1

LT COL DAVID DIGNAM

THE EVOLVING OPERATIONAL PARADIGM AND

THE IRISH DEFENCE FORCES

“No matter how clearly one thinks, it is impossible to anticipate precisely the

character of future conflict. The key is not to be so far off the mark that it becomes

impossible to adjust once that character is revealed”.

Professor Sir Michael Howard.

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INTRODUCTION

It was all going to be very different. The end of the Cold War and the apparent

triumph of western liberal democracy over competing political philosophies meant

that mankind’s ideological evolution was complete (Fukuyama, 1997). The

ideological conflict of the post war bi-polar era would be replaced by “a new kind of

international order, with nation states growing together or disappearing, ideological

conflicts disappearing, cultures intermingling and increasingly free commerce and

communications” (Kagan, 2008:3). It was to be what President George H Bush was to

call “The New World Order”, thus:

A world in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order. In the

words of Winston Churchill, a "world order" in which "the principles of justice

and fair play ... protect the weak against the strong ..." A world where the

United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfil the historic

vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights

find a home among all nations. (Bush, 1991)

It is apparent that the world since 1991 has failed to fulfil the promise identified

by President Bush. War remains as endemic today as ever before. War, famously

described by Clausewitz as politics by other means, appears to be an enduring feature

of human existence (Clausewitz in Howard and Paret, 1993) and Plato seems to have

been correct when he said “Only the dead have seen the end of war” (cited in Gray,

2005:19). Indeed, it is argued that war will remain a constant feature of the twenty-

first century which promises to be every bit as bloody as the twentieth century which

ended in such high hopes (Gray, 2005).

The manner in which wars are fought has undergone significant change over

the last four centuries, and particularly since the end of the Cold War. These changes

have occurred in response to the evolving context within which individual wars are

fought (Gray, 2005). This is in keeping with Clausewitz, who argued that each war

has its “grammar”; that is to say, unique “actualities of contemporary warfare” that

are dependent on the specific, multi-faceted context in which each war is fought

(Gray, 2005:84). Understanding this context and adapting to the evolving operational

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paradigm has been a significant challenge for armed forces since the turn of the

twentieth century.

This paper will explore this evolving operational paradigm and its

implications for the Defence Forces (DF). Through a review of the available

literature, it will seek to identify how other military forces have adapted to meet

current and future challenges. It will examine the role of transformation in preparing

the DF for the future and the importance of strategic leadership development in

delivering a modern and capable force. The importance of a broad-based military

and civilian education in preparing strategic leaders to manage transformational

change will be considered. It is hoped that this paper will add value to the DF’s

consideration of how best to prepare for a future that is hallmarked by “complexity,

ambiguity, uncertainty and volatility” (Kiszely, 2007:8).

THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF WAR

War is the use of extreme violence for political purposes and remains a viable

instrument of strategic choice. This is its fundamental nature. As Clausewitz said “It

is clear that war is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a

continuation of political activity by other means" (Clausewitz in Paret and Howard,

1976:99). In that sense, war has a “political, social and cultural context” (Gray,

2005:39). Where extreme violence is used for any other purpose (personal economic

gain, banditry etc), it is not war “as we have known it and chose to define it” (Gray,

2005:39). Hence it is the political context of war that distinguishes it from other forms

of organised violence.

Much has been written about the origins of war. It has been argued that war is

caused by insecurity which has a combination of political, military, economic,

environmental and societal origins (Buzan, 2007). It has also been argued that war is

endemic to the human condition and that social Darwinism inevitably leads to

aggression which has been essential to human evolution (Gat, 2006).

There are two dominant perspectives of the role of human nature in war. The

realist view suggests that war is an inevitable outcome of human insecurities and that

human nature (and therefore war) is irredeemable (Glaser, 2010). The liberal view

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argues that war is endemic but redeemable and that peace, not war is the natural

human condition (Morgan, 2010). It is also argued that the nature and structure of the

state and its relationship with its people is at the root of the incidence of war. The

anarchical nature of the international system is also used to partly explain the

phenomenon of war. It is therefore apparent that war is caused by the complex

interaction of a great many factors (Garrnett, 2007; Sheehan, 2007).

