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MilitaryReviewFORTt-riNE YE RS OF MIL 'iARY.. SERVii$B/,

VOLUME XLIII

NUMBER 12

DECEMBER 1963

Diluted Professionalism Mq; Wq/fer F. 'Ulmer, Jr., USA 3Lesson in Leadership Lt Gen Clovis E. Byers, USA Ref 12Social Sciences and the Military. . Col A. A. Jordan, Jr., USAU Col W. A. Schiess, USA 6Neutralism Lt Col A;thur S. Hyman, USA 23Indonesia Ma; Edgar O Ballance, British Territorial Army 30Where Is Red China Headed? Col Fernand Schneider, French Army 38Civic Action in Laos

The Royal Lao Program .Brig Gen O. Sananikone, Royal Lao Army 44The Military Program Ma; Charles W. Stockell, USA 55

Keeping Limited War Limited Ma; Alton R. Wheelock, USA 64Normandy Revisited Ma; Gen H. Essame, British Army, Ret 70To Beat the Guerrillas Albert L. Fisher 81Seizing the Initiative Maj L. G. Clark, Australian rmy 87Military Notes 97Military Books 107

The Military Review, a publication of the UNITED STATES ARMY, provides, a forum for the expression of military thought with emphasis on doctrine concerningthe division and higher levels of command.

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Editor in ChiefCol [(enneth E. Lay

Assistant EditorLt Col Albert N Garland

Layout Editor2d Lt Robert K. Lindgren

Spanish American EditorLt cJl Juan R. Melendez

Asst SpanishAmerican EditorMaj Jose E. Tizol

Brazilian EditorLt Col Joiio H. Faeo

Associate EditorCol Daniel E. HalpinArmy War College

Executive OfficerMaj James N. Hale

Production OfficerMaj Norman C. Murray

Staff ArtistCharles A. Moore

MILITARY REVIEW-Published monthly by U. S. Ann) Command and General Staff College. Fort Leavenworth. Ka nsas, in English. Spanish. and Portuguese. Use of funds for printing of this publication basbeen approved by Headquarters, Department of the Army. 3 July 1962.Second..class postagp paid at Fort Lea ienworth. Kansas. Sub.scription rates: 3.50 (US currency) ayear irt the United States, United. States mHit ry post offices. and those countries which are members ofthe Pan-American Postal Union (including Spain); 4.50 a year in all other countrieS. Address subscrip.

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The artin ComJla lY

DILUTED PROFESSIONALI MMajor Walter F. Ulmer. Jr., United States Army

The views expressed in this article are the author s and are not necessarily those of the Department ofthe Army Department of Defense,or the U S. Army Command andGeneral Staff College.-Editor.

ORE than the members of anyother profession;: 1 group, military officers are exposed to a great varietyof experience. Versatility and adaptability have been hallmarks of the professional soldier.The traditional training of line o -cers has consisted of a partially controlled sequence of varied short-termassignments interrupted by periods offormal schooling. Discontinuity seemsto bJ; an essential ingredient in a theoretically proper career. The shibboleth is broad background."

And yet, isn't the "broad background approach unsuited to the tech-

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PROFESSION LISMnological and political realities of thetimes? Can we continue to afford theluxury of training many officers forpositions they will probably never occupy? Can we operate effectively withan essentially transient group of practitioners who rarely attain expertisein any field?

There is today no lessening of theneed for soldierly virtues. Personal integrity an awareness of the fundamentals of the battlefield, the abilityto lead and inspire men, and devotionto duty remain cornerstones, of military officership. But the essential elements of modern professional competence include far more than good character and noble intent.reater KnowledgeAmong the credentials of a professional is the ability to perform hisrequired task w i ~ h skill and under

standing. Attainment of the requisiteskill and understanding demands intensive study and controlled experience. t demands, in a word, specialization. f military specialists are notproduced within the profession, theprofession can .expect to be supplanted by other industrious, ambitious, intelligent, wellrounded amateurs.

The tasks that must be accomplishedby any professional group are derivedfrom two sources: the body of knowl-

Major WalteJ; F. Ulmer Jr. is withHeadquarters Military AssistanceCommand Vietnam. His assignmentsinclude duty in Korea and Japan withthe 56th Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion and the 6th Tank Battal-ion. From 1958 to 1962 Major Ulmerwas an instructor at the United t ~ e s Military Academy and in June 1963he completed the Regular Course ofthe U S. rmy Command and General

edge indispensable to the functioningof the profession, and the operationalenvironment of the profession.

The technological and scientific rev-olution of our era has enlarged thebody of knowledge pertinent to theconduct of military operations. Com-plex weapon systems and their sup-porting logistical structures have cre-ated recognizable problem areas inmilitary operations. Proper fiscal man-agement of the resources required tosupport the current forces is itself asizable task. But the nuclear andspace-age subject matter does not re-place traditional military subjects; itis superimposed on the already con-siderable breadth and depth of mili-tary art and science.

n addition to the growing complex-ity of tactics, logistics, and management, today's professional sol die rpractices in a sensitive and demanding political environment. The circumstances of the cold war that pre-scribe the involvement of the militaryin a variety of governmental operations are well known. Worldwide commitments impose requirements for in-stant readiness-requirements whichdemand that operational needs takeappropriate priority.Lower StandardsSo it has come to pass that militaryactivities have become increasinglymore diversified as well as more complex. A likely result of an expandedprofessioh is a steady and insidiouslowering of professional standards.This must be avoided. We mustcounter the tendency toward a dilutedprofessionalism.

While the Army reacted promptlyto technological advances by producing new machines and updating or-ganizations and doctrine, there has

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~ new demands placed on the officercorps. In fact, preoccupation withequipment and organization has beenconducive to a neglect of many aspectsof personnel management.eneralist TheoryOur two major management problems-insufficient retention of highpotential personnel and a growing

qualified officers to higher echelonscontinues the operating units becomeshort both in numbers and quality ofofficers. At the top echelons vigorousambitious officers seeing the troopunits perform with difficulty attemptto rescue the situation by imposingrestrictions and controls on the actions of the troop unit commanders.

Army New Featuresilitary activities have become increasingly more diversified s well as more complexcentralization of authority-are intimately related to the generalist development theory and its attendingbroad assignment policies.

Because of the wide latitude in dutyassignments many of the most competent officers are selected for duty onhigh-level staffs. For a variety of reasons the operating units---eommandedfor relatively short tours by relativelyjunior officers-do not consistently receive a fair share of the outstandingofficers.As the gravitation of the highly

This situation often results in frustration and eventual disappointmentin the operating units. Capable juniorleaders become discouraged. The overworked draftee, conscious of the overcontrolled and hesitant performance ofhis unit too often returns to his community with a poor picture of the military service.

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara commented on the problemsof overcentralization in testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee. The Secretary stated:

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PROfESSION LISM

While believe that unified planning programming and decision-making are indispensable to the effectivemanagement o the defense effort 1am equally convinced that the actualoperation o the program should emanaged to the maximum extent possible on a decentralized basis.faith and fearCertainly inherent in any responsible manager s decision to allow trulydecentralized operations is a faith inthe skill and judgment of subordinateleaders. In this day and age, militaryskill comes to: fruition only after intensive study and experience. Onlywhen professional expertise is ensuredcan the necessary decentralization beexpected.

Our modern American Army hasassiduously avoided extensive specialization within the officer corps. This isparticularly true in the combat arms;it does except the few identified specialists in medicine, law, intelligence,engineering, and special occupationalskills.

There is a traditional fear that thespecialist will lack the background ofvaried experience -assumed necessaryfor successful performance in thehigher staff and command positions.The officer who has attained recognized proficiency in one area of studyis often regarded with suspicion-hishorizon surely must be limited. hisjudgment deformed.

t is doubtful, however, if the successful officer of the past, even whenthe complexities of the service demanded far less training than at present, followed the well-balanced careerpatterns that now are held in suchhigh regard. Nor does there seem tobe any indication that any recentAmerican senior commander has beenhampered in his exercise of command

by a special depth of understandingof one particular phase of militaryoperations.

