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~lS4~ ~.l ~~. Independent Boord of Inquiry • PO 30x 32293
Broomtonlein 201 7 JOhonnesburg South Airico Phone (011) Ll03-3256/7 Fox (011) Ll03-1366
REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT BOARD OF INOUIRY FOR THE MONTH OF
MAY 1992.
CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ......•..•................................... 1
II. STATE INSTITUTIONS
1. The South African Defence Force (SADF).
1.1 The Murder of Dr David Webster .... . ................. 2 - 3
1.2 The Murder of Matthew Goniwe and others ............. 4 - 5
2. The South African PoLice (SAP).
2. 1 Covert Operations ....•..•....•.... . .•............... 5 - 7
III. THE GOLDSTONE COMMISSION .
BOARD MEMBERS: Prot Lourie Ackermonn, [J Allen Boesok, Dr Alex Boroine, Mrs Judy Cholmers, Rev Dr Fronk Chikone, Dr Mox Colemon, Mr &iCY'1 Currin, PrOf John 'Dugord, Mrs SI18eno Duncon, Mr Peler Harris, Mr Peler Kerchholl, Mrs Lydia Kampe, Mrs Emma Mashininl, Br Jude Pielerse, Archbisl,op Desmond Tutu
1. 32 Battalion .... . ............ . ..... . ...... .. . . .... . . . 8 - 9
2. Train Violence ... . ........... . .... . ... . ......... . . . . 9 - 12
IV. NATAL.
1. The Trust Feed's Massacre .. . .. . .. ... ...... . . ...... ... ... 13
V. CONCLUSION .... . .. ... ... • ...... •.. . .. ......... . . . .•. • • . . . 14
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I . INTRODUCTION.
The month of May has been marked by allegations of state
involvement in assassinations, covert operations and the
covering up of and interfering with investigations . Ev ide nce
has emerged which suggests that the South Africa n Defence
Force (SADF) could have been involved in the murd e r of
Matthew Goniwe and others in 1985. In addition the civil
Co-operation Bureau (CCB) , a clandestine unit which was
attached to the SADF's special forces, has once again been
linked to the murder of Doctor David Webster. Finally
allegations have been made regarding the involvement of
members of the South African Police (SAP) in covert
activities in the Vaal area.
As far as the various Goldstone Comissions are concerned,
evidence has been that SADF units have shown a tota l
disregard for township residents. In relation to train
attacks it seems clear that the various authorities COQcerned
have not yet developed weasures which can adequa t e ly protec t
commuters.
- 2 - '
II. STATE INSTITUTIONS.
1. The South African Defence Force (SADF).
1.1 The Murder of Dr David Webster.
On April 28 it was announced that an inquest would be held to
attempt to determine who was responsible for the murder of Dr
David Webster. Dr Webster was shot dead outside his
Troyeville home on May 1 1989.
At the Harms commission of inquiry the issue of Dr Webster's
killing was dealt with in some detail. Counsel appearing on
behalf of the David webster Trust argued that the civil
Co-operation Bureau (CCB), a unit attached to the Special
Forces division of the SADF, was responsible for the murder.
The factors which led to this allegation included the
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following: Christo Brits, the co-ordinator for Region 6, the
CCB's internal cell, admitted that weapons had been iss ued to (
members of the cell three days before the murder; Brits '
diary, which was se ized by the commission, had had three
pages torn out of it, one of which was May 1 1989; such · CCB
files as were se ized by the commissi on indicated that Webster
was being monitore d by the CCB and CCB operative " Slang" van
Zyl admitted that the murder carried the hallmarks of a CCB
operation.
- 3 -
In his findings Judge Harms stated that a strong suspicion
existed that theCCB had killed Webster, a suspicion that
members of the organisation had done nothing to dispel .
In The citizen of May 4, in reaction to renewed speculation
that the CCB was responsible for the killing, an unnamed
police source stated that CCB agents had been involved in
political murders and that the organisation had a "virtual
license to kill". The source added that only a small
p~rcentage of the CCB's activities had been made public.
In an article in the Sunday star of May 17, it was claimed
that a Louis Yssel (a CCB operative) had told Advocate Martin
Luitingh that Ferdi Barnard, a one time CCB operative, had
confessed to the murder. At the time Yssel to l d him this
Luitingh was appearing on behalf of the David \~ebster trust
at the Harms Commission. Barnard has denied the allegations.
In evidence given at the Harms commiss'ion, Barnard claimed
that in March 1989 he was informed by the CCB that he would
no longer be used for internal operations but would be
utilised externally. Nevertheless from about June 1989 ~o
october 1989 he received instructions from from Van Zyl and
fellow Region 6 operative, "calla" Botha, in connecti o n Vlith
various CCB contracts.