MODERN AND POST MODERN WAR

The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 marks the commencement of the period of modern

war. It has been further argued that the twenty-first century has also seen the

subsequent evolution of post-modern war (Sheehan, 2007). Since Westphalia, the

legal right to wage war has lain with nation states, with the Treaty both codifying the

context and limiting the nature and character of state centric warfare. The Treaty also

marked the beginning of the modern international system. It established the principles

of sovereignty of states and the fundamental right of self-determination; of legal

equality between states and of non-intervention of one state in the internal affairs of

another. These principles continue to underpin the current Westphalian system of

international relations (Howard, 1975; Gray, 2005).

The growing importance of non-state actors in conflict has led to suggestions

that we are seeing the gradual demise of this Westphalian system and its monopoly

over the legitimate use of violence for political purposes (Van Creveld, 1991). Thus,

we may now be in a period of post-modern warfare, with non-state actors playing an

increasing role in current and future (post-modern) war (Sheehan, 2007). Further,

some strategists argue that future war will be dominated by religious or cultural

drivers rather than political imperatives (Van Creveld, 1991; Keegan, 1994).

However, as culture, religion and politics are inextricably linked, it is also arguable

that Clausewitz’ understanding of the nature of war as a political construct continues

to remain relevant today (Echevarria, 2003).

THE EVOLVING CHARACTER OF WARFARE

Strategists have argued that warfare has undergone a number of generational changes

in modern and post-modern history, driven by a variety of dynamic forces, beginning

in the aftermath of the Treaty of Westphalia and continuing to the present day. These

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forces include political change, economic forces, technological and societal

developments (Lind et al 1989; Hammes 2006). These generational changes will be

briefly described so as to provide a context for our consideration of the character of

twenty-first century warfare.

First Generation Warfare.

First Generation Warfare (1GW) evolved in the post-Westphalian period and ended

with the commencement of the American Civil War in 1861 (Lind 1989; Hammes

2006). 1GW warfare was characterised by the tactics of column and linear movement

on the battlefield and battles were fought in an orderly and highly regimented manner.

The latter period of 1GW (post-French Revolution) was marked by significant

political, economic and social changes as Europe transitioned from a feudal system

and small professional armies to the mass armies of Napoleon’s Levee en Masse. This

was facilitated by political drivers (including the significant political and social

changes wrought by the French Revolution), social change and the creation of wealth-

generating economies, all necessary for the generation and sustainment of mass

armies in the field. As Clausewitz stated in respect of the French Revolution

“War…again became the affair of the people as a whole, and took on an entirely

different character, or rather approached its true character, its absolute perfection”

(Clausewitz cited in Knox et al, 2003:57). Thus the impact of the French Revolution

on the evolving character of warfare was profound. This mass mobilisation of

nationalist sentiment was concurrent with significant “practical innovations in

artillery, drill and tactics, and communications” (Bond, 1998:27). Such changes led to

significant evolution in the command, control and organisation of armies as they

adapted to the changing paradigm of warfare. Thus, the Napoleonic period marked the

transition from the era of Limited War to the era of Total War (Bond, 1998; Bell,

2007).

Second Generation Warfare.

Further developments in the nation-states ability to wage war led to the evolution of

2GW. Increased economic output and technological progress during the nineteenth

century had significant implications for the ability of states to wage war. Increased

national wealth, rapidly developing means of transportation and communication and

the ability to mass produce weapons gave national armies greater strategic mobility,

destructive means and resilience. The emergence of general staffs, railway systems,

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the telegraph, growing industrial and economic power and increased national fervour

all drove this further evolution in the character of warfare (Goerlitz, 1954; Showalter,

2003).

2GW culminated in the bloodbath of World War One (WW1), but many of its

characteristics are readily identifiable in the American Civil War. This conflict

demonstrated that it was now extremely difficult for a war to be won in a single battle;

that railroads facilitated both the rapid movement and sustainment of large armies

throughout the campaign theatre; the telegraph enabled strategic decision makers to

influence tactical actions on an ongoing basis and the mass production of weapons

and munitions allowed the war to continue despite major reversals in the field

(Grimsley, 2003; Sheehan-Dean, 2006). Both American Civil War and WW1 officers

struggled to deal with these new battlefield realities and large scale casualties for little

tactical or operational advantage became the norm. The changes brought about by

these developments culminated on the battlefields of WW1, and resulted in large scale

attrition and bloody stalemate over a protracted period of time (Ferguson, 1998). Mass

firepower led to mass slaughter and denied any attacker the ability to manoeuvre to a

point of decision on the battlefield until very late in that conflict (Griffith, 1994,

Bailey, 2003).

Third Generation Warfare.

