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Rev PA1 2002-07-05 1 Ericsson Canada Distributed Security Infrastructure [email protected] Ericsson Research Open Systems Lab Montréal – Canada June 26 , 2002

[email protected] Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

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Page 1: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 1 Ericsson Canada

Distributed Security Infrastructure

[email protected] Research Open Systems LabMontréal – Canada

June 26 , 2002

Page 2: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 2 Ericsson Canada

Agenda

• Context• Security in Telecom business • Current situation • Need for a new software • DSI Goals and functionality • DSI overview • Security services

Page 3: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 3 Ericsson Canada

Context• Target application: soft real time applications

• High Availability: 99.999% uptime

• Clustered servers

• Exposed to the Internet

• Providing services to different operators

• Running untrusted third-party software

• Software configuration evolves slowly over time: no wild software installations

Page 4: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 4 Ericsson Canada

Why Security in Telecom business?

Page 5: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 5 Ericsson Canada

Change in the market: all-IP-networks

Clients

Multi-ServiceIP Backbone

Network

NarrowbandAccess

WirelessAccess

Today

BroadbandAccess

Service Control Service Capabilities

Management & SupportApplications & Content

YesterdayD

ata/

IP N

etw

orks

PLM

N

PST

N/I

SDN

CA

TV

Services

Access Transport & Switching Networks

Page 6: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 6 Ericsson Canada

The need for a new approach

Page 7: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 7 Ericsson Canada

“Distributed Systems Require Distributed Security”

Hartman, Flinn, Beznosov, Enterprise Security with EJB and CORBA

Page 8: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 8 Ericsson Canada

Challenges in Distributed security

• Implement coherent distributed security – Many layers to fit together: Applications, Middleware, OS,

Hardware, Network …– Heterogeneous environment: variety of Hardware, Software: OS,

Middleware, Networking technologies • Integration of different security solutions from potentially

different vendors …

• System management– If manually managed, it may lead to misconfigurations and

inconsistencies

Page 9: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 9 Ericsson Canada

Patching versus Coherent framework

• Precise place to intervene when it is necessary to increase performances or the needs for the system change according to the client or legal issues

• Coherent solutions evolve over time; patching does not!In

trusi

ons

Time

Disclosure PatchReleased

Scripts Out

Figure from “Building Secure Software”, Viega-McGraw

Page 10: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 10 Ericsson Canada

Benefits of a coherent framework

• Abstracting the underlying security algorithms and mechanisms

• Reducing development time

• Minimizing the risk of creating subtle, but dangerous security vulnerabilities by reusing security tested software

• Maximize our investment for security mechanisms

Page 11: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada

Security in different types of Clusters Traditional Clusters Carrier Class Clusters

• Target application: soft real time,

• No possible security policy upon traditional login, password,

• Running for a very long time (months) under the same login without rebooting,

• Fine grained security policy based on processes,

• Pre-emptive security.

• No real time applications, • Security policy based upon login

and passwords,• Running for short period of time

(days) before each reboot,• No pre-emptive security.

Page 12: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 12 Ericsson Canada

Access control Approach on cluster computing

Security Manager

Process a

Security Manager

Node 1

Access Request?

No Security check on Process a, but on Process b• Current security approach in

cluster computing:– Generally based on user

privileges (login, password)– Life time: a session of several

hours– Scope: limited range of operations

according to the application’s nature

• Our target telecom application:– One user only– Life time: months if not years– Scope: wide range of operations,

from upgrading software to managing information in database

Node 2

Process b

Page 13: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 13 Ericsson Canada

Existing solutions

• Many existing security solutions exist:– As external security mechanisms to the servers such as firewalls

and Intrusion Detection Systems– As part of servers such as Integrity checks and some mechanisms

to enhance security as a part of OS…

• However, there are few efforts to make a coherentframework for enhancing security in a distributed system

Page 14: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 14 Ericsson Canada

Distributed Security InfrastructureGoals and Functionality

Page 15: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 15 Ericsson Canada

Project Goals

• Design an architecture that:– Supports security mechanisms to protect the system against

External attacks originating from Internet, Internal attacks (Break through a node in the cluster, O&M security, Intranet attacks ..)

– Accommodates current and future needs – Provides mechanisms for detecting and reacting to breaches – Targets Carrier Class Clustered Server

• Architectural Requirements: – Scalable and Flexible– Does not provide a single point of failure– Does not impose any performance bottlenecks– Provide ease of development

Page 16: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 16 Ericsson Canada

DSI characteristics • Coherent framework: coherent through different layers of

heterogeneous hardware, applications….

