Merits of Direct Democracy

7/25/2019 Merits of Direct Democracy

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Direct Democracy

In general, the term "direct democracy" usually refers to citizens making policy and lawdecisions in person, without going through representatives and legislatures. The classic

example of this is the New England Town Meeting where anyone from the town who wants toshow up to debate and vote on town policy can do so. ntil recently, this wor!ed for scores of

communities, but low attendance at many modern town meetings has raised uestions about

whether they are truly democratic.

More recent direct democracy proposals tend to focus on voting schemes #usually high tech$ thatwould allow widespread, virtually continual voting by millions of citizenson whatever

proposals surfaced. %hile useful in building up a buffet of voting methodologies for possible

use in other contexts, the lac! of organi&ed public deliberation about the issues in uestion ma!essuch proposals loo! more li!e opinion polls than exercises of citi&enship. %ise solutions to

public problems won't li!ely come off the top of a hundred million heads.

( third approach to direct democracy )) the "initiative process"adapted by a number of states

)) allows anyone to propose a law which, if they can get enough of their fellow citi&ens to co)sponsor it #usually by signing petitions$, can be voted on by the entire electorate in the next

election. %hile apparently empowering the grassroots, this process has in many instances been

co)opted by special interest groups, especially monied interests who put initiatives on the ballotto increase their wealth and power in the guise of public benefit )) or to confuse voters about

competing initiatives that actually come from the grassroots. *ince the monied interests have

more resources to hire petition)signature)gatherers and to run powerful advertising campaignsbased on extensive mar!eting surveys and expert + advice #sometimes very devious, lastminute blit&es that can't be answered before the election$, there's a real uestion about how

democratic existing initiative processes are. -urthermore, such processes offer no more

deliberation than the unproductive media debates that characteri&e most political campaigns.

Swiss direct democratic institutionsHistorically, direct democratic institutions developed from bottom-up fromthe municipal and cantonal level to the national level. Between 1848 and1873 only mandatory referendums and initiatives aimin at a complete

revision of the !ederal "onstitution were allowed. #he optional leislativereferendum was introduced in 1874, and the citi$en%s initiative for a partialamendment of the "onstitution in 18&1. #hese institutions of directdemocracy were advocated by the so called %democratic movement% whichstood in opposition to the dominatin party 'find more on the historical andphilosophical roots of (wiss direct democracy in )ndreas )uer%s paper forthis conference*.


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+urin the th century, only minor modifications were made to directdemocratic institutions. #he referendum for international treaties, introducedin 1&1 and etended in 1&77, provided participation of citicens in foreinpolicy decision-ma/in. !urthermore, the riht of the !ederal )ssembly towithdraw its decisions from the referendum procedure throuh the use of the

so-called 0urency clause ')rticle 12 of the "onstitution* was limited in1&3& and 1&4& by the introduction of the abroative referendum. (i yearsafter the introduction of womens suffrae in 1&71, the number of re5uiredsinatures for an optional referendum was raised from 3 to , andfor a popular initiative from to 1. )t the cantonal level, thepopular rihts have developed considerably since the 1&th century, and nowinclude leislative initiatives, referenda on administrative acts, as well asreferenda on one-time or recurrin financial decisions '6inder 2*.#he most important direct democratic institutions that are actually inoperation are the mandatory referendum, the optional referendum, and theciti$en%s initiative.4

The mandatory referendum

) referendum is mandatory for all amendments to the federal "onstitutionand for membership to some international orani$ations '(ee 14 of the"onstitution*. ) popular vote must be held in such cases and a doublemaority is re5uired. !or adoption, a maority of the popular vote, the votescast throuhout the country, and a maority of the cantons, cantons in whichthe maority of voters adopted the proposal, is needed. 9n the case of a splitcantonal vote '11. of 3 cantonal votes*, the bill does not o trouh.The optional referendum

"iti$ens can also challene parliamentary decisions throuh optionalreferendums. !ederal laws, enerally bindin decisions of the "onfederationand some international treaties are subect to an optional referendum '(ee 141 of the "onstitution*. 9n these cases, a popular ballot is held if ,citi$ens re5uest it within 1 days after a decrees publication. ) doublemaority is not re5uired for an optional referendum. 9n other words, only amaority of the people 'not a cantonal maority* is needed. :ptional;eferendums were introduced in 1874.The citizen's initiative

)n initiative allows citi$ens to see/ a decision on an amendment they wantto add to the federal "onstitution. ) popular vote ta/es place if 1,

sinatures are collected in favor of the initiative within the leal timeframe of18 months '(ee 138 < 13&b of the "onstitution*. !or adoption of theinitiative aain a double maority is re5uired, i.e. a maority of the popularvote 'the votes cast throuhout the country* and a maority of the cantons'cantons in which the maority of voters adopted the proposal* is needed.

Merits of Direct Democracy:1. More eective popular sovereignty: Democracy is based on the principle of


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popular sovereignty. Direct democracy as embodied in the institutions of thereferendum and initiative upholds the principle of popular sovereignty moreeectively than the institutions of representative democracy. People directly takepart in legislation. Laws made by them epress their will more authentically thanthose made by their representatives. People know their own interests better thantheir representatives. !herefore" laws made by them are likely to serve their

interests more eectively than those made by the legislature.

#. Minimum evils of party system: !he referendum and the initiative minimi$e theevils of the party system. %n many countries party system has been responsible forthe failure of democracy. Parties and their leaders often act from partisan motives"ignore national interests and the wishes of the people" misguide and confuse themasses by their partisan propaganda and even corrupt them by means of patronagethey command. Direct democracy reduces these evils to the minimum. &ltimately" itis the people who decide whether they need a particular legislative measure or not.

'. (afeguards the interest of the people: Direct democracy safeguards the interestsof the people against the vagaries" high handedness" arrogance and incompetence

of the legislature. %n every democracy the legislature is dominated by ma)ority partywhich does not always re*ect the public opinion correctly. !he dominating partyoften represents the minority opinion of the public. Direct democracy eliminates thechance of a law being passed which is not approved by a ma)ority of the citi$ens.

+. %nculcates responsibility and patriotism: Direct democracy inculcates in thepeople a sense of responsibility and strengthens their sentiment of patriotism.,nowing they themselves are architects of their fate" they behave responsibly.-esides it gives them valuable political education and familiari$es them withintricacies of legislation.

. Damper to radical polities: Direct democracy acts as a damper to radical politics"minimi$es the possibility of political upheavals and discourages unbridleddemagogy. People know that they can get a law if and when they want it. !hey alsoknow that the legislature can/t impose upon them a law which they do not like. %n asituation like this political leaders hardly get a chance to fan the passions of themasses.

Demerits of Direct democracy:1. Less important of legislature: %t is said that the referendum and the initiativeundermine the power and prestige of the legislature. %t is obvious that when thepeople themselves legislate" the legislature is bound to lose its important.

#. Legislation re0uires eperts: nother argument against direct democracy is thatin the modern society legislation re0uires epert and technical knowledge which themasses are not supposed to possess. 2aturally the laws initiated by the people arebound to be slipshod" ambiguous and incoherent.

'. &nnecessary delay by referendum: %t is argued that the referendum involvesunnecessary delay often measures of urgent importance are delayed which oftenleads to harmful conse0uences.


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+. (low social transformation: 3inally it is said that people being conservative bytemperament laws aimed at eradicating deep4rooted social evils have no chance ofbeing enacted. Direct democracy thus slows down the tempo of socialtransformation.

4. Discontents of Swiss Direct Democracy

!or the remainin time 9 would li/e to brin up the issue of campainfinancin as well as a few thouhts and more or less provocative theses onselected topics related to (wiss direct democracy.Campaign Financing:ne would epect (wit$erland, with its lonstandin and fre5uent use ofdirect democracy institutions, namely the popular initiative, the optionalreferendum and the mandatory referendum, to have developed an etensivereulation on referendum campains, includin rules on campain financinand on media access. (urprisinly, this is not the case.#he referendum at the federal level is overned by provisions of the !ederal"onstitution and by the !ederal )ct on =olitical ;ihts. >one of these containrules dealin with referendum campains in particular. However, severalfundamental rihts uaranteed by the !ederal "onstitution have to beconsidered while eaminin the leal framewor/ of referendum campains.)ccordin to article 34 pararaph of the !ederal "onstitution, theuarantee of political rihts protects the free formation of opinion by theciti$ens and the unaltered epression of their will. #his provision does notimpose strict neutrality on political authorities durin the referendum debate.)uthorities are allowed to ta/e a position and to recommend the approval orthe refusal of a referendum 5uestion. However, any /ind of politicalpropaanda by political authorities would be contrary to the constitutional

uarantee of the political rihts, even more so if public funds were to beused for such propaanda. 9t is also forbidden to rant public funds toprivate referendum committees.:ther fundamental rihts uaranteed by the !ederal "onstitution ensure thata referendum debate is fair are the freedom of opinion and information, the9

freedom of the media, the freedom of assembly and the freedom ofassociation. However, there is no specific reulation on the financin ofreferendum campains by political parties and other civil society roups.#herefore, no public funds may be used for political propaanda, campainspendin is not limited, and there is no obliation for campainers to reveal

their donors or the amount of money spent on a referendum campain. 9nthis contet we should also mention that the financin of political parties isnot reulated in (wit$erland. =olitical parties do not receive any public fundsfor their activities. )s a result, they finance themselves from membershipfees, from donations of party members, non-members, private companiesand oranisations, as well as from contributions from office holders. :n thefederal level, there are no transparency rules at all. ?hereas this is enerally


