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Modern China 中华人民共和国万岁!
FromtheProQuestHistoryStudyCenter
OnOctober1,1949,ChineseCommunistParty(CCP)
chairmanMaoZedongstoodatopBeijing'sGateof
HeavenlyPeaceandproclaimedthefoundingofthe
People'sRepublicofChina(PRC).Mao'sdeclaration
culminatedmorethantwodecadesofCommuniststruggle
againsttherivalNationalist(Kuomintang/KMT)Partyand
theJapanese.Italsocontainedgreatsymbolicmeaning,for
theCCPhadsucceededinunitingChinaafterdecadesof
internaldisarrayandWesternandJapaneseimperialism.
YetthedivergentvisionsandgoalsofCCPleaders
eventuallyledtoadifferentkindofdisarrayand,finally,a
retreatfromtheextremistrevolutionaryvisionofradicals
suchasMao.
InthefirstyearsofCommunistrule,theCCPfocusedon
consolidatingitspowerandbringingtherevolutiontoeach
villageandregion.Communistcadreswontheloyaltyof
millionsofpeasantswiththeirrelativeincorruptibility,land
reformpracticesanddedicationtoreconstructionand
universaleducation.UnderpeacetimeCCPrule,
agriculturalproductionincreasedandpovertyfellforthe
firsttimesincetheanti‐Japanesewar.Yet,bythemid‐
1950s,slowinggrowthandpoliticalfervorspurredtheCCP
leadershiptoembracedeeplyflawedeconomicpoliciesin
anefforttomodernizeChinamorequickly.
Thesepolicies,togetherwithMaoZedong'sleftist
radicalism,undidmanyofthePRC'searlyachievements.In
1958,theCCPlauncheditsGreatLeapForward,a
disastrouscampaigntoexpandgrainproductionandto
catchuptoBritishandAmericansteelproduction
capabilitiesatthesametime.Bysettingincredibly
unrealisticfarmquotasandwastingfoodandlabor,Party
leadersmanagedtocreateahugeman‐madefaminethat
killedaboutthirtymillionpeople.AftertheGreatLeap,the
CCPreturnedtomoremoderateeconomicpoliciesunder
theleadershipofLiuShaoqi,DengXiaopingandChenYun,
whileMaoZedongplayedalessvisiblerolethan
previously.
Increasinglydisturbedoverthepaththeseleaderswere
taking,Maoandhisalliesin1965usedaninitiallyobscure
literaryandhistoricaldebatetourgeculturalrevolution
andeventuallytopurgethePartyinnercirclesofLiuand
othermoderates.Duringthisperiod,millionsofyoung
peopleandworkersansweredMao'scalltostruggle
against‘rightists’intheParty.These‘RedGuards’plunged
thenationintochaosastheirfactions,allclaimingtobe
Mao'struerepresentatives,foughtbloodybattles.Only
armyinterventionstoppedtheseclashes,afterwhich
radicalleaderssentthousandsofstudents,intellectuals
andCCPmemberstoremoteruralareastolearnfromthe
peasants.AlthoughtheworstdisorderoftheCultural
Revolutionwasoverby1969,radicalpartymembers
remainedinfluentialuntilMao'sdeathin1976.
SoonafterMaodied,formerleadersandgeneralswhose
claimstolegitimacylayintheirparticipationinthe
revolutionandtheLongMarchpushedtheradicalsoutof
powerandjailedtheGangofFour.Withthesupportof
thisoldguard,DengXiaopingemergedasChina's
paramountleaderandbeganworkingtoreversethe
effectsofyearsofchaosandeconomicmismanagement.
HeandhisalliesshiftedChina'sproductionfocustolight
industry,encouragedsmallbusinessandagricultural
sidelineproductionandredistributedcommunelandto
individualpeasantstofarmontheirown.ThePartyalso
openedcertainareasofSouthChinatoforeign
investment.Sucheconomicpolicies,whichcurrent
presidentHuJinTaohasfollowedandexpandedupon,
havesucceededincreatingrelativeprosperityacross
muchofChina.
However,theCCPhasprovedmuchlessinterestedin
initiatingpoliticalreform.Duringcertainperiodsofpost‐
Maopolitical‘thaw’,notably1978,1986and1989,
workersandstudentshavecalledfordemocracy,therule
oflawandanendtotheofficialcorruptionthathas
accompaniedrapideconomicdevelopment.Ineach
instance,thePartyhaseventuallycrushedthese
movementsandthedemonstrationstheyspawned.
Demographicsandbroadsocialtrendsin
Chinasuggestthatlargerstructuraland
socialchangesmusteventuallyoccur,
however.Greaterwealthhascreated
intellectualandculturalfermentin
Chinesecities,withurbanresidents
expressingtheirviewsmorefreelythanin
thepastandusingtheInternetto
communicate.Sincethe1980s,millionsof
peasantshavealsofloodedintoChinese
citieshopingtotakepartintheeconomic
boom.Suchmigrantsarenolongerunder
thetightsupervisionofvillageleadersin
thewaytheyoncewere.Economic
opennessandcompetitionhavealso
highlightedtheweaknessofstate‐run
enterprises,formerbackbonesofthe
industrialeconomythathavebecomecostlyliabilitieswith
legionsofpensionersandoutdated,inefficientequipment
andtechniques.Shuttingdownsuchcompaniesisrisky,
however,forlikethemigrants,theurbanunemployed
compriseaforcewithdestabilizingpotential.
Sincethe1989workerandstudentprotests,thecentral
governmenthasacceleratedeconomicreformsinaneffort
touseprosperitytocountersuchproblems.Inaddition,the
government‐runschoolsystemhasbeguninstilling
studentsfromanearlyagewithanintense,sometimes
xenophobicnationalism,acentraltenetofwhichisthe
indispensabilityoftheChineseCommunistPartytoChina
itself.
Causes
Beginninginthe1830s,aseriesofdomestictravailsand
WesterncolonialistincursionsintoChinagreatlyweakened
therulingQingdynasty.TheChineseCommunistParty
(CCP)emergedin1921asoneofmanyresponsestothe
chaosandwarlordismintowhichChinaplungedafterthe
1911RepublicanRevolutionandthefalloftheQing.During
the1920s,theCCPworkedbothaloneandwiththe
Kuomintang(KMT)toorganizevillagersandurbanitesin
partsofSouthChina.Thetwopartiesalsocollaborated
duringthe1927NorthernExpedition,duringwhichKMT
leaderChiangKai‐sheksucceededinunitingmuchofthe
countryunderNationalistruleorsympatheticregional
warlords.ButafterChiang'sforcestookShanghai,they
turnedontheirCCPalliesandslaughteredandimprisoned
thousandsofCommunistsandsuspectedCommunists.This
‘WhiteTerror’forcedashiftinCommunisttacticsaway
fromorganizingincitiesandtowardruralrevolution,a
viewthattheyoungcadreMaoZedongespoused.By1934,
relentlessKMTattackshadgreatlyweakenedthe
Communistsandpinnedthemdownintheruralsouthern
baseareastowhichtheyhadretreatedin1927.The
remainingCCPforcessucceededinbreakingoutofthese
bases,commencingacostly,year‐long‘LongMarch’to
northwesternChina.
By1936,growingpublicangeraboutthelarge‐scale
JapaneseinvasionofChinaforcedtheKMTtoshiftits
attentiontothisnewestdanger.TheKMTandtheCCP
formedafractious‘UnitedFront’againsttheJapanese,
withKMTforcescontinuingtofighttheCommunistsat
differenttimes.Duringthisperiod,MaoZedong
consolidatedhispowerandbecametheacknowledged
leaderoftheCCP.
TheCommunistsusedthewarperiodtorebuildtheir
armies,recruitthousandsofnewmembersandgain
increasinglegitimacyamongcommonChineseasa
patrioticforcefornationalunity.Incontrast,Nationalist
reluctancetofighttheJapanese,generalcorruptionand
economicincompetenceangeredmanyChinese.Afterthe
Japanesesurrenderin1945,theCommunistsusedtheir
newstrengthtopushtheincreasinglyunpopularandweak
KMToutofChinaby1949.
Effects
TheCommunistPartysucceededinunitingand
strengtheningChinaafteralmostonehundredyearsof
weakness,disunityandquasi‐colonialstatus.Inthepast
twentyyears,thePRCgovernmenthasalsoraisedthe
livingstandardsofthemajorityofChineseandhelped
ChinabecomearespectedpowerinAsiaandtheworld.At
thesametime,however,thedisastrouseconomic
mistakesandpoliticalmachinationsofCCPleadersleft
muchofthepopulationcynicalaboutthePartyand
communismitself.Thewidespreadofficialcorruptionof
recentyearshasonlycompoundedsuchsentiments.
Timeline
TheLateQingEra
ThedeathoftheQianlongEmperorin1799signalstheend
ofthe‘goldenage’ofQingdynastyrule,andinternaland
externalproblemsplaguetheempire.Theinadequacyof
Chinesemilitaryforcesandthetechnologicalsuperiorityof
industrializedWesternnationsbecomeparticularly
apparentafterseveralclasheswithBritishandother
foreigntroops.In1905,therulinghouseinitiates
numerousreforms,includingthecreationofaWestern‐
stylearmy,theabolitionoftheoldConfucianexamination
systemforbureaucratsandtheadoptionofaconstitution
withprovisionsforalegislature.ButthetaxestheQing
dynastyleviesforthesereformsangerthepopulace,and
thehaltingpaceofchangedisturbsmanyreformersand
elites.Manyhavebeencontemplatingafuturewithout
imperialruleforatleastadecade.
TheEarlyRepublicanPeriod
RespondingtoQingsuppressionofanationalist
revolutionarycell,troopsmutinyinWuhanonOctober10,
1911.Inthefollowingweeks,moremutiniesoccur
nationwide,culminatingintheoverthrowoftheQing
dynasty.OnDecember29,delegatesfromsixteen
provincialassemblieselectSunYat‐senprovisionalpresidentofthenewRepublicofChina.YuanShikai,chief
militaryleader,rejectsSun'sclaimstothepresidencyand
assumestheofficehimself.Yuannameshimselfemperorin
late1915butstepsdownjustafewmonthslaterafter
nationwideprotestsoverhismove.
Aseriesofcorrupt,inefficientregimesandwarlordsfills
thepoliticalvacuuminChina.Japanlendsmoneytothose
leadersinternationallyrecognizedasthelegitimate
governmentofChina,layingthefoundationsforits
subsequentclaimstosignificantportionsofChinese
territory.BothChinaandJapanenterWorldWarIonthe
Alliedside,withChinasendingthousandsoflaborersto
Europe.AttheVersaillesPeaceConferencein1919,Japan
isawardedGermanconcessionsinChina,basedon
internationalrecognitionofitssustainedinfluencein
China;studentsandintellectualsprotestagainstthe
decision.TheinitialprotesttakesplaceonMay4and
sparkstheMaytheFourthMovementforpoliticaland
culturalreforminChina.
The1920s
In1920,VladimirLenin,leaderofthenewCommunist
regimeinRussia,dispatchesComintern(Thirdor
CommunistInternational)agentstoChina.They
approachLiDazhaoandChenDuxiu,twoleftist
intellectualsinvolvedintheMaytheFourthMovement.
Li,Chen,theagentsandasmallgroupofacquaintances
meettostudyMarxism,thenrecruitothers.Chinese
studentsinEurope,includingZhouEnlaiandDeng
Xiaoping,becomeinvolvedwithsocialistgroups.The
nextyear,thefirstplenarymeetingoftheCCPsecretly
takesplaceinShanghai.Delegates,includingMao
Zedong,electChenDuxiusecretary‐general.
Stillsmallandweak,theCCPallieswiththeKuomintang,
andCominternagentshelpSunYat‐senstrengthenhis
positionandreorganizetheKMT.AfterSun'sdeathin
1925,themoreconservativeChiangKai‐shekassumes
leadershipoftheKMT.Between1925and1927,Chiang's
armiesdefeataseriesofwarlordsandmakealliances
withothers.AfterChiang'sforcescaptureShanghaiin
thespringof1927,theyturnontheirCommunistand
laborunionallies,jailingandkillingthousands.TheCCP
membersslipawaytoremoteareasofJiangxi,Hubei,
Hunan,Fujian,AnhuiandHebeiandattempttosetup
Communistbasesthere.