• Process level approach: security based on individual processes

• Pre-emptive security:changes in the security context will be reflected immediately

• Transparent key management: cryptographic keys ecurelystored and managed

• Dynamic security policy: run time changes in security context and policy

Page 17: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 17 Ericsson Canada

What we do vs. what we don’t do

Do Do Not• Design and implement a

coherent framework for the security needs of a cluster running a soft real time application

• Re-use as much as possible existing algorithms and protocols (COTS)

• Adapt current technologies to fit our needs and environment (soft real time)

• Invent new algorithms nor new protocols for cryptography, authentication or else

Page 18: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 18 Ericsson Canada

DSI Functionality• Access control: resources each subject should be able to

access and prevent the illegal accesses

• Authentication: verifies that the principals are who they claim to be.

• Auditing: provides a record of security relevant and allows monitoring of the subject in the system.

• Confidentiality and Integrity for communications

• Security Management

Page 19: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 19 Ericsson Canada

Distributed Security InfrastructureOverview

Page 20: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 20 Ericsson Canada

Distributed ArchitectureSecondary Security Server

Security Broker

Kern

el

SS SMSMSM

Security Server Node

Proc123Proc987

Service Provider

Security Service

Node 1 Node 2 Node 3

DSIData Traffic

SS: Security ServerSM: Security Manager

Page 21: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 21 Ericsson Canada

Security Services

Security ContextRepository

Security Context Security Manager

Security Policy Key Repository

Key Management

Auditing Service

Access Control Service

Authentication Service

Integrity Service

Page 22: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 22 Ericsson Canada

Service based (2)

• Separation between API and Implementation – Implementation changes, security patches do not affect the system

• Flexibility – Easily change, update, remove services based on needs, legal

issues • Evolution over time

Page 23: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 23 Ericsson Canada

Distributed Security Policy (DSP)• Express a coherent security vision (security policy) through

out all the cluster • Local security policy:

– Initially integrated to the secure boot software – Maintained and updated by the security server through security

broker• Based on domain enforcement • Define communication type between processes: secure,

not secure, authenticated, encrypted…

Page 24: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 24 Ericsson Canada

Distributed Security Policy

Security Broker

Data Traffic

Kern

el

SS SMSMSM

Security Server Node Node 1 Node 2 Node 3

SS: Security ServerSM: Security Manager

Port 21Proc987

Dist Sec Policy

Dist Sec PolicyDist Sec Policy

Logical Access

Page 25: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 25 Ericsson Canada

DSI CoreSecurity Server, Security Manager and

Security Communication Channel

Page 26: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 26 Ericsson Canada

Development Environment

• Kernel 2.4.17

• LSM patch 2.4.18

• Red Hat 7.2

• C/C++

• GCC 2.96

Page 27: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 27 Ericsson Canada

Secure Boot• Secure Boot: provides us with Distributed Trusted

Computing Base (DTCB)

• Kernel at secure boot is small enough to be thoroughly vulnerability tested

• Use of digital signatures and a local certification authority will prevent DTCB from malicious modifications

Page 28: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 28 Ericsson Canada

Secure Boot Status

• Development software kit done• Download boot images from the network• Checks RSA signatures on boot images• Executes the boot image• Kit based on

– Network-Boot kit• boots from LAN• runs Linux• diskless (RAM based)

– Two-kernel Monte– OpenSSL 0.9.5

Page 29: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 29 Ericsson Canada

• Security server is the reference for all security managers– It can declare a node compromised

• It manages the following tasks:– Monitoring:

• Audit the cluster: Testing the heart beats from Security managers, sending challenges to check their authenticity

• Audit the internal sub network between nodes for detecting attacks or intrusions,

– Triggering alarms, warnings to inside and outside of the cluster– Distributed Security Management – Propagate security related info through security broker: Distributed

Security Policy Updates, Node security status, Alarms, Warnings • Entry point to the DSI for administrators

Security Server

Page 30: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 30 Ericsson Canada

Security Server Status • Event Driven approach: Handlers/Callbacks for different

types of events

– More efficient and responsive to events (incidents)

– Less resource consuming, can run on background and only wake up when receiving events