Our lack of respons e to the challenge of a wider, more demanding sub.ject matter is n distinct contrast tothe specialization that evolved withinthe legal and medical professions. Thisspecialization was necessitated by theproliferation of new data and the de-velopment of more complicated procedures.Limited ttemptsWe have made limited attempts toincrease proficiency within the existing career pattern structure. Serviceschool curricula have been revised;civilian graduate training programshave been increased; the need formore specialization in logistics, intelligence, and research and developmenthas created career fields in theseareas; and the desire for increasedmobility has caused a near-career specialization program in aviation toemerge.Yet the principal functional areasof contemporary military operationshave been fundamentally unmodifiedby deliberate revision. Furthermore,the expanded diversity of contempo.rary duties has engendered an uncontrolled variety of assignments.An indiscriminate variety in assignments tends to minimize the proficiency that can be developed onlythrough pertinent experience. For example. an infantry major might serveon a troop unit staff, in a Military s-sistance Advisory Group, in a researchand development project, in the UnitedStates Continental Army Command,United States European Command,Supreme Headquarters Allied PowersEurope, Department of the Army, orUnited Nations command headquarters. He might attend graduate school

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in journalism, serve as a post information officer, be assigned to a logistics command in the communicationszone or work with the Atomic EnergyCommission. Often the assignmentsare intermingled and without discernible sequence.easurementThe officer evaluation system doesnot place a high premium on skill. Efficiency ratings reflect, in great meas-

US rmyWe must giv prim ry ttention to thunique and basic military skillsure, aptitude and versatility. Thesetraits, while essential, are not complete qualifications of a professional.Oddly enough, the Army today has norequirement that a specific professional skill-demonstrated by examination or job performance-be mastered before promotion to a highergrade. Thus the title Captain of Artillery carries with it no measuredprofessional qualifications.

During peace, and in the many shortepisodes of a cold war, the basic soldierly skill levels are difficult, if notimpossible, to measure accurately.However, facility in many peripheralfunctions performed by officers isreadily measured. The comptroller, engineer, and honor guard commanderdemonstrate talents that can be evaluated in peacetime as well as in war.Because of the relative ease of notingproficiency in nonbattle skills, performance in these r e a s is easilystandardized.In the long run, we are more apt tooverlook a lack of know-how in theunique military functions. The measurement of true proficiency in command and staff positions with operating forces is an arduous and demanding task. A 'lack of experience andtraining in these hardcore militaryskills tends to perpetuate itself. Thissame general scheme of events can beobserved frequently in unit trainingwhere the measurable activities (vehide appearance and starched fatigues) are emphasized, and some ofthe more important functions (theability to coordinate fire and maneuver) are neglected.roficiency

Other facets of the present-day poIitical and educational climate can beinterpreted (or misinterpreted) as deemphasizing the need to maintain proficiency in military subjects. Certainly, when the President urges the graduating cadets of the Military Academyto develop a facility in political scienceand negotiations, and calls attention totheir probable future roles in politicalmilitary affairs, he presumes, also, thedevelopment of their skills in basicmilitary operations. A reminder of theinextricable involvement of militaryactivities with political affairs is not

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PROFESSION LISM

a mandate to abandon e rpertise in theuse of military forces.We have seemingly, of late, produced officers who have so effectively

integrated the economic-political-military streams of interest that they arehard pressed to deliver a military opinion. The capacity to speak as a military specialist, when required, mustremain a fundamental capability ofthe professional soldier.Future evelopment

What must be done to ensure therequisite future professional development in the Army? I believe there arefour problem areas that must be considered:

We must give primary attentionto the unique and basic military skills.The essence of the military professionmust not become so intermingled withassociated peripheral matter as to become indistinguishable as a valid areafor professional study. This must bedone not as a retrenchment, but as atimely revitalization of professionalstandards

We must realize the magnitudeand complexity of the true militarysubject matter in relation to an individual's capacity to master all or partof it in one lifetime. Manpower resoUrces must then be fitted to the tasksto be done. The needs of the servicemust take priority over notions thatofficers must be generalists first andspecialIsts if time and circumstancespermit.

Recognizing the need for xp r-tis in a broad and complex profession, we must create specialties withinthe profession for all the officers. ffi-cer assignments must be restricted s\as to ensure an adequate professionaldevelopment as well as a broad generaloutlook.

There must be a means of readily'identifying officer skills as well as officer aptitudes. Too, p r o f i i n ~ y gainedin a specialty must be periodically as-sessed and recorded.SubdivisionsThe plan to effect these changesmust ,commence with a definition ofthe areas of specialization The follow-ing military functional areas seem tobe logical subdivisions;

Tactical OperationsThis area includes the fundamental

military skills of directing personnel,employing weapons, and managing re-sources in the execution of tactical op-erations. Officers would enter the tactical operations specialist career fieldafter seven to 10 years' service. Theprincipal source of this group wouldbe the combat arms.Assignments would prepare the offi-cer for command and staff duties withfield army, corps, division, and smallerunits, and might include tours withany of the combat arms'.

Duties other than with operatingunits appropriate to this specialtyarea would include -Reserve Officers'Training Cor p s (ROTC) , serviceschool faculty, combat developments,joint or combined staff duty at fieldarmy or below, and Military Assistance Advisory Group.Research and Development and Logistics

This area includes the provision ofweapons, equipment, and logistic support for the operating forces. Thiscareer field would include individualspecialties appropriate to the title, andwould include the members of the technical and administrative sel vices.

A tour of two years with a combatarm would precede specialization inthis field. Graduate schooling wouldbe appropriate in these specialty areas.

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Strategic lanning and ResourcesUtilizationThis field includes the translationof national objectives into militaryrequirements; coordination with othergovernmental and internatiqnal agencies; selection and allocation of resources; direction of strategic operations; and development of long-rangeplans.Officers would enter this field aftera minimum of eight to 10 years dutyin any of the arms or services. Graduate schooling iiI physical or social sciences would be appropriate for mostduties.Assignments would train officers forduty at field army and higher staff,and for joint and combined staff duty.Other duties within this specialty areawould include service school faculty,legislative liaison, Military AssistanceProgram, civil defense, internationalboards and agencies, and intragovernmental committees. Note that the tactical operations and stt ategic planningand resources utilization (SPRU)fields have overlapping assignmentareas in several cases

Other actorsTransfer among the specialty areaswould be authorized with the approvalof the gaining and losing fields. Orientation tours outside the specialty areawould be authorized, and identified assuch.Promotions would be allocated toeach specialty area. The prime requi

site for advancement would be that ofdemonstrated capability in a selectedcareer field.While the tactical operations specialist practiced his art, he would becontent that a fair amount of talentwas concentrating in the strategy andresources area. And, conversely, whenan officer transferred his priority of

interest from the integration of firesat brigade level to political geography,he would do so with the comfortingknowledge that other competent andinterested practitioners were concentrating on the tactical end of the spectrum.

This plan assists in assuring recognized competence in the operatingforces, enhancing the building of aclimate of mutual trust that enablestrue initiative to flourish. Eventually,as skills become highly developedthrough properly managed career patterns, large administrative and supervisory staffs should wither away. Theadministrative burden now justifiedby fear of improper operations in thefield should greatly diminish.

Each career field would provideenough diversity of assignment to af-ford challenging and varied duties, yetthe fields are sufficiently narrow topermit the compilation of substantialexperience and knowledge. General officers would be selected from any ofthe specialty areas, and, when promoted, would serve in any duties appropriate to individual capability.

Medical officers, chaplains, and lawyers would not be included in thesespecialty areas.Military SchoolingThe military schooling system wouldneed some revision to support thisbroad plan.

The first change would be in thecareer courses of the combat arms. Anidentical program of instruction wouldbe implemented at the infantry, ar-mor, and artillery schools to providean integrated combat arms background to future tactical operationsspecialists.

Detailed subject matter relative toone branch, omitted from the common

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l R,0FESSIONALlSMcombat arms programs of instruction,but essential for branch skills, wouldbe provided by the greater on-the-jobtraining available through the specialization system.Combat arms officers who would become SPRU specialists would have anadvantage of greater insight into all,the combat arms prior to specialization.

The career courses would not haveto serve as prime sources of experience. They could concentrate on updating and standardizing doctrine andtechniques, as opposed to ensuring acommon denominator of basic skills.The skills would be gained throughtimely, programed experience in thespecialty are , under the tutelage ofofficers who had a long-term interestin the people and the units within theirchosen field.The second change in schoolingwould appear at the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. Priorto attending this school, most officerswould have been assigned in one of thethree specialist areas. The College period of instruction would consist oftwo phases. One phase would be a common program for an students. For thisgeneral and broadening instructionthe students would intermingle and,hopefully, exchange concepts andopinions.

The other phase of the course wouldbe specialized information presented tosegregated classes of the three specialties. In these classes, current doctrineand intensive analysis pertaining tothe students' prime areas of interestwould be presented. The studentsshould have a common interest in thesesubjects and a motivation derivedfrom a future need-to-know.

The orientation courses-airborne,aviation, and ranger schools-would

not require change from current programs. The ROTC, United States M11itary Academy, and Officer CandidateSchool programs would not necessarilybe changed.Personnel ManagementOne beneficial byproduct of the cre-ation of specialty areas would be im-proved personnel management. The of-fice of personnel operations would haveonly three major assignment groupings for all officers with more thaneight to 10 years service. fficerswould not be available for the myriadof duties for which they are now eligible, and the reduction in assignmentoptions should permit longer rangeplanning. Elimination of the need tosample all types of ,duty would permitlonger tours, and reduce permanentchange of station moves and the attending cost and family discomfort.Extended association with the samegroup of specialists should ensure, insome measure, the sprit and community of effort that branch of serviceonce provided before the branch im-material tour became commonplace.

