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MIPS 2009 Debrief. 23 February 2009. Agenda. Brief Summary of Speaker Presentations Co-opted version of TF 150 Maritime Security Operations Operational Update Q&A. Presentations. MIP ConOps Critical Infrastructure Protection Understanding the Threat US Global Infrastructure Strategy - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
MIPS 2009 Debrief
23 February 2009
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
Agenda
• Brief Summary of Speaker Presentations
• Co-opted version of TF 150 Maritime Security Operations Operational Update
• Q&A
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
Presentations
• MIP ConOps• Critical Infrastructure Protection• Understanding the Threat• US Global Infrastructure Strategy• Infrastructure Security Development• Creating a Common Operating Picture• The Danish Model: VTS and AIS• CTF 150 Operations• USCG Contributions• Identity Management Initiatives• MSSIS Update• Addressing WMD threats• Panels and Scenario
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
Task Force 150
Maritime Security Operations
Operational Update
Commander Thomas Stig Rasmussen RDN
Branch Chief Operations
Danish Task Group
4 FEB 2009
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
Aim of Brief
Bridging the gap by explaining: • What we did• How we did it• Why we did it• Did it work?
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
Geo Strategic Situation
1000 NM
1000 NM
1000 NM
14 regional coastal nations3 chokepoints16.8 million km2
23.000 ships passing the Gulf of Aden Fragile and failed states with porous coast lines
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
CTF 150 is to counter or defeat acts of violent extremism, aggression and associated
terrorist networks in littoral and maritime TF 150 AOR. Work with regional, joint and other partners to improve overall security, stability and regional nations maritime capabilities. Be ready to respond to full range of crises, including environmental and humanitarian events until further notice in order to achieve secure and stable maritime environment free from terrorist activity
CTF 150 mission
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
Crisis Response
Actively prevent
smuggling of narcotics
Theatre Security Cooperation
Safeguarding traffic and explore pattern of life
Deter and disrupt piracy
Protect vulnerable shipping
DNK CTF 150 Campaign Effects Schematic
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
Piracy• Key to long term solution is ashore in Somalia. Remove the motivation
– Establish conditions that preclude criminal activity at sea and ashore– Stability, security, economic prosperity, governance, rule of law
• Piracy is about money – no proven link to terrorism. But could inspire terrorists future actions
– Impact of Al Shabaab? Stopping piracy or using piracy for funding?– No ransom no piracy
• Pirates are not fanatic. They are not willing to die for the “case”
• Definitions of piracy– Hijackings– Attacks– Attempts– Armed robbery
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
Hijackings per Month
What is the threat?
Has the problem moved?
Ships Pirated off Somalia (As of 31 Dec 2008)
0123456789
10
Jan-
05F
eb-0
5M
ar-0
5A
pr-0
5M
ay-0
5Ju
n-05
Jul-0
5A
ug-0
5S
ep-0
5O
ct-0
5N
ov-0
5D
ec-0
5Ja
n-06
Feb
-06
Mar
-06
Apr
-06
May
-06
Jun-
06Ju
l-06
Aug
-06
Sep
-06
Oct
-06
Nov
-06
Dec
-06
Jan-
07F
eb-0
7M
ar-0
7A
pr-0
7M
ay-0
7Ju
n-07
Jul-0
7A
ug-0
7S
ep-0
7O
ct-0
7N
ov-0
7D
ec-0
7Ja
n-08
Feb
-08
Mar
-08
Apr
-08
May
-08
Jun-
08Ju
l-08
Aug
-08
Sep
-08
Oct
-08
Nov
-08
Dec
-08
East Coast of Somalia Gulf of Aden
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
A problem out of control?
According to IMB:
- Risk of being attacked: 1: 340
- Risk of being hijacked: 1: 907
Media hype?