• Threads for each type of channel of SCC

• Scheduler thread to trigger regular audits, heart beats, security checks

Page 31: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 31 Ericsson Canada

Security Server Status (2)• Focus:

– Event driven architecture

– Triggering alarms, updates…

– Entry point for admins,

– Basic GUI for displaying alarms, warnings,… from SMs: GTK 2.0

• First prototype done

Page 32: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 32 Ericsson Canada

Security Manager• Enhance security mechanisms locally for a node,• It manages the following tasks:

– Key Management: generating, storing, and retrieving keys for local processes

– Make access control decisions – Authenticate local and remote processes– Ensure the integrity of data sent and received– Security Context management

• Assigns SIDs for local entities• Caching and cache coherency for security contexts

– Vehicle the security status through a security broker to the security server

Page 33: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 33 Ericsson Canada

Security Manager Status

• Event Driven Approach, idem to Security Server • Threads by types of channel

• Connect to DSM through system calls

• Focus:– Security Info sent and received from SS – Interfacing with DSM

• First prototype done

Page 34: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 34 Ericsson Canada

Secure Communication Channel (SCC)

Secure O&M Channel

Alarms Channel

Security Zone Y Channel

Security Zone X Channel

APPLICATION TRAFFIC

Kern

el

SS

Primary SecurityServer

Node 1

Secondary SecurityServer

INSI

DE

CLU

STER

OU

TSID

E C

LUST

ER

SECURITY O&M/IDS

Node 2 Node 3

SM SM SM

Sun

. . . . . . . . . . . .

SPARC10Sun

SS: Security Server

SM: Security ManagerAuthenticatd/Encrypted

CommunicationsPublish/Subscribe

Events

LEGEND

Page 35: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 35 Ericsson Canada

SCC Functionality

• Broke security related info to all security elements– Attention: SCC is not used for application data but security related

information• All communications authenticated and encrypted • Based on communication channels, Publish/Subscribe

approach • Portability layer

– Published API to services must be independent from underlying security mechanisms

• Priority queuing • Based on known standard security protocols

Page 36: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 36 Ericsson Canada

Advantages of using event channels

• No single point of failure

• Inherent event filtering– Less network bandwidth – Less CPU and memory for discarding irrelevant messages

Page 37: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 37 Ericsson Canada

SCC Status• Based on CORBA

– Omni ORB 3.0.5– Why CORBA has been chosen ?

• Support for Distributed Real time and embedded systems • Support for Advanced security mechanisms: CORBA SEC • Interoperability

• XML used for Messages and Commands – Xerces 1.7.0 – XML1.0, SAX 1.0– Why XML has been chosen:

• Self Described messages: easily augment the language • XML has its own mechanisms for security: digital signature,

extra security when paranoid situation • Comes with free parsers

Page 38: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 38 Ericsson Canada

SCC Status (2)

• Focus

– Portability layer done

– Publisher/Subscriber layer for Event service done

– Channel management logics done

– Logics done

Page 39: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 39 Ericsson Canada

DSI Security Services

Page 40: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 40 Ericsson Canada

Services

• Access Control Service

• Authentication Service

• Integrity and Confidentiality for communications service

• Auditing Service

Page 41: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 41 Ericsson Canada

Integrity and confidentiality for communications (ICC)

• Based on IPSec • Security Association chosen based on SID of initiating

process and DSP• 3 kinds of SA:

– AH – ESP – No Security

• Different IP addresses are used for each SA • DSM choose source and destination IP according to SID

and DSP

Page 42: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 42 Ericsson Canada

IPSec and DSI

AH SA

ESP SA

Proc34Proc12

SMSM

SID Proc123Error

SID Check Drop

DSI LSM Module

DSP

Use

r Lev

elIP

Sec

Secu

rity

Asso

ciat

ionsSource Node Target Node

No Secure SA

SSID + SNID

IP PacketSID CheckKe

rnel

Lev

el

Source andTarget IP @

selected

Page 43: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 43 Ericsson Canada

Advantages

• Fine grain control – Type of encryption chosen according to the process

• Flexibility: Modifying dynamically the security parameters according to the context: load, security incidents,…

• Security Administrator manages the SA type to be used– Enhance security for third-party software,

• Transparent to application– Useful for third-party software

• Enhancing security by firewalling rules for each sub network used for each SA type: AH, ESP, No

Page 44: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 44 Ericsson Canada

ICC Status

• IPSec implementation FreeS/WAN 1.94 • No modification to the kernel • IP source and destination addresses passed to DSM

through LSM hooks • DSM change addresses based on SID and destination IP

only• First prototype done

– Running with FreeS/WAN – Problems with use of IP Options and FreeS/WAN

Page 45: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 45 Ericsson Canada

DSI as an Open Source Project

Page 46: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 46 Ericsson Canada

Why DSI an Open Source Project?