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also the case at the cantonal level, two cantons have introducedtransparency rules. 9n the canton of #icino, donations of more than 1(wiss francs to political parties have to be published. 9n the canton of@eneva, anonymous donations are forbidden and transparency rules applynot only to political parties, but also to other political roups enaed in

campains. But for the time bein, such rules are still eceptional.;eardin the access to media by political parties and other civil societyoranisations enaed in a campain, there are no rules that would applydurin referendum campains only. "ontrary to the situation in othermember states of the "ouncil of Aurope, (wiss law does not determine anofficial time frame for the referendum campain.Turnout#he on the lonterm decreasin turnout rates for direct democracy votes in(wit$erland are recurrinly deplored and debated. ?hile the averae turnoutwas approimately 2 percent ust after ?orld ?ar 99, this fiure dropped to

4 percent by the mid-1&7s. #urnout for referendum votes in the last fewyears 'from 1&7 onwards* fluctuated between percent per year andaround 3 percent on averae.10

!hree 5omponents of swiss democracy:(wit$erland is a federation6 the territory is divided into #7 cantons. !he cantonsthemselves arethe aggregate of #"788 municipalities 9cities and villages. !he political system isstrongly in*uenced bydirect participation of the people. %n addition to the participation in elections"referenda and initiatives

are the key elements of (wit$erland;s well4established tradition of direct democracy.!he consensus type democracy is a third characteristic of (wiss political system.!he institutions are designed to represent cultural diversity and to include all ma)orpolitical parties in a grand4coalition government. !his leads to a non concentrationof power in any one hand but the diusion of power among many actors. fter theelaboration of these three important elements of the (wiss political system" acomparative perspective shall eemplify the main dierences of the system vis4


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"lthou*h the S+iss federal referendum ori*inated in ,-.-/ its historicalantecedents are as old as the Helvetic polity itself( Indeed/ direct democracy is

one of three definin* elements of S+iss political culture/ the others )ein*federalism and 0more recently1 consociationalism( The direct involvement of

citizens in important political decisions is ine2trica)ly +oven into the fa)ric ofS+iss history( "s discussed )elo+/ traditional institutions of direct democracy

have lon* )een part of cantonal *overnment( The introduction of the referendumat the national level +as a predicta)le development( #ot only did the device reflectlon*standin* notions of popular soverei*nty/ it also served as a channel for

potential discontent and as a chec3 on the enhanced po+er of the federal

*overnment( In order to fully understand the function of direct democracy inS+itzerland today/ one must first loo3 to the past( This chapter traces the

development of the referendum )y hi*hli*htin* various episodes and processes inthe history of the cantons and the onfederation( For reference purposes/ I include

here three ta)les useful in analyzin* the role that direct democracy has played(Ta)le ,4, presents a )rief chronolo*y of the most important events/ Ta)le ,45

e2plains the several different types of referendum that have emer*ed/ and Ta)le,46 sho+s the overall success rate of each type( " )rief historical narrative then

follo+s/ after +hich the present mechanisms of direct democracy are descri)ed in

detail( The chapter concludes +ith an historical overvie+ and a discussion of theapplica)ility of S+iss e2perience in other countries(

Early direct democracy

#he (wiss polity dates to the Bundesbrief of 1&1, the first !ederal "harter unitin thecantons of (chwy$, Cri, and Cnterwalden in a defensive alliance. 9n 133 6ucerne oined theallianceE and in the 13s, the "onfederacy epanded to include FGrich, Bern, @larus, andFu. )lthouh modern popular mytholoy sometimes characteri$es the early alliance as anidyllic mountain democracy, most historians paint a less utopian picture. 6i/e much ofAurope in the Diddle )es, the (wiss cantons were ruled by local oliarchies that used aheavy-handed approach in dealin with the peasantry. However, the (wiss peasants areenerally thouht to have enoyed a wider rane of rihts and freedoms than eisted inmost contemporary societiesE the fact that the population was armed and s/illed in battleundoubtedly helped to mitiate the oppressive instincts of (wiss rulers. )n impressive strinof fourteenth-century military victories left little doubt as to the martial proficiency of the)lpine peasantry. #he tet of the Bundesbrief itself, which describes the union of %the men ofCri, the corporate body of (chwy$%, and %the commune of the lower valley of theCnterwalden%, suests a deree of popular involvement in the formin of the alliance.

Dore seminal in the development of direct democracy was the 6andsemeinde, the annual,soverein assembly of all male citi$ens possessin the re5uisite status to vote. #his ancient

form of ideal democracy is traceable to the thirteenth century, the first attested meetin ofa 6andsemeinde bein held in (chwy$ in 1&4. By the start of the fourteenth century, the6andsemeinde was a well-established tradition in the three allied cantons and the othermountain cantons. )ll eliible citi$ens were re5uired to attend this annual, open-air meetinto vote on cantonal laws and decrees. otes were ta/en by a show of hands. 9n terms ofsi$e, the 6andsemeinden were impressive, the smallest consistin of less than 1, andthe larest involvin more than 1, people. !ound only in @erman-spea/in (wit$erland,the 6andsemeinde cantons included Cri, (chwy$, :bwalden and >idwalden 'the twocomponents of Cnterwalden*, @larus, Fu, )ppen$ell-9nner ;hodes, and )ppen$ell-:uter


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;hodes. !ive retain the practice today, usually convenin the meetin on the last (unday in)pril or the first (unday in Day each year. #he 6andsemeinde is one of only threedocumented institutions of direct overnment by citi$en assembly in the world, the othertwo bein the ancient )thenian ecclesia and the town meetins of >ew Anland. 9t is difficultto overstate how truly etraordinary the 6andsemeinde was, particularly in the earlycenturies of its eistence. ?hile the rest of Aurope was laborin under oppressive forms of

feudal overnment and absolutism, ideal democracy was flourishin in the mountain valleysof these (wiss cantons. 9n directness of participation on a relatively lare scale, the6andsemeinde has yet to be rivalled seven centuries later.

(hortly after the introduction of the 6andsemeinde in the central mountain cantons, aparallel development occurred to the east in the ;aetian ;epublic of the #hree 6eaues 'the@otteshausbund, the @rau Bund, and the Fehnerichtebund* in what is now the canton of@raubGnden. By the start of the fifteenth century, an early form of %referendum% wasinstituted in the ;epublic. #his procedure allowed for discussion and deliberation by citi$ensof each commune before policies could adopted at the leaue or republic level. 9t was theprimary instrument for decidin oint policies between the soverein leaues, as well as fordecidin policies between the constituent communes within each leaue. 9t was not as%direct% a process as the 6andsemeinde, but it was based upon the same notion that theleitimacy of decisions rested in the assent of the people. #his mutual commitment to aform of direct democracy fostered unity between the three leaues in spite of linuisticdifferences and eoraphic barriers.

#he city cantons followed a different path of political development. 9n the thirteenth century,most were overned by oliarchic councils. However, a wave of urban unrest in the 133sresulted in the widenin of the circles of power. #he creation of lare assemblies such as6ucerne%s 1332 %"ouncil of #hree Hundred% offered more citi$ens a role in overnment."antonal uilds were iven new authority and strenth, with full participation in theovernment of some cantons. #his fourteenth-century empowerment of the uilds providedan impetus to the entrenchment of democratic processes, since most uilds were internallydemocratic. 9ndeed, the epression of opinion allowed by the uilds was not unli/e that in

the rural 6andsemeinden. 9n the city cantons of the fifteenth and siteenth centuries, mostnotably in Bern, an early form of referendum was put into practice, in which all free menassented to cantonal decisions. However, this process was eventually terminated byabsolutist patriciates. #he rulin body in each city became the "ouncil of #wo Hundred'#hree Hundred, in Bern and 6ucerne* or @reat "ouncil. 9n time, even these bodies lostpower to the smaller =etty "ouncils. Both councils were invariably controlled either by theuilds or by a few powerful families. Bern, 6ucerne, !ribour, and (olothurn essentiallybecame aristocraciesE and the constitutions of Basel, FGrich, and (chaffhausen were onlyslihtly more democratic.

However, after the (wabian war of 14&& established the autonomy the (wiss cantons andtheir freedom from Habsbur control, the thirteen-canton "onfederacy of 113 institutedthe policy of ta/in central decisions bac/ to the communes ad referendum et instruendum.9n the allied republics of @raubGnden and alais, this practice was iven meaninfuldemocratic contentE free men had the opportunity to pass udment on the decisions oftheir rulin councils. @raubGnden, in /eepin with its traditions, was particularly enthusiasticin embracin direct democracy. )ccordin to Huhes, the canton underwent %an eperimentin total democracy, in continuous revolution, and anarchism%. Cnfortunately, the institutionsof direct democracy in @raubGnden came to be plaued by warrin entry, popular violence,and intimidation. >onetheless, the belief that political leitimacy rested in the direct assentof the people remained firmly planted.