The attritional nature of WW1 led to a major reconsideration of the character of

warfare in the 1920s and 30s. However, different states drew different conclusions

from their examination of the carnage of WW1. France saw the defence as dominant

and invested huge sums in fixed defences such as the Maginot Line (Posen, 1986;

Kier, 1997). Germany drew different conclusions and in particular saw mobility and

speed as key to future battlefield success. This was in keeping with the traditional

German way of war which always placed mobility and speed of action and thought to

the fore (Citino, 2005). In 1918, Operation Michael, the last German offensive of

WW1, demonstrated that the rapid non-linear penetration of the enemy rear area

through infiltration of forward defences could dislocate a linear defence

(Middlebrook, 1993; McDonald, 1998). This experience did much to shape German

doctrinal thought in the post war period (Condell and Zabecki, 2001). Subsequent

technological advances in the 1930s allowed the Germans to mechanise their forces

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and develop a new tactical system codified as “Blitzkrieg”. This directly led to

German tactical and operational success in the early part of WW2 (Citino, 2002;

Frieser, 2005). Subsequently, post war examination of German methods by the US led

to many German operational concepts being formally adopted by the US Army as

doctrine. Their acceptance of the concept of ‘the Operational Level’ and subsequent

development of doctrine relating to AirLand Battle were founded on earlier,

successful German concepts (Corum, 2001; Citino, 2004). Indeed, such concepts

“provided the (US) reformers with the key for the development of an advanced

conceptual substitution for the traditional paradigm of tactical attrition”

(Naveh,1997:262).

These key German concepts dominated Western military thinking until the end

of the twentieth century. Speed, surprise, battlefield agility, mission command, tempo

and the use of combined arms could create success through the physical and

psychological dislocation of the enemy. 3GW is non-linear and avoids a principally

attritional approach through manoeuvre (Naveh,1997; Citino, 2004). This approach to

warfare was central to Coalition success in the Gulf War of 1991, using 3GW

manoeuvre warfare to achieve tactical and operational success against the Iraqi Forces

(Citino, 2004).

Fourth Generation Warfare.

4GW as a theory emerged in the late 1980’s and refers to a form of warfare conducted

between states and non-state actors. 4GW is an “evolved form of insurgency that uses

all available networks – political, economic, social, military – to convince the

enemy’s decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too

costly for the perceived benefit” (Hammes, 2006:208). 4GW is a response to the

“apparent disparities between the philosophies and resources of nation-states and non-

state actors” (Williamson, 2009:4). It sees decentralised, non-state actors adopt

irregular and asymmetric methods to defeat the conventional superiority normally

enjoyed by state actors. The focus of the non-state actor is on defeating a state actor’s

essential political, cultural and population targets, seeking to destroy the moral

cohesion that binds the state based society together (Hammes, 2004; Williamson,

2009; Lind, 2010).

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It is possible to identify many of the antecedents of 4GW throughout history

but its formalisation as a modern operational theory is credited to Mao Tse-Tung who

utilised many of its tenets in his ideological insurgency in China (Hammes, 2006).

4GW has gained its current prominence as a result of recent conflicts in Iraq and

Afghanistan, where Western forces have been engaged in conflict with a variety of

non-state actors, variously classified as insurgents, terrorists or criminals. However it

is argued that a number of legacy characteristics of 3GW will be retained by the state

actors when engaged in 4GW: Mission Orders; decreasing dependence on centralised

logistics; a continued emphasis on manoeuvre over firepower and a focus on

collapsing the enemy internally rather than destroying him physically (Lind cited in

Williamson, 2009). 4GW also requires leaders to correctly identify and defeat an

opponent’s Centre of Gravity to succeed (Williamson, 2009). However, the nebulous

nature of the non-state threat makes the identification of such a Centre of Gravity

problematic.

In 4GW the state loses its monopoly on the use of force which it has controlled

since Westphalia (Lind, 2010). The activities of insurgents who operate outside the

state system, who do not recognise the norms associated with state vs. state war and

who are focused on significant societal change through any means possible are said to

threaten the status quo which has existed since 1648. Williamson argues that

4GW blurs the lines between war and politics, conflict and peace, soldier and

civilian, and battlefield violence and safe zones. This new form of warfare has

arisen from the loss of the nation-state’s monopoly on violence; from the rise of

cultural, ethnic, and religious conflict; and from the spread of globalization,

particularly advanced technology (Williamson, 2009:3).

Hybrid Warfare.

