MIDDLE EAST

r«

RV

HEADO'JARTEPv) ROYAL AIR FORCE MIDDLE EA^T

AMERICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

JANUARY-MARC

-A­MIDDLE EAST

REVIEW NO2

HEADQUARTERS ROYAL AIR FORCE MIDDLE EAST

1l: tl

i i i A | jM i*<-*

Contents

Forwarct to Tunis. Section I. With the VHIth Army to Mareth Page 5

Section II. Tunisian Encounter 23 Section III. The Pincers Begin to Close 40 Tables Showing Scale of Effort 51 Tables of Operations in the Mediterranean 55

Malta's Contribution 61 Rescued at Sea in a Storm 72 Madagascar Sideshow 75 The Other Side of the Picture 82 Fighter Recce — The Formation of 285 Wing ... 90 Filming Under Fire 95 Night Operations by Bostons 100 The Enemy's Last Days in Tripoli 105 From the 540s ... 110 Acknowledgment 113 Maps — Eastern Battle Area, 1st January - 31st March, 1943 4

Western Battle Area, November, 1942 Marcb, 1943 22 Malta, Sicily and the Toe of Italy 62 Madagascar 76

^ ^ ^ Review is Secret (= American Confidential). It 'is intended for, theJxSBmation of all officers and flying crews, under conditions of security app^0j0K^oy the Commanding Officer, who is to ensure that within these limits it has as wide a circulation as possible.

No quotation may be made from it without the authority of 8.A.A.O., H.Q., B.A.F., M.E.; neither are any of. its contents to be communicated to anyone out­side the Services.

All persons are hereby warned that the unauthorised retention or destruc­tion of this document is an offence against the Official Secrets Act, 1911-1920. Any unauthorised person obtaining possession of a copy should immediatelyforward it in a closed unstamped envelope to H.Q., R.A.F., M.E.

Foreword

IS umber Two of the R.A.F. Middle East Review covers the first quarter of 1943, during which Tripoli was captured, the enemy was forced out of the Mareth line, and the pincers of the British, American and Allied forces began to close on the enemy in Tunis from the west, south, and east.

Certain changes in the operational control of the air forces engaged ivere therefore inevitable. Mediterranean Air Command was established as a combined American and R.A.F. Operational Headquarters to co-ordinate all air force effort. The Twelfth U.S.A.F. and the R.A.F. Eastern Air Command, which were operating from the Algerian side, were combined into the North-west African Air Forces, including the North-west African' Tactical Air Force, the North-west African Strategical Air Force, and the North-west African Coastal Air Force. In February, following their entf-f into Tunisia, the Western Desert Air Force and part of the Ninth U.S.A.F?, entered under the operational control of the N.A.A.F., while Air Head quart? ers, Egypt, changed its name to Air Headquarters, Air Defences, Eastern Mediterranean, responsible for fighter defence over Tripolitania, Cyrenaica,. Egypt and the Levant, the coast line and convoys, from Tripoli (Trip.) to Tripoli .(Lev.). R.A.F. Headquarters, Malta, also changed to Malta Air Command under the operational control of Mediterranean Air Command.

The scope of the R.A.F. Middle East Review is not confined merely to reporting the activities of formations and units controlled by H.Q., R.A.F.. M.E. Its task is to present, as far as possible, a clear story of operations in the Middle East theatre as a whole. The historical narrative section, therefore, includes the work of the Dominions, Allied, and Royal Naval Air Squadrons which are working with, or as part of, the Royal Air Force. It is, however, obviously impracticable to designate the nationality of every aircfaft or squadron employed in mixed formations, but it is intended, in future numbers of the "Review", to cover, from time to time, the operations of each Dominion and Allied Air Force separately, if desired, over the period of their employment in the Middle East.

**• ,» i r

Forward To Tunis!

Daring the early days of November, 1942, it became evident that the "Battle for Egypt" had been won by the VUIth Army. From June to October the Axis threat to the Delta had been ever-present although progressively diminished; the next month, Rommel's battered remnants mere in full flight westwards.

The R.A.F.s part in stemming the enemy's advance into Egypt, aiding the VIIlth Army's break-through at El Alamein and attacking the Axis columns in their retreat across Cyrenaica has already been recorded in the previous number of the R.A.F. Middle East Review.

The war in Africa then entered a new phase. Menaced from the west by the Allied troops who had landed in North-west Africa and having no hope of hailing the VI11th Army advancing from the east, the. Axis f< rces at length took to I heir Tunisian strongholds, determined to keep a fooling on the southern shores of the Mediterranean as long as possible.

The story is now told of the air operations during the. first three months of 19'iS, ivhich were of paramount importance in the process of squeezing the enemy out of Africa. The account is divided into three sections; the first two deal separately with the operations of the Western Desert Air Force and the North-west African Air Forces up to the end of the halt at Mareth, and the third section gives a composite picture of the air activity during the attack on- the Mareth Line and the advance of the Allies in the northern and central sectors of the Tunisian battlefield.

The operations of Malta-based aircraft against Tunisian targets are not included in this account, as the activity of the Malta Force during the time that the island changed from a Mediterranean outpost to an offensive base for attacks on Tunisia and Italy is dealt with separately in the "Review".

SECTION I. WITH THE VIII ARMY TO MARETH

AT THE CLOE OF 1942, Rommel's forces had in oru-i" to hinder their occupation by the Western completed their withdrawal to the Buerat de- Desert Air Force. fences. In the final stages of this withdrawal The abandoning of Sirte by the enemy's 15th no serious attempts were made to check the Armoured Division without offering any resist-VHIth Army's advance by rearguard actions, al- ance and the withdrawal from Wadi Chebir, the though some delay was imposed by the thorough natural first line of defence of the Buerat posi­mining of roads and the rigging of booby traps. tion, before pressure was exerted by our land In addition, the landing grounds at Sirte and forces, indicated that the enemy had by no means garnet were ploughed up and strewn with mines recuperated sufficiently to make a determined

stand. Rommel's fighting strength was still de­pleted and, in particular, the Italian part of it consisted mainly of untried formations: the Ger­man tank strength was put at 70 to.80 and that of the Italians at something under 30. The enemy's deficiencies at this stage were in equip­ment and fuel even more than in man-power. His transport losses had been severe, his tank strength was low, and for artillery he was mainly dependent on new Italian divisions, supplemented by guns gleaned from the back areas which were mostly of obsolescent types. It was clear that reinforcements of tanks and guns were essential before he could give battle to our armour. An even more immediate need was petrol. Units had been chronically short for two months and the withdrawal across Cyrenaica had been made possible only by the stringent rationing and con­servation of fuel.

The Opposing Air Forces

At the beginning of 1943, the enemy's Tripoli­tanian-based air forces were estimated to consist of 155 German aircraft, of which all but 25 were ME.109s, and 310 Italian aircraft, which includ­ed 110 MC.200S and 202s and 100 CR.42s. Here again, the shortage of fuel limited offensive action. In the Mediterranean area, in general, however, the Axis air forces were still formidable as numerous squadrons of all types, were located in southern Italy and the adjacent islands, and Tunisia, Crete and the Dodecanese.

The moving up of the Allied squadrons con­tinued to keep pace with the advancing VHIth Army. An R.A.F. airfield reconnaissance party and an R.E. constructional unit moved westwards with our forward troops and ensured that aban­doned landing grounds were repaired at top speed. In addition, sappers of the VHIth Army cleared airfields of mines and their skill and courage in this dangerous activity prevented any ap­preciable time-lag between the abandonment of the landing grounds by the enemy and their oc­cupation by the Allied air forces. When the delay in putting into commission landing grounds which had been ploughed and mined was likely to be considerable, initiative was shown in the speedy construction of new landing grounds. Thus, when Tamet landing ground was found to be un­serviceable in the last days of December, 1942, three landing grounds at Hamraiet (about 30 miles S.W. of Sirte) were prepared for the fighter and fighter-bomber squadrons. At times, also, the speed of the enemy's retreat seemed likely to place his troops out of range of our fighter force. On these occasions, air transport, which had already been used to facilitate the R.A.F.'s movement across Cyrenaica, was again employed for the transference of personnel and equipment to landing grounds within close range of the retreating enemy forces. On 17th January, for example, the Kittyhawk squadrons of No. 239 Wing hopped from Hamraiet to Sedada, a distance of 100 miles, and operations continued without a pause. Throughout the advance, also,

the R.A.F. Regiment protected squadrons on the move and were responsible for the safety of land­ing grounds.

At the opening of 1943, Rear A.H.Q., Western Desert, was located at Benina and the Advanced H.Q. at Marble Arch; by the second week in January, however, the rear and advanced sections had moved up to Nofilia and Tamet, respectively.

Early in January No. 244 Wing consisting of four Spitfire squadrons and No. 239 Wing of four Kittyhawk squadrons were operating from the Hamraiet landing grounds; the reconnais­sance squadrons of Spitfires, Hurricanes and Baltimores were up in the Tamet area; there was a rear force of Kittyhawk and Hurricane squadrons at Belandah and Jedabya, respective­ly; and No. 3 S.A.A.F. Wing of two Boston and one Baltimore squadrons was based at Solluch with advanced landing grounds at Gzina. It is worthy of note that at this time, apart from the three light bomber squadrons, six of the eighteen fighter and reconnaissance squadrons were S.A.A.F. unit§.

As part of the Western Desert~"Air Force, also, certain fighter and bomber squadrons of the Ninth U.S.A.A.F. were well up in the forward area. No. 57 Fighter Group, which included three Warhawk squadrons, was operating from Tamet and No. 12 Bombardment Group of four Mitchell squadrons was based at Gambut, with advanced landing ground at Magrun.

A Wellington striking force, operating under No. 205 Group, was located at Baheira. Although formidable, it was no longer of such magnitude as during the "Battle for Egypt/' because as suitable targets thinned out on the mainland a number of Wellington squadrons had been trans­ferred to Malta, in order to attack shipping and enemy bases in Tunisia and southern Italy.

In the rear of the Western Desert Air Force, A.H.Q., Egypt, controlled a rear force of fighter squadrons, based at Benina, and retained respon­sibility for the air defence of Egypt and coastal shipping; the change of nomenclature of this formation to A.H.Q., Air Defences Eastern Me­diterranean and its increased commitments are mentioned on page 20. No. 201 (Naval Co­operation) Group continued to direct the opera­tions of squadrons responsible for sea reconnais­sance, strikes against enemy vessels and anti­submarine patrols. As at this stage of the battle the protection of our extended supply line was all-important, it cannot be over-emphasised that Middle East Naval co-operation units in January, 1943, covered the shipping lanes from Syria west­wards to Sirte.

In addition to the American squadrons operat­ing with the Western Desert Air Force, No. 9 U.S. Bomber Command had several heavy bomber groups located in the Suez Canal zone, with advanced bases at Gambut.

In Malta, never had the R.A.F. been so power­ful. At the beginning of 1$43, nearly twenty squadrons of such diverse types as Wellingtons, Beauforts, Mosquitoes, Baltimores, Albacores,

Sappers of the VllltJi Army cleared airfields of mines, and prevented any appreciable time lag between the abandonment of landing grounds by the

enemy and their occupation by the Allied Air Forces.

Swordfish, Spitfires and Beaufighters were based on the island. For many months the world had known that Malta could "take it"; it now be­came more and more evident that the island was in a position to "give it."

January, 1943, accordingly, found the Allied air forces in the Middle East well placed to play a full part in the land battle on the VHIth Army's front, protect the vast extent of territory already won, safeguard the v m t h Army's line of supply and strike at enemy shipping and bases.

The Enemy at Buerat 1943 opened with Rommel's forces withdrawn

to the Buerat defences. It was clear, however, that reinforcements to the Tunisian-based Axis forces held priority over the reinforcing of the retreating army then located in Tripolitania, and the halt at Buerat was intended simply to delay the Vlllth Army's advance as long as possible and not in order to make a stand. As early as 3rd January, in fact, the process of withdrawing the non-mobile units from Buerat was already

in process and it was evident that the Agheila programme was about to be repeated.

In the first half of January, while the Vlllth Army was engaged in constant patrolling in order to probe the enemy's defences and re­grouping preparatory to another advance, the Western Desert Air Force carried out daily re­connaissances, maintained offensive patrols, and limited the enemy's air activity by attacks on his advanced landing grounds. Attacks were also made on road junctions, traffic, and enemy vehicle concentrations.

During the first week in January, our air activity over the forward area was slight, due primarily to adverse weather conditions and partly to the fact that the R.A.F. fighter force was settling in on the new Hamraiet landing grounds. Twice during the week, ME.109s made bombing and 9traffing attacks on these advanced landing grounds, and on the second occasion, 7th January, Spitfires of No. 92 Squadron shot down one of the enemy raiders, probably destroyed another and damaged a third. One Spitfire was destroyed, but the pilot was saved.

The next week, our air operations in Tripoli­tania were on a progressively increased scale. From 8th to 14th January inclusive, R.A.F. iighter3 carried out 350 sorties on offensive pa­trols, and during the latter part of the week U.S. Warhawks of No. 57 Fighter Group also took a full share in this activity. Combats with the enemy aircraft, however, were few and arose principally from our interception of fighters and fighter-bombers attacking our forward positions and landing grounds. Thus, on 8th January, Spitfires and Kittyhawks intercepted three for­mations of ME. 109s which were attempting to attack the Hamraiet landing grounds and, after forcing many of the enemy fighter-bombers to jettison their bombs, shot down one ME.109, pro­bably destroyed two and damaged two more. In other combats on the same day, Spitfires of No. 1 S.A.A.F. Squadron and No. 92 Squadron shot down two MC.202s and one ME.109 and probably destroyed two MC.202s for the loss of one Spitfire. On 11th January, enemy air­craft attacking our positions in the Bir Zedan and Tamet areas were intercepted and our fight­ers shot down three MC.202s and one ME. 109, probably destroyed one ME.109 and damaged three other aircraft. Four additional aircraft were seen to crash, presumably through anti­aircraft fire. The next day, 12th January, Spit­fires of Nos. 1 S.A.A.F. and 145 Squadrons inter­cepted an attack by twelve ME.202s, escorted by seven ME.109s, on Tamet landing ground; four MC.202s and one ME.109 were shot down and anothef~ME.109 was probably destroyed. Our losses were two Spitfires, but both pilots were saved.

Offensive patrols reached their peak for the first half of January on the 14th, the day before the Vlllth Army resumed its attack. 79 Spitfire and 73 Kittyhawk sorties were carried out over the enemy's forward positions, and in the

of combats with enemy fighters one ME.109 was destroyed, two were probably destroyed and three damaged without loss to our aircraft. It was evident that the Vlllth Army could continue to count on the Allied squadrons ruling the air over the battlefield.

Activity prior to Vlllth Army's Advance Adverse weather conditions prohibited bomb­

ing operations in Tripolitania during the first week in January, but with the slight improve­ment in the weather in the following week our bombers and fighter-bombers operated whenever practicable.

At this time, it was evident that the bulk of Rommel's supplies was coming overland from Tunisia as after 2nd January no more merchant shipping arrived at Tripoli and no lighter traffic had been observed at Misurata since the third week in December. The constant attacks by N.W. African-based aircraft on the enemy's rail and road communication in the southern sector of the Tunisian battlefield are dealt with in Section 2.

In order to spread confusion on the enemy's supply route and hinder his troop movements westwards, on the night 8/9th January, five R.A.F. Liberators bombed road junctions in the Tripoli area, nine Wellingtons bombed and ma­chine-gunned Misurata and roads in the vicinity, and night-flying Hurricanes straffed the road between Zliten and Horns. Two nights later, four Liberators and three Wellingtons again bombed the road junctions at Tripoli and 22 Wellingtons attacked Horns and the coastal road. On the ll/12th January and the following two nights, Liberators continued their bombing of the Tripoli road junctions and attacked supply dumps in that area. Meanwhile, Hurricanes of No. 73 Squadron straffed traffic on the coastal road, particularly between Garibaldi and Castelverde, and extended this activity to the tracks leading to Tauorga and Bir Dufan.

The bombing of the enemy's positions and vehicle concentrations recommenced on 9th January. On that day, 36 Kittyhawk-bombers made two successful attacks on dispersed enemy transport in the vicinity of Wadi Zemzem, south­west of Gheddahia. Attacks at this time in the Gheddahia area were important as the enemy had armour and vehicles stretched out from Gheddahia to Ngem in order to guard his open southern flank. The following day, 10th January, the Kittyhawk-bombers continued their attacks by the bombing of a hundred dug-in vehicles in Wadi Raml, south of Gheddahia.

There were now large transport concentrations in the Gheddahia area, so on the night 13/14th January attacks on these targets were made by sixteen Wellingtons, aided by flare-dropping Albaoores, and the attacks were renewed the next day by Allied light bombers in the face of determined fighter opposition.

On several occasions, also, camps in the rear defences at Tauorga, twenty-five

seventeen Baltimores, escorted by Kittyhawks formation was attacked by 20 G^rmaHn'd Italian

Attacks in the Gheddahia area were important, as the enemy had armour and vehicles stretched out from Gheddahia to Bu Ngem in order to guard his

open southern flank.

fighters, of which fl damaged. Our losses, however, were greater— one Baltimore, four Kittyhawks and two U.S. Warhawks failing to return.

In order to limit enemy air activity on the eve of the VHIth Army's advance, attacks were made on landing grounds behind the Buerat line. On the night 13/14th January, seventeen Bostons bomb­ed Bir Dufan north landing ground, and the fol­lowing day 35 Kittyhawks straffed the landing ground at Churgia. Bir Dufan landing grounds were also attacked, on a larger scale, on 14th January, by formations of R.A.F. and S.A.A.P. Bostons and Baltimores and U.S. Mitchells, strong­ly escorted by Kittyhawks and U.S. Warhawks. On that day the enemy made strenuous attempts to save these important advanced landing grounds from devastation by determined fighter opposi­tion. In combats which were fought over the area six ME.109s were shot down, six probably destroyed and seven ME. 109s and two MC.202s damaged. Our losses were heavy—eleven fighters failed to return—but the attacks had fulfilled their purpose. The next day, few enemy "fighters were sighted and all avoided combat.

The Vlllth Army Attacks

At 07.15 hours L.T., 15th January, the Vlllth Army resumed its offensive. During the first day of our attack, stiff resistance was offered by the predominantly German forces holding the Buerat line itself and our armour was held up by the 15th Armoured Division along the Ghed­dahia - Bu Ngem track, on the enemy's southern flank. Proof, however, that the fighting repre­sented a delaying action only was provided by the fact that the enemy's 21st Armoured Division had departed westwards two days before the Vlllth Army's attack and accordingly there was now no mobile reserve with which Rommel could counter-attack. It appeared that this division had left its tanks behind for absorption by the 15th Armoured Division before leaving to join Von Arnim's forces in Tunisia.

On the first day of the Vlllth Army's attack, no suitable targets were located for our light bombers, but 24 Kittyhawks and 36 U.S. War-hawks made bombing and straffing attacks on groups of vehicles north of Gheddahia. Through­out the day, also, offensive patrols were main­tained over the battle area by 97 Spitfires, 22 Kittyhawks and 35 U.S. Warhawks. Enemy fighters, however, avoided combat and one for­mation of fighter-bombers jettisoned its loads on sighting Spitfires and fled.

Meanwhile, reconnaissances of the enemy's positions at Buerat and of the roads and tracks to the south and west were made by No. 40 S.A.A.F. Squadron and No. 1437 Flight respect­ively, and our land and air forces thus had a clear picture of the enemy's dispositions and movements.

The Enemy Withdraws During the night, 15/16th January, the enemy

evacuated Buerat and the covering forces

sposed along the Gheddahia-Bu Ngem track withdrew to the west of Wadi Zemzem.

