AMPARO IN REVIEW 237/2014

AND RECURRING complainers: *****

MINISTER SPEAKER: Arturo Zaldívar Lelo de Larrea

SECRETARIES: ARTURO BÁRCENA ZUBIETAIBARRA ANA MARIA OLGUÍN

PARTNERS: WILLIAM KOHN ESPINOSAMICHAEL OSCAR CASILLAS SANDOVAL

Mexico City. Agreement of the First Chamber of the SupremeCourt of the nation from the ** of ** two thousand fifteenth.

JUDGMENT

Reconciliation

Relapse under review under 237/2014, filed by theplaintiffs ***** ***** ***** ***** and *****, against thejudgment dated ***** by the Eleventh District Judge Administrativein  Matters Federal District, in theindirect amparo *****.

I. BACKGROUND

1. Facts giving rise to the dispute

On 31 May 2013, *****, *****, *****, *****, in its ownright and as proxies **** * requested in writing

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to the Federal Commission for the Protection against Sanitary Risk(herein after COFEPRIS), decentralized body of the Ministry ofHealth, the issuance of a permit that would allow them to consume regularly, and for purely recreational or entertainment purposes, the drugcannabis sativa (indica and American, in prepared resin and seeds)and psychotropic THC (Tetrahydrocannabinol, the following isomers:Δ6A (10a), Δthe 6th(7) Δ7 Δ8, Δ9, Δ10 Δ9 (11) and theirvariants),stereochemical  which are known as "marijuana".

Furthermore, within the said brief, the representatives of *****also requested authorization to carry rightscorrelative to the "consumption" of marijuana, such as planting,growing, harvesting, preparation, possession, transportation,employment, use and generally any act related to therecreational use of marijuana by the petitioners andpartners mentioned, excluding expressly commercial transactions, such as distribution, sale and transfer of the same.1

*****, the Executive Director of Regulation of Narcoticsand Psychotropic Chemicals COFEPRIS informed thepetitioners that they could not be issued theauthorization requested, in accordance with Articles 235 and237 -regarding the drug "cannabis sativa" - as well as 245,247 and 248 of -regarding psychotropic "THC". According to theGeneral Health Law it is prohibited throughout the countrythe performance of any act related to the aforementioned substances..21 Application to the  ***** Notebook protection, folio 68-69.2 COFEPRIS response to the request by the plaintiffs now. Notebookunder ***** 45.hander

2. Indirect amparo demand

In response to the above, lodged on 5 July2013, ***** with *****, *****, ***** and **** * they promoted anindirect amparo against the refusal of their request,claiming the unconstitutionality of Article 235, last paragraph,237, 245, section I, 247, last paragraph, and 248, all of the General Health Act.3 In this claim for protection, the complainantsput forward in summary the following arguments:

Concepts of violation first to fifth. Undue restriction ofthe fundamental rights to personal identity,self-image, free development of personality, self-determination andindividual freedom, all in relation to the principle of human dignityand the right to health4

After exposing the constitutional, conventional and jurisprudential framework regarding the fundamental rights to identity,personal self-image, free development of personality,self-determination and individual liberty, which arise from the same recognition of human dignity and the right tohealth,the plaintiffs argued that the prohibitionist policy towardmarijuana use established in the contested articles

3 In this regard, the complainants identified as responsible authorities to the following: (i)President (for the enactment of the General Health Law); (Ii) Secretary ofthe Interior (for the endorsement of the Act); (Iii) Deputy Director General of the OfficialGazette(the publication of the decree by which the law was enacted); (Iv)Congress(for the issuance of the General Health Law); (V) Ministry of Health, (vi)Foreign Secretary,(vii) Secretary of Defense, (viii) Navy Secretary (ix)Secretary of Finance and Public Credit (x) Economy Secretary (xi ) Secretary ofCommunications and Transportation, (xii) Ministry of Social Development, (xiii) Secretary ofEducation,Public  (xiv) Secretary of Labor and Social Security, and (xv) Head of the Federal District(all for the endorsement of the this law); and (xvi) Executive Director of Regulation Narcotics,Psychotropic Substances and Chemical Federal Commission for the Protection againstRiskSanitary(for the implementation of the General Health Law). Folio 2 turn back to 4notebook

under***** (claim for  4.protection.) Request for defense, folio 13-76.

4is not exceeded by screening tests established by the SupremeCourt for making restrictions on fundamental rights.

Indeed, the plaintiffs argued that the state can notundermine or eliminate the actions an individual may take tobe individualized in society, unless there is an overridinginterest that justifies, as the individual has a right tochoose freely and autonomously his or her life project and howthey will achieve the objectives that are relevant; in other words,the state can not impose models and standards of living upon citizens, or intervene in matters within the sphere of the personal and private.

In view of the above, the plaintiffs argued that by using marijuana, people project their preferences andfeatures that differentiate them from the rest of society. Thus,the prohibition of marijuana is unconstitutional because itinvolves the suppression of behavior that gives the individual aspecific difference according to its uniqueness. That restriction is not justified, and the imposition of a single standard ofhealthy living is not admissible in a liberal state, which bases itsexistence on the recognition of the uniqueness and independence of each human.

They also noted that the choice of using marijuana isa strictly personal decision, because it is the individual whosuffers the change in perception, mood and state of consciousness brought about by the use of marijuana. It is the individual who deals with the consequences of his or her decision, without disturbing or

affecting the rest of society. Therefore, through these prohibitionist measures, the state assumes that the individual has no rational capacity to dispose of his body, mind and person.5

Moreover, the complainants also argued that the prohibitionist policy derives from contested articles by violating the right to health in its negative aspect,understood as the ability or power to have personal control over one’s health. So, they notedthat the state can not interfere with the freedom of individuals tocontrol their health and body. That is, the state can not interferewith the freedom inherent in the right to health to control one’sown health.

In this regard, plaintiffs argued that the ban onmarijuana is based on a prejudice sustained bymoral values and not on scientific studies, thus revealing that thestate has not acted in an ethically neutral manner. Plaintiffs also warned that the state has taken a paternalistic stance by treatingcitizens as if they were not rational enoughto make their own decisions. Taken to its extreme, this stance could go so far as to prohibit substances such as tobacco, alcohol, sugar, fat or caffeine.

The plaintiffs concluded that the prohibitionist regimeconstitutes a restriction on the rights previouslyindicated; that said regime is not consistent with the requirementsof the proportionality test, as it does not have legitimate aim,because the imposition of a single standard of healthy living is notpermissible in a liberal state that bases its existence onthe recognition of human uniqueness and independence. The state has argued that the prohibitionist regime is instrumental in preventing risks to health or to fight addictions,

and yet it has not been shown that the decriminalization of marijuana increases demand and consumption. Indeed, the prohibitionist regime

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has not decreased demand or consumption. And finally, it is not proportional, as there are less restrictive ways to protect the health, and damages generated by the ban are higher than the benefits it has brought.

Sixth concept of violation. This is a violation of the objective purpose of criminal law as well as individual and personal liberty asa result of the criminalization of marijuana consumption5

Finally, the plaintiffs also alleged that the stateexceeded its powers to legislate in matters of public healthand in the determination of the offenses by criminalizing the consumption of marijuana, in violation of the objective purpose of criminal law and and individual personal freedom of individuals, principles set out in Article 73, Sections XVI and XXI of the Constitution ofthe United Mexican States.

This is so, according to the complainants, as the consumption of marijuana by individual people does not affect the freedom of others,so there is no justification for the criminal law to interfere andlimit this sphere of freedom of the individual.

3. Processing of the indirect amparo and its correspondingresolution

As a matter of duty, to hear the case corresponded JudgeEleventh District for Administrative Matters in the District,andFederal by car *****, registered the case under number

***** dossier and he agreed to process the claim.6

5 Request for defense, folio 77-85.6 Auto admission. ***** Notebook protection, folios 71 to 73.

7Subsequently, *****, once the appropriate procedural steps completed, the District Judge issued a final judgment by denying protection of the Constitution to the complainants to support the argumentssummarized below.

a) After exposing the constitutional, conventional, doctrinal frameworkand legal respects of the challenged provisions and thefundamental rights which were estimated by the violated plaintiffs,the District Judge called their arguments unworkable conceptsof violation regarding the moral person named plaintiff *****,while human dignity, and in Consequently the rightsderived therefrom, such as privacy, free development ofpersonality, self-image or self-determination, is itselfonly humans, so the said complainant could not allege a violation of such rights.7

b) However, with regard to the other complainants,the District Judge proceeded to respond to theconcepts of violation related to human dignity, statingthat it may derive rights to personality,physical and mental integrity, to privacy, to name, toself-image,marital status and even a right topersonal dignity; which although not recognizedexpressly in our Constitution, it is possible to derive them from theinternational treaties signed and ratified by Mexico, as well asthe self-recognition of human dignity in Article 1 of the Constitution.Nevertheless, the District Judge District noted thatthe concepts of violation were unfounded related to the violation of

these rights, because from their perspective the contested articles: (i) do not constitute an encroachment on the right to privacy insofar as they 7 Judgment of amparo, fojas149-164 .

8require people to reveal aspects of their private lives; (ii) do notviolate the right to free development of personality andself-image, then how to choose the appearance, activity or manner in which the plaintiffs wish to project and live their lives; (iii) does notviolate the principle of self-determination, and that the state has an obligation to take all measures required toprotect and make effective a right, in this case the health; andfinally, (iv) do not jeopardize the right todignity, and do not create a hazard intended to impose models andstandards of living that are beyond the individual. It is the duty of the state to provide everyone the greater enjoymentof physical and mental health through the fight againstaddiction.8c)

Moreover, the District Judge responded to theconcepts of violation referred to (the violation of the right to healthof the plaintiffs), noting that they proved unfounded,while agreeing that to the prohibition against marijuana contained in thecontested articles are suitable measures to protect the life and health of the people by avoiding the proliferation of harmful substances. This holds if one takes into consideration that the misuse of psychotropic and narcotics hasbecome one of the most serious public health problems, sothere is great concern by the federal government to generally maintain strict control.

In addition, in response to the argument of the complainantsregarding there are less burdensome alternatives that would allowJUDGMENT OF 8amparo, folios 165-180.

9the purposes of the state, the District Judge carried out atest of proportionality with regard to the contested articles,arriving at the following conclusions: (i) the unclaimed itemsupdated consistently constitutionally valid to avoid the involvement of third party rights restriction, through objectively expressly contained in the Constitution, namely the protect right to the health of people; (Ii) the legislation at issue is instrumentally appropriate and suitable to meetthe stated objective; and (iii) the measure is proportionate, sinceit does not ban marijuana but simply establishes conditions, which resultsin a minimal impact on rights.9

d) Finally, regarding concept of violation based on the idea that the criminalization of the consumption of marijuana violates the objective purpose of criminal law and violates individual and personal freedom, the District Judge called it unfounded in part, arguing that Congress has powers to issue such rules. The District Judge also found the idea irrelevant, because the argument of the plaintiffs was based on premisesthat were dismissed by analyzing previous concepts of violation.10

II. RESOURCES SERVICE

1. Principal resource review filed by the plaintiffsUnhappy with the amparo judgment, the plaintiffs filed an appeal for review.11 Judgment of under, folios 180-206.Ruling 10of amparo, folio 206 -212.11 Appeal for review. . Notebook under review under 237/2014, folios 143-291

10In their letter, the applicants presented in brief thearguments set out below:

Grievance second to sixth. Undue foundation andmotivation of the District Judge regarding the restriction of rightsfundamental to personal identity, self-image, free development of personality, self-determination and individual freedom,all in relation to the principle of human dignity and the right to the provision of health12

Applicants argued that the District Judge ignored most of the arguments presented by the plaintiffs in the concepts of violation,which were aimed at sustaining the unconstitutionalityof the challenged, considering that the provisionsconstituted an unjustified restriction on the rightsfundamental to personal identity, self-image, free developmentof personality, self-determination and individual freedom, all inrelation to the principle of human dignity and of the right to health. According to the complainants, the District Judge merely offered "free and improperly motivated" reasonsto argue that the prohibitionist policy did not violate those rights.

Indeed, firstly, the appellants argued that the fact that the state has an important aim is not reasonable to limit a human right, it isessential also to examine whether the restriction fulfills the otherrequirements of the test established by the Supreme Court. In thisregard, the appellants argued that the District Judge ruled that

the prohibitionist policy was instrumental in protecting the health while there were less restrictive measures to achieve the objective sought12 Appeal for review, folios 23-130.

11without exposing the reasons to substantiate his statement and without regard to evidence to the contrary.

Based on the above, the applicants argued that contraryto the provisions of the District Judge, the contested regulation doesimpose models and standards of living upon individuals, becauseonly the identity of each person is respected if it he or he is allowed to act upon their own traits, world views, conceptions ofthe good life and elements that define his or her singular view of the world. In this regard, the appellants argued that they would achieve these objectives by using marijuana, in the same way that other people achieved from practicing sports, hobbies, food they like and thecompany they kept, without the state being permitted to stigmatize and prohibit such behavior, except where it has been proven conclusively that such activity violates the rights of third parties.

In connection with the foregoing, the applicants argued that the District Judge made very narrow interpretations of the rights to the free development of personality and privacy. The Judge did nottake into consideration that one’s own "life plan" includeseverything that the individual wants to do with his life and his body. This is not limited to appearance and profession, but includes also private, social, and recreational activities; cultural, leisure and recreation. In addition, it also took into consideration that privacy does not only include the right not to disclose information, but also the right to keep the person and body in the private sector.

In addition, the appellants challenged the statement madeby the District Judge in meaning that the authorization for

12performing acts related to marijuana use can affect society in general, because there is no scientific evidence that the consumption of this substance can affect any other than the person who consumes it.

In another vein, the appellants argued that the District Judgewas oblivious to rule on the scope of the right to health, particularly with regard to the possibility of having one's own health. This, consideringthat the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of theUnited Nations in its General Comment No. 14, provided that theright to health implies the right to control one's health andbody, which prohibits individuals from being subjected to interference andnon-consensual health treatments.

Seventh grievance. Improper foundation and motivation of the District Judge regarding the argument about the violation of theobjective purpose of criminal law as well as individual liberty as a result of the criminalization of marijuana consumption13

Moreover, the applicants argued that the District Judgewrongly described as irrelevant their arguments by alleging that the challenged articles transgressed the power to establish offenses. In this sense, they argued that the District Judge held that through a literal reading of Article 73, Sections XVI and XXI, it was clear that the Congressis authorized to issue rules. However, these considerations do not detracted from the plaintiffs’ claim for protection because the District Judge

failed to make a teleological interpretation of those constitutional rules, which is to say that while indeed the Congress is entitled to legislate 13 Appeal review, folios 130-143.

13.on these matters, the fact is that that power is not free and unrestricted.

Torts first and eighth. Improper assessment of evidenceby the District Judge.14

Finally, the appellant argued that the District Judge conducted an inadequate analysis of the evidence, because the Judge overlooked the sophisticated and serious facts given at trial in a study by the Beckley Foundation, as the Foundation is accredited with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, and the report was prepared by scientists and researchers of high reputation and recognition.So, by not assessing that report, the District Judge based his decision on social prejudice and conjecture without scientific support,as the document revealed enough data for actual health effectsfrom the consumption of marijuana, its possible effects compared to other drugs, and the objective degree of danger from marijuana.

In addition, the appellants argued that the 2011 National Addiction Survey was assessed incorrectly, as it was given an inappropriate scope and probative value, considering that such a document does not establish that marijuana use has stopped or diminished, nor make any assessment of thestrategy implemented in our country to combat drug use. Such misjudgment led the District Judge to conclude that variations in marijuana use are a consequence of the prohibitionist policy of our country, without considering that the survey found no causal link between the two.

