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The inescapable conclusion of the film is that the status quo isdangerous. Continued building of settlements is going to elim-inate the possibility of a two-state solution. Israel has a peacepartner, but it must have the will to make peace. It is in Israel’slong term interest to do so.
In Montreal, Moreh was asked whether this conclusion was nota result of “cherry picking” excerpts from the interviews. Hesaid he had been accused of exactly that a number of times,but the Shin Bet officials whom he interviewed attended thepremiere of the film in Israel. None of them complained of hav-ing been misrepresented. Some of them have appeared withhim in public forums to make the case with greater force.
Moreh’s captivating presentation, which included excerptsfrom a series based on The Gatekeepers which will be broad-cast on Israeli TV, lasted two hours. The audience of 120 askeda variety of interesting questions. Soryl Rosenberg warmlythanked Moreh for an informative and stimulating evening.
Posters announcing the event were repeatedly torn down andstolen. Despite invitations, there were no Jewish communityleaders present, nor did the Canadian Jewish News assignimportance to the event by sending a reporter to cover it.
Dr. Frank Guttman is a past president of CFPN Montreal
ment expires and we return to the undesirable situation of sixmonths prior. Much more likely is that the interim accord isrenewed for a specific time period.
More desirable, of course, would be a permanent agreementbetween Iran and the P5+1.The process that began with theinterim step was intended to "reach a mutually agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure that Iran'snuclear program will be exclusively peaceful. A number of addi-tional measures will need to be introduced or upgraded in afinal agreement to bring that goal to fruition. Chief amongthem are:
- even stronger safeguards and monitoring capabilities thatwill require Iran to agree to the provisions of what is called the"Additional Protocol" of the IAEA.
- blocking the plutonium path to a bomb by Iran mothballingthe Arak reactor.
- significantly reducing the number and quality of centrifugesthat Iran could retain. Today Iran possesses almost 20,000 cen-trifuges as compared to less than 200 ten years ago.The pre-sent number is far in excess of what Iran needs for nuclearenergy purposes and a major reduction is required in order toseriously increase the pivotal breakout time.
The philosopher Voltaire once said that the best is the enemyof the good. It would, of course, be best if Iran had no possi-bility whatsoever of becoming a nuclear-weapons state. Thatalas is not possible. What can be achieved however is a dealmaking it impossible for Iran to produce a nuclear weaponwithout the world having significant warning and time torespond. That is a goal that seems within reach and well worththe effort, especially considering the alternative. Mr.Netanyahu notwithstanding, many Israeli security expertsagree.
Netanyahu Misses Iran Deal's Valuesetting back Iran's nuclear ambitions by a couple of years. Thedue date for destroying Iran's nuclear program is regrettably longpast. A military strike would accomplish little but would mostassuredly result in Iran becoming hell bent on possessing nuclearweapons. So like it or not, all that is realistically achievable is tomake it as difficult as possible for Iran to develop a nuclearweapon. The November "Joint Plan of Action" must be evaluat-ed in precisely that respect.
Our starting point is that by all accounts, Iran does not yet pos-sess a nuclear weapon and, left to their own devices, is about twoyears away from acheving one. The objective is, of course, not toleave matters to their own devices. That is what internationaldiplomacy is all about and it therefore is the only meaningful wayto assess the interim agreement. CONTINUED ON PAGE 4
PEACEMATTERSCURRENT AFFAIRS FROM CANADIAN FRIENDS OF PEACE NOW
FEBRUARY 2014
PEACEMATTERS is published by Canadian Friends of Peace Now Publications Agreement Number - 1750011
119 - 660 Eglinton Ave. E. Suite 517 Toronto, ON, M4G 2K2PH 416-322-5559 1-866-405-5387 FX 416-322-5587 E-MAIL [email protected] WEB-SITE www.peacenowcanada.org
4 PEACEMATTERS
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The November deal, In exchange for a small reduction in eco-nomic sanctions directed at Iran, will halt (and in some impor-tant areas rollback) advances in Iran's capabilities to producematerials for nuclear weapons -- in particular its stockpile ofenriched uranium. The main points are as follows:
- Iran's 20%+ enriched uranium will be neutralized [reactorgrade uranium is enriched to 3.5% and weapons grade needsto be 90% enriched] and no more produced.
- The installation and operation of additional centrifuges [thedevices used to enrich uranium] will be halted.
- Iran's acquisition of plutonium [the other route to a nuclearweapon] will be constrained by putting on hold the launch ofthe Arak heavy water reactor.
- These restrictions and others will be subject to daily intrusiveinspections and verification measures.
The effect of the deal so far would be, according to MarkFitzpatrick of the highly regarded International Institute forStrategic Studies, to double the "break-out time" it would takeIran to produce enough fuel for a nuclear weapon. Additionally,time would be needed for Iran to complete a functioning deliv-ery system necessary for "weaponizing" the fuel. While Iranwas in compliance with the terms of the agreement, it wouldnot be able to make advances. It could only do so by breakingthe agreement and making a dash to acquire a nuclearweapon.