The withdrawals were not allowed to proceed unhampered as during the night Bostons, Bal­timores and Albacores bombed vehicles on the Gheddahia-Sedada track and the main road near Misurata, and No. 73 Squadron Hurricanes straf­fed traffic between Gheddahia and Horns.

The next day, our infantry advanced in the Bir <Scefa area and our armour, with infantry support, moved across Wadi Zemzem to Sedada. Meanwhile, our light armoured forces pushed round the south, passed through Faschia, and engaged the enemy in the area beyond.

Offensive patrols over the forward area were carried out the entire day by 104 Spitfires sup­ported by Kittyhawks and U.S. Warhawks. There were, however, only two combats with enemy fighters, as a result of which Spitfires probably destroyed one ME. 109 and damaged two others without loss to themselves..

In support of our advancing land forces, also, 47 Kittyhawks and U.S. Warhawks made three bombing attacks on enemy transport in the Se­dada area, inflicting damage on vehicles and straffing troops.

The enemy made a further withdrawal during the night of 16/17th January and by morning was clear of Wadi Sofeggin. The retreating enemy columns provided excellent targets during the night for the R.A.F. bombers and, in particular, transport on the coastal road from Misurata to Castelverde and on the Bir Dufan-Misurata track was bombed by nineteen Welling-tons, 24 Bostons and six Baltimores. The high­light of the night's activity was the setting on fire of a petrol tanker, the flames of which spread to other vehicle 5.

In addition to the bombing of transport, dis­persed aircraft on the Bir Dufan landing ground were attacked by twelve of the light bombers, and night flying Hurricanes helped in this activ­ity and also attacked gun positions at Tauorga.

Our land forces on 17th January pressed hard on the heels of the retreating enemy, the infantry on our right flank making particularly good pro­gress along the main road.

During the morning, the fighter-bomber force concentrated their attacks agamst the Bir Dufan landing ground and transport in the vicinity. By noon, however, this landing ground had been evacuated and the fighter-bomber effort was then directed against enemy vehicles in the Beni UUd area where opposition was being encountered by our advancing armoured units.

During the day, No. 239 Wing of Kittyhawks was moved up from Hamraiet to a newly cons­tructed landing ground near Sedada and conse­quently on the following day the fighter-bombers were able to attack enemy columns withdrawing up the Tarhuna track towards Tripoli.

Enemy Airfields Attacked

As the__Axis forces retreated westwards, the irces struck hard at the enemy's land­

ing grounds in the Tripoli area and those aero the border in Tunisia.

On 17th January, our reconnaissance aircraft reported the presence of nearly 200 aircraft at the Castel Benito airfield, twenty miles south of Tripoli. There had always been a considerable force located at this important airfield but it was now augmented by the squadrons withdrawn from the enemy's advanced landing grounds. Accord­ingly, that night, the airfield was attacked by a bomber force consisting of three R.A.F. Libera­tors, 20 Wellingtons, 26 Bostons and one Baltimore. • Wide-spread damage was inflicted and thirty fires were caused, several of which were accom­panied by explosions. The airfield was attacked again on the night of 18/19th January by 34 Bos­tons and Baltimores and on the following night by eight Wellingtons. On both occasions' many fires were started among dispersed aircraft and some caused by the medium bombers were visible for fifty miles. Meanwhile, attacks were also delivered by N.W. African-based aircraft.

On 21st January, 87 Kittyhawks and U.S. War-hawks made the last attack on Castel Benito aerodrome. Several aircraft were destroyed and damaged, including JU.52s, and the ploughing up of the landing grounds, which was in progress, was hindered by the destruction of three ploughs. The Kittyhawks were attacked by German and Italian fighters, of which one MC. 202 was shot down and one ME.109 probably destroyed; our losses were two Kittyhawks.

As the Axis air forces withdrew to landing grounds further west, the Western Desert Air Force extended its attacks across the Tunisian border, beginning on 22nd January a series of fighter-bomber and bomber attacks on the Ben Gardane and Medenine landing grounds. These attacks were of great value in limiting the enemy's fighter and fighter-bomber effort imme­diately iaef ore and after our capture of Tripoli.

Attacks on Enemy Transport

Throughout 18th January, enemy columns re­treating up the Tarhuna track in the direction of Tripoli were attacked by our fighter-bombers which made eight attacks, comprising over 100 sorties. The attacks were continued during the night by sixteen Wellingtons which bombed trans­port south of Tripoli, particularly in the Gardane area, and a few Bostons operated around Tar­huna.

The next day, 19th January, Kittyhawk-bom­bers maintained pressure on the retreating enemy columns near Tarhuna, but low cloud hampered operations and "moderate" targets only were located. The Axis air forces made a special ef­fort to check the VHIth Army's advance, but their attemps were unavailing; one formation of ME.109S, in fact, actually aided our operations by bombing and machine-gunning their own troops, presumably due to poor visibility.

No respite was given to the enemy's retreating columns during the night. A strong force of S.A.A.F. Bostons arid Baltimores and U.S. Mit-

Us bombed and machine-gunned transport, vehicles on the .coascal- road bejweefi 'Cristefoeifle and Tripoli . and .jnjand in the Tarhujna ar.ea. Meanwhile, No£*73 Squadron^HuFricartes straffe^ traffic moving from Tripoli westwards to Zuara, encampments and petrol dumps south of Castel Benito, and the railway goods yard at Sabratha, 40 miles west of Tripoli.

During the morning 20th January, Tarhuna was occupied by our land forces and enemy rear-guards were engaged near Horns and north-west of Tarhuna.

Support was given to our troops in the Horns area by fighter-bomber attacks on gun positions and enemy rearguards near Cussabat, thirty miles south-west of Horns, and retreating columns con­verging on Tripoli were also bombed throughout the day. In all, nearly 100 sorties were flown by Kittyhawk and U.S. Warhawk fighter-bombers, which were strongly escorted by Spitfires, Kitty-hawks and U.S. Warhawks. In an engagement with ME.109s, the American fighters probably destroyed one enemy aircraft and damaged two others at the cost of one Warhawk destroyed.

For the next three nights and days the forward enemy columns retiring along the coastal road westwards from Tripoli were continuously attack­ed by the Western Desert Air Force. The night attacks were carried out by strong forces of light bombers and night-flying Hurricanes and the day attacks by fighter-bombers.

On the nights 20/21st, 21/22nd and 22/23rd January, 94 effective sorties were carried out by S.A.A.F. Bostons and Baltimores and nine U.S. Mitchells on transport vehicles withdrawing along the main road between Tripoli and Ben Gardane. The attacks on the night of 22/23rd January in­cluded machine-gunning and were particularly effective; several fires were caused, and in addi­tion to the havoc wrought among enemy vehicles, hits were scored on an A.A. position and on the Zuara jetty.

In day attacks on retreating enemy vehicles, from 21st to 23rd January inclusive, the Allied fighter-bombers carried out 260 effective sorties. Typical of these attacks was the effort of 22nd January. During that day, 58 Kittyhawks and 45 U.S. Warhawks, escorted by Spitfires, attack­ed closely-packed columns withdrawing into Tu­nisia, between Zuara and Ben Gardane. Many direct hits were scored on vehicles and much da­mage was done by machine-gunning; the high­light of the operations was the blowing up of a petrol tanker and twenty other vehicles which were standing by waiting to be re-fuelled. In ad­dition to the attacks on road transport, shipping in Zuara harbour was bombed in order to delay its departure before an attack by our Naval for­ces.

Offensive Patrols

Meanwhile, on the 21st and 22nd January, Spit­fires, Kittyhawks and U.S. Warhawks carried out offensive patrols over the Tripoli-Zuara area and maintained air supremacy. On the 21st, Spit^

Enemy aircraft on Castel Benito airfield after three nights' straffing by Allied and U.S. aircraft

fires engaged two formations of enemy aircraft, shooting down three JU.87s and two MC. 202s and probably destroying two more Stukas and an­other fighter without loss to themselves. The following day, Spitfires and Kittyhawks con­tinued their sweeps without sighting any hostile aircraft.

Attacks on Ports and Bales

From the time that the enemy established him­self at Buerat in late November, 1942, the Axis supply ports in Tripolitania, Tunisia, southern Italy and Sicily were subjected to heavy bombing by Allied aircraft based in Egypt and Cyrenaica, and this was supplemented by attacks carried out from Malta and N.W. Africa.

By the end of 1942, R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. heavy bombers based in Egypt had carried out over 70 effective sorties against port installations and shipping at Tripoli; Wellingtons had also made an appreciable number of attacks and these were continued in the New Year from Malta Thfe majority of the 1942 sorties against Tripoli were flown by the heavy bombers of the Ninth U.S.A.A.F. which dropped an estimated bomb-load of 459,000 lbs. on the harbour.

The attacks on Tripoli harbour were re-com­menced in 1943 on 15th January by Liberators of the Ninth U.S.A.A.F. and continued for the next six days. During this week of bombing, the Libe­rators carried out 73 effective sorties and drop­ped 364 x 1,000 H.E. bombs on shipping in the harbour and port installations. The Liberators again demonstrated the effectiveness of their fire by shooting down one M.E. 109 and one M.C. 200, -probably destroying three M.E. 109s and damag­ing two more without loss to themselves, although on two occasions the American heavy bombers sustained damage through intense anti-aircraft fire.

Further west in Tunisia, U.S. Liberators and Liberators of No. 160 Squadron carried out heavy attacks against the ports of Sousse and Tunis. The following table showing the estimated daily tonnage discharged at the main Tunisian ports during the month of January indicates the result of the combined effort of the Royal Navy and Air Force in the sinking of Axis ships en route to Tunisia, and of the Allied air attacks, delivered from bases east and west of the enemy, on his port facilities and shipping in harbours.

Normal daily Average daily Port. discharge. discharge in January.

Tunis 2,400 tons. 700 tons. Bizerta. 1,800 tons. 1,000 tons. Sousse. 1,500 tons. 300 tons. Sfax. 1,500 tons. 200 tons. Gabes. 300 tons. Nil.

In addition to attacks on the mainland, U.S. Li­berators, during the first three weeks in January, reached across the sea to strike at the Axis sup­ply bases at Naples and Palermo. These attacks were multiplied and extended in the following weeks.

The F

Shortly after dawn on 23rd January, armoured units of the VHIth Army entered Tripoli. On the spot where II Duce had been presented with the "Sword of Islam" the Commander of the VHIth Army received the keys of the last city of the Italian Empire.

All sea-worthy ships had left Tripoli by 21st January, although several of these were inter­cepted by our destroyers. In an attempt to delay our re-commissioning of the port the enemy had carried out extensive demolitions (where R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. bombs had not done the job for him) and five block-ships were sunk in the en­trance to the harbour.

Rommel knew that his forces were still ina­dequate for the task of giving battle to the Vlllth Army and his object was to gain time until he had established himself at his next main halting-place — the Mareth Line. The plans for delaying our pursuit which had proved effective during his retreat across Cyrenaica and Tripolitania were still operative; maximum damage was inflicted to ports in order to increase our difficulties of supply, delay was imposed by rearguard actions and the mining and blocking of roads, and landing grounds were rendered unserviceable in an at­tempt to limit our air operations.

By 6th February all enemy forces had with­drawn across the Tunisian border. The intensive attacks of the Twelfth U.S.A.A.F. in this southern sector of the Tunisian battle area are indicated in Section 2.

For two or three days after the capture of Tripoli the Allied fighter-bombers continued their attacks on enemy road traffic between Sabratha and Zelten (twelve miles west of Zuara), and on the night 23/24th January a small force of light bombers and night-flying Hurricanes extended their attacks as far as Ben Gardane. Owing to the increased dispersal of the withdrawing enemy forces, however, few suitable targets were now available and there was a lull in this activity until vehicle concentrations were located in the Ben Gardane area on 5th February.

From 25th January to 4th February, the enemy pressed into service all types of sea-going craft, including, motor-vessels, schooners, barges, ketches and "F"-boats in order to relieve the strain on road transport carrying supplies to his forward troops at the Tunisian frontier. Accord­ingly, during this period the R.A.F. fighter-bomber attacks were directed principally against enemy coastal shipping off the island of Djerba and along the strip of coast between Zarsis and Pisidia (20 miles west of Zuara). In spite of bad weather which limited the scope and scale of air operations, on practically every one of the eleven days coastal craft were located and bombed and machine-gunned.

Meanwhile, in the rear of the vmt h Army, with the Cyrenaican ports brought into full use and Tripoli rapidly being put into commission again, R.A.F. fighters provided constant protec­

tion to the ships bringing up supplies to <5ur land and air forces. During the week ending 10th February, for instance, R.A.F. fighters flew 400 sorties over shipping plying between the Nile Delta and Tripoli and a further 120 aircraft were engaged in anti-submarine patrols. In addition, over Tripoli harbour itself 88 fighter sorties were carried out to cover the unloading of convoys. The Hurricane squadrons were chiefly responsi­ble for this air protection of our coastal shipping; although their sorties were now less spectacular then during the "Battle for Egypt" their work was vital to the prosecution of the war in Tuni­sia.

Pursuit Slowed Down

Up to 12th February the advance of the VHIth Army was slow. The coastal road had been thoroughly mined and progress was constantly hindered by demolitions covered by enemy fire. Above all, heavy rain on the salt flats, which stretch for over 40 miles south from Ras Agedir (on the Tunisian frontier), rendered going off the main road virtually impossible. These conside­rations, coupled with the delay imposed by our construction of a causeway across the salt flats and the fact that the enemy had strong rear-guards of armour east and south of Ben Gardane and guarding his southern flank, made the con­ditions for an enemy delaying action more fa­vourable than at any time since the Buerat with­drawal.

During this time, moreover, bad weather se­riously restricted our air operations in Tunisia. Mention has already been made of the small-scale but effective attacks of R.A.F. fighter-bombers against the enemy's coastal shipping from 25th January to 4th February; during the next eight days escorted fighter-bombers were able to make a total of approximately 150 effective sorties only in attacks on transport of the enemy's rear-guard in the Ben Gardane area, -and this activity was rendered practicable only by taking immediate advantage of breaks in the weather.

Vlllth Army approaches Mareth

During the night 12/13th February, the enemy withdrew a large proportion of his armoured units, which had been performing the duties of rearguards, for service on the Western Front and the task of rearguard now devolved entirely upon his depleted 15th Armoured Division.

In view of this weakening of his delaying for­ces the enemy abandoned Ras Agedir and Taguel­mit, evacuated Ben Gardane, and by 16th Fe­bruary had withdrawn the main part of his 15th Armoured Division to the area west of Medenine.

While these withdrawals were in progress at­tacks were made by No. 239 Wing Kittyhawks, which had moved up to an advanced landing ground at El Assa (28 miles west of Zuara), on transport in the Ben Gardane and Medenine are_a and these aircraft also carried trols over our forward

On 20th February our land forces occupied Medenine. The enemy's armoured units which withdrew on that day were followed and engaged at Metameur by our armour and part of his forces was nearly cut off. This engagement resulted in the accelerated withdrawal of the enemy's 15th Armoured Division and by 21st February it had dropped back into positions dug in front of the southern end of the original Mareth Line.

While the enemy was withdrawing his remain­ing forces to the Mareth defences the Western Desert Air Force activity was limited to a few tactical reconnaissances carried out by No. 40 S.A.A.F. Squadron as bad weather prevented any offensive fighter operations.

Lull at Mareth

By withdrawing to the Mareth defences, Rom­mel had rid himself of many supply difficulties and was no longer obliged to suffer the hand­to-mouth existence experienced at Agheila and Buerat. The bulk of his supplies continued to come from Bizerta and Tunis and a determined effort made to increase the tonnage off-loaded at these ports met with some success, in spite of sea and air attacks on his shipping and the constant bombing of the ports. Supplementary to the shipping plying between southern Italy (and Sicily) and the northern Tunisian ports, the enemy was using air transport on a large scale ; 50 to 75 transport aircraft, chiefly JU.52s, were arriv­ing in the Tunis area daily and, in addition, about five ME.323s (six-engined transport air­craft).

Photographic reconnaissance revealed that coastal shipping to Sousse and Sfax had greatly diminished and supplies were sent overland to the forces at Mareth. The air attacks delivered by N.W. African-based aircraft on this supply line are dealt with in Section 2. In February, two trains per day, each with a lift of 300 tons, nor­mally ran from Tunis to Sousse and one of them continued to Gabes. The remainder of Rommel's supplies was brought up by road transport; with a line of communication not exceeding 300 miles, however, this presented no great difficulty.

Until 3rd March there were no land operations on an appreciable scale in the Mareth area and the respite before the Vlllth Army's inevitable attack enabled the units from Rommel's army which had been diverted to the Western Front to achieve some local successes and remove any immediate threat to the rear of the Mareth Line. Meanwhile, work went on apace in strengthening the Mareth defences where the enemy had decided to stand and fight.

The Mareth defensive zone stretched from the Gulf of Gabes to Fount Tatahouine, a distance of sixty miles, with outlying strong-holds further south. From Fount Tatahouine north to Toujane, the Matmatas Mountains, fortified and tunnelled,

BsfililP&d a strong line of defence. From Toujane, $hr||JBh the village of Mareth to the sea, about \tk Smffes, was the heavily fortified zone which »\ _ <' iJ§

had given its name to the entire , ^ fortifications comprised not so muph' a 'Hine" as a series of fortifications in depth which included permanent anti-tank obstacles and concrete em­placements. To the north the line was covered by a coast unsuitable for landings and to the south by rough and difficult country. The develop­ment of the existing Mareth defences was slow up to the end of January, as much cleaning out and patching up of the original works were ne­cessary, due to the half-hearted demolitions car­ried out by the French in compliance with the 1940 arTnistice terms. In February, however, the work on the defences was speeded up. New stretches of anti-tank ditch were dug near the coast and in the sector of the line six miles south from Mareth, and many new infantry positions were dug and some minefields laid down, parti­cularly in the vicinity of Arram, four miles south­east of Mareth. ' The enemy did not use the case­mates of the line extensively, but sited his guns in new positions between them, preferring to sa­crifice the protection they afforded to increased mobility. It was evident even at this stage that Rommel envisaged the likelihood of another with­drawal and was not going to risk the possibility of having to leave his guns behind him.

Attacks on Enemy Landing Grounds

During the last week in February, while the opposing armies were preparing for the renewal of the land fighting, heavy attacks were made on the landing grounds immediately behind the Mareth defences, in order, primarily, to limit the enemy's fighter activity and ensure that the Western Desert Air Force continued to be master of the air over the battlefield.

The enemy's principal forward air base on the Eastern Front was the Gabes west landing ground; accordingly, this became the nightly ob­jective of the Middle East long-range bomber force. The attacks previously delivered by N.W. African-based aircraft are mentioned on page 32. in Section 2. Fresh crews were available for the Halifaxes and No. 462 R.A.A.F. Squadron now added weight to the Wellington attacks. The attacks on Gabes west landing ground began on the night 23/24th February and continued for the following three nights; in all, 21 Halifax and 64 Wellington effective sorties were carried out and, in addition to attacks on the landing ground, tar­gets in the town were also bombed. Bombs rang­ing from 4,000 to 250 lbs. each were dropped on dispersed aircraft, runways and administrative buildings and on each of the four nights fires and explosions were caused. The enemy protected the landing ground by extremely accurate anti­aircraft fire but only one Wellington was shot down in the course of these operations.