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The rise of the referendum7 revolution/ restoration/ and re*eneration

9n late 17&7, revolutionary !rance launched an invasion of (wit$erland. #he pretet ofliberatin the (wiss from their outmoded political order scarcely concealed !rench desins

on control of the strateic passes of the central )lps and on possession of Bern%s well-filledtreasury. !rench troops marched first into the Bernese Iura. #hen, in Ianuary 17&8, theyused a minor frontier incident and the pretense of upholdin an old treaty to sweep the(wiss canton of aud under their protection and ta/e the audois capital of 6ausanne byforce. Bern%s politicians and military men /new that they would be the net and fell intodispute over whether to neotiate or fiht. #he /ey 5uestion was whether or not Bern couldcount on the assistance of the other cantons. #he parties to the :ath of )arau had voweda united (wiss defense in the face of forein invasion. However, the pact between thecantons crumbled when confronted with the !rench challene. >ot only was !rance%s armytoo lare to be resisted, its promises of liberation were too temptin to be inored.Aducated men outside the hereditary patriciates were eaer to topple the old powerstructure in the cities. Basel defected from the "onfederacy in Ianuary 17&8, and )arau

followed shortly thereafter. #he brea/away cantons constituted themselves as freeterritories in anticipation of the !rench troops. #hurau soon oined them. 9n the end, Bernwas the only city canton to offer any resistance the !rench invaders. :n Darch, a force of4, Bernese soldiers, supported by only 4,& men from other cantons, attempted toward off a two-proned attac/ by a !rench army nearly double its si$e. #he city fell beforethe con5ueror%s mus/etry within the day. ?ith the defeat, the :ld ;eime of (wit$erlandeffectively collapsed, fatally wea/ened by internal forces see/in liberation from patricianrule.

#he !rench soldiers brouht with them a new political order for (wit$erland. )t an hastily-convened constitutional assembly in )arau in )pril 17&8, a draft constitution, which hadbeen drawn up by the reneade Basel patrician =eter :chs and proclaimed from =aris by>apoleon, was amended and adopted. 9n one swift stro/e, (wit$erland was outfitted with

the trappins of the modern nation-state under the %"onstitution of the Helvetic ;epublic,one and indivisible%. ) national representative assembly was establishedE twelvedepartments of state were created and placed under the oversiht of a five-membereecutive +irectoire li/e that in !ranceE and the separation of leislative, eecutive, andudicial powers was introduced. ) number of basic freedoms were proclaimed, as was theprinciple of political e5uality. Dore importantly, manhood suffrae was introduced in all thecantons via a system of indirect elections. However, subse5uent constitutions would addproperty 5ualifications that would remain for the net five decades. A5ually important wasthe creation of a unitary (wiss state. #he cantons, which had been virtually sovereinpolities before 17&8, were ruthlessly mered toether for administration by federal prefects.#he first article in the "onstitution stated, %#here shall no loner be any frontiers betweencantons and subect territories or between one canton and another.% #his particular reform

was the most ill-received, for it cut aainst the rain of cantonal autonomy and self-overnment which had lon been part of (wiss political tradition.

#he !rench-imposed "onstitution met with different reactions in the various cantons. ?hileFGrich under its uild rule was enerally receptive to the new system of overnmentE Bernwith its aristocratic past was less cooperative. However, it was in the mountain cantons thatthe !rench scheme met with the reatest defiance. #he reat maority of male citi$ens inthese cantons had enoyed !rance%s supposedly revolutionary rihts of man for more than years. +irect democracy in the form of the 6andsemeinde had offered them much


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reater control over their own affairs than that held by citi$ens in !rance. By and lare,inhabitants of the mountain cantons were fully satisfied with their own political institutions."onse5uently, there was no disruntled class of citi$ens eaer to usher in the !renchsystem. 9n three cantons, attempts to impose the new order encountered armed resistance.9n the summer of 17&8, @larus and (chwy$ rebelled. #he !rench @eneral (chauenbourattac/ed and defeated the two cantons. 9n (eptember, tiny >idwalden rose in defiance. 9n

the resultin battle aainst !rench forces vastly superior in number, every farm wastransformed into a fortress. ) slauhter ensued, in which 4 of the canton%s inhabitantswere /illed, nearly one-third of them women and children. )lthouh the rebellion wasultimately 5uashed, it cost the lives of more than , !rench soldiers.

#he early years under the new order were disastrous. !orced into a military alliance with!rance, the Helvetic ;epublic became a fre5uent battlefield in the continental strulebetween !rance and her opponents. #he population was demorali$ed by the continuedpresence of s/irmishin !rench, ;ussian, and )ustrian troops. A5ually burdensome was thetendency of !rench soldiers to pillae (wiss farms in order to /eep themselves supplied. #hefinancial pressures of the war forced the !rench to renee on a promise to eliminate feudaltithes and round rents, a plede which had been essential to ainin the support of the(wiss peasantry in some cantons. By 18, the Helvetic ;epublic was ban/rupt, 1 millionfrancs in debt after ta/in over a 2 million franc surplus.

9n addition to these difficulties, internal factiousness was ravely wea/enin the newovernment. #he most eplosive issue was the 5uestion of restorin a federal state versusmaintainin a unitary state. #he (wiss people were polari$ed between conservativeadvocates of a return to cantonal federalism, supported by )ustria, and liberal advocates ofunitarism, favorin close ties with !rance. #he new cantons, which had been formed out ofsubect territories and reconi$ed by the !rench, were stronly in favor of the latter.Between 18 and 18, there were five coups d%Jtat in which the two factions succeededeach other. #he three years of civil strife saw one unwor/able constitution follow another.

)lthouh the 17&8 constitutional system was frauht with wea/nesses and elements alien to

(wiss convention, it echoed (wiss tradition in one important respect - it laid the foundationfor direct democracy at the national level. #he 17&8 document itself was not submitted tothe people, but provision was made for subse5uent constitutional referendums.)mendments and revisions could be submitted to so-called assemblJes primaires. 9n 18,the provision came into effect when the fifth constitution was submitted to the people forapproval. (wit$erland saw her first nationwide referendum.

However, the cards were heavily stac/ed in favor of >apoleon%s preferred outcome. 9n theIune 18 vote, it was publicly announced beforehand that abstentions would be consideredaffirmative ballots. #hus, the apathetic, the ambivalent, and the inconvenienced would all becounted as supporters of the new reime, as would be the many (wiss citi$ens who had lostall faith in the new order and opted out of the debate entirely. #he "onstitution was

accepted with &, votes aainst and only 7, in favor, because there were 127,abstentions.

9n response to the perceived unfairness of the outcome, supporters of the :ld ;eime led(wiss soldiers in a rebellion that threatened to topple the overnment once and for all.>apoleon responded by reintroducin the !rench army and intervenin personally as theself-proclaimed %Dediator% in the conflict. Cnder the )ct of Dediation of 1& !ebruary 183,he imposed a new "onstitution, which restored the sovereinty of the cantons in a federalsystem, officially leitimi$ed the new cantons and set the cantonal boundaries that have


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persisted to the present day. #he framewor/ replaced the Helvetic ;epublic with a new"onfederation, in which 1& cantons were formally reconi$ed. #he "onfederation did notinclude >euchKtel, alais, or @eneva, all of which were anneed to !rance. ) streamlinedand more powerful !ederal +iet was created. ;espectin traditional (wiss democracy,>apoleon presented forms of cantonal overnment more closely related to those of the oldconfederate system. However, the hereditary basis of suffrae that had eisted in some

cantons was replaced by a straiht wealth 5ualification. #he structure of the new systemwould offer clear advantaes to the liberal allies of !rance.

#he 183 "onstitution functioned ade5uately and was enerally well-receivedE this resultwas reatly aided by the fact that there were no battles on (wiss soil for more than adecade. However, the international environment chaned drastically followin the successfulinvasion of (wit$erland by troops under )ustrian command in 1813 and the final defeat of>apoleon at ?aterloo in 181. #he !rench prop behind the constitutional structurecollapsedE and in the ensuin power vacuum, (wit$erland was left free to determine herown political framewor/. )ustria and her allies, ;ussia, Britain, and =russia, made no claimto mediate in (wit$erland, leavin the (wiss wide leeway in shapin any new constitution.)ddin to the confusion was the epansion of the "onfederation. #he cantons which hadoined in 183 ')arau, @raubGnden, (t. @allen, #icino, and aud* were allowed to retaintheir e5ual status, and the three anneed by !rance were re-admitted.

#he old rift between advocates of federalism and those of unitarism opened aain,promptin the settlement of 181. #he conservative, anti-!rench federalists concededreconition of the !ederal +iet, as well as the office of the 6andamman, the rotatin nationaleecutive established in the Dediation "onstitution. However, the net effect of theareement was still a maor retrenchment in the direction of the old cantonal "onfederacy.)doptin the "onstitution of 181 without a referendum, the +iet abdicated much of itsauthority and ac/nowleded that the cantons were the soverein bodies which had createdthe union. #he +iet stated that the purpose of the federation was %to maintain their Lthecantons%M freedom, independence and security aainst attac/s of forein powers, and topreserve peace and order within%. 9t could only act with the approval of a maority of the

cantons. #he period became /nown as the ;estoration.

9n 183, referendums assumed a new importance in (wit$erland. 9nfluenced by the Iuly;evolution in =aris, reform-oriented %6iberals% in a number of cantons enineered successfulcoups. ) wave of democratic reform ensued in the so-called 6iberal ;eeneration. !ollowinevery 6iberal ta/e-over ecept that in !ribour, the new leadership established theconstitutional referendum at the cantonal level. (ubectin proposed chanes to a popularvote, the 6iberal cantonal reimes rewrote their constitutions and leitimi$ed the new powerstructures via direct democracy. However, they were reluctant to ta/e any chances. #heyonly offered a restricted franchise and sometimes insisted on a publicly spo/en voterecorded by a carefully selected electoral committee. #he role of leitimi$in new reimes,so prominent in the use of the referendum outside of (wit$erland in the twentieth century,

was the first role it assumed in (wit$erland as well.

