Marwa Daoudy - soas.ac.uk

Third International Workshop on Hydro-Hegemony, LSE, May 2007 Do not cite without author’s permission.

Conceptualizing and Disentangling CooperationConceptualizing and Disentangling Cooperation

Marwa DaoudyMarwa DaoudyGraduate Institute for International Studies (Geneva)Graduate Institute for International Studies (Geneva)Center for International Studies & Research (Paris)Center for International Studies & Research (Paris)

[email protected]

London Water Research Group- LSE-13/05/2007


UNDERLYING CONCEPTSUNDERLYING CONCEPTS

►►HegemonyHegemony

►►CooperationCooperation/Collaboration/ /Collaboration/ CoordinationCoordination

►►SecuritySecurity



CooperationCooperation

►►CoperationCoperation isis requiredrequired in in anyanysituation situation wherewhere parties must parties must actacttogethertogether in in orderorder to to achieveachieve a a mutuallymutually acceptable acceptable outcomeoutcome



CollaborationCollaboration

►►A A formform ofof cooperationcooperation requiringrequiringparties parties notnot to to defectdefect fromfrom a a mutuallymutually desirabledesirable strategystrategy for an for an individuallyindividually preferablepreferable strategystrategy



CoordinationCoordination

►►A form of cooperation requiring A form of cooperation requiring parties to pursue a common parties to pursue a common strategy in order to avoid the strategy in order to avoid the mutually undesirable outcome mutually undesirable outcome arising from the pursuit of arising from the pursuit of divergent strategiesdivergent strategies



RESEARCH QUESTIONRESEARCH QUESTION

►►WhyWhy do States do States findfind itit difficultdifficult to to cooperatecooperate??



(Neo) Realists and the Difficulty of (Neo) Realists and the Difficulty of CooperationCooperation

•• World of mistrust and constant security World of mistrust and constant security competitioncompetition

•• Little change in postLittle change in post--cold war worldcold war world

•• Cooperation can occur but is difficult (Waltz Cooperation can occur but is difficult (Waltz and and MearsheimerMearsheimer))



WhyWhy isis CooperationCooperation difficultdifficult??

►►The problem of cheatingThe problem of cheatingFear that others will cheat on Fear that others will cheat on agreements and attempt to gain agreements and attempt to gain advantages advantages

►►The problem of relative gainsThe problem of relative gainsStates are concerned by States are concerned by ““relative relative gainsgains”” rather than rather than ““absolute gainsabsolute gains””



WhyWhy isis CooperationCooperation difficultdifficult??

►►TheThe SecuritySecurity DilemmaDilemma

►►MutualMutual distrustdistrust



WhenWhen cancan CooperationCooperation OccurOccur??

►►““Security CommunitiesSecurity Communities”” (K. (K. Deutsch)Deutsch)

►►““Security RegimesSecurity Regimes”” (R. Jervis)(R. Jervis)

►►““Security ComplexSecurity Complex”” (B. Buzan) (B. Buzan) ––HydroHydro--SecuritySecurity ComplexesComplexes



Social Social ConstructivistsConstructivists andandCooperationCooperation

►►Fundamental structures of Fundamental structures of international politics are socially international politics are socially constructed constructed

►►Shared knowledge, material resources Shared knowledge, material resources and practicesand practices

►► Optimists or pessimists about Optimists or pessimists about changing international relations and changing international relations and achieving international securityachieving international security


OrientalismOrientalism

►► Edward Edward SaidSaid (1979)(1979)►► Knowledge and material power cannot be Knowledge and material power cannot be

separatedseparated►► Western culture (novels etc..) fundamentally Western culture (novels etc..) fundamentally

entwined with imperialism and the domination of entwined with imperialism and the domination of the Islamic world. the Islamic world.

►► Hegemonic way of referring to the East and its Hegemonic way of referring to the East and its people from the standpoint of western civilization.people from the standpoint of western civilization.

►► Representations have been crucial to the success Representations have been crucial to the success of economic and military domination over East and of economic and military domination over East and the construction of identities. the construction of identities.



LiberalLiberal InstitutionalistsInstitutionalists & & CooperationCooperation

►►Institutionalized cooperationInstitutionalized cooperationInstitutions operate on the basis Institutions operate on the basis of of reciprocityreciprocity

►►Opportunities to achieve Opportunities to achieve greater international securitygreater international security



►►Cooperation among egotists (Cooperation among egotists (OyeOye))►►Cooperation problem: Cooperation problem: ““cheatingcheating”” or or

nonnon--compliancecompliance

►►What strategies can states adopt to What strategies can states adopt to foster the emergence of cooperation?foster the emergence of cooperation?