( , - 4 -
1.2 The Murder of Matthew Goniwe and others.
In a report carried in the New Nation of April 30, the
newspaper claimed to be in possesion of a signal message
form, dated June 7 1985, sent from a Lieutenant Du Plessis,
of Eastern Province (EP) Command, to a General Van Rensburg (
of the state Security Council in Pretoria. The signal, marked
"Top Secret", refers to a discussion between the General and
a Brigadier Van der Westhuisen, then Officer Commanding EP
Command, which dealt with the "permanent removal from
society" of activists Matthew Goniwe, Mbulelo Goniwe and Fort (
Calata. The signal stated that thi~ issue was now a matter of
urgency. Matthew Goniwe, Calata and two other activists,
Sparrow Mkonto and Sicelo Mhlauli were murdered approximately
two weeks after the message was sent.
It has subsequently emerged that the signal form was given to
the New Nation by the Military Leader of the 'l'ranskei, Major
General Bantu Holomisa. Holomisa claims that he has a "thick (
file" of similar documents which will be released as soon as
their veracity has been established.
Du Plessis, now a Commandant, has admitted that he sent the
message.
- 5 -
He allegedly said to the New Nation that he realised that he
"is in a lot of trouble", but refused to comment further
because he claimed that he was bound to silence by the
Official secrets Act. Van der Westhuizen now holds the rank
of Lieutenant General and the position of Chief of Staff
Intelligence at SADF Hea dquarters in Pretoria. He has
refused to comment on the allegations. Former Stat~
President, P W Botha, who chaired meetings of the state
Security council at the time, claimed that he could not
remember if Goniwe was ever discussed a t any of the meetings .
On May 8 1992 President F W de Klerk ordered that the
allegations be invest igated . They will be the subject of a
jUdicial investigation headed by !he Judge President of the
Eastern Cape, Justice J P zietsman.
2. The South African Police (SAP).
2.1 Covert Operations.
In January 1992 researchers at the Board took a n af f idavit
from Daniel Kolisang in which h e claimed that person s , whom
he believed were attached to the Transvaal Provincial
Admini s tration, had a ttempted to recruit him to carry out
certain covert operations in t h e Vaal area.
- 6 -
The operations included ·gathering of information and the
carrying out of petrol bomb attacks. The targets were members
of the African National Congress (ANC) , the South African
communist Party (SACP) and the ANC's armed wing Umkhonto we
Sizwe (MK). After some initial investigation done by Board
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researchers the affidavit was given to the Weekly Mail. This ~
was done with Kolisang's approval.
The Weekly Mail established that a house to which Kolisang
was taken, was in fact a ·police "safe house" which was used
as a base for covert operations in the area. These opera~ions
involved the use of falsely registered pager numbers,
fictitious company names and false car registration plates.
The operatives which Kolisang named in his affidavit were all
members of the SAP and many of them were former Security
Policemen. 1;'he people whom Kolisang had named as potential
"targets" were indeed senior .members of the above named
organisations in the Vaal area. Minister of Law and Order,
Hernus Kriel, stated that allegations concerning possible
illegal activities by this unit should be referred to the
Goldstone Commission.
On May 14, the commissioner of Police, General Johan Van ·der
Merwe admitted in an affidavit that a nationwide network of
covert bases was set up by the SAP in 1988.
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The house referred to b; Kolisang in his affidavit was one of
these. Bases had been established in eleven regions across
the country. Previously the bases had been utilised by the
security Police but they now fell under the Criminal
Investigation Service (CIS) into which the Security Police
were absorbed l ast year. The SAP claim that disclosures about
such bases endanger the lives of those involved in the
combating of crime. This, according to the SAP, is the reason
why the bases are still utilised.
On May 26 Judge Goldstone announced that a commission of
inquiry would be appointed to investigate the alleged illegal
activities of the Vaal unit. Board researchers will be
assisting the commission.
II. THE GOLDSTONE COMMISSION.
During the Month of May two new issu es were investigated by
the Commission; allegations that 32 Battalion were
responsible for various acts of violence in Phola Park on
April 8 and the violence on commuter trains.
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1. 32 Batrtalion.
Residents of Phola Park have alleged that on the night of
April 8 members of 32 Battalion swept through the squatter
camp killing two residents, raping three and assaulting forty
three, many of them severely.
In giving evidence, captain Mark Hermanson, the officer
commanding the Company to which the troops involved are
attached, claimed that the troops had not assaulted any
residents, they had only acted in a "heavy handed" manner.
Personally he was happy with his troops behaviour. He stated l. that he believed that the firing of indiscriminate shots at
the camp had been justified, as the soldiers had been acting
in self defence after they had been fired on .
