Mentalidad Cero Defectos

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Bradford, captain of the Bennington, thoughtLejeune was a poor performer. On Lejeunes firstfitness report, Bradford evaluated Lejeune as goodin professional ability and general conduct . . . ex-cellent in sobriety and health [but] not good in at-tention to duty and efficiency ofthe men under his command.6

Bradford explained his substan-dard evaluation of Lejeune in theremarks block of the fitness re-port: The men under this officer[Lejeune] are not trustworthy assentries and are not tidy and sol-dierly in appearance. The officeris apparently too indolent andlacking in zeal; he does not givethe personal attention to his menthat he should; the result is a

want of efficiency in the guard.7Even when Lejeune received asecond poor fitness report fromBradford, he did not appeal.

Commandant of the Marine Corps Brigadier Gen-eral Charles Heywood counseled Lejeune sternly ina letter: [These reports have] greatly disappointedme both as regards to you and the fact that the Corpshas been so poorly represented on board the

Bennington, and your record as an officer will begreatly affected unless you pay closer attention toyour duties.8

Lejeune received two more mediocre evaluationsfrom Bradford, although his performance had appar-ently improved somewhat: he was rated tolerableinstead of not good and received no more corre-spondence from Heywood. After 1894, while he wasstationed at the Marine Barracks in Norfolk, Vir-ginia, Lejeunes fitness reports improved consider-ably.9

Despite his poor fitness reports, Lejeune was pro-moted to first lieutenant while on theBennington.Twenty-five years later, as a major general, Lejeunecommanded the 4th Marine Brigade in France dur-ing World War I. Later that year, General John J.

Pershing appointed Lejeune commander of the 2dInfantry Division. Twenty-seven years after his poorofficer evaluations on theBennington, Lejeune be-came Commandant of the Marine Corps, a positionhe held for 9 years.

General George S. Patton, Jr., U.S. Army. In1926, Patton was the operations officer of the Ha-waiian Division, later the 24th and 25th Infantry Di-visions. Although he held the rank of colonel duringWorld War I, Patton had been demoted to major in

the postwar Army. Patton was unpopular with thedivision staff and brigade commanders because heconsistently wrote papers and after-action reportsthat admonished subordinate commanders and unitsand described them as incompetent. Major General

William R. Smith, the HawaiianDivisions commander, yielded topressure from his brigade com-manders and relieved Patton, say-ing he was too positive in histhinking and too outspoken.10

Smith administratively reassignedPatton as the division intelligenceofficer, but notably, did not end hiscareer.

In August 1943, while com-manding the Seventh Army,Patton encountered two privates

suffering from battle fatigue. Mis-takenly believing they were cow-ards and malingerers because theyhad no visible signs of wounds,

Patton lost his temper, screamed at them, andslapped them both in the face.11Pattons superior,General Dwight D. Eisenhower, reprimanded Pattonin writing, but he did not order Patton to apologizeto every soldier in Seventh Army in formation, ashe had originally planned. Eisenhowers letter of rep-rimand directed only that Patton make in the formof apology or otherwise such personal amends tothe individuals concerned as may be within [his]power.12

Patton went on to become a four-star general. Ascommander of the Third Army, he played a key rolein the defeat of Nazi Germany.

General Henry H. Hap Arnold, U.S. ArmyAir Forces. In January 1917, when Arnold was thesupply officer at the Signal Corps Aviation Schoolin San Diego, two pilots disappeared during a train-ing flight. The base commander, Colonel W.A.Glassford, did not approve the dispatch of a searchparty until 6 days later. Three days after that, search-ers found the pilots alive, but in poor condition. Arnold

and the schools training officer, Captain H.A.Dargue, demanded an army investigation into thedelay in dispatching the search party and testifiedagainst their senior officers. Glassford immediatelytransferred Darque and Arnold to non-Army AirCorps jobs.13When Arnold arrived at his new dutystation, his commander, General Clarence Edwards,greeted him and then referred to Arnolds most re-cent evaluation report: Its so rotten, it makes youstink.14

