Local Governments and Local Elites

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Local Governments and LocalElitesShadiullah Khan aa Department of Public Administration , GomalUniversity , D.I. Khan, PakistanPublished online: 22 Jul 2008.

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Local Governments and Local Elites

SHADIULLAH KHANDepartment of Public Administration, Gomal University, D.I. Khan, Pakistan

ABSTRACT Local government reform 2001 is an important part of the Government ofPakistan’s programme for democratic renewal. The main feature of introducing the LocalGovernment System was to empower the people at the grassroots level and to transferpower from the elite to the masses. This paper uses councillors‘ data from north-westernPakistan to examine the economic and social status of village representatives. Landownership, high income, education and political connections increase the chances ofelection to public office at the district and sub-district level, but do not have much impact atthe village level. There is evidence of genuine change at union (village) level as themajorityof councillors (65 per cent) at this level belong to low-income group and small landowners.So the system has changed the identity of the locally politically dominant group. But, at thesame time, results suggest that while local governments units are helpful in creating spacesfor a broader range of non-elite community leaders to emerge, elite control of decisionmaking is pervasive. However, it is expected that the presence of non-elite members in thecouncils may change the allocation of resources in favour of the disadvantaged group withthe passage of time, provided elections to councils are held regularly.

KEY WORDS: Decentralisation, governance, participation, elites and non-elites,

democratic reforms

Introduction

In response to the well-documented limitations of centralised governanceapproach, practitioners and academics increasingly promote more partici-pative and decentralised approaches to governance. There is a wave ofdemocratic reform which has brought in its wake the devolution of powerfrom central to local governments throughout the world (Azfar &Livingston, 2007). Over the past three decades, the system of localgovernment has been radically reformed both structurally and functionallyand substantial resources transferred to local councils in almost all thedeveloping and developed countries.

Pakistan has been a leading exponent of decentralisation. Being aconstitutionally provincial subject, the present local authorities are

Correspondence Address: Shadiullah Khan, Assistant Professor, Department of Public

Administration, Gomal University, D.I. Khan 29050, Pakistan.

Email: [email protected]

Local Government StudiesVol. 34, No. 4, 509–528, August 2008

ISSN 0300-3930 Print/1743-9388 Online � 2008 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/03003930802217470

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established by the Provincial Local Government Ordinance 2001. Thisordinance specifies local authorities of three types: union administration –consisting of a number of villages; tehsil/town municipal administration;and district government. Each type has two principal sections – thelegislative section and the administrative section. The members of thelegislative sections are elected by the local population, while the members ofthe administrative sections are appointed by the provincial government andare deputed to the local authorities to implement the projects and themunicipal action plan. The legislative section of each type consists of anelected Nazim (Mayor/Chairman), Naib Nazim (Deputy Mayor/DeputyChairman) and other councillors (members) while the administrative sectionof each type consists of administrative heads of the decentraliseddepartments/offices and other ancillary staff, responsible for communitydevelopment and delivery of municipal services in the villages, town anddistrict (Government of NWFP, 2001). Union Administration is the lowestlevel of local administrative structure and is made up of a number ofvillages. It is a body corporate, covers the rural as well as urban areas acrossthe whole district. Each district is subdivided into a number of sub-districts(tehsils/towns). At the top there is a district government.

This multi-level local government system offers multiple opportunities forparticipation and election. It extends elected representation to the village level,through union to tehsil/town level and up to the district. Citizens have ampleopportunity to participate in the political process through voting and bycompeting in the electoral process. Under the system, any individual can,without reference to a political party, stand for any elective office, on theprinciple of ‘individual merit’. Elections for reserved seats for women andpeasants/workers in town/tehsil and district councils are through electoralcolleges. Councils are reformed on the initiative of the provincial governmentin order to curb the historical bureaucratic and political elite domination invillages and provide villagers a chance to elect among themselves their leaders.

