(27)A man kicked Bill .

(28

)(3e) (kicking(e) & [an x : man x]agent x, e) & patient (Bill, e) & past(e

Clearly this analysis presents roblems or the A -theorist , since t argues hatthere s an event which is past Is there some way to avoid his consequence fthe ntroduction of events?

Recall he discussion f the de dicto/de re distinction earlier n this chapterEvent descriptions will be nnocuous o ong as hey remain safely within thescope of TNS. The situation s parallel o that of modals Depending upon the

relative scope f an existential uantifier and he modal, we might ind ourselvescommitted o some unwelcome ntities Consider 29).

(29)A unicorn may have eaten my vegetablesOn the nnocent nterpretation f this example the existential uantifier emainssafely within the scope of the modal , as n (30).

(30)possibly (3x)(x is a unicorn & x ate my vegetables ]

In the problematic ase illustrated n (31), the existential quantifier akes widescope over he modal ; the result s an onto logical commitment o unicorns

atp

Temporal Anaphora without B-Series Resources

(31)(3x: x is a unicom possiblyx my vegetables ]

(33)

Similar considerations pply o the ntroduction of quantification over eventsin cases ike (27). The nnocent ase inds the event

quantification safelywithin

the scope of the past-tense operator

(32)PAST[(3e) (kicking(e) & [an x: man x ]agent x, e) & patient(Bill, e ]The case o be avoided (for the Priorean ) is (28 ), where the event quantifier has

scope outside of the temporal operator . However , so long as we exercise care ,we can safely incorporate most of standard aspectual theories. Some modifica -

tions are necessary however. Consider the following possible properties of events(Parsons 1991 ):


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122 ChapterS

(34)CUL(e,t): e culminates at t

Can we get id of the ime eferences ere? Easily Suppose e adopt 35)and 36 ). (The PROG elation s actually edundant n the event emantics sedhere and we willnot need t in the ollowinganalyses)

(35)PROGe): e n progress

(36)CUL(e : e culminates

We hen ave vailableheanalyses 37)-(42), where hePRES nd PROGmorphemeare omitted s edundant n these articular nalyses

(37)Smith s drawing circle(3e)(drawinge) & agent Smith e) & theme circle e when . . . ]

(38)Smithwasdrawing circle

PAST (3e( drawinge) & agent Smith e) & themecircle e ] whenPAST . . .](39)Smithdrewa circlePAST (3e)(drawinge) & agent Smith e) & themecircle e) & CUL(e ]whenPAST . . . ]

(40)Smithhadbeen rawing circle

PAST (3e( drawinge) &agent Smith e) &themecircle e ]before AST. . . ](41)Smithhad drawn circlePAST (3e)(drawinge) & agent Smith e) & themecircle e) & CUL(e ]beforePAST. . . ]]

(42)Smithwill have rawn circleFUT

[(3e)( drawinge)

&agent

Smith e)

& themecircle e)

& CUL(e

]before UT [. . . ]]Notice rom he l n (39) (41) and42 ) thatwedontneed o inktheculminatio


132/252

Aktionsarten can be incorporated n the usual ways . States achievementsaccomplishments and actions an be distinguished y nternal redicates f eventsFor example we can ntroduce HOW (e)

" for states If states re distinct romthe progressive we can distinguish PROGe )" from "HOLD(e)." Actions willadmit CUL( e)," achievement erbs ike 'win' will have RESULT e)," and so on.

There are, however some easons or supposing hat aspect houldbe reatednot as a predicate f events but rather as a predicate f proposition like objectsChief among hese s the mperfective paradox which was discussed riefly inchapter 5. Consider 43).

(43)

John s drawing a circle.The "paradox

is that on the event semantics ust given there will be an existentialquantification over circles (There s a circle x , such hat John s drawing

x), yet (43) can be b11e ven f there s no circle (say if John s run overby ab11ckafter he completes nly a 15- degree rc). Unless we are prepared o follow Parsons(1991 and ntroduce "incomplete objects

" our event semantics will give incorrectb11th onditions or certain utterances f (43).

Notice that a tenselike analysis of the progressive ctually can oil the mperfectiveparadox If I take ense o be a property of sentences r of proposition

-like entities the analysis f (43) may un as shown n (43' ), and he semantics

of PROG may be given by the axiom (43*).