If and when it did so, it would then take about twice as muchtime to actually possess a nuclear weapon as it would havebefore the recent agreement was reached. That in itself is aconsiderable achievement for nuclear non-proliferation.Moreover, the goal of a more permanent agreement would beto further stretch the time that Iran would need for a success-ful break-out -- during which the international communitycould mount a vigorous response.
A few months from now, the time for a permanent agreementwill be near. In the worst case scenario, the interim arrange-
By Simon Rosenblum
Simon Rosenblum is apast president of CFPN Torontoand author/editor of four bookson nuclear weapons.
Please raise your hand if you feel comfortable with Iran possess-ing nuclear weapons. I suspect that none of you has done so -and for very good reasons. Israel, in particular but by no meansalone, fears Iran becoming a nuclear weapons state. Given thestatements made by Iranian leaders from time to time aboutIsrael not being a legitimate state, Israel's concerns are morethan warranted. That is not to say that a nuclear-armed Iranwould unleash a nuclear attack on Israel. Indeed, given the con-sequences, it most probably would not. But the very thought thatit could provides reasonable grounds to be quite worried.
A few months ago, the P5+1[the permanent members of the UNSecurity Council plus Germany] signed an interim six-monthframework agreement with Iran establishing tight controls onIran's nuclear program. Israeli Prime Minister BenjaminNetanyahu was adamantly opposed to the deal and called it an"unbelievable Christmas present" to Iran,making a comparisonto the 1938 Munich pact. Netanyahu will no doubt label asappeasement anything short of the complete dismantlement ofIraq's nuclear facilities. That, of course, is completely impossibleto negotiate, nor is it achievable militarily. Ten years ago, maybe,but now.
Iran's nuclear facilities are too geographically dispersed anddeeply buried for a military attack to achieve anything more than
KerryNegotiations:a Face-saving'Framework'?
By Yossi Alpher
U.S. President Barack Obama told the Saban Forum inWashington [on December 7th] that the current goal [ofIsraeli-Palestinian talks] was to reach a "framework agree-ment" by the end of the nine months allotted for negotia-tions, in April. According to Obama, the structure of theframework agreement would be designed to give both sidesan incentive to continue discussing a final status deal. Asrecently as December 13th, a Palestinian official in Ramallahnoted after yet another meeting between Secretary of StateJohn Kerry and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas, that
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CFPN Montreal hosted a presentation by Dror Moreh, the direc-tor of The Gatekeepers, at McGill University on November 28,2013. The documentary film reveals the perspective on theoccupation of six former chiefs of the Shin Bet, Israel's securitynetwork in the Palestinian territories. The film was nominatedfor an Oscar for best documentary in 2012.
Moreh's concern about the future well-being of Israel and itsinstitutions so focus his being that there was none of thehaughtiness that one might have expected of a director who sorecently was acclaimed for his work.
Professor Neil Caplan introduced the speaker. He emphasizedthe strength of Moreh’s message: that no one understands thetoll of the occupation better than these six men interviewed inthis outstanding documentary. These men devoted their lives tothe security of the State. They are true patriots.
Moreh began his talk with some reflections on being an Israeli.During his recent travels in North America, he met many Israeliex-pats and enquired why they had emigrated. He discoveredthat they remain strongly attached to Israel. They could liveanywhere, but home was still Israel. Later he affirmed that hehad several attractive offers in the U.S. but felt strongly thatwhile he, too, could live in the diaspora, he was not going toaccept the offers. He loves living in Israel.
His talk was about the evolution and creation of TheGatekeepers. He said he did not come to the project, as somewould believe, as a leftist. The seeds of the film were plantedwhile he was working as a cinematographer on Ariel Sharon`s
Gatekeepers Director Dror MorehSpeaks in Montreal by Frank Guttman
election campaign in 2003. His company was enlisted to mar-ket Sharon. He did not come to the project as a supporter ofSharon, having served in the 1982 Lebanon war, where heexperienced the loss of close friends. He also had been inspiredand made hopeful by Yitzhak Rabin’s election and the Oslopeace process, which Sharon vehemently opposed.
The idea for The Gatekeepers emerged from a long interview hetaped with Sharon. According to a close advisor, Sharon wasdeeply affected by these leading security officials who warnedof the dangers of maintaining the occupation, especially ques-tioning the maintenance of settlements in Gaza, which theyargued represented a security liability. Sharon took these warn-ings to heart, and after serious deliberation, announced Israelwould withdraw from Gaza.