Although the reform process has sought to strengthen local governmentin terms of representation, responsiveness, accountability and participation,there are still significant concerns over these issues. As a result, there arealways questions about whether local governments are representative of thepoor or dominated and are captured by the elites. Pakistan is a countrywhere governmental organisations, including councils, have been tieduniquely to social class. The distinctive advantage of the decentralisedgovernment in Pakistan is that it will create opportunities and the politicalspace necessary to rectify elite capture (NRB, 2001). This paper looks at thecomposition of the councils to determine if councils are dominated by elites.

Theoretical Aspects

This paper is based on elite theory of democracy and the concept of powerelite which, as opposed to a Marxist notion of ruling class, is well established

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in the discipline of political science, sociology and economics (Farazmand,1999). According to elite theory, political power is always going to beconcentrated in the hands of a small group in every society in every politicalsystem. The elite theorists believe that every single modern society is ruledby a class that is of great intelligence, higher social status and political skilland also likely to come from a wealthy, landowning and educatedbackground. Elitists believe in the German thinker Robert Michel’s ‘IronLaw of Oligarchy’ – the idea that democracy, in its true meaning ofexercising popular power and popular participation, can never be fullyrealised (Michel, 1915). The power in today’s political system is not onlyheld by force but by consent and election, which gives a legal and moralbasis for elite rule and justifying minority rule.

Similarly, Presthus (1964: 24) was also of the view that power elites are asmall part of the community. They may not be representative of the largercommunity in social terms. They may belong to upper and middle classes.They have the special skills and qualities required for leadership. They aredifferent from the rest of the community on the basis of class, status,leadership and resources. The basis of their power is expertise, education,class, status or wealth and decisive control of such resources. (ibid: 26). Theliterature identifies several sources of elite power, including land holdings,kinship, lineage, employment, political party affiliation, educationalattainment, religious affiliation or tenure in the community (Dasgupta &Beard, 2007).

In all assemblies and groups and organised bodies of people, from anation down to the committee of a club, direction and decisions rest in thehands of a small percentage, less and less in proportion to the larger size ofthe body, until in a great population it becomes an infinitesimally smallproportion of the whole number. This is and always has been true of allforms of government, though in different degrees (Prewitt & Stone, 1973:131). This small group either makes the decisions or influences the decisionmaking in the institutions, organisations and governmental units; thus, acentral premise of the classical elitist theory of democracy is that in everysociety a minority makes the major decisions (Chilcote, 1981: 350).

This leads to the point that organisations, legislative bodies andgovernmental units – whether local or central – do not mirror thecharacteristics of the represented community and are dominated, if notcaptured, by the very rich, educated and higher social status people (see, forexample, Birch, 1959; Dahl, 1961; Stone, 1989; Bottomore, 1964; Elkin,1985; Presthus, 1964). This, in turn, implies that institutions andgovernment units dominated by elites do not mirror the (politically relevant)characteristics of the represented community and so are not descriptivelyrepresentative (the term used by Pitkin, 1967: 89) bodies. It is a verycommon thought among theorists and practitioners that elite capture ordomination opens the way for manipulating the decision-making process inthe government, organisation or institution as there is a genuine danger that

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members pursue significantly different agendas from those of grassrootsmembers. Elite domination or capture refers to the process by which theseindividuals dominate and corrupt community-level planning and govern-ance (Dasgupta & Beard, 2007) and who can use – rather misuse – theinstitutions to benefit themselves (Abraham & Platteau, 2004). Theseauthors show that elite domination is not unique to local governments indeveloping countries. As US political scientist Ostrom says, the existence ofan elite is unavoidable for any political system, be it democratic or not(UNDP, n.d.). Even in the most egalitarian societies, however, governingbodies will almost always be dominated by elites (Mansuri & Rao, 2004).