This specialization would not createa General Staff Corps, nor would itestablish an elite group either at highstaff or tactical levels. Rather, it woulddelineate functions and permit training and experience to be focused onmanageable segments of military affairs.An additional feature of this planwould be an administrative procedurefor assessing officer skill resources atany given time. Officer military occu-pational specialties (MOS s) would beexpanded in meaning and significance,to include digits indicating experienceand training. As an officer completesschools and o n t h ~ j o experience, hisMOS would be changed to reflect hisattainments.

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IThe limitations of human judgment

lin statistics would remain. Therewould be some basis however forrapidly appraising total officer professional qualifications ana experience; no such method is currentlyavailable.

The essence of the problem has beenidentified as a lack of adaptation ofo i ~ r assignment policies to the needsof the times. The reasonable desire forbroad background has led to such divergency of assignments as to jeopardize proficiencY in any number of crit-ical skill areas. On-the-job proficiencynow more difficult to attain than in thepast is absolutely essential in conducting the daily cold war military tasks.

In order to ensure continued professionalism. the Army must adopt

controlled specialization for all offi-cers. The total problem must be subdivided into manageable parts. Thecombat arms officer now so broadlyoriented must become the prime tar-get of specialist training.

This approach to professional development does not depreciate traditionalmilitary values. Parochialism or limited comprehension of the broad impact of military operations is not condoned. A true skill is required in somefunctional area of operations.

The military must concentrate itstalent. above all on its special problems. t must not attempt to be allthings to all men. The Nation deservesnothing less than the highest possibleprofessional competence from its offi-cer corps.

There is no substitute for staying witb some fragment of knowledge until you have obtahied mastery of it. No substitute for making such an effortof your own. t seems a truism of this that one needs to know deeply inorder to experience the full joy of liberal learning.

Dr. N athan M PuseyPresident Harvard University

ecember 963

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cme hoto

LESSON IN LE DERSHIPLieutenant General Clovis E Byers.United States Armu Retired

THE most h a l e ~ g i n g combat sit-uation facing the commander is that inwhich an enemy has been consistentlysuccessful. In such a situation. the tideof battle may be changed only in oneof two ways-by overwhelming rein-forcements or by leadership of a newand dynamic quality.

In late 1942 General Douglas Mac-Arthur faced precisely this situation.Since fTuly the Japanese had been ad-vancirl.@: across New Guinea from Gonato Buna . Although checked by the com-

bined effort of the Australians andAmericans the threat had not beeneliminated. nor would it be until theenemy had been thrown out of Buna.principal supply port on the northcoast. But now the US forces that wereto accomplish this task had been weak-ened by hunger fatigue disease andunit disorganization until their condi-tion had become deplorable. MacAr-thur of course had no reinforcementsto throw in. Leadership was his onlyhope.

ilitary Rev ew2

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Don't Come Bac k AliveOn 30 November 1942, LieutenantGeneral Robert L. Eichelberger, Com-manding 1st Corps, US Army, re-ported as ordered to General MacAr-thur s Port Moresby quarters. Aftera terse briefing, General MacArthursaid, Time is of the essence for theJapanese may iand reinforcements anynight. He stopped his rapid pacingof the floor, pointed his finger in Ei-chelberger's face, and exploded, Coout there, Bob, and take Buna or don'tcome back alive.General Eichelberger soon deter-mined the true state of affairs on theother side of the Owen Stanley Range.A breakdown in the service of supplylargely explained the pitiable conditionof the troops. Methodically but expe-ditiously the new commander learnedwhere the trouble lay, instituted cor-rective measures, and soon had supplyrolling in.His next problem was more diffi-cult. Ground units had been sent to theBuna area in air echelons; for a va-riety of reasons, the air movementhad become greatly confused withmany units landing remote from theirintended destinations. Organizationalintegrity scarcely existed.

Reprinted by permission of the~ o p y r i t holder, th MarineCorps Association, publishers ofthe MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, professional journal for Marine officers. Copyright 1962 by theMarine Corps Association. Originally published in November 1962under the title Assault and Capture of Buna, part of the JohnA Lejeune Forum on CombatLeadership.General Byers is vice presidentof General Telephone Electronics Corp., Washington, D. C.

The front consisted of an irregularstring of troop islands having no tac-tical integrity above company level;adjacent companies were from differ-ent battalions; and adjacent battalionswere from different regiments. To capthe situation, the inexperience of thetroops and their condition meant thatunits hesitated to patrol the strangejungle. The result was that no one wassure who was on his right or left. AJapanese diary later captured offeredthis illuminating picture of initial USaction: The enemy has received almost notraining . their movements are veryslow. At this rate they cannot make anight attack.The enemy has been repulsed by ourkeen-eyed snipers. In the jungle itseems they fire at any sound, due tQillusion. From sundown until about 1Qp.m. they fire light machine guns andthrow hand grenades recklessly.Forward Units Visited

In an effort to determine the exactcondition of his troops and to remeQYoutstanding deficiencies, General Ei-chelberger visited the most forward ofhis units. Believing in leadership bypersonal example, he invariably ex-posed himself to the lurking enemy.When trying to learn why desirablepositions a few yards to the front wereleft unoccupied, time and again hewould move to the indicated spot, causemen to come forward, and assist themin locating their new gun positions. Onone occasion during the early days, anaide moving behind the general wasseriously 'wounded, but this did notstop his explorations.

The general s attitude, of course, didnot escape notice of the troops. Withsupply moving, spirits rose, and withthe front slowly gaining cohesion, di-rect patrolling began. For the first

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U A rmyAn infantry patrol pushes through the jungle

LE DERSHIP

time, commanders began to get a truepicture of the nature of their front.Now attack plans could be developedwith some hope of success.General Eichelberger soo witnessed the positive results of his ef-""

learned that the colonel was forward.At the battalion command post, welearned the same. The trip was nowbecoming lonesome. Finally spottinga single American soldier in a foxholein the kunai grass, We asked where

fort, albeit indirectly. On the left ofthe Buna front, an understrength USregiment was attached to the Australian forces. Eichelberger was nowasked by the Australian general commanding to relieve the American commander because of his slow advance.Replying that he never relieved anyoneuntil he personally saw the justification, he suggested, instead, that theyboth gO forward to see how the American colonel was conducting the operation.

At regimental headquarters, theparty, of which I was a member,

the Japanese were. The soldier unconcernedly pointed across a trail to amound of earth about 100 feet to hisfront. Over there in that bunker.Do you know where your regimental commander is?The soldier pointed to anothermound of earth about 10 yards to hisright. In that bunker.No undue haste was evident, butcommon agreement promptly causedall to join the colonel in his bunker.There we found that, through a tremendous effort, the colonel was on theverge of launching a coordinated at-

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tack-indeed, a very skillful one thatsoon ,resulted in the US regimentbreaking through to the coast.On the return trip, the Australiangeneral suddenly turned to his Amer-ican opposite: Bob, I'l l be foreverthankful for this lesson you've taughtme You have saved me from doing oneof the greatesf injustices a man evercould do.By this time, a drive similar to thecolonel's was permeating the entirebattleline. And now the smug tone ofthe Japanese underwent dramaticchange:

The nature of ~ enemy is superiorand they excel in firing techniques.Hqs is a pitiful sight due to theirartillery fire . Enemy scouts appeareverywTiere and attack, shooting auto-matic rifles. . .And finally:With the dawn the enemy startedshooting all over. ll I can do is shedtears of resentment. Now we are wait-ing only for death. The news that re-

inforcements had come turned out tobe a rumor. ll day we stay in thebunkers. Weare filled with vexation.Comrades, are you going to stand byand watch us die? Even the invincibleImperial rmy is at a loss. Can t any-thing be done? Please GodGeneral Eichelberger had arrived on

the Buna front 1 December 1942. On2 January 1943, his dynamic, tireless,and imaginative leadership had as-serted itself, and the message so critically needed by General MacArthur,as delivered: Buna has fallen.

The farthest advance the Japanesehad made had been turned back. Therewere many days of difficult fightingthrough the next 18 months of islandpopping, and countless deeds of outstanding leadership and extreme brav-ery. But in Buna there was that initialdefeat of a heretofore victorious army'that marked the turn of a tide. This,in my mind, constitutes the most in-spiring example of leadership I haveever witnessed.

War is s much a conflict of wills and of spirit s of means. Hence inmy judgment the decisive element in warfare is not the weapon and theequipment but the man who uses the hardware.

General Earle G Wheeler

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SOCI LSCIENCES

NDTHEMILIT RY

PROFESSION

Colonel Amos A Jordan, Jr.UnUed States rmyLieutenant Colonel William A Schiess,

United States rmy

THE social sciences offer the mili-tary man a way to enlarge his mentalcapacities and broaden his horizons.They open up fresh avenues of commu-nication with. his counterparts in civillife and provide him, first, with freshinsights and principles with which hecan develop new ways of dischargingtraditional functions and, second, withthe kinds of knowledge and analyticalskills needed to meet the new responsi-bilities being thrust upon him.