On three occasions the night raids on Gabes west landing ground were followed up on the succeeeding mornings by fighter-bomber attacks — a practice which had proved effective against the Daba landing grounds during the previous October. The Allied fighter-bombers also attacked

y enemy fighters at fiordj Touaz; spuTh^wes^f Mareth, and on 26th February" heaVy attacks' * were made simulta­neously on that landing ground and on the one at Gabes. On that day, eight bombing attacks were delivered, comprising a total of 133 R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. Kittyhawk and 24 U.S. Warhawk effective sorties, and escort was provided by 48 Kittyhawks. The Kittyhawk-bombers made in­creasing use of 40 lb. bombs on these operations, a stick of six of these bombs being substituted for the usual 500 lb. bomb. Enemy fighters on 26th February put up a determined resistance and seven ME. 109s were shot down in combat, three probably destroyed and five damaged ; on our side, nine Kittyhawks failed to return, one crash-landed at base and two were seriously da­maged. The effect of these and the previous medium and heavy bomber attacks were appa­rent on the following day when few aircraft were located on the Gabes west landing ground. The fighter-bomber effort was then switched against the El Hamma landing ground, four attacks being delivered by escorted Kittyhawk and U.S. Warhawk fighter-bombers on 27th February.

The air offensive against the enemy's advanced landing grounds succeeded in forcing him to evacuate or partly evacuate several of his ad­vanced bases and greatly limited the activity of the enemy's fighter force.

Air Attacks on Mareth Line and Concentrations Beginning in the third week in February, si­

multaneously with the attack on the enemy's advanced landing grounds mentioned in the pre­ceding paragraphs, the Western Desert Air Force began its attacks on the Mareth positions and transport in their vicinity and rear. The night attacks were carried out by Allied light bombers and the day attacks by fighter-bombers.

The air offensive against the Mareth Line and vehicles in the battle area was opened on the night 23/24th February with attacks by 26 Bos­tons and fifteen Baltimores of No. 3 S.A.A.F. Wing and seventeen U.S. Mitchells and on the following two nights a total of 93 effective sorties by Allied light bombers was made against the same targets. On each occasion fires were caused and in several instances these were accompanied by explosions. The biggest fighter-bomber effort during the week against these objectives was made on 25th February when two attacks were made on enemy transport vehicles and armoured cars in the Gabes and Mareth areas. Until the beginning of March, however, the fighter-bomber attacks against enemy positions and transport were sub­ordinate to their attacks on the enemy's advanced landing grounds.

On 1st and 2nd March, considerable road mo­vement was reported in the rear of the Mareth Line by reconnaissance aircraft of No. 1437 Flight. It was evident that reinforcements and supplies were moving up to the Mareth defences in preparation for an enemy attack and, in par­ticular, the 21st Armoured Division was in pro­

15

cess of leaving the Front.

On these two days, Kittyhavvk-Hbmters" afta' ed enemy vehicles, particularly on the road be­tween Gabes and El Hamma, and on the night 2nd/3rd March attacks were made on dispersed enemy transport vehicles in the Mareth and Gabes areas by 20 Wellingtons and five Halifaxes. 57 tons of bombs were dropped which burst across vehicles and tents and close to tanks, causing eight fires and several explosions.

Rommel Prepares to Hit Back In February the enemy, as related in Section 2,

had scored several striking successes in attacks against Sbeitla and Gafsa in the central sector of the Tunisian battlefield, and had also launched an offensive in the north; his third stroke was in­tended to cripple the VHIth Army before it was ready to launch its assault on the Mareth de­fences.

On 3rd March, a small scale attack, supported by 30 tanks, was made from the enemy's strong­hold of Arram, south-east of Mareth. This was merely a feint, however, and the attacking forces withdrew the same night.

During the day, Kittyhawk-bombers, escorted by Kittyhawks and Spitfires, carried out 77 ef­fective sorties. The principal attacks of the fighter-bombers were directed against eight hun­dred vehicles reported by tactical reconnaissance aircraft to be moving southwards between Gabes and Matmata: hits were scored on vehicles and many were also machine-gunned. Increased ene­my air opposition was encountered, but our air­craft had the better of the exchanges. Kitty­hawk-bombers shot down two ME.109s and da­maged three others and Spitfires and Kittyhawks, on patrol over the Gabes area, destroyed one ene­my fighter and damaged two more. As a result of the day's operations we lost one Kittyhawk. That night, five Halifaxes and 28 Wellingtons bombed enemy vehicles and troops which were massed in the Mareth area. Hits were scored on vehicles and tents and buildings in Mareth village and four of the medium bombers also made low-level machine-gun attacks on vehicles and searchlight positions.

There were now indications that the enemy intended to attack our positions in strength and on 4th March more than 100 Kittyhawk and Warhawk fighter-bombers attacked vehicles moving up to the battle area. The principal attacks were made in the Bardj Touaz and Hal­louf areas but targets were classed as "poor."

One formation of U.S. Warhawks which was. at­tacked by ME. 109s succeeded in shooting down one of. the German fighters and damaging two more. Covering sweeps were provided by Spit­fires, and in combat with enemy fighters, No. 92 Squadron shot down two ME.109s without loss.

Meanwhile, reconnaissance of enemy disposi­tions and rail and road movements were made by No. 40 S.A.A.F. Squadron and No. 1437 Flight

N a 6 8 0 s < 3 u a d r o n a n e v e keptgrounds.

y , R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. fighter-bombers attacked a group of large transport ve­hicles dispersed west of Toujane, and Spitfires carried out offensive patrols to cover the Kitty­hawk-bombers and swept the Gabes and Medenine areas, in the course of which two fighters were lost. For the greater part of the day, however, sand storms prevented offensive operations. The bad weather continued during the night, causing two Hurricanes of No. 73 Squadron sent out to make independent night reconnaissances*of the Sfax area to return to base with their mission unfulfilled.

Rommel's Abortive Attack On the morning of 6th March, Rommel at­

tempted to hit back at the Vlllth Army. Enemy forces which had achieved success on the Western Front now determined to try their luck against our yeteran desert forces. The enemy attacked in three columns: the 15th Armoured Division, 90th Light and the Italian Spezia Divisions ad­vanced south-east from Mareth; the 21st Armour­ed Division came througn the Toujane defile and advanced eastwards to Metameur; and the 10th Armoured Division passed through the Hallouf defile and approached the predominating height of Point 270, two and a half miles north-west of Metameur. Meanwhile, a reconnaissance group, reinforced by 20 tanks, guarded the enemy's southern flank.

The northern column made three attacks during the day in the area of the Abdulla feature (high ground eight miles north-west of Metameur). Two of these attacks in the afternoon met with slight initial success but later our land forces counter­attacked successfully. The 21st Armoured Divi­sion tried to attack twice during the day some miles north-west of Metameur but failed, and the 10th Armoured Division's attacks on Point 270 were equally unavailing. Our massive concent­ration of field, medium and anti-tank guns sited along the high ground north-west of Medenine effectively barred the enemy's passage and the Allied fighter-bomber attacks mentioned below added to the destruction wrought by our gun­ners. By nightfall the enemy had had enough and the next day his withdrawal was in full swing. Over fifty tanks were left abandoned on the field of battle and these were blown up by our sappers. "Auf zum Angriff! Sprit ist da!" (Forward to the attack! Petrol has arrived!) proved to be a disastrous war cry. As in his abortive offensive of the previous September, Rommel once again under-estimated the power and precision of our artillery, with the same la­mentable consequences to his armoured forces.

In spite of bad weather, six escorted Allied fighter-bomber attacks, mostly at three-squadron strength, were made against the enemy columns approaching Medenine from the west. In parti­cular, a group of tanks with refuelling vehicles and a transport column were effectively bombed

and fires were started amongst the Vehicles-other hits were scored on a tank carrier and gun posi­tions. Several formations of Kittyhawk-bombers, however, were unable to locate targets owing to bad visibility and low clouds.

The enemy's offensive was not preceded by air attacks on our landing grounds and supply lines, but the assault itself was supported by JU.87s, ME.109 and FW.190 fighter-bombers and ME.210s employed as bombers. A number of attacks were made on our forward troops and one on an ad­vanced landing ground, but little damage was re­ported. This was the first appearance of FW.190s and ME.210s in southern Tunisia and they had apparently been transferred to the area especially for this operation. When the Axis land attack petered out the enemy air effort was reduced and the FW.190s and ME.210s returned presumably to northern Tunisia and Sicily respectively. The FW.190s were not seen again in this sector until the Vlllth Army launched its attack on the Ma­re th Line.

Offensive sweeps over the forward area, for the purpose of covering our fighter-bomber opera­tions, were made by 75 Spitfires. There were se­veral engagements with enemy aircraft, which were attempting to support their advancing land forces. In all, one ME.109 and one JTJ.87 were shot down, one JU.87 was probably destroyed, and six other aircraft were damaged. We lost one Spitfire.

Bad weather over the battle area prevented our fighter-bombers locating suitable targets on the following morning, 7th March, but in the aft­ernoon enemy columns still retiring in the hills near Hallouf and Toujane, after their unhappy experience at the hands of our gunners, were suc­cessfully attacked, although low cloud rendered these targets extremely difficult to find.

Spitfires, which carried out over 100 sorties in patrols over the battle area, had a very success­ful day. One formation of 20 ME.109s was forced to jettison its bombs, and six ME.109s and two MC.202s were shot down, three ME.109s and two MC.202s were probably destroyed and seven ME. 109s, two MC.202s and one JU.88 were damaged without loss to our fighters. In other engage­ments, two enemy aircraft were destroyed, one probably destroyed, and two others damaged; in addition, during an attack on our forward land­ing grounds a ME.109 was hit by our anti-aircraft fire and was subsequently shot down by a Spit­fire.

The next day, 8th March, Kittyhawk-bombers continued their attacks on enemy transport col­umns still withdrawing into -the hills near Hal­louf: bombs burst near a group of tanks and transport vehicles were machine-gunned, but tar­gets were now "thinning-out." One fighter-bomb­er formation attacked by ME.109s succeeded in shooting down one of the enemy fighters.

Spitfires flew over 100 sorties on offensive patrols. Following their mauling on the previous day, however, enemy aircraft were not greatly in

evidence and "Spitfires had one engagement only, as a result of which one ME.109 was destroyed.

Rommel's last full scale attack on the Vlllth Army had proved an utter fiasco; it was the gambler's last big throw to recoup his losses.

The R.A.F. Aids the Fighting French Although the enemy was now obliged to await

the inevitable assault of the Vinth Army, he made one more attempt at offensive action, but this time on a limited scale. On 10th March, light armoured units of two enemy reconnaissance groups attacked positions held by the Fighting French at Ksar Rhilane, 50 miles south-west of Medenine. Our holding of the high ground in that area was of great strategic importance as it enabled us to deny the enemy observation to the south.

The Fighting French reported the position of the attacking force of armoured cars and other vehicles and it was decided that these constituted suitable targets for the Hurricane IIDs. Ac­cordingly, after their period of enforced in­activity, the "tank-busters" of No. 6 Squadron again went into action and scored a decisive success. Thirteen Hurricane IIDs, escorted by Spitfires, located a group of 20 enemy vehicles and this was attacked for 30 minutes: nine to twelve vehicles were set on fire and others were damaged. A second formation of six escorted Hur­ricane IIDs succeeded in scoring direct hits on a Mark IV tank and an armoured car. In the after­noon, another target consisting of vehicles and guns was reported by the Fighting French and two squadrons of Kittyhawk-bombers were de­spatched to make an attack. Fifteen vehicles, including an armoured car, an ammunition truck and a petrol bowser, were destroyed and about twelve more vehicles were damaged.

The Spitfires escorting the first Hurricane formation over the target shot down an ME.109 which attempted interception, and Kittyhawk­bombers prevented a heavily escorted formation of JU.87s from bombing our Ksar Rhilane posi­tions and shot down two ME.109s and one JU.87 and damaged one ME.109. At dusk another JU.87 formation, which was approaching Ksar Rhi­lane, turned tail on sighting a Spitfire patrol, and made for home.

As night fell, the enemy began to withdraw from the Ksar Rhilane area; his attack had fail­ed. The R.A.F. losses for the day were six Kitty-hawks, but the wrecked vehicles and ten guns abandoned by the enemy paid tribute to the help given to the defending land forces. For a brief spell the days at Bir Hakim had been lived anew, but this time with a happier outcome.

Air Attacks on Enemy Positions As the time for the Vlllth Army's assault drew

near, the Allied air forces renewed their bombing attacks on the enemy's Mareth positions. The attacks re-commenced on 11th March when eighteen S.A.A.F. Bostons, escorted by Kitty­

hawks and with a Spitfire top cover, bombt enemy positions at Arram, the strong-point four miles south-east of Mareth. For the next three days, S.A.A.F. Bostons and Baltimores and U.S. Mitchells took turns in delivering the attacks on the fortifications in the Mareth area, carrying out 49 effective sorties against these objectives. On 16th March, the day preceding the Vlllth Army's first tentative night attack against the Mareth Line, the air attacks were on a somewhat increased scale, seventeen Baltimores, escorted by Kittyhawks and eighteen U.S. Mitchells, escorted by U.S. Warhawks, attacking enemy positions at Arram and Mareth respectively. As a result of the light bomber attacks on the five days mentioned, hits were scored on pillboxes and gun positions, and several fires were caused. These attacks, however, merely foreshadowed the supreme air effort which was to be made in the following week when the Vlllth Army resumed its offensive.

While the Allied bombers were carrying out these attacks, enemy air opposition was ne­gligible. On one occasion only, the 13th March, were enemy fighters brought to combat. On that day 36 U.S. Warhawks, with top cover provided by twelve Spitfires, carried out an offensive sweep over the Gabes area. A formation of about 30.ME.109s and MC.202s was encountered north­west of Gabes and in the ensuing fight the War-hawks shot down four ME. 109s, probably de­stroyed another and damaged four more; the Spitfires added to the bag by destroying one ME.109 and damaging two others. Four U.S. Warhawks were shot down but the pilot of one aircraft was saved. For the next three days enemy fighters avoided combat.

Attacks on Italian and Sicilian Bases

While the enemy was engaged in building up his Tunisian supplies the ports of on-loading in Italy and Sicily were attacked by the Middle East Air Forces.

Attacks on Naples by Liberators of the Ninth U.S.A.A.F. and No. 160 Squadron had been fairly frequent during the last month of 1942, but in January of the next year operations against this port were limited owing to adverse weather con­ditions. During the month one effective attack only was made by Middle East-based aircraft, namely on 11th January when eight U.S. Libera­tors dropped 40 X 1,000 lb. bombs on the harbour installations. Observation of results was obscured by low cloud but one fire was seen to break out in the town. The Liberators succeeded in shooting down one of the ME.109s which attacked them, but they themselves lost two aircraft.

Low cloud over the Naples area continued to hamper the heavy bomber effort in February. On several occasions U.S. Liberators were unable to locate shipping in the harbour through bad visibility and an alternative target such as qro­tone (near the entrance to the Gulf of Taranto) was attacked, or bombs were brought back. One

of the most successful February efforts was the attack on the 15th, when two formations of U.S. Liberators attacked shipping in Naples harbour at dusk, carrying out fifteen effective sorties; The target area was partly covered by low cloud which prevented the complete observation of damage caused, but two merchant vessels along­side the Massaniello Mole were seen to be hit by thousand pound bombs. Photographs taken two days later revealed that the stern of one of the vessels was submerged and the other had ap­parently sunk. The Liberators proved more than a match for attacking enemy fighters: three ME.109s and two MC.202s were shot down and six more fighters were probably destroyed. One Li­berator failed to return and another was damag­ed by anti-aircraft fire. In all, the Ninth U.S.A. A.F heavy bombers carried out 48 effective sorties against Naples harbour during February and dropped 116 tons of bombs.

Attacks on Naples harbour were continued during March by the Ninth U.S.A.A.F. Liberators which made 98 effective sorties; Liberators of No. 178 Squadron also attacked this objective on three nights, carrying out eleven effective sorties. As in the previous two months adverse weather conditions considerably limited the scope and scale of our air attacks: the attacks succeeded, nevertheless, in causing considerable damage to port installations and shipping in the harbour.

Owing to the success of our sea and air attacks (from Malta and N.W. Africa) on his shipping, however, the enemy was dissuaded from the attempt to provision Bizerta and Tunis direct from Naples. Increasing use was made of Sicily as an advanced dumping base and ships were run under cover of darkness from Palermo and other Sicilian harbours to the northern Tunisian ports. The supplying of Sicily entailed a vastly increas­ed rail and road traffic down the Italian coast and across the train ferry at Messina. The valu­able work done by Malta-based aircraft in at­tacking these rail and road communications and the Messina terminus is dealt with elsewhere in the "Review."

As the Sicilian ports and railway terminus at Messina acquired increasing importance, the at­tacks of the Middle East-based bombers, like those of the sister force in N.W. Africa, increas­ed in scale and frequency.

During January, Liberators of the Ninth U.S.A.A.F. carried out 22 effective sorties against Palermo and an equal number against Messina. At this stage, however, the attacks usually re­presented the bombing of alternative targets when bad flying weather prevented aircraft reaching Naples. An examination of photographs revealed that at Messina damage was done to quays and railway tracks and at least two ferry boats were immobilised.

In February, the majority of the Ninth U.S.A. A.F. Sicilian attacks were centred on Messina while R.A.F. Halifaxes and Wellingtons made Palermo their main objective. As in the previous

Sousse under attack by U.S. Liberators in January, 1943.

naval jetties and north of the harbour, including month, hpwever, adverse weather conditions pre-the dry dock area. The smoke screen, which was cluded the carrying out of an intensive air of-now a standard protective measure for the Me­fensive. The heaviest attack on Palermo during diterranean Axis ports, prevented one Welling-February was made by six Halifaxes and 30 ton only from locating the target and this aircraft Wellingtons on the night 22/23rd: one explosion attacked four ships outside the harbour. The and eight fires were caused in the harbour and most effective attacks on Messina during the town areas and bursts were observed across the

month were made by two formal American Liberators, comprising eighteen air­craft, on the 23rd. Hits were scored on the train ferry terminus and on the railway sidings to the south of the harbour and many fires and ex­plosions were caused. In addition, a bomb burst on, or very near, a vessel in the harbour. In the course of the month, Messina was attacked by 45 Liberators and six Halifaxes and Palermo by eighteen Halifaxes, 23 Liberators and 73 Well­ingtons.

During March, there were four attacks on Palermo by R.A.F. Cyrenaican-based aircraft, comprising sixteen Halifax and 86 Wellington effective sorties. These attacks, which took place in the first half of the month, undoubtedly caused considerable damage to port installations and shipping in harbour, but low cloud prevented the full observation of results. During the latter part of the month the bombing of Palermo was continued by Fortresses based in N.W. Africa: the havoc wrought by these aircraft is indicated in Section III. Messina was attacked on five occasions by Cyrenaican-based aircraft, seven effective sorties being made by R.A.F. Liberators and 46 by American Liberators. The heaviest raids were made on the 24th, when two attacks were made by nineteen U.S. and six R.A.F. Liberators respectively. Photographs taken dur­ing these attacks showed hits in the vicinity of the train ferry terminus, and it- appeared that the western end of the building housing the operating gear was hit and one of the train fer­ries damaged. Other hits were scored on naval installations near the U-boat base, where an oil fire was started, and on quays, warehouses and railway sidings.

These air attacks on the main Italian and Sicilian ports of on-loading during the first quarter of 1943 played an important part in consistently hampering the Axis attempts to pro­vision his Tunisian forces.

Air Protection of the VHIth Army's Supply Line Early in March, A.H.Q., Egypt, was re-named

A.H.Q., Air Defences Eastern Mediterranean. The latter title denoted more fully the formation's

creased responsibilities, which included the air defence of Egypt and the protection of sea and land communications from Tripoli (Levant) to Tripoli (Tripolitania). The formation controlled four groups located at Tripoli, Benina, Alexan­dria and Haifa.