Although elite capture is universal to all units of government, local unitsare more susceptible to it. According to Bardhan and Mookherjee (1999),the lower the level of government, the greater is the extent of capture byvested interests, and the less protected the minorities and the poor tend tobe. James Madison (cited in ibid.) held similar opinions long ago that localgovernments are more prone to capture: the smaller the society, the fewerwill be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinctparties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found ofthe same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing themajority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, themore easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression.Abraham and Platteau (2000) and Fung and Wright (2003), as quoted inDasgupta and Beard (2007), show that community (local) governance isparticularly vulnerable to elite capture because participants enter the processfrom unequal positions of power: they have asymmetrical social positions,disparate access to economic resources, varying levels of knowledge ofpolitical protocols and procedures and different literacy rates. Similarly,Gerard Marcou (1993, cited in Kliksberg, 1994) has stated that localautonomy may lead to the confiscation of power, and hence of the resourcesthat come with it, by a dominant political or social group. The UNDP’sHuman Development Report (1993) stated that decentralisation can end upgiving more power to local elites than to the local population. Similar viewshave been expressed in more recent times, for example, Mansoori and Rao(2004) described how local institutions are dominated, if not captured, bylocal elites and poor people are systematically excluded from theparticipatory process because of their weak social and economic power.

In the words of Bardhan (2002: 192) and Bardhan and Mookherjee(2000), it is unlikely that local governments are more prone to capture asthey are less accountable and the probability of capture increases with localinequality. In a similar vein, Huque (2002) said that there is an enduringtendency to retain control and domination over local institutions by a smallgroup of elite. The World Bank (2001: 106) has specifically warned thatdecentralisation can strengthen the power of elites and, instead offacilitating equity – in participation, representation, influence and benefitsharing, it might result in providing additional instruments of oppression in

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the hands of influential elites (Human Development Centre 1999: 53). Thisdomination or capture by elites may result in less responsiveness of localgovernments to the needs of the people, especially of poor people(CIRDAP, 1992: 105, cited in Krishna, 2005; UNDP, 1998: 56). With elitecapture, there is a tendency for the local government to over-provide theservice to local elites at the expense of the non-elites (Platteau, 2003). Thisdomination may work against the kind of broad-based democraticparticipation envisaged by advocates of community-driven developmentbecause the rules crafted by the elite may discourage poor people fromparticipation in the councils (Bardhan, 2000).

The elites domination/capture of government units and other institutionshas long been a concern of both political philosophy and empirical research.Elites, as defined by Dasgupta and Beard (2007), are locally based personswho have disproportionate access to social, political or economic power. Inaddition to the latter, other authors have conducted studies in differentcountries to analyse elite capture (Bienen et al., 1990; Lieten, 1996; Tendler,1997; Baland & Platteau, 1999; Bardhan & Mookherjee, 1999, 2000, 2002;Abraham & Platteau, 2000; Blair, 2000; Vedeld, 2000; Khwaja, 2001;Bardhan, 2002; Conning & Kevane, 2002; Huque, 2002; Kumar, 2002;Crook, 2003; Ebrahim, 2003; Fung & Wright, 2003; Olowu, 2003; Rao &Ibanez, 2003; Dasgupta et al., 2004; Mansoori & Rao, 2004; Platteau, 2004;Shatkin, 2004; Beard & Dasgupta, 2006). However, the problem in assessingelite capture is that there are no studies that look at an appropriatecounterfactual.

The common presumptions of the theory to elite domination in localgovernments are theoretically controversial, and the evidence mixed. Anumber of case studies have provided ample evidences supporting thetraditional presumptions. Bienen and others have pointed out thatdecentralisation has created opportunities for elites to dominate decisionmaking at the local level in Nepal (Bienen et al., 1990: 72–73). SimilarlyKumar (2002) stated that the poor are net losers in Indian decentralisationprogrammes. In Bangladesh, under Ershad’s decentralisation reforms,although people were mobilised at the local (upazila) level, the decisionsover allocation of resources continued to be made by elites of politicallybased factions that controlled the local governments (Westergaard & Alam,1995; see also Das, 2000; Veron, 2001; Rao & Ibanez, 2003).

Work by Lieten (1996) and Mathew and Nayak (1996) showed that localelites have undermined certain local village governments in central India.The World Resource Institute (2003), examining decentralisation reforms,also found that rather than amplifying the voice of the community, manydecentralisation reforms have actually strengthened non-representative localauthorities, and shifted decision-making power to local elites. This iscommon in developing countries. There are studies that provide ampleevidences of elite capture in the context of decentralised developmentexperiences.