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
Acts of Piracy 2008
Categorization
TOTAL 130
GOA 112
HOA 18
As of 31 DEC 08
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
Darod Clan Group
• AOO Sea: GOA
• AOO Ashore:Bosasso Eyl
• Base: Eyl
• FOB: Caluula and Bargaal
Hawiye Clan Group
• AOO Sea:Somali East Coast
• AOO Ashore:Hobyo Mogadishu
• Base: Harardera & Hobyo
HARADHERE
BOSASSO
EYL
MOGADISHU
HARARDERA
HOBYO
HAWIY
E CLA
N GRO
UP
CALUULADAROD CLAN GROUP
BARGAAL
Piracy Areas
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
Typical Piracy Event (Darod)
BOSSASSO
CALUULA
EYL
Attack
Anchorage area
Stopover areas
GARACAD
XABO
BARGAAL
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
Traffic in GOA (MAR 08)
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
Traffic in GOA (JAN 09)
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
Piracy Activity
62 events of which 20 were successful
15 SEP 2008 – 12 JAN 2009
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
New Transit Corridor
The old corridor
The new corridor
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
Claim:
A combination of international focus, naval forces passive deterrence, offensive disruption and improved self protections measures from ships is now to some degree keeping the piracy in Gulf of Aden at bay
But an enduring solution must be linked to improved situation ashore in Somalia
TF 150 Anti-piracy Ops
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
• Most targets are slow moving ships with low freeboard (tankers and bulk carriers)
• Few examples of attacks on containerships or cruise liners
• Almost all attacks in GOA in daylight
• Direct connection between sea state and piracy
Piracy characteristics & tactics
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
• Pirates use different kinds of mother ships (skiffs, dhows, tugs etc.) to support operations
• One team consisting of one or two skiffs with 5 or 10 pirates
• Up to five teams observed operating simultaneously. Normally no more than two teams
Piracy characteristics & tactics
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
• Pirates have become more determined, but not more violent
• When met with with overwhelming force pirates in small skiffs are willing to surrender. Only dhow mother ships have resisted apprehension
• Leaders know they are “safe” when onboard and in control of M/V
• Reappearance of pirates not observed
Piracy characteristics & tactics
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
• Pirates may de-conflict actions
• Coordination rarely observed
• Pirates are using spoofing
Piracy characteristics & tactics
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
Port Visit
DIRECT SUPPORT TO CTF150
ASSOCIATED SUPPORT TO CTF150
NATIONAL TASKING
CDT BIROT
OAK HILL
BADR
ABSALON
IROQUOIS
Operations – 23 SEP
CHATHAM
VIL. D. QUEBECK
MALAYSIAN TG
COURBET
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
GOKOVA GORKOVA
Port Visit
DIRECT SUPPORT TO CTF 150
ASSOCIATED SUPPORT TO CTF 150
NATIONAL TASKING
ABSALON
Operations – 18 DEC
TOWADA
NORTHUMBL.
WAVE KN.
KARLSRUHE
TIPPU SULTAN
MASON
MYSORE
PORTLAND
PSARA.
EU
PRE M LHER
MVP
SRI INDERA SAKTI NEUSTRASHIMY
DILIGENCE
ARIAKE
ABHA YELNYA
NIVOSE
JEAN DE VIENNE
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
Legal Framework
• UNCLOS • UNSCR 1816• UNSCR 1838• UNSCR 1846• UNSCR 1851• But no legal frame-
work to handle detaines
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
• Most effective efforts are provided by the M/V themselves
• After successful hijacking little we can do
• Find and board when tripwires met
• Measurement of success? Number of attacks versus number of successful hijackings?
Counter Piracy
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
• The traffic corridor enables naval forces to concentrate resources, but pirates know where the targets are