Military leaders are often requiredto exercise command and control ofcomplex, and destructive forces which

must be kept at a state of instantane-ous readiness during indefinite periodsof tension and infrequent interludesof relaxation. Other military leadersmust develop individuals and unitswhich can operate effectively with min-imum resources and under the primi-tive conditions of guerrilla warfare.In either case, these forces must becontrolled by centralized arrangementscapable of decentralized execution andbe manned by highly skilled and intel-ligent individuals.

This combination of requirementsnecessitates the development of military leaders with a keen insight intothe motivation of men and the dynam-ics of small group leadership. Undertoday s circumstances, neither the traditional methods of leadership nor thefamiliar dependence of the soldier onhis comrades,to the left and right may,in themselves, suffice.

What guidance can the behavioralscientists offer to today s model of aThis article was digested fromthe original, published in the AIR

FORCE COLLEGE JOURNAL Can-ada) 1962. All Rights Reservedby the AIR FORCE COLLEGE JOUR-NAL. The ideas expressed in theJOURNAL are those 0 the writersand do not necessarily reflect 0 -ficial policy. When writing this,Colonel Jordan was Professor 0/Social Sciences at the UnitedStates Military Academy, WestPoint, New York. Colonel SchIesswas with the Offiice 0/ the Chief0/ Information, Department ofthe r y ~ in Washington.

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modern major general? These specialists in individual and group behavior,of social interaction, sometimes seemto be talking about things whicheverybody knows in language whichnobody understands. Yet study oftheir writings on how individuals orgroups react and adapt to continualstress and change can be invaluableto a profession as characterized bystress and change as is the military.The Trait pproach

The psychologists' investigations into personality can help us identify'desirable readership traits. The traitor personality approach to leadership,which recognizes the central importance of the leader's ability to galvanize others, seeks to identify thosequalities which make men follow him.Of course, any examination of leadership characteristics will be inconclusive, for there are so many traits thatmay apply and so few consistent traitpatterns.Despite its inconclusiveness, this approa ch has found certain characteristics that are generally correlated withleadership. These core traits provideus with a list for self-improvement orfor guiding and counseling others indeveloping their leadership capabilities. While these traits, such as an nterest in people, or decisiveness, arenot easily developed, they can be cultivated and nourished. In short, leaders can be made as well.as born.Motivation FactorsTo supplement the trait approach to

l e ~ e r s h i p psychologists can assist usto understand motivation. What causessome men to do their job willingly andefficiently while others respond in anegative and mediocre manner? Whatinfluence do rewards and punishmentplay in motivation? How should thesebe applied? How do intrinsic and ex-

trinsic factors influence the individual? The very nature of these questions indicates that motivation is afocal point in understanding behavior.Motives are not all as simple aswanting food or trying to avoid fa

tigue duty. They vary in frequency, inintensity, and in direction or valence.They can be directed towara shortrange goals Of distant ones. They canbe physiological or strongly social.

In seeking to motivate others, theleader must recognize the differencebetween intrinsic motivation (satisfying by the very nature of the task)and extrinsic motivation (providinga means to another goal). The formeris, of course, more lasting while thelatter is more immediate and evanescent.ttitudest is not uncommon to find men, bothin and out of the military profession,who will-under certain conditionsundergo arduous tasks for considerations other than material reward.

Learning how to create and mai'ntainsuch conditions over extended periodsand in the face of situations whichvary from indifference to hostility isthe challenge.Motivation does not occur in a void;it is linked with attitudes, which arethe comparatively stable feelings, ortendencies, which predispose individuals to act in certain ways. The serviceman approaches his military career,either voluntarily or involuntarily,with certain attitudes that haveevolved through his educational'development, home influence, and spiritualguidance. t is upon these positive attitudes that the leader builds. He develops the soldier both as an individual and as a member of a team oriented toward unit goals.More specifically, attitudes influence

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the wayan individual sees or per-ceives things, the way he interpretsevents. A person sees what he wishesto see and hears what he wants tohear, In the development of an individual's perception of a situation,there is a good deal of omitting, sup-p,lementing, and structuring. t is theleader's task to understand the pat-terns of his followers' perceptions andto try to reinforce those which producehigh regard for the leader and groupand which encourage mission-orientedbehavior.Influence of PersonalityAll of the foregoing factors are aspects of the complete personality. Per-sonality is the sum o the dynamiccharacteristics within the individualwhich determines his reactions to environment. t is' a product of heredity,environment, and maturation level andis an integrated whole, not just a listing of traits.

The leader's personality inevitablydiffers from that of the follower. Thishas been the subject of much res' arch.t is generally concluded that follow

ers are less concerned about prestige,dominance, and power and that theypossess lower levels of aspirations.Caution in generalizing is indicated,however, by the fact that sociometricstudies show that good leaders musthe good followers, at least in democratic societies. Leadership and followership should not be considered as twoextremes of the same continuum. In-difference, rather than followership, isthe opposite of leadership.Since the leader operates in a socialsetting, we should be aware of the interactions between the leader and themembers of his unit or organization.All individuals in a unit have certainsocial needs which they try to satisfy,such as, status, security, and dignity.

Most of these needs are satisfied bysocial interactions. To complicate theproblem, the leader, too, has personalmotives which may not coincide withhis institutional role as leader. If, in

U Af mlJThe leader must be capable of motivating f lis men t actions which may be far

removed from their persona desirespursuing his own personal needs, theleader fails to satisfy the subordinate's needs, someone else will; if theformal leader does not function effectively, an informal head will emergeto weaken or destroy the formal leader's influence.As the institutional head of his unit,the leader must not only possess thetechnical knowledge to accomplish themission (which is paramount); hemust also be capable of motivating hismen to actions which may be far removed from their personal desires.Only by knowing and by understanding his men, and by increasing thesatisfactions which they derive from

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the group, can the leader inspire themto accomplishments under the gamutof conditions which currently typifymilitary service.roup PsychologyPerhaps the one contribution of thesociologist most directly applicable tothe military leader's tasks is thatbranch known' as social psychology,

~ specifically the portiQn Qf it dealing with small grQUps An organization can be viewed merely as a cQlIec-tion of individuals with a common aim.In reality, hQwever, a close-knit groupcan better be viewed as we do the individual, as an organism with attitudesand behavior patterns all its own.Within the main group, subgroupsemerge, consisting of individuals withcommon interests and experiences, andinformal Qrganizations develop andflourish within the formal organization.

The purposes and attitudes whichgroup members share lead to the development of group norms and sharedframes of reference. These serve asa common basis for understanding andsimplify the establishment of rules andstandards. They provide the basis forgroup solidarity, ease of communication, and unit identification. Additionally, group norms are behavior standards. Members of a unit have very different personalities, yet understandone another while working together,for they interpret one another's behavior through common ri'orms. Thesenorms are, in turn, accepted and internalized by members of the group.

Membership within a group provides satisfaction for some of man'smost basic needs. Fulfilling these needsmay be so important to the person involved that he will be willing to foregophysical well-being-even to risk hislife-for their attainment. These so-

cial needs may be subdivided into threecategories: affiliative, status, and' security needs.

The individual who wishes to affiliate With a group must generally acceptthe group standards of behavior. Themore one adheres to them, the more heis likely to identify himself with thegroup, since the group reference hasbecome his reference. This manifestsitself in his behavior, by which heseeks to approach identity with whathe considers normal for the group.This phenomenon can be used in themilitary services in developing esprite corps

The more the individUllI adheres togroup rules and ideals, the more complete his acceptance as a fellow member. Departure from the norm of behavior by a member will normally result in pressure by others to align thedeviate with the group norm. The morevalued the member, the greater will besuch pressure. The type and intensityof pressure applied will vary from situation to situation, but in all instanceswill be designed to restore behavior tothe group norm.Belongingness contributes directly to group cohesiveness and achievement. A leader's understanding of thefactors contributing to it will help himto foster this feeling among subordinates. In military organizations, thechain of command should foster unitidentification in its subordinates. Normally, identification will occur firstand be the strongest at the lowest unitlevel. The soldier identifies with hissquad or crew before he develops battalion or squadron spirit.

Within an organization, the individual sees himself in relation to the othermembers. His status needs may be satisfied through dominance Qver Qthers

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or through socially approved behaviorsuch as the accomplishment of somefunction valued by the group. Thepoint is that every man desires recog-nition. Because the attainment of sta, tus depends on responses of others, theindividual achieves status by the rec-ognition he receives, explicitly or im-plicitly, in the group to which he be-longs.Finally, security needs are fulfilledwithin the group by the adherence togroup norms and group acceptance.Membership in a group, therefore, notonly provides satisfaction to its ini-tiates, but also bolsters the insecureamong them.Human Relations

Human relations practices have aplace in the conduct of the militaryleader with respect to his unit. Theyare successful when each member ofthe group sees the accomplishment ofa mission as contributing to the ful-fillment of his own personal needs.These practices in a military situationvary with the mission, size, and com-position of the unit. applied discrim-inately, not routinely, they foster unitesprit if incorrectly applied, they un-dermine unit integrity.Most important, human relationscannot be so. oriented toward the fol-lower that unit proficiency and missionaccomplishment are impaired. A com-mander can, for example, conductsound human relations practices andstill exercise supervision and punish-ment authority. Human relations is ameans to an end to the military pro-fessional, not an end in itself.