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Not all studies, however, find that elite domination always has negativeimpacts. This dominationmay notwork against the interests of the people andsuch a group of scholars considered elite domination as useful and beneficialfor the people at large in the community. They maintain the thesis that ‘elitesare necessary for the material well-being of the society’, of which they are theguardians. It is sometimes argued that elite domination is not always elitecapture. In their case study, Rao and Ibanez (2003) found that more than 80percent of beneficiaries ultimately expressed their satisfaction with the projectand so they have termed this elite domination as a benevolent one. Khwaja(2001) also validated this pointwhenhe considered participation by hereditaryleaders essential to improve the maintenance of projects. In a similar case-based evaluation of a community-driven development project in TirtaKencana, Indonesia, Dasgupta and Beard (2007) concluded that, despite elitecontrol,UPPhadbeen successful in targeting resources to the poor and there isno evidence that project benefits are capturedor ill appropriated. These studiesdo not support the presumptions of elite domination, as not all elites are self-interested and egocentric.

This is why Mansoori and Rao (2004) considered some degree of elitedomination as inevitable for development, particularly in rural areas, wherethe elites are often characterised as leaders representing moral and politicalauthority in the villages. It is noteworthy to mention here that villages indeveloping countries, generally, are backward intellectually and culturallyand no progress can be made from a backward environment. So, often theseelites are the only ones who are able to contribute the time and know-howand can effectively communicate with outsiders, read project documents,keep accounts and records and write proposals. Mansuri and Rao (2004: 30)also raised the possibility that elites, within contexts of clear disparities inpower, might take actions that benefit the poor (‘benevolent capture’).Similarly, Tendler (1997) in a case study in Brazil, concluded that theinterests of the common people could sometimes be rather well protected byelites despite the former’s inadequate and insufficient representation indecision-making bodies. This leads us to differentiate between elitedomination/control/capture and benevolent capture. Elite dominationmay not always be elite capture in the sense of elites appropriating all thebenefits from the public good (Mansoori & Rao, 2004). Here, the role of theelite is important in the governing body. Mansuri and Rao (2004), however,provided insights that when local cultures and systems of social organisationresult in tight control of community decisions by elites, malevolent forms ofcapture become likely and they, therefore, called for checks and balances forreducing capture.

Research Methodology

The history of local government reveals the rule of elites and their influencein the decision making of local councils. The local government system 2000

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is also charged for elite rule, though the system promises to bring power tograssroots level (Gul, 2005). Commenting on the Local GovernmentReforms, Bushra (2003) said that Musharraf’s promise of bringing in newblood through local governments has failed to materialise. Most of thepeople elected were either old party workers or belonged to landed politicalparties. According to an independent research study, 30 per cent of ZillaNazims in Punjab were former members of the National Assembly (MNAs)or members of Provincial Assemblies (MPAs) and approximately 90 percent belonged to established political families (Herald, August 2001 as citedin Bushra, 2003). While largely at Union council and to some extent at otherlevels of local government, some of the formerly marginalised groups havenow come into the political system (HRCP, 2000). So critics have chargedthe system with empowering the elites and not the general public of thecountry (Bari, 2004).

After several years of the implementation of the local government system,the call has gone out for closer examination in specific contexts, particularlyin two areas: The first is the question of whether Pakistani local governmentunits are captured/dominated by elites or are common villagers represented?Representativeness is vital to government performance and responsivenessto peoples’ needs. The concept of representativeness as emanating from anation’s pluralism concerns realities about the composition of localgovernment units.

In this background, the study aims to establish the nature of thesecouncillors, mayors and deputy mayors, discover who is influential andexercises influence in decision making, and determine whether theconventional ruling elite are dominant again or has the system trulyempowered the people at the grassroots.