The1930s
ChiangKai‐shekcontinuestofighttheCommunists
throughouttheearly1930sastheconditionofthe
nationdeteriorates.Japanesetroopsmoveinto
Manchuriain1931andexertinfluenceoverotherareas
ofnorthChina.Theworldwideeconomicdownturn
affectsthecountry,andgovernmenttaxationand
modernizationpoliciescreateresentmentandpoverty.
Officialcorruptionisrife,despiteChiang'sinauguration
oftheNewLifeMovement,whichstressesConfucian
valuesandmorality.Still,theKMTcomescloseto
crushingtheCCP'smainbaseinJiangxi,forcingthe
CommuniststoundertaketheirlegendaryLongMarchin
1934.Chiang'sparamilitarysupporters,modeling
themselvesonEuropeanfascists,targetChineseleftists
inKMT‐ruledareasofthecountry.
By1935,JapaneseincursionsintoNorthChinabecome
increasinglyworrisome,butChiangKai‐shekstillfocuses
onexterminatingtheCommunists.Patrioticstudents
protestKMTpolicyindemonstrationsacrossChina.Late
in1936,ZhangXueliang,thewarlordincontrolofXi’an,
kidnapsChiangKai‐shekandforceshimtomeetwith
Communistleaders.Chiangfinallyagreestofightthe
JapaneseinsteadoftheCommunists.
1937‐45:TheWarYears
AfterJapaninvadesChinaproperin1937,theCCPandKMT
maintainaUnitedFrontbutfrequentlyclash.TheCCP
createsaloyalfollowing,redistributingincomeandlandin
areasitcontrols,rebuildingitsmilitaryforcesandfighting
theJapanese.Communistsgainareputationforhonesty
andfairnessincontrasttoKMTofficials,whosebrutality
shocksAmericanallies.Neartheendofthewar,the
Americangovernmentconsidersco‐operatingwiththeCCP
butgivesuptheideaafterChiangprotests.
1945‐49:TheRenewedCivilWar
FollowingtheJapanesesurrender,theCCP‐KMTCivilWar
resumes,buttheCommunistsnowenjoysignificant
advantages.TheRedArmyhasgrowntoonemillionmen.
TheUSSRallowstheCCPtocapturesurrenderedJapanese
weaponsandsuppliesinManchuria.Althoughthe
AmericangovernmentsupportstheNationalists,the
UnitedStatesgrowsincreasinglydisillusionedwiththe
KMT,whichsuppressesdissentandsupportsruthless
landlordrepossessionofpropertyinformerlyCommunist
areas.ThroughoutKMT‐ruledChina,rampantinflation
createsgeneralmisery.
TheCommunistsspendmuchof1945and1946
transformingtheirguerrillaarmiesintoaconventional
fightingforce—thePeople'sLiberationArmy—before
launchingattacksontheNationalistslatein1946.ThePLA
movessteadilydownfromthenorthintotheChinese
heartland,assistedbyCommunistagentsinkeycitiesand
generaldissatisfactionwiththeKMT.TheCCPcaptures
muchofnorthernChinain1948andtakesthesouthin
1949.
The1950s:ThePeople'sRepublicofChina
ThePartyredistributestheholdingsofthewealthy(or
unpopular)tothepoorandlandless.Atleastseveral
hundredthousand‘classenemies’and
‘counterrevolutionaries’dieduringthislandreform.Party
campaignseliminateopiumabuseandprostitution.With
Sovietassistance,theChineserebuild,emphasizingthe
developmentofheavyindustry.
In1956,MaodelivershisfamousHundredFlowersspeech
invitingcriticismofthePartybutquicklyrelentsasthe
mountingcritiquesangerotherleaders.Partyofficials
launchtheGreatLeapForwardin1958tosparkChina's
economy(seefig.ofastreetmarketoftheperiod)but
createafamine,whichlastsuntil1961andkillsthirty
millionpeople.AttheLushanPlenumin1959,Peng
DehuaiprivatelycriticizesMao'sLeappolicies.Maopurges
PengandcontinuestheLeap.
IdeologypushestheSovietUnionandChinafurtherapart,
resultinginatotalsplitby1960.Chinaattemptsto
positionitselfasthechampionoftheso‐calledThird
World,sendingaidandtechnicaladvisorstoAfricaandto
Asia;still,thePRCfightsaborderwarwithIndiain1959
andputsdownanti‐ChineseprotestsinTibet.
The1960s
ThePartybacksaway
fromLeappolicies,
shrinkingcommunesand
allowingsmallbusinesses
toemerge.Theeconomy
slowlyrecoversunderthe
managementofLiu
Shaoqi,ChenYunand
DengXiaoping.By1965,
however,Maobecomes
disgustedwiththese
moderates,whomhe
considers
counterrevolutionary
‘rightists’,andlaunches
theCulturalRevolutionto
putChinabackonthe
‘correct’revolutionary
path.SchoolscloseasRed
Guardsandradicals
attempttomake
revolution.Theyfighteach
otherand‘struggle’against‘rightists’,includingcadres,
teachersandotherauthorityfigures,manyofwhomdie
frommistreatment.
TheworstchaosoftheCulturalRevolutionendsby1968
withbloodyPLAintervention.Leftistradicalsalliedwith
MaoandJiangQingretainpower,sendingmillionsof
students,cadresandyoungurbanitestothecountryside
to‘reform’throughlabor.
Aroundtheworld,theChinesemedia'shighlysanitized
versionoftheCulturalRevolutiongainspopularitywith
radicals,anti‐colonialrevolutionaries,intellectualsand
manypeopleofChineseancestry.Soviettroopbuildupson
China'snorthernbordercausethePRCleadershipgreat
concernbythelate1960s.
The1970s
ZhouEnlaimakesoverturestotheUnitedStates,andin
1972,PresidentRichardM.NixonvisitsChina.Maoplays
offleftistsattemptingtocontinuetheCulturalRevolution
againstmoderateshopingtoreinstateorder.By1974,the
leftistshavepurgedDengXiaoping,butprotestsafterZhou
Enlai's1976deathrevealhowintensepopulardiscontent
hasbecome.AfterMao's
deaththatyear,premier
HuaGuofengmoves
againsttheleftists.
DengXiaopingreemerges
topushthemoreradical
Huaoutofpower.Deng
andhiscolleagues
inauguratereformsthat
graduallyopenthenation
toforeigninvestmentand
breakupcommunes.
AlthoughtheCCP
‘rehabilitates’many
Chinesepunishedbetween
1957and1976,most
reformsareeconomic.
Whenstudentsand
workersvoicetheir
discontentinthe1978‐79
DemocracyWall
movement,the
governmentimprisons
thosewhocallforgreater
politicalopenness.
In1979,DengvisitstheUnitedStatesandnormalizes
relations(seefig.).ProtestingVietnam'sgrowing
willfulnessandpersecutionofethnicChinese,PRCtroops
fightabriefwarthere.TheVietnameseprevail,revealing
China'sneedformilitarymodernization.LiketheUnited
States,ChinabacksthemurderousPolPotregimein
CambodiabecauseofitsoppositiontoVietnam.
The1980s
Intheearly1980s,theeffectsofmarketreformsandland
privatizationbecomeapparent.Somefarmerswithready
marketsgrowwealthysellingcashcrops.Othersinpoorer
areasfarelesswell,andmanycadresandpeasantsresist
theretreatfromtherevolution.Surplusagricultural
laborersandtheurbanunemployedsetupsmallshops.
NumerousChinesecitizensareabletopurchasetelevision
sets,washingmachinesandsimilarluxurygoods.Although
theleadershipcontinuestopushmarketreforms,they
simultaneouslyinitiate‘anti‐spiritualpollution’campaigns
tocountertheinfluencesofwealthandWesternculture.
Thecentralgovernmentalsoinstitutesarigorously
enforcedone‐childpolicytokeeppopulationgrowthin
check.
In1986,studentsinAnhuiprotestagainstthe
undemocraticnatureofParty‐controlled‘elections’.A
nationalstudentprotestemerges,butauthoritiessuppress
itinearly1987.DengXiaopingblamestheParty'sreform‐
mindedsecretary‐general,HuYaobang,fortheunrestand
purgeshim.WhenHudiesinApril1989,thousandsof
studentsmarchtoTiananmenSquareinBeijingtolay
wreathsinhismemory,protestingPartycorruptionand
thelackofdemocracyinChina.Aroundthenation,
workers,studentsandothersjointhewideningprotest
movement.Asdemonstratorscallfortheresignationof
DengXiaopingandPremierLiPeng,thecentralleadership
criticisestheprotesters.TheyalsopurgePartySecretary‐
GeneralZhaoZiyang,whoisopenlysympathetictothe
demonstrators(andapotentialDengrival).OnJune4,
1989,PLAtroopsmoveonTiananmenSquareand
surroundingareas,crushingtheprotestsandkillingan
unknownnumberofpeople.Protestersfleeoverseasorgo
undergroundasthepolicecrackdownondissenters.
NumerousnationscriticizeChina'smoveandimpose
sanctions.
1990‐Present
Theearly1990sareaperiodofslowedgrowthand
reducedforeigninvestmentandinterest,duetothe
crackdownandtheensuingconservativeresurgencein
China.ButtheeconomytakesoffafterDengXiaopingvisits
Shanghaianddeclaressupportformarketreformsthere.
Theeconomycontinuestoboomthroughoutthe1990s.
TheUnitedStatesandotherWesternnationsruntrade
deficitswithChina,whichreliesonlow‐costlabortomake
itsexportsattractive.Althoughhard‐lineleaderssuch
asLiPengretaininfluence,therelativelymoderate
JiangZeminbecomesChina'sleaderuponDeng'sdeath
in1997.
Hugepro‐democracymovementsnowseemathingof
thepast.Thegovernmenthasinstitutedasystemof
limitedlocalelectionsbutmaintainsstrictcontrolover
theentireprocessanditsresults.AsChina'seconomy
becomesincreasinglymarket‐driven,muchofthe
populationfocusesitsenergiesongettingrich—
includingtherecentlyreleasedleadersofthe1989
protests.WithCommunistPartyideologyincreasingly
diluted,millionsofChinesereplacetheirbeliefin
communismwithdevotiontofolkreligionsand
Christianity.Othersworshipmoney.
Asinthe1980s,Partycadresatalllevelsgetrichfaster
thanordinarycitizens,dueinlargeparttotheirpower,
influenceandsusceptibilitytocorruption.A1993study
ofAnhuiProvincereportsthat300,000cadres—or
twentypercentofallofficialsintheprovince—are
involvedincorruption.Throughoutthe1990s,theParty
institutesanti‐corruptioncampaignsandexecutes
thousandsofpeoplefoundguilty.ButleadersinBeijing
findimposingtheirwillonprovincialauthorities—many
ofthemenmeshedinnetworksofcorruption—
increasinglydifficult.Topofficials’childrenand
relativesareinvolvedincorruption,whichis
particularlyembarrassing.Evidenceemergesaswell
thatthePLAisrunningnumerousprofitablebusinesses,
someofthemillegal,throughoutthecountry.
After1989,thePartyharnessespotentnationalismto
divertattentionawayfromthecontinuedlackof
democracyandgrowingofficialcorruptioninChina.
ThereturnofHongKongtoChinain1997sparks
celebrationsacrossthenation.Butnationalismturns
violentin1999,afterNATOmissileshittheChinese
embassyinBelgrade,Yugoslavia;Chinesestudentstake
tothestreetsofBeijingandattacktheAmerican
embassywiththetacitassistanceofthepoliceandthe
authorities.Taiwanremainsamajorissueaswell;with
Taiwaneseofficialsexpressingdecreasedinterestin
reunificationwiththemainland,Chineseleaders
becomemorethreateningintheirrhetoric,evenas
theywelcomegreaterTaiwaneseinvestmentinthe
PRC.