(43')PROGJohn draws a circle ]

(43*)Val(x, PROG iff x is in the process f becoming b11e

Thus, if we go this route , (43') is b11e ff 'John draws a circle ' is in the processof becoming b11e The existential quantifier emains burled safely n the scopeof the PROG operator

Recall hat one of the central objections o a Priorean semantics f tense sthat it is unconstrained If complex tenses are derived by nesting ense morphemes

, then there s potentially no limit to the number of possible ensesThat objection certainly doesnt apply to this version of a Priorean semanticsfor the

simpleeason hat ense

morphemesrent nested at all!

The esult s a highly constrained iew of possible enses based pon he possiblecombinations f PAST PUT, and he emporal onnectives ( Here assume



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Chapter 8

conj -clause conjunction

PAST PAST when PastFUT FUT when FuturePAST PAST before Past PerfectFUT FUT before Future PerfectPAST PAST after Future n PastFUT FUT after Future n Future

The picture s going to be a bit richer than this , since everything urns on theavailable onstructions n the system of explicit temporal conjunctions For example

, are here some ases where matrix and when-clause enses an be mixed(say to get uture shifted eading of Future n the Past ? t all depends n whetherthe explicit system f temporal onjunctions will also allow us such mixing . Forexample do we have he following paradigm ?

matrix conj-clause conjunction tense

PAST FUT after Future n Past

e.g

.: 'John waseaving

after heparty

next week

It is arguable hat this case s really talking about a past ntention of John s(that he was ntending o leave after he party next week ), but whatever s goingon in the explicit case that s essentially what accounts or the apparent utureshifted eading of

'John was eaving .The tense system merely recapitulates he structures made available by the

system fexplicit emporal onjunctions and nherits he constraints n hat system. That , in effect , is what constrains he tense system on this theory

Temporal Adverbs AgainIf there are going to be difficulties in executing his version of a A-theory semantics

, they are doubtless oing to come n the analysis of temporal adverbsMatters begin easily enough As noted above temporal adverbs ike

'yester -

day' and tomorrow can be reated isquotationally At worst , we might run nto

a proliferation of such adverbs and here might be some concern about a finiteaxiomatization or them - but these worries stem rom adverbs ike 'three daysago and four days ago , and t is pretty clear hat we can come up with waysof decomposing hese without slipping nto talk of B -series elations 8

O h h d b " h d

124

matrix tense


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The ellipsed part of the clause could indicate some onn of conventional datingsystem such as

"standard alendar ystems ndicate. . . ."

Similar considerations pply o 'before and after with NP complements asin (47).


(46)The ast class s when .. . July4, 1995 .

indexical or not , and whether we think we can display ts sense r not , somewould say hat t still refers o a day. That s , it refers o a time in the past , andhence the argument would go) we do not escape he need or the B -

theoryconception

of the past .The flaw in this objection s that it simply begs he critical question by assuming

that 'yesterday ,' tomorrow ' , etc. refer to days (or to anything else).

On the heory being developed ere these adverbs re reated as predicates i.e. ,with axioms ikeVal (x, ):esterda :) iff x was rue yesterday or, alternatively oneday ago ), and not axioms ike Val(x, ):esterday iff x = yesterday . On the assumptions

made explicit in section 2.6 , predicates re not referring expressionson this theory

If this is right , a similar sort of disquotational reatment hould be availablefor the other emporal adverbs swell. For example we might ntroduce axiomslike those n (44).

(44)Val(x, ~ ~ ) iff x is always rueVal(x, n~ iff x is never rue

Now t might be argued hat, even f it is plausible o treat yesterday and al -

ways as predicates it is suspicious o try and reat "locating adverbials in thesame way, for they surely directly refer o specific dates Following he exposition

by Kamp and Reyle 1994 , let us consider omeof these ases beginningwith calendar ames as n (45).

(45)The ast class s July 4, 1995

Is it really possible o avoid reference o times n this case? I fail to see whynot. Following the assumptions et out above this sentence must have an mplicit

when-clause hence it is natural o suppose hat he date tself is merely aconstituent f that clause


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Chapter 8

Examples uch s 47 ) too are simplycases f partiallyellipsed emporal onjunctio.

(48)The ast classwillbe before . . . July 5].