14 Appeal for review, folios 10-23 and 144-49.

14.

2. Resource revision filed by the Ministry of Health on behalf of the President

Moreover, by letter filed on January 30, 2014, the Assistant Director of Administrative Resources of the Coordination General of Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Health Secretariat lodged an adhesive revision, representing the President of the Republic and the Health Secretariat,arguing in essence that the grievances listed below:

First offense. Regarding the assessment of the evidencebyJudge District15

Responsible authorities argued that the grievances and facts asserted by the complainants are unfounded regarding alleged improper evaluation of the evidence offered during the injunction, because although the District Judge District did not analyze each and every one of the pieces of evidence offered by the plaintiffs, the fact is that through the documents exhibited isno claim of the plaintiffs credited because it is information of no scientific value.

Second and Third grievances. Regarding the analysis that theDistrict Judge regarding the alleged violation of the complainants’ fundamental rights16

On the other hand, the responsible authorities also argued that thegrievances of the complainants should be declared unfounded and inoperative, because cannabis prohibition established by the contested legislation is a legal control and a valid protection of the right to health. 15 of adhesiveResource review, folio 5-9.16 adhesive Resource review, folios 9-30.

15.

They also noted that the restrictions in question are duly justified, while the measures (i) are admissible, as they are aimed at protecting the right to health of society in general; (Ii) they are necessary, since it is scientifically proven that the effects of marijuana use are harmful to the physical and mental health of people; and finally (iii) they are proportionate, giventhat the degree of restriction is amply rewarded by the benefits gained by protecting the health of the general population, and in particular the health of minors.

In fact, according to the state authorities, the prohibition contained in the contested articles is not arbitrary or capricious, while as noted by the district court itself it does not violate the right to privacy, free development ofpersonality, personal identity or self-determination, nor violates the right to health, as it is a measure instrumentally appropriate for attaining the objectives of protection of life and health, it does not intervene in the private and personal sphere of the individual.

In addition, the responsible authorities claimed that infact there does not exist as such a prohibition on the consumption ofcannabis, under which in accordance with Article 479 of theGeneral Health Law, there is permission for personal consumptionas established in the table of orientation of maximum levels of personal consumption of various materials.

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Finally, policy makers noted that the District Judge correctly noted that the rights claimed by the plaintiffs are confined exclusively to the human being,so it was not possible to extend them the moral person complaining, making them inoperative arguments in this regard.

III. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE APPELLATE COURT

The appeal aforementioned revision was referred to the Fifth Appellate Court in Administrative Matters of the First Circuit, which, by car *****, ***** formed the record and the declared admissible appeal review.17

The Appellate Court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the amparo review, since it is matter on which there remained a problem ofconstitutionality, specifically, with respect to Articles 235 lastparagraph, 237, 245, section I, 247, last paragraph, and 248 of the General Health Law about which there is no case law, sothat the original jurisdiction of the High Court updatingto hear the present case.18 Accordingly, the Appellate Court referred the case to the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation.19

IV. PROCESSING BY THIS SUPREME COURT

In view of the above, by order of April 9, 2014, the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation took its original competition, to hear this under review in registering

17 Auto admission. Notebook under review ***** index in theCourt,Appellate  folios 152-52.18 Resolution of the Appellate Court. Notebook under review ***** index in theAppellate Court, folios 368-380 back.19 Office of referring the matter to the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation. Notebookamparo 237/2014 review, foja 2.

17the matter with the file number 237/2014 and taking turns toMinister Arturo Zaldivar Lelo de Larrea for study.20

Subsequently, by order of 24 April 2014, the First Chamber ofthe Supreme Court took over the hearing in this underreview, and the cars were sent to Minister ArturoZaldivar Lelo de Larrea to prepare the corresponding draft resolution.21

V. COMPETITION

The First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation has jurisdiction to hear this appeal for review, in terms of the provisions of Articles 107, section VIII, paragraph (a) of the Constitution of the United Mexican States; 83 of the Amparo Act effective from April 2, 2013; 21, section II, subsection (a) of the Organic Law of Judicial Power of the Federation; and 86 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, in relation to the provisions of the first and third pointsof the General Agreement 5/2013, issued by the Plenary of the High Courton 13 May 2013.

VI.OPPORTUNITY

Needless First esta Chamber to rule on opportunity this application for review, as the Fifth Court Collegiate in Administrative Matters of the First Circuit and the made calculation in Its resolution of *****, concluding thatfiling was made in the same time22 .20 and turn Registry Agreement. Notebook 237/2014 under review, pages 323-325.21 avocamiento Agreement. Notebook 237/2014 under review, hander327.22 ResolutionAppellate Court. Notebook under review ***** index in theAppellate Court, folios 372-372 back.

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VII. STANDING AND ORIGIN

The plaintiffs filed an appeal to review, asserting procedural law that accorded by paragraph (e) of Section I of Article 81 of the Law of Amparo, according to which may appeal review against a decision issued by one district judge.

Consequently, it is undeniable that if the ruling went to theindirect amparo, ***** denied the protection to the complainants,they have the legal standing to fight, having not satisfied the claim by which promoted the request for defense.

In fact, the origin comes from the fact namely that the appeal was filed against the interpretation that a District Court held, in the sense that wereconstitutional Article 235, last paragraph, 237, 245, section I,247, last paragraph, and 248 of the General Health Law, consideringthat they do not transgress the fundamental rights ofdignity, personal identity, personality rights, self-image, free development of personality, self-determination, individual personal and physical freedom and the right to one’s own health. Mindful of the above, it should be noted

that this appeal is appropriate and was presented by legitimized part, having been filed by the complainants. On the other hand, the use of adhesive revision was also brought by party entitled, since the public serverbrought that on behalf of the President, they are entitled in the case in accordance with Article87 of the Law of Amparo.

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VIII. STUDY BACKGROUND

The appellants originally raised, in their request for a defense on unconstitutional grounds, several articles of the General Health Law, arguing that they establish a "prohibitionist policy "regarding the individual consumption of marijuana, believing that it unduly limited, among others, the fundamental rights to personal identity, self-image,free development of personality and self-determination, all inrelation to the principle of human dignity.

Accordingly the prohibition of marijuana involves the suppression of behavior that gives the individual a specific difference according to their uniqueness. The appellants argued that this restriction is not justified and that the imposition of a single standard of healthy living is not admissible in a liberal state, which bases its existence on the recognition of uniqueness and human independence. In essence they argued that the ban on marijuana is based on a prejudice sustained by moral values and not on scientific studies, thus revealing that the state has not acted ethically neutral.

In the judgment of amparo, the District Judge described asunfounded the arguments of the plaintiffs, noting among otherthings that the contested provisions do not limit the right of thecomplainants to choose their appearance, activity or how they wish toplan and live their lives, nor are they intended to impose models and

20standards of living that are unrelated to the complainants, but thatthey are directed to protect and make effective the right tohealth of the general population.

Unhappy with that decision, the plaintiffs filed a petitionfor review, which they argued primarily that--contrary to theprovisions of the District Judge--the contested rules imposemodels and standards of living outside individuals, because the identity of each person is respected only if allowed to act upon their own traits, worldviews, conceptions of the good life. In this sense, they argued that they "singularizarían" and would achieve those objectives through marijuana use, in the same way that other people achieved from the sports they play, hobbies they enjoy, food they like and the company they keep, with the state prohibiting and stigmatizing such behavior, except if it’s been proven conclusively that such activity violates the rights of others.

So, the First Chamber notes that the grievancesraised by the appellants, particularly those identifiedas second, third, fifth and sixth, which together areaimed at combating the District Judge's decision to considerthe contested constitutional rules, are essentially

sound and sufficient to overturn the judgment under appeal and giveconstitutional protection to the plaintiffs on the ground that they limitunjustifiably the fundamental right to free development ofpersonality. In contrast, as shown below, they areunfounded assert grievances made by the Assistant Director of Legal Affairs, Human Rights, of the Secretariat of Health, representing

21the President of the Republic and the Health Secretariat, inwhich the constitutionality of the provisions are sustained.

Before entering an analysis of the grievances, theFirst Chamber considers important to note that although the requestfor defense noted among the complainants to the moral personnamed *****, we see that in the contested judgment the District Judgedeclared inoperative all arguments related to that entity, considering that human dignity is a fundamental right it may just be inherent toindividuals.23 In this sense, it does not appear that the complainants have raised wrong one in the appeal to combat ineffectivenessdecreed by the District Judge, so the First Chamberconsiders that the determination question must be firm and,therefore, the study carried out by the High Court over the right tofree development of the personality shall be limited only tothe following plaintiffs: *****, *****, **** * and *****.

It should be noted that while the arguments on the concepts of violation are directed to challenge generically the "prohibitionist policy" that preventsplaintiffs from using marijuana, and the policy identifies thecontents of at least eight articles General Health Law (234,

235, 237, 245, 247, 248, 368 and 476), the fact is that the District Judge determined that the challenge had been taken onlyagainst Articles 235, last paragraph, 237, 245, section I, 24723 Judgment of amparo, folios 149-165.

22last paragraph and 248 of that law.24 Thus, since it is a decisionthat was also not contested by the appellants, the First Chamberunderstands that it must also be firm.

In order to justify the announced decision andto respond to the arguments raised by the appellants in relationto the constitutionality of the unclaimed items ordered by theDistrict Judge, the First Chamber considers it necessary to develop thefollowing points: (i) explain the regulatory framework ofnarcotic drugs and psychotropic provisions of the General Health Act;(ii) establish the impact of the legislative measure at issueprima facie content of the fundamental right to free development ofpersonality;and (iii) determine whether the measure exceeds thefour steps of the proportionality test: (1) constitutionality ofthe measure aims pursued; (2) suitability; (3) need; and (4)strict proportionality. Finally, (iv) there are presentedfindings of the constitutionality of the articles challenged and (v) the effects of the grant of protection needed.

I. Regulatory framework on the control of narcotics and

psychotropic substances in the General Health Law

Sections XXI and XXII of article 3 of the General Health Law25

takes into consideration matters of public health, prevention and sanitary control in the consumption of "drugs" and "psychotropic substances".26 24 Judgment of amparo, folio XXX.25 Unless otherwise indicated, all items whose contents are listed in thissection correspond to the General Health Law.26  Article 3 . In terms of this law, it is a matter of general health  [...]XXI. The prevention of drug and psychotropic andanti-drug program;

23In this regard, in accordance with Article 194 does "health check" to all actions of counseling, education, sampling, testing and, where appropriate,application security measures and sanctions that the Ministry of Health performs about the process, use, import and export of various substances and objects, among which are narcotic and psychotropic substances.27

Specifically, health and control over narcotic and psychotropic substances is regulated in Chapters V and VI of Title Twelfth General Health Act and in Chapter III of Title II of the Regulation of Health Products. In this regard, it should be noted that the Act provides for a similar regulatory framework for narcotics and psychotropics. First, the legislature established a list to determine which substances should be considered as narcotics and psychotropic substances (Articles 234 and 245). It determined that all acts related to narcotics or psychotropic substances, or any product thatcontains, requires an "authorization" from the Ministry of Health and XXII. The sanitary control of products and services and import and export.27 is important to note that according to Article 197 of the General Health Law, theterm "process" all activities relating to the production, processing, manufacturing ,preparation, storage, mixing, conditioning, packaging, handling,transportation, distribution,storage and sale or supply to the public. Article 194. For the purposes of this title, the term disease control all theactionsof counseling, education, sampling , verification and where appropriate, implementing  measuressecurityand sanctions exerted by the Ministry of Health with the participation of producers,traders and consumers, based on that established the official Mexican standards and

other provisions.The exercise of sanitary control shall apply to: I. Process, import and export of food, soft drinks,beverages,alcoholic  cosmetics, toiletries, snuff and raw materials and,where appropriate, additives used in their preparation; II. Process, use, maintenance, import, export, and final disposal ofequipment,medical  prosthetics, orthotics, functional aids, diagnostic agents, supplies ofuse,dental  surgical materials, healing and hygienic products, and III. Process, use, import, export, application and disposal of pesticides,plant nutrients and toxic or hazardous to health substances as well as  materialsrawinvolved in its production.Sanitary control of the process, import and export of drugs,narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and the raw materials necessary for itssubstances.development, responsible exclusively to the Ministry of Health, based on the potentialhealth risks that these products represent

24can only be granted for medical and / or scientific purposes (Articles 235 and 247, respectively). In this line, there is also an express prohibition to grant the above mentioned authorization for drugs and psychotropic substances (Articles 237 and 248).

Indeed, in accordance with Articles 235 and 247 and Article 44 of the Rules of Inputs for Health, any person who intends to plant, cultivate, prepare, condition, acquire, possess, trade, transport, prescribe medically, supply, use, use, consume and, in general, any action related to the substances listed in the Articles 234 and 245 of the General Health Act, or anyproduct that contains, must have an "authorization" from the Ministry of Health and can perform only those actions that have medical and / or scientific purposes.2828  Article 235. The planting, cultivating, harvesting, processing, preparation, conditioning,acquisition, possession, trade, transport in any form, prescription, supply,employment, use, consumption and, in general, any act related to narcotics or anycontaining product that is subject to: I. The provisions of this Act and its regulations; II. International treaties and conventions to which the United Mexican Statesare a party and which has entered into under the provisions of the ConstitutionUnitedof the  Mexican States; III. The provisions issued by the General Health Council; IV. What other laws establishing general provisions and relatedmatters;

V. (Repealed). VI. The provisions related to emit other Federal Executiveintheir respective areas of competence.The acts referred to in this Article may be made onlymedical andpurposesHealth.forscientificand require authorization from the Ministry of Article 247. The sowing, cultivation , harvesting, processing, preparation, conditioning,acquisition, possession, trade, transport in any form, prescription, supply,employment, use, consumption and, in general, any act related to psychotropic substances orany product that contains, is subject to: I. The provisions of this Act and its regulations; II. International treaties and conventions to which the United Mexican Statesare a party and which has entered into under the provisions of the ConstitutionUnitedof the  Mexican States; III. The provisions issued by the General Health Council; IV. What other laws establishing general provisions and relatedmatters; V. (Repealed) VI. Provisions concerning that issue other Federal Executive intheir respective areas of competence.

25However, Article 368 stipulates that "health authority" is the administrative act by which the health authority permits a public or private transactions person related to human health, in the cases and with the activities, conditions and procedures determined by the General Health Act itself. However, Articles 237 and 248 expressly prohibit the issuance of the authorization have been referred in respect of certain substances considered as a serious public health problem, among which are the narcotic drug "cannabis sativa, indica and American or Marijuana" and thepsychotropic "tetrahydrocannabinol '(THC), the isomeric Δ6A (10a), Δ6A (7), Δ7 Δ8, Δ9, Δ10 Δ9 (11) and its stereochemical variants, substances in dispute in this appeal for review.29

In this regard, it is important to note that Articles 238 and 249 provide an extraordinary course to allow the acquisition of narcotic and psychotropic drugs referring to the aforementioned Articles 237 and 248 for purposes of scientific research, for which it will be necessary that the body or institutionacts referred to in this Article may be made onlymedical andpurposes,toforscientific  and required, like the respective substances, authorized by the Ministry ofHealthProducts. Regulation of HealthArticle 44. The collection, processing, manufacture, preparation, mixing,conditioning, packaging, handling, storage, marketing, importation,exportation, prescription, supply, possession, transportation, employment, use, consumption and, in

general, any act related to narcotics and psychotropic substances, except  withoutthosetherapeutic value and are commonly used in the industry may be used onlymedicalfor  and scientific purposes, after authorization of the Secretariat.29  Article 237. It is prohibited in the country, all the acts mentioned inArticle 235 of this Act, with respect to the following substances and plants: opium preparedforsmoking, heroin or diacetylmorphine, its salts or preparations, cannabis sativa, indica and Americanor Marijuana, Papaver somniferum, or opium poppy, Papaver bactreatum and novogratense Erythroxilonor cocaine, in any form, derivatives or preparations.The same prohibition may be established by the Ministry of Health to other substancesreferred to in Article 234 of this Act, when considered they can be replaced in theirtherapeutic uses other elements that, in his opinion, do not cause dependence. Article 248. It is forbidden all acts mentioned in Article 247 of thisAct, with respect to substances listed in Section I of Article 245.