ThefurthestextentofQingpower
ThePeople’sRepublicofChina
LeadershipStruggles
LikeMao,mostofthePRC'searlyleadersjoinedtheChineseCommunistPartyasyoungmen
inthe1920sandrosetocentralleadershippositionsduringthe1930s.Particularly
legendarywerethosewhotookpartintheepicLongMarch,includingMao,ZhuDe,Deng
Xiaoping,LinBiao,ZhouEnlaiandPengDehuai,aswellasthosewhofoughttheJapanese
fromYan’an.After1949,thisgenerationruledjointly,butMaoremainedfirstamongequals,
thefinalauthorityonalldecisions,andthesymbolofPartypowerandstrength.Though
scholarscontinuetodebateMao'sbehaviorduringthistime,FrederickC.Teiweshasargued
convincinglythatwhileMaoexercisedhisauthoritywithrelativerestraintduringthefirst
yearsofthePRC,healsogrewincreasinglylessconcernedaboutcreatingconsensus.The
unifyingthreatoftheKMTarmieswasnowgone,andMao'sassumptionofthetrappings
andresponsibilitiesofpowerlefthimlessaccessibletootherleadersthanhehadbeenin
theYan’anperiod(Teiwes13).
SplitsinthePartyleadershipbecameapparentby1958,afterMaoandotherleaders
endorsedtheGreatLeapForward.The LeapreflectedMao'sbeliefthathuman
willismoresignificantthaneconomic forcesincreatingsocialchange,butasa
policyitwasatremendousfailure. WithLeap‐relatedproblemsgrowing
increasinglynoticeableby1959, Partyleadersconvenedthe
LushanPlenumtorectify Leappolicies.After
GeneralPeng Dehuaicriticized
theLeap,Mao denouncedhim
asa‘right opportunist’.Mao
intensifiedtheLeap ratherthanmoderating
it,andhereplacedPeng withLinBiao.
Eventually,Mao backedawayfromthe
disastrouseconomic policiesoftheGreat
Leap,andashe woulddoinsimilar
situationsforthenext fifteenyears,heturnedto
economicmoderates withinthePartyinan
efforttopromoteretrenchment.By1959,Maohadsteppeddownfromhispostasheadof
state,apositionLiuShaoqiassumed.Duringtheearly1960s,Maoleftmuchofthedaily
workofrunningthenationtoeconomicpragmatistssuchasLiu,ChenYunandothers.At
thesametime,however,LinBiaomovedthePeople'sLiberationArmyinamorepolitical
direction,institutingthestudyofMaoZedongThoughtamongtheranksandcementingthe
growingcultofMao.
By1965,MaohadbecomeincreasinglyfrustratedwiththedirectionoftheParty,whichhe
sawdescendingintoeconomicandpoliticalrevisionismalongSovietlines.Inashrewd
gambit,hecriticizedinanarticleahistoricalplaythatheclaimedpaintedhimasadespotic
imperialfigure.ThedebatethatensuedinprintlaterresultedinMao,hiswifeJiangQing
andtheiralliesdenouncingleadingintellectuals,PartymembersandfinallyLiuShaoqiand
DengXiaoping.MaomovedtoisolateLiuandtopurgeseveralotherleadersfromtheir
positions,afterwhichZhouEnlaiproclaimedthecommencementoftheGreatProletarian
CulturalRevolution.Mao'salliesthenencouragedradicalstudentstoengageinthis
revolutionanddenounce‘revisionist’Partymembers.
Althoughmanyleft‐leaningWesternintellectualsatthat
timeromanticizedtheCulturalRevolution,mostscholars
nowseeitasamultifacetedstruggleinvolvingconnected
strugglesbetweenleadershipfactionsandlargersocial
classes.Initially,thesonsanddaughtersofPartyofficials
andmembersofother‘red’classesansweredtheMaoists’
calls,formingso‐calledRedGuardunits.Whilethese
groupsviolentlyattackedtheold‘classenemies’and
sometimeskilledthem,moderateleadersattemptedto
containthegrowthoftheCulturalRevolutionmovement.
Maoresistedthisbyintensifyinghiscriticismofhisrivals
andbycallingforawiderCulturalRevolution.Indoingso,
theChairmancapitalizedontheclassresentmentshe
helpedprovokealmosttwodecadesearlier;soon,
membersofthe‘badclasses’organizedtheirownRed
Guardunitstostruggleagainstthe‘conservative’Red
Guards.
AsHongYungLeehasshown,thebattlesthattookplace
withinmassorganizationsandbetweenRedGuardfactions
reflectedthoseofMao,hisalliesandtheireliteopponents,
allofwhommanipulatedsegmentsofthepopulationas
theystruggledforpower.Atthesametime,however,the
outcomeofcitizens’conflictsinfluencedthemovesMao
andothersmadeastheyjockeyedforposition(Lee2‐3).
Eventually,thearmedforcesintervenedtostopthe
widespreadviolencethatcaused,directlyandindirectly,
hundredsofthousandsofdeaths,includingthoseofLiu
Shaoqiandotherdisgracedleaders.
Inhislastyears,Maogrewincreasinglysuspiciousofhis
subordinates,suchasLinBiao,andeventuallychosean
unknownprovincialofficial,HuaGuofeng,tosucceedhim.
AlthoughHuaremainedpremierforafewyearsafter
Mao'sdeath,theLongMarchgeneration,particularlythe
mostrespectedeldergeneralsandcadres,threwtheir
weightbehindDengXiaoping.
Dengrefusedtocultivateapersonalitycultthewaythat
Maohad,butheandotherleadersgrappleduneasilywith
theproblemofmaintainingPartypowerwhilerejecting
themanypurges,campaignsandexcessesthathad
markedCCPrulesince1949.Whilepromotingeconomic
liberalizationandrejectingtheworstpoliciesofthepast,
Dengandotherleadersresistedanyattemptsat
democratization.MuchoftheLongMarchgeneration,
dedicatedtoPartycontrolandrememberingthechaotic
Chinaoftheiryouth,supportedthe1989PLAcrackdown
againsttheworkersandstudentsatTiananmenSquarein
Beijing.Thefewleaders,suchasZhaoZiyang,whoevinced
sympathyfortheprotestersfoundthemselvespurgedand
sometimesjailed.
Thepost‐Dengleadershipconsistsofproponentsofthe
crackdown,suchasLiPeng;politicalciphersinitially
promotedfortheirloyaltytoDeng,includingPresident
JiangZemin;andtechnocratslikeHuYaobangandZhu
Rongji.Thesemen,likethePartyitself,remaincommitted
topreservingCCPauthorityinthemidstofrapideconomic
changeandthesocialdisruptionthatchangehascreated.
BureaucracyandClass
ThetremendoussizeofChina'spopulationhasalways
presentedachallengetothosewhowouldleadthe
country.Inthenineteenthcentury,astaticnumberof
officialsgovernedarapidlygrowingpopulation,leadingto
conditionsthathelpedweakentheQingdynasty'sgripon
power.Provincialandcentralattemptstoextracttaxes
duringthe1920sand1930sledtocorruptionandto
widespreaddisillusionmentwithKMTgovernmentamong
villageleadersandprominentcitizens(Duara249‐51).
WhentheCommunistscametopower,theirauthority
reachedmuchfurtherthanhadthatofanyprevious
regime.TheQingemperorsandtheKuomintanghad
largelyreliedonelitesandthenlocalstrongmentocollect
taxesandimposeauthoritybelowthecountyordistrict
level;Communistcontrol,ontheotherhand,penetrated
rightdownintovillagesandurbanneighborhoods,where
cadrestranslatedthePartylineintoaction.
Inthecities,theCCPin1949initiallyretainedmanypre‐
PRCofficialsandmuchoftheeconomicinfrastructureinan
attempttopreserveorderduringthetransitionto
Communistrule.However,inaseriesofcampaigns
beginningin1951,thePartyworkedtopurgethe
potentiallydisloyalfromtheurbanscene.Initiallyattacking
‘counterrevolutionaries’,thePartyeventuallymovedto
increaseitsinfluenceoverworkersandtodecimatethe
ranksofthebusinesspeopleandcapitalistswhohad
remainedinChinaafter1949.
Asitextendeditscontroloverthecitiesandthe
countryside,thePartybegantodefineChinesecitizensby
theirsupposed‘classbackgrounds’,dividingthemintopoor
peasants,middlepeasants,richpeasants,landlords,
capitalistsandothersimilarcategories.Althoughsuch
labelingoftencorrelatedwithreality,manyChinese
‘capitalists’werealmostaspoorastheirworkersand
numerousvillagescontainednoreallandlords.Sinceclass
strugglehelpedignitepro‐Partyfervor,theCCPpursuedits
labelingcampaigninspiteoftherelativelackofclassesin
manyareas.Intheprocess,cadresandthe‘masses’often
targetedunpopularresidentsdistrustedforreasonsother
thantheirwealth,includingChristians,formerKMT
membersandJapanesecollaborators(Huang114‐18).
Whether‘richpeasants’,‘landlords’and‘capitalists’ornot,
thesenewlyminted‘classenemies’foundthemselvesand
theirchildrenpermanentlylabeled.Despitethefactthat
manytopleaders,includingMao,DengXiaoping,Liu
ShaoqiandZhouEnlai,werethemselvesthechildrenof
intellectualsor‘richpeasants’,Partyleadersparadedout
classenemiesduringeachnewpoliticalmovement,from
theAnti‐RightistCampaigntotheCulturalRevolution.
These‘enemies’hadnorecourseandsufferednotjust
humiliation,butsometimesphysicalharm.Partyyouth
organizationsrefusedtoadmittheirchildren,whothen
hadlittleornoaccesstohighereducation,certainjobsand
decentland.
ThePartyselectedcadresinlargepartbecauseoftheir
classbackground,asystemthatfavoredformerpoor
peasantsandlaborersinthecountryside.Butreplacingthe
rulingeliteinthevillagesandatotherlevelssimply
creatednewpowerstructures.BecausetheParty
eventuallyconsolidatedlandholdingsintocollectivefarms
andcombinedhouseholdsintoproductionteams,team
leaderswieldedsignificantpowerinrationingresources,
fromscarceclothingandbicyclestoworkpoints.Brigade
heads,whooversawgroupsofproductionteams,also
enjoyedsignificantpowerandinfluenceoverthepeasants
(Oi6‐9).
Theroleofthesecadresasacriticallinkbetweenthe
centralgovernmentandthepeasantryplacedthemunder
significantpressure,however.Inshort,thepenetrationthe
Communistgovernmenthadachievedcompromisedthe
protectivefunctionoftheadministrativestructurethat
pre‐1949regimeshadcreated.Team,brigadeandother
localleadersprovidedharvestinformationtothecentral
government,whichthendecidedontheamountofsurplus
grainthatbelongedtothestate.Whenpoliticsintervened,
reportingprovedcrucial,particularlyaspoliticalactivism
becameacrucialaspectofcadreperformance.Inthelate
1950s,localandprovincialcadrescaughtupinthefrenzy
oftheearlyGreatLeapForwardgreatlyover‐reported
grainproductionfigures.JeanOihasarguedthatsuch
misinformation,whichcadresinitiallyprovidedto
demonstratethe‘red’characteroftheirproductionteams,
ledtothehugeGreatLeapForwardfamine(91).Asthe
famineprogressed,however,localcadresalsohidgrain
fromthestateastheyattemptedtofeedtheirpeasant
teammembers.Eveninlessdiresituations,teamand
brigadeleadersoftenstruggledtotranslatefaultycentral
policiestoskepticalpeasantsandtoconveypeasant
resistancetohigher‐levelofficials.
Increasingeconomicliberalizationsincethelate1970shas
lessenedstatepenetrationand,tosomedegree,the
powerofcadresoverthelivesofindividuals.Peasantswho
migratetocitiesescapethesupervisionoftheirworkunits,
evenastheylosesomeofthebenefits—suchasschooling
fortheirchildren—thatworkunitregistrationbrings.For
theirpart,cityofficialsmindfuloftheneedforcheaplabor
oftentoleratethepresenceofillegalmigrants,sacrificing
statecontrolforeconomicdevelopment.
Still,theinfluencelocalofficialscontinuetowieldhasled
IntellectualsandtheState
OnMay4,1919,studentsatBeijingUniversityandother
new,Western‐styleschoolsinChinaprotestedagainstthe
signingoftheTreatyofVersaillesendingWorldWarI.