• Get proper peer review

• React fast in a full-disclosure world

• Establish common framework

• Joining our forces to do more and better

Page 47: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 47 Ericsson Canada

Different DSI Components

Security Agents(Security Server and Security Managers)

Secure Communication Channel

AuthenticationService

Integrity Service

Security Context

Management

SecurityPolicyManagement

Key Management

SecurityManagement

Core DSI

SecurityServices

SecurityService Providers

KernelSpace

UserSpace

DSI Components

?

?

?

?

?

?

? = Available for contribution

Access Control Service

Auditing Services

Page 48: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 48 Ericsson Canada

Project Status• Implemented:

– Distributed Trusted Computing Base (DTCB): secure boot mechanism for a diskless Linux

– DSI Linux Security Module – SCC based on OmniORB, Open Source CORBA implementation

• On going – Core DSI: First implementation done – DSI Authentication and Integrity service based on DSM and IPSec:

First prototype done – Integration of DSM and SCC: Distributed Access Control to be

extended to all necessary operations in the cluster – Work on DSP

Page 49: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 49 Ericsson Canada

Conclusion

Page 50: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 50 Ericsson Canada

DSI is important because …

• DSI provides with:

– Protection against security attacks

– In the case of security breach:• Efficient Mechanisms for Detection• Fast Reaction to control damage

Page 51: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 51 Ericsson Canada

DSI is Open Source and we need contributors

• Feedback

• Contribute some work

• Become partner

Page 52: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 52 Ericsson Canada

Contact Info

• Email: [email protected]

• Web Site: http://www.risq.ericsson.ca (206.167.214.56)

Page 53: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 53 Ericsson Canada

DSI inside a node: layered approach

Net

wor

k Le

vel

Ker

n el

L ev e

lU

ser

L ev e

l

Secure C

omm

unicationM

echanisms

Secure API

Secure API

Security Services

DSI Security Provider

DSI

Authentication

Encryption and

Decryption

Page 54: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 54 Ericsson Canada

Security context

• Privileges associated with each process, defined through the whole cluster

• Security ID: fixed size value corresponding to the security context– Can be transferred and interpreted

through the whole cluster, – Assigned by local security manager, – Unique for each entity in the

distributed system,

SID:fixed size, 64 bits

SecurityContexts:

Variable Size

Page 55: Makan.Pouzandi@Ericsson.ca Ericsson Research Open …disec.sourceforge.net/docs/dsi_ols-slides.pdf · Rev PA1 2002-07-05 11 Ericsson Canada ... – As external security mechanisms

Rev PA1 2002-07-05 55 Ericsson Canada

Telecom business changes…

• Change in the market: all-IP-networks

• Increasing number of attacks via the Internet

• Huge demand for security

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Some facts on security

• Security is a chain; it is only as secure as its weakest link.“Schneier”

• There is no 100% secure systems• Security based on firewalls is not enough to stop hackers:

Hard outside, Soft inside• Defence in Depth

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Authentication service

• Fine grained authentication: process

• Local authentication: Based on verification by DSM at kernel level

• Remote authentication: Local authentication extended by the use of IPSec – IPSec provides secure sessions between nodes with

• Authentication • Data integrity and confidentiality

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Auditing Service

• Defined requirements

• Based on Open source project EVLOG API

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Increasing number of attacks via the Internet

• 4,000 denial-of-service attacks every week(University of San Diego researchers, June 2001)

• Organizations victim of attacks via the Internet increased from 38 percent in the 1996 survey to 70 percent in 2001

(2001 Computer Crime and Security Survey)

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More money is spent on secure platforms and applications • Companies will spend 4% of their revenues on information security in

2011, up from 0.4 percent in 2001(Gartner Institute)

• Gartner analyst firm Dataquest forecast that the worldwide security-software market will grow to $4.3 billion this year, up 18 percent from $3.6 billion in 2001. Meanwhile, managed security services should grow even faster, according to market researcher IDC, which estimates that such network-protection providers will take in $2.2 billion in 2005, up from $720 million in 2000.