26concerned present a research protocol approved by the Health Secretariat30

Thus, the First Chamber understands that the contested rules are subject to a "system of administrative bans" which is part of the regulatory framework provisions of the General Health Law for the control of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, which constitutes a legal obstacle to lawfully perform all actions necessary to be in a position to carry out theconsumption of marijuana (planting, growing, harvesting, preparation,conditioning, possession, transportation, etc.). For one, the last paragraphs of Articles 235 and 247 stipulate that the authorization for the studies and acts related to narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances is subject to the condition they have only "medical and / or scientific" purposes, excluding the possibility that marijuana can be used for "recreational or leisure" purposes. The numerals 237 and 245, in conjunction with Article 248, establishes an express prohibition so sharp that the Ministry of Health was unable to issue the authorizations that the complainants requested in relation to the use of marijuana for the purpose of exercising their right to free development of personality.

30  Article 238 for scientific research only, the Ministry of Healthauthorized agencies or institutions that have presented research protocol

approved by that agency, the acquisition of drugs referred Section237 ofthis Act. Such organizations and institutions communicate to the Ministry of Health theresult of investigations conducted and as used. Article 249 for scientific research only, the Health Departmentmay allow the purchase of psychotropic substances to which section I ofLaw,Article 245 of this  to be delivered under control bodies or institutions that havepresented research protocol approved by that Unit, which in turninform the said Secretariat the result of investigations conducted and howisused.

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In this vein, it is important to note that although Article 478 of the General Health Law,31 in conjunction with Article 479, states that the Public Ministry will not exercise criminal action against persons possessing five grams of marijuana, the Supreme Court has interpreted that provision to contain an exclusive responsibility,32 which only means that in such cases it should not apply to the person who committed the crime in question, but does not establish in any way an authorization or a right to personal consumption, but is only meant to decriminalize consumption in a very small amount. Those provisions do not allow in any way the carrying out of other activities correlated to consumption, such as planting, growing, harvesting, preparation, transportation, etc.

It should be noted that the aforementioned items are not not part of "the system of administrative bans" contested by the complainants, but of the “punitive system" under the General Health Law and the Federal Penal Code in relation to the control of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, so they are not relevant precepts regarding the constitutionality approach proposed by the complainants, which straightened only against the numerals that form the aforementioned"administrative system of prohibitions," among which obviously are not

31  Article 478. The Public Ministry will not exercise criminal action for the offense under thepreceding article against whoever drug addict or consumer and possessing any of thenarcotics listed in the table, equal to or less than the amount provided therein for itsstrict staff and outside places specified in section II of section 475 of thisconsumption.Act  The ministerial authority shall inform the consumer the location of the institutions or centersfor medical or counseling for the prevention of drug treatment.32 In this regard see the thesis category "crime against health. ARTICLE 478OF THE GENERAL HEALTH LAW, by providing for not applying the exclusion ofliability in respect ofdrug addicts HOLDERSany narcoticIN DETENTION CENTER, EVEN IFquantitydoes not exceed the legal limit does not violate theguarantee of equality "[ninth period; Record 162 389; Instance First Chamber; Type ofThesis: Isolated; Source: Judicial Weekly of the Federation and its Gazette; Volume XXXIII, April2011;Matter (s): Constitutional; Thesis: 1a. LII / 2011; Page:. 307]

28Articles 478 and 479 of the General Health Law. Once the scope of the contested rules are established, then it will be analyzed if such an administrative "prohibitions system" generates the damages that the plaintiffs argue.

In this sense, even though the appellants argue violations of the rightsof personal identity, self-image, privacy and human dignity, the First Chamber considers that all these fall under the right to free development of personality. Thus, it is necessary to explain the premium content facie this right and then decide whether the claimed items affect such content.

II. Analysis of the impact of the measure challenged inthe premium content facie the free development of personality

The modern theory of fundamental rights draws a distinction prerequisite for understanding the way in which the constitutional courts often control the constitutionality of rules through the principle of proportionality: the scope of the fundamental right and the extent of their protection. 33 According to this distinction, the examination of the constitutionality of

a legislative measure must be carried out through a two-stage analysis.

First, it must be determined whether the contested provision affects the prima facie scope or content of the right at issue.34 In other words, it must be established whether the contested legislative measure limits

33 Barak, Aharon, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and Their Limitations, trans. DoronQalir, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 19.34 Bernal Pulido, Carlos, The principle of proportionality and fundamentalrights, Madrid,CEPC, 2007, p. 45.

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the fundamental right.35 At this stage of analysis is necessary to resort to the interpretation of the relevant legal provisions. On the one hand, we must determine the scope of the prohibition or obligation set by the legislative provision at issue. On the other hand, we must also interpret the constitutional provision that hosts the fundamental right in question, in order to determine the scope or content of this. Thus, in this first stage, we must determine if the behaviors are covered under the fundamental right in question. If the conclusion is negative, the test should end at this stagewith the statement that the legislative measure at issue is constitutional. But if the conclusion is positive, it upgrades to another level of analysis.

In the second stage of analysis, it must be determined whether the standard actually involved in the fundamental right is constitutional. So, at this stage of the analysis we should consider whether there is a constitutional justification for legislative action to reduce the extent ofprotection that initially granted the right. This exercise involves examining whether the legislative intervention meets the requirements of the principle of proportionality: a constitutionally valid purpose, suitability, necessity andproportionality.

35 Barak,  cit., p. 26.

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According to the above, the First Chamber proceeds to determine whether the legislative measure limits the raw content of the facie right to free development of personality.

First, it should be noted that the Mexican Constitution grants broad protection to empower people, to ensure the enjoyment of certain goods which are indispensable for the choice and realization of life plans proposed by individuals.36 Thus, in general terms it can be said thatfundamental rights are accorded to "entrench" those goods against state measures or actions of third parties that may affect personal autonomy.37 In this way, the rights considered to be "off limits" to state action are linked to the satisfaction of those commodities that are necessary for the satisfaction of any plan of life.38

In this vein, rather than the more generic is required to ensure the autonomy of people is the freedom from any conduct that does not harm others.39 The Constitution and international treaties recognize a catalog of "rights of freedom" that result in permissions to perform certain actions that are considered valuable for the autonomy of individuals (expressing

opinions, moving unimpeded, freedom of association, freedom to adopt a religion or other belief, the right to choose a profession or work, etc.), and which also involve targeting the government and third parties, since imposing negative bans intervenes or obstructs the actions permitted by

36 Nino, Carlos, Ethics and Human Rightslimits.A test basis, 2nd ed., BuenosAires, Astrea, 1989, p. 223.37 Nino, op. cit., p. 223.38 Garzón Valdés, Ernesto, "Something about 'the preserve'" Doxa. Journal ofPhilosophy of Law no. 6, 1989, p. 209.39 Nino, op. cit., p. 223.

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the fundamental right in question.40 However, the right to free development of personality protects a "residual area of freedom" not covered by other public freedoms.41 As the German Constitutional Court explained in Elfes,42

these fundamental rights protect the freedom of human performance of certain "living space." These, according to historical experience, are morelikely to be affected by the government when a certain "vital space" is operated through a state measure and is not expressly protected by aspecific right of freedom. In these cases, people can invoke the protection of the right to free development of personality.

Thus, this law can come into play whenever an action will not be supervised by a specific right of freedom.43 In this regard, the specialized doctrine has indicated that the right to free development of personality involves "a radical rejection of the ever-present temptation of state paternalism, who think they know better than the people what is good for them and what they should do with their lives,” so it can be said that thisright is “the constitutional proclamation that respects the rights of others, that each human being is the best judge of their own interests" (emphasis added).44

40 Alexy, Robert, Theory of fundamental rights, trans. Carlos Bernal Pulido, Madrid,CEPC, 2007, pp. 197-201.41 Díez-Picazo, Luis Maria, System Fundamental Rights, 2nd ed., Cizur Menor,Thomson Civitas, 2005, p. 70.42 BVerfGE 6, 32, judgment of 16 January 1957. Quoted by the translation contained inKommers, Dolad P, and Sussel A. Miller, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic ofGermany, 3rd ed., Durham, Duke University Press, 2012, p. 40243 Eberle, Eduard J., "Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and AmericanConstitutional Law," Utah Law Review, 1997, p. 979.44 Díez-Picazo, op. cit., p. 69.

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In the Mexican system, the Supreme Court has understood that the free development of personality is a fundamental right derived from the right to dignity, which in turn is provided for in Article 1 of the Constitution and It is implicit in international human rights treaties signed by our country.45 In thisregard, in the judgment that decided the direct protection 6/200846 a plenaryof the High Court held that "[t] he individual, whoever he is, has the right to choose freely and autonomously, their life plan, how it will achieve the goals and objectives that, for him, are relevant.”

That precedent explained that the right to free development of personality allows “the achievement of a life project for himself, the human being, as an autonomous entity," so that there exists "state recognition of the natural ability of every person to be individual, without coercion or undue controls or impediments by others, in order to meet the goals and objectives it has set, ie, it is the human person who decides the meaning of his own existence, according to his or her own values, ideas, expectations, tastes, etc." This criterion was subsequently reflected in the separate opinion of category "right to free development of personality.”47

45 In this regard, see the thesis category "human dignity.LEGAL ORDERMEXICANRECOGNIZED AS THE BASIS OF CONDITION AND OTHERRIGHTSFUNDAMENTAL"[Ninth Period; Register 165813; Instance: plenary; Type of Thesis: Isolated;Source: Judicial Weekly of the Federation and its Gazette; Volume XXX, December 2009Subject (s): Constitutional; Thesis: P. LXV / 2009; Page: 8]46 Judgment of January 6, 2009, resolved by the full Supreme CourtRegister:..47 Ninth Period,  165 822, Instance: Full, type Thesis: Isolated, Source:Judicial Weekly of the Federation and its Gazette, Volume XXX, December 2009 Subject (s): Civil,Constitutional, Thesis: P. LXVI / 2009, Page:7.

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In line with the statement made by the German Constitutional Court in the Eppler case,48 it can be said that the "indefinite" freedom which is supervised by the right to free development of personality complements the more specific freedoms such as freedom of conscience or freedom of expression, since its function is to protect the "personal sphere" is not protected by traditional and more concrete liberties. In this sense, this right is especially important against the new threats to individual freedom presented today. However, the specialized doctrine states that the freedevelopment of personality has an external and an internal dimension.49

From an external point of view, the law provides coverage for a generic "freedom of action" that allows any activity that the individual considers necessary for the development of his personality.50 However, from an internal perspective, the law protects a "sphere of privacy" of the individual against external incursions that limit the ability to make certain decisions through which personal autonomy is exercised.51

As shown below, although at a conceptual level this distinction can be drawn between external and internal aspects, it is difficult to assign the cases to exercise this right to one of these dimensions. This is because the

actions performed by individuals in the exercise of personal autonomy involve the decision to carry out that action, while decisions on issues that

48 BVerfGE 54, 148, judgment of June 3, 1980. Cited by the translation contained inKommers and Miller, op. cit., p. . 406-40749 Eberle, Eduard J., "Observations on the Development of Human Dignity and Personalityin German Constitutional Law: An Overview", Liverpool Law Review Journal. of ContemporaryLegal and Social Policy, vol. 33, no. 3, 2012, p.211.50 According to the German Constitutional Court, the free development of personalityis an independent fundamental right that guarantees a general freedom of action. In thisregard,Case BVerfGE 6 3651 Eberle, "Observations ...", op. cit., p. 211.

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in principle concern only the individual normally require certain actions to materialize. In any case, it seems that it is a matter of emphasis. So while there are situations in which the most important aspect of personal autonomy is seen in the action taken, there are other situations in which the exercise of autonomy is seen most clearly through the decision taken by the person.

Moreover, it is worth noting that in comparative law there are other fundamental rights that serve a similar free development of personality function.

In American law, for example, from the right to due process in its substantive aspect it has developed what is known as "decisional privacy."52 This aspect of the right to privacy is directly related to personal autonomy, since it not only guarantees an area of freedom in making decisions that only concern the individual, but also provides coverage for a generic freedom of action, which includes aspects such as how to behave in public or the lifestyle of the individual.53 According to what has been

presented, it seems clear that the right to free development of personality is a right whose contours should leave jurisprudential needs. In comparative law, the form in which it has carried out the specification process is to ask from specific cases whether a particular action or individual choice is protected under this law.

52 It is worth noting that in American law the "decisional privacy"it distinguisheswhat is known as the" privacy physical "and" informational privacy ". While theright to privacy entails physical protection for the home and personal integrityagainst unjustified interventions by third parties, the right to informational privacygivesthe individual control information related to himself. In this regard, seeMayer-Schönberger, Viktor, "Strands of Privacy: Informational Databases and DNA and thePrivacyOECDGuidelines" (ed.), David Lazer, The Technology of Justice: DNA and the Criminal JusticeSystem, Cambridge, MIT Press 2004.53, Rossler  Beate, The Value of Privacy, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2005 p.89

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For example, the German Constitutional Court has held that the free development of personality provides coverage for "recreational" activities like traveling abroad, hunting and horse riding54 while in cases involving transsexuals the right protected the decision regarding the sex and gender with which an individual wishes to be identified.55

In a similar vein, the US Supreme Court held that the right to privacy in the aspect aforementioned protects a variety of personal decisions from external interference,56 such as those related to contraception,57

education,58 the care of children,59. and family relations. 60 Thus, these decisions are covered by the right to privacy specifically because they belong to the sphere of personal autonomy. As noted above, the protection afforded by the right not only includes those decisions, but also the actions necessary to realize those decision.

54 Kommers and Miller, op. cit., pp. 400- 404.55 Kommers and Miller, op. cit., p. 413.56 Brashear, Bruce, "Marijuana Prohibition and The Constitutional Right of Privacy: AnExamination of Ravin v. State "Tulsa Law Review, vol. 11 1975, p. 571.

57 The US Supreme Court has recognized in several cases the right ofindividuals to decide on the use of contraceptive methods. In this regard, see among othersGriswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965), which declared unconstitutional a state lawprohibitingthe distribution of information about birth control to married persons; and Eisenstadt v.Baird, 405 US 438 (1972), which held that the right to privacy protects thedecisionsindividual  on contraception.58 With regard to educational issues, Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 US 183 (1952), theSupreme Court held that the right to privacy gave coverage to the freedom ofresearch, thought and education; Martin v. Struthers, 319 US 141 (1943) noted thatthe right to privacy also included the right to distribute, receive and read information,and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390 (1923) established that the right to privacy alsoincluded the right to access the full spectrum of available knowledge based ontheFirst Amendment.59 On this issue, the US Supreme Court ruled in Pierce v. Society ofSisters, 268 US 510 (1925), that the right to privacy protected in turn the right to educateone's children as one chooses.60 In this regard, in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 US 158 (1944) recognized that theright to privacy protects state interference private sphere of family life, andin Loving v. Virginia, 388 US 1 (1967) held that the right to privacyincludedalsothe right to decide who you want to marry a person.

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Now this way of specifying the content of the right to free development of personality, consisting of cases that specifically recognize that certain types of conduct or decisions are protected by law, which in turn results in therecognition of a right to make those behaviors or make those decisions without State interference, is consistent with the manner in which this Supreme Court has approached the problems related to the scope of the right in question.