Accordingly it seems hat emporal dverbs even ocating adverbials neednotbe egarded s efening xpressions ndhence eed ot pose onceptual ifficultie

for the A-theoryWe mightwish o treat he standard -theory redicates before and after

as composed utof more basicA-series elations The dea here wouldbe hata sentence ike (49) wouldhave a

ogicalorm n which before is treated s

composed f a past tensemorpheme nda simplewhen clause s n (50).

(49)TNS[SI] before NS[S2

(50)[sTNS[PAST SI] when S2 ]]Notice hat he original ense morphemes renow construed sa single morpheme

that akes cope ver he entire onjunction (The second xplicitmorphememightbe construed sa kind of scopemarker or tense )This s a ittle bit abstract so consider he ogical orm hat wouldbe given

for the sentences I ate before left the house , and I will eat before leave hehouse :

(51)[sPAST[pASTthere s an eating y me when there s a eaving f the houseby me ]]

(52)[sFUT pASTthere s an eating yme when there s a eaving f the houseby me llNotice hat his storydoesn t introduce ested enses since he outer ense pplies

to the conjunction nd he nner oneapplies nly o the irst conjunctThe analysis or 'after wouldbe analogous A sentence aving he surface

form(53) wouldhave he ogical orm (54).

(53)TNS[SI] afterT N SS2

126


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One difficulty for this general strategy s going to be handling emporal adverbslike 'seldom or 'often in terms of 'past ,

'present , and future . Technical

difficulties begin o emerge with predicates ike 'since , which has he followingtwo senses

case 1I've been n England since January 1 (been here continuously .

case 2I've been n (to) England since January 1 (been here once or more).

If we attempt a reductive strategy then since January'might be part of a restricted

substitutional uantifier over when-clauses (See section 4.3 for a discussionof substitutional uantification )

The gloss or case 1 might be as n (55), the gloss or case 2 as n (56).

(55)(For all S, sit. 'PAST['

- ' S-" after January 1 . . J]' is T ) 'I've been n England

when - ' S is T

(56)(For some S, sit. 'PAST['

- ' S-" afterJanuary

1 . .]]

' is T)

'I've been nEngland when - ' S is T

So far so good, but when we move o adverbs of temporal quantification , wesoon un into difficulties. Consider 57)-(58), for example

(57)We go to London often.

One might suppose hat these cases certainly 58 finally force us nto the ntroductionof past and uture imes ; we say

"six times ," after all. But if we wereto look at translations f (58) into other anguages the quick acceptance f timeswould certainly seem premature consider Italian , in which one would say"sei volte " (six turns).

Still, secondorder emporal adverbs o raise nteresting ssues Note that n(57') and (58') it is not sufficient o quantify directly over when-clauses


(58)

Weve been o London ix imes

(57')(For many S)

'we go to London when - S is T


137/252

As was mentioned n note 14 o chapter 4, substitutional uantification breaksdown in these cases there can be many when -clauses hat describe a single

visit to London.But we do need some way of talking about times ," even f we don ' t want otake them as being points of time in the sense of the B -series metaphysicsOnce again it turns out that we can solve he problem with off -the-shelf philo-sophical esources Following a general strategy or substitutional quantification

sketched n Ludlow 1985 we can go second order and build times out ofwhen-clauses as n (59).

(59)In a given context c, for each clauseS tense morpheme ns, there s a unique"time" t, St. t = {Si: tns

- ' ['- S- '] when

- tns- ' ['- Si- ' ]' is T }

Intuitively, then, times are derivative of our primitive notion of when. We saythat A and B happen t the same ime because e know that A happens when Bhappens Further anything hat happens when B happens lso must, ipso acto ,happen at the same time

" that A happensFurther constraints re necessary since he when -clause must uniquely specifywhen

something appenedFor

example it

mightbe rue hat went o London

when had a headache but 'I had a headache cannot be a relevant substitutioninstance So apparently we end up with (591.