Cooperation under Anarchy Cooperation under Anarchy



StrategicStrategic InteractionInteraction

►►LiberalLiberal InstitutionalistsInstitutionalists andand GameGame TheoryTheory►►AssessAssess factorsfactors thatthat inhibitinhibit collaboration in collaboration in

an an anarchicanarchic settingsetting►►FocusFocus on on thethe ineractionineraction betweenbetween twotwo actorsactors, ,

eacheach withwith onlyonly twotwo possible possible strategiesstrategies , , oneonecooperativecooperative, , oneone competitivecompetitive

►►Four possible Four possible outcomesoutcomes►►StrategiesStrategies chosenchosen on rational on rational calculationcalculation


►►Benefits of mutual cooperation (CC) Benefits of mutual cooperation (CC) relative to mutual defection (DD) & benefits relative to mutual defection (DD) & benefits of unilateral defection (DC) relative to of unilateral defection (DC) relative to unilateral cooperation (CD)unilateral cooperation (CD)

►►For mutual benefits to exist, actors must For mutual benefits to exist, actors must prefer unilateral defection (DC) to unilateral prefer unilateral defection (DC) to unilateral cooperation (CD). cooperation (CD).

►► Cooperation desirable but not automaticCooperation desirable but not automatic

Cooperation under Anarchy Cooperation under Anarchy


silentsilent confessconfess

silentsilent --11,,--11 --1010,,00

confessconfess 00,,--1010 --55, , --55

Positive-Sum Game►(Prisoner’s Dilemma)

Prisoner C

Pris

oner

R



Coop.Coop. DefectDefect

Coop.Coop. 33,,33 1,1,44

DefectDefect 44,,11 2,2,22

India & Pakistan’s Arms Race►(Prisoner’s Dilemma)

Pakistan

Indi

a



►►Equilibrium outcomes are suboptimal: Equilibrium outcomes are suboptimal: defection is dominant strategydefection is dominant strategy

►►Cooperation unlikely in singleCooperation unlikely in single--playplay►►Need to monitor and increase shadow Need to monitor and increase shadow

of the future.of the future.

Collaboration Problems Collaboration Problems


►►Expectation of continued interaction:Expectation of continued interaction:““iterated environmentiterated environment”” ((OyeOye, 1986), 1986)

►►Lengthening shadow of future:Lengthening shadow of future:►►DecomposeDecompose interactions over time interactions over time

((SchellingSchelling, 1963; , 1963; AxelrodAxelrod, 1984) , 1984) ►►IssueIssue--LinkageLinkage: cooperation on one : cooperation on one

issue contingent on cooperation in a issue contingent on cooperation in a separate future issueseparate future issue

Reciprocity as Solution to AnarchyReciprocity as Solution to Anarchy



►►Conditional Cooperation: Conditional Cooperation: ““TitTit--forfor--TatTat”” ((AxelrodAxelrod, 1984) , 1984)

►►Strict reciprocity after initial Strict reciprocity after initial cooperative move in repeated PD cooperative move in repeated PD gamegame

TitTit--forfor--TatTat



PrisonerPrisoner’’s s DilemmaDilemma►► Explains wide range of irrational outcomes in the Explains wide range of irrational outcomes in the

international arena in rational termsinternational arena in rational terms►► States choose subStates choose sub--optimal outcomeoptimal outcome►► Importance to identify mechanism that will Importance to identify mechanism that will

convince all actors that there s no danger of convince all actors that there s no danger of defectiondefection

►► Establishment of international regimes (water Establishment of international regimes (water regimes?)regimes?)

►► If dominant or hegemonic actor, actor may be If dominant or hegemonic actor, actor may be prepared to sustain the cost of producing public prepared to sustain the cost of producing public good.good.



WhyWhy HegemonyHegemony??

►►From traditional approach to From traditional approach to national security (realists):national security (realists):

InterInter--State relations as struggle for State relations as struggle for powerpowerAll that States could do is to try and All that States could do is to try and balance the power of other States to balance the power of other States to prevent anyone from achieving prevent anyone from achieving hegemonyhegemony


HegemonyHegemony((BaylisBaylis & Smith, 2005)& Smith, 2005)

►►Political and/or economic domination of Political and/or economic domination of region, usually by a superpowerregion, usually by a superpower

►►A system regulated by a dominant leader. A system regulated by a dominant leader. ►►In realist theory, the influence that a Great In realist theory, the influence that a Great

Power is able to establish on other states in Power is able to establish on other states in the systemthe system

►►Extent of influence ranges from leadership Extent of influence ranges from leadership to dominanceto dominance

►►Power and control exercised by a leading Power and control exercised by a leading state over other statesstate over other states

Documents

Marwa Daoudy - soas.ac.uk