AlthoughChinaandJapanhadbothparticipatedinthe
conflictontheAlliedside,thetreatygaveJapanGermany's
oldconcessionsinthenorthernpartofChinaratherthan
returningthemtotheChinese.TheMaytheFourth
Movement,initiallyapatrioticresponsetothisnational
humiliation,soongrewintoliteraryandpolitical
movementsintentonnationalsalvationandcultural
reform.AsanthropologistHelenSiuhasnoted,‘[T]hat
awakeninginthoughtbroughtwithitastrongsenseof
mission,adeepcommitmenttosociety’(2).Whilethis
commitmenttocultural‘enlightenment’andpolitical
renewalhasdefinedintellectualendeavorssincethattime,
torampantcorruptionandprofiteering.Cadreshaveused
theirinfluenceandconnectionstopurchasestateassets
cheaply,tostealtheproceedsofsuchsalesandtoextract
bribesfrombusinesspeopleenteringtheprivatesector.To
compensatefortheirowncorruption,manyhavealso
leviedexcessfeesonfarmers,studentsandtraders,whose
attemptstoprotestagainstsuchpolicieshavebeen
silencedwithpolicepower.Giventhedegreeoflocaland
provincialcorruption,thecentralgovernmenthas
encounterednumerousdifficultiesinquashingillegal
activitiesatthelowerlevelsofthebureaucracy.
Chinesecitizenshaveenjoyedasomewhatgreatervoicein
theirgovernmentthanintheMaoera,however.Although
directelectionsfortownshipPeople'sCongresseshave
takenplaceinChinasincethe1950s,foralongtimethe
votershadnochoiceofcandidatesandnosecretballot.In
1979,thegovernmentintroducedsecretballotsandsome
competitionforseatsandhasmadecountyPeople's
Congressesdirectlyelectedaswell(Jacobs174).However,
themajorityofcandidatesaregovernment‐sponsored,
oftenretiredcadresorrepresentativesofstate
organizations.Thoseelectedtogovernmentofficeoften
findthattheparallelPartybureaucracycontinuestowield
powerandmakeall‐importantdecisions.Official
enthusiasmforelectionsandsupportofthecampaign
processalsovariesfromplacetoplace,reflectingthe
continueddiscomfortofmanycadreswithprocesses
beyondtheircontrol.Inanycase,Chinesecitizensstillhave
nosayintheselectionofleadersabovethecountylevel.
ithasalsocreatedtensionsbetweenoutspokenChinese
andthesuccessionofgovernmentsthathaveruledthem
duringthetwentiethcentury.
AftertheJapaneseinvasion,manyintellectualssought
refugewiththeCommunists,thegroupmostdedicatedto
fightingtheJapanesearmies.Theintelligentsiainthe
northwestreadilyacceptedtheCommunists’callto
embraceruralcultureandtouseittoremakethemselves
andpromotetheCCPcauseamongthepeasantry(Judd
377).Yetthecosmopolitanism,individualismandWestern
orientationofmanyoftheseintellectualsdisturbedParty
leaders,whoadvocated‘nationalproletarianforms’ofart
andliterature(Cheek28).WriterssuchasWangShiweiand
DingLingcalledforintellectualstoserveascriticsofthe
stateandsociety,whileMaoandotherPartyleaderssaw
theirroleasdoingpropagandaworkandcelebratingthe
Partyandthemasses(Cheek30).Duringhisfamous‘Talks
attheYan’anForumonArtandLiterature’in1942,Mao
outlinedthisroleandcommencedhisRectification
Campaignduringwhichheandotherleaderscriticizedand
punishedWang,Dingandotherwritersandartists.
Althoughmembersoftheintelligentsiafellintoline,similar
problemscontinuedtobesettherelationshipbetweenthe
Partyandintellectualsafter1949.Inthenewclasssystem
theCommunistscreated,themost‘red’groupswere
workersandpoorpeasants.Intellectuals,or‘experts’,did
haveaplaceinthisorder—China'sdesperateneedfor
well‐educatedspecialiststoassistinitsdevelopment
ensuredthis—andthousandsofChineseintellectualswho
hadleftthecountryduringitsyearsofchaosreturned
after1949toassistinrebuildingthenation.Atthesame
time,intellectuals'classbackgroundswerenowconsidered
suspect;manyhadcomefromrelativelyprosperous
bourgeoisfamilieswiththeresourcestoeducatethem,
andothershadattendeduniversitiesincapitalistcountries
suchastheUnitedStates.Partypoliciesoftenisolatedand
demoralizedintellectuals,whounderwentintense
indoctrinationinMarxismandMaoistthoughtintheearly
yearsofthePRC.Aspoliticsshiftedleftward,writers,
artistsandother‘thoughtworkers’oftenbecametargets
ofcriticismforpastwork.Thosewhoveeredtoofarfrom
thePartylinesimilarlyfacedpunishmentandfound
themselves‘sentdown’tothecountrysidetolearnfrom
thepeasants.
DifferentfactionsintheCCPdebatedtheroleof
intellectualsduringthe1950s,withseveralPartyleaders,
includingMaohimself,advocatingbettertreatmentof
citizenswithsuspectbackgroundsinanattemptto
improvedevelopmentandencourageTaiwantoseek
reunification(Spence567).In1956,duringaParty
conference,Maoparaphrasedatraditionalsayingwhenhe
calledfor‘lettingonehundredflowersbloom,one
hundredschoolsofthoughtcontend’—inessence,inviting
PartymembersandotherChinesetocommentonand
critiqueCCPpolicies.Bymid‐1957,intellectualswere
openlycriticizingPartyshortcomingsandcomplaining
aboutunfairbureaucraticpractices,small‐mindedcadres
andharshpolicies.ButtheoppositionofPartyleaderswho
hadneversupportedtheHundredFlowerscampaign
compelledMaotobackawayfromthenewopenness.Ina
swiftlycommenced‘anti‐rightist’campaign,theParty
labeledmorethanaquartermillionintellectuals‘rightists’.
TheCCPsentmanydowntothecountrysideforyearsand
jailedothers,andthe‘rightist’labelthatremainedinthe
filesofallruinedtheircareers.
Forthenation'sintellectuals,theaftermathoftheHundred
Flowerscampaignsignaledthebeginningofaperiodin
which‘red’trumped‘expert’,regardlessofnationalneed.
Leadingintellectualfigures,includingliterarynotableswho
hadsupportedtheCommunistsduringthecivilwar,
becamemajortargetsoftheCulturalRevolution,asdid
traditionallearningitself.RedGuardsburnedlibraries,
destroyedartworkandwreckedhistoricbuildings.Jiang
Qingandheralliesurgedthedestructionoftraditional
cultureandpromoteddreary‘modeloperas’andfiction
thatuncriticallycelebratedthemasses.
Inadditiontodemoralizingandpunishingthousandsof
educatedpeople,Partyleadersalsostuntedthenation's
educationalsystem.Elementaryandsecondaryschools
shutdownforthefirstyearsoftheCulturalRevolution,
whileRedGuardsviciouslyattackedandevenkilledmany
teachers,professorsandculturalworkers.Afterthe
primaryandsecondaryschoolsreopened,Partyleaders
limitedstudents'readingmaterialstoMarxisttractsand
theteachingsofMao.Universities,whichclosedin1966,
remainedshuttereduntilthemid‐1970s,leavinganentire
generationofChinesewithnoaccesstohighereducation.
TheCCPalsosentdownthousandsmoreeducatedpeople
tothecountrysidetolearnfromthepeasantsandleave
behindtheir‘bourgeoisintellectual’ways.
AfterthedeathofMao,theCommunistPartypublicly
rehabilitatedmanyoftheintellectualsvilifiedduringthe
1950sand1960s,includingelderlywritersandartistswho
hadparticipatedintheoriginalMaytheFourthMovement.
DengXiaopingallowedChineseuniversitygraduatesto
travelabroadforfurthereducation,despiterealistic
expectationsthatfewwouldreturnhome.Professorsalso
revampeduniversitycurriculaandremovedmuchofthe
Maoistliteraturethathadbeenastapleoftheschools
sincethe1960s.
Theensuingthawencouragedmanyintellectualsto
critiquestatepolicies,somethingDengandotherofficials
initiallyallowed.Butaswritersandartiststurnedtheir
attentionfromMaoistexcessestocontemporaryproblems
suchascorruptionandlackofdemocracyinChina,they
lostthesupportofthePartyleadership.Atthreepoints—
1979,1986and1989—thestatecrushedtheprotestsof
intellectualsandworkerscallingforgreateropennessand
democracy.
Partyleadershavecontinuedtomaintainatightreinon
intellectualcritiquestheyconsidersuspectandhave
struggledwithdissidentstudentsandintellectuals
attemptingtocastthemselvesaslegitimateheirstothe
MaytheFourthtradition.Morerecently,thePartyhas
workedassiduouslytocontroltheflowofinformationin
Chinesesocietyandtoquietcriticismbyarrestingscholars
andbusinesspeopleonvaguechargesofspreadingstate
secrets.ButtheParty'scommitmenttoinformation
controlhascreatedtensionsbetweencadresand
capitalists,whorequireandexpecttransparencyandthe
freeflowofdataandnews.Alreadypublishersand
newspapersforcedtobeself‐supportinginthemarket
economyhavecreatednewintellectualchallengestothe
authorityoftheParty,ashavenewtechnologiessuchas
theInternet.
MaoZedongfromTheOxfordCompaniontoPoliticsoftheWorld
Byallreasonablestandardsofhistoricaljudgment,MaoZedong
mustbecountedamongthehalf‐dozenmostimportantpolitical
actorsinmodernworldhistory.Maowastheacknowledged
leaderofthegreatestandmostpopularofmodernrevolutions.
Andalmostuniqueamongrevolutionaryleaders,heremained
thedominantfigureinthepost‐revolutionaryregimeformore
thanaquarterofacentury,presidingoverthebeginningsofthe
modernindustrialtransformationoftheworld'smostpopulous
land.Certainlynooneinfluencedmoreprofoundly,forbetteror
forworse,thelivesofmorepeoplethandidMaoZedongby
virtueofhisperson,hispower,hispolicies,andhisthought.
Thesonofarichpeasant,MaoZedongwasborninthevillageof
ShaoshaninHunanprovinceon26December1893.Duringhis
earlyyears,theoldimperialChineseorderwasrapidly
disintegrating,radicalreformistandrevolutionarymovements
wererising,andnewlyintroducedWesternideasandideologies
wereunderminingfaithintraditionalvaluesandbeliefs.
AlthoughtheyoungMaobecamewellversedinclassicalChinese
textsandretainedastrongattachmenttocertainaspectsof
tradition(especiallyhistoricalnovelsandpoetry),hesoon
becamecaughtupintheradicalpoliticalandiconoclastic
intellectualcurrentsthatsweptChinesecitiesintheyears
precedingandfollowingtheRevolutionof1911thatoverthrew
theimperialsystem.Asastudentatthemiddleandnormal
schoolsintheprovincialcapitalofChangshaduringtheyears
1913–1918,MaoeagerlyassimilatedabroadrangeofWestern
ideas,brieflypursuedacareerasateacher,andembarkedupon
hislifelongcareerasapoliticalorganizer,establishingthe"New
People'sStudySociety",oneofthemoreimportantofthelocal
groupsthatweretoprovesopoliticallyandideologically
instrumentalinthemakingoftheradicalMayFourthMovement
of1919.InChangsha,MaobecameinvolvedwithNewYouth
magazine,thatextraordinarilyinfluentialwesternizingand
iconoclasticjournalofthenewintelligentsiathatmoldedthe
ideasofawholegenerationofmodernChinesepoliticaland
intellectualleaders.ItwasinNewYouththatMao'sfirst
publishedarticleappearedin1917,AStudyofPhysicalCulture,
whichcombinedanardentChinesenationalismwithanoless
ardentrejectionoftraditionalChineseculture—inthisinstance
anattackontheConfucianseparationbetweenmentaland
manuallabor.ItwasauniquelymodernChinesecombinationof
nationalismandculturaliconoclasmthatverymuchreflected
theradicalspiritofthetimesandonethatwastoremaina
prominentfeatureoftheMaoistvision.
CommunistChina,1949‐.ProQuest.HistoryStudyCenter.ProQuestLLC.28Aug.2009<http://www.historystudycenter.com/>.
Inlate1918,MaoZedongleftChangshaforBeijing.