(59')In a given context c, for each clauseS tense morpheme ns, there s a unique"time " t, St. t = {Si: tns

- ' ['- S- '] when

- tns- ' ['- Si- ' ]' is T , and

tns- ' ['- Si- '] only when

- tns- ' [' S- ']' is true }

This allows he extension of t to include "anchoring clauses ike "when celebrated

my eighteenth irthday " but not "when had one of my many headaches "Notice he contextual ariable here This s crucial , since what counts as happening

"at the same ime" depends pon our nterests We might mean he sameday, we might mean he same nanosecond or we might mean during the briefhistory of the human species

Given his revised notion of times as sets of when-clauses we can now returnto the non -first-order emporal adverbs nd reat hem as n (5T

') and (58").9

(57")

For many , there s an S , Set , St.'we go to London when

- S is T"

128 Chapter 8


138/252

Thus, when we say hat we have been o London six times we are not saying hatour trips feU on six distinct time points (that wouldn 't work in any case a single

tripcould

overlap six time points), nor are we talking about six events Weare alking about six non-overlapping ventdescriptions Thus , I might characterizethe six times have been o London as being when came o talk at Kings,

when came on my Nth birthday and so on.


8.3 More on E-Type Temporal Anaphora

Although Partee 1984 observed number of similarities between emporal and

nominal anaphora she ailed to note one class of similarities: temporal constructionsthat mirror Evans s example John owns some sheep ndFrank shears

them. ' The temporal analogues re as shown n (60).

(60)Jack goes up the hill sometimes nd hen he comes umbling down with Jill.The traditional analyses f anaphora ail here. If temporal anaphora works asbound variable anaphora oes then we have something ike (60').

(60')

(sometimes )[Jack goes up the hill at t and he comes umbling down with Jillat t ]

But that doesn t get he ruth conditions of (60) right, since t doesn t specify hateach ime he goes up he comes umbling down. Likewise it doesn t work to suppose

that each of these clauses has an independent emporal quantifier . Thatmerely gets us o (60").

(60")(sometimes )[Jack goes up the hill at t] and (sometimes )[he comes umbling

down with Jill at t ]

Of course this doesn t get the truth conditions ight either What stands ut inthis instance s the fact that E -type temporal anaphora seems o work quitesmoothly here 1:

(60*)

(sometimes

)[Jack

goes up the hill at t ] and he comes umbling down withJill (after he goes up the hill )]

Of course it is also ibl o h t t t f


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Hinrichs (1981 1986 and by Kamp and Reyle (1993 . This is not the place o

open up a debate about he relative merits of E- type anaphora nd DRT (someof this debate s taken

upin Ludlow 1994 ), much ess about he extension of

those heories o temporal anaphora This is not a book about anaphora my interestin temporal anaphora ere s philosophical and t turns on precisely one

concern that the A-theory needs o avoid emporal eference E -type anaphorspresent ne possible and workable way of meeting hat need There may wellbe other solutions and t may be hat some of those solutions will employ DRTresources or, perhaps the dynamic emantics f Groenendijk ndStokhof 1991and Chierchia 1995 . At present however the philosophical ontent of thosetheories s

cloudyon this ssue If such

approaches can

helpus to avoid

emporalreference in the echnical sense f 'reference I am using here), I have no objectionto them .

8.4 Further Issues

Temporal Anaphora in NominalsIn section 5.2 I discussed n observation due o En~, that nominals often seemto have an implicit temporal eference of their own- possibly quite independently

of the "temporal eference of the sentence sa whole . The example rom

that discussion s repeated ere as (61).(61)The hostages ame o the White House

There is an intuitive sense n which we wish the NP to pick out some imeframe hat s ndependent f the visit to the White House- intuitively the hostagesat a certain ime and place say the hostages aken rom the US Embassy uring

the Iranian evolution).It is sometimes

upposedhat these sorts of cases

resentdifficulties for Atheory

semantics presumably ecause hey provide additional evidence f theneed or temporal eference As we have seen however armed with E-type emporal

Chapter 830

In chapter 5, two of the more interesting extensions of the B-theory involved the

incorporation of temporal"reference " in norninals and the phenomenon of sequence

of tense . In this sectionI will show how these

phenomenacan be handled

on the A -theory . I will then return to the philosophical objection raised by

McTaggart and discussed n section 7.4 above.


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Anaphora without

Sequence f TenseAs was discussed n section .2, sequence f tense nvolves ases ike (62), whereBiff 's llness may have occurred simultaneously ith Mary

's report or may haveoccurred at some ime previous o the report .

(62)Mary said hat Biff was ll .