#he same period also witnessed the introduction of the optional leislative referendum,which allowed citi$ens to challene routine laws by petition, thereby brinin the 5uestionsbefore the electorate. alais and @raubGnden had already established the institution by183. (t. @allen oined them in 1831, followed by Baselland in 183. #hen in 1841 thedevice was adopted by 6ucerne, and by aud and (chwy$ in 184 and 1848 respectively.)fter 1848, the optional leislative referendum spread rapidly throuhout the remainincantons. 9n addition, a number of cantons proclaimed the riht of their citi$ens to call a


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constitutional initiative for total revision. #his institution enabled the people of a canton todemand a fundamental revision of the cantonal basic law. !irst proclaimed in several of theconstitutions drafted after the 183 movement, the institution was viewed by some asdanerous and destabili$in. However by 1848, it was widely reconi$ed to be an effectivesafeuard aainst revolutionary violence, in that it channelled public discontent into a state-sanctioned avenue of reform.

#he events leadin up to the establishment of the cantonal referendums and initiatives inthe 183-1833 period demonstrated the etent to which the popularity of direct democracystemmed from pervasive discontent with cantonal leadership. #he conservative federalistshad one too far in their retrenchment after >apoleon%s defeat. >ineteenth-century(wit$erland was becomin too reminiscent of the old reime, revivin some of itsundemocratic characteristics alon with the enerally-desired return to federalism. Danycantonal rulers had become aristocratic or oliarchic, betrayin the democratic spirit of thetimes. ) similar public discontent inspired the second sure in the establishment ofreferendums, which occurred in 1848.

#he referendum was not only a response to undemocratic tendencies amon the cantonalleadership, it was also seen as a viable replacement for communal direct assemblies andcantonal 6andsemeinden. =opulation rowth was ma/in such meetins impractical. )s@eneva%s Iean-Iac5ues ;ousseau reasoned, %+emocratic overnment suits small states,...where the people may be readily assembled and where each citi$en may easily /now all theothers%. 9n ;ousseau%s view, only diminutive states, such as the (wiss mountain cantons ofthe eihteenth century and earlier, could preserve direct democracy in its ideal formN %)llthins carefully considered, 9 do not see how it will be possible henceforth amon peopleli/e us for the soverein to maintain an eercise of its rihts unless the republic is verysmall.% Had he lived another 7 years, he would have seen referendums and initiativeswidely adopted in his homeland as an answer to the problem. 9n some cantons, such as(chwy$ and Fu in 1848, the substitution was immediate and direct, with the referendumintroduced as the 6andsemeinde was withdrawn. :thers preserved their citi$en assembliesalonside modern parliaments. #his is still the case in the five cantons which retain their

6andsemeinden - :bwalden, >idwalden, )ppen$ell-9nner ;hodes, )ppen$ell-:uter ;hodes,and @larus.

) third force also contributed to the introduction of referendums and initiatives in thecantons - the ambition of enterprisin politicians. :utsiders who wished admittance to theinner circles of power found that they could ma/e their entrance on the shoulders of thepeople. )spirin leaders in the cantons called for the adoption of various referendumdevices, winnin massive public support and personal acclaim by doin so. :pposin such ademocratic call was difficult. )s Huhes notes, nearly every canton had its dominantpersonality who rose to federal office while maintainin a secure base in referendumdemocracy.

9n 183&, an important discovery was made by the ;iht in (wit$erland. )lthouh the6iberals had risen to power in many cantons by callin for the establishment of referendumprocedures, the conservatives found that they could benefit from the referendum%soperation. Beneath the enfranchised aristocracy was a vast pool of non-votin commoners.!ar from revolutionary, this potential electorate was fundamentally conservative in politicaloutloo/, with a stron reliious strea/. #he ;iht reali$ed that if suffrae could be etended,they miht achieve a loc/ on power. "onse5uently, both =rotestant and "atholicconservatives became ardent defenders of broadenin the franchise and etendin thescope of the referendum. #his pattern, in which proressive forces call for the referendum


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only to see conservatives reap the rewards, has been repeated many times since, in(wit$erland as well as in many other countries.

#he spread of cantonal direct democracy in the 183s was well received by (wit$erland%s"atholic interests for another reason. )lthouh the 181 settlement left "atholic politicalfactions in effective control of a number of smaller cantons, they were loc/ed into minority

status in the larer, liberal cantons. "onservative in character, the "atholic community waspolitically active and souht to solidify its position in overnment where possible."onse5uently, "atholic political forces became fervent advocates for decentrali$ed authority,cantonal sovereinty, and popular votin rihts in referendums. #he referendum was seenas a vital means of securin power in cantons with a "atholic maority.

,-.84,-9,7 The da+n of the federal referendum

9n 1847, (wit$erland was torn apart by civil war. Aver since the siteenth century thedivision between =rotestants and "atholics had been a source of periodic crises, often of a

violent nature. #he (onderbund ?ar of 1847 was the culmination of several years of tensionand bloodshed that had transformed (wit$erland into the Clster of nineteenth centuryAurope. #he wave of political reform unleashed by the (wiss 6iberals in 183 had a stronsecular tine to it, which (wiss "atholics found particularly offensive. Anthusiastic 6iberalsattac/ed the authority of the "hurch and bean implementin systems of free publicschoolin. 6iberalism soon evolved into a more inclusive and broad-based form /nown as;adicalism, but it was no more accommodatin toward "atholicism or conservatism. 9n the184s, the political environment became eplosive. "atholics in 6ucerne pulled off asuccessful counter-coup in 1841, oustin the ;adical authorities and turnin cantonaleducation over to the Iesuit :rder. @ans of ;adicals responded by attac/in 6ucerne in1841 and 184. 9n neihborin )arau, an armed "atholic resistance challened the ;adical=arty overnment as it dissolved the canton%s monasteries.

9t was in this volatile environment that the conservative and "atholic cantons concertedtheir resistance efforts and formed the secret (onderbund alliance. 9t included 6ucerne, Cri,(chwy$, :b- and >idwalden, Fu, !ribour, and alais. Cnder the !ederal =act of 181,such a leaue was illeal. 9t was clearly secessionist at heart. #he (onderbund even beanto conduct its own forein policy. onstantin (iewart, the (chultheiss of 6ucerne,conducted secret tal/s with Detternich of )ustria. (ee/in Detternich%s assistance, heintended to redraw cantonal boundaries in a way that would completely separate the ;adicalcantons on either side of the conservative "atholic center. :nce the (onderbund wasdiscovered, the ;adical cantons immediately called for its abolition. )lthouh the ;adicalroupin already represented 8 percent of the (wiss population and controlled an evenlarer slice of (wit$erland%s wealth, they still did not control the federal +iet. 9n 1842 and1847, ;adical overnments too/ over in more cantons, enouh to produce an absolute

maority in the +iet. By 1847, they controlled 1 votes and two half-votes out of the total cantonal votes. #he political balance of power had now tipped as well. #he +iet declaredthe (onderbund dissolved and called for the epulsion of the Iesuits from (wit$erland.

"ivil war was inevitable. #he (onderbund selected as its military commander Iohann Clrichvon (alis-(olio, a =rotestant. 9t also bean to appeal for assistance from abroad. Dany ofthe conservative, aristocratic reimes of Aurope were annoyed by the ;adical cantons andmiht have intervened if the conflict had been allowed to dra on. #he +iet had no intentionof allowin this to happen, votin to use force in the dissolution of the (onderbund. @eneral


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Henri +ufour, the commander of the federal forces, struc/ immediately with his army of1,, ta/in !ribour and Fu, then 6ucerne nine days later. 9n 2 short days in>ovember and +ecember of 1847, he brouht the (onderbund to its /nees and acceptedthe rebel cantons% surrender. "asualties were remar/ably low, with the federal side losinapproimately 1 men and the (onderbund even less. Bismarc/ dismissed the whole affairas a Hasenschiessen 'rabbit shoot*.

>onetheless, the repercussions of the conflict shaped the political environment of(wit$erland for decades to come. 9n early 1848, twenty-three +iet deleates drafted a newfederal constitution for (wit$erland. )lthouh the document was imposed by the victorious;adical maority, it was fairly even-handed, representin a sincere effort to heal the nation%swounds. 9t uaranteed a host of civil liberties, includin the freedom of association, e5ualitybefore the law, and the riht to choose one%s place of residence. #he cantons lost a dereeof autonomy, includin the riht to levy customs duties. "urrency was unified, as wereweihts and measures. However, considerable cantonal sovereinty was maintained, indeference to the wishes of the defeated cantons. 9n the newly-created !ederal )ssembly thebicameral structure of the C( "onress was copied, in order to concede disproportionateinfluence to the smaller cantons in the second chamber, the "ouncil of (tates. "omposed of44 members, two for each canton and one for each half-canton, the "ouncil of (tates waseplicitly intended to protect minorities and cantonal preroatives in the new federal state.#he larer chamber, the >ational "ouncil, was chosen on a popular basis of one member forevery , citi$ens. ) seven-member eecutive, the !ederal "ouncil, was created. ?ithinthis colleial body, the =residency of the "onfederation would rotate on a yearly basis.)ain, the framers souht to uard aainst the dominance of any sinle person or canton inthe federal overnment.