BeijingUniversityhadthenbecomethecenterof
radicalChineseintellectualandpoliticallife.Under
theinfluenceofradicalintellectualsandtheir
activiststudentfollowers,Maobecameincreasingly
politicized.Eventhoughhewasunabletoenrollas
aregularstudent,heworkedasanassistant
librarianattheuniversityandwasfirstintroduced
toMarxisttheoryinthewinterof1918–19asa
memberofalooselyorganizedMarxiststudy
group.ButMaodidnotbecomeanimmediate
converttoMarxism.Helaterdescribedhisideasat
thetimeasa"curiousmixture"ofWestern
liberalism,democraticreformism,andutopian
socialismoranarchism.Itwasonlyafterhisreturn
toChangshainthesummerof1919,underthe
influenceoftheincreasinglyradicalandfiercely
nationalisticcurrentsthenrisinginChina,thatMao
begantobeattractedtothepoliticalmessageof
theRussianRevolutionanditsaccompanying
LeninistversionofMarxism.
YetMarxianinfluencesarebynomeansapparent
inMao'sprolificwritingsandfreneticpolitical
activitiesduringthewinterof1919–20.Rather,
whatismostclearlyevidentisapowerfulpopulist
strainthatcelebratestheorganicunityand
inherentrevolutionarypotentialoftheChinese
people.Alsocelebrated,againintypicallypopulist
fashion,wasabeliefintheadvantagesof
backwardness.AlthoughtheChinesepeoplehad
beenoppressedandmadeimpotentfor"thousands
ofyears,"Maowroteinhismaintreatiseofthe
periodentitledTheGreatUnionofthePopular
Masses,thishistoricbackwardnesspromisedgreat
politicaladvantagesforthefuture—for,ashe
confidentlyputit,"thatwhichhasaccumulatedfor
alongtimewillsurelyburstforthquickly."These
populist‐typebeliefsweretoremainenduring
characteristicsoftheMaoistmentality,profoundly
influencingMao'sreceptionandreinterpretationof
Marxism.
MaoZedong'sactualconversiontoMarxism,
accordingtohisowntestimony,occurredonlyinthe
summerof1920,followingdiscussionswithoneof
hispoliticalmentorsinShanghai.Hethenplunged
intoorganizationalactivities,workingtoestablisha
laborunionforminersinhisnativeprovinceof
HunanandorganizingasmallCommunistgroupin
Changsha,oneofseveralsuchlocalgroupsin
variouspartsofthecountry(andamongChinese
studentsstudyingabroad)whichcoalescedintothe
ChineseCommunistParty.Maowasoneofthe
thirteendelegateswhoattendedtheparty's
foundingcongress,secretlyconvenedinShanghaiin
July1921.
Duringthefirst,urban‐basedphaseoftheparty's
history(1921–1927),andespeciallyduringthe
periodoftheSoviet‐fashionedCommunist‐
Nationalistanti‐warlordalliance(1924–1927),Mao's
populistproclivitiesincreasinglydrewhimfromthe
citiestothecountryside—andfromtheproletariat
tothepeasantry.Maowasnottheonly,northe
first,ChineseCommunisttodiscoverthe
revolutionarypotentialitiesofthepeasantry,buthe
didofcourseprovetobethemostimportant.
Duringtheyears1925–1927,hedevotedthegreater
portionofhisprodigiousenergiestodetailed
investigationsofruralsocioeconomicconditions,to
theorganizationofpeasantassociations,and(under
Nationalistauspices)tothetrainingofapeasant
organizationalcadre.Mao'spopulistimpulsesfound
theirfullestexpressionneartheendofthisperiodin
hisfamousReportonanInvestigationofthe
PeasantMovementinHunan,publishedearlyin
1927.Here,inwhatisperhapsthemostpristine
expressionofwhatlatercametobeknownas
"Maoism,"theyoungMaocelebratedthe
spontaneityofpeasantrevolt,anelementalforce
thathedescribedasatornadoandahurricane,one
"soextraordinarilyswiftandviolentthatnopower,
howevergreat,willbeabletosuppressit."Maonot
onlylookedtothepeasantryasthepopularbaseof
theChineseRevolution;healsoattributedto
peasantsthemselvesallthoseelementsof
revolutionarycreativityandstandardsofpolitical
judgmentthatorthodoxMarxist‐Leninistsreserved
fortheCommunistParty.ForMao,itwasnotthe
partythatwastojudgetherevolutionarycapacities
ofthepeasantry,butratherpeasantswhowereto
judgetherevolutionarysufficiencyoftheparty.
Throughout,thedocumentemphasized,inmost
non‐Leninistfashion,thecreativerevolutionary
worksthatthepeasantswereaccomplishingon
theirownandexpressedhostilitytoallexternal
organizationalrestraints.
The"HunanReport,"sohereticalfromanorthodox
Marxist‐Leninistpointofview,nodoubtwouldhave
earnedMaohisexpulsionfromtheChinese
CommunistPartyhaditnotbeenforthecollapseof
theCommunist‐Nationalistalliancejustweeksafter
thepublicationofthedocument.Itwasinearly
April1927thatChiangKai‐shekturnedhisarmyto
thetaskofdestroyingtheCommunistsandtheir
urban‐basedmassorganizations.Therelativelyfew
Communistswhosurvivedthecounterrevolutionary
carnageweredrivenfromthecitiesandsought
refugeinthemoreremoteareasofthecountryside.
ThetiebetweentheCommunistPartyandthe
urbanworkingclasswasseveredandwastoremain
brokenuntil1949.Theconfinementofthe
revolutiontotheruralareaswastheessential
conditionthatpermittedMao'spoliticalascendancy
intheCommunistPartyandtheemergenceof
"Maoism"asthedominantChineseversionof
Marxism.
TheriseofMaoZedongtopartyleadershipinthe
mid‐1930swasaccomplishedonlyafteralongand
bitterstruggleagainstaMoscow‐supportedfaction
ofChineseCommunists—andindirectdefianceof
Stalin.DuringtheentireStalinisteraoftheworld
Communistmovement,Maowastheonlyleaderof
aCommunistpartytoachieveleadershipwithout
theblessingsoftheSovietdictator.TheChinese
party'sdefactoindependenceofMoscowsowed
oneoftheseedsofthelaterSino‐Sovietdispute.
TheYananera(1935–1945)—socalledafterthe
areainremotenorthwestChinawherethe
Communistsestablishedabaseareatoescape
annihilationbyChiangKai‐shek'sNationalist
forces—wastheheroicand
decisivephaseinthe
historyoftheChinese
Communistrevolution—
anditwasundoubtedly
Mao'sfinesthourasa
revolutionaryleaderand
militarystrategist.Under
Mao'sleadershipand
throughacombinationof
popularnationalistand
socialrevolutionary
programs,theChinese
Communistswonenormous
popularsupport,especially
amongthepeasantryof
northChina,theessential
basisfortheireventual
victoryoverthe
Nationalists.Duringthe
Yananerathedistinctive
ChinesevariantofMarxism‐
Leninism(canonizedas
"MaoZedongThought")
crystallizedasaformal
bodyofdoctrine.Itwasan
ideologymarkedby
powerfulnationalist,
populist,andvoluntaristic
impulsesthatgreatlymodifiedtheinherited
corpusofMarxist‐Leninisttheory.Indeed,
"Maoism"implicitlydefineditself,inlarge
measure,byitsdeparturesfromthemain
premisesofMarxisttheory.Itwasadoctrinethat
rejectedtheMarxistorthodoxythatcapitalismis
anecessaryandprogressivephaseinhistorical
developmentandthustheessentialprerequisite
forsocialism.Accordingly,Maoismrejectedthe
Marxistfaithintheindustrialproletariatasthe
necessarybearerofthenewsociety,instead
lookingtothepeasantryasthetrulycreative
revolutionaryclassinthemodernworld.Further,
MaoisminvertedtheMarxistconceptionofthe
relationshipbetweentownandcountrysidein
themakingofmodernhistory,rejectingthe
MarxistandLeninistassumptionthatthecityis
thesourceandsiteofsocio‐historicalprogress.
AndreflectingthelackofanyrealMarxistfaithin
objectivelawsofhistoricaldevelopment,Maoism
placedadecisiveemphasisontheroleofhuman
willandconsciousnessinmoldingsocialreality.
Suchweresomeoftheessentialintellectualand
ideologicalpreconditionsfortheMaoist‐led
ChineseRevolution,whichtookthehistorically
unprecedentedformofharnessingthe
revolutionaryenergiesofthepeasantryinthe
countrysideto"surroundandoverwhelm"the
conservativecities.Thatuniquerevolutionary
process,withanow‐semi‐sacredMaoZedongas
itsunquestionedleader,culminatedin1949when
theRedArmydefeatedthenumericallysuperior
armiesofChiangKai‐shek'sNationalists—and
peasantsoldiersvictoriouslymarchedintothe
citiesto"liberate"anurbanworkingclassthathad
beenmostlypoliticallypassivesincethedefeatsof
1927.Onthebasisofthatvictory,thePeople's
RepublicofChinawasformallyestablishedon1
October1949,unifyingChinaafteracenturyof
disintegrationandhumiliation.In1949Maostood
highatoptheGateofHeavenlyPeace
("Tiananmen"),appearingasbothnational
liberatorandsocialistprophet.
MaoZedongdominatedthehistoryofthePeople'sRepublicfor
morethanaquarterofacentury,untilhisdeathinSeptember
1976,justashehaddominatedthehistoryoftherural‐based
revolutionthathadproducedthenewcommunistparty‐state.
Muchofwhatisuniqueanddistinctiveaboutboththegeneral
patternandthespecificeventsofChina'sturbulentpost‐
revolutionaryhistorymustbecreditedto—orblamedupon—the
leadershipofMaoZedong.Rarelyinworldhistoryhasanentire
historicalerabeensodeeplystampedbythepersonalityofa
singleindividual.
InconsideringthethoughtandpoliciesofMaoZedongover"the
Maoera"(1949–1976),oneisstruckbyseveralenduring
themes.First,itisaperiodanimatedbythenotionof
"permanentrevolution."AlthoughtheMaoisttheoryof
permanent(later"continuous")revolutionwasnotexplicitlyset
forthaspartof"MaoZedongThought"until1958,theessential
componentsofthenotionwerepresentfromtheoutset—an
impatiencewithhistorythatexpresseditselfinanambivalent
attitudetowardtheMarxistassumptionthatsocialism
presupposedcapitalism;aburningdeterminationtopass
throughtheMarxian‐defined"stages"ofhistoryinthemost
rapidpossiblefashion;anardentfaiththatpeoplearmedwith
theproperwillandspiritcanmoldsocialrealityinaccordance
withthedictatesoftheirconsciousness,regardlessofthe
materialcircumstancesinwhichtheyfindthemselves,and
indeedatendencytoextoltheadvantagesofbackwardnessas
suchfortheadvancementofsocialism.Thelatternotionwasto
finditsmostextremeexpressioninMao'scelebrationofthe
allegedChinesevirtuesofbeing"poorandblank."
Thisutopianimpulsetoescapetheburdensofhistory
manifesteditselfinthebrevityofthe"bourgeois"or"New
Democratic"phaseofthehistoryofthePeople'sRepublic,
essentiallyterminatedattheendof1952withtheproclamation
ofthebeginningoftheperiodof"thetransitiontosocialism."It
furtherrevealeditselfinthe1955–1956campaigntocollective
agriculture,accomplishedinlittlemorethanayear.Anditfound
itsmostfulsomeexpressioninthedisastrousGreatLeap
Forwardcampaignof1958–1960,whoseutopianideology
envisionedaspirituallymobilizedpopulacesimultaneously
bringingaboutthefull‐scalemodernizationofChinaandits
transitionfromsocialismtocommunismwithinafewshort
decades.