In addition to indicating the influ-ences of leadership traits and groupdynamics, psychologists and sociolo-gists can help illumine situational fac-tors external to the individual and thegroup ,which must be considered in

appraising leadership problems, Situ-ational variables arise with differentunits, different theaters of operations,and different missions. Military lead-ership requires flexibility in technique,for methods applicable in one situa-tion may not work in another.

Experience can, therefore, neverdictate-but only guide-future ac-tion. This statement has particularpertinence in an era in which revolu-tionary developments in the tools andtechniques of warfare have produceda disjunction in the military art. ntoday's milieu, rational action to definein advance the probable environmentand to determine ways of minimizingor circumventing the constraints in-herent in it is essential. In the past,security matters have characteristic-ally been handled pragmatically; how-ever, the pace of modern war, cold orhot, no longer permits military lead-ers to accumulate decades or evenyears of experience in dealing withproblems before having to decide howto deal with them.

ctive SharingIn the brief space allotted, it is im-possible to trace the relevant ideas ofall the social sciences in even the sket-chy detail given in the foregoing topsychology and sociology. Economics,political science, and anthropology allhave concepts and methods which the

military man could profitably employin some circumstances, particularly indischarging his new or extended coldwar missions. Foremost among theseis 'his responsibility to share activelyin the development of national policy.With the boundaries between war andpeace so blurred and the distinctionsbetween foreign policy and militarypolicy so fuzzy, the military is nolonger regarded as passive onlookers

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unt'il other instruments have failedand war is the, only recourse.conomic and Political ContextEven in fields where yesterday's mil

itary man would not have dared tres.pass, such as economics, today's officeris being asked for advice. Althoughthe aavice of the professional economist will also'presumably be availableon questions such as aid, gold flow andforeign procurement, the intertwiningof military and economic considerations means that the military manmust understand the issues involvedand be able to discuss them with theeconomist.

The military commander and theeconomist, alike, are concerned withthe efficient use of scarce resources.Economists have developed severaltools whieh the military can borrowfor example, marginal analysis, whichis the procedure of allocating resources so that the employment of thelast item, man or dollar, devoted toa particular use is optimized-that is,the item would not yield a higher return if it were applied to any otheruse. Similarly, production possibility and uindifference curves can beused systematically to explore the besthlend of resources for a given purpose.

Indeed, a whole systems analysismethod for optimizing strategic aswell as budgetary decisions has beendeveloped by economists and others inrecent years. While many militaryproblems are not easily quantified, andhence cannot be handled rigorously bythese methods, even they can often bebetter dealt with by a systematic costand gains approach.

If the professional officer is to offersound cold war advice, he must developan awareness of the political contextin which military decisions are made.The political feedback from militaryecember 963

activities can become critical for acountry such as the United Stateswhich has over half a million men, accompanied by a million dependents,stationed in nearly 50 countries.International Scene

In this context, military men willfind it helpful to consult the politicalscientists' studies on the nature ofpower and how it is wielded, particularly on the international scene. Anawareness of the pervasiveness of thecompetition for influence, and an appreciation of the shifting role playedby military power therein, will helphim to understand anti cope with thepolitical environment-whether thatof a national community, within analliance, or between hostile nations.

The rise of the newly independentand less developed countries of Africaand Asia and the tensions attendantupon their nation-building efforts area further subject of concern to bothsocial scientists and military professionals. Political scientists and sociologists have developed a specills of systems analysis for analyzing these societies which the military might wellborrow.This type of analysis focuses on thefunctions which any society must perform and then explores the methods,styles, and institutions for their performance in the country under investigation. If Khrushchev's promise of

wars of national liberation in thenew states indicates the pattern of thefuture, our profession must quicklylearn about these areas which the Communists are determined to liberate.

Anthropologists can probably teachus more about the less developed nations than any of the other social scientists. Their concept of culture,which they generally define as the2

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shared values and beliefs underlyinga community s institutions and cus-toms, can throw light for the militaryon such questions as what taboos toobserve, how to elicit cooperation, 01under what conditions a society is will-ing to fight for independence ratherthan to acquiesce in domination. Al-though they have specialized in com.paratively primitive cultures, the an-thropologists findings can also helpus understand our own societies by thecontrasts and generalizations whichthey afford.

No officer, regardless how brilliant,can hope to master all of the materialin the social sciences which is relevantto his profession. Certainly, there isinsufficient time in the formal educa-tional process for the military m nfully to explore these fields. Yet thenature of the crisis in Which we findourselves, and the consequent burgeon.ing of our responsibilities, requires usat least to be aware of the kinds ofassistance-in information, concepts,and analytical tools-which the socialscientist can offer.

. . . our future lies in the leadership and counsel that Army officers pro-vide in unified joint and combined headquarters in allied counsels in theJoint Chiefs of Staff Organization, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense,and in other ~ e n i e s of the Government.

Secretary of the rmy Cyrus R Vance

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NEUTR LISMLieutenant Colonel Arthur S. Hyman, aited State Army

NEUTRALISM is a relatively newphenomenon in the history of international relations. For this reason,the words neutralism. nonalign-ment, and neutrality are often (andincorrectly) used interchangeably. Theresult has been a rather widespreadobscurity about the meaning and im-plications of neutralism in world poli-tics. A brief semantic exercise mayhelp to reduce this obscurity and setthe stage for a m 0 r e accurateanalysis.

Neutrality is deeply imbedded in in-ternational law. t is a legal status ofstates which demands certain rightsfrom the belligerents in time of warand accepts certain obligations towardthese belligerents. t is a status whichcomes into existence only after a warhas begun.

Nonalignment is a policy of politicalpassivity. t connotes a policy of re-maining free of bloc conflicts, nothingmore. A nonaligned state remains clearof military alliances with a lY bloc orgreat power. t also assetts tliat aUforeign policy issues will be judgedon their merits.

The advocates of neutralism have,in consensus with those espousing non-alignment, a strong desire not to takesides in any bloc conflict. In contrastto nonalignment, the policy of neutralism goes much further-i t involves apolicy of positive action toward blocconflicts. A neutralist state assumes anobligation to help reduce tensions be-tween blocs with a view toward themaintenance of peace or bringingabout peace. From this, it'may be con-cluded that a major foreign policy ob-

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jective of a state espousing neutralismis the reduction of tensions whichcould lead to war.CornerstoneNeutrality, for over 100 years before World War II, was a cornerstoneof United States foreign policy. We'isolated ourselves-protected by geog.raphy and the British Navy-and di.rected our efforts toward domestic affairs. Americans felt that the best wayto avoid war, especially in Europe,was to remain neutral toward all belligerents, claiming and maintainingcertain legal rights and duties.

In the vastly altered world arenaof today, the neutralist sees that thebest way of remaining out of war isby preventing war. Thus it seems thatthe policy of neutrality has been transformed by circumstances into a morepositive policy of neutralism-an altered means to the same goal.

From t i s analysis, neutralismwould appear to have emerged throughnecessity as a modern policy version ofthe classic status of neutrality. Nonalignment, on the other hand, wouldappear to have developed as an intermediate stage at some point in timebetween neutrality and' neutralism.While this article focuses on south andsoutheast Asia, it must be understoodthat many factors are common in otherareas of the world.

Lieutenant Colonel Arthur S. Hy-mall is with the Special Warfare Di-rectorate Office of the Deputy Chiefof Staff for Operations. Departmentof the Army He served in the Pacificduring World War l and was wtththe 40th Infantry Division during theKorean Conflict. He is a graduate ofthe U S. Army Command and GeneralStaff College. the Armed Forces StaffCollege. and the U S. Army Waro l l g ~

Factors A ooref,1 n 'M; ' ; . 'f I ; ~ - :relationship between the mternatlOnal. environment and internal conditionsof the newly independent countriesduring the early postwar period is es lsential to the understanding of thepolicy of nonalignment and, subsequently, neutralism. It was the interrelationship between the two thatmade the early emergence of a policy !of nonalignment a natural transformation.

The aftermath of World War tbrought with it the rapid erosion ofthe colonial power of Western nationsin Asia. In India the transition to independence was measured and relatively harmonious; in Indonesia andIndochina, violent and bloody. In everyinstance, independence was predictable, inevitable, and desirable. Nevertheless, regardless of the various con-ditions of colonial rule, the passage ofimperialism left the new countries ina condition of physical weakness andemotional exhaustion.