It is not purposed in this account to give de­tails of the defensive activities which rendered the continuance of our ground and air offensive pos­sible, but the scale of effort of Middle East-based fighters engaged in the protection of our Medi­terranean convoys is indicated by the following, figures. At no time for the period 29/30th De­cember, 1942, to 27th March, 1943, were the fort­nightly totals of sorties flown on this activity fewer than 785 and during one fortnight, 17th to 30th January, the 1,000 mark was exceeded. In all, during the three months mentioned, 5,500 sorties were flown on shipping protection. In addition', units operating under A.H.Q., Air Defences Eastern Mediterranean flew constant sorties in defence of our supply ports and land lines of com­munication.

Meanwhile, No. 201 Group units, in co-opera­tion with the Royal Navy, kept a constant watch for enemy shipping and submarines. As the enemy was driven further and further westwards, how­ever, the main stream of Axis shipping came more and more within the orbits of squadrons based in Malta and North-west Africa and the offensive sorties of Middle East-based aircraft decreased. During the first three months of the year, as a result of 129 effective sorties, one medium-sized M/V was sunk, one probably sunk and four damaged; six other M/Vs were attacked with unobserved results. Two barges and one schooner were destroyed, one schooner was da­maged and fourteen barges and schooners were attacked with unobserved results. In addition, four attacks were made on enemy submarines, but it was impossible to give an assessment of the damage caused.

Thus, during the first three months of 1943 the sea lanes from the Turkish to the Tunisian borders were kept clear for our shipping; at no time was the supply line of the VIHth Army and Allied air forces in danger of being cut by the enemy.

(Continued on page 23).

Cagliari Harbour - 2&th Fe­bruary, 1943. Two M/Vi­be fore attack; right centre

and bottom left.

Both vessels on fire after bombing by B. 17/s.

SECTION 11. TUNIS! The Great Armada

s ON 8th NOVEMBER., 1942, the peoples of the United Nations who had recently been heartened by the news of the Axis collapse at El Alamein were astounded to learn that British and Ameri­can forces had landed at nodal points along the 400 miles stretch of coast from Casablanca to Algiers.

The first convoy for North, Africa left the United Kingdom more than a fortnight before the landings were effected, the escorting British and American naval vessels comprising 34 large warships, 102 destroyers and 45 miscellaneous warships. The total number of ships involved in carrying out this greatest amphibious operation in military history was put at 500 transport ves­sels and 350 warships.

The task of providing air cover for the convoys was a tremendous one. The danger of enemy sub­marines converging in thfe path of the convoys was ever present and to counter this it was ne­cessary to provide air escort for each convoy during the hours of daylight. Meanwhile, anti­submarine patrols in the Bay of Biscay were maintained at maximum intensity and Iceland-based aircraft continued their anti-submarine activity and in addition watched for a possible break-out of enemy warships from the Norwegian ports. Coastal command, strengthened by Hali­faxes from Bomber Command and Liberators from the Eighth U.S.A.A.F., was able to meet its heavy commitments and carrier-borne fighter aircraft provided protection for the convoys en route.

When the enemy realised that Dakar was not the Allied objective after all, U-boat opposition increased in intensity. By that time, however, our coastal aircraft were operating from the Oran and Algiers areas. Some indication of how the menace of the U-boats was countered by the the Allied air forces is shown by the fact that during the period 23rd October to 30th November, 1942, aircraft from the British Isles made 29 U-boat sightings, resulting in sixteen attacks, and those from Gibraltar and North-west Africa sight­ed 113 of which 60 were attacked.

On the whole, Vichy French opposition to the Anglo-American forces was not formidable. Al­giers capitulated first and port installations were found intact; moreover, the authorities readily co-operated and shore labour was soon available. Within twelve hours of the capitulation R.A.F. fighters were operating from the Maison Blanche and Blida airfields. Stronger resistance, parti­cularly naval, was encountered in the Oran and Casablanca sectors, but in a short time these too had been invested.

Almost immediately afterwards, Bougie, Phil­lipeville and Bone in eastern Algeria were oc­cupied by our seaborne and parachute troops without any opposition being encountered. Th«J

building up of the 1st Army was at once initiated in the Bone area and the Tunisian border was crossed in the succeeding days.

The immediate implications of the North Afri­can landings were obvious. The Axis forces fleeing westwards across Cyrenaica were now menaced by fresh troops who would presumably advance and cut off their line of retreat; then with the linking of the vni th Army and the North African Expeditionary Force and the con­sequent occupation of the entire southern shore of the Mediterranean, Allied mastery of that sea would be assured.

The importance of this mastery to the United Nations' cause can hardly be exaggerated. Apart from the fact that southern Europe becomes im­mediately vulnerable to attack, a direct sea route is opened from America and Great Britain to the Indian Ocean. Thus the transit of vital supplies to Russia and India can be immeasurably acceler­ated. The way is opened for an offensive against the tenuous power of Japan in east Asia, and the Axis plan for the coalescence of the Nazi-Fascist land bloc with the Japanese zone of con­quest becomes impossible of fulfillment.

Axis Reactions The enemy's answer to the Anglo-American

landings was to occupy Vichy France and Corsica and rush troops by air and sea to Tunisia. Within a few days of our landings the enemy took pos­session of the ports of Bizerta and Tunis and the airfields in their vicinity. By 16th Novem­ber the enemy had already approximately 5,000 troops available to provide a protective screen for his Tunisian bridgehead, and protective detach­ments were soon pushed out to the approaches to these ports to a radius of 25 to 30 miles. In the course of the next five days, moreover, the ports and airfields at Sousse} Sfax and Gabes were oc­cupied and the Axis forces in Tunisia then num­bered about 12,000.

It became increasingly evident that the rein­forcing of the Axis forces in Tunisia was consi­dered of supreme importance and the transmis­sion of supplies to Rommel's retreating army was of secondary importance.

Meanwhile, practically the entire German Me­diterranean bomber force had been concentrated in Sicily and Sardinia and fighters and dive-bom­bers were established at El Aouina airfield (Tu­nis). Italian reinforcements of fighters and tor­pedo-bombers were also sent to Sardinia and some fighters joined the German contingent at Tunis.

The attacks on the Axis airfields and ports which were immediateay delivered by Malta-based aircraft are considered elsewhere in the "Review."

In spite of our sea and air attacks on his shipping and the bombing of his ports, the enemy, principally by the extensive use of air

2.'5

ofmidable force in the northern sector and occupied the entire eastern coast.

The November Advance "If it were done when 'tis done, then t'were

well it were done quickly." Acting on this belief the Allied ground forces pressed on as quickly as possible towards Bizerta, Tunis and Sfax. On 18th November came the first clash be­tween advanced columns of the 1st Army and German units. Considerable losses were inflict­ed on the enemy's infantry and eleven tanks knocked out. Our losses were comparatively slight.

On the 24th November, Allied forces were advancing into Tunisia along three lines; one along the coast road towards Bizerta, one to­wards Tunis, and one in the direction of Sfax. At that date, Allied troops were 30 miles from Bizerta, 35 miles from Tunis and 120 miles from Sfax. The situation appeared satisfactory.

Early Air Effort A formidable air force composed of British

and American squadrons was quickly established in N.W. Africa under the joint control of the Eastern Air Command and the Twelfth U.S.A.A.F.

Aid to our advancing ground forces was pro­vided principally by fighter-bombers, while Allied fighters carried out patrols over the for­ward area and our supply ports.

In order to hamper the enemy's air effort de­termined attacks were made on his Tunisian airfields. Typical of the bomber effort in No­vember, 1942, were the attacks delivered on the nights 27/28th and 28/29th. On the former night 33 U.S. heavy bombers attacked Sidi Ahmed (Bizerta) airfield, fifteen Bisleys attacked El Aouina (Tunis) airfield, and twelve other air­craft bombed landing grounds at Gabes. The following night. the attack on Sidi Ahmed was renewed by seventeen Bisleys.

The December Set-back In the early days of December, 1942, it became

evident that the Allied attempt to hustle the enemy out of Tunis and Bizerta before adequate Axis supplies and reinforcements arrived had failed. Within three weeks of the North African landings the enemy had built up a Tunisian force strong enough to turn from defence to counter-attack. In achieving this he was cer­tainly favoured by possessing short lines of communication to Italy and Sicily and a large force of transport aircraft, but quick decisions and rapid improvisation also played their part.

On 10th December, the enemy attacked our positions at Medjez el Bab, the gateway to the Tunisian tip. The following day our troops were compelled to withdraw along the line of the Mejerda valley, although the town itself still re­mained in our hands. The enemy thus succeed­ed in widening his Tunisian bridgehead and wa^

back on the perimeter which he held before our drive towards Tunis and Bizerta began. In ad­dition, the enemy reinforced his troops in the southern sector and began offensive patrolling towards Faid and Sbeitla.

During the first week in December the air sup­port to our ground forces varied from attacks delivered by U.S. Lightnings on enemy tanks in the Djedeida area to the bombing of enemy forces south of Gabes by U.S. Mitchells.

The following week low cloud and heavy rain hampered the air operations of both sides. Never­theless, an effort was made to give support to our ground forces withstanding the enemy attacks in the Medjez el Bab area; in particular, Spitfires carried out effective straffing attacks against enemy tanks and transport vehicles. In the south the attacks on enemy vehicle concentrations and gun emplacements around Gabes were continued by U.S. Marauders and U.S. Lightnings.

Lull in the Ground Fighting

During the last fortnight in 1942 the ground fighting in Tunisia was on a small scale. Both sides took advantage of this respite to concentrate on building up supplies. In the north, the enemy, having safeguarded his bridgehead, returned to the defensive; in the centre and south, enemy protective patrols were extended westwards in order to deepen the defences covering the Sousse ­Sfax - Gabes line of communication. By the end of the year, the constant heavy rains had caused widespread floods which permitted limited patrol activity only.

In spite of the bad flying weather and bogging of landing grounds, air attacks on the enemy's lines of communication and encampments -in­creased as the R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. squadrons grew in strength. The following examples illus­trate the attacks on the enemy's rail communi­cations, which relieved the JlfaZfa-based Beau-fighters and long-range Hurricanes of part of this activity. On 19th December, five Mitchells and six Marauders, escorted by six Lightnings, all of the Twelfth U.S.A.A.F., attacked the rail­way sidings at Sousse; in spite of the intense flak encountered direct hits were scored on a goods train and station buildings. At dusk on the same day light bombers, escorted by Spitfires, attacked the sidings at Sfax. On 23rd December, U.S. Warhawks shot up a train between Sousse and Kairouan and three days later destroyed two loco­motives during an offensive sweep in the north­ern sector.

During the luil in the ground fighting, enemy transport vehicles were both bombed and straf­fed. Two of the most effective bombing attacks were delivered on the afternoon of the 17th and in the brilliant moonlight of the night 28/29th respectively. On the former occasion, twelve U.S. escorted Bostons successfully bombed vehicle concentrations at Massicault (south of Tunis) and on the latter, Bisleys and Blenheims patroll­ing the roads from Tunis to Massicault and Pont

du Fahs attacked vehicles at various points and set on fire a considerable number of trucks.

Owing to the dispersal of vehicles, however, fighter and fighter-bomber attacks were more effective than those of the bombers. On 24th De­cember, six U.S. Warhawks reported the destruc­tion of 60 vehicles out of a group of about 100 near La Fauconnerie and of another six south of Fondouk el Aouareb (south-west of Kairouan). On 28th December, eight U.S. Lightnings, in spite of an encounter with ten ME.109s, destroyed eight vehicles south-west of Tunis and U.S. War-hawks destroyed another ten during an offensive

'reconnaissance north-east of Kairouan.

Fighter Engagements The Allied fighters' tasks in December, apart

from fighter-bomber and straffing attacks, in­cluded the defence of our Algerian supply ports and back areas, shipping cover, escort to our day bombers and interception of enemy bomber attacks. In the latter activity, particularly, our aircraft were usually outnumbered by the enemy escorting fighters. During the month, however, the fighter activity on either side was limited through bad weather and landing grounds were unserviceable from time to time owing to flood­ing.

The following are typical of the December com­bats. On the morning of the 2nd, twelve U.S. Lightnings sweeping the Mateur-Djedeida area encountered eight JU.88s escorted by ME.109s. The JU.88s were forced to jettison their bombs in enemy territory and one JU.88 was destroyed, one ME.109 probably destroyed and two aircraft damaged; two Lightnings only suffered damage. A revealing encounter took place on 12th Decem­ber between a U.S. Lightning and a FW.190. The latter confidently attempted to out-climb the Ame­rican fighter, but was beaten at his own game. The two aircraft engaged at 12,000 feet and then the FW. 190 resumed its climb. The Lightning followed and at 19,000 feet pulled up under the German fighter and shot it down. On 28th De­cember, ten Spitfires engaged six JU.88s, escort­ed by six ME.109s, south-west of Pont du Fahs. In the ensuing combats two JU.88s and one ME.109 were destroyed and one bomber and one fighter damaged; one of our Spitfires failed to return. Later in the afternoon, fifteen ME. 109s were sighted over our Souk el Arba aerodrome; on this occasion the enemy had the better of the exchanges and two Spitfires were destroyed.

Throughout the month the work of the night Beaufighters, operating from Souk el Arba, was outstanding and, in particular, their "bag" in­cluded a number of HE. 11 Is shot down over the Bone area.

Attacks an Enemy Airfields During December the Allied air forces based in

N.W. Africa intensified their attacks on the enemy's Tunisian airfields in order to hamper his attempts to secure air supremacy in the northern sector.

The heaviest attacks were El Aouina (Tunis) airfield. On the 1st Decein-" ber, attacks were made by six escorted Bostons and thirteen escorted Fortresses of the Twelfth U.S.A.A.F.; these were followed up at dawn on the following day by six Bisley and three hours later by nine U.S. escorted Bostons. Photographs taken after these raids showed that apart from fresh damage to hangars at least 30 of the 60 aircraft photographed on the ground were damaged. Later in the morning twelve U.S. escorted Marauders took up the attack: fires were started near the hangars and of the 50 aircraft observed on the landing area about fifteen were destroyed. Dur­ing the same week a night attack was delivered by sixteen Bisleys, but a ground haze prevented the observation of results. Additional attacks on El Aouina airfield during the month included that on the 16th by seven U.S. Marauders, when bombs were dropped on dispersed aircraft.

Determined attacks were also made on 8idi Ahmed (Biserta) airfield. On the evening of 2nd December an attack was deJivered by U.S. Fort­resses and this was followed up on the night 3rd/4th by Bisleys which made both bomb­ing and machine-gun attacks. Other effective attacks in December included that made by eight U.S. Mitchells, escorted by U.S. Lightnings, on the 8th.

In addition to the bombing of the Axis' main air bases at Tunis and Bizerta, attacks were also made on the enemy's landing grounds at Sidi Tabet ('west of El Aouina) and Mateur.

Destruction of Enemy Supplies The Tunisian campaign was above all a war of

supplies: the denial of them to the enemy in­volved the liquidation of Von Arnim's and Rom­mel's aflmy alike. Accordingly, the shipping strikes and attacks on the enemy's ports by AfaWa-based aircraft were now paralleled by in­tensive attacks from N.W. Africa.

From the successful attacks on shipping may be cited that made by seven Swordfish at Ferry­viUe on 13/14th December. While four Bisleya carried out a diversionary bombing attack on the harbour installations, the Swordfish made torpedo attacks on shipping: one ship, believed to be a tanker, was hit and burst into flames and an­other ship was damaged.

In general, throughout December, Malta-based bombers concentrated on night attacks against the enemy's Tunisian ports and the N.W. African squadrons were chiefly engaged in day bombing.

The heavy day attacks on the port of Tunis in December began on the 6th, when fifteen U.S. Fortresses, escorted by U.S. Lightnings, attacked shipping in the harbour. The attacks were con­tinued on the 13th and 14th by seventeen and fifteen escorted U.S. Fortresses and on the 15th by seventeen U.S. Liberators. An interesting feature of an attack made on 16th December was the reporting by Spitfires escorting American bombers that twenty fires were burning in the dock area before the bombers attacked the target

25

' W 2 7 Malta-based WWffigtbris on the previous night.

During the second half of December, N.W. Afri­can-based boimbers made night attacks on Tunis in addition to the usual day bombing. On the night 13/14th, for example, Bisleys made an ef­fective attack and on the following night Bisieys and U.S. Fortresses resumed the attack.

Many day attacks were also made against the port of Bizerta during the month. On 2nd De­cember, U.S. Fortresses bombed the port installa­tions and two days later U.S. Fortresses and Ma­rauders made another attack ; on the latter occa­sion hits with 500 lb. bombs were scored on mer­chant vessels in the entrance to the docks. An effective low-level bombing attack was carried out on the 6th by Bisleys, and one of the several fires caused in the docks area was described as "out­standing". During the second week in December, successful attacks were delivered by U.S. Fort­ressses and Liberators on the 14th and by Libe­rators on the following day. In the course of the attack on the 15th, 60 x 1,000 lb. bombs were dropped in the target area and hits were scored on several ships. During the third week in De­cember U.S. Bostons took over the day bombing of Bizerta, and in an attack on the 19th many hits were scored with 1,000 lb. bombs on ships in the harbour, including one on a light cruiser. The heaviest raid in the last week of the year was made by eighteen escorted U.S. Fortresses on the 26th, when fires were started in the docks and probable damage was inflicted to vessels at the quays. Shortly afterwards, on the night 28/29th December, Wellingtons made their debut under the Eastern Air Command with an attack on the Bizerta docks and goods station.

In the latter part of December, also, Sousse and Sfax, which had already been bombed by aircraft based in Malta and Egypt, were attacked from the N.W. African end, in order to limit the sup­plies reaching Rommel's retreating army. Thus, on 27th December, the port of Sousse was attack­ed from all sides. In the morning fourteen Alge­ria-based Fortresses bombed shipping and the docks; in the afternoon twelve Liberators from Egypt scored two direct hits on a vessel and caused large fires in the area north-west of the harbour, and three MaZta-based Albacores bombed a group of barges; then during the night six Egypt-b&aed Liberators set on fire a motor-vessel with 1,000 lb. bombs and started large fires on the quays.

It is evident from the above accounts that the December bomber activity against enemy supply bases by N.W. African-based aircraft was inten­sive; it remains to be emphasised that it was achieved despite adverse weather conditions.

The Enemy's Strength and Intentions In spite of the sea and air attacks on his ship­

ping and the blasting of his ports, the enemy suc­ceeded in building up his Tunisian forces. By 1st January, 1943, it was estimated thpt he had amassed 30,000 German and 14,500 Italian com­

ti-.s

26

battant troops; his tank strength was put at 160­190 German tanks, of which about 140 were serviceable, and 60 Italian tanks, whose service­ability was an unknpwn factor.

Opposing the enemy's land forces in the north­ern sector, roughly in the area north of the line east to west through Pont du Fahs, was the Bri­tish 1st Army. The central sector (the area north of the 8fax - Sbeitla road), and the south­ern sector (the area south of this line), were held by the 2nd U.S. Corps and by four French divisions.

The German forces were for the most part con­centrated in the northern sector and the Italians were mainly in the central and southern sectors. The latter were soon to be reinforced, however, by the 21st Armoured Division, withdrawn from Rommel's Army and non-mobile Italian units from Tripolitania.

The enemy's task was to secure the coastal plain against an Allied advance. To do this it was necessary (a) to secure his positions in the Mateur a r ea ; (o) to t a k e Medjez el Bab; (c) to seize the mountain range from Djebel Fkirine to Pichon; and (d) to capture Sbeitla and Gafsa in the south in order to safeguard the coastal route which was Rommel's main line of communication. How far the enemy succeeded in putting his plan into effect will emerge in the following pages.