ApopulistmodificationofLeninismisanotherstrikingly
pervasivefeatureofMaoZedong'spost‐revolutionarytheory
andpractice,onemanifestationofwhichwasacontinuous
tensionbetweenthepersonandpersonaofMao,ontheone
hand,andtheinstitutionoftheChineseCommunistParty,onthe
other.Thetensionoriginatedwiththe"HunanReport"of1927
whenMaodrewasharpdichotomybetweentherevolutionary
spontaneityofthepeasantmassesandtheconservative
restraintsthatpoliticalparties(andintellectuals)attemptedto
imposeuponthem.Asimilardichotomyreappearsafter1949,
withMaopresentinghimselfnotsimplyasthechairmanofthe
CommunistPartybutalsoastheembodimentofthepopularwill
strugglingagainsttheconservatismofanincreasingly
bureaucraticizedpartyapparatus.ThistensionbetweenMaothe
leaderandtheinstitutionheleddramaticallyrevealeditselfin
July1955whenMaopersonallyoverrodethecollectivedecisions
ofthepartyleadershipandappealeddirectlyto"thepeople"in
launchingtheaccelerated
campaignforagricultural
collectivization.Itisalso
apparentinthe"Hundred
Flowers"campaignof
1956–1957whenMao
encouragednonparty
intellectualstocriticizethe
CommunistPartyfrom
without.Andthetension
culminatedintheCultural
Revolution,whichbegan
(butdidnotend)withthe
extraordinaryMaoistcall
forthemassestorebel
againsttheauthorityofthe
partyanditsorganizations.
Perhapsthemost
distinguishingfeatureof
thepost‐revolutionary
MaoZedongwashis
historicallyunique(if
ultimatelyunsuccessful)
attempttoreconcilethe
meansofmoderneconomicdevelopmentwiththeendsof
socialism.RejectingtheinheritedStalinistorthodoxythatthe
combinationofrapidindustrializationwithstateownershipof
themeansofproductionwouldmoreorlessautomatically
guaranteeeverhigherstagesofsocialismandeventually
communism,Maoemphasizedthatthecontinuoussocialist
transformationofhumanbeingsandtheirsocialrelationswas
essentialiftheprocessofmoderneconomicdevelopmentwere
tohaveasocialistoutcome.Thissocialradicalismwas
responsible,inpart,fortheadventuresoftheGreatLeapandthe
CulturalRevolution—andMaoZedongmustbearthehistorical
andmoralresponsibilityfortheenormoustollofdeathand
sufferingthatresultedfromtheseextraordinaryevents,
howeverunintendedthoseresultsmayhavebeen.ButMaoist
socialradicalismalsoservedtoforestallthefullyStalinist
institutionalizationofthepost‐revolutionaryorderinChinaand
perhapsservedtokeepalive,amongsome,thehopeforthe
eventualrealizationoftheultimatesocialistgoalsthatthe
revolutionpromised.Itcertainlykeptthepost‐revolutionary
orderinflux,providingMao'ssuccessors,includingDeng
Xiaoping,withconsiderableflexibilityforchartinganewcourse
ofdevelopment.
TheconventionalviewoftheMaoeraisthatMaoZedong
sacrificedmoderneconomicdevelopmentto"ideologicalpurity"
inavainandcostlyquest
forsomesortofsocialist
utopia.Yettheactual
historicalrecordoftheera
suggeststhatMaowas
moresuccessfulasan
economicmodernizerthan
asabuilderofsocialism.
OvertheMaoperiod
(1949–1976),Chinawas
transformedfroma
primarilyagrariannationto
arelativelyindustrialized
one,theratioofthevalue
ofindustrialproductionto
totalproductionincreasing
from30to72percent.
From1952(when
industrialoutputwas
restoredtoitshighest
prewarlevels)untilthe
closeoftheMaoera,
Chineseindustrygrewat
anaverageannualrateof
11percent,themostrapid
paceofindustrializationachievedbyanymajornation
(developedordeveloping)duringthattime.Indeed,Maoist
industrialization,howevercrudetheprocesswasinmany
respects,comparesfavorablywithcomparabledecadesinthe
industrializationofGermany,Japan,andtheSovietUnion,
hithertogenerallyregardedasthethreemostsuccessfulcases
ofmodernizationamongmajor"latecomers"ontheworld
industrialscene.
RapidindustrializationduringtheMaoperiodexactedenormous
humanandsocialcosts,ashadbeenthecasewithotherlate‐
industrializingcountries,andmostofthecostswereborneby
thepeasantry.Agriculturalproductionbarelykeptpacewith
populationgrowth,andlivingstandardsinbothtownand
countrysidelargelystagnatedafter1957asthestateextracted
mostofthesurplusproducttofinancethedevelopmentofheavy
industry.Yetalthoughtheblunders,deficiencies,inequalities,
andimbalancesthatmarkedandmarredtheprocessweremany
andgrave,futurehistoriansneverthelesswillrecordtheMaoera
asthetimewhenthebasicfoundationsforChina'smodern
industrialismwerelaid.
FarmorequestionablethanMao'sstatusasamodernizerishis
reputationasthecreatorofasocialistsociety.Forwhatismost
strikinglyabsentinbothMaoisttheoryandpracticeisthe
elementalMarxistprinciplethatsocialismmustbeasystem
wherebytheimmediateproducersthemselvesdemocratically
controltheproductsandconditionsoftheirlabor.IntheMaoist
system,bycontrast,thecontroloflaboranditsfruitswasleftin
thehandsofaneverlargerandmorealienbureaucratic
apparatus.Mao,tobesure,repeatedlyconductedanti‐
bureaucraticcampaigns,andthereisnoreasontodoubtthe
genuinenessofhisantipathytobureaucracy.Butfromthose
campaigns,hetimeandagainfailedtodeviseanyviablemeans
ofpopulardemocraticcontroloverthepowerfulbureaucratic
apparatusoverwhichheuneasilypresided.AndifMaobroke,at
leastinsomesignificantways,withtheStaliniststrategyof
socioeconomicdevelopment,inthepoliticalrealmtheMaoist
regimeretainedessentiallyStalinistmethodsofbureaucraticrule
andconsistentlysuppressedallformsofintellectualandpolitical
dissentinStalinistfashion.TheMaoerawasthusmarkedbya
deepincongruitybetweenitsprogressivesocioeconomic
accomplishmentsanditsretrogressivepoliticalfeatures,an
incongruitythatprecludedanygenuinesocialistreorganizationof
Chinesesociety.
TheMaoerainthehistoryofthePeople'sRepublicwasoneof
themostturbulentperiodsinmodernworldhistory,andit
remainsoneofthemostcontroversial.Whenthepolitical
passionsengenderedbytheerahavesubsided,mostfuture
historianswilllikelyevaluateMaoZedongmuchinthefashionin
whichheisnowideologicallyportrayedbyhissuccessorsin
Beijing.Firstandforemost,MaowillbelaudedasmodernChina's
greatestnationalist,theleaderofarevolutionwhoseenduring
achievementwastobringnationalunificationandindependence
totheworld'smostpopulousland—afteracenturyofrepeated
internalpoliticalfailuresandgraveexternalimpingements.Mao
willalsobeseenasagreatmodernizerwho,despitemonumental
postrevolutionaryblunders,presidedovertheinitialmodern
industrialtransformationofoneoftheworld'smosteconomically
backwardlands,inauguratingalengthyprocessdestined
eventuallytomakeChinaagreatworldpower.Ultimately,Mao
Zedong'sroleasapioneerofsocialismwillreceiveless
attentionandwillappearfarmoreproblematicthanhislegacy
asanationalistmodernizer.
Meisner,Maurice.TheOxfordCompaniontoPoliticsoftheWorld‐MaoZedong.2009.16August2009<http://www.oxfordreference.com/pages/samplep02.html>.
BenjaminI.Schwartz,ChineseCommunismandtheRiseofMao
(Cambridge,Mass.,1958).
MaoTse‐Tung[MaoZedong],SelectedWorksofMaoTse‐Tung,5vols.
(Beijing,1967–1977).
RossTerrill,Mao:ABiography,2ded.(Stanford,2000).
MauriceMeisner,Marxism,Maoism,andUtopianism:EightEssays
(Madison,Wis.,1982).StuartSchram,TheThoughtofMaoTse‐Tung
(Cambridge,U.K.,1989).
JonathanSpence,MaoZedong(NewYork,1999).
FromTheOxfordCompaniontoPoliticsoftheWorld
MaoZedong
Hisruthlessvisionunitedafracturedpeopleandinspired
revolutionsfarbeyondChina'sborders
ByJONATHAND.SPENCE
MaoZedonglovedtoswim.Inhisyouth,headvocated
swimmingasawayofstrengtheningthebodiesofChinese
citizens,andoneofhisearliestpoemscelebratedthejoysof
beatingawakethroughthewaves.Asayoungman,heandhis
closefriendswouldoftenswiminlocalstreamsbeforethey
debatedtogetherthemyriadchallengesthatfacedtheirnation.
Butespeciallyafter1955,whenhewasinhisearly60sandat
theheightofhispoliticalpowerasleaderoftheChinese
People'sRepublic,swimmingbecameacentralpartofhislife.
Heswamsoofteninthelargepoolconstructedforthetop
partyleadersintheircloselyguardedcompoundthattheothers
eventuallylefthimasthepool'ssoleuser.Heswamintheoften
stormyoceanoffthenorthChinacoast,whentheCommunist
Partyleadershipgatheredthereforitsannualconferences.And,
despitethepleadingsofhissecurityguardsandhisphysician,he
swamintheheavilypollutedriversofsouthChina,driftingmiles
downstreamwiththecurrent,headback,stomachintheair,
handsandlegsbarelymoving,unfazedbytheglobsofhuman
wasteglidinggentlypast."Maybeyou'reafraidofsinking,"he
wouldchidehiscompanionsiftheybegantopanicinthewater.
"Don'tthinkaboutit.Ifyoudon'tthinkaboutit,youwon'tsink.
Ifyoudo,youwill."
Maowasageniusatnotsinking.Hisenemieswerelegion:
militarists,whoresentedhisjournalisticbarbsattheir
incompetence;partyrivals,whofoundhimtoozealousa
supporteroftheunitedfrontwiththeKuomintangnationalists;
landlords,whohatedhispro‐peasantrhetoricandactivism;
ChiangKai‐shek,whoattackedhisruralstrongholdswith
relentlesstenacity;theJapanese,whotriedtosmashhis
northernbase;theU.S.,aftertheChineseenteredtheKorean
War;theSovietUnion,whenheattackedKhrushchev'santi‐
Stalinistpolicies.Maowasequallyunsinkableintheturmoil—
muchofwhichhepersonallyinstigated—thatmarkedthelast
20yearsofhisruleinChina.
Maowasbornin1893,intoaChinathatappearedtobefalling
apart.ThefadingQindynastycouldnotcontainthespiraling
socialandeconomicunrest,andhadmortgagedChina's
revenuesandmanyofitsnaturalresourcestotheapparently
insatiableforeignpowers.Itwas,Maolatertoldhisbiographer
EdgarSnow,atimewhen"thedismembermentofChina"
seemedimminent,andonlyheroicactionsbyChina'syouth
couldsavetheday.
Mao'searliestsurvivingessay,writtenwhenhewas19,wason
oneofChina'smostcelebratedearlyexponentsofcynicismand
realpolitik,thefearsome4thcenturyB.C.administratorShang
Yang.MaotookShangYang'sexperiencesasemblematicof
China'scrisis.ShangYanghadinstitutedasetofruthlessly
enforcedlaws,designed"topunishthewickedandrebellious,in
ordertopreservetherightsofthepeople."Thatthepeople
continuedtofearShangYangwasprooftoMaotheywere
"stupid."MaoattributedthisfearanddistrustnottoShang
Yang'spoliciesbuttotheperceptionofthosepolicies:"Atthe
beginningofanythingoutoftheordinary,themassofthepeople
alwaysdislikeit."
AfterthecommunistvictoryoverChiangKai‐shekin1949,and
theestablishmentofthePeople'sRepublicofChina,Mao's
positionwasimmeasurablystrengthened.Despiteallthatthe
Chinesepeoplehadendured,itseemsnottohavebeentoohard
forMaotopersuadethemofthevisionaryforceandpractical
needfortheGreatLeapForwardofthelate1950s.InMao's
mind,theintensivemarshalingofChina'senergieswoulddraw
manualandmentallabortogetherintoafinalharmonious
synthesisandthrowabridgeacrossthechasmofChina'spoverty
tothepromisedsocialistparadiseontheotherside.