Aware of the impact the security officials had on Sharon,Moreh had a brainstorm. He would interview the heads of theShin Bet so that they could explain their views of Israel’s situ-ation as they saw it. When he told his friends, they thought hewas crazy. It would never happen. But it did, gradually. By thetime the interview process was over, he had seventy hours ofinterviews to edit.
One could not accuse the ex-Shin Bet heads of being ‘bleedinghearts.’ Ami Ayalon, naval hero, author of the second-strikecapability of Israel's nuclear-armed submarines, agreed toMoreh’s planned doc and helped him to approach the others.Moreh noted that they did not constitute an ex-Shin Bet club.(In fact they disliked each other.)
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"Kerry stressed that the two sides should reach the frameworkagreement so their negotiations...could become more serious."
From other sources I have learned that the Palestinian leader-ship is cautiously optimistic that some sort of helpful agree-ment that falls short of final status could emerge from the cur-rent talks. A framework in which the two sides map out theirareas of agreement and disagreement on each and every finalstatus issue, for example, could be a prelude to an Americanattempt to propose solutions that close all the gaps. Certainlythe framework is not intended to be an interim or partialagreement, as Kerry himself clarified in remarks made at BenGurion Airport as he left just ahead of a major blizzard that vir-tually closed down both Israel and Palestine.
It's difficult to make sense of this. The Palestinian leadershipuniformly states that no progress has been made and thatIsrael is fixated on security and settlements. High-levelPalestinian reactions to the Kerry-Allen security plan for theWest Bank rejected out of hand any residual Israeli securitypresence in the Jordan Valley, which the plan proposes,because it violates a cardinal negotiating principle establishedfrom the outset by Abbas: no Israeli soldiers will remain onPalestinian territory. (This would appear to indicate that notevery American attempt at bridging the two sides' differenceswould be acceptable to the Palestinians.)
On the Israeli side, assessments are mixed. Newly-reinstatedForeign Minister Avigdor Lieberman told the Saban Forum thetalks were doomed to failure. After a briefing by Kerry, FinanceMinister Yair Lapid was more upbeat. Chief Israeli negotiatorTzipi Livni maintains a public profile of absolute determination,while blaming the settler camp within her own government forattempting to sabotage talks.
Prime Minister Netanyahu carefully avoids substantive com-ment on the talks. Yet his government's Ministerial Committeeon Legislation [has] endorsed a bill that would mandate a two-thirds majority in the Knesset merely for the government to bepermitted to negotiate with the Palestinians on Jerusalem. IfNetanyahu allows the bill to move through the Knesset, thiswill seriously constrain Livni's freedom to talk with thePalestinians about final status issues, which include aPalestinian capital in Jerusalem.
Palestinian anger over Israel's ongoing settlement constructionand pessimism regarding the degree of progress registeredthus far is also a reflection of a concerted "anti-normalization"campaign among Palestinian intellectuals that seeks to counterand prevent informal meetings and cooperation among peace-minded people on both sides. The campaign is a constantreminder to the PLO leadership that is negotiating formallywith Israel that an influential sector of Palestinian public opin-ion is highly critical of any and all concessions.
I recently came across a depressing reminder of the pervasiveinfluence of the anti-normalization campaign. IPCRI, "Israel-Palestine: Creative Regional Initiatives" (formerly theIsrael/Palestine Center for Research and Information), is a vet-eran bi-national group engaged in peace-building and, frankly,in normalization, through initiatives like a recent Israeli-Palestinian professional women's leadership meeting in Haifa.Yet IPCRI now feels obliged to append to its reports a note that"We are against normalization".
Yossi Alpher is an Israeli strategic analyst, a former IDFand Mossad intelligence officer who was Director of theJaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University.
[L-R] - Gilbert Plaw, Frank Guttman, Dror Moreh, Soryl Rosenberg, Ruth Rohrlick, Dov Oukenev , Reuven Shultz, Toby Morantz Photo: Howard Kay
Syrian Expert Moshe Ma'oz Speaks in TorontoCFPN hosted distinguished Israeli scholar Moshe Ma'oz in Toronto onNovember 22nd. Following the Erev Shabbat service at TempleEmanu-El, Dr. Ma'oz spoke to the congregation on “Israel and theMiddle East Maelstrom.” Introduced by Rabbi Debra Landsberg, hediscussed the outlook for Israel's diplomatic and strategic prospectsin light of the Palestinian negotiations, the Syrian civil war and theIranian diplomatic engagement. Dr. Ma'oz recently completed asemester as Visiting Israeli Professor at the University of Michigan.He is professor emeritus at Hebrew University, where he was former-ly director of the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for theAdvancement of Peace. He has served the Knesset as an advisor onArab Affairs, and was a member of official advisory committees thatcounseled Prime Ministers Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin.
[L-R] Guest speaker Moshe Ma'oz, Temple Emanu-El member PatSinervo and CFPN Board members Sheldon Gordon and Erez Anzel.