Higginbotham 1995 argued hat he shifted eading was he core case and hatthe unshifted eading nvolved he llusion of past ense n the complement lauseIn Higginbotham s words, "the appearance f the past ense n a complementclause can be an appearance erely; cross reference akes place as n the firstcase but the tense of the complement s present not past .

"

Clearly he same olution s available o the A-theorist but ust as clearly hereis something nsatisfactory bout t. If there s no past tense morphology n thesecomplement lauses why does t sound as f there s? More urgently what arethe mechanisms y which we get llusory

pastense n these ases?

If this approach s unattractive there are other solutions available with the Atheoryframework For example the

"independent

theories of SOT discussed

Temporal B-Series Resources 131

Just as he B-theory had o be augmented we must say something more aboutthe A-theory f we are o account or the temporal character of certain nominals

.Clearly

he when-clauses hat we have ntroduced hus ar will not do thejob , since hey are merely describing properties f the matrix event in the case

of (61), the visit to the White House . What can be said about emporal anaphorain NPs?

One attractive possibility would be to develop he dea , suggested y Bachand Cooper 1978 , that there can be mplicit relative clauses n NPs. For example

, in the case of (61) there would be an mplicit relative clause with the possiblecontent ndicated n (61').

(61')[NPNP he hostages [s (who were captured n the US Embassy uring heIranian evolution)]] came o the White House

The content of the relative clause would be extracted rom previous discourse rfrom shared background nformation n a manner analogous o the treatmentof E-type pronouns In sum, we can again avoid he move o temporal eference

if we are prepared o accept certain degree f abstract yntacticStruCture12


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132 Chapter 8

(63 )[s Mary said that So iff was ill (when ) [ . . . ]] when [. . . ] ]

Focusing our attention on the internal complement clause , we know (following02 above ) that the principal constraint on when -clauses s that their lead tensesmatch those of the clauses with which they are conjoined . Hence , in the above

example , we know that the when -clause paired with'Biff was ill ' must be past

tense. But that is the only constraint . The clause might have a content like' 'as

Mary was speaking"

(giving us the unshifted reading ), or it might have a contentlike "when she visited him last week " (giving us the shifted reading ). In each

case , the content of the when -clause is going to be extracted from previous discourseor

from some form of common knowledge ) in fundamentally the sameway that the content of E-type pronouns are reconstructed .

If this picture is right , then it is a mistake to think of tense being"shifted " or

of there being a"

sequence" of tense at all . Rather , what is happening is that ,

depending on how the implicit clause is reconstructed , the described situation

may be cotemporaneous with any described past -tense situation . It might be

cotemporaneous with the described event of the matrix clause (Mary's speaking

), or it might be cotemporaneous with any other contextually salient past -

tense event description (e .g ., when Mary saw Biff last week, or when Biff missedhis meeting with Napoleon , or whenever ). Interestingly , this parallels the last

(and in my view the most promising ) of the B-theory solutions that we lookedat: simply letting R pick up any past - or future -tense event.

13

In sum , the extensions to the B-theory that we looked at in section 5 .2 have

analogous extensions in the A -theory . Importantly , the extensions are possiblewithout the appeal to temporal reference , and hence there is no conceptual costto the basic A-theory program . Other extensions will proceed in like manner.

Whereas the B-theory appeals to temporal reference , the A -theory looks forimplicit clausal structure to carry the E-type temporal anaphora . Whether this

strategy can be carried out is an open empirical issue ; perhaps the positing ofthis implicit clausal structure will collide with general principles of linguistic

theory .14But notice how striking it is that every construction for which researchers

are inclined to posit temporal reference happens also to be a construction for

which an implicit -clause story seems plausible . Indeed , it is even more strikingthat the case for temporal reference routinely involves some sort of explanation

that relies upon the requisite clausal structure to identify the supposed referent(e. g .,

"hostages who were captured in the US Embassy during the Iranian

" hi i l h f i l d ll


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Temporal Anaphora

As was noted n chapter 4, reference oes not come or free . The epistemological burden nvolved n positing reference n these cases s great , and seeno efforts n the literature o take

responsibilityor that burden The

positingof implicit clauses nvolves a burden of its own , and t will have o be shouldered. But at least we have a model for how implicit clauses an be incorporatedinto current linguistic theory . SCan the same be said for the liberal

postulation of reference?