InFebruary1957,MaodrewhisthoughtsonChinatogetherin
theformofaramblingspeechon"TheCorrectHandlingof
ContradictionsAmongthePeople."Mao'snotesforthespeech
revealthecuriousmixtureofjocularityandcruelty,ofutopian
visionsandblinkeredperceptions,thatlayattheheartofhis
character.Maoadmittedthat15%ormoreoftheChinesepeople
werehungryandthatsomecriticsfelta"disgust"withMarxism.
Hespoketooofthehundredsofthousandswhohaddiedinthe
revolutionsofar,butfirmlyrebuttedfigures—quotedinHong
Kongnewspapers—that20millionhadperished."Howcouldwe
possiblykill20millionpeople?"heasked.Itisnowestablished
thatatleastthatnumberdiedinChinaduringthefaminethat
followedtheGreatLeapbetween1959and1961.IntheCultural
Revolutionthatfollowedonlyfiveyearslater,Maousedthearmy
andthestudentpopulationagainsthisopponents.Onceagain
millionssufferedorperishedasMaocombinedtheruthlessness
ofShangYangwiththeabsoluteconfidenceofthelong‐distance
swimmer.
Rejectinghisformerpartyallies,andanyonewhocouldbe
accusedofespousingthevaluesofanolderandmoregracious
Chinesecivilization,Maodrewhissustenancefromthechanting
crowdsofRedGuards.Theironyherewasthatfromhis
youthfulreadings,MaoknewthestoryofhowShangYanglate
inlifetriedtowooamoraladministratortohisservice.Butthe
officialturneddownShangYang'sblandishments,withthe
wordsthat"1,000personsgoing'Yes,yes!'arenotworthone
manwithabold'No!'"
Maodiedin1976,andwiththeyearsthoseadulatorycriesof
"Yes,yes!"havegraduallyfaded.LeadersMaotrained,likeDeng
Xiaoping,wereabletoreverseMao'spoliciesevenasthey
claimedtoreverethem.TheygavebacktotheChinesepeople
theopportunitiestoexpresstheirentrepreneurialskills,leading
toastonishingratesofgrowthandacompletetransformation
ofthefaceofChinesecities.
Arethesechanges,thesemovestowardanewflexibility,
somehowMao'slegacy?Despitetheagonyhecaused,Maowas
bothavisionaryandarealist.Helearnedasayouthnotonly
howShangYangbroughtharshlawstotheChinesepeople,
evenwhentheysawnoneedforthem,butalsohowShang
Yang'srigorshelpedlaythefoundationin221B.C.ofthe
fearsomecentralizingstateofQin.MaoknewtoothattheQin
rulershadbeenbothhatedandfearedandthattheirdynasty
wassoontoppled,despiteitsmonopolyofforceandefficient
useofterror.Butinhisfinalyears,Maoseemstohave
welcomedtheassociationofhisownnamewiththesedistant
Qinprecursors.TheQin,afterall,hadestablishedaunitedstate
fromauniverseinchaos.Theyrepresented,likeMao,notthe
bestthatChinahadtooffer,butsomethingruthlessyetcanny,
withthepowerbrieflytoimposeasinglewillonthescattered
emotionsoftheerrantmultitude.Itisonthatgrimlystructured
foundationthatMao'ssuccessorshavebeenabletobuild,even
astheystruggle,withobviousnervousness,tocontainthesocial
pressuresthattheirownmoreopenpoliciesaregenerating.
SurelyMao'ssimplewordsreverberateintheirears:Aslongas
youarenotafraid,youwon'tsink.
JonathanSpenceteachesatYaleandistheauthorofseveral
acclaimedbooksonChina
Spence,Jonathan.TimeMagazineTop100.2009.16August2009
CIVILWARINCHINA
TheuseoftwoatomicbombsbytheAmericansagainstJapaninAugust1945endedthewarsoonerthananyoneinChinaexpected.ChiangKaishekreturnedintriumphtoNanjinginthefallof1945,butsoontheebullientmoodinChinawasmutedbywhateveryoneknewwasonthehorizon:thefinalshowdownbetweentheNationalistsandtheCommunists.
ForatimetheAmericanstriedtomediateinChinaandpreventcivilwar.This,however,turnedouttobeanimpossibilitybecauseeachsidewasdeterminedtodefeattheotherandwasnotsincerelyinterestedinanysortofreconciliation.Atthesametime,however,bothsidesattemptedtocurryfavorwiththeUnitedStatesandtriedtohumortheidealisticAmericandiplomatswhosoughttoreconciletheNationalistsandtheCommunists.TheU.S.governmentwassympatheticwiththeNationalistsforthesimplereasonthatChiangKai‐shek’sregimewasalmostuniversallyrecognizedasChina’sgovernmentatthetime.
ImmediatelyafterJapan’ssurrender,AmericandiplomatPatrickHurley,acantankerousandapparentlyprematurelysenileman,triedtogetthetwosidestogethertoconductdiscussions.YieldingtoU.S.pressure,ChiangKai‐shekinvitedMaotoChongqing,butMaobalkedbecausehefearedaKMTtrap.AfterHurleygavetheassurancesoftheU.S.governmentthattherewouldbenotrap,MaoboardedanairplaneforthefirsttimeinhislifeandflewfromYan’antoChongqinginmid‐August1945.Sixweeksoftalksyieldednopracticalresults,however,andMaowentbacktoYan’andeterminedtoprepareforall‐outwarwithChiangKai‐shek.HurleyreturnedtotheUnitedStatesadiscouragedanddisillusionedman,buttheAmericanswerenotyetreadytogiveuponChina.InDecember1945theUnitedStatessentanotherenvoytoChina,GeneralGeorgeC.Marshall,theoriginatoroftheMarshallPlanforthepostwarrecoveryofEurope.BecauseofMarshall’senormousprestige,theNationalistsandCommunistscametothenegotiatingtableoncemoreinearly1946andfeignedatentativesettlementoftheirdifferences.ByMarch,however,bothsideswerefightingonceagain.“Talk,talk,fight,fight”wastheguidingprinciplefortheCommunistsatthistime,anditmightaswellhavebeenfortheNationalistsaswell.MarshallfinallyleftChinainJanuary1947,thoroughlydisgustedwiththerefusalofbothsidesintheChinesecivilwartoengageinpeacetalksingoodfaith.
AfterMarshall’sdeparturefromChina,civilwarflaredupinManchuria.AmericanmilitaryadvisorshadencouragedChiangtomaintainhisholdoversouthernChinaratherthanspreadhisforcestoothinintheCommunist‐dominatednorth.Chiang,however,stubbornlyrefusedtoheedtheiradviceandhadtheAmericanmilitaryairliftthousandsofNationalisttroopstoareasthroughoutnorthernChina.Chiang’sinsistenceonattemptingtorecapturethenorthwassimplefromtheNationalists’pointofview:ManchuriaandotherpartsofnorthernChinahadbeenoccupiedbyJapaneseinvadingforcessince1931,andonemajorreasonforChina’swarwithJapanwasovertheseveryareas.Strategically,however,Chiang’smovesagainstthenorthwerequitefoolish,andhiscampaignsturnedoutjustasAmericanmilitaryadvisorshadfeared:hiswidelyspreadforceswereeventuallyoutmaneuveredandoverwhelmed.Bylate1947hisarmiesinManchuriahadbeenlargelywipedout,andinDecember1948Beijing(thenstillcalledBeiping)felltotheCommunists.
NanjingitselffelltotheCommunistsinApril1949,andonOctober1,1949,MaowasconfidentenoughintheCommunists’ultimatevictorythatheproclaimedinBeiping(nowrenamedBeijing)theliberationof
ChinaandthefoundingofthenewPeople’sRepublicofChinatojubilantthrongsofcelebrantsinTiananmenSquare.HeannouncedtoChinaandtheworldthatChinahadstoodup.Meanwhile,theremnantsofChiangKai‐shek’scorruptgovernmentanddiscouragedmilitaryfledtotheislandofTaiwan,whereithasremainedeversince.
ThefallofChinatotheCommunistswasbemoanedintheUnitedStatesduringthe1950sbySenatorJosephR.McCarthyandotherfarrightextremistswhosoughtascapegoatforAmerica’s“loss”ofChina.Inreality,ofcourse,ChinawasneverAmerica’stoloseinthefirstplace.ChiangKai‐shekandhisgovernmentlostmainlandChinabecauseofcorruption,incompetence,andutterignoranceofthecountryside.TheNationalistswereoverwhelminglycityorientedintheirthinking.ChiangKai‐shek’seconomicadvisorshadbeeneducatedatIvyLeagueuniversitiesandknewtheinnerworkingsoftheeconomiesofindustrializednations,buttheyhadonlythefaintestideaofhowChina’soverwhelminglyruralsocietyanditspeasantmassesreallyworked.ManypeopleinChiang’sgovernmentwerecorruptandcynicalmanipulatorswhosawinChina’sturmoilachancefortheirownenrichment.TheCommunists,ontheotherhand,basedtheirpowerandinfluenceonthesupportofChina’speasantry,andthismadethemunstoppable.PeasantarmieseventuallyoverwhelmedChiang’sfortifiedcitiesandsenthisgovernmentpackingtoTaiwan.
Wright,DavidCurtis."China:CivilWarinChina."TheHistoryofChina.SantaBarbara,CA:Greenwood,2001.DailyLifeOnline.ABC‐CLIO.5Oct2009.<http://dailylife.greenwood.com/dle.aspx?k=4&x=GR0940&=p=GR0940‐604&bc=>.
NATIONALRECONSTRUCTIONEFFORTS,1949–1956
TheendoftheKoreanWarbroughtsomestabilityandnormalcytoChinaforthenextfewyears.Ultimately,however,MaobecameconcernedbecauseChinawasgettingdowntothepracticaltasksofpeacetimereconstructionandrationaleconomicplanningandseemednolongertopossesstheideologicalfocusandrevolutionaryardorofpreliberationdays.LongingtoseeChinarealizehisrevolutionaryobjectivesbeforehisowndeath,MaoattemptedtopropelChinaquicklyalongtherevolutionarypathtosocialism.Inthishewasexcessivelytheoreticalandidealisticandignoredthereal‐worldon‐the‐groundconsequencesofhisadventurism.Asaresult,Chinawasplungedintotwodecadesofchaosandturmoil.From1956untilhisdeathin1976,MaomoreorlesshadhiswaywithChinaandsetthecauseofmodernizinghiscountrybacktwentyyears.InretrospectitisclearthatMaowasafinefighterandtheoreticianbutlargelyafailureasapracticalpeacetimeleader.Mao’scontributionstoChinaessentiallyendedwithliberationin1949.
ThefirstdecadeofthePeople’sRepublicstartedoutwellenough.TheKoreanWarwasabriefbutsignificantinterruptiontoChina’splansfordomesticreconstructionandpoliticalconsolidation.EvenduringtheKoreanWar,however,somereformsproceeded.Positivereformsincludedthelandreformprogramofconfiscatingallfarmlandandredistributingittolandlesspeasantsandreformofmarriagelaw,whichoutlawedconcubinageandpolygamyandmadeiteasierforwomentoobtaindivorces.Negativedevelopmentincludedanationwideroundupandexecutionofmorethan500,000“counterrevolutionaries”(basicallyanyonedeemedhostiletothenewCommunistregime,includingformerNationalistofficialsandpeoplewhohadvoiced
disapprovalofwhattheCommunistsweredoing)andnew“reformthroughlabor”techniquesthatemployedbackbreakingphysicallaborandsubtlepsychologicaltorture.Theobjectofreform‐through‐laboreffortswastochangethethoughtpatternsofpeopledeemedhostiletothenewstatebutnotdeservingofthedeathpenalty.
ThePeople’sRepublicusedSovietmodelsandfive‐yearplanstoachieveitssocialisttransformation.Foritsfirstfouryears,thePeople’sRepublicofChina,orPRC,focusedoneducation,industrialization,andhealthcare.ThefirstformalSoviet‐style‐five‐yearplan,whichextendedfrom1953to1957,continuedeffortstoimproveeducationandhealthcare,butitwasconcernedprimarilywithimprovingheavyindustrialandagriculturalproduction.Industrialoutputsteadilyincreasedduringthisperiod,thankslargelytotheassistanceofSovietindustrialexperts.Agriculturewas,however,adifferentstory.MaoandthemoreidealisticoftheChineseCommunistsenvisionedanagriculturalcollectivizationschemeunderwhichChina’speasantswouldcombinethemselvesintoagriculturalproducers’cooperatives(oftenabbreviatedAPCs)ofbetween40and300households.Thesecooperativeswould,theyanticipated,poollaborandcreatemuchmoreefficientagriculture.Inpractice,however,theresultsofcollectivizationweredisappointing,andmorepracticallymindednationalleaderssoughtthedissolutionoftheAPCs.Thepracticalcampeventuallyprevailedovertheidealisticcamp,andby1955severalthousandAPCshadbeendisbanded.