Dore importantly for the purposes of this study, the 1848 settlement brouht thereferendum to the federal level. )lthouh the "onstitution itself was not subected to anational vote 'in which it would undoubtedly have been accepted by a lare marin*, it wassubmitted to the individual cantons for approvalE and most held a bindin referendum onthe issue. #he 1848 "onstitution enshrined the obliatory constitutional referendum at the

federal level, but only on future amendments to the "onstitution passed by the !ederal)ssembly. 9t also established the constitutional initiative for total revision, by which ,citi$ens could petition the overnment to call a referendum on a proposed rewritin of thedocument. !urthermore, the 1848 "onstitution imposed both the constitutional initiative fortotal revision and the obliatory referendum 'for constitutional amendments* upon thecantons which did not already possess the institutions. )lthouh it did not adopt the optional'or %facultative%* referendum, the 1848 "onstitution set the stae for its arrival by implyinthat all vital national decisions should be subect to a popular vote.

?ithin the cantons, direct democracy received a new boost. +emands for a stroner federalunion had fre5uently been accompanied by demands for reater democracy in politicalinstitutions. :nce the settlement of 1848 achieved the former, citi$ens in the cantons bean

to press for the latter. 9t was arued that the centrali$ation of power embodied in the federalconstitution must be compensated by a democratic dispersal of power in the cantons. :neof the most %direct% of the various types of referendums is the leislative initiative 'asopposed to constitutional initiative*, in which citi$ens enoy the riht to propose routinepieces of leislation and enact them by popular vote, circumventin the leislature entirely.aud had already pioneered the institution in 184, and the idea was spreadin rapidly.)arau introduced the device in 18. )fter 182, the cause ained new momentum.Baselland established the leislative initiative in 1823, followed by FGrich, #hurau, and(olothurn in 182&.


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!or several decades after 1848, the ;adicals enoyed political heemony in (wit$erland.#heir faction in the !ederal )ssembly, the !reisinnie, held a considerable maority in bothhouses. #he seven-member !ederal "ouncil was drawn eclusively from their ran/sE andwould continue to be so until 18&1. However, their control of (wiss political institutions sincethe 183s had not been based upon universal manhood suffraeE and they were reluctant to

remove property 5ualifications for fear of losin electoral strenth. )s Huhes speculates,the ;adicals may not have represented the will of the maority in (wit$erland. )fter 1848,they fortified their position with more subtle devices such as the intimidation of employees,eclusions from the votin reister, and errymanderin. (uch tactics were successful inensurin continued ;adical maorities in the !ederal )ssembly.

#his was not a situation the defeated (onderbund cantons accepted happily. (wit$erlandwas very much a maoritarian polity at the national level, with little political influence left forthe "atholics and the conservatives. :ne means by which they could epress theiropposition to the ;adicals was throuh the federal constitutional referendum. 9n the mid-182s, ;adical overnments introduced a number of proposed amendments to the"onstitution. #hey repeatedly found "atholic and conservative interests allied in oppositionto the proposals. #hese two roups were able to mobili$e their membership to vote in larenumbers. "ombined with ;adicals and =rotestants dissentin on any iven issue, thealliance could be 5uite effective. By Ianuary 1822, the ;adical =arliament had passed nineconstitutional amendments, which were presented toether on one national referendumballot. #he issues under consideration were diverse. ?eihts and measures were to bestandardi$ed, suffrae 5ualifications at the cantonal and communal level were to be set,lotteries were to be prohibited, and certain criminal punishments were to be eliminated. )llwere reected in the popular vote but one, an amendment bannin discrimination aainstIews which passed narrowly, with 3. percent approval. 9n referendum after referendumuntil the turn of the century, the cantons defeated in the (onderbund ?ar would be foundon one side of the issue, while most of the victorious cantons lined up on the other side. #hescars of the 1847 conflict ran deep and would remain for enerations.

)lthouh political out-roups used the referendum effectively at the federal level to opposethe overnment, the scope of the device was limited to constitutional issues raised by thosein power. #he federal referendum from 1848 to 1874 was essentially a controlled one. #hefacultative leislative referendum, by which citi$ens could challene any statute and place itbefore the people, eisted only in the cantons.

his was to chane with the constitutional revision of 1874. #he rulin ;adicals wanted toepand the central overnment%s powers in various ways. #hey souht the centrali$ation ofthe (wiss military, as well as reater uniformity in economic leislation. #he once laisse$-faire ;adicals were becomin more interventionist in their old ae, desirin theconstitutional authority to reulate (wit$erland%s economy. )t the same time, a diversecoalition of proressives, socialists, rural populists, and supporters of the old rulin families

was bound toether by the common desire for more direct democracy, specifically thefacultative leislative referendum at the federal level. #his broad democratic movement, incombination with the conservative and "atholic opposition, challened ;adical heemony."oncedin the desirability of a federal leislative referendum, the ;adical overnmentplaced the proposal alonside its own list of constitutional reforms. 9n 187, the first ;adicalattempt at a total revision of the "onstitution was put to a popular vote. :f course, the term%total% was a misnomer, since the proposed document retained virtually all of the 1848political institutions without alteration. #he proposal was defeated closely, with . percentof the electorate votin aainst it. !ederalists from the "atholic central cantons combined


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with federalists in the =rotestant west to bloc/ an unacceptable epansion of centralauthority.

#wo years later the ;adical overnment tried aain. #he federal leislative referendum wasretained as part of the revision pac/ae. 9t served as a concession to the democraticmovement and to the conservative minority. #he device was also viewed as a

counterbalance to the removal to Bern of some of the cantonal overnments% powersE itoffered federalists a means of fihtin future attempts to erode cantonal authority. #heprimary chane in the second draft was that the much-resented centrali$in clauses werescaled bac/, while the anti-"atholic ones were enhanced. #he tactic wor/edE the =rotestantfederalist opposition was enticed to come on board and separate itself from the "atholics.#he 1874 !ederal "onstitution passed with a popular endorsement of 23. percent.

)lthouh the new "onstitution was a triumph for the ;adical =arty, particularly in achievinthe unification of (wit$erland into a sinle economic entity, it opened the door to forces thatwould end the era of ;adical dominance. #hese forces would find epression in a new staeof direct democracy. ?ith 3, sinatures - not difficult to achieve in a country of .7million - or with the vote of eiht cantons, any non-urent law could be challened in a

nationwide referendum. +ieter !ahrni describes the introduction of the federal leislativereferendum as %one of the most important turnin points in modern (wiss history. #o thisday the referendum has remained the lynchpin of the (wiss political system.%

#he 1874 "onstitution eacerbated the alienation felt by (wiss "atholics in national politics.)t the same time, it ave them a valuable new device for challenin and obstructin;adical policies. #he "atholic-conservative alliance was particularly stron in its defense offederalism. Amployin the referendum repeatedly, federalist forces struc/ down numerousstatutes which threatened cantonal preroatives. otin rihts acts were reected in 187and 1877. ) statute introducin paper currency was stopped in 1872. 6eislation on primaryschools was defeated in 188, and attempts to orani$e a +epartment of Iustice and anational criminal code were bloc/ed in 1884. 9n addition to this federalist alliance, the"atholics successfully established common cause with the rowin socialist movement on

numerous occasions to defeat overnment proposals. #hese alliances, both of which wereorani$ed to neate ;adical leislation, eventually threatened to brin federal political life toa standstill. +urin the ten-year period of 187-1884, 14 federal laws were challened byreferendumE 11, or 7& percent, were reected. )s +er Bund, the pro-overnment paper inBern, lamentedN %9n this way the popular referendum, which was supposed to consolidatethe bonds between liberty and order, is bein deraded to an instrument of revolution and isbrinin about the disinteration of the state.%

#his account captured the frustration felt by ;adicals at the time. However, its conclusionwas inaccurate. #he effect of the referendum was not revolutionaryE it was conservative andobstructionist. #he (wiss political system between 1848 and 18&1 was not a on/ordan$-+emo/ratieE it was maoritarian system in which the ;adical maority ealously uarded its

monopoly of power in federal representative institutions. #he referendum was a tool usedeclusively by alliances of political minorities as a bra/e on ;adical policies. 9n this way, itwas provin to be an etremely effective chec/ on the leislature and the !ederal "ouncil.)lthouh errymanderin, superior campainin, and voter loyalty /ept the ;adicals firmlyin the maority in the !ederal )ssembly, direct democracy continually revealed maorities inthe electorate opposed to ;adical policies. #hese repeated defeats foreshadowed the cominend to ;adical domination of (wiss representative institutions.


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#he referendum in (wit$erland had evolved into a completely different animal from that in!rance. #he !rench used controlled referendums throuhout the nineteenth century toleitimi$e new reimes and constitutional structures. 9t was a self-affirmin way of hailininstitutional proress. "onse5uently, it was not unusual to see affirmative maorities of morethan & percent. 9n (wit$erland, the referendum was uncontrolled. #he (wiss people used itto preserve the status 5uo and 5uestion the so-called %proress% advocated by those in

power.

9n 1884, followin a decade of referendum defeats, the ;adicals finally ave in and openedthe circle of political power. 9n an effort to co-opt the opposition, a "atholic 'who was also aconservative* was elected to the !ederal "ouncil and made =resident - Iosef Femp. #hisconcession resulted in a deree of referendal success for the ;adicals. Between 188 and18&, only two laws were challenedE and neither was ultimately reected by the people.However, the election of Femp was not enouh to enlist the full support of "atholics andconservatives. Aarly in 18&1, a law providin pensions to federal officials was challenedand defeated in a referendum. 6ater the same year, a crucial statute nationali$in the (wissrailways was reected by 28.& percent of the electorate. ?hat then resulted was a rareoccurrence in the (wiss political system - a !ederal "ouncillor resined. #he "ouncillorconcerned was Amil ?elti, one of the most prominent (wiss politicians of his era.