In addition, they were, without ex-ception, seriously weak economicallyand, in varying degrees. in the qualityof their human resources-resourcesneeded to administer modern countries. conduct foreign affairs, developdemocratic institutions, initiate andmanage economic development, andeducate their backward people. Com-p ely ab ed by these serious problem at h me, it was little wondel' thatthe rs of the new states viewedthe outside world with a lack of understanding and deep foreboding.

In large part, neutralism in this re-gion was the child of colonialism andnationalist revolution, and bequeathedto south and southeast Asia a legacyof pervasive anti-Western sentiment.A deep and basic distrust of the West

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etn Powers e1

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.NEUTRALISMonly in China ut throughout theworld, without exception, one inclineseither toward imperialism or towardsocialism. Neutrallty is merely a cam-ouflage; a third road does not exist.These early lessons in Communistintentions did not go unobservedthroughol!t Asia. Fear of the power

,1946. Prime Minister Jawahlrlal Neh.lru declared in September of that year Ithat India would: ,. . . . keep away from power politici

of groups, aligned against one -other, which had led in the past tworld wars and which may again leadto disasters on an ever vaster scale.All the basic premises of the policy: Comm,""' ~ ~ r to-

.

ed China has proved to be an imperialistic and ruthless neighborfluence on indigenous Communist Par-ties, in addition to strong nationalisticfeelings and distrust of Western nations, kept the neutralists from moving toward any alignments. In fact, theearly", postwar events seemed to havereinforced the convictions of theseAsian leaders as to the correctness oftheir nonalignment policies.volution

The first recorded official declaration of a policy of nonalignment camewith the independence of India in

such as anticolonialism, nonalignment with power blocs, and faith inthe protection of the United Nationswere elaborated by him in a speecha few days later. This Indian policy ofnonalignment served as a model forother new states emerging from colo-nial domination.

With the advent of political independence, nationalism was manifestedby the urge for modernization andrapid social improvements. But thesuccess of social and economic develop-

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ment within the backward countriesof Asia depended upon peaceful conditions-internally and internationally. The fear of another world warwhich might destroy their national independence. if not their very existeMe,prompted these states to seek peace,often at any cost. They began to arguestrongly ~ total disarmament andpeaceful settlements of disputes.The support which they gave theUnited Nations was largely based onthe belief that the world body was theonly hope and workable organizationfor peaceful settlement of international disputes. They also found in theUnited Nations an instrumentality inwhich they were able to realize equality with other nations and a means ofmaximizing their influence in worldaffairs.Fundamental DifferencesOne might conclude that the neutralist states followed identical policies on all international issues. Thisis far from the truth. There were important and fundamental differencesin the nation'al and regional factorswhich influenced domestic policy in thecountries and caused significant variances in foreign policy. Internal conditions-the presence of strong rightor leftwing political parties, socialstructure, economic conditions, geographical location, and security requirements-were but some of theseelements. he s e differences weregraphically demonstrated to the worldfirst at the Bandung Conference of955 and later at the Neutral NationsSummit Conference held in Belgradein 1961.Although major differences in out

look on many issues existed among theleading neutralist states, especially-those of a regional nature, the Belgrade Conference demonstrated most

forcefully to the world that these uncommitted states had some stronglyshared interests and had become anactive and significant force with whichboth the East and West blocs had toreckon. Twenty-five neutralist countries produced at Belgrade, for thefirst time, a comprehensive and complete statement of shared opinions oninternl tional questions. As a groupthey were united by at least threemajor preoccupations:

Anxiety to avoid involvement inthe East-West dispute. Economic development. Safeguarding their independenceand fighting colonialism.The clear and comprehensive state

ment of objectives and goals which resulted from the Belgrade Conferencedemonstrated how far neutralism hadevolved as a positive world force sinceNehru rather hesitantly observed in1947 that India's foreign policy willbe rather vague." t seems reasonableto conclude, however, that only thestrongest of external pressures, ashave been generated in the cold warthese past 17 years, could have forcedso diverse a group of states to for-mulate jointly international goals.old War PressuresThe initial reactions of both theSino-Soviet bloc and the Western nations toward those Asian countriesespousing a policy of nonalignmentwere a mixture of puzzlement, dismay,

and often enmity. Neutralism was frequently looked upon by Western observers as simply the reflection of someperverse shortsighted or selfish codeof Asian values which failed to dis-tinguish between communism anddemocratic traditions of the West. orstill worse which favored the Marxistphilosophy.

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The Soviet Union contemptuouslyreferred to the neutralist leaders aslackeys, stooges, and tools of theimperialists, and, as previously mentioned, in 1948 launched local Communist insurrections throughout Asia.Mao Tse-tung had made clear the pos,ition of the Chinese Communists withrespect to a third road. Secretary ofState John Foster Dulles expressedthe views of many Western leaderswhen he aid in 1956 that neutralitywas ,tan obsolete conception and, except under very exceptional circumstances, was an immoral and short-sighted conception. On 4 July 1956Vice President Richard M. Nixon,speaking in Manila, said that:

. . . a condition for commandingAmerican sympathy was that foreignnations ust make a moral distinctionbetween the communist world and thefree world

ard actWith the passage of time and increased threat of nuclear weapons, thecold war struggle appears to have become a no-war-no-peace reality. TheUnited States, the Soviet Union, and,. to a lesser extent, Red China seem tohave become more and more reconciledto neutralism as a hard fact of inter-national life. .Since the death of Stalin, the Soviet Union has increased appreciablyher efforts to swing the uncommittedstates toward her side by repeatedstrong stands against colonialism inany form and offers of economic aidand military assistance.Peking, likewise, radically changedits approach tow a r d neighboringAsian countries. At the Bandung Conference, Chinese Foreign MinisterChou' En-Iai exerted all his diplomaticskills to promote the new Red Chineseforeign policyl n e

Although a gradual change in attitude by both blocs toward the neutral.ists became apparent, the increasingimportance of neutralism itself represented the most compelling inducementmechanism for the change.Gradually, t he neutralist statesdeveloped skill in using the instrumentality of the United Nations for political maneuvering, and thereby in-creased its value to them. The develop.ment of a balance between the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union in bothstrategic and tactical nuclear weaponsimposed rigid restraints upon the ability of each t act, and, consequently,further increased the capacity of theneutralists to resist alignment.ReevaluationThe increasing significance of neu-tralism as a world force, coupled witha discernible change in Sino-Sovietstrategy, forced the United States toreevaluate her foreign policy. In retrospect, it appears that earlier US foreign policy vis-a-vis the neutralistcountries of Asia lacked both understanding and flexibility.A better insight into US foreign pol-icy, as it was applied in the westernPacific, requires that we look brieflyat the policies of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. By the endof 1949, a clear-cut pattern of US pol-icy had become evident, with the firstpriority on strengthening Western Europe's security.

To meet the demands of this gigantic task, it was felt that United Statescommitments in Asia had to be reduced. This decision resulted, in part,from the triumph of the Chinese Com-munists, and the belief that if a globalwar occurred, it would be ignited inEurope, not in Asia. In the early partof 1950, the United States was at apoint of charting a new course in her

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Far Eastern policy-a course aimed atavoiding military involvement.As a result of the Korean War, however, and under the guidance of thenext Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles,US foreign policy in Asia was reversed. This policy, until then, seemedto be based upon one premise: communism could be contained in Asiaonly by the establishment of an unbroken chain of alliances.Suspicion lind distrust. of US motives and policies in Asia was sharplyincreased when Dulles warned the Chinese Communists of the grave consequences which might arise if they intervened in Indochina. t was in thisconnection that he gave voice to a contemplated change in America's over-aUstrategy. Speaking before the Councilof Foreign Relations in New York inJanuary 1954, Dulles declared, in effect, that a new emphasis would beplaced by the United States on the deterrent of massive retaliatory powerthat would be employed instantly, bymeans and at times of our own choosing to counterbalance the weaknessesof the containment policy-a cornerstone of US foreign policy under President Truman.amage DoneAlthough Dulles quickly qualifiedhis remarks, the damage had been

done US attempts to force the neutralist countries to choose sides in thecold war and her threat to use nuclearweapons to contain communism created deep anxiety and distrust amongthe neutralist leaders, who either didnot share our apprehensions or fearedto provoke their Communist neighbors,Then, too, the neutralists realisticallysaw that their policy of neutralismcould not protect them in the event ofa nuclear war.As the United States entered the

present decade, some of the past policy errors seemed apparent to our leaders. The right and propriety of neutralism was no longer questioned inthe highest policy-making levels, despite an occasional cry of outrage atevidence of such unneutral neutralism as that displayed at the BelgradeConference. Recently, in answer to anurgent plea from Mr. Nehru, theUnited States promptly delivered armsto India for the purpose of defenseagainst the outright Red Chinese aggression directed from Peking.