In fact, in the judgment of that direct relief 8/2008 the Supreme Court held that in the matter of "'sexual reassignment,” for a person to decide to have surgery for that purpose, in order to adapt their psychosocial and physical state, hence, live in the sex with which the person identifies fully, is undeniably a decision that is part of the free development of personality, as an expression of the individuality of the person. It is part of their sexual perception of themselves, which strongly influences their life project. It is a decision that is part of the Rights to the free development of thepersonality.61

Subsequently, the Supreme Court has stated repeatedly that the decision to stay married or not is covered by the right to free development of personality. So, at the judgment of the direct amparo 917/2009

61 Ninth Period, Register: 165 698, Instance: Full, type Thesis: Isolated, Source:Judicial Weekly of the Federation and its Gazette, Volume XXX, December 2009 Subject (s): Civil,Thesis: P. LXIX / 2009, page 17.

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review,62 when analyzing the constitutionality of no-fault divorce in the civil legislation of the Federal District, the First Chamber held that "respect for the free development of personality justifies recognizing greater importance to the individual's will when you no longer wish to remain connected with your spouse, therefore, the right to process the dissolution of marriage, can not be made dependent on the demonstration of cause some, for that determinant is simply the end of that will expressed in demand, resulting inadmissible that the State is endeavoring to maintain in force the marriage of those seeking divorce to consider its particular situation becomes irreconcilable.”

In similar terms, in the direct protection under review 1819/2014,63 the First Chamber explained that "with the expression of the decision to not continue the marriage, the right to the free development of personality is exercised, for deciding to not to continue to remain married, a change of marital status, is the way the individual wants to live his life project; the way the individual chooses his freely autonomous life project", which was

subsequently the criteria set out in the separate opinion: "DIVORCE without explanation is a form of exercising the right to free development of the personality.”64

62 Judgement of September 23, 2009, resolved unanimously votes of the fourMinisters Jose Ramon Cossio Diaz, Juan N. Silva Meza, Olga Sanchez Cordero of GarciaVillegas (Rapporteur) President Sergio A. Valls Hernández. Absent Minister José de JesúsGudiño Pelayo.63 Judgment of 22 October 2014, decided by a majority of four votes of theMinisters Arturo Zaldívar Lelo de Larrea, Jorge Mario Pardo Rebolledo, Olga Sánchez CorderoGarciaVillegas (Rapporteur) and Alfredo Gutierrez Ortiz Mena. Dissident: Jose Ramon Cossio Diaz,who reserved its right to formulate dissentingRegistration.64, Tenth Season   2,008,492, Instance: First Chamber, Thesis Type: Isolated,Source: Gaceta Judicial Weekly of the Federation, Book 15, February 2015, Volume II,Matter (s): Constitutional, Thesis: 1a. LIX / 2015 (10a.), Page: 1392

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In the same vein, in the analysis of the free development of the personality, the constitutionality of the divorce system through which accreditation is required grounds to dissolve the marriage, the First Chamber again reiterated in the contradictory argument 73/201365 that "the decision of a spouse not to stay married, regardless of the reasons, is also part of a life plan chosen independently, which should not be hindered by the state or by a third party, such as when the other spouse refuses to grant a divorce, which means that the decision is also covered at least primafacie by this right.”

Moreover, it is worth noting that in solving the aforementioned direct protection, 8/2008 the plenary Supreme Court also noted in obiter dictum that "the right to free development of personality, comprising, among others, the freedom to marry or not; to bear children and how many and at what point in your life, or decide not to have them; to choose one’s personal appearance; profession or work activity; and, of course, freedom of sexual

choice, as all these aspects are obviously part of the way the individual wants to project and live his life and therefore he alone can decide for himself.”

As shown, the precedents cited show a line of cases in which the Supreme Court has recognized that the right to free development of personality gives

65 Judgment of February 25, 2015, determined by a majority of four votes of theMinisters Arturo Zaldívar Lelo de Larrea (Rapporteur), Jorge Mario Pardo Rebolledo, Olga SánchezCordero Garcia Villegas and President Alfredo Gutiérrez Ortiz Mena against issued by theMinister Jose Ramon Cossio Diaz, with regard to competition and by a majority of threevotes Ministers Arturo Zaldívar Lelo de Larrea (Reporter ), Jose Ramon Cossio Diaz (whoreservesthe right to make concurring) and Olga Sanchez Cordero Garcia Villegas,contraryto those issued by the Ministers Jorge Mario Pardo Rebolledo and President AlfredoGutiérrez Ortiz Mena (who reserved the right to formulate dissenting), whichrefersto the background.

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cover in principle to a variety of actions and decisions connected directly with the exercise of individual autonomy. However, in this case the first question to be answered is whether the decisions and actions thus described are protected by the law in question.

The complainants claimed that Health unlawfully refused to grant them permission to "use marijuana regularly, personally and for purely recreational purposes." They claimed that they recognized "correlative rights to the consumption of marijuana, such as planting, growing, harvesting, preparing, possession, transport in any form, employment, consumption and use, in general, any act related to the recreational useof marijuana," on the understanding that his request expressly excluded “commercial transactions, such as distribution, sale and transfer of the same.”

The appellants argue that the free development of personality gives cover to the decision to consume marijuana for recreational purposes and, consequently, also all the necessary tools to be able  carry out their own consumption (planting, growing, harvesting, preparation, preparation, possession, transportation, etc.) In this regard, the First Chamber understands that the fundamental right in question allows prima facie that seniors may decide without state interference decide what type of recreational or leisure activities they want to enjoy.

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The choice of a recreational or leisure activity is a decision that undoubtedly belongs to the sphere of personal autonomy protected by the Constitution. That choice may include, as in this case, the intake orconsumption of substances that produce experiences that in some way "affect" the thoughts, emotions and / or feelings of the person.66 In this line, the decision to smoke marijuana can have different purposes, including "the relief of stress, the intensification of perceptions or include the desire for new personal and spiritual experiences."67 So, being "mental experiences", they are among the most personal and intimate that anyone can experience, so that the decision of an individual of senior age to "affect" hispersonality in this way for recreational or entertainment purposes is covered under for the right to free development of personality.68

Now, discussed in the regulatory framework for the control of narcotic and psychotropic substances in the General Health Law and the premium

content of the facie right to free development of personality, this First Chamber is in a position to conclude that the articles of that system identified by the District Judge acts claimed as effectively influencing the premium content of the facie fundamental right, because they constitute a legal obstacle preventing the plaintiffs from exercising the right to decide what recreational or leisure activities they want to perform, while also

66 In this regard, see the dissenting opinion of Judge Levinson to the judgment of theCourtSupremeof Hawaii in the Hawaii case State v. Kantner, 53 H.327,493 P.2d 306 (1972).67 Id.68 Id.

41preventing them from lawfully carrying out all necessary actions and activities to realize that choice through the consumption ofmarijuana.

That being said, the free development of personality is not an absolute valid right valid, so you may be limited in order to pursue some constitutionally valid goal. In this regard, it is important to identify the limits to this right that have been recognized by the High Court. Under this theme, in that direct protection of the 6/2008 plenary Supreme Court she explained that this right "is not absolute, as is its limits in the rights of others and public order". As can be seen, these outer limits to the right to work as provisions authorizing the legislature to intervene in the free development of the personality to pursue those aims.69

In this vein, the specialized doctrine has stated that fundamental rights and their outer limits operate as principles, so that relations between the law

and its limits enclose a collision that must be resolved using the test of proportionality.70 Thus, for our constitutional interventions carried out under the law that limit the free development of personality must meet certain characteristics: the legislative measure must be appropriate to protect the rights of others and / or public order; and should not restrict unnecessarily and disproportionately this fundamental right.

69 On this understanding the way in which the outer limits of theoperate,rights  see Prieto Sanchis, Luis, constitutional justice and fundamental rights, Madrid,Trotta, 2003, p. 22270 Idem.

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In other words, the measure in question has to pass a test of proportionality in the broad sense.

According to this, the fact that the Supreme Court has established that the free development of personality gives facie premium coverage to a specific duty to decide and implement whatever recreational or leisure activity you want to perform, which may include the use of certain substances for leisure or entertainment, does not mean that this right is final.

In this sense, the fundamental right adopts double face: the proportionality test presents a basis and only after it has completed the scrutiny acquires a definitive character, so that if the legislative measure limiting the right fails the test of proportionality, the final content of the right will coincide with the attributed prima facie; however, if the law is justified in light of the

proportionality test the contents of the right will be smaller than the apparent or prima facie.71

III. Analysis of proportionality in the broad sense of themeasure challenged

As explained above, in a second stage of analysis must be determined: whether the rule involved in the initially area protected by the fundamental law is constitutional. So, at this stage of the analysis we should consider whether in there is justification from the point of view of the constitutional case that the legislative measure limits the raw content of the facie right. This exercise involves establishing whether the legislative action pursues a constitutionally valid purpose and examines whether the measure exceeds

71 Ibid, p. 221.

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an analysis of strict suitability, necessity and proportionality.

In the case, remember the measure whose constitutionality is analyzed is the "system of administrative bans" set by the contested articles, whichform part of the regulatory framework established by the General Health Law on the control of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. In this regard, it should be clarified that the "punitive system" under the General Health Law and the Federal Penal Code in relation to this issue will not be subject to any ruling of constitutionality. In this line, it also reiterates that neither the request of the complainants before the administrative authority or the request for defense included request for a "commercial market" for marijuana, hence the First Chamber deems appropriate to clarify that there will be no pronouncement on this activity.

1. The constitutionality of the aims pursued by the measureFirst, we must identify the aims pursued by the contested measure to determine whether they are constitutionally valid. This stage of the analysis presupposes the idea that there is any purpose can justify limiting a fundamental right.72. In effect, we are considering whether the ends can justify the legislative intervention on the exercise of fundamental rights.

72 Barak, op. cit., p.245.

44In this vein, fundamental rights, property collective and legal rights as guaranteed constitutional principles constitute legitimate purposes underlying the intervention of the legislature in the exercise of other rights.73

However, it should be clarified that the state can not require people to act in accordance with a particular model of virtue.74

In the case of the precepts that make up the "system of administrative bans" it appears that the legislature considered it necessary to prohibit the administrative authorization to perform all activities related to marijuana, with special attention paid to the harmful effects associated with that product in the "health" and "public order." Indeed, the General Health Law was to intended to regulate the right to health protection.75 In this regard, among the goals envisaged in the law itself was to “promote the physical and mental well-being of man, to contribute the full exercise of their abilities." (Section I of Article 2) Thus, in order to achieve that level of

welfare, the legislature considered it necessary to implement a "health check" of psychotropic and narcotics, under the premise that their use is a

73 Bernal Pulido, op  cit., p. 697.74 Nino, op. cit., pp. 425-426.75 This law replaced the former Health Code and was promulgated on February 7, 1984.From that date have not been renovated Articles 235 and 237, which were challenged bythe complainants.

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problem for public health in that both generate dependency in the consumer.76

Later reforms to various provisions were made in order to better clarify which substances can be considered narcotics or psychotropic substances77 So the legislature understood that such details are moved in "to progressive realization of the right to health protection, contained in article 4. of our Constitution substances:."78 In this regard, in the preamble to the latest amendment to Article 245 of the General Health Law, in which were added as psychotropic substances mephedrone, piperazine, TFMPP, midazolam and K2,79 it was noted that "one of the most serious problems of public health serious at the international level is relative to consumption and marketing of drugs, a phenomenon that in recent years has experienced

increasing complexity due to the internationalization of illegal building activities, production and smuggling of precursor chemicals."80

In this vein, the preamble also stated that "[t]hese behaviors represent an increase in illicit activities and have allowed criminal groups amass great resources and income; the problem should be analyzed from the perspective of the impact that causes on public health, as this phenomenon

76 So warns of the preamble to the Act, and their correspondinglegal opinions. In this regard, see: Preamble, Chamber of  Chamber ofDeputies, Mexico, Federal District November 15, 1983 on the initiative of the GeneralLawOrigin:.Health77 In this respect, the December 23, 1987 was enacted an amendment to the Articles 245,247 and 248 of the General Law of Health. This last item has not been modified since.78 Opinion of the chamber of origin of the Joint Commissions and General HealthFirst Section of the Legislative Studies of the Senate of 26November1987.79 This reform he issued the January 7, 2014 and was the last to be made to article245.80 Reason of January 23, 2012 by Federal Executive in thedraft reform of sections I and III of Article 245 of the General Law Health.

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causes the increase of diseases, disorders and even death, all a result of their addictive use, making its effects felt in the social, economic, and political fields.”81

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the current Article 1 of the General Health Act provides that this law aims to regulate the right to the protection of the health of any person in the terms of Article 4 of the Constitution, and to establish the basis and methods for access to health services and the participation of the Federation and the states in terms of "general health". According to the law itself, this concept includes, among other things, both the prevention of drug and psychotropic substances as the existence of aprogram against drug abuse (section XXI of article 3).

In accordance with the foregoing, we conclude that the purpose of the regulatory framework for the control of narcotic and substances psychotropic referred to in the General Health Act is to protect the "health" and "public order", since under a systematic interpretation of the system as well as the different processes to amend the law, it can appear that the legislature intended to ensure the health of drug users and protect society from the harmful consequences of drug use, since it was considered that this activity has harmful effects both for the consumer and for society in general.

81 Reason for January 23, 2012 by the Federal Executive, in thedraft reform of sections I and III of Article 245 of the General Health Law.

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In this regard, the First Chamber understands that both purposes are constitutionally valid. On the one hand, it is clear that the protection of health is a goal that can legitimately pursue the state, since it is fundamentally recognized in Article 4 of the Constitution, which provides expressly that everyone is entitled to the protection of health.82 In this regard, we must not forget that this right has both personal and individual projection and a public or social component.

Regarding the protection of health of people as individuals,the Supreme Court of Justice has established many precedents that the right to health results in obtaining a particular general welfare composed of the physical,

mental, emotional and social status of the person, which derives another fundamental right, consisting of the right to integrity.83

Hence it is evident that the State has a constitutional interest in people procuring individually adequate health and welfare.

On the other hand, involved in the social or public face of the right to health is the duty of the state to address the health problems that affect society in general and to establish the necessary mechanisms to ensure that all

82  Article 4 [...]. [...]Everyone has the right the protection of health. The Act defines theandrulesforms for access to health services and establish the concurrence of the Federationand the states in matters of public health, as available to the fractionXVI of Article 73 of the Constitution.  [...]83 P.LXVIII / 2009, supported by the Full Court, available on the Ninth PeriodJudicialWeekly of the Federation and its Gazette, Volume XXX, December two thousand nine, PageSix, under the heading: "RIGHT TO HEALTH. Not limited to the physical aspect, but thattranslatesinto OBTAINING A PARTICULAR GENERAL WELFARE.

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people have access to health services.84 In the direct protection under review 4321/2014,85 the First Chamber acknowledged that in order to safeguard and protect the human right to health, the State must undertake the actions necessary to achieve that purpose, such as policy development, quality control of health services, identifying the main problems affecting the public health, etc. In this sense, we can say that the General Health Act identifies marijuana as a public health problem.

Closely related to the protection of public health is protecting public order.

While it is difficult to define what this constitutional principle is,86 it is a concept that refers to the welfare of society in general. If so understood, there is no doubt that public policy is the pursuit of collective social goals through legislative or public policy decisions. Moreover, it should be noted that the Constitution recognizes as a legitimate state interest the protection of society as a whole.