Therefore, the general issue addressed in this paper pertains to thecomposition of the local government units: whether those who are elected tothe local councils are representative of their people – not in terms ofgeography but the socio-economic and cultural pluralism of the people. Thegeographical representation used as a yardstick is being challenged. A newand different concept ‘all segments of society to reflect the nation’s diversity’is the new measure – not hypothetically but remedially and realistically.Representativeness is perceived as a social contract with the purpose ofincluding the full diversity of people in the area. In this regard, the researchis designed to analyse the composition of councils in terms of councillors’education, culture, and their socio-economic background in order to assesswhether the council is elite dominated or non-elite represented. Councilsthat have a higher proportion of individuals of elite status are assumed hereto be ‘dominated’ or ‘controlled’ to a greater extent by elites.

The second area concerns the actual behaviour of elites themselves. Thewaning demand for representativeness has directed renewed attention to thecentral issue of representative roles: what councillors do, and how theyshould act, rather than who they are (Rao, 1998), which also needs


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researching. The second area of survey is concerned with the examinationand assessment of how councils – whether controlled by elites or not –actually perform. This is explored in two ways. First, the self-perceived roleof council members is examined and, secondly, to what extent do councilsactually function: the influence of members over the councils’ decisionmaking is examined.

Earlier researchers have used interviews, as well as secondary data, tosupport their claims, thus, it was decided to augment survey data withinterview data. The data for this study were collected from May 2002 toOctober 2002 in the districts of Kohat and Mansehra, using a combinationof social survey methods that included councillors’ characteristics surveyand individual perceptions survey. The demographic and socio-economiccharacteristics were noted for all council members in Kohat and Mansehra(n¼ 1459 individuals) and the questionnaire was administered directly torandomly selected (n¼ 258) members of two districts (n¼ 68), four tehsils(n¼ 70) and 11 union councils (n¼ 120) in the districts. It included a widerange of multiple-choice questions describing the history of the individual’sinvolvement in council meetings, perceptions and personal attitudes ofmembers towards their participation in and influence over the decisionmaking of the council.

Councils’ Composition: Socio-economic Profile of the Councillors

The socio-demographic data of councillors were assessed to analyse whetherlocal councils are dominated by local elites. In this context, in order to assessthe research hypotheses that ‘local councils are elite-dominant institutions’,three aspects of the councillors were considered: socio-economic profile,localism and number of times elected to council. Socio-economic profile isdefined demographically. Councillors are considered less representative tothe extent they differ from the villagers generally in occupation, income,landholding and education. Localism is considered a second aspect ofcouncillors’ representativeness. It is presumed that people who live amongvillagers and are accessible on a day-to-day basis best represent the villagers.Council membership more than once by any councillor is consideredpresumably as the most representative because of his familiarity with localproblems and grievance mechanisms.

Judging from the characteristics of councillors, the data show that thedistrict and tehsil councillors do not come from more diverse backgrounds.The general picture in terms of occupation and landholding shows thatdistrict/tehsil councils are not in any respect microcosms of society as awhole. Dissimilarity among socio-economic status does not connoteabsentee leadership, however. The village development demands leaderswho can mediate between local activities and relevant professionals, anddeploy leadership resources in villages. However, the composition of unioncouncils is distributed widely among the various sections of the community.

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It may be observed from the data in Table 1 and Figure 1 that, althoughabout two-thirds of union councillors have a rather modest education up tosecondary level, the proportion of college graduates is not negligible. About30 per cent of union councillors are college graduates. The district/tehsil/union Nazims, Naib Nazims, are relatively better educated than the unioncouncillors, where 45 per cent, 35 per cent, and 20 per cent have completedtheir school, college and university education, respectively. Differences,however, in the educational levels are observable between union councillorsand district and tehsil councillors.

For comparison, according to Bari’s (2001) study, the majority ofcouncillors in her study sample were literate (79 per cent), while 21 per centwere matric, 10 per cent intermediate and about 16 per cent graduate levelor above. Thus, the results of our study are verified by Bari (2001: 10). It isevident that academically the people entering into local government aremore – but not highly – educated, as there are minimum education

Table 1. Councillors’ education

Educational levelof the respondents

District/tehsil Nazims(mayor) and district

and tehsil councillors (%)Union

councillors (%)Average(%)

Middle schooling – 15 07.5High schooling 45 50 47.5College education 35 30 32.5University education 20 5 12.5

Figure 1. Educational level (%) of the district/tehsil councillors compared with the unioncouncillors


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qualifications prescribed for councillors in the NWFP Local GovernmentOrdinance 2001.