What the future of this force ofneutralism will be is anybody's guess.Recent events on the Chinese-Indianborder may have forced the Asian neutralists to reevaluate their foreign policies. t seems reasonable to conclude,however, that they have becoroe awareof the value and importance of neutralism as a force in world affairs.

Other factors which, n the past,contributed to the emergence of neutralism still remain-the cold war continues unabated, economic and socialconditions are still critical, Red Chinahas proved to be an imperialistic andruthless neighbor, and democratic institutions, at best, operate precariouslyin many neutralist countries. In thisenvironment, regardless of both theoutcome of the Chinese-Indian borderdispute and the Sino-Soviet split, thepolitical status of neutralism shouldcontinue to offer many tempting inducements to the weaker states.

t is conceivable, moreover, that theneutralist countries offer the best hopefor ultimately bridging the gap between the East and the West. Theirmiddle position enables them to provide an acceptable channel of communications in a world where the loss ofdiplomatic contact could mean a catastrophe.

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INDONESIAMajor Edgar O Ballance, Territorial Army Great Britain

NDONESIA is one of the world smost prominent neutrals. Her strategic position 011 southeast Asia causesher to be courted by both the West-ern and the Eastern blocs.Sometimes a neutral, sitting on thefence, has influence and prestige outof proportion to her size and potential.Is this the case with Indonesia?

With a population of 97 millionpeople, the Republic of Indonesia,comprising an area of about 1.9 mil-lion square kilometers, is made up. ofsome 3,000 islands spread over a largeexpanse of ocean, 011 the southeast

Jcorner of the Asian Continent. Thelarger and better known of the islandsa t least to Western readers-are

Sumatra, Java, Borneo, the Celebes,and the Moluccas. Java contains morethan half of the total population andthe Republic s capital, Djakarta (Ja-karta . The capital, formerly knownas Batavia, has a population of overthree million people.

For centuries these islands wereruled by the Netherlands. At the turnof the 20th century, nationalismmade its appearance. The first Na-tionalist Party was formed in 1911;

ilitary Review

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in its wake, others of a similar character sprang tip over the ensuingyears.

An Indonesian Communist Partywas formed in 1920, but it wascrushed six years later after a seriesof disturbances. During the period between the two World Wars, Nationalist and Socialist political parties weretolerated but not encouraged by theDutch.During World War the islandswere occupied by the Japanese whoallowed an Indonesian nationalist government to exist under their control.In this government, two local leaderscame to the fore-Dr. Achmed Sukarno and Dr. Mohammad Hatta.When tl)e Japanese surrendered in

1945, Sukarno proclaimed his country's independence, but the Britishmilitary forces which had moved inyielded control to 'the Dutch the following year.Upon returning to Indonesia, theDutch were faced with this de factorival nationalist government which

wanted independence. Negotiationsbroke down in 1947, and there followed a two-year, guerrilla-type struggleThe Dutch showed they could takeand hold the cities, but could notmaster the countryside. In 1948 Sukarno was captured, but other nation-Major Edgar O Ballance is a Territorial officer with the 5th Battalionof the Sherwood Foresters in Derbyshire, England. His assignments haveincluded duty as a staff officer, regimental duty, and commander of a battalion in Burma against the Japaneseduring World War II A frequent contributor to the MILITARY REVIEW, Ma-

o jor O Ballance has written extensivelyo Asian affairs.

alist leaders continued the struggle.At last, weary of the fight and of adverse world opinion, the Dutch decidedto withdraw. The transfer of powerover all the former Dutch East Indies,except Dutch New Guinea, took placelate in 1949; in 1950 Sukarno, asPresident, proclaimed the Republic ofIndonesia.Early DaysThe Indonesian Rep ubI i c wasfounded on the five principles of belief in God, nationalism, humanitariapism, social justice, and democracy;the separate provinces were grantedbroad regional autonomy. Electionswere held and President Sukarno governed through a series of coalitioncabinets that were formed on a Moslem-nationalist basis. The CommunistParty, which was legal, was not represented.

Revolt torn and chaotic, the Republic ambled uneasily along until 1957when President Sukarno, tired ofsquabbling politicians and factions,introduced his gUided democracy allowing the Communists to take partin the government. He decided, afterthis trial period, that the Westerntype democracy was not suitable forthe diverse peoples of Indonesia.

Since about 1955 President Sukarnohas globetrotted many countries, bothof the Eastern and the Western blocs,refusing to b e com e enmeshed intreaty obligations with either-altbough he has accepted loans, arms,and other aid at various times fromboth camps.Armed ForcesFormally established in October1945, the Indonesian armed forceshave their roots in a J apanese-sponsored paramilitary youth movementwhich was introduced during the pe

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/1 ; MOLUCC ISL NDSs- _a CQ >CELEBES

CER MK R T B NOUNG

l B LI . - fJ V . 'I;:? t ~ PORTUGUESE TIMORce t

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riod of Japanese occupation. This organization developed into a nationalarmy which faced the Dutch whenthey returned in 1946. When independence became an accomplished factin 1949, the national forces had increased to over 600 OOO--nly a smallproportion were under President Sukarno's direct control. The bulk consisted of guerrilla and partisan groupsspread throughout the islands-someof which were of doubtful loyalty andhad dubious aims.The immediate and most urgentneed was to produce an efficient, unified. disciplined, smaller army to keepinternal order and prevent fragmentation. For example. military action hadto be taken against the Amboinese.who had been Dutch mercenaries forgenerations and who were reluctantto accept the authority of the newRepublican Government. There wasneither the cash nor available equipment to maintain a large standingforce.

Strength was slowly reduced to300.000. and then to 200.000. Today,in keeping with the events of the lastfew years, the armed forces numberabout 400,000 personnel.

rmyIn character, the army is mainly infantry, consisting of about 130 infantry battalions distributed in some16 regional brigade groups on a looseterritorial basis. There are a limitednumber of specialist units, such asfield engineers, artillery, antiaircraft.armor, signal, and transportation. Byand large, though, the IndonesianArmy is still in the rifle and machinegun stage of development.

There is a large detachment ofparatroops, said to be about 30,000 Indonesia Armed Forces, Militaf1l ReviewOctober 1963 p 107

strong. The remainder of the i ~ n t r y is fairly well grounded in basic infantry work, with the accent being ondefensive measures and guerrilla warfare. It is boasted that 75 percent ofthe men have combat experience inthat sphere. The standard of trainingtends to vary from island to island,the most efficient being located onJava where the built of the armedforces are. and where smart detachments of all arms are always availableto show the flag.Ample volunteers have been available, and it has not been necessary toimplement conscription which hasbeen introduced recently. Soldiers tendto stay on in the army if they can because of the attractive conditions ascompared with civilian ones, and theturnover of men has been slow.

NavyThe Indonesian Navy was established in 1949. the departing Dutchproviding a few small craft to formthe nucleus. Since then other shipshave been accumulated from varioussources.

Today, the Indonesian Navy, with amanpower strength of about 40,000,operates 250 ships. The fleet includesone 19 OOO-ton heavy cruiser, two frigates mounting ship-to-ship g u i e dmissiles, about 20 submarines. sevenmodern destroyers. an antisubmarinehelicopter squadron. approximately 60motor torpedo boats, and 12 patrolcraft.t has a sizable marine detachmentwhich has recently received a numberof Soviet-type amphibious vehicles.The navy also has an air arm equippedwith Gannet antisubmarine aircraft,and lbatross and Catalina flyingboats. More Soviet helicopters areexpected, as well as some Soviet missiles.

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ir ForceWith 23,000 men, the Indonesian

Air Force has some 100 Soviet i -15, 17, and 19 fighters, plus 18 longrange, t wi n - j e t MiG-21 s. In thebomber category..are 20 Il-28 turbojet aircraft and 10 pure jet TU-16 s.

President Aehmed SukarnoThe air force possesses a respectabletransport capability with 'its US C-47 s and C-180 s and numerous Soviettroop carrier aircraft. In addition, theIndonesians are said to possess around100 Soviet SA-2 Guideline surfaceto-air missiles, effective up to about60,000 feet.

The over-all d e due t ion must bethat as the armed forces are slowlybecoming modernized, it will be sometime before they could be capable ofsuccessful sustained action against anarmed force of any first, or evensecond-rate power. They are, however, adequate to keep internal order

and quell island revolts. Conversely,the guerrilla potential of Indonesiain terrain, armed forces, and the peo-ple is great.Internal ProblemsLike any young country, Indonesiahas her share of internal problemsbuilding up a sound economy, estab.lishing industrialization, raising thestandard of living, and wiping out i1literacy. There are, however, threepotential issues that may affect herinternational standing and influence.These are:

Fragmentation. Communist r i v l r y with thearmy. The survival of President Suokarno.

FragmentationThere is an inherent rivalry -tween the various ethnic groups

there are 12 different ethnic groupsand about 114 different languages. Insome cases, regional autonomy doesnot seem to be enough.