In contrast, the prohibition of marijuana by mere moral self-degradation involves not pursue a legitimate purpose. The Constitution does not impose an ideal of human excellence; it allows each individual to choose his own life plan and adopt the model each person considers valid, while not

84 P. / J. 136/2008, based on the Ninth Period Judicial Weekly of the Federationand its Gazette, Volume XXVIII, October two thousand eight, sixty-one page, under the heading: "HEALTH. THERIGHT TO PROTECTION UNDER YOUR ARTICLE on the 4th., THIRD PARAGRAPH, OF THECONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES, is asocialresponsibility."85 Judgment of June 10, 2015, determined by a majority of a majority of four votesof the Honourable Ministers Jose Ramon Cossio Diaz, Jorge Mario Pardo Rebolledo (Rapporteur), OlgaSánchez Cordero Garcia Villegas, and President Alfredo Gutiérrez Ortiz Mena, contraryissued by the Minister Arturo Zaldivar Lelo de Larrea, who said that it reserves the rightto formulate an individual opinion.86 The principle of public order is recognized in the Constitution in Articles6, first paragraph, 16, eighth paragraph, 115, section VII, 122, FIFTH BASE, first paragraph, 94paragraphF)and 130 second paragraph.

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affecting others.87

Thus, the supposed effects of marijuana that cause social performance,88

for example, decreased labor productivity, and "amotivational syndrome"89- can not be considered valid reasons to act upon the right to free development of personality.

Moreover, examining the law under consideration, and the rule making processes that have reformed it, it is not the legislature's intention to

promote a particular clear model of personal virtue. As explained, the law seeks to protect the health and public order. Once it has been established that the regulatory framework for the control of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances provided for in the General Health Law is a constitutionally valid purpose, we must now analyze whether the prohibition of marijuana for recreational purposes and therefore the ban on all the necessary tools to be able to carry actions out their own consumption (planting, growing, harvesting, preparation, possession, transportation, etc.), is a measure appropriate to protect the health and public order.

87 Nino, op. cit., p.423.88 According to some studies, the effects of marijuana on school andlifeprofessionalof the average consumer are unclear. Although it has been associatedpoorwithschoolperformance frequency of use, it has also been suggested that this may be due toother causes, such socioecómicos and cultural conditioning of those who consume it. In thisregard,see Caulkins, Jonathan P, Hawken, Angela Kilmer, Beau, and Kleiman, Mark, MarijuanaLegalization: What Everyone Needs to Know, New York, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 77. Inthis vein, in a survey conducted in Mexico City found that 70% ofmarijuana users are working, 43% study and 20% study and work. Cf. Zamudio Angles,Carlos Alberto and Castillo Ortega, Rain, First survey of users of illegal drugs inCity,Mexico  Mexico, Collective for an Integrated Drug Policy to the AC, 2012.89 "amotivational syndrome" ("syndrome amotivational ') is defined as a pattern ofbehavior characterized by a lack of motivation, energy and initiative. Cf. Hall, Wayne,Degenhardt, Louisa, and Lynskey, Michael, The Health and Psychological Effects of Cannabis Use, 2nded.,

Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 2001, p. ix.

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2. Suitability of the measure

At this stage of scrutiny we should examine whether the measure is an appropriate means to achieve the ends sought by the legislature. In this regard, consideration of suitability presupposes an empirical relationship between the right intervention and the intended purpose of such involvement, it is sufficient that the measure contributes in some way and to some degree to achieve the purpose sought by the legislator.90 Thus, the

suitability of a legislative measure must be shown from scientific knowledge or social convictions generally accepted.91 However, in this case we must determine whether the "system of administrative bans" set by the items contested is an appropriate measure to protect health and public order.

Before carrying out such scrutiny it is essential to make some methodological considerations about how to conduct the examination of the suitability of the measure. First, the legal literature that addresses the issue of the adequacy the of prohibition of consumption of drugs, it is sometimes often noted that this analysis is to determine whether the measure effectively reduces the consumption. Supporters of the analysis of adequacy onsider that a ban which in fact proves to be ineffective in

90 Although in American law the proportionality test is not usedwhenanalyzes the constitutionality of a measure usually done a similar analysis to testsuitability. In this regard, see for all Bates v. Little Rock 361 US 516; Roe v. Wade, 410 US113 (1973); McLaughlin v. Florida, US 379 184 (1964). In connection with the ban on theconsumption of marijuana, American literature also agrees on the need forsuch restrictions outweigh intense scrutiny. On this point, see Weber, Tim,"Would Government of Marijuana Prohibition Pass Strict Scrutiny?" Indiana Law Review, vol. 46,2013, pp. 529-556; and Carcieri, Martin D., "Obama, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the DrugWarm" Akron Law Review, vol. 44, 2011, pp. 303, 307-308, 311-312.91 Bernal Pulido, op.cit., P. 733.

51reducing consumption.92 On this point, there are indeed many studies showing that the ban does not deter consumption.93 Thus, in the present case it could be argued that the "system of administrative prohibitions" set by the articles contested has failed to reduce marijuana use.94 In this line, for example, data from the National Addiction Survey indicate that between 2002 and 2008 the consumption of illegal drugs increased from 4.6% to 5.2% among the population ages 12 to 65,95 which could be interpreted as meaning that the system of prohibition is ineffective in reducing

consumption.However, the First Chamber considers that the methodology set out above is inadequate to determine the suitability of the contested measure . In this vein, we accept that the analysis performed in this manner would lead to declare unconstitutional any prohibition or obligation that was ineffective in achieving the mandates established by those rules. In this

92 Uprimny, Rodrigo Guzman, Esther and Diana Parra, Jorge Alberto, "Des-ratio in theprosecution of drug offenses? The Colombian case "in Catalina Pérez Correa (ed.),Excessive Justice. Proportionality and drug offenses in Latin America, Mexico, Fontamara,2012, pp. 111-113Study".,93 In all, see Pedersen, Willy and Skardhamar, Torbjorn, "Cannabis and Crime:Findings From a Longitudinal  Addiction. Society for the Study of Addiction, vol. 105, no. 1,2010, pp. 109-118; Fergusson, David., Swain-Campbell, Nicola., And Horwood, John, "Arrests andConvictions for Cannabis Related Offences in a New Zealand Birth Cohort," Drug and AlcoholDepend, vol. 70, no. 1 pp. 53-63.94 In this regard, there is an extensive literature showing that prohibitionist policiesnothavebeen effective in reducing consistent and permanent supply and demand for drugs. Forall, see Blackwell, Michael J., "The Costs and Consequences of US Drug Prohibition for thePeoples of Developing Nations" Indiana International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 24, no.3, 2014, p. 666; Christiansen, Matthew, "A Great Schism: Social Norms and Marijuana ProhibitionEssay.",A Short  Harvard Law and Policy Review, vol.4, No. 1, 2010, pp.. 241-244; Camacho,Adriana Gaviria, Alejandro, and Rodriguez, Catherine, "drug consumption in Colombia,"AlejandroUribe  Gaviria and Daniel Mejía Londoño (coomp.), Anti-drug policies in Colombia. Successes,failures and deviations; Bogotá, Ediciones Uniandes, 2011; Kisley Stephen, "The Case forPolicy",Reforming Cannabis Control  The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, vol. 53, no. 12, 2008, pp. 795-796 ;. Beckett, Katherine, and Herbert, Steve, The Consequences and Costs of MarijuanaProhibition, Seattle,ACLU / University of Washington, 2009, pp. 11-26; van het Loo, Mirjam, Hoorens, Stijn van't Hof, Christian, and Kahan, James P., Cannabis Policy. Implementation and  SantaOutcomes,Monica,RAND Corporation, 2003. In the same vein, see the following reports: OpenSociety Institute, War on Drugs. Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy, 2011, pp. 2-4 .; andReport by the Advisory Committee on Drug Dependence, London, Home Office, 1969.95 Perez Correa, Catalina, "Crimes against health and (dis) proportionality inMexican law"in Pérez Correa, op. cit., p. 196.

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sense, this Supreme Court finds that the prohibitory rules cannot be considered unconstitutional simply for being ineffective in motivating the behavior of people. The reduction in consumption can not be considered an end in itself of the measure itself, but in any case a state of affairs which is a means or an intermediate in order to achieve further purpose, such as the protection of public health or public order.96

An alternative way to analyze the suitability is to argue that the "system of administrative bans" set by the contested items will be suitable to achieve the aims pursued by the legislature, consisting of the protection of healthand public order, to the extent that an empirical relationship exists betweenthe consumption of marijuana and certain damages to health and public order. In other words, if marijuana does not cause injury or damages to health or  as society a whole, the ban will not be a suitable measureto protect these constitutional objectives. The examination of fitness then requires corroboration of the existence of an empirical relationship between use marijuana and certain states of affairs that can be characterized as damages to health or society.

Now, if you examine the literature that has analyzed the effects of the recreational use of marijuana, it is possible to identify at least the following states of things normally considered to be associated with the recreational use of marijuana: damages to health; propensity to use "harder" drugs; and incitement to commit other crimes. So, in the next section marijuana will

96 In the literature the "primary problem" caused by thediffer.abuse of a psychoactive substance, of the "secondary problems" arising from  policiescontrolthat States adopt against substance  Cf. Uprimny, Guzman and Vine, op. cit., p.108.

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be evaluated regarding the causes of the above damages to health and public order. It should also be pointed out that to pass the test of suitability it will be enough that such damages exist, regardless of grade. In other words, to find constitutional justification for the prohibition of marijuana from the point of view of the adequacy of the measure, it is necessary to show that it affects the health and public order, even if that involvement is

minimal.97 Thus, an intervention may be considered suitable if the correlation between means and end is positive, regardless of their level of efficiency.

According to the above, then the court will analyze whether there is empirical evidence to support the belief that marijuana causes the damage or damages identified above.

To corroborate the existence of such a relationship, the First Chamber will rely on the scientific literature that has addressed this issue, as well as several empirical studies available on the subject. As a preliminary observation, it is worth noting that the available evidence shows that indeedmarijuana causes harm or damages of various kinds. However, as shown below, some of these damages have been confirmed conclusively, while others are unlikely or that are mere speculations. It is worth noting that the uncertainty largely explains the fact that it is difficult to determine whether marijuana use causes adverse effects on health and public order or if

97 According to the Global Commission on Drug Policy, public drug policiesshould be based on evidence showing that indeed these will help reduce damage to thehealth, safety of people and society in general. Open Society Institute, op. cit., p. 5.

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this is just a simple correlation98

A.Impact on HealthIn general, the studies agree that from the evidence that exists, marijuana use in adults does not pose a significant risk to health, except when it is

used chronically and excessively.99 In relation to the effects caused by marijuana on the health of people, the literature distinguishes overrideschronic. So while the first place persists only for duration of the poisoning in the body, the second persist even if the consumer does not feel intoxicated.100 Temporary alterations occur in the immediate aftermath of marijuana use. Some of the effects produced are panic, anxiety reduction, alertness, stress, increased sociability, gradual reduction of cognitive and motor functions, enhanced perceptions of reality--colors, flavors, sensations--or visual and/or hearing hallucinations.101 So, being dependent

98 On this subject, see, among others Caulkins, Hawken, Kilmer, and Kleiman, op. cit., p. 54;Room, Robin Fischer, Benedikt, Hall, Wayne Lenton, Simon, and Reuter, Peter, Cannabis Policy:Moving Beyond Stalemate, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010; D 'Souza, Deepak Cyril, Sewell,Richard Andrew, and Ranganathan, Mohini, "Cannabis and Psychosis / Schizophrenia: HumanStudies" European Archives of Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience, vol. . 259, No. 2009, pp413-431.;and Hall, Wayne, and Liccardo Paccula, Rosalie, Cannabis Use and Dependence: PublicHealth and Public Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010,99 Fischer, Benedikt, Jeffries, Victoria, Hall, Wayne, Room, Robin, Goldner Elliot , Rehm J.,"Lower Risk Cannabis Use Guidelines for Canada (LRCUG): A Narrative Review of Evidence andRecommendations", Canadian Journal of Public Health, vol. 102, no. 5, 2011, pp. 324-327; andHall, Wayne,"The Adverse Effects of Cannabis Use: What Are They, and What Are Their Implicationsfor Policy", International Journal of Drug Policy, 2009, vol. 20, pp. 458-466.100 In this regard, see for all Hall, Wayne, and Degenhardt, Louisa, "TheAdverseEffects of Chronic HealthCannabis Use" Drug Testing and Analysis. Special Issue: Cannabinoidspart II: The Current Situation With Cannabinoids, vol. 6 Nos. 1-2, 2013, pp. 39-45; and Halland Degenhardt Lynskey, op. cit.101 In this vein, it has even indicated that negative effects on the state ofintoxication, such as anxiety, panic, paranoia and / or psychosis, are usually associated with subjects

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So as regards temporary marijuana intoxication, research indicates that these effects are reversible and do not represent a proven health risk.102

The alleged existence of chronic disorders as a result of consumption is controversial in the literature. Studies indicate that permanent implications are unlikely or minimal, their persistence is uncertain and may even have

originated from a plurality of different factors consumption.103 An example of the latter situation is the association found between smoking marijuana andrespiratory cancers,104 which could be explained because many marijuana users also smoke tobacco, implying that the existence of a causal linkbetween marijuana use and cancer is not proven.105

psychologically vulnerable, such as people with schizophrenia. In this regard, see Ashton,Heather, "Pharmacology and Effects of Cannabis: A Brief Review", The British Journal ofPsychiatry, vol. 178, no. 2, 2001, pp. 101-106.102 Douaihy, Antoine, "Cannabis Revisited" UPMC Synergie, 2013, pp. 1-9.103 Ashton, op. cit., pp. 101-106. As an example, a study shows, among otherthings, that there is uncertainty about whether the adverse effects associated with marijuana arecausally related to its consumption, which is not clearly address the relationship betweenconsumptionand depressive disorders or emotional damages that cognitiveorintellectual intensity and reversibility of the impact is uncertain, and  consequencespsychoticare subject to the consumer suffers any special susceptibility topsychiatric disorders. In this regard, see Hall and Degenhardt, op.citMathieu.;104 In this regard, see Mehra, Berthiller, Julien, Straif, Kurt, Boniol,  Voirin,Nicolas; Benhaïm-Luzon, Veronique; Ayoub Ben Wided, Dari, Iman, Laouamri, Slimane, Hamdi-Cherif, Mokhtar, Bartal, Mohamed Ayed Ben Fahrat and Sasco, Annie, "Cannabis Smoking and Riskof Lung Cancer in Men: A Pooled Analysis of Three Studies in Maghreb ", Journal of ThoracicOncology, 2008, vol. 3 no. 12, p. 1398; Reena, Moore, Brent A., Crothers, Kristina, Tetrault,Jeanette; Fiellin, David A., "The Association Between Smoking and Lung Cancer Marijuana. ASystematic Review ", Archives of Internal Medicine, vol. 166, 2006, pp. 1359-1367; and Hashibe, Mia,Morgenstern, Hal, Cui Yan, Tashkin, Donald P., Zhang Zuo-Feng, Cozen, Wendy, Mack, ThomasM., and Greenland, Sander, "Marijuana Use and the Risk of Lung and Upper aerodigestive TractCancers: Results of a Population-Based Case-Control Study, "Cancer, Epidemiology, Biomarkers &Prevention, Vol. 15, no. 10, 2006, pp. 1829-1834.105 on this discussion, see Caulkins, Hawken, Kilmer and Kleiman, op. cit .; Hashibe,Morgenstern, Cui, Tashkin, Zhang, Cozen, Mack, and Greenland, op. cit .; Hall and Degenhardt, op.cit;Hall, Wayne, and Taylor, D. Robin, "Respiratory Health Effects of Cannabis: Position Statement of TheThoracic Society of Australia and New Zealand", Internal Medicine Journal, Vol. 33, 2003, pp. 310-313; Hall, Wayne, "What you Research over the Past Two Decades Revealed About The AdverseHealth Effects of Recreational Cannabis Use?" Addiction, vol. 110, no. 1, 2015, pp. 19-35.