By the beginning of 1943, also, the enemy's air forces were in a position to make a maximum ef­fort in Tunisia. It was estimated that the German Air Force strength in Tunisia, southern Italy, Si­cily and Sardinia amounted to 610 aircraft, of which 225 were JU.88 bombers and 150 ME.109/ FW.190 fighters. Italian aircraft in the same areas numbered about 560, including 250 fight­ers of various types. German serviceability was estimated at 55-60% and the Italian at 50%.

Serviceable aircraft figures for 5th January in respect of the Allied squadrons in N.W. Africa were :— R.A.F.:— 144 fighters, 20 Beaufighters, 23 fighter-bombers, 11 light bombers, 20 medium bombers, 30 G.R. aircraft, 3 P.R.U. aircraft. Twelfth U&.A.A.F.:— 149 fighters, 22 light bom­bers, 41 medium bombers, 35 heavy bombers, 3 P/R aircraft, 23 transport aircraft. A combined total of 524 serviceable aircraft. In the follow­ing weeks reinforcing went on apace. ' Elsewhere in the Mediterranean zone there was

a vastly increased force at Malta, while the West­ern Desert Air Force, with defence fighters and heavy and medium bombers in its rear, was fol­lowing up the Vlllth Army.

Spitfires Reinforced

Early in January, 1943, the N.W. African Spit­fire squadrons were reinforced. This strengthen­ing of the fighter force coincided with increased enemy air activity and combats became frequent. In particular, the Spitfires did good work in in­tercepting enemy aircraft attacking our shipping in Bone harbour.

During the first half of January the average daily sorties of R.A.F. fighters exceeded the 100 mark; thereafter, with the further strengthen­ing of the fighter force this figure was soon doubled.

Air Attacks on Battlefield Targets

From 1st to 17th January inclusive, while the ground activity was still on a small scale, the Allied air forces increased their attacks on trans­port vehicles, rail communications and enemy positions.

Attacks on enemy vehioles were not numerous as these were not concentrated to any extent and were often concealed in woods or camouflaged in fields. In the early days of January attacks were made on vehicles in the northern sector by Spit­fires and Hurricanes, while U.S. light bombers and fighter bombers straffed tanks at Fon­douk el Aouareb in the central sector. In the following week U.S. Bostons, escorted by U.S. Warhawks, turned their attention to the southern sector, where the enemy was building up his armoured forces, and attacked tank concentra­tions near Gabes. Meanwhile, Bisleys, operating at night, patrolled the coastal road and bombed and machine-gunned enemy vehicles, particularly between Tunis and Sfax.

A number of attacks were made on enemy positions in all three sectors but on many oc­casions bad weather caused the cancellation of operations. On 6th January Hurricane-bom­bers, escorted by Spitfires, in support of our troops west of Mateur, succeeded in silencing enemy gun batteries and on the same day U.S. Bostons, escorted by U.S. Lightnings and U.S. Warhawks, attacked a camp near Kairouan- The following day U.S. Marauders, escorted by U.S. Lightnings, bombed barracks at Gabes in addi­tion to the airfield there. Other camps attacked included the one at Kebili (65 miles west of Ga­bes) by U.S. Bostons on 10th January and on the same day a U.S. Warhawk dropped a 500 1b. bomb plumb through the German Headquarters at Kairouan.

Attacks on Lines of Communication During the January lull in the ground fight­

ing air attacks by the Twelfth Air Force on the enemy's land lines of communication were in­tensified, particularly on railways and bridges in the central and southern sectors. On 4th January, eight escorted Mitchells attacked the railway yards at Kairouan and another eighteen resumed the attacks two days later. The next week the attacks were extended to the southern sector in order to cut Rommel's supply line. On 8th January, twelve escorted Mitchells attacked the railway junction at Graiba (west of Mahares) and destroyed two bridges, and six more escort­ed Mitchells bombed the railway junction at Ka­laa Srira (west of Sousse). On the 10th, nine escorted Marauders attacked the marshalling yards at Gabes and on the following day six escorted Fortresses bombed the railway and road

jUes Fthe

Tencha "bridges (south of Sfax) by twelve escorted Marauders on the 12th; attacks by ten and six escorted Marauders on railway junctions near Sousse and Mahares res­pectively on the 14th; an attack on bridges across the Oued Akarit by eighteen escorted Ma­rauders on the 15th; and the bombing of the rail­way junction at Graiba by twelve Mitchells on the 17th.

These attacks inflicted local damage but were not of sufficient intensity to cause a serious dis­location of the supply route to Rommel's forces across the Tunisian frontier.

The Enemy's Attack in the Central Sector On 18th January an enemy attack in some

strength, in which units of the 10th Armoured Division participated, was launched south-west from Pont du Fahs. The enemy's aim was to secure the range of mountains from Djebel Fki­rine to Djebel Ousselat, which would deprive us of positions from which to debouch on to the coastal plain. A breach was made in our posi­tions in the Oued el Kebir and the enemy's forces passed through. On 21st January the enemy thrust in a southerly direction along the road to­wards Pichon and, in spite of Allied opposition, by the end of the day had advanced to the general line of Kairouan - Ousseltia - Sidi Amara. In the succeeding days our ground forces halted the enemy's advance in the Ousseltia valley and re­gained local initiative. Axis forces, however, re­tained the major part of their gains — the range of mountains .from Djebel Hannikat - Djebel Haifa - Djebel Bou Dabous and northwards, to­gether with part of Djebel Ousselat. Thus the po­sition stood at the end of January.

Air operations in support of our ground forces in the central sector were carried out by Spit­fires, Hurricane-bombers and Bisleys. Spitfires, operating from Souk el Arba, made daily recon­naissance of the battle area and passed back targets for the Hurricane-bombers.

Enemy troops and vehicles, in general, were not concentrated sufficiently to provide targets for day bomber operations, but there was in­creased scope for fighter-bomber activity. On one occasion onily — the 21st January — day bombers were despatched to attack a group of tanks re­ported near Pont du Fahs, but the eighteen U.S. escorted Mitchells briefed for the attack were unable to locate the tanks and bombed Pont du Fahs town instead. From 18th January to the end of the month almost daily attacks were made by escorted Hurricane-bombers, in the course of which troop-carriers and other vehicles were attacked and enemy positions and bridges, par­ticularly in the vicinity of Pont du Fahs, were bombed. By night, Bisleys, operating from Can­robert (about 42 miles S.E. of Constantine), at­tacked road and rail communications in the Tunis

Teboura — Pont du Fahs area, and on occa­sions £xteni|ed Xhe activ-J^y 'to north ofr^Kairouan;

vehicles on the road and trains were successfully; attacked and rail' and road j.lincti<)nrarid,f.viai[ii^i^ were bombed.

The Enemy Captures Faid Having improved his positions in the central

sector, the enemy now sought to do the same in the southern sector, in order to safeguard the Rommel supply line along the coastal plain.

South of Pichon the country is less mountainous than the area considered in the preceding para­graphs. The dorsal ridge continues, however, although less defined, and is broken by two main passes, one at Maknassy on the Sfax - Gafsa road and the other at Faid, where the Sfax -Sbeitla road cuts through Djebel Kralif.

Maknassy had been in the enemy's hands from the beginning, but he now made determined attemps to eliminate our forward troops at Sened Station, 30 miles east of Gafsa. Sened changed hands several times but the Axis forces were un­able to push along the road to Gafsa as intended. At Faid, however, they had greater success and occupied the defile on 30th January. The enemy thus succeeded to some extent in deepening the defences covering the Sousse - Sfax - Gabes line of communication, which was vital for the main­tenance of Rommel's army, now in process of crossing the Tunisian border.

Mention has already been made on page 27 of the Twelfth U.S.A.A.P. attacks on enemy com­munications in the southern sector during the lull in the fighting from 1st to 17th January. The attacks in the southern sector were now intensified as Rommel's army established itself in the Ben Gardane - Medenine - Gabes area. Constant at­tacks were made on transport vehicles, principal­ly by U.S. Lightnings. Thus on the 19th Ja­nuary eighteen Lightnings swept the Ben Garda-ne - Zuara road and straffed about 20 vehicles, including two petrol carriers. On the 21st, seven Lightnings shot up a 20 truck convoy near Mede­nine and 26 Lightnings shot up military traffic on the Gabes - Ben Gardane road and reported the destruction of 65 vehicles; further attacks were made on the same day on vehicle concen­trations by U.S. Bostons. Other Lightning at­tacks included the straffing of "countless vehi­cles" moving west on the Gabes - Medenine - Ben Gardane road on the 23rd and the shooting-up of vehicles on the Sfax - Gabes road on the 27th. Meanwhile, U.S. escorted bombers attacked ene­my encampments and railway mashalling yards. Medenine town and car park were attacked by eighteen escorted Mitchells an the 19th; sixteen Fortresses bombed a camp and barracks at Gabes on the 20th ; and eighteen escorted Mit­chells attacked the marshalling yards and bar­racks at Sfax on the 28th. The building up of the Axis forces in the southern sector did not proceed unhampered.

Attacks on Enemy Airfields During the first three weeks of January the

Twelfth U.S.A.A.F. made several heavy attacks on the Castel Benito airfield, south of Tripoli, in

order to supplement air attacks being made from the east and hasten the liquidation of the enemy's Tripolitanian-based air forces. On the 9th Ja­nuary, five escorted Marauders dropped frag­mentation bombs on the hangars, and three days later twelve escorted Fortresses destroyed about 20 of the 75 aircraft seen on the ground. On the former occasion, three enemy fighters which at­tempted interception were shot down and during the latter raid fourteen ME.109s were claimed as destroyed. A third attack was made by thirteen escorted Fortresses on the 18th, when numerous fires were started; intercepting enemy fighters again received a mauling, three being destroyed, five probably destroyed, and four damaged for the loss of one Fortress and one escorting Light­ning.

The enemy air forces withdrawing from Tri­politania were not allowed to settle down unhin­dered at their new base at Medenine. On the 22/23rd eleven Wellingtons attacked the main landing ground, where patrolling U.S. Lightnings had previously reported the presence of 100 enemy aircraft; bombs were dropped varying from 4,000 lbs. to 30 lbs. each but results were not observed. The raid presumably had good effect, however, as eighteen U.S. escorted Mi­tchells despatched to attack the same landing ground on the 24th found it deserted. A move had been made to a landing ground west of Me­denine and the 60 to 70 aircraft found on the ground there were bombed with good results. Other attacks on enemy landing grounds in the southern sector included successful U.S. Marau­der attacks on the important base at Gabes.

In the central sector attacks were made by Bisleys and U.S. Marauders on Kairouan airfield, and in the north two night attacks by Welling-tons were made on Sidi Ahmed (Bizerta) airfield and several day attacks by various aircraft of the Twelfth U.S.A.A.F. on El Aouina (Tunis) airfield.

The outstanding blitz of the month was the three attacks on El Aouina airfield on the 22nd. The first attack was delivered by 40 U.S. Fort­resses, escorted by U.S. Lightnings, in the course of which 471 fragmentation clusters and 57 x 500 lbs. G.P. bombs were dropped. Many fires were started, including some which could be seen for 80 to 100 miles on the return journey. Later in the morning, twelve U.S. Marauders, escorted by U.S. Lightnings, renewed the attack and dropped 208 x 100 lb. bombs on dispersed aircraft, and in the afternoon eighteen U.S. escorted Mitchells dropped 203 fragmentation clusters. Many fires and heavy smoke were seen issuing from the numerous parked aircraft when the Mitchells left the scene.

Shipping Strikes The most outstanding shipping attacks reported

during January were those delivered by Twelfth U.S.A.A.F. Marauders and Mitchells in the latter part of the month. The following accounts indi­cate the success of these attacks.

28

On 20th January six Mitchells, escorted by twelve Lightnings, sighted a tanker 300 to 400 feet long, accompanied by a small motor vessel and two destroyers, between Sicily and Tunisia; 15.x 500 lb. bombs were dropped from a height of 200 feet and one direct and two very near misses were scored on the tanker which was seen to settle in the water after a violent explosion. On the 22nd, six Marauders, escorted by twelve Lightnings, scored hits on a freighter en route to Tunisia and left it listing. The following day further small freighters were attacked by five escorted Marauders; one ship exploded, one caught fire and capsized and another was listing when last seen. On the 27th, six escorted Mitchells attacked two enemy destroyers. Two direct hits and three near misses were scored on the starboard side of one destroyer, which was left on fire and listing heavily, and four near misses were scored on the stern of the other. Two days later, six Mitchells, escorted by twelve Lightnings, attacked an enemy convoy consisting of two cargo liners, six freighters, four destroyers and several smaller vessels. Two direct hits were scored on a 350 to 400 foot vessel and another vessel of similar size was set on fire. Sixteen enemy fighters which attempt­ed to prevent the attacks received a mauling.

The most successful attack on a submarine was that delivered by a Hudson of No. 500 Squadron on the 17th against a fully surfaced tT-boat. In the first attack the aircraft dropped 3X250 lb. D.Cs from 300 feet, but overshot by 50 yards. A firing duel then followed between the two opponents and in a second attack, made from 1,600 feet, one 250 lb. G.P. bomb fell within 20 feet of the submarine. The Hudson then con­tinued straffing, but return fire ceased from the ;U-boat as it submerged. The aircraft remained in the vicinity for three and a half hours, and observed an oil streak eight miles long.

Destruction of JU. 52s During January as many as 70 JU. 52s landed

in Tunis from Sicily and Naples in a single day. Apart from the destruction of transport aircraft on the ground during the heavy raids on El Aouina airfields previously mentioned, escorted formations were on several occasions caught en route, particularly by U.S. Lightnings escorting U.S. Marauders and U.S. Mitchells on anti-ship­ping sweeps. In particular, there were several successful interceptions in the third week of January.

Thus, on the 15th six JU. 52s, one ME. 323 and two escorting FW. 190s were shot down and several other aircraft damaged; on the 17th two JU. 52s and one JU. 88 were destroyed at the cost of one Lightning, and four days later one JU.52 and one FW.190 were shot down.

Attacks on Tunisian Ports Intensified During January, Wellingtons, which had re­

cently arrived to strengthen the Eastern Air Command's bomber force, made the night bomb­ing of Bizerta, the enemy's principal port of off-

loading, their prime consideration. The Welling-tons attacked the harbour on sixteen nights, car­rying out a total of approximately 150 effective sorties; on the remaining nights of the month adverse weather conditions prevented operations or alternative attacks were made on enemy air­fields. During the first half of the month low cloud rendered the target extremely difficult t.o locate and hampered the observation of results. Beginning on the night 14/15th January the weather cleared and on this and four of the following five nights Wellingtons carried out 71 effective sorties and inflicted wide-spread damage on the docks. The bombs dropped included an appreciable number of 4,000 and 1,000 pounders and vast quantities of incendiaries in addition to the usual 500 and 250 lb. bombs. On several occasions the fires caused were visible for 40 miles on the return journey.

During the latter part of the month U S. escorted Fortresses carried out several day at­tacks on Bizerta and Ferryville comprising ap­proximately 100 effective bomber sorties. In addition to the fires started on the docks, direct hits were scored on shipping in the harbour. A striking feature of the attacks was the conside­rable number of enemy fighters destroyed— a tribute to the concentrated fire of the Fortres­ses and the skill of the U.S. Lightning escorts.

Tunis was attacked by U.S. Fortresses on three occasions and once by U.S. Marauders; on several occasions, however, missions were abandoned owing to bad weather in the target area. The attacks were not confined to the docks area and included such objectives as the power-house, military camps, the industrial area south of Tunis and the marshalling yards south-east of the town. Once again the Fortresses shot the op­posing fighters out of the skies; in particular, on 2nd January, it was reported that seventeen enemy fighters were destroyed, ten probably destroyed and fifteen damaged for the loss of two American aircraft.

In the southern sector, Sfax was attacked on three separate days by a total of 64 U.S. escort­ed Fortresses, eighteen U.S. escorted Mitchells and fifteen U.S. escorted Marauders. The most damaging attacks were made on the 28th Ja­nuary, when 27 Fortresses, escorted by eighteen Lightnings, began the attack at 14.22 hours by dropping 319 x 500 lb. G.P. bombs on the docks; ten minutes later eighteen Mitchells, escorted by eleven Lightnings, attacked the marshalling yards; and at 14.50 hours, fifteen Mitchells, escort­ed by eleven Lightnings, attacked the harbour, dropping 273 x 100 lb. demolition bombs. In combats with enemy fighters six were destroyed, two probably destroyed and two damaged; Ame­rican bosses were one Mitchell and one Lightning.

Sousse was also successfully attacked by U.S. escorted Fortresses on three occasions and damage was inflicted on shipping in the harbour.

The success achieved in January in limiting the enemy supplies reaching Tunisia by sea and air attacks on Axis shipping and the bombing of ports is indicated by the table on page 13.

First German landings photographed at El Aouina airfield, Tunis.

Small-scale Ground Operations During the first half of February the ground

fighting was on a small scale. The enemy re­sisted tenaciously any local advances on our part and, in fact, improved certain positions in the central sector. In particular, he gained more points of vantage north of Pichon and in the Maknassy-Sened area.

In the main, R.A.F. fighters and fighter-bom­bers operated in the northern part of the central sector and American aircraft in the south/

Spitfires made daily offensive reconnaissances of an extensive area south of Pont du Fahs and regularly shot up transport vehicles, particularly ,on the Pont du Fahs-Enfidaville road, and at­tacked ^several tented camps. When suitable

burnt-out aircraft were destroyed in an attack by Bcaufighters from Malta.

targets were located escorted Hurricane-bom­bers took up the attack; thus, successful attacks were made on troops and transport south-west of Pont' du Fahs on the 6th.

Meanwhile, aircraft of the Twelfth U.S.A.A.F. attacked enemy positions and vehicles in the vicinity of Faid and Maknassy, where the enemy was preparing to resume offensive operations.

In the Faid area the most successful attacks were the bombing qf tanks and transport vehicles by six U.S. Bostons on 1st February and the silencing of gun positions at Sidi Bou Zid by U.S. Airacobras on the 6th. The attacks in the Maknassy area included the bombing of road and railway bridges across the river north of Mak­nassy by eighteen U.S. Marauders on 3rd Fe­

31

bruary; attacks on transport on the Maknassy-Gafsa road by U.S. Airacobras on the 6th; and the destruction of four 88 mm. guns west of Sened by six U.S. escorted Bostons on the 12th.

These attacks on military targets were made in spite of bad flying weather which limited the scale of our air operations.

Apart from adverse weather conditions, how­ever, effective direct support to our ground forces throughout the campaign was extremely difficult to provide as the hilly wooded terrain of the central and northern sectors often pre­vented the positive identification of enemy posi­tions. Stmoke was used on occasion by our troops to indicate enemy positions but this auto­matically betrayed their presence to the enemy and, moreover, could be copied by him to confuse the issue further.

Attacks on Gabes Landing Grounds While Rommel's forces were establishing them­

selves on the Eastern Front heavy attacks were made by aircraft of the Twelfth U.S.A.A.F. on the landing grounds at Gabes in order to limit enemy air activity in the southern sector.

On 3rd February fifteen Marauders, escorted by Lightnings, attacked the main airfield; obser­vation of results, however, was prevented by dust. Stiff opposition was encountered from enemy fighters and a running fight which lasted for forty minutes resulted in three ME. 109s being destroyed, two probably destroyed, and three da­maged for the loss of one Marauder and two Lightnings. The following day the attack on the airfield was renewed by eighteen Fortresses, es­corted by Lightnings, and six or seven fires were caused among aircraft on the ground. The Fort­resses were attacked by ME.109s and FW.190s during the bomb run; the Fortresses claimed nine enemy fighters destroyed and eight damaged. Later in the day, 24 additional Fortresses, escorted by Lightnings, attacked the important landing ground west of Gabes. Many bursts and a great column of smoke were observed in the target area. As a result; of a running fight for 50 miles with enemy fighters, sixteen enemy fighters were claimed as destroyed, nine probably destroyed and one damaged; on the American side one Fortress was shot down and four Lightnings failed to re­turn. Attacks on the Gabes landing grounds were also made on 8th March by fifteen Ma­rauders and eighteen Mitchells. Many bursts and fires were observed in the target area.