John A.Lejeune

US Marine Corps

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In February 1926, while stationed at the Air Ser-vice Headquarters in Washington, D.C., Arnold pub-licly petitioned congressmen for a separate air forceand drew news media attention. After Brigadier Gen-eral Billy Mitchells December 1925 court-martial forunauthorized remarks about airpower, the GeneralStaff forbade young officers to lobby for a separateair force publicly. Major Gen-eral Mason M. Patrick,Chief of the Army AirCorps, accused Arnold of at-tempting to influence legis-lation in a manner forbiddenby regulations and otherwisedecidedly objectionable.15

Patrick offered Arnold achoiceresign or face acourt-martial. Arnold chose

the court-martial. He hadgood reason; he was to becourt-martialed for some-thing Patrick had once askedhim to do. Two years earlier,Patrick had asked Arnold toinfluence a California con-gressman to vote in favor ofa bill the Air Service wanted passed into law. Patrickchose not to request Arnolds court-martial. He re-assigned Arnold to Fort Rileybut not before hold-ing a press conference and denouncing Arnold pub-licly. Arnold left Washington, D.C., in disgrace.16

Arnold prepared for a tepid reception at FortRiley, but General Ewing E. Booth, the post com-mander, who had been a member of the board atMitchells court-martial, welcomed Arnold: Arnold,Im glad to see you. Im proud to have you in thiscommand. I know why youre here, my boy. Andas long as youre here, you can write and say anydamned thing you want. All I ask is that you let mesee it first.17

Twelve years later, Arnold became Chief of theArmy Air Corps, thus taking over Patricks former

job. Arnold retired in 1945 as Commander of the

Army Air Forces. In 1949, President Harry S.Truman appointed Arnold the first (and still the only)permanent five-star general of the Air Force.18

The Zero-Defect Militaryand Fitness Reports

In todays military, Nimitz, Lejeune, Patton, andArnold would probably not have attained flag officerrank because the U.S. military has no room at thetop for officers found guilty at a court-martial, re-

lieved from duty, or having derogatory evaluation re-ports. But should there be? How many of us wouldselect an officer to captain a ship when he had al-ready run one aground? We might hire an officerwith derogatory evaluation reports or even one whowas relieved, but would we offer him a command?What would happen today if a general officer

slapped a soldier? The ser-vices tolerance for errors ismuch smaller today than 60years ago. Nevertheless, theleadership and tolerance thatmentors Harris, Heywood,Smith, and Booth showedto Nimitz, Lejeune, Patton,and Arnold should still ap-ply today.

Todays zero-defect mili-

tary is based on the officerfitness or Officer EvaluationReport. A poor evaluation onthe report is a fatal blow toan officers career. Manyofficers do not even try torecover from a poor evalua-tion, so good officers are lost

to corporate America because no one took thetime to coach, teach, and mentor them properly.Many officers believe that one mediocre ratingmuch less a derogatory onewill end their careers.So, instead of working together, they compete witheach other to curry favor from their superiors.Unlike with Lejeune or Arnold, when todays officerreceives a mediocre or derogatory evaluation, heimmediately begins to plan for a career other thanmilitary service. He gives little thought to redeem-ing himself because he thinks trying to do so ispointless.

Senior officers in all services are concerned aboutthe adverse effects of the zero-defect mentality.Each service recently changed its evaluation report-ing system for the same reason: the zero-defectmentality had corrupted the system. The services

goals are to eliminate severe competition among jun-ior officers and to encourage them to apply them-selves to learning their jobs instead of constantlycompeting with their peers.

After 1997, the Army began removing secondlieutenants evaluation reports from their official mili-tary personnel files when they attained the rank ofcaptain.19Historically, 95 percent of lieutenants be-come captains. Removing earlier reports means anofficers first few evaluation reports are not a fac-

Henry H. Arnold,circa 1918

US

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tor in future promotions. The lieutenant is free to fo-cus on learning his job instead of vying for the topblock within the battalion.