It is argued that future warfare will evolve from 4GW into a new hybrid form,

wherein adversaries will concurrently utilise all available conventional and non-

conventional capabilities at their disposal. A hybrid threat is “… any current or

potential adversary, including state, non-state and terrorist, with the ability, whether

demonstrated or likely, to simultaneously employ conventional and non conventional

means adaptively, in pursuit of their objectives” (GAO 2010:15).

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This cross utilisation of conventional and non-conventional forces and

capabilities is sometimes referred to as “convergence”, and it is argued that this

convergence of physical and psychological means, kinetic and non-kinetic effects and

combatants with non-combatants will shape future conflict (Hoffman, cited in

Williamson, 2009). This “blurring of the modes of war will involve the entire gambit

of traditional military forces, irregular forces, terrorists, criminals and disruptive

threats” (Hoffman, 2009a:35). It has also been suggested that proxy forces, such as

Hezbollah, will also play a significant role in future conflict, utilising concurrently

both conventional and guerrilla capabilities. Future warfare will be multi-modal or

multi-variant rather than the one dimensional form with which most Western armies

have traditionally been pre-occupied (Biddle and Friedman, 2008).

THE CHALLENGE AND THE RESPONSE

It is therefore broadly accepted that the post-modern battlespace is fundamentally

different to the traditional or modern battlespace and has the following general

characteristics, summarised from a number of commentators as follows:

It is currently focused on state-vs.-non-state conflict, while the future

battlespace is expected to be a hybrid form of warfare incorporating state and

non-state actors utilising all available means to prosecute their campaigns.

There is no longer a clear delineation between war and peace.

There is no clear definition as to what constitutes victory or defeat.

There is a continual blurring of the labels applicable between war, combat,

peace enforcement, peace keeping, stabilisation, nation building etc.

The post-modern battlespace is hallmarked by complexity, ambiguity,

uncertainty and volatility. (Kiszely, 2007; Biddel and Friedman, 2008;

Hoffman, 2009a; Hoffman, 2009b; Williamson, 2009).

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This evolving character of warfare has profound implications for armies

designed, configured, trained and equipped to fight Westphalian war. It has forced

many military forces to undergo significant change to adapt to the new operational

paradigm (Demchak, 2002). Significant reform and remodelling of force design and

capability has been necessary in order to deal with the new operational challenges of

the twenty-first century. Within “Western” military forces, it has required a

significant departure from forces configured to fight conventionally. The evolving

operational paradigm now requires forces that are lighter, agile, responsive, and

capable of conducting expeditionary operations at some distance from their logistic

and support bases. It requires a significantly different type of military force. This is

reflected in the British Army’s Future Forces 2020 concept which states that for the

future it will be tasked with providing “[light], specialist forces of short duration

interventions; sufficient multi-role forces to provide flexibility for larger or more

complex intervention operations or to undertake enduring stabilisation operations”

(SDSR, 2010: 24).

This rebalancing of force design began in the aftermath of Gulf War 1 and was

initially intended to harness emerging western technologies that provided battlespace

dominance and “offered the potential to revolutionise the conduct of warfare” (Terriff,

Osinga and Farrell, 2010: 2). Originally referred to as a Revolution in Military Affairs

(RMA), it was soon realised that the term was insufficient to describe the nature,

scope and extent of the change involved. While RMA focused on exploiting emerging

technologies, the change process required new thinking as well as new technology.

The term transformation was adapted to describe this broader, more fundamental

change. This process was accelerated by the seminal event that was 9/11 and

subsequent Coalition operations in Afghanistan (2001-2) and Iraq (2003) which

“focused Western military minds on the return of irregular warfare” (Terriff et al,

2010: 3). This required a very different approach to the conduct of operations than did

traditional, conventional armoured warfare for which most Western forces were

materially and psychologically equipped. This became “transformation”. US Defence

Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld defined transformation in 2003 as “... a process that

shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new

combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our

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nation’s advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our

strategic position” (emphasis added) (Rumsfeld, cited in Terriff et al, 2010:3).

Rumsfeld’s definition recognises that post-modern war requires more than

leveraging a technological advantage. It requires a new way of thinking and a new

way of operating in order to succeed in the post-modern battlespace.

THE DEFENCE FORCES AND THE OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES OF

THE FUTURE

Context.