In 1952 an abortive revolt was ledby General Abdul Haris Nasution,then Chief of Staff of the ArmedForces, against the central government. Until that moment the armywas considered to be completely loyalto President Sukarno. but this showedthat it was becoming politically con-scious and more independent. GeneralNasution was reconciled with President Sukarno, and three years laterwas restored to his former positionas chief of staff. Today, he is bothChief of Staff of the Armed Forcesand Minister of Security.

The Revolt of the Colonels occurred in 1957 when s ev e r a I localarmy commanders proclaimed a seriesof coups. This movement spread untilthe central government controlled onlyJava and parts of Sumatra. The reb

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els in Sumatra began negotiatingwith foreign s u r ~ s for imports andexports. A state of siege had to bedeclared and the situation was finallyrestored by the ever popular, PresidentSukarno, skillfully using his tremendous prestige.The Revolt of the Outer Islandsbroke out the following year, and thecentral government had to use force

to cope with it. Although order wasrestored by the army, it was admitted,n December 1958, that there werestill over 10,000 armed rebels at large.These events show that s i r ~ forlocal independence are real, and thatany weakness of the central government may be exploited. Realizing this,the army has always favored strongcentral control. Danger of fragmenta-tion exists, and, should it occur, thepower and influence of Indonesiawould wane accordingly.

rmy versus CommunismThe next problem, yet to be solved,is the army versus communism disputewhich may one day project the country into a bitter civil war which couldattract foreign Communist intervention.In 1948 the Communists tried topull off a coup but were crushed, andsome of the leaders were executed.Even though the Communists polledsome six million votes at the generalelections after independence, Presi-dent Sukarno, for some time, wouldnot have them in his coalition cabinets.Today, the Indonesian CommunistParty claims to have over two millionmembers and is the third strongestin the world, The large, growing Communist Party is counterbalanced bythe army which is strongly pro-Moslem and anti-Communist. So far, theCommunists have been unable to gain

a foothold in the armed forces, andthe army has prevented the Communists from exploiting into the countryside.

When granted emergency powersduring the revolt of 1958, GeneralNasution banned the right of publicassembly and curtailed free speech.Both of these measures hit the Communists hard. Since 1958 the Presi-dent has tended to favor the armedforces, to the Communists' detriment.Although temporarily checked, theIndonesian Communist Party is stillt p9werful organization with greatPotentialities, and the army fully realizes the danger. The Moslem and Nationalist political parties do not yetfully share this view, but all dislikethe Communist program.

The army has taken a leaf from theCommunist handbook and is activelyparticipating in the battle for theminds of the peasants. Short coursesof instruction are held for both offi-cers and men in subjects such as agri-culture, social services, public health,and anti-Communist propaganda. Soldiers are sent out into the villages toteach the peasants to read, and theysupply suitable anti-Communist propaganda to read. Occasionally, theyhelp in the fields and assist on minorprojects such as irrigating, sinkingwells, building houses, and constructing roads. They are prepared to offeradvice and guidance as well as practical help. t is in this way that thearmy has been able, in the countryside.to keep the Communists at bay.

The armed forces and the Communists are uneasy bedfellows, and bothrealize that the real struggle forpower is yet to come. f and when itdoes come, the danger lies not only inthe Republic being torn by civil war,

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but y huge clandestine injections ofexternal Communist infiltration andaid.The resident

As long as President Sukarno remains the active leader, it is reasonable to assume that the existing statuswill continue. The President is agifted coordinator who has, over theyears, successfully persuaded politicalgroups and factions and the army towork together under his leadership.He has attained a sort of magical influence ~ r the people of Indonesia,and his personal popularity has enabled him to stay well above partysquabbles. He has an uncanny politicalsense, and he knows when to r ~ witha loose rein and when to put on thebrake.

t may seem odd in a so-called democracy that one man-a coordinatorrather than a direct administratorshould be the one and, seemingly, onlykeystone. but, to a large extent, thisis so. What will happen if he diSilPpears from the scene?

President Sukarno s stature in Indonesia is such-or appears to be soto an outsider-that no obvious replacement stands hovering in thebackground (although Dr. Hatta isoccasionally mentioned) who couldhold the Republic together.

The removal or President Sukarnomight unleash latent forces. The CommUllists, if they are running true toform, are feverishly preparing forthat day. This could mean civil warand fragmentation.oreign elations

Neutrals have few trustworthy, reliable friends, and smiles and pleasantries frequently hide internationalinsincerity. There have been numerous changes in emphasis and alignment s,ince Indonesia played host to

the famous Bandung Conference in1955.The US attitude has been one ofcautiousness and, accordingly, hasgiyen only limited arms and aid toIndonesia. Today, US aid has beenrestricted, although the United Statesfully realizes the strategic importance

of Indonesia and the disadvantagesthat would ensue if the RepUblicturned Communist. .The Soviet Union, until recently, did

little to help, partly, perhaps, becausethe country was so far distant fromMoscow, or because President Sukarnorefused to be drawn into any com-mitments, or, perhaps, because, in theperiod when the Soviets and RedChina were firm friends, it was feltthat Indonesia fell more naturally intothe Red Chinese sphere of influenceOnly since serious ideological differences between the two Communistgiants have arisen has the SovietUnion decided t increase her military aid to Indonesia.

Indonesia s relations w t h RedChina have been cool. Although Presi-dent Sukarno has publicly admiredMao Tse-tung s methods and results,this has not prevented him from taking over many Red Chinese interestsin Indonesia and deporting numbersof the 3.5 million Chinese domiciledthere.

With Great Britain, President Suokarno has several differences of opin-ion, but so far he has been careful toact correctly. He is displeased withthe recently created Federation ofMalaysia.

Australia also regards Indonesiawith suspicion, and the germ of afuture dispute over the possession ofparts of the island of New Guineaseems to be breeding.

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With his next door n,eighbor, thephilippines, President Sukarno hasanother possible dispute in embryo-this one is in reference to claims toparts of the island of Borneo.Communist infiltration in southeastAsia never ceases. Today, it is corroding South Vietnam and Laos; tomorrow it may have spread farther afield,perhaps to Thailand, Malaysia, or evenIndonesia. Ranged against this creeping persistent advance of a ruthlessideology is only the loose SEATO(Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) framework.Indonesia s strategic position is ofvital importance to SEATO. As longas Indonesia remains neutral and cancontrol her Communist Party, thereis not much to worry about. Thispremise seems to depend, to some large

,extent, upon the survival of the President who has continuously refused tobecome involved in any military alliances.f the st tus qu is interrupted, itwould seem that an active struggle involving open hostilities between thearmed forces and the Communists maybegin which could mean that Indone

sia might become another Vietnam.Should the Communists emergetriumphant from such a struggle, thena distinctly unfriendly power wouldbe set square astride the routes to,and between, the SEATO countries.This happenstance would not onlycause many practical difficulties, it

would probably make SEATO unworkable.On the other hand, should the armedforces gain control, it could meanthat Indonesia would have a totalitarian regime. While military dictatorships do not commend themselvesto Western democracies, it would atleast be strongly anti-Communist.Even if it were not able to enterSEATO, which isn t completely impossible, it might qualify for Westernaid to build up a strong front againstcommunism.No one can say with certainty whatthe eventual outcome will be of thelatest Indonesian reactions to the establishment of the Federation ofMalaysia, particularly those towardthe British. The burning of the British Embassy may be interpreted eitheras a premeditated event-to showdispleasure at Britain s support ofthe new Federation---{)r as an eventcaused when a mob got out of hand.t is difficult to believe that President

Sukarno wants a war with eitherGreat Britain or Australia at thistime.Certainly, the prompt replies ofGreat Britain, the United States,. andAustralia to the events of late September 1963 must have given President SUkarno food for thought. Andthe stand taken by those three countries might well determine Indonesia sfuture course in international affairsfor months to come.

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WHEREIS

RED CHINAHEADED?

Colonel Fernand Schneider. French rmy

RE China in full process ofevolvement with her personal form ofcommunism her astonishing industrialdevelopment and her tragic agricultural stagnation poses-under thepressure of lier demographic growtha distressing problem for the West

ern World.Without question this country is at

a turning point in its history. But itsdestiny far from being shaped in isolation will be inescapably determinedunder the conditions of contacts withother nations-such as the USSR Japan and India-which are themselvesundergoing revolutionary transformations.Under these conditions it is difficultto form .any clear picture of the Com

munist Chinese situation in the nearfuture particularly when related tothe realities aspirations and problems of the Soviet Union.

To begin with t is well to state thatthe so-called Marxist common denomi-nator between Red China and theUSSR does not constitute a determining and exclusive phenomenon. Fromthe ideological standpoints there ex

This article was translated anddigested from the original, pub-lished in the R VU MILITAIREGENERALE (France) February1963, under the title, Qu va laChine? Translation by Mr. a-Vergne Dale, Leavenworth. Kan-sas.

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ists no identity between the Soviet andthe Chinese forms of