In 1988, the Air Force attempted to change itsreputation as the one-mistake Air Force by rede-

signing its evaluation system. The Air Force mea-sures officers on six standards with each officer ei-ther meeting or not meeting the standard.20Anofficers senior rater completes a separate promo-tion recommendation form and forwards it to a cen-tral selection board with his recommendation of apromotion category of Definitely Promote, Pro-mote, or Do Not Promote. The Definitely Pro-mote category has a fixed number of openings forofficers at the rank of major and above. Junior of-ficers do not compete against each other for Defi-nitely Promote rankings.21

Navy regulations forbid the numerical ranking of

peers on all evaluation reports, either direct or im-plied.22Instead, raters rank officers as Early Pro-mote, Must Promote, Promotable, Progress-ing, or Significant Problems. Limits exist on howmany officers the Navy can place in the top cat-egory.23In 1998, the Navy decided that ensigns andlieutenants junior grade would not be rated higherthan Promotable, saying, Forced ranking of jun-ior officers has been a major concern voiced by se-nior officers. . . . With the current ranking scheme,

a mark of Promotable is perceived as disenfranchis-ing junior officers, thereby shifting their focus fromearning warfare qualifications to competing withpeers. [E]arly competition in the initial period of of-ficer development is counterproductive and not in the

Navys best interest, particularly for officers whohave not reached their minimum service obliga-tion.24

The Marine Corps has changed its system as well,allowing one rater to numerically rank all officers inthe same grade under his supervision. Now, the raterranks each officer against all others of the samegrade that he has rated in his career. The rater isnot allowed to restart his profile and must keep thesame rating standards, which reduces cutthroat com-petition among officers within the same command.25

In 1999 and 2000, four Navy amphibious ships,the USS Underwood, Shreveport, Oak Hill, and

LaMoure County, ran aground. Two commanderswere relieved, one disciplined, and one remainedin command and continued his mission.26Will theirsupervisors remember that Nimitz once also ran aship aground? Will the Navy promote any of the fourto the next rank? How many will attend the WarCollege? Only time will tell.

Officers supervisors can determine the futurecourse of their careers. The Air Force aptly definesrating supervisors as those who know the officer

US

Army

Colonel George S. Patton, Jr.,during World War I. Pattonreverted to his regular rank ofmajor in the postwar Army andwas relieved of a divisionalstaff position after writing

papers and after-actionreports that stronglyadmonished subordinatecommanders and units hefound incompetent.

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Major Claire E. Steele, U.S. Army, is a Congressional Fellow in the CongressionalFellowship Program under the administration of the U.S. Department of the Army. Shereceived a B.S. from Siena College, an M.A. from Webster University, and an M.M.A.S.from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

NOTES

1. GEN James L. Jones, Jr., U.S. Marine Corps, speech to the U.S. Army Com-mand and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC) class of 2001, Fort Leavenworth,Kansas, 1 December 2000.

2. Ibid.3. GEN John M. Keane, letter to senior commanders concerning junior officer re-

tention, 2000. No further information given.4. Dede W. Casad and Frank A. Driskill, Chester W. Nimitz, Admiral of the Hills(Aus-

tin, TX: Eakin Press, 1983), 75.5. Ibid., 78-79.6. Merrill L. Bartlett, An Era of Candor: John A. Lejeunes First Series of Bad Fit-

ness Reports, Marine Corps Gazette(November 1994): 76.7. Ibid, 77.

8. Ibid.9. Ibid.10. Carlo DEste, Patton: A Genius for War(New York: Harper Collins, 1995), 341.11. Ibid., 533-35.12. Ibid., 536.13. Thomas M. Coffey, Hap(New York: The Viking Press, 1982), 4.14. Ibid., 89.15. Ibid., 5.16. Ibid., 127.17. Ibid., 128.