#he vacancy was filled by a second "atholic conservative, a move which finally ave the"atholics a meaninful level of participation in the national eecutive body. #he eventmar/ed an important turnin point in (wiss political history. 9t was the first step in theprocess of ma/in the composition of the federal eecutive proportional to the strenth ofparties in the electorate. #he process would culminate in 1&& with the establishment of the%maic formula% whereby the !ederal "ouncil would henceforth be composed of two ;adicals,two "hristian +emocrats, two (ocial +emocrats, and one member of the ararian (wiss=eople%s =arty. 9n 18&1, (wit$erland left behind the maoritarian concept of democracy inwhich overnment and opposition theoretically alternated between full possession of politicalpower and relative powerlessness. #he sharin of power embodied in the concept ofon/ordan$-+emo/ratie was born. #he role of the referendum in brinin about this

transformation is difficult to eaerate. ?ithout it, the "atholics and conservatives wouldnever have been able to force open the doors of power. #he 1874 introduction of the federalleislative referendum also demonstrated how one structural innovation could have far-reachin conse5uences on informal 'but crucial* distributions of political power.

18&1 was an important year in the history of direct democracy for another reason. #heconstitutional initiative for partial revision was introduced at the federal level. #he 1848"onstitution established the people%s riht to demand the total revision of the "onstitution,which loically implied the riht to demand specific amendments. #he deleates at the!ederal "onstituent )ssembly had clearly stated that this was the case. However,subse5uent ;adical overnments were not eaer to concede this etra measure of directdemocracy in a period when they were ta/in beatin after beatin in national referendums.

9n 187&, a petition with , sinatures was submitted, re5uestin a partial amendmentof the "onstitution. 9n what was seen as a somewhat autocratic response, the !ederal)ssembly refused to consider it. ?idespread feelins of discontent bean to emere. ) yearlater, an initiative for a constitutional amendment concernin paper currency was submittedunder the uise of a total constitutional revision. )lthouh the initiative failed in the popularvote, it established a danerous precedent to which the overnment felt it must respond.=roposals for minor constitutional amendments were bein treated as total revisions of the"onstitution. 9t became clear that a constitutional initiative for partial revision wasnecessary to complement the initiative for total revision. However, there was considerable


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disareement as to the li/ely conse5uences of introducin the device. (ome politiciansfeared that the it would have a destabili$in, even revolutionary, effect. :thers predictedthat it would have ust the opposite effect by ivin voice to popular discontent before iterupted in civil unrest. >ational "ouncil D= )lbert @obat warned that allowin initiatives forconstitutional amendments would result in the possibility of a %friedlichen (taatsstreich%'peaceful coup d%Jtat* whenever the overnment was defeated on such issues. He assumed

that the loic of maoritarian democracy would prevail, in which defeat on important matterswould prompt calls for the resination of the overnment and the dissolution of theparliament. His prediction was subse5uently proven wron, as the passae of initiatives towhich the overnment was opposed rarely resulted in even the suestion of resination.

9n 18&1, the overnment finally conceded and placed before the people an amendmentintroducin the partial constitutional initiative. 9t succeeded, with 2.3 percent votin infavor, but the distribution of votes indicated that the maority of ;adicals in the populationwere opposed. #he ;adicals in the !ederal )ssembly were also uneasy about theopportunities afforded to their political opponents by this new device. #he threat of anti-overnment initiatives bein launched by the opposition intensified the need toaccommodate the "atholic and conservative minorities. #hus, the constitutional initiative forpartial revision also contributed to the decision later in 18&1 to elect a second "atholicconservative to the !ederal "ouncil.

#he adoption of the initiative for partial constitutional revision placed (wit$erland in thecurious position in which the hihest law of the land was more easily amendable by popularaction than were routine statutes. #he timin of political events prevented the federalleislative initiative from emerin before 18&1, and it still does not eist today. #hissituation has encouraed proponents of reform to cast as constitutional amendmentsproposals that otherwise miht have been enacted as normal laws, allowin the (wiss"onstitution to become a hodepode of fundamental law mied with routine leislation. )nattempt was made to introduce the federal leislative initiative in 1&21, but the move wasreected by 7.2 percent of the voters.

,-9,4,9.:7 Direct democracy on the road to consensual politics

9n the first years of the initiative%s operation, nine constitutional amendments werelaunched which also received the , sinatures necessary to 5ualify for the ballot. :fthe nine, only two passedE and another was withdrawn in favor of a overnmentcounterproposal which succeeded. #he onslauht of initiatives dreaded by some opponentsof the device had not occurred. 9t is worth notin that none of the initiatives urin dramaticstructural reform or concernin fundamental rihts won popular approval. #he (wiss peoplereected a riht to wor/ amendment '18&4*, proportional representation in the nationalleislature '1& and 1&1*, popular election of the !ederal "ouncil '1&*, and an

amendment concernin seats in the lower house, the >ational "ouncil '1&3*. #he twoinitiatives that won at the polls resembled normal leislation. #he first was an 18&3 measureprohibitin the slauhter of cattle accordin to Hebrew rite. #his intolerant and preudicedproposal encountered indifference by the eneral public. However, a peculiar combination ofantisemites and societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals succeedin in mobili$intheir ran/s and pushin it throuh to win 2.1 percent of the vote. (wiss minorities,unprotected by a bill of rihts, were etremely vulnerable to this sort of popular abuse, andremain so today. However, as public attitudes became more tolerant, the 18&3 amendmentcame to be inored by police and the courts, as it is today.


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#he second successful initiative banned absinthe, a particularly stron li5uor, in 1&8. #heinitiative withdrawn in favor of a overnment counterproposal provided for federal leislationconcernin hydraulic resources when national interests were at sta/e. #his was more%constitutional% than the other two initiatives, since it implied a potential transfer of powersfrom the cantons to Bern. However, the overnment%s counterproposal did so only in aminimal way. 9n effect, (wit$erland had a leislative initiative rather than a constitutional

one, after all. #able 1-4 illustrates the operation of the device durin its first two decades ofits eistence.

9n 1&2, a bill establishin the leislative initiative at the national level was introduced inthe !ederal )ssembly. 9t was debated, tabled, and reconsidered for several yearsE but it wasnever enacted. Deanwhile, direct democracy continued to epand in the cantons. By 1&1,all but three of the 18 cantons with representative assemblies had adopted the leislativeinitiative. !our of the 6andsemeinde cantons still enacted all of their leislation by popularvote at that time. "oncurrent with this epansion of direct democracy at the cantonal levelwas a sure in the establishment of referendums and initiatives at the local level ofovernment. Between 188 and 1&1, all of the larer (wiss cities introduced both devices.9n many cities, the referendum was also made compulsory in matters of public finance.

18&1 also saw the entrenchment of another /ey feature of (wiss politicsN the formulation ofpolicy throuh the conflict and barainin of maor interest roups. 9t was in that year thatthe referendum battle over the revised #ariff )ct was fouht. #his was the first leislativedispute in (wiss history to be arued primarily by competin interest roups rather than bythe cantonally-based political parties. )ll four of (wit$erland%s most influential interestroups '/nown as erbOnde* were formed either slihtly before or soon after this debate. 9n187, the orort des shwei$erischer Handels- und 9ndustrienverein '(wiss Cnion of"ommerce and 9ndustry*, commonly /nown as the orort, was established on the federallevel. By 1881, it was bein subsidi$ed by the federal overnment. #he (chwei$erischer@ewerbeverband '(wiss Cnion of (mall Businessmen* was founded in 187&. 9n the sameyear, a 6abor (ecretary was chared with the tas/ of collectin statistics on laborE and theprocess of overnment consultation with union officials commenced. #he (chwei$erischer

@ewer/schaftsbund '(wiss !ederation of #rade Cnions* was formed out of the older ?or/ers%)ssociation in 188. #he last of the bi four interest roups to ta/e shape was the(chwei$erischer Bauernverband '(wiss !armers% Cnion*, created early in the twentiethcentury. )ll four started receivin financial support from the overnment shortly after theircreation and continue to do so today. #he overnment has always ustified this publicependiture by pointin to the need for reliable technical information which the minuscule(wiss bureaucracy has been unable to provide on its own.

#he early rise to prominence of these interest roups was aided by the structure of (wissfederalism. #he focus of (wiss politics had always been at the cantonal level. However, themoderni$ation and rowth of the economy at the end of the nineteenth century presentedcomplications which re5uired the attention of the central overnment. #he federalbureaucracy in Bern was too small to cope with such problems alone, and there were fewsuitable institutions outside of the overnment that were orani$ed on a national level.9nterest roups were summoned to fill the ap.

#he orani$ations% epandin administrative influence was accompanied by impressivestrenth in the arena of direct democracy. #hey enoyed lare memberships, mountinfinances, and a prominent position in virtually all of the cantons. #he threat of a referendalchallene from one of these orani$ations was not ta/en lihtly in the !ederal )ssembly. )sa result, the process of %consultation% emered. Aarly in the twentieth century, leislative


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committees started invitin representatives of the maor interest roups to collaborate inthe shapin of leislation in the earliest staes of the lawma/in process. #oday, thepractice of consultation is the very cornerstone of policy ma/in in (wit$erland. 9n both itsformal and informal uises, it is yet another institutional spin-off resultin from theintroduction of the facultative referendum in 1874. "onsultation is eamined in detail in"hapter (i.