Similarly, the majority of councillors (district as well as union) aregenerally drawn from the lower socio-economic strata: 41 per cent of thecouncillors have an average income up to 4000 Pakistani rupees (Rs), 47 percent belong to the middle strata and only 22 per cent are from the highereconomic strata (Table 2, Figure 2). The economic status of the councillorsis measured by their average monthly income. It is obvious that, on thewhole, district/tehsil councillors have a better economic status than theunion councillors. Making an arbitrary grouping of51000 Rs as low, 2001–4000 Rs as medium and44000 Rs as high incomes, the data also reveal thatcouncillors of district and tehsil council come from relatively better-offfamilies compared to their counterparts in the uneion councils.

Table 2. The councillors’ income level

Income level of therespondents(Pakistani rupees)

District/tehsil Nazims(mayor) and district

and tehsil councillors (%)Union


Lower strata 41.051000 16.4 30.9 23.71001–2000 16.4 18.2 17.3

Middle strata 14.5 14.5 37.22001–3000 5.5 14.5 14.53001–4000 16.4 9.1 10.04001–5000 5.5 7.3 12.7

Higher strata 25.5 5.5 21.95001–6000 6.446000 15.5

Figure 2. Percentage of district/tehsil councillors and union councillors in different incomebrackets (Pakistani rupees)

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Although 34.65 per cent of councillors, including district/tehsil mayorsand deputy mayors, belong to the higher economic strata (Table 2), they arenot highly educated (barely 12.5 per cent) and many (more than half: 55 percent) are simply educated up to secondary level.

On average, agriculture (58 per cent) and business (27 per cent) accountfor a larger percentage of union councillors’ occupations (Table 3, Figure 3).It is significant to note that district, tehsil and union leadership is heldmainly by the agriculturalists.

As more than 61 per cent of all the councillors are involved in agriculture,their landholding size was also taken as the base to ascertain their economicstatus. The distribution of councillors in various landholding groups

Table 3. The councillors’ occupation

Occupation of therespondents

District/tehsil Nazims(mayor) and district andtehsil councillors (%)

Unioncouncillors (%)

Average(%)

Agriculture 65 58 61.5Business 25 27 26Other 10 15 12.5

Figure 3. The councillors’ occupation (%): 1, district/tehsil Nazims (mayor) and councillors; 2,union councillors; 3, average


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(Table 4, Figure 4) reveals that, on the whole, more than 47 per cent ofcouncillors belong to the small landholding group with 1–25 acres of land,whereas 22.15 per cent of councillors are in the medium landholding groupwith 26–50 acres of land. It is noteworthy that 17.5 per cent of councillorsbelong to a landless group of a village. This reveals that councillorsgenerally come from a landless, small and medium landholding group of thepeople.

As far as age of councillors is concerned, it can be seen from Table 5 andFigure 5 that union councillors are far younger when compared to thedistrict/tehsil councillors. About 63 per cent of union councillors are belowthe age of 40, whereas only 55 per cent of district/tehsil councillors fall inthis range. In the upper age group, one finds that 45 per cent of district/tehsilcouncillors are above 45 years of age, whereas only 37 per cent of unioncouncillors come into this category. No councillor, district or town/tehsiland union, was below 25 years of age, as this is a mandatory threshold forcontesting local councils’ elections under the law.

Table 4. Councillors’ land size

Landholding sizeof the respondents(acres)

District/tehsilNazims (mayor)and district and

tehsil councillors (%)Union


Landless 0 35 17.51–25 50 45 47.526–50 35 12 22.15450 15 8 11.5

Figure 4. Landholding size of the district/tehsil councillors and union councillors (acres)

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In the case of the new local government system, Bari (2001) has carriedout a detailed analytical study of five phases of local government electionsheld in 2000–01. She found that the majority of elected councillors,including mayors, belonged to the younger strata of the society. In her studyaround 75 per cent of elected councillors were less than 46 years of age andonly 7 per cent of them were over 55 years of age. It is noteworthy here thatBari’s study also comprised all elected representatives (councillors andmayors), but focused only on selected districts. The analysis clearly showsthat younger leadership has come up in the recent local governmentelections. Although limited to a study of mayors and deputy mayors, Alam’s(2004) study has also verified the same.