• Naval forces are spread along the corridor, ready to react with Helo
• Quick reporting by M/V is essential. The golden 30 minutes
• Air surveillance is crucial to success
• Convoy/escort operations only part of solution
• Best solution is combined escort and disruption operations
Counter Piracy
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
September
16 NOV: Update to Commanders guidance and intent for MSPA operations.
20 SEP: ABS disarms 10 pirates.
17 SEP: ABS detains 10 pirates.
02 OCT: BRT disarms 12 pirates.
20 OCT: ABS helo and rhib fires warning shots. Pirates looses skiffs, ladder and RPG.
December
03 NOV: ABS disarms 10 pirates.
30 NOV: JDV disarms 4 pirates.
04 DEC: ABS disarms 7 pirates.
13 DEC: MYS detains 12 pirates.
04 NOV: ABS disarms 10 pirates.
07 NOV: CMB disarms 8 pirates.
11 NOV: CMB disarms a total of 31 pirates in 2 incidents.
17 DEC: ABS disarms 9 pirates.
19 DEC: JDV disarms 7 pirates.
25 DEC: KAR foils attack and disarms 4 pirates.
18 NOV: TAB destroys Ekawatnava 5.
November
01 JAN: LHR detains 8 pirates
02 JAN: ABS detains 5 and disarms 19 pirates
January
04 JAN: JDV detains 19 pirates
02 JAN: MYS disarms 7 pirates
Kinetic encounter
Hijacking
Failed Attack
October
Piracy activity
1 – 4 JAN 48 pirates disarmed of which 32 were detained
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
Date UnitNo of pirates Rifles
RPG launchers
Other arms Ladders Action taken
17SEP08 ABS 10 8 1 0 2 Detained – landed, 1 skiff and 1 mothership destroyed
20SEP08 ABS 10 9 1 2 2 Disarmed
02OCT08 BRT 12 ? ? ? ? Disarmed
20OCT08 ABS ? ? 1 ? 1 Shots fired, 1 skiff destroyed
03NOV08 ABS 10 2 0 0 1 Disarmed
04NOV08 ABS 10 8 1 0 0 Disarmed
07NOV08 CMB 8 6 1 0 0 Disarmed, 1 skiff destroyed
11NOV08 CMB 16 7 1 0 1 Disarmed, 1 skiff destroyed
11NOV08 CMB 9 5 1 1 1 7 Detained 2 killed - handed over to Kenya. 1 skiff confiscated
18NOV08 TAB ? ? ? ? ? Vessel neutralised. Crew and pirates killed XMT one. 1 skiff escaped
30NOV08 JDV 4 4 0 0 0 Disarmed - put on a dhow to Somalia, 1 skiff destroyed
04DEC08 ABS 7 5 1 0 0 Handed over to Yemen as sailors in distress, 1 skiff destroyed
13DEC08 MYS 12 7 1 3 0 Handed over to Yemen, 1 skiff confiscated
17DEC08 ABS 9 5 1 1 1 Disarmed, 1 skiff destroyed in the attack on MV Zhen Hua 4
19DEC08 JDV 7 5 2 0 1 Disarmed
25DEC08 KAR 4 3 1 1 0 Disarmed
01JAN09 LHR 8 6 1 0 2 8 pirates detained
02JAN09 MYS 7 ? ? ? ? Disarmed
02JAN09 ABS 5 ? ? ? 1Crew abandoned skiff due to fire, skiff sunk by ABS. 5 pirates detained. Samanyolu incident
Encountered pirates
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
Date UnitNo of pirates Rifles
RPG launchers
Other arms Ladders Action taken
02JAN09 ABS 7 3 1 0 1 Disarmed
02JAN09 ABS 3 3 0 2 0 Disarmed, engine repaired
04JAN09 JDV 10 6 1 0 1 Disarmed, handed over to Puntland
04JAN09 JDV 9 5 1 0 1 Disarmed, handed over to Puntland
Total 177+ 97+ 17+ 10+ 16 11 skiffs destroyed or confiscated
Encountered pirates
Of the 177 pirates encountered: 063 were handed over to authorities107 were released after disarming002+ died005 are still in custody
No confirmed reappearance by any of the 177, but not all had their biometrics registered
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
• Malaysian units (1-2 units since SEP 2008)
• Russian units (2-3 units since OCT 2008)
• Indian units (1 unit since NOV 2008)
• TF 169 (Chinese Force) (2-3 units since JAN 2009)
• TF 432 (NATO Force) (4-6 units OCT – DEC 2008)
• TF 465 (EU Force) (3-4 units since DEC 2008)
Co-ordination with Non coalition Forces
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
• Welcome paperwork• Staff visit – explaining about pattern of life• Exchange of SITREPs including area allocation for
units, convoy schedules, and reports on any actual piracy activities
• Daily summery of activities, intelligence information and assessments (classified, but releasable to all military forces)
• De facto tactical coordination including tasking of units, aircraft and alert helicopters
• Communication crucial
Co-ordination with Non coalition Forces
• Each force provider will have a requirement to promote own presence, which must be accepted and respected
U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively
Conclusion• Combined Maritime Forces / Navies and international organizations have
taken actions:– Maritime Security Patrol Area and traffic corridor established– Vulnerable shipping provided escorts– Naval Forces assigned to deter, disrupt, capture, and destroy pirate equipment– Coordinate, de-conflict, share intelligence / information– UNSCRs passed, providing robust legal mandate for military actions
• Most important factor is merchant ships self defense and information sharing
• Need to focus on counter piracy alone. CTF 151 do just that• Legal framework to deal with apprehended pirates crucial. Significant
movements observed • CTF 150 will revert to “old” mission• Operations are having effect. Problem contained but not eradicated.
When is security good enough? Need to convince commercial shipping• Improvement of conditions ashore in Somalia is the long term solution