#he maor (wiss interest roups ained an important ede in the (wiss political system byvirtue of the fact that they preceded the development of national political parties. )lthouhmost cantonal parties were already well established by the middle of the nineteenth century,national party orani$ations emered relatively late. #he (ocial +emocrats'(o$ialdemo/ratische =artei der (chwei$ - (=(* were the first. )lthouh some claim that the(=( dates bac/ to 188 with the establishment of the @ewer/schaftsbund, the politicalparty was actually orani$ed in 1888. #he ;adicals responded to this challene andestablished the national ;adical +emocratic =arty '!reisinni-demo/ratische =artei der(chwei$ - !+=* in 18&4. #he "atholic "onservatives, later to evolve into the "hristian+emocrats '"hristlichdemo/ratische ol/spartei der (chwei$ - "=*, orani$ed nationally inthe same year by one account, or in 1& by another. #he )rarian =arty, eventually tobecome the (wiss =eople%s =arty '(chwei$erische ol/spartei - (=*, came even later,brea/in off from the ;adicals in 1&1&. >one of the parties employed proper partysecretariats until the 1&s. +ue to their late arrival, the national parties developed in theshadow of the dominant interest roups, whose influence over overnment policy was morepervasive. #he federal referendum played a critical role in the evolution of the parties.9ndeed, one of the primary motivations for the creation of national party orani$ations wasthe desire to wield reater influence in the national referendums. #hey were eared morefor this purpose than for the tas/ of winnin seats in the !ederal )ssembly.

)lthouh the (ocial +emocratic =arty was the first to orani$e, it was only the third (wissparty to ac5uire any real influence in national politics. 9t bean to epand its ran/s after1&, ma/in its presence felt throuh referendum campains which brouht about thepopular reection of several laws. 6i/e socialist parties in other Auropean nations, it ained a

considerable number of parliamentary seats durin and after the !irst ?orld ?ar. +urin thewar, (wit$erland had served as a meetin point for socialists and Darists around thecontinent. )fter the war%s close, the (ocial +emocrats bean to ma/e effective use of thefederal initiative. 9n 1&18, the (ocial +emocratic =arty achieved its most important victorywith the lon souht-after introduction of proportional representation '=;* in >ational"ouncil elections. =roportional representation had appeared in some cantonal leislatures asearly as the 18&s. 9n 1&13, the (ocial +emocrats and "atholic "onservatives co-sponsoredand submitted a constitutional initiative for proportional representation in the >ational"ouncilE but the votin was postponed by the war. :n 13 :ctober 1&18, the pollin too/placeE and the initiative succeeded, with 28.8 percent of the voters and 1& 1P cantons infavor. #his was the parties% third =; initiativeE the previous two attempts failed in 1& and1&1. #he victory in 1&18 brouht about a fundamental structural chane in the (wisspolitical system, demonstratin that the initiative was not only a vehicle for routineleislation, but a device of enuine constitutional reform as well.

Avents at the close of 1&18 pushed the new electoral system into use sooner than had beenplanned. (ocialist ferment amon industrial wor/ers and fears of civilian unrest in FGrichprompted Clrich ?ille, @eneral of the (wiss )rmy, to send in troops. #he !ederal "ouncilapparently concurred. #he ensuin display of force prompted a one-day protest stri/e inFGrich, which was followed by the nationwide @eneral (tri/e beinnin on 11 >ovember. :n13 >ovember, the %:lten )ction "ommittee% representin the stri/ers finally capitulated to an


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ultimatum delivered by the =resident of the "onfederation. 9nstillin fears of revolutionaryviolence, the crisis induced the overnment to brin the net elections forward. 9n 1&1&, avery different >ational "ouncil was elected. #he ;adical +emocrats 'with 8.8 percent of thevote*, their conservative allies in the small 6iberal =arty 'with 3.8 percent*, and theirovernin partners, the "atholic "onservatives 'with 1. percent*, could still produce aparliamentary maority. However, it was a reatly reduced one, in which they controlled 11

of 18& >ational "ouncil (eats, compared to 17 in the 1&17 election. #he (ocial +emocratswon 3. percent of the vote and 41 seatsE and the newly-formed )rarians bro/e awayfrom the ;adical +emocrats to win 1.3 percent of the vote and 3 seats in their firstelection. ;adical heemony was dead. #he introduction of proportional representation madeit virtually impossible for any party in the (wiss system to achieve a parliamentary maority.9n virtually every election since, the three larest parties - the ;adical +emocrats, the"atholic "onservatives, and the (ocial +emocrats -have each received between 1& and 2percent of the vote. #he )rarians have reularly received 1-13 percent. #he 9ndependent)lliance, founded in 1&3 primarily on a platform of consumer interests, has usually claimed4-8 percent of the vote. #he "ommunist =arty formed in the 1&s has never received morethan .& percent of the vote, with the eception of 1&47, when it won .1 percent.

)t the start of the !irst ?orld ?ar, the primary political cleavae in (wit$erland shifted fromthe old "atholic-=rotestant rift to one of lanuae. #he @erman-spea/in (wiss had culturaland linuistic ties to @ermany and =russia, while the !rench- and 9talian-spea/in (wisswere sympathetic to !rance and 9taly. +urin the war, @eneral ?ille conducted intellienceoperations for the @ermans, a move which deeply anered !rench and 9talian spea/ers. 9n1&17, !ederal "ouncillor Hermann Hoffman was forced to resin when his secret diplomacyon behalf of @ermany to ;ussia was eposed. #o placate the infuriated !rench-spea/ers of?estern (wit$erland, the overnment offered them a !rench-spea/in seat on the !ederal"ouncil. 9n this way, proportionality in the eecutive was used to bride a second politicalcleavae. 9n the same spirit of reconciliation, (wit$erland oined the 6eaue of >ations in1&. However, this decision was fervently opposed by many who arued that itcompromised the country%s lon-standin posture of neutrality. #hey maintained that it wasprecisely this policy of neutrality which had prevented the nation from tearin itself apart

durin the war. 9n spite of their obections, the decision to oin the 6eaue was narrowlyratified in the ensuin referendum, with 2.3 percent in favor.

)fter the industrial violence of 1&18, the socialist-boureois cleavae stole the spotlihtfrom the linuistic divide. #he ;adical +emocrats and "atholic "onservatives allied aainstthe new socialist threat. However, after (wit$erland%s (ocial +emocrats refused to follow thedirectives of the third "ommunist 9nternational in 1&1& - a move which provo/ed thecommunists to ump ship and form their own party - the (=( bean to drift slowly bac/toward the center. Beinnin on the local level, the (=( and the moderates of the boureoisparties radually reconciled themselves to wor/in with one another. 9n 1&37, an accordwas reached on the industrial front with the conclusion of the =eace )reement of 1& Iuly,which ended the rash of stri/es witnessed in the first half of the 1&3s. #he unrest hadforced a drastic devaluation of the (wiss franc. !acin the imminent threat of unwantedovernment mediation, the metal industry employers and the principal metalwor/ers% unionsconcluded a settlement to maintain industrial peace. #he first =eace )reement lasted twoyearsE and subse5uent areements have been renewed every five years since. )lthouh therift between the (ocial +emocrats and the overnin parties radually healed durin the1&3s, it was not until 1&43 that a (ocial +emocrat was elected to the !ederal "ouncil bythe leislature. 9t was the last of the four maor parties to be brouht on board. 6i/e the"atholics, the (ocial +emocrats had used direct democracy as political outsiders in their bidto win an insider role in the (wiss political system.


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9n the 1&3s, a new cleavae bean to supplant the socialist-boureois rift, in the form ofthe center parties versus etremists on the 6eft and the ;iht. )s the (ocial +emocratsreached an accommodation with industry and the boureois parties, the "ommunist =artydrifted further to the left in support of Doscow. Deanwhile, the riht-win )rarians alliedwith staunchly anti-socialist and anti-communist elements in the "atholic community. #heywere oined at the etreme riht of the political spectrum by various military roups and

rapidly epandin %!ronts%, patterned after those in >a$i @ermany. #he larest of these, thefascist >ational !ront, attained 1 percent of local election votes in some communes durinits stronest years '1&3, 1&37, and 1&4*. However, its share in most localities durin thisperiod was only half this percentae. 9n national elections, the !ronts were only able to electa one member to the >ational "ouncil 'in 1&3, with 1. percent of the vote*. )ainst bothetremist factions was the besieed political center, which loo/ed for support to the 6eaueof >ations powers, Britain and !rance, as well as to the Cnited (tates.

#he riht-win frine orani$ations attempted to use the referendum to open the doors ofpower as the "atholic "onservatives had done in the 187s and 188s and as the (ocial+emocrats had done in the 1&1s. 9n 1&3, they launched an initiative for the total revisionof the "onstitution. #he attempt failed, winnin only 1&7, votes versus 1, opposed'7.7 percent voted in favor*. #wo years later, the ;iht brouht forward an initiative toprohibit !reemasonry. 9t too failed, winnin only 31.3 percent of the vote. )s theseeamples illustrate, the reactionary ;iht of the 1&3s failed to pry open the doors of powerwith direct democracy. #he referendum had been used in this way previously, but onlybecause the population was ready to accept such chanes. 9t cannot confer political poweron those roups lac/in a sufficiently broad base of popular support.