Later in the month, as mentioned on page 15 in Section I, the attacks on the Gabes landing grounds were continued from the east by the Allied squadrons following up the advance of the Vlllth Army.

The Enemy Attacks Rommel, by withdrawing to the Mareth de­

fences, had strengthened the enemy forces in the southern sector. Meanwhile, as indicated in Sec­tion I, the necessity of building up supplies from Tripoli^ the bad going and adverse weather con­

ditions were all combining to delay the inevitable assault of the Vlllth Army. The enemy took advantage of the lull on the Eastern Front to direct forces northwards. The 21st Armoured Division had already joined Von Arnim's forces and had turned the scales at Faid on 30th Jan­uary; in addition, on 12th February, half of the armoured units which had been acting as re­arguard east and south of Ben Gardane departed for the Western Front. The enemy now had strong striking forces in the central and south­ern sectors and planned to use them before an assault on the Mareth Line necessitated their withdrawal southwards again.

On 14th February, an enemy force of all arms, including 80 to 100 tanks of the 21st Armoured Division, moved west from Faid. The main body, with about 50 tanks, advanced along the Faid -Sbeitla road and in spite of Allied counter-attacks had approached to within fifteen miles of Sbeitla by the afternoon. Meanwhile, a small force of about 30 tanks, advancing from the north-east, had reached a point south-south-east of Sbeitla. Further tanks were kept in reserve south of Faid. As a result of this advance and ths threat of enemy armoured units, withdrawn from Rom­mel's army, which were approaching Gafsa from Gabes, the Allied forces at Gafsa were withdrawn to Feriana during the night 14/15th February. Allied armoured units on the 15th then initiated a counter-attack southwards towards Sidi Bou Zid and fighting in that area continued throughout the day.

Our troops involved in these engagements were predominantly American and operations in the battle area were carried out by the air support units of the Twelfth U.S.A.A.F. which made ex­tensive straffing and reconnaissance missions. In the course of the two days, also, American fighters destroyed eight ME.109s and four F.W. 190s, probably destroyed four ME.109s and da­maged seven other aircraft.

Meanwhile, R.A.F. Spitfires continued their of­fensive reconnaissances further north in the area north-west of Pont du Fahs and on the 15th made sweeps over the Pont du Fahs - Kairouan, Pont du Fahs - Fkirine, and Mateur - Medjes el Bab -Tebourba areas in order to see if any attack was pending in the northern sector. Little movement was observed and no enemy aircraft were encoun­tered.

During the night 15/16th February, fifteen Bisleys bombed transport on roads near Kairouan which probably represented elements of 10th Ar­moured Division en route to reinforce the 21st Armoured Division's attack.

The Enemy's Success The enemy now endeavoured to thrust as far

north as possible in order to cut off or force a withdrawal of our forces threatening Tunis and Bizerta.

During 16th February, in spite of unfavourable weather, American air support units continued their straffing missions. In particular, six escort­

ed Bostons attacked gun emplacements Bou Zid and put out of action six howitzers; six more escorted Bostons attacked enemy concen­trations north-west of Gafsa, and Airacobras at­tacked suitable targets in the Kairouan - Sidi Bou Zid - Gafsa area. Nevertheless, it became evident that the Allied counter-attack towards Sidi Bou Zid from the north had failed and the enemy established himself on a line running southwards from Djebel Lessouda to Sidi Bou Zid and thence south-west to Djebel el Hafey.

On the night 16/17th the enemy broke into the Sbeitla defences and our forces withdrew to the line of hills running south-west from the Djebel Barbrou and covering the defiles running north and north-west from Sbeitla, Kasserine and Feriana.

The following morning, the enemy's 21st Ar­moured Division occupied Sbeitla and a force consisting principally of the 10th Armoured Di­vision moved west and occupied Kasserine. Si­multaneously, enemy artnoured units from the south occupied Feriana and Thelepte. An attack on Pichon on the same day, however,- was re­pulsed and our troops withdrew unhindered across the Ousseltia valley that night.

During the 17th Spitfires continued their tac­tical reconnaissance and straffing of vehicles around Pont du Fahs and destroyed one FW. 190 and damaged another without loss. American fighters, meanwhile, carried out sweeps over the central sector battle area and reported the des­truction of several tanks and many vehicles. Enemy vehicle concentrations south of Feriana were also attacked by six U.S. escorted Bostons and that night twelve Bisleys effectively bombed transport on the roads Fondouk - Sbeitla, Faid-Sbeitla and Gafsa - Feriana.

On 18th February, all bombing missions were cancelled on account of unfavourable weather, but American fighters in the course of offensive sweeps over the forward area attacked troop concentrations and encampments in the vicinity of Sbeitla and Feriana.

On the following day, the enemy's attack was renewed. Armoured units from Feriana advanced to Kasserine in two sections — one northwards from Sbeitla along the Le Kef road and the other to the north-east of Kasserine. The attack from Sbeitla was held in the Sbiba pass and made no progress, but the other from Kasserine succeeded in capturing the defile on the 20th.

Offensive air operations on 19th February were prevented by bad weather. During the night, how­ever, in spite of unfavourable weather conditions, 26 Bisleys attacked roads and railways in the Gafsa area, but results could not be observed. On the following day, while the enemy was en­gaged in capturing the Kasserine defile, the con­tinued bad weather prevented air operations on an appreciable scale but U.S. Airacobras made a few attacks on enemy vehicles near Kasserine. During the night, also, 24 Bisleys bombed trans­port and roads in the Thelepte - Kasserine - Fe­riana area; once again the bad weather prevented an assessment of the damage caused.

Anglo-American Co-operation

On 19th February, the squadrons of the East­ern Air Command and the Twelfth U.S.A.A.F. merged to form the North-west African Air Forces. The final sub-divisions comprised five main formations, three of which were operational and two concerned with training and servicing.

Of the operational formations, the Tactical Air Force, consisting of fighter, fighter-bomber, light bomber and reconnaissance squadrons, was to afford close support to the Allied armies; the Strategic Air Force, composed of heavy and medium bomber squadrons, was allotted, prima­rily, the task of attacking enemy , bases and convoys; the Coastal Air Force, embodying gen­eral reconnaissance and certain fighter squadrons, was responsible for the defence of our ports and convoys, shipping sweeps and anti-submarine patrols.

The three formations, however, by no means worked in water-tight compartments; their com­mitments often over-lapped and aircraft of the different formations co-operated as the need arose. The aim was to create a flexible all-round air force: the guiding principle was to select the most appropriate aircraft for the job in hand.

The Eastern Air Command and the Twelfth U.S.A.A.F. had each done splendid work. In spite of fulfilling the heavy commitments involved in supporting ground operations and attacking enemy bases and convoys, sight was never lost of the prime necessity of shooting the opposing air forces out of the sky. The following figures, giving Axis aircraft destroyed in combat, indicates the success achieved in this activity during the time the R.A.F. and the U.S.A.A.F. operated as independent partners (8th November, 1942, to 18th February, 1943):—

ProbablyDestroyed Damaged Destroyed

E. A. C 255 55 160 12th U.S.A.A.F. ... 384 127 166

Totals 639 182 326

Following the creation of the unified force, the Allied air attacks increased; thus, in the first three weeks of its existence the North-west African Air Forces dropped two and a half million lbs. of bombs, which represents more than a third of the total poundage dropped by the Twelfth U.S.A.A.F. during its 105 days of official existence.

Furthermore, the creation of the Mediterranean Air Command, having ultimate control of all Allied air forces based in the Middle East, North­west Africa and Malta, ensured that large-scale operations could be co-ordinated with the mi­nimum delay.

The Enemy's North-west Drive Abandoned.

On 21st and 22nd February the enemy forces which*hoped to push on to Thala were engaged

i^-y y * ^•iw

by Allied armoured units. ^.lthough certain enemy advanced units thrust to within four miles of their objective, by the evening of the 22nd it was clear that further progress was problema­tical; accordingly, on the following day the enemy decided to withdraw. Above all, these armoured units were now required to return to the Mareth defences to meet the threat of the VTIIth Army.

During this time, in spite of bad weather con­ditions, considerable help was given to our troops by the Allied air forces. On 21st February, ten U.S. Mitchells attacked the railway yard at Gafsa and U.S. Airacobras continued their straff­ing of enemy vehicles in the Kasserine area. The following morning, twelve Hurricane-bombers, escorted by 28 Spitfires, effectively bombed the enemy's forward units approaching Thala. In addition, straffing attacks were carried out by American fighters around Kasserine; seven U.S. Fortresses dropped small fragmentation bombs on a bridge in the Kasserine area ; and U.S. Mitchells also provided close support to the Allied land forces.

The Enemy Withdraws The enemy withdrew much faster on his left

flank than on his right and he held on to Sbeitla after he had evacuated Kasserine in order to prevent the forces on his left flank from being cut off. The roads were heavily mined and rear-guards attempted to delay the advance of our troops; in spite of these, however, Feriana was re-occupied on 28th February and Sbeitla on 1st March.

While the enemy was engaged in this with­drawal he was subjected to the constant attacks of the Allied air forces.

On the first day of the withdrawal proper— the 23rd—45 U.S. Fortresses bombed Kasserine, and eighteen U.S. Marauders concentrated on the actual pass. Twelve U.S. Mitchells attacked heavy traffic on a road near Sbeitla and U.S. Bostons attacked traffic between Kasserine and Thelepte. The damage caused could not be as­sessed owing to poor visibility. Meanwhile, U.S. Airacobras and Spitfires carried out offensive sweeps over this particular battle area. The following day, U.S. escorted Bostons attacked Sbeitla town, the railway, and traffic on the Feriana-Gafsa road, while U.S. Airacobras and Spitfires swept the whole area of the enemy's withdrawal and shot up enemy transport vehicles.

For the remaining days of the enemy's with­drawal air operations in this sector were on a reduced scale, due partly to unfavourable weather conditions and partly to the fact that the enemy had initiated an attack in the north which ne­cessitated increased air operations in that sector.

Von Arnim's Attack in Northern Sector

Meanwhile, on 26th February, the enemy launched an attack with about two divisions and a battalion of tanks in the_n<artta«iflsBPflolrlthis

was an opportunist move designed to take ad­vantage of the fact that we had been obliged to send reinforcements southwards to counter the enemy's push mentioned in the preceding para­graphs. The enemy planned to thrust down the road from Mateur to Beja, with a secondary at­tack in the north towards Sedjenane, and to advance southwards to El Aroussa. The latter was to be attacked from the east through Bou Arada and the Djebel Mansour. The successful completion of these operations would have left Medjez el Bab in a salient projecting nearly 20 miles forward.

The two thrusts from Mateur at first met with some success, but a skilful counter-attack by our ground forces halted the enemy three miles north of Sedjenane. A few enemy tanks penetrated the mine barrier on the road from Mateur to Beja on 27th February and approached to within ten miles of the town, but they were stopped by our artillery fire and the air attacks mentioned in the next paragraph. Further north, enemy forces on the road to El Aroussa were engaged by our armoured forces and forced to retire. The enemy attacks from the east against Bou Arada and Djebel Mansour, moreover, were both suc­cessfully held by our ground forces.

Air operations in support of our troops in the northern sector were carried out principally by Spitfires and Hurricane-bombers and many enemy vehicles and tanks were destroyed. The air at­tacks were particularly intensive on the 28th. On this day, Spitfires and Hurricane-bombers flew 276 sorties comprising seven attacks; two of the attacks were against tanks and vehicles in the Sidi Nsir area, five against similar targets north-east of Beja. In addition, U.S. escorted Mitchells attacked enemy position at Mateur. During the first three days of the attack—26th to 28th February—enemy air opposition over the northern sector of the battlefield was negligible.

The Enemy Captures Sedjenane The enemy's attack towards Sedjenane was

resumed on 1st March. He achieved some initial success and eventually, after suffering severe casualties during the heavy fighting on the 3rd and 4th, succeeded in capturing the town. Further exploitation, however, was prevented by our land forces.

Meanwhile, the Axis force attacking towards Beja met with little success and all attacks made against Hunt's Gap, ten miles north-east of Beja, were repulsed by our troops, aided by the attacks of the Tactical Air Force. On 5th March, 30 German tanks were observed immobilised in this area.

By the 7th March the enemy's attack in the northern sector had lost all momentum and he was digging in six miles south-west of Sedjenane and north-west and south-west of Hunt's Gap. At the cost of many casualties in men and arm-our he had forced us back over a triangular stretch of land twenty miles across in the north running down to a point at Medjez el Bab, We

34

were now further from Bizerta, but we had re­tained our hold on Medjez— the approach to Tunis.

To a considerable degree the stemming of the enemy's advance was due to the support given to our land forces by the Tactical Air Force. Air operations were especially intensive during the first five days of the month, when over 1,000 fighter and bomber sorties were flown in attacks on targets in the northern sector. In particular, widespread attacks on transport and troops were delivered by Spitfires and Hurricane-bombers, and Spitfires carried out continuous offensive sweeps over the entire battle area. Their most successful interception occurred on 4th March when ten to fifteen JU.87s, escorted by ME.109s, were prevented from bombing our troops in the Jefna-Sedjenane area and forced to jettison their bombs. Two JU.87s were shot down, one was probably destroyed and four others were damaged. In the course of other offensive sweeps on the same day seven ME.109s were damaged.

Reduced Activity on Western Front

From 7th to 17th March operations on the Western Front were restricted to local attacks and patrolling in strength. At 8edjenane the enemy managed to retain the ground previously won. Pichon remained a no-man's town with strong enemy positions on the hills on either side. In the Gafsa area the enemy withdrew from Tozeur and Metlaoui, but continued to patrol sporadically for a distance of about thirteen miles west of Gafsa. The situation in general in this area, however, could best be described as "fluid."

In spite of adverse weather conditions the Tactical Air Force carried out operations in all sectors. In particular, Spitfires continued to maintain air superiority in the northern and central sectors. Thus, on 8th March, Spitfires on offensive sweeps in the north damaged six ME.109s and in the central sector destroyed a FW.190 in the vicinity of Pichon. Two days later, Spitfires destroyed five ME.109s and damag­ed two more near Jefna. Meanwhile, Spit­fires and Hurricane-bombers continued their attacks on enemy transport in the northern sector, whenever suitable targets were located. U.S. Marauders also made effective attacks in the central sector, their most successful being that against railway bridges and supply dumps at Enfidaville on the 12th, when 21 tons of bombs were dropped.

Further south, around Gafsa, U.S. Marauders, escorted by U.S. Warhawks, "softened" enemy resistance preparatory to an attack by the Allied land forces.

Attacks on Enemy's Tunisian Airfields

During February and the first fortnight of March, the enemy's principal Tunisian airfields were regularly attacked, although bad weather caused the cancellation of several missions against

these objectives, IJartfedlit-li tcfiNfoeftjft end ol February.

In February, apart from the raids on the Gabes landing grounds already referred to on page 32, the principal attacks were against the airfields at Tunis, Kairouan and Sfax.

The most effective raids on El Aouina (Tunis) airfield were made on the 13th and 24th. On the former occasion, an attack was made by thirteen U.S. escorted Marauders; bursts were observed among concentrations of aircraft in the south-west corner of the airfield. Enemy fighters which attempted to prevent the bombing received their usual punishment: four ME. 109s were re­ported as destroyed, three probably destroyed and four damaged for the loss of one Marauder. On the 24th February, an attack was made by eleven U.S. escorted Marauders and hits were scored on transport aircraft and single-engined types. During this attack the flak was intense and enemy fighter opposition was formidable. The latter made determined attacks on the Marauders rather than on the escorting fighters; two Marauders were lost but the enemy achieved this only at the expense of five ME.109s destroyed, one probably destroyed and another damaged.

Sfax el Maouh airfield was effectively attacked on 2nd February by fourteen U.S. Marauders and eighteen U.S. Mitchells, escorted by U.S. Lightnings. Bomb bursts covered the airfield, causing a large fire, and some aircraft were destroyed on the ground.

Attacks on Kairouan airfield were most fre­quent during the second and third week in February, when fighting was again intense in tha central sector. On 9th February, an attack was delivered by 24 U.S. Fortresses, escorted by U.S. Lightnings, and bursts were reported to cover the entire airfield. On the 15th, attacks were made by thirteen U.S. Marauders and nine U.S. Mit­chells; in each case U.S. Lightnings acted as escort. A total of 2,028 x 20 1b. fragmentation bombs was dropped and several fires were caus­ed. In combats with enemy fighters it was reported that five ME.109s and two FW.190s were destroyed, three ME.109s probably destroyed and one FW.190 was damaged; on the American side one Mitchell was lost. On the 24th an attack was made by 22 U.S. escorted Fortresses: 2,970 x 20 lb. fragmentation bombs were dropped and bursts were observed all over the airfield.

During the first fortnight of March particular attention was paid to the landing grounds north­west of Gabes and those in the Tunis area.

On the 3rd, when Rommel's forces were pre­paring to hit back at the Vlllth Army, nineteen U.S. escorted Fortresses attacked a landing ground north-west of Gabes which covered an area of four or five square miles. Bursts cover­ed the target area, on which fifteen to thirty aircraft were well dispersed, and a large fire and black smoke was observed. Three other landing grounds in the same area were subsequently at­tacked by ten U.S. escorted Marauders and fifteen U.S. escorted Mitchells.

Attacks on airfields in the Tunis area included two on El Aouina by U.S. escorted Fortresses on 3rd and 10th March. The first-mentioned attack was delivered by fifteen U.S. Fortresses, escorted by U.S. Lightnings; bursts which were observed over the entire target area were particularly con­centrated in the north-east corner, where 35 to 40 aircraft were seen. The attack on 10th March was on a larger scale, being carried out by 37 U.S. escorted Fortresses. Hits were scored on three large aircraft on the ground and eight to ten other aircraft were left burning. Air combats with enemy fighters resulted in five ME.109s being destroyed, two probably destroyed and two damaged. On the same day, JU.52 concentrations on the landing ground at La Marsa, in the Tunis area, were also attacked. The 34 U.S. escorted Fortresses which carried out this raid dropped 4,824 x 20 lb. fragmentation bombs and the air­field was reported to have been well covered by bursts. Of the enemy fighters which attempted interception one ME. 109 was destroyed, and two others were damaged.

Sardinian Air Bases Raided During February attacks were extended across

the sea to the airfields around Cagliari, Sardinia, in order to limit the enemy's JU.88 activity.

The raids were initiated on the night lst/2nd February with an attack by nine Wellingtons, which dropped approximately fifteen tons of H.E. bombs on Elmas airfield. The first aircraft over the target dropped incendiaries and flares which lit up the hangars in the west corner of the air­field; the succeeding aircraft bombed this area and the south of the airfield causing fires and explosions.

On the 7th, aircraft of the Twelfth U.S.A.A.F. made their first attacks against the Sardinian air bases, when Elmas airfield and the seaplane base at Cagliari were bombed. In all, 32 Fortresses and nineteen Marauders participated in these attacks, escort being provided by Lightnings. 84 x 1000 lb. H.E. and 4,782 x 20 lb. fragmenta­tion bombs were dropped and the results were described as "satisfactory". Many fires were started, including some caused by aircraft des­troyed on the ground, and runways, buildings and hangars were hit. In encounters with the enemy five ME.109s were destroyed and two RE.2001s and one ME.109 damaged.