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Moreover, there are studies that argue that marijuana produces the same respiratory damage as any other smoked substance,106 and that it is less harmful than other substances such as opium, amphetamines, alcohol or barbiturates.107 In this vein, several reports conclude that the danger ofmarijuana has been "overexposed"108 and generally emphasize that this substance has a very low level of toxicity.109 Moreover, there are also

studies that said the effects normally considered "chronic" are essentially reversible after consumption is suspended for a variable period of time.110

Similarly, studies agree that the relationship between marijuana and psychotic or mental disorders is unclear,111 except in consumers who aresusceptible to mental illness. In this line, it has not been shown conclusively that consumption produce damage in the reproductive systems of the consumer,112 nor is there evidence that marijuana generates a permanent impairment in the cardiovascular system,113 nor has it been

106 Al respect, see Royal College of Physicians of London, Cannabis andCannabis-BasedMedicines. Potential Benefits and Risks to Health, London, 2005; Joy, Janet E, Watson,Stanley, and Benson, John A (eds.), Marijuana and Medicine: Assessing the ScienceBase, Washington,DC, National Academy Press, 1999.107 Ballotta, Danilo, Bergeron, Henri, and Hughes, Brendan, "Cannabis Control in Europe,"SharonRodner Sznitman, Börje Olsson, Robin Room (eds.), A Cannabis Reader: Global Issuesand Local Experiences, Perspectives on Cannabis Controversies, Treatment and Regulation inEurope; Lisbon, EMCDDA, 2008; and Report by the Advisory Committee on Drug Dependence, op.cit.108 Ballotta, Bergeron, and Hughes, op. cit.109 Ashton, op. cit., pp. . 101-106110 As an example, see Solowij, Nadia, Cannabis and Cognitive Functioning,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006; and Pope, Harrison G., Gruber, Amanda J., Hudson,James I., Huestis, and Marilyn A. Yurgelun-Todd, Deborah, "Neuropsychological Performance inLong-term Cannabis Users", Archives of General Psychiatry of 2001, vol. 58, no. 10 pp. Number 909915.111 Zammit, Stanley Moore, Theresa HM, Lingford-Hughes, Anne Barnes, Thomas R.E., Jones, Peter B. Burke, Margaret, and Lewis Glyn, "Effects of Cannabis Use on Outcomes ofPsychotic Disorders: Systematic Review, "The British Journal of Psychiatry, vol. 193, no. 5. 2008,pp. 357-363; Hall and Degenhardt Lynskey, op. cit., p.75.112 Hall, Degenhardt and Lynskey, op. cit., p.56.113 Hall, Degenhardt and Lynskey, op. cit, p. 64.

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proven that prolonged severe cognitive damages occur similar to those observed after chronic alcohol consumption.114

Under such conditions, the First Chamber notes that while the medical evidence shows that marijuana can cause damage to the health of consumers, it is less than or similar to those damages produced by other

substances not prohibited such as alcohol or tobacco. So it can be concluded that the damage to health from the consumption of marijuana is not serious.

B. Development In the scientific literature, experts usually distinguish between abuse andsubstance dependence. While considering abuse from the continuous use of drugs, the agency requires that consumption meet additional criteria, such as development of drug tolerance, withdrawal and consumption interference with the development of other consumer activities.115 In this regard, regular marijuana users do not necessarily qualify as drug addicts.

However, there are clear differences in the literature regarding the frequency with which the drug is presented in marijuana users. Additionally,there are discrepancies in the period and intensity of consumption that arenecessary for marijuana to cause some degree of addiction. In this regard, there are studies that suggest that there is a low degree of probability that marijuana produces dependence. Indeed, according to this research not

114, Hall  Degenhardt and Lynskey, op. cit, p.86.115 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental DisordersDSM-5, 5th ed., Washington, DC :, New School Library, 2013, p. 483.

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only do few users marijuana develop addiction, but also there exists the possibility that the consumption of marijuana that triggers the dependence is subject to various factors such as preexisting behavioral and personality disorders.116

Thus, some studies have found that 9% of those who use marijuana dependence develop it at some point in their lives,117 while other research suggest that 10% of people who have used marijuana ever developed habit-forming problem.118 In the same vein, other reports estimate there is enough evidence to conclude that some chronic marijuana users develop effectively.119

However, numerous studies agree that the implications for health and social consequences reported by those who seek to control their consumption are much less severe than those reported by addicted to other substances, such as opium or alcohol. For example, a report showed thatonly 3% of the adult population of the United States would meet the clinical diagnosis of dependence, compared with about 14% of those suffering from alcoholism. Such research findings also occurred in Australia and NewZealand.120

116, Joy  Stanley, Watson, and Betson, op  cit.117 Caulkins, Hawken, Kilmer and Kleiman, op. cit., p. 66118 Hall and Degenhardt, op.cit; Hall and Degenhardt Lynskey, op. cit .; Ashton, op cit., Pp. 101-106.119 Hall, Degenhardt and Lynskey, op. cit.120 Hall and Degenhardt, op.cit .; Hall and Liccardo Paccula op. cit .; Hall, Wayne, and Degenhardt,Louisa "Extent of Illicit Drug Use and Dependence, and Their Contribution to the Global Burden ofDisease," Lancet, vol. 379, no. 9810, pp. 55-70.

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C. Propensity to use "harder"drugs.In general it can be said that available studies show that marijuana has a low level of incidence in the consumption of other riskier drugs riskier.121

However, it is true that they have identified associations between

marijuana use and consumption of more intense drugs like heroin or cocaine.122 In this regard, some studies have tried to explain these correlations from a pharmacological perspective, arguing that the chemical effects of marijuana are conducive to the consumption of other narcotics.123

However, this approach has been contrasted with various social and contextual explanations that understand the phenomenon from the socio-economic, cultural and biological conditioning of the consumer.124 Thus, it can be said that these approaches to the problem which are based essentially on the hypothesis that there are a number of reasons beyond their own marijuana consumption for the use of other drugs are more empirically supported.125

121 Hall and Degenhardt, op.cit.122 Kandel, Denise B., Examining the Gateway Hypothesis: Stages and Pathways of DrugInvolvement in Kandel, Denise B. (ed.), Stages and Pathways of Drug Involvement. Examining theGateway Hypothesis. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 3-18.123 Yet studies have supported this explanation, say their results shouldbe examined carefully, recognizing that there are different explanations thatcould make sense of a probable causal relationship, as genetic or social factors. Asan example, see Emmet, David and Nice, Graeme, What You Need to Know About Cannabis:Understanding the Facts, London, Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2009.124 Hall, Degenhardt, and Lynskey, op. cit. In this regard, it may be noted that the relationship has beenexplained from the fact that marijuana users usually have greateropportunity to get other illicit drugs on the black market.125 In this regard, see, inter alia Hall and Degenhardt, op.cit .; Wagner, Fernando A, andAnthony, James C., "Into the World of Illegal Drug Use: Exposure Opportunity and OtherMechanisms Linking the Use of Alcohol, Tobacco, Marijuana, Cocaine and" American Journal ofEpidemiology, vol. 155, no. 10, 2002, p. 918; Fergusson, David M, Boden, Joseph, Horwood,John, "The Developmental Antecedents of Illicit Drug Use: Evidence From a 25-year LongitudinalStudy", Drug Alcohol Depend, vol. 96, Nos. 1-2, 2008, p.165; Backpack, Andrew, McCaffrey, Daniel,Paddock, Susan ,. "Reassessing the Marijuana Gateway Effect" Addiction, vol. 97, No. 12, 2002,p. 1493; Lessem, Jeff, Hopfer, Christian, Haberstick, Brett, Timberlake, David, Ehringer, Marissa, andSmolen, Andy, "Relationship Between Adolescent and Young Adult Marijuana Use Illicit Drug Use",Behavior Genetics, vol. 36, no. 4, 2006, p.498.

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In this sense, some studies rule out completely the theory that marijuana causes subsequent use of other drugs. Note that marijuana could rather be just a variable that has to be analyzed together with other factors of social, psychological and physiological risk.126 However, other studies qualify this

conclusion by noting that there is no conclusive evidence to show that marijuana leads to the use of other drugs.127

Thus it can be said that the reports agree that marijuana has a low degree of impact on the consumption of riskier drugs. In any case, it appears that the consumption of subsequent drugs is the result of several factors acting together, but not simply the consumption of marijuana itself.128 In this regard, for example, sociological studies show that peer pressure or the continued use of marijuana increases the likelihood that someone consumed first,129 which of course does not mean consumption will grow continuously.130

D. Incitement to commit other crimesThe evidence that marijuana use leads to an incitement to commit other crimes is highly speculative. Indeed, several studies have concluded that

126 Joy, Watson and Benson, op. cit .; Ballotta, Bergeron, and Hughes, op. cit .; Caulkins,Hawken, Kilmer and Kleiman, op. cit. For example, in a recent report it states that even ifthere is a causal relationship between marijuana use and the use of moredrugs,harmful  this could be explained by sociological factors more than by pharmacological factors ofmarijuana.To respect, cfr. Hall, Degenhardt, and Lynskey, op. cit.127 Ballotta, Bergeron, and Hughes, op. cit .; other Caulkins, Hawken, Kilmer, and Kleiman, op.cit .; National Institute on Drug Abuse, Marijuana and Health. Fourth Report to the United StatesCongress from the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 1974, p. 6.128 Hall, Degenhardt, and Lynskey, op. cit.129 Joy, Stanley, Watson, and Betson, op. cit., p. 61 ;. Ali, Mir M, Amialchuk, Aliaksandr, Dwyer,Debra S., "The Social Contagion Effect of Marijuana Use Among Adolescents", PLoS ONE, vol.6,no. 1, 2011, p. 5.130, Joy  Stanley, Watson, and Betson, op. cit., p. 61.

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marijuana is not a determining factor in the commission of crimes.131 First, the correlation is too statistically small to be considered significant.132

Furthermore, it is noted that the commission of crimes and marijuana use may originate in the same social causes.

In fact, the available evidence suggests that marijuana itself does not induce violent crime, quite the contrary.133 In this regard, several studies indicate that marijuana inhibits impulses of aggression in the user because it usually produces states of lethargy, drowsiness and shyness.134

According to the information available, in Mexico only 10% of people who committed a crime they did under the influence of drugs, and of these only 11% had used marijuana.135

Although the rate of marijuana use is higher among people who have committed crimes than among those who do not, this probably is due to the fact that the commission of crimes and the consumption of marijuana may arise from the same social causes.136 Moreover, it is clear that some consumers facing criminal charges are doing so precisely because marijuana is also criminalized.

E. Marijuana use and motor vehicle accidentsHowever, regarding the association between marijuana use and motor vehicle accidents, the most recent studies show that actual consumption of the substance decreases necessary driving skills and therefore increases

131, Pedersen and Skardhamar  op. cit., pp. 109-118.132 Caulkins, Hawken, Kilmer, and Kleiman, op. cit., p. 75.133 Caulkins, Hawken, Kilmer, and Kleiman, op. cit., p.74.134 National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, Marijuana: A Signal ofMisunderstanding, 1972, pp. 70-71; and Report by the Advisory Committee on Drug Dependence, op.cit.135 Zamudio Angles and Castillo Ortega, op. cit.136 Caulkins, Hawken, Kilmer, and Kleiman, op. cit., p. 74.

62the chances of causing road accidents.137 In fact, the effect is increased when marijuana is combined with alcohol.138 It is important to note that the decline in driving skills when marijuana is consumed is more variable than when alcohol is ingested, since its effects are subject to factors such as

dose and tolerance developed by frequent consumption, among several others.139

Thus, of the analyzed evidence it shows that marijuana does not encourage the commission of other crimes. Although consumption and crime are usually associated situations, this may be due to various social and contextual explanations, as both may have the same courses causes. On the other hand, many addicts face the punitive system of the state precisely because of the existence of prohibitions on marijuana. It was also found that marijuana use itself adversely affects the ability to drive motor vehicles and may increase the likelihood of causing accidents.

137 Hartman, Rebecca, and Huestis, Marilyn A., "Cannabis Effects on Driving Skills", ClinChem, vol. 59, no. 3, 2013; Li Mu-Chen, Brady, Joanne E., DiMaggio, Charles J., Lusardi, ArielleR., Tzong, Keane Y., Li Guohua, "Marijuana Use and Motor Vehicle Crashes" EpidemiologicReview, vol. 34, no. 1 2012; Bergeron, Jacques Langlois, Julie, and Cheang, Henry S., "AnExamination of the Relationships Between Cannabis Use, Driving Under the Influence of Cannabisand Risk-Taking on the Road", European Review of Applied Psychology, Vol. 64, no. 3 2014Asbridge, Mark Hayden, Jill A., Cartwright, Jennifer L., "Acute Cannabis Consumption and MotorVehicle Collision Risk: Systematic Review of Observational Studies and Meta-Analysis", BritishMedical Journal, vol. 344,2012.138 Hartman and Huestis, op. cit .; Downey, Luke Andrew King, Rebecca, Papafotiou,Katherine, Swann, Phillip, Ogden, Edward, Boorman, Martin, and Stough, Con, "The Effects ofCannabis and Alcohol on Simulated Driving: Influences of Dose and Experience" Accident,Analysis and Prevention, Vol. 50, 2013; Li, Brady, DiMaggio, Lusardi, Tzong, and Li, op. cit .; Sewell,Andrew, Poling, James, Sofuoglu, Mehmet, "The Effect of Cannabis Compared With Alcohol onDriving", American Journal on Addictions, vol. 18, no. 3, 2009139 Li, Brady, DiMaggio, Lusardi, Tzong, and Li, op. cit .; Sewell, Poling and Sofuoglu, op. cit.

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Conclusion on suitability analysis

According to the above, the First Chamber concludes that there is evidence to believe that marijuana does cause various effects on the health of people. In this regard, although in general it can be said that this damage is only minor, this does not preclude the conclusion that in this particular case the "system of bans" formed by the challenged laws is indeed a suitable measure to protect the health of people.

The analyzed evidence failed to show that marijuana influenced the increase in crime, because although consumption is associated with antisocial consequences, they can be explained by other factors such as the context of the consumer’s social system or the punitive laws against the drug itself.

Other studies analyzed lead to the conclusion that marijuana use among drivers is a factor that increases the likelihood of causing traffic accidents, which means that the contested measure only in this appearance is also asuitable measure to protect public order.

Necessity of the measure

Once passed a test of suitability, an analysis of whether the "system of administrative bans" contested is necessary to protect the health and public order or if, on the other hand, there are equally suitable alternative measures affecting to a lesser extent the right to free development ofpersonality. Before examining the measure, the First Chamber deems it appropriate to make some methodological details of the way in which they should perform the analysis of comparative alternative measures in this

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proportionality test. The test of necessity implies, first, whether there are other means equal or superior to achieve the aims pursued and, second, whether these alternatives involve with lower intensity the fundamental right affected. The first aspect of the necessity test is very complex, since it involves making a catalog of alternative measures and determining the degree of suitability of these, ie, assess their level of efficiency, speed, likelihood and the material impairment of its object.140

Thus, the search for alternative means could be endless and require the constitutional court to imagine and analyze all possible alternatives.141

However, such scrutiny can be bounded by weighing measures that the legislature considered appropriate to similar situations or alternatives incomparative law that are designed to regulate the same phenomenon.

In this vein, we will then examine whether the measures used to regulate substances which cause similar damage, such as tobacco or alcohol, are equally or more suitable to protect health and public order, and if they limit

140  Bernal Pulido, op. cit., p.750.141  Bernal Pulido, op.cit., P. 742.

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to a lesser degree the right to free development of personality. Moreover, a comparative analysis was also performed with the alternatives to prohibition of marijuana that have been implemented in comparative law.