8.5 McTaggart Revisited

[]S[] will be ruewhen ] [. .. ] [] will be rue

Similar onsiderationspply

o 66),whichwill havehe ruth onditionshown

in(66*).

(66)

without B-Series Resources 133

(65*)

Having equippedourselves with a better

understanding f the revised Atheory, let us now return o McTaggart s original objection o the A-theory Mellor(1981 has claimed hat Prior 's answer discussed n section 7.4 above fails toescape he vicious egress But does t really ail? Generating he regress equiresthat we be able o move rom (64) to saying hat here s a time at which x is future

and hat there s a time at which x is past (thus delivering the contradiction: x is future and x is past).

(64)

x was uture and will be pastPrior 's response was hat we need not have made his step but we are now n aposition o make an even stronger esponse We don

't need o avoid he step Ina certain sense we could not make he step f we wanted o!

Here s the dea. (65) is shorthand or an LF representation f the orm givenin (65').

(65)

FUT[S](65')FUT[S] when FUT[. . . ]

But then he semantics elivers he following truth conditions or (65'):


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(66*)[]S[] was rue when ] [. . . ] [] was rue

We can never get o the point where we have a conjunction of two conflicting Atheorytensed laims. Clearly (65*) and (66*) are not incompatible since hewhen-clauses will have different contents

To illustrate take a proposition ike

[] [(3e) e is the dying of Queen Anne] [].

That proposition was uture and s now past but we cant overlook he temporalanaphora There s an mplicit when-clause so hat what we actually have s

that heproposition

was uture(say

whenQueen

Anne was born)

and t ispast(say as write these words). There s not even he llusion of a contradiction f

we remember o include he temporal anaphoraThe reason or the failure of the McTaggart argument here s not one usually

given, and I believe t is not one anticipated by Mellor . The claim is notmerely hat the B -theorist has attempted o strip away he tense rom (63) and(64). The B-theorist must also strip away he emporal anaphora rom these onstructions

. But, by hypothesis all tensed entences ave mplicit when-clauses

which serve o do the work of temporal naphora But f (63) and 64 ) come completewith when -clauses then hey cant possibly contradict each other unlessthose when-clauses ave he same ontent But they don

' t.Nor will it help o attempt o take his to a metalevel - for example by suggesting

that a given set of A-theory ruth conditions ike (66*) is future at sometime, present at some ime , and past at some ime. If we try to formalize suchclaims, as n (67) and (68), we disguise he actual structure of such claims.

(67)(66*) is PAST

(68)(66*) is FUT

Spelled out properly according o the heory developed n this chapter the ruthconditions of (67) will be as n (67*).

(67*)(66*) was rue when [. . . ] was rue

The B-theorist can ace along his path ndefinitely ooking for a contradictionbut nolevelof embedding s going o generate contradiction

134 Chapter 8


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This is the sense n which the theory developed ere s stronger han Prior 'swith respect o the McTaggart argument Prior had no recourse o temporalanaphora and hence he had o allow that at every other

stepn the

McTaggartargument here was an apparent ontradiction This gave he mpression hatPrior had o keep moving up a level to escape hese contradictions and hencethat he was orced nto an nfinite regress Though am not convinced hat hiswas a genuine egress the entire question s now rendered moot. The contradictionis

never generated The McTaggart argument ails.

Temporal Anaphora without B-Series Resources 135


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As should be evident rom the previous wo chapters I think the preponderanceof evidence eans n favor of an A-theory semantics f tense I hope t is also clearthat I consider his semantical vidence o support he A -theory conception oftime. In this chapter want o broaden he nvestigation omewhat y taking upthe question of whether evidence rom psycholinguistics r even rom phenomenology anchange he verdict However there are a ot of arguments n he ableand perhaps t is time to try and put them ogether n a single package

Let us review some of the reasons or favoring a A -theory conception oftime and ense First, we have good reasons o suppose hat there s a close ifnot isomorphic relation between he semantics f tense and he metaphysicsof time. As I rhetorically asked n previous chapters what makes somethingthe semantics f "tense if not that t has some eflex n the temporal characterof the external world? Moreover appeals o the psychology of time consciousness

only delay he nevitable onnection etween ense nd ime. Mter all , whatmakes something time

" consciousness f not some connection between hose

mental states nd emporal eality?What can we conclude about he semantics f tense? As we earned n chapter6, the B -theorist s going to have profound difficulties n accounting or the

indexical character f temporal discourse Moreover there are eally only threeoptions or the B -theorist n this matter. The B -theorist can follow a token-reflexive strategy n which the utteranceevent tself makes t into the content of a tensed utterance thought But, as wesaw n chapter 6, that packs oo much nformation into the biconditionals ofthe T -theory and we soon collide with the problem of utterances ike 'there sno spoken anguage .