That night (7/8th February) the attacks were resumed when sixteen Wellingtons were despatch­ed to attack Villacidro landing ground, about 20 miles north-west of Cagliari. On arriving over the Sardinian coast 7/10ths to 10/10ths cloud was encountered and consequently only eight aircraft located the target. Bursts were observed in the south-east corner of the airfield. Of the remain­ing aircraft, three attacked Decimomannu land­ing ground, about ten miles north-west of Ca­gliari, and five bombed the estimated positions of Elmas airfield. A total of 56,660 lbs. of bombs were dropped on these targets.

Adverse weather conditions prevented the at­tacks from being resumed for nine days, bi

18th February American aircraft made up for the lull by increasing the weight of their attacks. The airfield at Elmas was bombed by 44 Fort­resses, escorted by Lightnings; the latter, how­ever, were unable to observe the results of the bombing owing to poor visibility. Of the enemy fighters which attacked the two formations one FW. 190 and one MC.200 were destroyed without loss to the U.S. aircraft. On the same day nine U.S. Mitchells attacked the airfield at Villacidro, and three U.S. Mitchdlls and fifteen U.S. Marau­ders attacked the alternative target of Decimo­mannu airfield; all of these aircraft, which bombed at 12,000 feet, were escorted by U.S. Lightnings. Bursts were seen on the north-eas^t side of Villacidro airfield and many aircraft were believed to have been destroyed on the ground at Decimomannu. Over the latter airfield two Ma­rauders were lost in a collision.

Ports of Off-Loading Attacked The local successes gained by the enemy in

February and the early days of March were illu­sionary. Once the enemy's stream of supplies

-could be reduced to a trickle it would avail him little that he demanded this or that djebel and occupied this or that pass. Accordingly, the Al­lied air forces continued their set plan of striking methodically at the Axis supply ports.

Bizerta, the enemy's principal port of off-loading, remained primarily the objective of the Wellington force. The most effective medium bomber attacks were delivered on the nights 3rd/4th and 15/16th February by eleven and twelve Wellingtons respectively. On both nights many bursts were observed in the harbour and town areas. In addition to the frequent Welling­ton attacks a heavy attack was delivered by 32 U.S. escorted Fortresses on 25th February, when numerous hits were scored on the docks and near misses on the ships in the outer harbour.

The principal attacks on Tunis during Feb­ruary and the first half of March were delivered in the early days of each month. On 1st February, nineteen U.S. Fortresses, escorted by U.S. Lightnings, dropped 60 x 1,000 lb. and 166 x 500 lb. bombs on the docks and shipping. Fires were caused along the harbour and hits were scored on a large ship at the docks. Enemy fighters attacked during the bomb run but re­ceived short shrift from the Fortresses and escorting Lightnings : nine enemy fighters were destroyed, two probably destroyed and four damaged. A Fortress was lost by being rammed by a FW. 190, whose pilot had presumably been killed. On 2nd March, eighteen U.S. escorted Fortresses scored many hits on the quays and on the same day eighteen additional U.S. Fort­resses, escorted by U.S. Lightnings, bombed the power-house, ship yard and dry dock areas at La Goulette. Later in the month, on the night 12/13th March, eleven Wellingtons dropped 2 x 4,000 lb., 62 x 500 lb. bombs and 1,080 x 4 lb. incendiaries on the docks and marshalling yards

Concentrated bombing on Tunis docki.

at Tunis and on the centre of the city. Some of the fires started were visible for 60 miles on the return journey. On this occasion, also, pam­phlets were dropped over a wide area.

In addition to attacks on Bizerta and Tunis, a few heavy attacks were made on the docks and shipping at Sousse. On 8th February, 42 U.S. escorted Fortresses dropped 186 x 1,000 lb. bombs on this target: considerable damage was inflict­ed on jetties and buildings and two ships in the harbour received direct hits. On 12th March, another heavy attack was delivered by 38 U.S. escorted Fortresses when one hundred and four­teen tons of bombs were dropped from 24,000 feet. Fires were caused in the docks area and bursts were observed in the marshalling yards and in the vicinity of the power-house and oil

storage and loading piers. In addition, a hit was scored on a medium-size vessel in the harbour.

Attacks on Sicilian and Sardinian Ports

In February, N.W. African-based aircraft sup­plemented the air attacks of our Malta and Libya based bombers on the Sicilian and Sardinian supply ports from which the Axis ships made their hit-or-miss dashes to northern Tunisia.

Trapani was attacked on several nights by Wellingtons; in particular, successful attacks were made on the nights 31st January/lst Fe­bruary and 9/10th February by seven and ten bombers respectively. On each occasion bursts were observed in the docks area.

The principal attack on Palermo from the N.W. African end in February was made on the 15th by eighteen U.S. Fortresses. , One large ship was hit and left burning in the harbour, an oil tank was set on fire and bursts were observed in the docks area. On 1st March an even more devastating attack was carried out by 38 U.S. Fortresses, escprted by U.S. Lightnings. Many bursts from 2,000 lb. and 500 lb. bombs were observed on the docks, in the dry docks and ship-building areas- and in the town; in addi­tion, hits were scored on one large M/V and several smaller ones in the harbour and five vessels were set on fire.

Towards the end of February, also, heavy at­tacks were made by the Strategic Air Force against the important port of Cagliari, Sardinia. On 26th February, nineteen U.S. Fortresses scor­ed hits on the docks, the railway yards, and in­dustrial area of the town. Two days later a heavier attack was made by 46 U.S. Fortresses, escorted by U.S. Lightnings. Large fires were started on the docks and in the town and direct hits and near misses were scored on vessels in the harbour and near the docks. The extensive damage caused was confirmed by the evidence of photographs taken during the raid. About nine enemy fighters were engaged by the escort­ing Lightnings which claimed the destruction of two MC. 200s and one ME.109. No losses were incurred by the American aircraft.

Attacks on Convoys

While the bombing of the Axis supply ports and attacks on shipping in harbour were going on, N.W. African-based aircraft supplemented the magnificent work of the Royal Navy by at­tacks on enemy vessels in transit between northern Tunisia and Sicily and Sardinia.

During the first three weeks in February adverse weather conditions usually prevented sightings and often caused the cancellation of missions. The most successful attack during this .spell was carried out by nine U.S. escorted Mitchells on 10th February. Four vessels, be­lieved to be Siebel ferries, were attacked from a height of 500 feet about 40 miles north of Cape Bon; one was sunk and another was left sinking.

From the last week in February onward, how­ever, considerable success was achieved, as is shown in the following table. The results ta­bulated represent those obtained from 19th Fe­bruary (when the Allied squadrons merged to form the North-west African Air Forces) to 19th March inclusive. The categories are defin­ed as follows:—

(a) Sunk. Ships seen to sink or explode. (b) Severely Damaged. Ships seen to be

heavily listing, to be in a sinking con­dition, or in flames.

(c) Damaged. When direct hits claimed, but no further results observed. When observed damage could not be consider­ed critical. Near misses, unsupported

by additional evidence of damage, have been disregarded.

(a) Sunk. 20

(b) Severely Damaged. 15

(c) Damaged. 11

The most successful attacks during the period were carried out during the week ending 12th March. Five anti-shipping missions were flown by U.S. Fortresses, Mitchells and Marauders, escort being provided by U.S. Lightnings. Six enemy vessels, including several Siebel ferries, were sunk, eight severely damaged, and three damaged. The thoroughness of the attacks is exemplified by the fact that Wellingtons des­patched from Malta on the night 7/8th March to finish off the remnants of a convoy attacked by U.S. escorted Mitchells and Fortresses during the day reported that the latter had done such a good job that further action was unnecessary.

In nearly every case in this week, also, the American formations were attacked by enemy escorting aircraft. 28 of these were destroyed, fifteen probably destroyed and four damaged; the American losses, in comparison, were small.

Protection of Shipping and Ports

Day in, day out the Coastal Air Force ensured that our shipping was adequately escorted, ports and supply bases protected against enemy air attack and the U-boat menace kept in check.

By night, Beaufighters carried out local and convoy patrols. These were usually made with­out incident, but on the occasions when the enemy's JU.88s were operating, the Beaufighters made their presence felt; thus on the night 11/12th March, for example, a JU.88 was des­troyed 40 miles north-east of Bone. During the day, Hurricanes and Spitfires maintained conti­nuous patrols on local defence and convoy escort duties: few enemy air attacks materialised and combats were rare. There is little doubt that the enemy's caution was dictated by his appre­ciation of the reception always awaiting him.

Meanwhile, Hudsons and Swordfish kept up their unceasing search for U-boats. On a num­ber of occasions enemy submarines were attack­ed but, as is usual in U-boat attacks, the damage caused could only be conjectured. There was no doubt, however, about the results aohieved by a Hudson on 4th March. A fully surfaced U-boat was sighted and immediately attacked with three A/S bombs. As these appeared to have no effect the attack was renewed with machine-gun fire, and subsequently three depth charges were dropped. White smoke was observed coming from the U-boat, and oil and bubbles appeared on the water as it began to sink. The Hudson remained in the vicinity for half an hour; by that time the submarine had disappeared and twenty-five bodies were observed in the sea.

Eve of the Allied Attack

Mid-March found the North-west African Air Forces ready to play a full part in the coming battle. The fusion of R.A.F. and U.S. squadrons into a mighty striking force was complete. British and American commanders were imbued

y, and beat him utterly.

The following section gives an account of the Allied air activity on both fronts from 17th March to the end of the month. The process of squeezing the enemy out of Africa was then ap­proaching its final stage.

A heavy attack on \7th February, 1943, by U.S.A.F. bombers on Naples harbour, during which hits were scored on a number of vessels and the

military barracks.

PINCERS BEGIN TO CLOSE

Preliminary Attack on the Mareth Line

IN PREPAEATION FOR the VHIth Army's of­fensive, scheduled for four nights later, a limited attack was launched on the Mareth Line east and north-east of Arram on the night of 16/17th March; this achieved sufficient local success to establish close contact with the enemy between the road and the sea and to provide information about enemy dispositions. The northern sector of the line, with its salt marshes and formidable anti-tank obstructions, was held by Italian troops; in view of the strong natural and artificial de­fences it had evidently been decided that for the moment German stiffening was unnecessary. The central sector was screened by the enemy's 90th Light Division in positions dug along the Mede­nine road, and further south the Hallouf and Kreddache passes were guarded by elements of the 164th Division. The 15th Armoured Division was in position as immediate reserve in the Ma­reth area, and the 21st Armoured Division, in the vicinity of Gabes, was available for either the Eastern or the Western Front. Meanwhile, the 10th Armoured Division had apparently left the Eastern Front temporarily to strengthen Kairouan in the central sector of the Tunisian battlefield. It was estimated that the Axis troops numbered 100 to 110,000 in southern Tu­nisia: of these, 45 to 50,000 Germans and 30 to 35,000 Italians were with combatant units. The total German tank strength in the south was put at 150 runners; Italian runners, however, were so few that they could be practically ignored.

Air Support In order to bring the full weight of the air

arm to bear on the enemy's Mareth positions practically all the fighter and fighter-bomber squadrons and a light bomber wing of the Wes­tern Desert Air Force (now controlled by the North-west African Tactical Air Force) were up in the Medenine-Neffatia-Ben Gardane-Bu Grara area. Some of the fighter-bomber squadrons were located only twelve miles behind the front-line and anti-tank guns were in posi­tion 300 yards from the landing grounds. The se­cond light bomber wing, the U.S. Mitchell squa­drons and four additional fighter squadrons were further east at Zuara and El Assaj about 30 miles across the Tunisian border. In the rear, a Hali­fax and four Wellington squadrons based at Bir el Gardabia, south-west of Misurata, were ready to carry out intensive night attacks.

From the night 16/17th until 19/20th March, Allied air attacks on enemy positions were limit­ed, as low cloud and dust caused most of the operations planned to be cancelled. On one occasion only, the 17th, Spitfires were able to patrol in strength and as a result of four engage­ments one ME.109 was shot down, one MC.202 probably destroyed and three ME., 109s, were

damaged. Two Spitfires were lost but both pilots were saved. The following day, 18th March, 36 Bostons and Baltimores bombed enemy concentrations and positions at Toujane and Mareth respectively, but low cloud hampered both the operations and observation of results.

On the night 19/20th March, the weather clear­ed sufficiently to enable our medium bombers to resume their attacks. Thirty-four Wellingtons with Albacpre illumination, bombed enemy camps and transport vehicles along the main road west of Mareth; many fires and one violent explosion were caused and a hit was also scored on an anti-aircraft gun position.

The next day, 20th March, the Allied light bombers operated at maximum intensity in order to "soften" the northern sector of the Mareth de­fence zone preparatory to the Vlllth Army's night attack. Nine attacks were made in the Mareth area comprising 71 Boston, 54 Baltimore and 36 U.S. Mitchell effective sorties, escort being pro­vided by 187 Kittyhawks and U.S. Warhawks. The bombing was particularly successful around Mareth village, where many hits were scored on dug-in positions and buildings, including bar­racks, and south of Mareth where enemy strong-points were heavily attacked. Enemy fighters made no attempt to intercept these formations but two Bostons were shot down by anti-aircraft fire. Meanwhile, two formations of 36 U.S. War­hawk-bombers, escorted by Spitfires and U.S. Warhawks, attacked transport vehicles in the enemy's rear near Gabes.

Offensive patrols over the forward area were carried out by Spitfires and Kittyhawks and No.l S.A.A.F. gained the honour of being the first Western Desert Air Force squadron to shoot down a F.W. 190.

The Americans Attack

Meanwhile, further south, American ground forces on 17th March initiated a full-scale attack and occupied Gafsa and Zannouch. The attack .of the II Corps on Gafsa was preceded by the ef­fective bombing of the town by U.S. escorted Bostons and Mitchells. Other air activity during the day included the straffing of enemy tanks and transport withdrawing along the road from Gafsa to El Guettar, about 70 miles west of Gabes. The following day the American forces pushed on to El Guettar and Sidi Bou Zid, south-west of Faid.

The Blitz on Southern Landing Grounds

Coinciding with the opening of the Western Desert Air Force's offensive against the Mareth defences on the night 19/20th March the North­west African Air Forces began their blitz on enemy landing grounds in the Gabes-Sfax area, in order to limit air opposition during the period of the Vlllth Army's attacks and the Americans'

advance in the El Guettar area. The night attacks were delivered by Wellingtons and Bisleys and the day attacks by U.S. escorted Fortresses, Ma­rauders, Mitchells and Bostons.

From 19/20th to 26th March inclusive nine at­tacks were made on the enemy's Djebel Tebaga landing grounds, in the course of which 356,160 lbs. of bombs were dropped; 8fax el Maouh airfield was attacked on four occasions and 131,640 lbs. of bombs were dropped; landing grounds in the vi­cinity of Gabes and Mezzouna were also attacked with bomb-loads of 57,600 lbs. and 35,440 lbs. res­pectively. Widespread damage was inflicted on enemy aircraft, runways and administrative buildings, and the effect in reducing enemy air activity at the time of the intensive operations of the AWied air forces recounted in the following pages cannot be over-emphasised.

Frontal Attack on the Mareth Line During the night 20/21st March a full-scale

attack was launched by the VHIth Army against the enemy's northern positions between the road and the sea. The assault was preceded by an air attack delivered by eleven Hal^faxes and 45 Wel­lingtons, with Albacore illumination, on enemy concentrations and encampments along the road west of Mareth as far as Katena. Fourteen fires and three violent explosions were caused and several of the Wellingtons added to the effect of the bombing by low-level machine-gunning.

Our ground attack met with initial euccess and during the following day, 21st March, in spite of strong enemy opposition, a bridgehead was es­tablished over the Oued Zigzaou, the natural anti-tank obstacle in front of the enemy's main positions. Meanwhile, a subsidiary attack had been launched by a mobile force, composed prin­cipally of New Zealand troops, which moved round the enemy's west flank and by the evening of 21st March had reached the enemy's line of defences between the Djebel Tebaga and the Dje­bel Melab.

The Western Desert Air Force threw in the full weight of the light bomber squadrons in sup­port of the vn i th Army's frontal attack. Ten attacks were delivered on 21st March by 72 Bal­timores, 54 Bostons and 54 U.S. Mitchells, escort­ed by 139 Kittyhawks and 96 U.S. Warhawks, on enemy concentrations between Katena and Ma­reth. Targets were far more plentiful than on the previous day and the attacks were of great help in "softening" enemy opposition. Numerous direct hits were scored on enemy positions and fires and explosions were caused among vehicle concentrations. Few enemy aircraft were en­countered during these operations and only one attempt, which proved unsuccessful, was made to interfere with our bombing programme. Con­sidering the scale and effectiveness of the air attacks casualties were light: a Kittyhawk and a U.S. Warhawk failed to return and another Kittyhawk crashed.

In the enemy's immediate rear, also, to help our out-flanking attack, U.S. Warhawks bombed

and straffed dispersed transport; iricludirig'vtahks, south-west of Gabes, anfl y'escortecf, Kittyjhawk­bombers attacked an enemy strori-g 'pojfot'-in the same area, starting eleven fires.

Enemy air activity over the forward area was again negligible ana patrolling Spitfires had one engagement only witn enemy lighters, as a re­sult of which one ME.109 was probably des­troyed.

During the night 21/22 March, air attacks were delivered with the object of "softening" op­posiaon to me main and subsidiary attacks, of the land forces. Concentrations of the enemy's 2ist Armoured Division in the Gabes area and transport on roads near Katena were heavily at­tacked by ten Halifaxes and 51 Wellingtons, the target areas being illuminated by Albacores.

• While these air attacks were taking place, our land forces in tue northern sector maae a further auvance and succeeded in occupying Ouerzi Est and Ouerzi Ouest. During the night our out­flanking force also met witn success and succeed­ed in piercing the enemy's defences between the Ujebels Tebaga and Melab.

The Enemy Resists

The enemy's anticipated counter-attacks were duly launched on 22nd March. The attack at the northern end of the Mareth line was carried out mainly by his mobile reserve (the 15th Ar­moured Division), his last reserve of German in­fantry, and elements of the 90th Light Division. Bitter fighting ensued but eventually the enemy succeeded in re-taking the Ouerzi Est and Ouerzi Ouest positions. Our out-flanking force was also held up by German armour, supported by 88 mm. guns, fifteen miles south-west of El Hamma.

The Allied light bombers were unable to operate on the morning of 22nd March owing to bad wea­ther and low cloud. With the improvement in the weather in the afternoon, however, three successful attacks were delivered by a total of 53 Bostons, Baltimores and U.S. Mitchells, es­corted by Spitfires and U.S. Warhawks, on enemy concentrations near Zaret which were massing to stem our frontal attack. The enemy's air effort was also more intensive than formerly. Enemy fighters attacked two of our bomber formations and in the ensuing combats escorting U.S. War-hawks probably destroyed two ME.109s and da­maged three ME.109s and a MC.202. Our bomb­er casualties included a U.S. Mitchell which fail­ed to return and a S.A.A.F. Baltimore shot down by anti-aircraft fire.

Meanwhile, a group of 40 tanks, armoured cars and transport vehicles, menacing our out­flanking force south of Hamma landing ground, was bombed by twelve escorted Kittyhawk­bombers and the attacks were continued by eight­een Hurricane IIDs, escorted by Spitfires and Kittyhawks. The flying "tin-openers" had their most successful day to date: hits were scored on 32 tanks, nine of which were destroyed, and four armoured cars and an, 88 mm. .gun' were also hit.

Mareth village under attack by S.A.A.F. light bombers. Three direct hits were scored on barrack buildings.

S.A.A.F. Bostons en route to bomb Zarat.