The Irish DF is no stranger to the realities of the post-modern battlespace. Indeed, this

author would argue that the DF is more familiar with the realities of the post-modern

battlespace than it ever was of the modern (conventional) battlespace. The DF has

spent most of its existence operating in an internal security role or conducting peace

support operations overseas. It was only during the 1939 – 1945 period that the

army’s focus was on the conventional defence of the state against external aggression.

In 1960, the decision of government to respond positively to a UN request to

provide troops for operations in the Congo was to have a dramatic effect on the Irish

Army. Once deployed, the army found itself conducting operations across the entire

spectrum of conflict, including offensive operations and defensive actions, while

concurrently dealing with rebellion, internal security, local militias, mercenaries and

inter-tribal violence (Bredin, 1987; Power, 2005). Thus began a period of continuous

service on UN mandated operations which has continued to the present day. Indeed,

this author’s experience of service in places such as Lebanon, Kosovo, Croatia,

Afghanistan and Chad would be representative of the range of operational exposure

that the Army has experienced over the last 30 years. While the Army has (with the

limited exception of the 1939-1945 period) never been properly organised, trained,

equipped or prepared for the conventional defence of the state, its training

programmes and officer and senior NCO education systems deliver the range of

military capabilities required to perform across the full spectrum of conflict. This has

in the past provided the DF with the means required to deliver a small but capable

force with a broad range of capabilities and an adaptive mind-set.

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The DF Response.

Changes in the DF’s strategic and operational context has seen it follow international

best practice with its Strategic Planning Office assigned the task by the Chief Of Staff

(COS) of creating the DF’s Transformation Agenda for the period 2011 – 2013

(Defence Forces, 2011b). It identifies two primary drivers for the need to transform;

the national economic context and the consequent need to transform the wider Public

Service (not considered further in this paper) and the evolving operational

environment. In that regard it recognises that

…the rapidly evolving character of conflict and crisis management will make

considerable demands on our Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Materiel,

Leadership, Facilities and Interoperability (DOTMLPFI). This is of critical

importance as we seek to deploy and sustain high quality military forces on

demanding expeditionary operations in support of Ireland’s security and

foreign policy objectives (Defence Forces, 2011b:2).

It then goes on to identify “…the DF may find itself dealing directly and

indirectly with the consequences of the multi-faceted threat environment that is

currently emerging” (Defence Forces, 2011b:2). The Agenda identifies the modalities

involved in transforming the DF’s organisational structures; the development of single

component and joint capabilities and the strategic and operational management of the

DF. Critically, the Agenda identifies the Transformation End State as:

By end of 2013, we will develop and maintain a DF that is Flexible,

Deployable, Sustainable, Interoperable and Adaptable, capable of deploying

and sustaining high quality military forces on demanding national and overseas

expeditionary operations in support of Government security and foreign policy

objectives. (Defence Forces, 2011b:4)

It seems that the DF has embraced Rosen’s consideration of military innovation

in adapting to the evolving operational paradigm. Rosen argues that peacetime

military innovation involves a top-down campaign of military change led by a

visionary military leader (Rosen in Farrell, 2010:2). For the DF, that visionary

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leadership is provided by the Chief of Staff and his Transformation Agenda is given

the status of an Army Order. This gives it both a formal legal standing and a degree of

cultural resonance as it emanates from the office of the professional head of the DF.

What is less clear is how the strategic leadership of the DF proposes to guide and

direct the organisation during this period of transformational change. While the

Agenda states that “Strategic direction of the Transformation Agenda lies with the

Chief of Staff” and that “The management of the Transformation Agenda is vested in

the Strategic Planning Office which is designated as the principal Change Agent

within the DF”, it does not articulate a clear vision of the internal and external barriers

to transformation or how they will be identified and overcome (Defence Forces,

2011b:6)

.

Managing Transformational Change.

Maintaining continuity (delivering the DF’s outputs with reduced resources) while

concurrently transforming will be a significant leadership challenge within a highly

complex operational environment. Stacy recognises what he refers to as “the paradox

of continuity and potential transformation at the same time” (Stacy, 2005:492).

Resolving this paradox will require strategic leaders who are capable of concurrently

transforming and transacting, strategic leadership skill sets described by Kakabadse as

“an absolute necessity” (Kakabadse, 2000:6).

A major difficulty facing the DF’s strategic leadership is that the complex

operational environment does not necessarily lend itself to predictive transformation.

Mowels, Stacey and Griffin have identified that “Management theories and strategies

based in systems thinking imagine that change can be predictable in advance and

privilege the idea of wholesale transformation through the agency of leaders and

managers ‘designing’ solutions to problems (Mowels, Stacey and Griffin, 2008:807).