A. Regulating marijuana-like substances

As shown in the examination of suitability of the measure, marijuana produces adverse health effects similar in their intensity to those caused by tobacco or alcohol, although very different from those produced by other narcotics and psychotropic substances. Marijuana produces the same respiratory problems as other smoked substances,142 is less harmful than other substances such as opium, amphetamines and barbiturates,143 and the implications for health and social consequences reported by those who seek to control their consumption are much less severe than those reported by people addicted to other substances, such as opium or alcohol.144

However, despite the similarities to tobacco and alcohol in terms of the damage that marijuana produces, legislators designed a "regime of enabling controlled” for the consumption of the  two former substances. Below are the most features are set important of the scheme prohibited.;

According to the General Law for the Control of Tobacco, the prohibition of the sale, distribution and possession of tobacco by minors extends

142  Royal College of Physicians, op. cit.143  Ballotta, Bergeron, and Hughes, op. cit; and Report by the Advisory Committee on DrugDependence, op. cit.144 Report by the Advisory Committee on Drug Dependence, op. cit.

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to public and private educational institutions.145 Consumption of tobacco is also prohibited in 100% smoke-free spaces; in public and private elementary and secondary schools; and indoor areas of work whether public or private.146 The production of and trade in tobacco are subject to various administrative provisions.147 Finally, advertising of tobacco products is allowed only when it is directed to adults through adult magazines, mail and within facilities whose access is exclusively restricted to adults.148

Similarly, the General Health Law establishes prohibitions to sell or supply

145 General Law for the Control of Snuff:Article 17. The following activities are prohibited:I. Trade, distribution, donation, gift, sale and supply of products snuff tominors;II. Trade, distribution, donation, gift, sale and supply of snuff productsin public and private educational institutions of basic and secondary education, andIII. Employ minors in commerce, production, distribution,supply and sale of these productsControl.146 General Act SnuffArticle 26. It is prohibited for any person using or have to have on anyproduct of snuff in the spaces 100 % smoke-free snuff, as well as in schoolspublicand private elementary and secondaryand higher education.In such places be set inside and outside signs, logos and emblemsestablished by the Secretariat.Article 27. In places with public access, or indoor work areas, public orprivate, including universities and colleges, there may be areasexclusively for smoking, which should in accordance with theregulations:I. Be located in open spaces orII. In isolated interior spaces that have mechanisms that prevent the transfer ofparticles into the spaces 100% smoke-free snuff and is not liable fornonsmokers step.147  These laws provide that the companies producing snuff should have ahealth license and report the content of snuff products, the ingredients used andemissions and their effects on health at the Ministry of Health and the public in general.While those who trade, sell, distribute or supply products of snuff, should within their businesses have announced the ban on the sale and supply tominors, require buyers accreditation of age and display legendswarningabout the consumption of snuff.148 General Control Act the Snuff:

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alcohol to minors.149 As a control measure, the Ministry of Health sets limits for alcohol in the blood and expired air of the drivers of motor vehicles.150

With respect to product advertising, the law states that all alcoholic beverages shall display on the packaging the words "abuse in the consumption of this product is harmful to health," written in easily legible type and contrasting colors without invoking or making reference to anylegal provision.151

B. Setting in comparative law: Examples of  Colorado, Washington State, the Netherlands,

Uruguay

Regarding marijuana, in comparative law comparative there may be alternative methods of regulation.This section briefly explains some of the regulations that are alternatives to a ban on the total consuption of marijuana.

The state of Colorado, in the United States, allows the use of marijuana and marketing in certain conditions.

149 General HealthArticle 220. In no case and in no way may sell or supplyalcohol to minors.The violation of this provision shall be equivalent to the crime of corruption of  Personsminorsof eighteen years of age or persons who lack the capacity to understandtheMeaning ofact or persons who are unable to resistLaw.150 General HealthArticle 187 bis. powers of the Ministry of Health under the protection of thehealth of others and of society from the harmful use of alcohol:I. Set blood alcohol limits and expired air to drivevehicles,motor  which must be taken into account by the federal authorities and those ofthe states, in their respective areas of competence. For vehiclesthat provide a public service, people who make use of mechanisms, instruments, devices ordangerous substances by themselves, develop speed, by their explosivenature,or flammable  by the energy of the electric current or lead other similar causes,as well as professional, technical and auxiliary health involved in the medical and surgical careof a user, the blood alcohol limits and expired air will be zero;

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Permission is limited to consumption by persons over twenty years and can only be sold in quantities limited to an ounce to each resident and a quarter ounce to nonresidents. Mass advertising is prohibited, especially if said advertising can reach children. Moreover, cultivation and the distribution of the product in shops is strictly controlled by the state uthority responsible for regulating alcohol and tobacco, which is achieved through a system of licensing of growers, producers, transporters and stores.152

Washington State, also in the US, takes the process of authorizing the use of marijuana through the state agency that also regulates alcohol. Here also is the issuance of permits for trade and the strictly regulated amount of sale and consumption. For example, driving with more thanfive nanograms of marijuana concentration per milliliter of the bloodis a crime. In addition, sales of the product have a high tax burden and the revenue collected is devoted to education, research and treatment of problems associated with this drug.153

In the Netherlands there is a different scheme for the regulation of marijuana. Although this country has never formally legalized production, this activity is not monitored or sanctioned effectively. The trade of the substance is restricted to coffee shops, distribution centers which are

152  Room, Robin, "a market for Legalizing cannabis for pleasure: Colorado, Washington,Uruguay and Beyond" Addiction, vol. 109, no. 3, 2014, pp. 345-351.153  Room, op. cit., loc. cit.

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subject to very specific rules, such as restrictions on the amounts that can be stored and sold per person.154

In Uruguay, the State assumes full control and regulation of the marketing, production and distribution of marijuana.155 Authorizations are issued to producers who in turn sell marijuana to the government.156 With regard to acquisition, a person can buy up to 40 grams per month and a state institute sets the price of marijuana. The institute also carries a confidential record of registered consumers and producers. In this regard, it is clear that only Uruguayan citizens or permanent residents can buy marijuana.157

Moreover, the cultivation, production and selling of marijuana by unauthorized persons or institutes is prohibited.158

C. An alternative to the absolute prohibition

The above examples set forth above constitute a number of elements that could be an alternative to the measure in question, the absolute prohibition of leisure and recreational use of marijuana as is set by the "system of administrative bans" contested by the complainants: (i) limitations on the

154  Reuter, Peter H., "Marijuana Legalization. What Can Be Learned from Other Countries ",Working paper. Drug Policy Research Center, 2010.155  The second article of Law 19,172 on Marihuana and Derivatives establishes that"the state will assume control and regulation of the activities of import,export, planting,cultivation, harvesting, production, purchase any title, storage,marketing and distribution of cannabis and its derivatives, hemp or when appropriate,throughthe institutions which give legal mandateLaura.""156  Legalizing Marijuana in the shadows of International LawGraham,  TheUruguay, Colorado , and Washington Models "Wisconsin International Law Journal, vol. 33, No.1,2015, pp. 140-166.157  Graham, op. cit.158  Graham, op. citconsumption.;

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places of sale and consumption (ii) ban on driving or operating dangerous equipment or substances under the influence of the substance; (iii) prohibitions on publicizing the product; and (iv) restrictions on the age of those who can purchase and consume. As can be seen, there are measures that viewed as a whole do not prohibit the consumption absolutely and, in contrast, only limit the use of the substance in very bounded regulations.

It is important to note that where marijuana has been legalized in other countries, just as is done with the consumption of tobacco and alcohol in Mexico, these legalization regimes have been accompanied by educational and health policies. In this sense, we have already implemented various information campaigns on the adverse health effects of the consumption of these substances (tobacco and alcohol), as well as social programs to address the damage to the health of people who have developed an addiction.159 In this regard, we can say such policies would also form part of an alternative measure to the ban now under consideration, which would in general terms be a regime that only limited marijuana use in certain circumstances and that could include the parallel implementation of educational and public health policies.

159  In this regard, see for example the Health Sector Program 2013.2018, published inthe Official Journal of the Federation on December 12, 2013, whose main objective is theimprovement and protection of health, through public policies of prevention, protection andpromotion of physical activity, diet, reduced consumption of alcohol, snuff,drugs.illicit and generally in all those situations that endanger the physical or mental integrityWith regard to the topic addiction, the main lines of action are thestrategy 1.4, entitled "Promoting comprehensive actions for the prevention and control ofaddiction", among which the promotion of information campaigns; the promotion of anetworknationalfor the treatment and prevention of addictions; promote actions to reducedemand,availability and access; promote models of alternative justice for people withaddictions in conflict with the law; and promote intersectoral actions promoting alifeproductivein adolescents.

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D. Evaluation of the need for the contested ban

Now the court will consider whether this is an appropriate measure to achieve the aims of the measure at legislative issue, which involves assessing whether it is causally adequate to prevent or combat the harms associated with marijuana use. As noted, these consist of damage to the health of the person, developing dependence on the substance, inducing the use of other more harmful drugs, spreading the use of drugs, and traffic accidents committed under the influence of the substance.

It should be noted that the alternatives to the measure articulated and identified above are also suitable to prevent damage to health and marijuana dependency. In fact, one can say that is more effective a policy that seeks to prevent directly those damages to health by attacking thesocial factors that cause marijuana use, rather than a measure that combats this problem indirectly through the prohibition of consumption.160 In this regard, information campaigns and public strategies to conceivedrug dependence as a public health problem, for example, have proven more effective than prohibitionist policies. As already explained, the prohibition of marijuana has not reduced the number of consumers and,consequently,has not diminished the health damage associated with consumption.161

160  Hamilton, Olavo, first gives proporcionalidade and war as drugs " Mossoró,Hamilton & Hamilton, 2014, p.158.161  In this regard, see footnote no. 94.

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Concerning the effects of consumption on third parties, either through inducing the use of other more harmful drugs and the spread of its use to other people, it can be said that both on advertising the product as well as educational and health policies are also suitable measures to prevent such damages from occurring. Finally, regulations that prohibit driving or operating dangerous tools when under the influence of substances like marijuana are also effective measures to prevent accidents and protect the health of consumers.162

The second aspect of the test of need is in determining whether alternative measures involved a lesser infringement of the right to free development of personality than the "system of administrative bans" set by the contested articles. The First Chamber understands that the examined alternatives are not only suitable to prevent damage to health or public order as outlinedabove, it is also a measure less restrictive of the free development of personality.

Thus, while the system of administrative prohibitions set by the contested items prohibits a "generic class act (any act of consumption), the alternative

162  Article 171 of the Federal Penal Code punishes with imprisonment of up to six months,a fine up to one hundred pesos and suspension or loss of the right to use the license management, theperson intoxicated or under the influence of narcotics drugs commits anyviolationof traffic regulations and circulation.In the same vein, Article 93 of Regulation Federal Transit prohibitsdriving while impaired psychophysical or suspected ingestion of alcohol,psychotropicsubstances, narcotics, including drugs with this effect and allthose drugs whose use affects the ability to drive, doing stressed that theprescription does not exempt from this prohibition. The fines set by the regulated aretougher to increase to 100 to 200 times the minimum wage, and the withdrawal fromcirculationof the vehicle.On the other hand, Article 135 of the Criminal Code of the Federal District provides for the case ofinjury, murder or damage to property caused culpably to mark the passage ofvehicles, where the agent was driving while intoxicated or under the influence of narcoticsor psychotropic drugs or other substances having similar effects,  benefitsdo not applytheof settingsculpable.crimes

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measures actually prohibit only “a more specific subclass" of such acts (acts of consumption in very specific circumstances).163 In this order of ideas, it can be said that the legislative measure at issue prevents the use of marijuana in any circumstances where, for the purposes intended, such prevention could be limited to discourage certain behavior or establish prohibitions on more specific situations, such as driving under the effects of the substance, consuming in public places or inducing others to also consume it.

In other words, the "system of administrative bans" set by the contested articles is highly suprainclusivo. As is known, a standard is suprainclusiva when it comprises or regulates circumstances that have no basis in justification of this standard.164 In this case, as already explained, the state chooses to perform an absolute prohibition of marijuana although it is possible to ban its use only in cases that are justified by the protection of health and public order. In this way, it can be said that regulations thatallow marijuana use, limiting the age to consume and / or the place where you can make such consumption, are measures which identify better the assumptions where actual damage to health and public order are produced. These regulations only limit consumption in these cases, which involve lessintervention to free development of the staff. In contrast, the contested measure is longer than necessary, because it prohibits marijuana use in any situation.

163  In a similar vein, see the discussion in Nino, op. cit., p.444.164  Schauer, Frederick, Playing by The Rules. A Philosophical Examination of Rule-BasedDecision-Making in Law and in Life, New York, Oxford University Press, pp. 31-34.

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This results in an interference with the right in question to a greater degree. Consequently, we can say that alternative regulations are more benign for the right to free development of personality.

In accordance with the above, the "administrative system of bans" set by the contested items is an unnecessary measure, since there are alternative measures equally suitable to protect health and public order which infringe upon the fundamental right to a lesser extent.  Thus, the First Chamber considers that the ban on personal use of marijuana for recreational purposes is unconstitutional as it does not stand the test of proportionality.

Strict proportionality of the measure

Throughout this constitutional scrutiny it has been shown that although the measure in question is suitable for protecting health and public order, there exist suitable alternative measures involved the right affected to a lesser degree. In this section the proportionality test will be held strictly to highlight the imbalance between the intense involvement of the right to free development of personality against the minimum degree to which legislative purposes are met by prohibiting the consumption of marijuana.

The proportionality test in the strict sense is to make a balance or weight between two competing principles. In the present case we should compare the effectiveness with which the "system of administrative prohibitions" challenged by the plaintiffs satisfies the health protection of people and the public order with the level of infringement upon the right to free development of personality. In the section where the suitability of the measure was examined, it was enough to show that it contributes positively

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to the realization of the end pursued, regardless of its effectiveness. Arguments about the degree will also be exhibited as to whether the "system of administrative prohibitions" contributes to the protection of health and public order.

In fact, in this part of the study showed that marijuana use does not pose a significant risk to health, since its permanent consequences are unlikely, minimal or reversible. It was noted that marijuana generates a dependence less than other substances, which is located in about 9% of people who consume it. In the same vein, it is also argued that marijuana has a very

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low level of incidence or questionable use of other, riskier drugs. Similarly, it was acknowledged that to drive and operate hazardous tools under the influence of marijuana itself poses a risk to public order. Finally, it was stated that there is uncertainty about the claim that marijuana encourages the commission of other crimes or does it in some degree.

In contrast to the limited effects on the health and public order protecting the "system of administrative prohibitions" about marijuana regulated by theGeneral Health Law, infringement upon the right to free development of personality is intense. As noted in analyzing the scope of the contested articles, they impose an obstacle in law that prevents plaintiffs from consuming marijuana legally and from carrying out all actions correlative to consumption (planting, growing, harvesting, preparing, possession, transportation, etc.). The measure analyzed constitutes an intervention in the free development of the personality because it involves interference with personal autonomy. As explained above, the way in which an individual wishes to recreate belongs to his most intimate and private sphere, as only he can decide how he wants to live his life. In this vein, the measure in question has a very significant effect on the right to free development ofpersonality, since it prevents the plaintiffs from deciding which recreational or leisure activities they wish to perform.

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Indeed, an intervention in a fundamental right which totally prohibits performing a behavior covered by this law will be more intense than an intervention that is realized to regulate or prohibit certain conditions in the exercise of that right. From this point of view, the allocation to the freedevelopment of the personality that carries the "system of administrative bans" regulated by the General Health Law can be described as very intense; it is a virtually absolute prohibition to consume marijuana and perform activities related to the consumption of this,167 such that it suppresses all legal positions on the right exercised. The measure in question is not confined to regulate how and where these activities can bedone, but directly prohibits all such conduct.