+urin the (econd ?orld ?ar, the parties of the center rallied toether in the face ofpotential @erman and 9talian aression aainst (wit$erland. )fter the fall of !rance in1&4, the tiny democracy was surrounded on all sides by the )is powers. )lthouh therantin of asylum to refuees was limited because of @erman pressure, and several seniorpolitical officials made controversial suestions that (wit$erland should accede peacefullyto @erman demands, the (wiss ultimately refused to cave in. #he cause of resistance was

strenthened massively by @eneral @uisan%s famous address on the ;Gtli meadow in 1&4.#he nation came toether behind the policy of ?iderstand 'resistance* and the stratey ofthe alpine redoubt. (tranely, the plan would have conceded & percent of (wit$erland%spopulation and two-thirds of its territory to the invaders. #he /ey was that, if attac/ed, thearmy would remain steadfastly committed to bloc/in the vital mountain passes lin/in@ermany and 9taly, ready to destroy them in the end if necessary. #he war years eventuallydiscredited the political etremists in (wit$erland, and the sure of patriotism mitiated theepression of the various social cleavaes. ) powerful unifyin sentiment was created whichpermeated the political environment well into the 1&2s.

Direct democracy in the post+ar period

he (econd ?orld ?ar was followed by years of unprecedented economic rowth in(wit$erland. )n influ of forein wor/ers, virtually all of whom were denied political rihtsunder (wit$erland%s strinent naturali$ation re5uirements, made the boom possible. Hue(wiss multinational corporations arose in various industries, particularly in chemicals,machine-buildin, and food products. #oday, most carry out the bul/ of their productionabroad. >estlJ, the larest, earns &8 percent of its turnover in forein countries. Deanwhile,the (wiss financial sector epanded to colossal proportions, eneratin much of its income


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by investin forein funds beyond (wiss borders on behalf of its clients. By 1&73, revenueearned abroad accounted for 44 percent of net social product in (wit$erland.

#his prosperity affected the operation of direct democracy. 9n the 1&s, a number ofcontroversial laws were passed without havin to face the test of a referendum. !oreample, a 1&2 act made collective areements between manaement and labor bindin

on both parties. )n epensive national hihway proram in 1&2 went unchallened, as didmany etensions of the old-ae pensions scheme. :nce-frual (wiss overnments bean tospend enormous sums of money improvin public facilities. #otal spendin by all three levelsof (wiss overnment tripled in real terms between 1&& and the mid-1&7s. )ruably, theseoutlays would have met much reater resistance had the overnment attempted tointroduce them durin the recession of the late 1&7s

9n 1&&, the development of consensual overnment culminated in the %maic formula%, bywhich all four maor parties were represented on the !ederal "ouncil in a NNN1 ratio. #he(ocial +emocrats, after si years% voluntary withdrawal, returned to the "ouncil with twoseats. #he other parties were undoubtedly anious to brin the (=( bac/ on board after itsreferendum campain in opposition to a 1&8 ta hi/e which was seen as insufficiently

proressive. #he finance measure succeeded narrowly, with only 4.2 percent approvin.#he "hristian +emocrats and the ;adical +emocrats retained two seats each on the !ederal"ouncil, with the (wiss =eople%s =arty allotted one. #his informal distribution of seats hascontinued unchaned to the present day. 9n 1&&, the four overnin parties represented 8percent of the electorate. !or the net three decades, rouhly 8 percent of (wiss voterswere continuously represented by their party on the national eecutive. 9n 1&87 theovernin parties% share of the vote dropped to 7.3 percent, fallin aain in 1&&1 to 2&.percent. #his shift has primarily been due to the rise of small, issue-oriented parties sincethe early 1&7s, described in detail in "hapters !our and !ive. 9n addition to proportionalityaccordin to party, seats on the !ederal "ouncil are informally distributed accordin tolanuae. #here are usually four @erman spea/ers, two !rench spea/ers, and one 9talianspea/er.

)fter the narrow adoption of a popular initiative in 1&4& rulin out certain wartimerestrictions on referendums, the initiative in (wit$erland entered a lon dry spell. 9n thenet 33 years, no less than 4 initiatives were reected by the (wiss electorate. #he netsuccessful initiative did not occur until 1&8, when 2.1 percent voted to introduce pricecontrols to stem inflation. 9n 1&21, an attempt had been made to introduce the federalleislative initiative device. #he effort failed badly, winnin only &.4 percent of the vote.enneth 6ibbey arues that this remar/able strin of initiative failures was larely a popularrefle aainst the epansion of overnment activity. However, this eplanation must beviewed s/eptically, for the unchallened rowth of the (wiss overnment in the 1&s and1&2s contradicts itE and it fails to account for the resurence of the initiative in the morefiscally conservative 1&8s.

#he (wiss people are enerally conservative in economic matters, particularly when itcomes to raisin overnment revenues. :ne miht suspect that the presence of directdemocracy would ma/e modern overnment impossible, because all ta increases aresusceptible to referendal challene. !urthermore, many direct and indirect ta hi/es re5uireconstitutional chane in (wit$erland and must therefore pass an obliatory referendum. #he@ewerbeverband and the orort campain aainst most ta increasesE both orani$ationshave been reluctant to countenance additional burdens upon the tapayer. #heBauernverband typically adds its voice to the chorus of opposition when the farmincommunity is seen to be disadvantaed. >onetheless, politicians in the maor parties usually


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o alon with such ta increases if their leaders aree to them in the !ederal "ouncil.However, there are occasional mutinies. 9n 1&27, the (ocial +emocrats pleded to oppose afederal ta reform pac/ae, supported by the other parties, by fihtin it in a referendum.#he threat dissuaded the ;adical +emocrats, the main proponents of the measure, fromeven standin by their bill throuh the final leislative debate. Between 1&4 and 1&&, the(wiss electorate passed udment upon proposals involvin ta increases or the

imposition of new taes. :f this number, 13 succeeded and 1 failed. "learly, the (wisspeople have not made it impossible for their overnment to finance itself.

9n some cases, such as in 1&7 and 1&74, overnment plans to raise taes are defeatednarrowly in a referendum the first time around, only to succeed later. 9n 1&7, .4 percentof voters favored the hi/e, but the measure failed to ain the necessary maority of cantons,winnin only nine. 9n 1&74, a similar measure lost the popular vote as well, with 44.4percent in favor. However, in both cases the overnment came bac/ the net year withanother ta hi/e proposal and won the popular referendum. "ertain types of taes havebeen more successful than others. #he (wiss people voted for federal hihway taes on twooccasions, in 1&7 and 1&84. #he federal value-added ta has met with less success. 9tsintroduction has been reected four times, in 1&, 1&77, 1&7&, and 1&&1. #he (wisspopulation holds a similar distaste for income taes at the federal level. Aver since it beantryin in 1&18, the federal overnment has been unable to impose a reular income taupon the "onfederation. 9nstead, it has been forced to rely upon indirect taation to financeits ependitures.

#he overnments of the cantons levy a mi of income and property taes. However, mostdecisions to raise the rates of taation are subect to cantonal referendums. )lthouh newependitures are often approved, attempts to increase revenues accordinly are fre5uentlyvoted down. #his has lon been a source of irritation to cantonal overnments. 9n somecantons, the obstacles to raisin revenue are particularly reatE the overnments must winan obliatory financial referendum every time they wish to raise taes. #his re5uirementsaves opposition roups the trouble of collectin sinatures. 9t may only ta/e a few vauecomments or editorials in newspapers to spar/ public s/epticism and mobili$e anti-ta

sentiment. #he potentially embarrassin conse5uences of this arranement weredemonstrated in )arau in 1&24. #he citi$ens of the canton refused to approve the creditsnecessary to present a cantonal day at the (wiss >ational Aposition, and the canton wasconspicuously absent. 9n some cantons, such as Bern, the citi$ens relish this riht of veto.9n others, such as aud and @eneva, the cantonal overnments were able to persuade theirvoters to surrender this preroative.

#he postwar era has seen federal referendums in numerous sensitive areas of overnmentactivity. #he (wiss have repeatedly brouht measures affectin national defense and foreinpolicy to a popular vote. 9n this way, the left win of the (ocial +emocratic =arty bean tochallene the military establishment and its policies in the late 1&s, with mied success.9n 1&7, the introduction of a national civil defense system was reected narrowly 'with 48.1percent in favor*, due in lare part to (ocial +emocratic opposition. However, two yearslater a similar measure won popular approval. 9n 1&2, the (ocial +emocrats launched aninitiative to prohibit nuclear armamentsE but only 34.8 percent of the people supported theban. #he followin year the (=( too/ a smaller bite, proposin that any future decision toac5uire nuclear arms be re5uired to pass an obliatory referendum. #he new proposal wonthe support of only 3 percent more of the electorate. 9n 1&7, anti-military roups verynearly succeeded with an initiative stoppin the eport of armamentsE and in 1&87, the 6eftbrouht forward two more anti-military initiatives. #he first attempted to ma/e all militaryappropriations subect to obliatory referendum and failed. #he second, an initiative toprohibit the construction of the ;othenthurm military base, was a surprise success. Because


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measure was even more etreme than the 1&7 initiative. Astimates of the economic impactof the measure showed that the (wiss economy would be ravely endanered. ?holebranches of industries would face almost certain collapse if it passed. By 1&74, 17 percentof the (wiss wor/ force was forein, comin primarily from (pain and 9taly. #he =resident ofthe "onfederation delivered a public speech condemnin the initiative and implorin thepublic to vote aainst it - a rare occurrence in (wit$erland. #hen, in Darch 1&74,

(chwar$enbach dissociated himself from the >ational )ction initiative, statin that %hisconscience would not permit him to support proposals which would lead (wit$erland to thebrin/ of a catastrophe%. ;elations soured between the two roups, and the movement loststeam. 9n the :ctober vote, only 34. percent favored the initiative, considerably less thanin 1&7. 9t carried no canton

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Merits of Direct Democracy