This alas is not the environment that the DF is operating in. With the evolving

operational paradigm undergoing constant and often unpredictable change, ‘designing

solutions’ will be immensely challenging. As Gray has said “The core problem for

those charged with the strategic function of conducting defence planning…is the need

to prepare prudently for a future about which almost everything in general is known,

but nothing is known in reliable detail” (Gray, 2010:5).

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There is also the additional complexity provided by the thorny issue of civil-

military relations in the context of transformation. Farrell recognises that civilian

policymakers can have a role in military transformation and are often the drivers of

significant change. Indeed, he states that “civil policymakers are often more open to

initiating and implementing transformation than military professionals as they have no

stake in the status quo and will be relatively unaffected by the changes brought about”

(Farrell in Terriff et al, 2010:8). This will resonate with DF officers who remember

the production of the Defence White Paper of 2000 which brought about significant

change within the DF without the active involvement of the then General Staff.

Conversely, it would appear that the DF’s Transformation Agenda was written

without any input from the Department of Defence (DOD). As the Dept. has the role

of "the administration and business of the raising, training, organisation, maintenance,

equipment, management, discipline, regulation and control according to law of the

military defence forces" (DOD,2000:8.2.2), it is difficult to see how true

transformation can be successful without the active participation and support of the

Dept. With the Govt. committed to producing a Green Paper followed by a White

Paper on defence in the near term, the strategic leadership of the DF might see this as

an opportunity to enshrine their transformation agenda within the strategic construct

at national level. This would give it the status of national policy rather than a concept

for internal, institutional consideration.

Developing Strategic Leaders and Leadership

The DF will need strong strategic leadership if it is to successfully transform to meet

the challenges of the evolving operational paradigm. So how will the DF develop the

necessary skill sets required? Graham identifies the need for military leaders with the

“ability to come to reasoned responses to unpredictable situations… to think beyond

experience, plan beyond tenure and avoid failures of imagination” (Graham, 2011: 6).

Kiszely further identifies that the post-modern battlespace will require “a far greater

breadth and variety of competencies” than in the past. This will require:

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…practioners to have a high level of understanding across a wide range of

subjects, including: the political context; the legal, moral and ethical

complexities; culture and religion; how societies work; what constitutes good

governance; the relationship between ones own armed forces and society; the

notion of human security; the concept of legitimacy; the limitations on the

utility of force; the psychology of one’s opponents and the rest of the

population.

Kiszely goes on to state:

Compared with large-scale, inter-state combat, therefore the challenges facing

military professionals conducing post-modern warfare … are certainly very

different – not least, considerably broader and more cerebral, requiring far

greater contextual understanding; and successful decision-making at all levels

is likely to depend less on purely military expertise than on the application of

wisdom. (Kiszely, 2007:8)

Meeting these challenges requires the DF to continually increase and develop

the intellectual capital available to the organisation. Broad post-graduate education

taken in tandem with professional skills development has become a cornerstone of

officer and NCO training and education over the past 10 years. Level 9/10 education

for senior officers is now the norm, with the DF’s academic partners both supporting

and challenging the DF in this regard. Strategic leader development has been

formalised, “…to promote a culture of reflexive leadership among senior officers who

have responsibility to define how the Defence Forces can best position themselves

within an evolving globalised post-modern context…that is increasingly less

amenable to predetermined or well established responses” (Galavan and Ryan,2011).

Such an approach recognises the complexity and importance of the DF’s response to

the evolving operational paradigm.

CONCLUSION

This paper has sought to explore the evolving operational paradigm facing the DF and

to consider the key organisational challenges facing its strategic leadership. It has

identified the role of transformation in preparing the force for the future and the

importance of strategic leadership development in delivering a modern force. While

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it is impossible to accurately predict the future, it is certain that effective strategic

leadership will be fundamental to operational effectiveness and the provision of

societal security for the people of Ireland into our uncertain future. A broadly based

combination of military and civilian education will remain fundamental to achieving

this objective. As President JF Kennedy so accurately identified in 1961:

You (military professionals) must know something about tactics, strategy,

logistics, but also economics, politics, diplomacy and history. You must also

know everything you can about military power, and you must also understand

the limits of military power. You must understand that few of the important

problems of our time have, in the final analysis, been resolved by military force

alone (Kennedy, 1961).

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