The data also show that almost all the councillors are more permanentmembers of village community. They reside in the village full time and haveexperience of councillorship as one-third of them have been elected morethan once.

According to these data, the councillors’ socio-economic profiles showthat district and tehsil/town councillors (union Nazims and union NaibNazims) constitute a group drawn from the higher socio-economic strata of

Table 5. The age of councillors

Age range of therespondents (years)

District/tehsilNazims (mayor) anddistrict and tehsilcouncillors (%)

Unioncouncillors (%)

Average(%)

25–30 10 25 12.531–35 25 20 22.536–40 20 18 1941–45 35 20 27.546–50 4 11 7.5450 6 6 6

Figure 5. Age range of the district/tehsil councillors and union councillors (years)


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rural society, who live with people in the village and have some experienceof councillorship. However, it is clear that councils are largely the domain oftraditional rural elites (landlords). The union councils, on the other hand,consist of a majority of councillors who belong to the landless and smalllandholding group, are young, energetic but comparatively less educatedand less experienced. Also, taken collectively and generally, the data showthat the majority (65 per cent) of councillors belong to a group who areeither landless (17.5 per cent) or small landholders (47.5 per cent) and areeither of low income (23.75 per cent) or medium income (41 per cent). Itappears that local reforms have dislodged large landowners and social elitesfrom control over local politics. Thus, the data do not validate – at least atunion level – the research hypothesis that local government units are elite-dominated institutions. Although, the Pakistan democratic system harnesseselections to socially conservative ends because running for office at any levelof government is prohibitively expensive, so that only the wealthy or thosebacked by wealth can usually stand for elections. However, the data inTables 2 and 4 and Figures 2 and 4 show that the system has had a greatinfluence on breaking down this paradox and is making an enduringcontribution to local democracy.

Councillors’ Participation in Meetings and their Influence over Decision

Making

Local governments are advocated throughout the world as a key means ofmaking policies more responsive and accountable to local people, especiallyto the poor (Crook & Sverrisson, 2001). Elites, having the upper hand and adisproportionate influence in local governance, can slant the decision-making process and, accordingly, the decisions made about local resourcesby those institutions are beholden to their interests.

The job of councillors is to represent, be accountable to, and an advocatefor, all their electors in formulating policies and practices for the localauthority, monitoring their effectiveness and providing leadership for thecommunity. In order to understand the extent to which meaningful localgovernment has taken place, Rao (1998) suggested that two factors shouldbe examined closely: what councillors do, and how they should act, ratherthan who they are. So the waning demand for representativeness hasdirected renewed attention to the central issue of representatives‘ roles; thisneeds further research conducting. This part of the paper examines theactual performance of the councils with special emphasis on the councillors’involvement in and influence over council decision making. Table 6 andFigure 6 examine the councillors’ participation in councils meetings.

Councils are the highest decision-making authority of a local governmentunit where policy making, development plans and funds allocations etc. arediscussed and debated. So it is assumed that by attending the meetings,councillors might succeed in allocation of resources for their wards

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(constituency). Council meetings are scheduled once per month to discussand monitor the development projects of the council. These meetings aregenerally conducted in the premises of the council in the morning andmostly councillors attend these meetings. As much as 57 per cent and 24 percent of the members attend these meetings either many times or all the time.A very small percentage of councillors (18.7 per cent) attend few or sometimes. Other studies on elites have also found that about one-quarterattended few meetings, about two-fifths of attended most of the meetings,and more than one-third attended all the meetings (Gul, 2005).