Lieutenant Ras, the troops' Platoon Commander, ' said that the
troops had entered Phola Park after they had been shot at and
one of their number had been injured. ~s the soldiers moved
into the camp a fire fight developed in which approximately
200 R4 and 30 AK 47 shots were fired. The troops then
conducted a search operation for approximately forty five
minutes after which they withdrew. He denied that any acts of
violence had been committed but accepted that his troops may
have acted in a "heavy handed" manner .
- 9 -
He believed that their behaviour was justified in that they
had come under fire and were tense. Advocate Solly sithole,
the Commission's chairperson, said that he could not
understand why so many shots were fired at the squatter camp
before it was searched.
On May 26, lawyers representing 32 Battalion conceded that
members of the unit may have "technically committed acts of
violence" but denied that they had committed acts of murder,
rape or assault. Hearing of evidence on the incident has been
suspended whilst the various parties discuss the possibility
of a settlement.
2. Train Violence.
This commission, under the chairpersonship of Gert Steyn, a
regional court magistrate, sat from May 4 to May 21. Most of
the evidence came from police witnesses, the South African
~ Railways Commuter Corporation (SARCC) and Spoornet. An
inspection in loco was also conducted. One of the Board's
researchers attended most of the proceedings.
One of the most disturbing things to emerge from the
commission was the manner in which the authorities responded
to the issue.
- 10 -
Most of the measures that the SARCC and the SAP have taken or
plan to institute in the future, were only implemented or
discussed after Judge Goldstone announced in January that a
commission would be appointed to investigate this issue. This
was approximately eighteen months after the phenomenon of
train attacks started and after well over one hundred people
had been killed.
The inspection in loco revealed that at most stations there
is a lack of access control . This makes it extremely
difficult for members of the SAP to search commuters before
boarding trains. Many stations also have inadequate -fencing
which means that potential attackers would have easy access
to trains and stations. On evidence given at the commission,
the responsibility for addressing these problems lies with
the SARCC.
As far as the issue of policing is concerned several aspects
of the evidence give cause for concern. Firstly there has ~
been an apparent lack of co-ordination and liaison between
the various police units involved in the different aspects of
train violence, i.e. prevention, patrolling ard
investigation. There is a similar lack of co-ordination '
between the various regions which have been affected, namely
Soweto, the East Rand and Johannesburg.
- 11 -
Thus far there appears to be no uniform strategy for
addressing the issue. Secondly many of the witnesses
contradicted each other on what the major problems of
policing are. Some of the witnesses claimed that there wa s a
lack of manpower, others denied this. Some witnesses claimed
that the SAP lacked proper authority to search commuters ,
others said that they had such authority.
The third problem relates to the issue of investigation of
the attacks. As is well known, thus far there has been only
one successful prosecution . Those investigating officers wh o
gave evidence said the reason for this was that commuters
refused to come forward and identify their attackers, nor
were the SAP able to recruit informers to provide informa tion
about these attacks. The veracity of this information wa s put
into dispute by the evidence of a witness identified as ~l .
01 alleged that he had been an informer in Nancefield Hostel,
that he had given the SAP information about two train
attacks, that people had been arrested after he had given
such information, that he had not been called to court to
testify against these, people des pite his willingness to do so
and that ultimately his position a s a n informer wa s exposed
to the Hoste l dwe llers by the verypo licenie n vlhom he ha d bee n
working for.
- 12 -
The evidence of 01 is still to be tested under cross
examination. 01 also testified to the fact that two of the
largest of the train attacks were planned in Nancefield
Hostel and were carried out by Hostel dwellers. These attacks
took place 'at Kliptown station on June 26 1991 and at Orlando
station on october 23. A total of fifteen people were killed
and fifty eight were injured in the two incidents. This was
the only evidence that was lead which specifically identified
train attackers. What did emerge from police evidence
however, was that, while no single group or faction can be
blamed for all the attacks, where attackers have been
identified, the overwhelming majority have been identified as
Hostel dwellers.
III. NATAL.
1. The Trust Feed's Massacre.
In the passing of eleven death sentences on former SAP
Captain Brian Mitchell, Judge Wilson called for an
independent inquiry into the alleged cover up following the
killings, the apparent interference with the investigation of
Major Dutton and the possible involvement of the SAP in
counter revolutionary strategies.
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He stressed that an internal police inquiry was not
sufficient and that the findings of the inquiry should be
made public. Major Dutton has backed the call especially the
requirement that the findings be made public.
Minister of Law and Order, Hernus Kriel, announced that
regional court Magistrate, Willem Krugel, had been appointed
to conduct the investigation . The General council of the Bar
of South Africa have expressed their dissatisfaction ~ith
this decision and have called for the appointment of a Judge
or retired Judge instead.
Collection Number: AG2543 INDEPENDENT BOARD OF INQUIRY (IBI) Records 1989-1996 PUBLISHER: Publisher:- Historical Papers, University of the Witwatersrand Location:- Johannesburg ©2012
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