Chapter 9

Broadening the Investigation


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Chapter

9.1 Psycholinguistic onsiderations

In section 2.4 we considered suggestion rom Evans 1985b that support orone of two competing semantic heories might be found by appealing o psychologic

evidence In particular we considered he possibility that evidence

for a particular semantic heory might be found n facts about anguage cquisitionand n facts about acquired anguage eficits. In this section I will look

di d ill h

138

. The B -theorist can disquotationally ntroduce he ndexical predicates nto theaxioms of the T-theory But this amounts o becoming an A -theorist

It seems o me that all the extant objections o the A -theory semantics anbe dealt with. Insofar as hose objections urn on temporal anaphora this doesnot orce us o accept heory of temporal eference to the contrary we can havea theory of E-type temporal anaphora Not only does such a theory appear ocover he facts ; it also allows us to skirt some otherwise embarrassing symmetries

between emporal eference nd ordinary efer~nce (for example it allowsus to avoid reference o times or events with which we have no causal

connection ).

Thus , the A-theory semantics has epistemological advantages as well as whatI would argue to be an empirical advantage (namely , its ability to adequatelyhandle the facts about temporal indexicals ). But what if we throw out temporalindexicals ? This is a funny bit of evidence to throw out , since by some lightsthese facts constitute the very core of the temporal phenomena that we want toaccount for. Furthermore , if I am right , the temporal morphemes PAST and FUTare themselves ndexical predicates , so ignoring indexicality amounts to ignoring

the phenomenon of tense tout court . For the sake of argument , however , let

us say that these facts can be ignored . Also for the sake of argument , let us dismisswhatever purchase epistemological arguments may have. (Never mind

the fact that epistemological concerns led to the invention of Russellian descriptionsand E-type pronouns in the first place .)

If we throw out all the evidence adduced so far on behalf of the A -theory , dowe get a stalemate ? Or is there further evidence that weighs in favor of one position

over the other ? As it turns out , even if we decide to ignore temporal in-

dexicals and epistemological considerations , there remains some very suggestive

psycholinguistic research hat supports he A-theory semantics developed n thisbook.


147/252

Investigation

What psychological questions will be decisive n adjudicating between healternative emantic heories or tense? Intuitively, we will be nterested nquestions

that detennine whether heanguage

f the B -theory or the anguage f theA-theory s more undamental For example according o the B-theory the semantics

given or the PAST PRES and PUT tense morphemes resuppose nunderstanding f the before after (earlier thanlater -than) relation. Alternativelythe semantics or the A-theory might give he semantics or 'before and after 'in terms of the predicates past ,

'present ,

'future , and he relational predicate'when. If it could be shown hat knowledge fone set of these elations mergedsignificantly before he other we would have strong evidence or the semantic

theoryhat akes

hose elations as primitive .Evidence also might be found n the study of acquired anguage eficits. Aslinguistic abilities erode do we lose he ability to understand asic ense morphemes

first, or do we ose he ability to understand erms ike 'before and afterfirst, or do these abilities always degrade ogether? If one ability degrades arlier

, that may suggest hat hat ability was not he more undamental th'([t it mayhave been a higher level inguistic ability requiring he knowledge fother moreprimitive linguistic abilities.