18. Ibid., 386.19. U.S. Department of the Army Pamphlet 623-105, The Officer Evaluation Report-

ing System In Brief(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1 Oc-tober 1997), 1.

20. U.S. Air Force (AF) Pamphlet (Pam) 36-2404, Guide to the Officer Evaluation Sys-tem(Washington, DC: GPO, 1 December 1996), 26.

21. Ibid, 37.22. Navy BUPERSINST 1610.10,Navy Performance Evaluation and Counseling Sys-

tem(2 August 1995), A-11. No further publishing information given.23. Ibid., A-12.24. NAVADMIN 276/98, Interim Change to Navy Performance Evaluation and Coun-

seling System Instruction(221546Z DEC 98). No further publishing information given.

25. U.S. Marine Corps Order P1610.7E with Erratum and Changes 1-2, PerformanceEvaluation System(1 January 1999), Appendix G. No further publishing informationgiven.

26. Jack Dorsey, Norfolk-Based Navy Ship Hits Reef Off Coast of Chile, TheVir-ginian-Pilot, 13 September 2000.

27. AF Pam 36-2404, 26.28. CGSOC 2001-Staff Group 4B, leadership discussion during C700, Fundamentals

of Excellence, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS,September 2000.

29. Personal conversation with a Marine Corps officer, 10 January 2001.

best.27Procedures are in place in all services toensure that the leader who knows the officer bestis the one who counsels him. However, a recentsurvey of students at the U.S. Army Command andGeneral Staff Officers Course showed that suchcounseling does not always occur.28In the end, onlya senior officers conscience determines whetheror not he creates an environment in which juniorofficers can excel.

A Recent ExampleExamples exist today of leaders who have sal-

vaged subordinates abandoned by their chain of com-mand. A Marine Corps company commanderthought a lieutenant under his command was a su-perb officer even though he had been relieved ofduty. The company commander decided to investi-gate the conditions of the lieutenants relief and dis-

covered that as a new, inexperienced weapons pla-toon commander, the lieutenant had supervised anequally inexperienced platoon sergeant who had notreceived proper weapons training. Their chain ofcommand had placed the two new leaders, the lieu-tenant and the sergeant, in charge of a combinedrange, with the lieutenant as the safety officer. Be-cause of their inexperience, an incident occurred. Itwas raining, and the platoons ammunition got wet.As a result, a 60-millimeter mortar charge wentoff, but not the increments. The weapon fired,but the round only traveled 60 to 90 feet to a loca-tion dangerously close to the soldiers on the range.

Fortunately, the round did not explode, but boththe lieutenant and staff sergeant were relieved oftheir duties and received derogatory fitness reports.

The company commander felt that the inexperi-

enced lieutenant had been set up for failure becausehe had received no training. He simply did not knowthat if the increments were wet, they would notwork. The company commander thought the newlieutenant and staff sergeant were scapegoats forsuperior officers in their chain of command. Thecompany commander gained the support of the bat-talion commander, and they salvaged the lieutenantscareer. He was selected for augmentation, promotedto captain, and became a successful company com-mander.

But, the story does not end there. The staff ser-geant worked at the battalion headquarters for about6 months, attended mortar and machinegun leadercourses, earned honors, and was assigned to theweapons platoon in the new company commandersunit. He applied himself with a vengeance, dili-gently studied the companys heavy weapons sys-

tems, and soon became the battalions weaponsexpert. The Marine Corps removed his derogatoryfitness report from his records and promoted himto gunnery sergeant.29

Is There Hope?One hopes that the military can cure the zero-de-

fect cancer. The services have taken a step in theright direction by changing their evaluation systemsto protect new junior officers from a zero-defectenvironment. Senior leaders are aware of the zero-defect mentality and are teaching officers to pre-vent it through lenience and tolerance. Given a

choice of tolerance versus zero defects, tolerancemust win because one day one of us could besupervising the next Nimitz, Lejeune, Patton, orArnold.MR

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Mentalidad Cero Defectos