S.A.A. F. Bostons over typical Tuni­sian country, en route to Djebel Ter­

baga airfield.

inemy fighters which attempted to dispute our mastery of the air over the battlefield received short shrift from patrolling Spitfires. Two for­mations of ME. 109s were engaged with the result that three enemy fighters were destroyed, two probably destroyed and three damaged without loss to our aircraft.

The Frontal Attack Abandoned

During the night 22/23rd March, the enemy continued his counter-attack at the northern end of tne Mareth Line and succeeded in re-capturing most of his lost strong-points. While the land lighting was in progress enemy transport con­centrations and encampments between Gabes and Mareth were attacked by 34 Wellingtons and ten Halifaxes near Katena, where a large fire giving oif clouds of black smoke was started among a group of vehicles.

Throughout the next day our land forces across the Oued Zigzaou stubbornly resisted the enemy's onslaught which became ever-more vehement. The fullest support was afforded by the Western Desert Air Force. Allied light bombers made ten attacks on enemy concentrations in the Mareth area, comprising 166 effective sorties; escort was provided by 136 U.S. Warhawks. Many large fires accompanied by explosions were caused a­mong enemy positions and groups of vehicles and a number of guns were silenced. One bomber formation was attacked ineffectively by ME.109s and the escorting Warhawks destroyed one of the enemy fighters. Meanwhile, enemy positions south of Mareth were attacked by escorted Kittyhawk-bombers.

In order to weaken enemy resistance to the New Zealand outflanking force, 36 Kittyhawks and 24 Spitfires effectively machine-gunned an enemy strong-point south-west of Gabes, im­mobilising about fifteen vehicles, including a troop-carrier, and inflicting casualties on troops. At least six fires were ablaze in the area when the last of our aircraft left.

Spitfires carried out over 100 sorties on of­fensive patrols between Mareth and Gabes, but there were only two indecisive engagements with enemy fighters.

On the night of 23rd/24th March our bridge­head across the Oued Zigzaou was given up and in consequence the frontal assault on the Mareth Line was abandoned. The. enemy's opposition was greatly helped by the wadi, which proved an unsurmountable obstacle. Apart from the dif­ficulty of negotiating its width — 250 feet — the wadi at this time held a stream 50 feet wide, and efforts to build a causeway were frustrated by enemy machine-gun nests which had remained concealed in the banks. In consequence, the re­inforcing and supplying of our troops across the uiner side became increasingly difficult.

While our troops were withdrawing across the Oued Zigzaou, the nightly bombing of enemy transport and encampments between Gabes and Mareth was continued by 23 Wellingtons and

three Halifaxes, and night-flying Hurricanes of No. 73 Squadron carried out offensive reconnais­sances from Mareth westwards. The following morning, transport vehicles and tanks massed near Zaret, at the northern extremity of the Mareth Line, were most effectively bombed by 78 Allied light bombers. This was the last big attack on the line proper; thereafter, the attacks were switched to the Hamma area in order to give the fullest support to our out-flanking forces.

Out-flanking of the Mareth Line

A great tactician is essentially an opportunist: the Commander of the VHIth Army proved that he was both by giving up his plan of- a frontal attack immediately it was checked in favour of reinforcing his out-flanking force, thus turn­ing its limited attack into a major assault. Additional mobile forces were sent round the enemy's southern flank to the area south-west of Hamma, while an infantry force invested the Hallouf and Kreddache passes, in order to secure a shorter supply-line, and moved north against the Italians in the hill position at Toujane and Mutmata. To counteract our threat to his rear the enemy moved his only mobile reserve behind the Mareth Line, the 15th Armoured Division, westwards. By the evening of 25th March, it was in reserve behind the 21st Armoured Division, which was blocking the passage between the Djebels Tebaga and Melab. In addition, further Italian and German units were withdrawn from the Mareth defence zone to positions along the djebels themselves.

While these land operations were in progress the Allied air forces concentrated on "softening" the enemy's opposition to our forces south of Hamma and attacked enemy landing grounds in the southern sector of the Tunisian battlefield.

On the 24th March, two most successful attacks were delivered south of Hamma by escorted Kit­tyhawk-bombers and Hurricane LCDs. In the first attack 47 Kittyhawks and twelve Hurricane IIDs, escorted by Spitfires, sent up in flames four tanks and about twenty transport vehicles, and three armoured cars and fifty other vehicles were damaged. In addition, two guns were silenced and their crews killed. In the second attack, seven "tank-busters", escorted by sixteen Spitfires, attacked a group of sixteen tanks and destroyed six of them. The widespread damage caused by these attacks was confirmed by our ground forces. Our aircraft encountered intense flak, but the four Hurricanes and two Kitty-hawks hit managed to make forced-landings within our lines.

During the night, intensive bombing of the enemy's concentrations south-west of Hamma and along the Hamma-Gabes road was carried out from dusk to dawn by nine Halifaxes, 65 Wellingtons, 25 Bostons and 34 Baltimores. The target area was illuminated by Aibacores. Heavy damage was inflicted on vehicle concentrations and fifteen large fires and numerous smaller ones were started.

The next morning, 25th March, escorted R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. light bombers supplemented the attacks being made by the North-west African Air Forces on the landing grounds at Sfax el Maouh and north of Djebel Tebaga in order to limit enemy air opposition to the Western Desert Air Force's great offensive planned for the morrow.

Meanwhile, Kittyhawks and U.S. Warhawks continued their straffing of vehicles and encamp­ments south-west of Hamma and in the Djebel Tebaga area.

Spitfires were on constant patrol throughout the day. One formation of six Spitfires inter­cepted about fifteen ME. 210s, escorted by a

'large number of ME. 109s, south-west of Gabes, and forced most of the ME. 210s to jettison their bombs on their own troops; in addition, one ME.210 was shot down and a ME. 109 damag­ed. In other engagments, Spitfires destroyed two ME. 109s and three MC. 202s and damaged one ME. 109. Three of our fighters failed to re­turn..

That night, 25/26th March, six Halifaxes, 59 Wellingtons, 40 Baltimores and 28 Bostons con­tinued the bombing of the enemy's concentrations of tanks and vehicles south of El Hamma. Fif­teen fires were started, some of which appeared to be petrol burning, and a number of explosions were caused.

Epic Air Attack Blitz methods were now necessary to blast a

way through the bottle-neck between the Djebels Tebaga and Melab so that our land forces, which were superior in strength to the enemy, could be deployed in the open country beyond. Mention has already been made of the heavy air attacks by night on the enemy's 15th and 21st Armoured Divisions in this area; it remains to be emphasis­ed that these succeeded not only in inflicting widespread material damage but weakened the enemy's will to fight by denying sleep to his troops.

The epic Western Desert Air Force's attack of 26th March began in the afternoon with an onslaught by light bombers followed by concen­trated and continuous low bombing and straffing by Kittyhawk-bombers and Hurricane "tank­busters".

As the country was exceedingly difficult for navigation a scheme of indentification was devis­ed which included the sending up of coloured smoke from a striking land-mark throughout the period of the attack. Simultaneously, our for­ward troops sent up smoke of another colour. Then, for the first few minutes of the air .blitz our artillery shelled the enemy's principal strong-points with smoke shells in order to indicate them to the fighter-bombers. Half an hour after the air attack had begun our artillery fired a heavy barrage which crept forward at the rate of 100 feet per minute, thus automatically de­fining the bomb line.

ing by escorted light bom fittflJ strength, which achieved surprise by their low approach. Thereafter, two and a half squadrons of Kittyhawk-bombers were fed into the area every quarter of an hour. These aircraft were briefed to bomb particular targets followed by the straffing of gun positions which constituted a menace to our armour. Meanwhile, the Hurri­cane IIDs broke up the enemy's tank concen­trations.

In order to guard the fighter-bombers and "tank-busters" from enemy interference a Spit­fire patrol, at one squadron strength, was main­tained over the area of operations. Moreover, as mentioned on page 40, the North-west African Tactical Air Force was engaged in attacking enemy landing grounds in the vicinity, in order to limit air opposition and create a diversion.

Our air blitz came as a total surprise to the enemy and the concentrated low bombing and straffing completely disorganised his defences. The forward elements of the VHIth Army were thus able to capture the Axis strong-holds and our armour passed through the bottleneck un­molested.

The evidence of prisoners of war and the great quantities of war material abandoned by the fleeing enemy bore witness to the extensive moral and material effect achieved.

The complete air attack was carried out in the space of two and a quarter hours, during which time 412 sorties were flown at the cost of eleven pilots missing.

Advances in Southern and Central Sectors

While the Mareth battle was in progress the American ground forces in the southern sector, which had occupied Gafsa and Zannouch, advanc­ed to Sened station and then continued to push on to Maknassy. Simultaneously, an effort was made to exploit eastwards from El Guettar. The two manoeuvres constituted a threat to Rom­mel's line of retreat to the north.

In the central sector Allied forces advanced north-east from Sbeitla on 26th March and oc­cupied Fondouk, without serious opposition, on the 27th. During the following days, however, the enemy's resistance in this sector stiffened.

Aircraft operating under Advanced Headquar­ters Tactical Air Force gave extensive support to the Allied ground forces. On 23rd March, nineteen missions, comprising 336 sorties, were flown in the Kairouan, Maknassy, Mezzouna and El Guettar areas. In particular, road transport near Maknassy and east of El Guettar was ef­fectively straffed and 90 U.S. escorted Bostons and eighteen escorted Mitchells added to the weight of these attacks and bombed enemy troops and transport concentrations.

The following day, attacks were continued in the above-mentioned areas and also extended to Fondouk, 378 sorties being carried out. The at­tacks. iasJudadf-an ,^cor,ted Boston attack on

Barracks at Gabes wer-e bombed in support of the Vlllth Army's advance. Inset shows area before bombing.

88 mm. gun positions in the El Guettar area; the Djebel Tebaga landing grounds while the three guns were put out of action. Western Desert Air Force blitzed the enemy at

On 25th March, fighters and fighter-bombers El Hamma. operated at full pressure, bombing and straffing vehicles and troop concentrations. The next day, Mareth Line Evacuated apart from the shooting up of transport around The concentrated attack of the Western Desert Maknassy, the main effort was directed against Air Force on 26th March on the enemy forces

astride tne runnel leading to El Ham extended that night to enemy concentra and around Gabes town. Five Halifaxes and Wellingtons carried out the attack and hits were scored on barrack blocks, fuel installations, rail­way sidings and transport on the main road. Five fires, described as "good", were started in the area. One Wellington failed to return.

The following day our armour drove the 21st Armoured Division up to El Hamma, and an enemy counter-attack from the south-east, launched by the 15th Armoured Division, was beaten off by another of our armoured brigades following up. The German 164th Light Divi­sion attempted to stop the advance of our in­fantry but at length withdrew to the north-east, after suffering heavy casualties.

Unfavourable weather restricted the Western Desert Air Force's activity during the day, but Kittyhawk-bombers made three bombing and machine-gun attacks on enemy transport vehicles on the road between El Hamma and Gabes.

Spitfires patrolled the Gabes area throughout the day. A formation of JU.88s was intercept­ed near Gabes and forced to jettison its bombs on enemy territory; two JU.88s were destroyed and three damaged. In another encounter the Spitfires destroyed one ME.210 and damaged four others. Three Spitfires were lost.

That night, 27/28th March, under cover of a thick haze which prevented air operations, the enemy evacuated the Mareth Line. The enemy's 15th and 21st Armoured Divisions took up posi­tions south-east of El Hamma to screen the eva­cuation.

On 28th March, our troops occupied the whole Mareth Line and part of our armour advanced towards Gabes from the south-west. Meanwhile, the enemy held on resolutely at El Hamma.

Continued bad weather, including sand storms, limited our air activity to a few fighter-bomber attacks on enemy vehicles between El Hamma and Gabes in support of the thrust by our ar­moured forces. Later in the day, when the weather improved, fighter-bomber attacks were made on transport vehicles withdrawing north­wards from Gabes.

Rommel Retreats to Oued el Akarit

During the night 28/29th March the enemy rear-guard at El Hamma was withdrawn and Rommel's forces in the Gabes area retreated northwards for seventeen miles to his next delay­ing position at Oued el Akarit.

Towards dawn the weather cleared sufficiently to enable operations to be carried out by four Halifaxes and 48 Wellingtons, assisted by flare-dropping Albacores. Enemy transport concentra­tions from Oudref, twelve miles north-west of Gabes, right up to 8fax were attacked. Targets were described as "excellent" and ten large fires were caused among vehicles.

and armoured \g days they

Oued el Akarit. The enemy forces retreating northward from

Gabes on the 29th were subjected to heavy bomb­ing and straffing attacks by a total of 418 R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. Kittyhawks and U.S. War-hawks and 36 escorted, R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. Bos­tons and Baltimores.. Damage was inflicted on transport vehicles as far north as Mahares and fires were caused all along the road. At least 50 vehicles were destroyed and 270 damaged and six anti-aircraft posts were wiped out. Attacks were also made on landing grounds between Oudref and Sfax, in the course of which three aircraft were destroyed and six damaged on the ground. Four Kittyhawks and three U.S. War-hawks did not return from these intensive ope­rations.

During the day, also, escorted Baltimores and U.S. Mitchells made two heavy attacks on the Sfax el Maouh and Zitouna landing grounds, causing seven large fires. One U.S. Mitchell was shot down by anti-aircraft fire.

Meanwhile, patrolling Spitfires, which included the Polish Flight, had a very successful day, shooting down six ME.109s, two MC.202s and one JU.88 and damaging five other aircraft without loss.

Attacks on Sfax el Maouh Airfield

By 30th March enemy vehicles had become well dispersed; accordingly, the main attacks of the Western Desert Air Force were directed against Sfax el Maouh, the enemy's principal airfield be­hind the Oued el Akarit defences. Three attacks were made by a total of 71 Allied light bombers, escorted by Spitfires and U.S. Warhawks. Se­veral aircraft were seen burning on the ground but observation, in the main, was prevented by low cloud.

During that night the attacks were continued by 45 Wellingtons, with Albacores acting as "path-finders"- Fifty fires were caused which were visible for eighty miles.

On 31st March, further attacks were delivered by escorted S.A.A.F. Bostons, R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. Baltimores, and U.S. Mitchells; several air­craft were destroyed on the ground. Two U.S. Mitchells hit by the intense flak encountered over the target came down in the sea off Djerba island. After mid-day, bad weather prevented further operations from being carried out against the airfield.

Re-occupation of Sedjenane

Meanwhile, in the northern sector, an attack in considerable strength was launched by the 1st Army against the enemy's positions north-east of Djebel Abiod on 28th March. Although pro­gress was difficult owing to bad weather, heavy going and thick undergrowth an' advance of ten miles was made on a broad-front arid Sedjenane

was re-occupied by our groun on 30th

Owing to the adverse weather?*- conditions air operations in this sector were limited. Whenever possible, however, Spitfires carried out offensive sweeps but ground attacks were restricted.

War of Supplies Continued While the Allied forces were achieving suc­

cesses in all sectors of the Tunisian battlefield the air attacks on the enemy's supply lines con­tinued unabated.

During the last week in March the principal attacks on the enemy's ports of off-loading were made by U.S. escorted Fortresses of the N.W. African Strategic Air Force. On 23rd March, 22 U.S. Fortresses, escorted by U.S. Lightnings, at­tacked Bizerta and bursts were observed on the docks on both sides of the channel, on quays and in the town; in addition, near misses were scored on a ship in the lake. In air combats with enemy fighters over the target three ME. 109s were destroyed and three others damaged for the loss of one U.S. Lightning. On the following day, the U.S. Fortresses turned their attention to Ferryville where 250 x 500 lb. bombs were dropped on the docks, causing many fires and explosions. A report from a reliable ground source stated that three vessels, one of which had a cargo of ammunition, were sunk. On 25th March, Sousse was bombed by 22 U.S. Fortresses, escorted by U.S. Lightnings. Apart from the damage done to the jetties, hits were scored on a large ship at the south quay and a smaller vessel was sunk in the harbour. Other attacks on enemy bases included one on bomb and fuel storage installations at Groubalia, south-east of Tunis, on 26th- March by 12 U.S. Mitchells, but poor visibility on this occasion prevented the observation of results.

Attacks were also continued on the main Sicilian and Sardinian supply ports. On 22nd March, U.S. escorted Fortresses supplemented the Libyan-based bombers' offensive against Palermo mentioned on page 20. 287 x 500 lb. bombs were dropped and bursts were observed among ships in the-harbour; one burst, in parti­cular, caused an explosion which was felt by the bombers at 24,000 feet. Photographs taken two days later confirmed that tremendous damage had been inflicted on port installations. On 31st March, docks and shipping at Cagliari harbour were attacked by 24 U.S. Fortresses, which drop­ped 288 x 500 1b. (.021 to 1 second delay) bombs from 23,000 feet. Photographs taken by the bombers revealed that two large M/Vs were set on fire, three more M/Vs and a coaster received direct hits, and damaging near misses were scor­ed on nineteen small craft. The dock area was well covered with bursts and a large explosion occurred in the north-west corner of the harbour.

The most successful attacks, on enemy CJ in the latter half of 20t

tacked, a convoy of four M/Vs and two escort v^ss^ls and 24 x 500 lb. demolition bombs were dropped from heights of 750 to 150 feet. One M/V was set on fire and near misses were scor­ed on one of the escort vessels. On the 22nd/ fifteen U.S. escorted Marauders bombed a large troopship, three medium-sized M/Vs and sb escort vessels from heights of 7,500 feet to.3,500 feet. Direct hits were scored on the troopship which caused an explosion and left it in flames and listing, and direct hits were also scored on one M/V and one escort vessel. During botjf these shipping attacks interception was attempt­ed by formations of enemy aircraft; in all, sixteen ME.109s, two JU.88s and an unidentified Italian fighter were claimed as destroyed by the American bombers and fighters.

In the meantime, aircraft of the Coastal Air Force were dealing with enemy submarines. On 28th March, a Hudson sighted a U-boat at peri­scope depth and attacked with three depth charges which forced the U-boat to the surface. Two 100 lb. A.S. bombs were then dropped which blew the submarine fifteen yards broadside to star­board. When last observed the submarine was unable to submerge and was progressing at about five knots.

Heavy attacks on Sardinian Airfields On the last day of March heavy attacks were

made by the Strategic Air Force on the enemy's' airfields in Sardinia, from which Italian and Ger­man torpedo-bombers and JU.88 bombers sallied out to attack our convoys and ports and enemy fighters provided protection for convoys to Bizer­ta and Tunis.

The attack on Decvmomannu by sixteen Wellingtons on the night 30/31st was followed on the next day by attacks on that airfield and those at Monserrato and Villacidro by a total of 68 Fortresses, which dropped 9,072 x 20 lb. frag­mentation bombs. Photographs taken during the raids showed that 44 aircraft were destroyed or badly damaged on Decimomannu airfield, twelve at Monserrato and one at Villacidro. In addi­tion, thirteen enemy fighters were shot dowfffl by the American formations over the targets.

Beginning of the End in Tunisia By the end of March it was evident that the

Tunisian campaign was about to enter its final phase. The Vlllth Army had pursued Rommel's forces to the Oued Akarit;. in the El Guettar and central sectors American and French troops were increasing their pressure on enemy positions which were rapidly becoming untenable; in the north, the 1st Army was ready for a trial of strength with the forces of Von Arnim.

To a great extent the imminence of victory was due to the varied and intensive operations of the Allied air forces. A mighty air arm had been forged which was ready not only to play its full part in the final struggle in Tunisia, but to strike heavier and heavier blows at the south­ern bastions of Hitler's European "fortress."

Palermo docks and shipping under attack on 22nd March, 1943.

The force of this explosion at Palermo on 22nd March was felt by the aircraft at 24,000 feet. Results are slioivn on page 71.