So from an analysis of strict proportionality, the state would be justified in enacting such a severe limitation on the right to free development of personality only if there were serious harm associated with marijuana use. Conversely, if the legislative measure were only able to avoid or prevent minor damage, then the absolute ban would represent a disproportionate

167  As explained by exposing the regulatory framework on the control of narcotics andpsychotropic substances in the General Health Law, the possibility of having up to five grams ofmarijuana in terms of the provisions of Article 478 and 479 of the General Health Law,  notisan authorization or a right to personal consumption, but an exclusion ofliability only makes sense in the context of "punitive system" under theLawGeneral Healthand the Federal Penal Code, but that is irrelevant to the"system of administrative bans" contested by the complainants. Moreover, of theseitems are limited to decriminalize consumption in a very small amount and do not allow inany way the performance of the other corollaries to subsistence activities such as planting,growing, harvesting, preparation, transportation, etc.

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legislative action that severely affects the free development of personality168

Once we have analyzed the benefits and costs of the measure, the First Chamber considers that the "system of administrative bans" on marijuana contained in the Articles of the General Health Act challenged by the plaintiffs, cause an intense infringement upon the right to free development of personality, compared with the minimum level of protection of health and public order.

Although the Supreme Court recognizes that the legislature may limit the exercise of activities involving damages to the rights protected by our Constitution, in the case of the restriction to the free development of the personality that underlies the measure, the First Chamber does not find that the damages were of such gravity as to warrant an absolute ban on consumption.

In addition, it is worth noting that throughout this constitutional scrutiny it has been shown that there are alternative measures that infringe to a lesser degree the right to free development of personality, consisting of regulatory regimes subject to conditions that the legislature deemsrelevant. These regulations may be accompanied by public education policies and health protection. Moreover, although these alternatives represent economic costs for the state and society in general, they arecomparable to those arising through the system of prohibition for personal consumption.

169,168  Uprimny, Guzman and Vine, op. cit., p.107.169  According to some scholars, in addition to its limitations in effectiveness, thesystem of prohibition on marijuana and activities related to it have highcosts for the state and society, both direct and derivativeseradication

cropThe prosecution of trafficking networks and the prosecution and imprisonment of

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Even though the "system of administrative bans" formed by the articles of the General Health Act challenged by the plaintiffs exceeds the first two steps of the proportionality test, having been established that it is a move intended to protect health and public order, the First Chamber considers that it is a measure not only unnecessary, but is also disproportionatein the strict sense, since it generates minimal protection of health and public order while producing intense intervention into the right of people to decide what recreational activities they want to perform.

It must be emphasized that the First Chamber does not minimize the damage that can result from the consumption of marijuana. It is a decision, however, that is rightfully made by each individual. The High Court considers that it belongs within the strict scope of individual autonomy protected by the right to free development of personality: the possibility to responsibly decide whether to experience the effects of this substance despite the harm that this activity can generate to a person.

peoplerelated thereto; and indirect, more difficult to estimate, derived fromother factors such as casualties of the war on drugs and the loads theymust support hundreds of people losing their freedom during it. In this regard,see for all Camacho, Adriana Gaviria, Alejandro, and Rodriguez, Catherine, op. cit.; Uprimny,Guzman and Vine, op. cit., p. 106; TNI and WOLA, 2010

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IV. The unconstitutionality of the challenged articles

Based on the foregoing, the First Chamber reaches the conclusion that Articles 235, 237, 245, 247 and 248, all of the General Health Law, in the specific sections introducing a prohibition of acts related to personal use of marijuana for recreational purposes (that is, to plant, cultivate, harvest, prepare, possess, transport, etc.), are unconstitutional.

This decision rests only and exclusively in connection with the drug "cannabis" (sativa, indica and American or marijuana resin, prepared and seeds) and psychotropic "THC" (Tetrahydrocannabinol, the following isomers: Δ6A (10a), Δ6A (7), Δ7 Δ8, Δ9, Δ10 Δ9 (11) and their stereochemical variants) collectively known as "marijuana." This declaration of unconstitutionality does not in any way authorize any persons to carry out business activities, or any other provision that refers to the sale and / or distribution of substances referred to above.

It should be noted that, as has been reiterated in the present resolution, no statement is made regarding the constitutionality of the criminal provisions that penalize consumption and other marijuana-related events. The truth is that this declaration by the High Court regarding the constitutionality ofthe provisions of the General Health Act outlined above, shall allow the appellants to receive authorization from the Ministry of Health to perform all activities necessary for the use of recreational marijuana, to make them recurring and not crimes against health provided by both the General Health Law itself and by the Federal Penal Code.

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This is because the crimes contained in the Articles 194, section I, 195, 195 bis and 196 ter of the Federal Penal Code170 and Articles 475, 476 and 477 of the General Health Law,171 related acts sought by the appellants,have atypical normative elements which stipulate that the conduct must take place "without authorization.” In this sense, one of the purposes of granting of this protection consists of170 Federal Penal Code:Article 194. Imprisonment for ten to twenty-five and one hundred to five hundredbe imposedpenaltythat day:I. Produce, transport, traffic, trades, even provide free or prescribe anynarcotics mentioned in the previous article, without authorizationtherefers;by  General Health Law[...]Article 195. Be imposed from five to fifteen years in prison andone hundred to three hundred andfinedfifty days, which possesses any of the narcotics listed in Article 193, withoutauthorization by the General Health Law refers to, provided thatpossession either in order to perform any of the acts referred to in Article 194,both of this Code.Article 195 bis. When the circumstances of the possession of any of thenarcotics listed in Article 193, without authorization by the General  Law refersHealthto,can not be regarded as intended to perform any of the acts that refersArticle194to,four penalty applies to seven years six months in prison and fifty to one hundredand fifty days fine.Article 196b. They are imposed from five to fifteen years in prison andof one hundred to three hundreda finedays, and confiscation of instrumentalities, objects and proceeds of crime, to divert orby any means contribute to divert chemical precursors, essential chemicals ormachines, to cultivation, extraction, production, preparation or conditioning of narcotics inany manner prohibited by law.The same prison term and a fine and disqualification to hold any job,position or commission for up to five years shall be imposed on public servants that, inexercisingits functions, permitting or authorizing any conduct covered in this articleare chemical precursors, essential chemicals and machines as defined in therelevant lawLaw..171 General HealthArticle 475 shall be imposed prison four to eight years andof two hundred to fourfinedays, whose unauthorized trades or supplies, still free, narcoticsunder the table, on the lower amount obtained by multiplying the per thousand of theamountplannedin the table.[...]Article 476 shall be imposed for three to six years in prison andthree hundred eighty

fineddays,which possesses any narcotic than those indicated in the table, on the lower amountbytheobtained  multiplyingper thousand amounts provided in the table, without  authorizationthereferred to in this Law, provided that such possession isthe purposeforof marketing them or supply them, even for free.Article 477 penalty applies ten months to three years in prison and up to eighty dayticket to any of possessing narcotics indicated in the table below the amountbyobtained  multiplying by a thousand those provided in the table, without the authorization referred to in thisLaw, if the circumstances of such possession can not be done considered intendedmarket or supply them, even for free.We did not proceed criminally for this crime against the person possessing medicinescontainingany of the narcotic under the table, whose retail besubject to special procurement requirements, when his nature and quantity of suchmedications are needed to treat the person who owns or otherpersons under the custody or care who has them in his possession.

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an obligation on the Ministry of Health to issue the authorization referred to in Articles 235 and 247 of the General Health Law, and it is obvious that the complainants may not commit the crimes in question.

The Federal Penal Code contains certain offenses relating to narcotics that do not have this typical element (in particular, those contained in Article 194, Sections II, III and IV; 196 Ter; 197 and 198); however, it warns that they are not aimed at punishing behavior sought by the complainants interms of the above in the present application for Code review.172172 Federal PenalArticle 194. imprisonment for ten to twenty five years will be imposed and one hundred to five hundreddays fine that:[...]II. Into or out of any country of the narcotics included in thearticle,previous  although it may momentarily or in transit.If the input or output to which this section shall not have been consummated is concerned, butto acts performed clearly follows that It was the purpose of the agent, thepenaltywill be up to two-thirds of the under this Article.III. Financial contribution or any kind resources or cooperate in any way tofinancing, supervision or encouragement to enable the execution of any of the offenses  tochapter;referredin this  andIV. Perform acts of publicity or propaganda, for any of theconsumedsubstancesin the previous article.The same penalties provided in this article and also deprivation fee or commission anddisqualification to hold another up to five years, be placed on the public servant who, inthe exercise of their duties or taking advantage of his position, allow, authorize or tolerate any of  actsthementioned in this article.Article 197. Whoever, without a prescription medicine legally authorized, giveto another person, whether by injection inhalation, ingestion or by any other means, a narcoticthat Article 193 refers, shall be liable to three to nine years in prison and sixty toone hundred and eighty days fine, whatever the amount given. Penaltiesincrease to a half more if the victim is a minor or unable to understand therelevance of the conduct or resist the officer.At that provide free or improperly prescribing to a third adult,anarcotic mentioned in Article 193, for personal and immediate use, shall be liable to twoto six years in prison and fined forty to one hundred twenty days. If the acquirer is aminoror incompetent, penalties increase to a half.The same penalties will be imposed from above which induces or assists another

toconsume any of the narcotics listed in Article 193.Article 198. who dedicated as main activity ownfield work,plant, cultivate or harvest marijuana plants, poppies, hallucinogenic mushrooms, peyote orany other plant that produces similar effects on their own, orfinancingthird partywhen it attend poorly educated and extreme financial need,  bewillimposed imprisonment of one to six years.The same penalty shall be imposed on a property in his ownership, possession or possession,consents planting, cultivating or harvesting these plants in similar circumstances toprevious assumptions.

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Finally, it is also important to note that the situation described above is being updated in the same way regarding administrative penalties provided in Articles 421 and 421 bis of the General Health Law, thereto providingfor fines arising from a violation of Articles 237, 238, 247, 248, 375, 376, 235 and 289 of the same law, concerning the authorization of the Ministry of Health to perform acts related to narcotics and psychotropic substances,173 for forwarding those provisions made to items that have beendeclared unconstitutional. However, there could not be imposition of an administrative penalty to the complainants in the light of the provisions this judgment performed.

In connection with the foregoing, the First Chamber notes that in his seventh offense, related to the sixth concept of violation raised in the petition for relief, the plaintiffs argued that the District Judge improperly attended his argument to the effect that Articles 234, 235, 237, 245, 247, 248, 368 and 479 of the General Health Act, are unconstitutional by transgressing Article 73, Sections XVI and XXI of the Constitution, based on the power to legislate in matters of public health and establish the crimes and offenses against the Federation, because this power "is an implicit limit on individual relationships that do not interfere the sphere of action of another person or persons". In this regard, complainants

173 General Health LawArticle421. punishable by a fine equivalent to 6000-12000times the daily force in the economic area concerned minimum wage, violationof the provisions of Articles 67 , 101, 125, 127, 149, 193, 210, 212, 213, 218,220, 230, 232, 233, 237, 238, 240, 242, 243, 247, 248, 251, 252, 255, 256, 258 , 266, 306, 308,309, 315, 317, 330, 331, 332, 334, 335, 336, 338, last paragraph, 342, 348, first paragraph, 350 bis1 365, 367, 375, 376, 400 , 411 and 413 of this Act.Section 421 bis. Is punishable by a fine of 12,000 to 16,000

times the daily minimum overall force in the economic area concerned wages, the violationof the provisions contained in Articles 100, 122, 126, 146, 166 Bis 19, 166 Bis 20, 205,235, 254, 264, 281, 289, 293, 298, 325, 327 and 333 of this Act.

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presented several arguments about the ethical limits of criminal law regarding the consumption of marijuana.

Even though it is observed that the District Judge described as unfounded and ineffective that concept of violation, the First Chamber considers that the grievance becomes inoperative, while as stated in preceding paragraphs, the items identified by the complainants as claimed acts do not refer to offenses relating to drug crimes, but merely administrative regulations on authorization for studies and acts related to narcotic and psychotropic drugs.

Thus, it is clear that the First Chamber is unable to rule on the constitutionality of the criminalization of marijuana, as claimed by theappellants, for articles containing the offenses in question were not challenged in the appeal for protection or applied in administrative decision claimed. Moreover, as the appellants stated above, it does not cause harmthe existence of the mentioned offenses, while in obtaining authorization from the Ministry of Health their behavior under this ruling would not shape crimes against health provided by the General Health Law and the Federal Penal Code.

In connection with the above argument, it is also the argument irrelevant injured third party consisting of Article 478 of the General Health Law in relation to the table of guidance on maximum dosage for consumption set out Article 479, which allows the use of marijuana, while as explained these

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provisions were not applied to the complainants above. In addition, as noted at the time, the possibility of possessing five grams of marijuana is not a right to personal consumption, but an exclusion of liability.

In another vein, it is unnecessary to examine the other grievances having been granted constitutional protection to the plaintiffs in the above specified terms, while no practical purpose to lead the implementation of the relevant study.

V. Effects of the judgment of amparo

So, as noted above, this Supreme Court of Justice declares as unconstitutional Articles 235, last paragraph, 237, 245, section I, 247, last paragraph, and 248, all General Health Act, for the reasons statedthroughout this judgment. It should be taken in consideration that the declaration of unconstitutionality is limited to regulations which refer to only the narcotic "cannabis" (sativa, indica and American, resin, prepared and seeds) and psychotropic "THC" (Tetrahydrocannabinol, the following isomers: Δ6A (10a), Δ6A (7), Δ7 Δ8, Δ9, Δ10 Δ9 (11) and its stereochemical variants), together known as "pot"; on the understanding that the declaration of unconstitutionality has no scope to allow the issuance of an authorization for recurring use involving commercial transactions,supply or any other that relates to the sale and / or distribution of the substances above-mentioned .

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Accordingly, the High Court then revoked the contested judgment and granted the injunction to the effect that the Executive Director of Regulation Narcotics, Psychotropic and Chemical Substances of the Federal Commission for Protection Against Risk health, identified as responsible inthe injunction as the authority with power to grant the plaintiffs the authorization referred to in Articles 235 and 247 of the General Health Act,with respect to the substances and effects to those referred to above, on the understanding that the authority may not use the regulatory portions which has been declared unconstitutional in the terms outlined above as a basis for issuing the corresponding resolution.

Due to the above, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, is

RESOLVED

FIRST. In the matter of the review, the judgment under appeal is revoked.

SECOND  EU Justice covers and protects *****, *****, ***** and *****, against the issuance and enactment of Article 235, last paragraph, 237, 245, section I, 247, last paragraph, and 248, all of the General Health Act and its application, consisting of the office of *****, issued by the Executive Director of Regulation of Narcotics and Psychotropic Chemicals of the Federal Commission for the Protection against Sanitary Risk, for the reasons stated in this judgment.

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THIRD The justice of the Union does not cover or protect *****, against the authorities and procedures specified in the first paragraph of this judgment.

FOURTH. The adhesive resource review filed by the responsible authorities is notified that with testimony of this resolution, return cars to their place of origin and, in due course filed the Ministers, as decided by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court  Justice of of the Nation, by _________ votes of  _______

Firman President of the Chamber and the Minister Rapporteur with theSecretary of Agreements, which authorizes and certifies the BOARD:

PRESIDENT OF THE FIRSTMinister Alfredo Gutiérrez Ortiz MenaSPEAKER:Minister Arturo Zaldívar Lelo de Larrea