UFPPC (www.ufppc.org) Digging Deeper LVII: September 15, 2008, 7:00 p.m.

Jane Mayer, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War on American Ideals (New York: Doubleday, July 2008).

Ch. 1: Panic. After 9/11 and the anthrax scare, “it is nearly impossible to exaggerate the sense of mortal and existential danger that dominated the thinking of the upper rungs of the Bush administration”—a way of thinking Dick Cheney was used to (4; 1-5). In the aftermath of 9/11, Bush and Cheney insisted in viewing raw intelligence reports; Cheney became “paranoid” (Lawrence Wilkerson) (5-6). Instead of focusing on intelligence failure, Bush and Cheney drew the lesson that the U.S. was too “soft” (6-7). Cheney was the central figure in the historically portentous decision to jettison the U.S.’s anti-torture stance and become the first nation to authorize violations of the Geneva Conventions, creating “a new system of law” (7; 7-10).

Ch. 2: Blame. The “tangled story, filled with good intentions and near misses, complicated by increasingly fractious relations with the rivalrous FBI,” which has “never been adequately explained,” of how the CIA tracked hijackers but never alerted the FBI (11, 17; 10-21; Mayer accepts unquestioningly the official conspiracy theory of 9/11). At the higher levels of government, there was a “tragic history of missed opportunities” to decide on more aggressive offensive action against Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda (24; 17-27).

Ch. 3: The Warning. Cofer Black of CIA devised a “global plan for a secret war” to be waged by CIA agents, including use of the Northern Alliance to overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan; this was eagerly signed by Bush (28-44).

Ch. 4: Men of Zeal. Through secret memos, Bush claimed the power to wage

war everywhere, including inside the U.S., ignoring congressional resistance to such powers (44-48). David Addington, Cheney’s legal counsel, was the “lead architect” of this drive for power (48-64; cf. Colin Powellsaid “he doesn’t believe in the Constitution” [87], Lawrence Wilkerson said he has “no scruples” [127]). John Yoo authored legal memos to expand presidential power in the Office of Legal Counsel, whose opinions “are legally binding on the rest of the executive branch” (65; 64-71).

Ch. 5: Detainee 001. John Walker Lindh, the American Taliban (72-79). The creation of “an alternative legal system following rules of the executive branch’s own devising” was “the origin of almost all of the Bush Administration’s most vexing legal problems in the war on terror (80; 80-83). Review of U.S.’s history of humane treatment of prisoners; the Geneva Conventions (83-85). On Nov. 13, 2001, Cheney & Addington maneuvered Bush into signing an order establishing military commissions without review within government (86-87). The legal establishment was alarmed (87-91). Lindh was ultimately tried and sentented to twenty years in prison (91-100).

Ch. 6: Outsourcing Torture. The extraordinary rendition program was puzzled out by Rajif Chandrasekaran of the Washington Post; its origins date to 1995 (101-04; 108-16). Ali Abdul Aziz al-Fakhiri, a.k.a. Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, head of bin Laden’s training camp, taken to Egypt for torture, where he said Saddam had WMD (104-08; 134-38). Daniel Coleman had success using traditional interrogation methods with Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl, a key al-Qaeda informant (115-

19). There was a struggle over rules high in the Bush administration (119-25). Mamdouh Habib, an innocent Australian suspect, was tortured in Egypt (125-28). CIA planes (128-29). The case of Maher Arar, an innocent Canadian citizen seized at JFK and rendered to Syria (129-34). The U.S. embraced torture on no rational basis (134-38).

Ch. 7: Inside the Black Sites. Capture of Abu Zubaydah (139-46). CIA set up “black sites” (146-48). Zubaydah was rendered to Thailand (148-50). A Jay Bybee memo redefined torture (150-54). FBI vs. CIA interrogation (154-57). The history of U.S. torture from the point of view of James Mitchell, a former military psychologist who was “apparent leader” of a CIA interrogation team who had earlier worked for a secretive military program called SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape) which subjected U.S. soldiers to torture to endure them to it (157-64). Torture of Zubaydah (164-77). Bush administration officials were probably victims of self-deception (177-79). Cofer Black was sidelined in 2002 as the administration’s focus shifted to Iraq (179-81).

Ch. 8: The Experiment. Reacting to paucity of intelligence from Guantanamo prisoners, SERE techniques were applied there (182-90). Al-Qahtani was identified as the missing 20th 9/11 hijacker (190-93; 211-21). High officials struggled over policy at Guantanamo (193-202). Lawyers and military rebelled, led by the FBI’s Jim Clemente (202-10).

Ch. 9: The Memo. Notified by the head of the Navy’s criminal investigation that abuse was being committed in Guantanamo, Alberto Mora, general counsel to the U.S. Navy, protested, confronting Yoo and ultimately writing a 22-page memo on Jul. 7, 2004 (213-37)

Ch. 10: A Deadly Interrogation. Abu Ghraib (238-48). The killing of al-Jamadi, a Saddam loyalist, was exposed when the Abu Ghraib scandal became public (249-60).

Ch. 11: Blowback. Jack Goldsmith, who replaced Jay Bybee at the Office of Legal Counsel, determined that all Iraqis are covered by the Fourth Geneva Convention, and became a dissident in the Bush administration (261-69). Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, “the primary architect of the 9/11 attacks,” (269 [the 9/11 Commission’s phrase in its Report, but Mayer gives no citation, and the Report itself cites KSM’s interrogation under torture as its only source]; 269-79). Goldsmith worked to reverse the torture memos (280-94). Ch. 12: Cover-Up. Dan Levin, new head of the Office of Legal Counsel, had himself waterboarded to inform his views (295-99). Rasul v. Bush (2004) asserted U.S. jurisdiction over Guantanamo prisoners, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004) rules that prisoners have due process rights (299-304). Cheney and Addington resist (304-05). Gonzales restores the “golden shield” protecting CIA agents, who were more and more worried about legal liablity (305-14). The Senate debated torture (314-16; 319-21). An effort to shut down the secret detention and interrogation program failed when Cheney intervened (316-19). Addington prepared legislation to “reverse” the Supreme Court decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006) upholding the Geneva Conventions, but Bush refused to go along (319-24). However, Cheney succeeded in keeping the secret detention program going (324-26).

Afterword. Post-9/11 has been “a battle for the country’s soul” (327). Fear has dictated policy; there has been “surprisingly little intelligent debate about the Bush Administration’s

approach to terrorism” (329). The consensus is shifting against it, however (330-334). Philip Zelikow: “Fear and anxiety were exploited by zealots and fools” (335).

Acknowledgments. Editors, friends, family. Book “written quickly” in “much of a year” (336-37).

Endnotes. 23 pp. Selectively sourced; many interviews, some with unnamed sources.

Bibliography.

A Note on Sources. Book based on 13 article in the New Yorker. Anonymous sources are necessary in national security reporting (370). Text of defensive CIA statement (370-71).

Index. 21 pp.

[About the Author. Jane Mayer is the granddaughter of American historian Allan Nevins.]