Attending meetings does not enable councillors to have decisions in theirconstituents’ favour. Therefore, councillors were asked to assess theinfluence they had on the development plans, resources allocation etc. Theresponses indicate that councillors are ‘very’ or ‘quite’ influential overthe development plans and resource allocation in favour of their ward. Themajority of councillors feel that they exercise considerable influence (41.6per cent), medium influence (27.6 per cent) and a lower influence (20 percent) over the development fund for their constituency. A minority of

Figure 6. Councillors’ participation in council meetings

Table 6. Councillors’ participation in council meetings

Local unit Few/some times (%) Many times (%) All the time (%)

Union councillors 24 50 26Tehsil/town councillors 22 50 28District councillors 10 72 18Average 18.7 57.3 24


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councillors (11.3 per cent) replied that they are ‘not at all’ influentialconcerning the allocation of development funds. So it is evident that oneparty in particular does not exercise greater influence, as the majority ofcouncillors are more influential (Table 7) in having a due share in theavailable development funds for different projects in their respective wards.

The scholastic findings of Gul (2005), in her study establishing who wasinfluential in the decision-making process of local government, alsoindicated that almost two-thirds of councillors have a medium and higherinfluence on council decisions (35 per cent, 35 per cent and 30 per cent for alower, medium and high level of influence, respectively).

This has been verified by further research, which has indicated that themajority of people, despite failures, did appreciate and accept the councils.While the role of the councils is generally accepted, there is some reservationconcerning the effectiveness and responsiveness of elected councillors: theresults of a survey asking the question ‘to what extent are local governmentunits successful in terms of infrastructure development and service delivery?’showed that more respondents answered negatively. However, this could beinterpreted, as termed by the villagers, as a reflection of overall needs andlimited funds available to the councillors (Khan, 2006). It is clear from thesurvey elsewhere that there is no perception that an elite group is getting richat the expense of the rest (ibid.) and all villagers benefitted equally by thelocal development projects. In the developing world, however, there are onlya few examples of decentralisation reforms that have benefited disadvan-taged groups (Crook & Sverrisson, 2001).

Although not the remit of this study, an important future piece of workwill be to provide a robust assessment of the impact of councils from theperspective of villagers and common people themselves.

Conclusion

The survey undertaken is a landmark in the study of local politicalrepresentation. It explored the representative character of local governmentin terms of actuality, i.e. councillors’ own characteristics. The surveyprovided evidence on the actual characteristics of councillors in respect oflocal residence, age, gender, education, income and land owning.

Table 7. The level of influence of councillors

Councillors influence level (%)

Local unit Union Tehsil/Town District Average

No influence 11 9 14 11.3Some influence 16 22 22 20Medium influence 23 30 30 27.6Higher influence 50 39 36 41.6

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Pakistan’s Devolution of Power Plan was introduced in 2001, creating adecentralised structure of district and sub-district governments, each with itsown Nazim and Naib Nazim (mayor and deputy mayor), elected council andadministration. This study analysed the composition of councils in order toassess their representativeness and finds uneven but encouraging progress onmost fronts. At present, and despite concerns raised in a number of reports,there has been little change in the socio-economic profile of councillors atdistrict and tehsil level. Poor men and women are under-represented in thecouncils at district and tehsil level. The elected councils have still beenextraordinarily vulnerable to being hijacked by elites as elections favour thewealthy and landowning elites and other influential individuals, it isnevertheless the former practice of councils. There is evidence of genuinechange at union level in this regard as the majority of councillors at this levelbelong to a low-income group. Widening the pool of people from whichcouncillors are drawn would appear to be a necessary step in broadening therepresentativeness of elected members, if actual representation is a desirableoutcome.

The study has demonstrated that the majority of councillors do havesufficient influence over decision making in the councils, although womencouncillors still face obstacles in attending the meetings and exercisinginfluence on decisions. This, however, leads us to conclude that the magnitudeof the impact of councillors on decision making is more apparent.

The study concludes that Councils of ‘all talents’ will not occur withoutspecific policies to improve the election and retention of a more diverse bodyof councillors and a holistic approach to reform is needed, which recognisesthe many factors that inhibit or discourage people from standing as localcouncillors. Furthermore, commitment and political will are crucial at alllevels – government, party and local authority.

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Documents

Local Governments and Local Elites