As it turns out , there has been extensive psycholinguistic esearch on theacquisition of temporal anguage and a number of the studies are suggestiveHowever for the most part , the psychological studies have not been designedto answer he kinds of questions hat exercise s here and hence not aU of themcan help us choose between our two semantic heories This is not a criticismof the psychological esearch The focus of research s inevitably ied to the nterests

of the field, and here s no reason hat these nterests should be in theultimate outcome of linguistic or metaphysical ebates

Still, some of the esearch as been ery suggestive For example a great dealof research as gone nto the nvestigation f our irst question whether nowledgeof the meaning of

'before and after emerges imultaneous ith or afterour knowledge meaning of

'past ,

'present , and future ' . Here the evidence

seems o suggest hat he child's ability o comprehend before and after emerges

significantly ater. Indeed the acquisition of simple enses merges uite early(by age 2), and, as Clark (1973 reports as a lower limit children do not learnthe relational emporal erms before

and after until age of5 !3

This order of progression s nicely llustrated by Weist (1986 , who specificallytracks he development f temporal anguage using the event-based esourcesof Reichenbachs theory According o Weist children move h h a

Broadening he 139


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149/252

There are also narrower questions o be nvestigated The A -theory of tenseas developed n chapter 8, necessarily ncorporates notion of when as a primitive

, and his notion ssupposed

o be distinct rom the notion ofoccurring

at thesame ime. This s a very subtle distinction and most psychological tudies re notdesigned o tease part he wo notions Nevertheless some esearchers ave observed

just such a distinction , and have noted hat a particular sense f 'whenemerges efore he child has a notion of temporal order and simultaneity

For example in a remarkable assage Cromer 1968 p. 110) notes hat irstuses of 'when (such as "When ts got a flat tire , its needa go to the. . . to thestation ) are more statements f co- occurring events han statements f genuine

simultaneity Cromers

ascinatingonclusion s

that perhaps he ability to'datean event by a contemporaneous vent s more primitive ' than he notion of serial

ordering"

Interestingly as Kelier-Cohen 1974 noted similar observationsabout early uses of

'when (i.e. , that t doesn t mean at the same ime") can befound n Chamberlain nd Chamberlain 1904 and n Jesperson 940

Clearly his observation y Cromer and others does not by itself support hethesis hat here s a nonsequential se of

'when which s prior to the notion oftwo events ccurring at the same ime. The research ecessary o come up with

conclusive esults n this area would be delicate ndeedsYet Cromers observationis promising for it suggests hat he question may have an empirical answer(and ndeed hat nitial observations upport one of the key suppositions of theA-theory semantics.

I hope hat he kinds of questions aised here will help o focus uture esearchon the acquisition of event structure of tense and of the general onception oftemporal rder There s certainly much at stake n the answer o properly ramedquestions bout elative order of acquisition First, the semantics f tense or natural

language may well be lluminated by the answer second if the general rogramfollowed n this book s correct ultimately he metaphysics f time couldbe lluminated by the answers we get to these very low-level questions It mayseem urprising hat answers o grand metaphysical uestions hould urn on answers

to questions bout he acquisition of language y children , but I hope heconsiderations utlined n this book will make such a conclusion seem moreplausible if nevertheless till surprising

9.2 Saving he Phenomenology6

Broadening he Investigation

TheA -theory s often supposed obemore aithful toour intuitionsabout ime


150/252

notion of genuine emporal change Perhaps more significantly I have ejectedthe reality of future and past events Surely these moves also conflict with ourintuitions about he nature of time! Or do they?

A lot turns on what we mean by 'intuitions ' .There are hose ntuitions whichwe are rained o have n our philosophy lasses and hen here are what we mightcall "untutored ntuitions " Obviously I am unimpressed y philosopher inducedintuitions in this domain. This leaves our untutored ntuitions . It is fair to askwhether here are such hings, and, if there are, what they might be.

At a minimum, we might expect a theory hat comports with our ntuitions obe consistent with the way we experience he world . That is , if we experiencesome hings as uture and others as past we would say hat a theory which reverses

that "direction" clashes ith our ntuitions Likewise if we experience heworld as having a genuine uture out here

" then barring omeexplanation thesort of theory advocated ere might well count as conflicting with our intuitionsabout ime.

This talk of "experiencing he world," of course lands us hick in phenome

nology Although he phenomenological ethod s controversial it seems o methat t can be nstructive n cases ike this , because t shows hat even he notionof how we

experiencehe world has o be handled with

delicacy particularlyin the case of the phenomenology f time.How do we experience ime, then? One might suppose hat the philosophi

cally untutored way we experience ime s as a dynamic system n which eventsmove rom the future to the present and on into the past . That is certainly howa number of philosophers have written about our experience of time. Themetaphors n this score are endless Williams (1951 pp. 461-462) cataloguedthem as ollows:

Time lows or flies or marches

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