Wright,DavidCurtis."China:NationalReconstructionEfforts,1949‐1956."TheHistoryofChina.SantaBarbara,CA:Greenwood,2001.DailyLifeOnline.ABC‐CLIO.5Oct2009.<http://dailylife.greenwood.com/dle.aspx?k=4&x=GR0940&=p=GR0940‐619&bc=>.
THEHUNDREDFLOWERSCAMPAIGN
Maoandhisideologicalcolleaguesviewedthesedisbandmentswithalarmbutforatimecoulddonothingaboutthem.Maowascarefulanddeliberateinconductingwarfare,butwhenitcametopeacetimenationalreconstructionheprovedtobeanimpatientandimpetuousman.Hesawtherelativepeaceandprosperityofthe1950sasastepawayfromtheoldrevolutionarycommitmenthehadknownintheLongMarchandYan’andays.HesatandstewedatthedissolutionoftheAPCsbutcoulddolittleaboutitbecausehewasoutvotedinthePolitburo.Butvoteswerenoteverything,andMaoknewquitewellthathewasstillthedominantpersonalityoftheCommunistpartyandhadanenormousreservoirofesteemandgoodwillamongthecommonpeople.Inearly1957hepublishedanimportantessayentitled“OntheCorrectHandlingofContradictionsAmongthePeople”inwhichheurgedthosewhodisagreedwithhispoliciestocomeforwardandofferconstructivecriticismsandsuggestions.“Letahundredflowersbloomandahundredschoolscontend”washis
message,anditeventuallybackfiredonhim.
ThemagnitudeoftheresponsemighthavesurprisedMao.ThousandsofintellectualstookMaoathiswordandcriticizedtheSovietUnion,Mao’simpetuosityintheagriculturalcollectivizationmovement,andevensocialismandtheCCPitself.SomepostersputupbystudentsinBeijingwerealmostfreneticintheirdenunciations.ByMay1957Maoannouncedthatcriticismsofsocialismandthepartywouldnolongerbetolerated,andadistinctionwasdrawnbetween“fragrantflowers”and“poisonousweeds.”Thosewhohadalreadyuttered“poisonousweeds”weretrackeddownbythehundredsofthousandsand“sentdown”tothecountrysideforbackbreakingagricultural“reformthroughlabor.”
DidMaoplanallofthisfromthestartandusetheHundredFlowersmovementasarusetosmokeouthiscriticsandthencrackdownonthem,ordidhestartthemovementwiththebestintentions,onlytobetakenabackbythemagnitudeofthenegativeresponse?Manyscholars,aswellasmanyChinesepeoplewholivedthroughthisperiod,disagreeontheanswertothisquestion.
Wright,DavidCurtis."China:TheHundredFlowersCampaign."TheHistoryofChina.SantaBarbara,CA:Greenwood,2001.DailyLifeOnline.ABC‐CLIO.5Oct2009.<http://dailylife.greenwood.com/dle.aspx?k=4&x=GR0940&=p=GR0940‐623&bc=>.
GreatLeapForward(GLF)TheGreatLeapForwardmovement(GLF)wasstartedin1958asanambitiouseconomiccampaign,butendedin1959asaneconomicbankruptcyaccompaniedbyafamineofamagnitudethatwasunprecedentednotonlyinChina'shistory,butalsothroughoutworldhistory.About20
to30millionpeople,mostlypeasants,diedofhungerduringthefamine.Someputthenumberat40million.Theexactdeathtollmaynevercometolight.
MaoZedong,thenthetopleaderofChina,initiatedtheGLF.DespitethesmoothcompletionoftheFirstFive‐YearPlanin1957withhelpfromtheSovietUnion,MaobecameimpatientwiththeRussianmodernizationstrategy,whichemphasizedbureaucraticplanning,capitalaccumulation,andtheheavy‐industryandurbansectors.Asamanwithabigegobutlittleknowledgeofeconomics,Maobelievedthathecouldusesomeofthe
principlesdevelopedduringtheguerrillawarperiod,suchasmassmovement,tobettermobilizeChina'spopulationforeconomicgrowth.Heputforwardanew“GeneralLineforSocialistConstruction”thataimedatgreatlyacceleratingeconomicgrowthbyorganizingthepeopleintovariouskindsofquasi‐militaryunitsandinstitutions,suchasmilitiasandcommunes,sothathecouldeasilydrivethemtofulfillhighproductionquotas.
MaowasabletolaunchtheGLFwithoutmuchopposition.In1957,MaohadjustcrackeddownondissidentintellectualsintheAnti‐RightistCampaign.Inearly1958,heforcedsomeofthetopleaders,includingthenpremierZhouEnlai,tomakeself‐criticismsonbeingtooconservativeinmakingproductionplans.ThusMaosetthestageforthetragedybysilencingallpublicopinionthatdisagreedwithhisradicalideas.Governmentsatalllevelswerecompetingtoreportonemiracleoutputafteranother.Thegreatlyinflatedoutputswerethenreportedinnewspapersorbroadcastbyradiosnationwide,leadingthewholenationtobelievethatChinawasmakingagreatleapinproductionandwascatchingupwiththeWesterndevelopednationsrapidly.
ToMao,theoutputsofiron,steel,cotton,andgrainweretheultimatesymbolofanation'seconomicandmilitaryprowess.Underhispressure,theChinesegovernmentfrequentlyupwardlyrevisedproductionquotas.Thefulfillmentoftheironandsteelquotaswasviewedasthewholenation'sresponsibility.Homemadefurnaceswereerectedinschoolplaygrounds,governmentofficecompounds,residential
backyards,andvillageopensquaresacrossthenation.PeopleweredriveneitherbytheirblindtrustinMaoandtheCommunistPartyorbyfearandpeerpressuretoworkdayandnightwithoutabreak.Mostoftheironandsteelproducedbytheseso‐calledbackyardfurnaceswasatotalwaste.Inmanyruralareas,century‐oldtreeswerecutdownandusedasfuel.Inmanyurbanareas,steelgates,fences,doors,windows,andothermetalframeworkweretakenoffbuildingsandhousesasinputs.Theybecametotallyuselessafterbeingmelted,althoughtheywerereportedaspartoftheironandsteeloutputs.Theruralecologyandurbanlandscapingsufferedtoagreatextentasaresultofthismassmovementofbackyardsteelproduction.
IftheGLFmovementmainlycausedgreatmateriallossesanddisordersinurbanareas,inruralareasitresultedinbothmaterialandhumanlossesofanunprecedentedmagnitude.Thehard‐hitprovinceswereSichuan,Henan,Anhui,Shandong,Qinghai,andGansu.AlloftheseregionsexceptforShandongarelocatedinland,andlittlenewsaboutthetruesituationintheseremoteareasleakedtotheoutsideworld.
Intheearlyspringof1959,Maolearnedthroughclassifiedreportssenttohimfromvariouslocalitiesthatafoodshortagewasdevelopinginsomepartsofthecountry.Realizingthathemustdosomethingtocontrolthesituation,inearlyJuly1959,MaoconvenedasummitmeetinginLuMountain,asummerresortlocatedinnorthernJiangxiProvince.Tobefair,MaooriginallyintendedtocooldownthefanaticatmosphereoftheGLFbyreducingtheoutputquotasandbysofteningsomeoftheradicaleconomicpolicies.However,whenanumberoftopleaders,representedbyPengDehuai,thenthedefenseminister,openlyquestionedthecorrectnessofMao'spolicies,Maofeltthathisundisputableauthoritywasseriouslythreatened.HeaccusedPengandhissupportersofbeingopportunistsandtraitorsanddemandedthatallthemeetingparticipantskeeptheirdistancefromPengandhissupporters.MaovehementlydefendedhisideasabouttheGLFandurgedthePartyandthenationtoadhereevenmorecloselytothegoalsoftheGLF.ThemeetingendedwiththehumiliationanddemotionofPengandhissupporters.Meanwhile,thefaminespreadanddeepened.ChinathuslostagoodopportunitytocontrolthedamageoftheGLFatitsinitiallevel.Mao'sresponsetoPeng'swell‐groundedcriticismclearlyrevealedthedarksideofhispersonality.Heviewedhispersonalreputationandauthorityasfarmoreimportantthanthetruthandthewelfareoftheordinarypeople.ThedisasteralsoclearlyrevealedtheseriousflawsintheChinesepoliticalsystem:therewasnoaccountability,andthemosthonestandoutspokenpoliticiansgotweededoutfirst.
Manyfactorswerelistedaspossiblecontributingcausestothisdisaster:unwieldinessofthehugesizeofanaveragecommune,reducedareassownwithgrain,misleadingreportsaboutinflatedgrainoutput,thecollapseofgrainproduction,overprocurementofgraininruralareas,badweather,communaldininghalls,andphysicalexhaustioncausedbythenonstopmassproductionmovement.Themajorcausesofthefaminearestillsubjecttodebate.
TheChinesegovernmentneverofficiallyadmittedthatafaminetookplaceduringtheGLFperiod.However,thegovernmentadmittedthatChinawasexperiencingafoodshortagewhenitbecameclearthatboththesummerharvestandthefallharvest
of1959notonlyfellfarbelowtheplannedgoalsforthatyear,butalsobelowthoseof1958.Theculpritfirstwasbadweather,laterthemainculpritbecametheSovietUnionwhentheideologicalsplitbetweenChinaanditsmainallybecamepublicin1961.TheChinesepeopleweretoldthatmuchofthegrainwasshippedtoRussiabecausethelatterdemandedthatChinapaybackitsdebtsimmediately.
Ithasnowbecomeclearthatbadweatheranddebt‐serviceobligationcouldnotbethemaincausesofthefamine,norcouldthefaminehavebeentriggeredfirstbyproductioncollapse,assomeearlierstudiestriedtoprove.Theweatherin1958wasveryfavorable,andthefallharvestinthatyearwasarecordhigh.Itistruethatthecommunesystemdeprivedpeasantsofincentivestoworkhard,butduringtheperiod1961–1984,whenthecommunesystemwasstillthedominantruralinstitution,Chinaneversawanyfamineagain.Heavyprocurementcouldbeafactor,buttheprocurementsin1958and1959werecomparablewiththoseofsomeyearsintheearlier1950s.Therefore,procurementalonecouldnotbethemaincauseofthefamine.Sinceexportscamefromthepoolthatwasprocuredbythegovernment,theywouldnotfurtherreducethegrainstockcontrolledbythecommunaldininghalls.Theindustrialmassmovementwasmostlyconcentratedinurbanareas.Giventhefactthattheabnormaldeathrateinurbanareaswasmuchlowerthanthatinruralareas,physicalexhaustioncouldnotbethemaincauseofthehighabnormaldeathratethatwasobservedinruralareas.Afterthesefactorsareexcludedasthemainfactors,thecommunaldininghallsloomlargeasamoreplausiblemaincauseofthefamine.
Underthecommunaldininghallsystem,foodwascontrolledcompletelybythecommunaldininghalls.Peasantswerenotallowedtoeatathome.Fooddistributioninthesedininghallswasnotbasedoncontributionsofacommunemembertoproduction,butonhisorhermembershiponly.Atfirst,thesedininghallswerepopularbecausetheyletpeasantseatasmuchastheywantedforfree.Thispolicyledtoabigdemandshockandcausedasignificantamountofgrainstocktobeconsumedorwastedwithinashortperiodoftimebeforethesummerharvestof1959wasready.Whenthefoodshortagedevelopedinthespringof1959,theegalitariandistributionoffoodinthesedininghallsledtorampantshirkingandfree‐ridingbehaviorthatinturnledtothecollapseofproduction.Assoonasthecommunaldininghallswereabolishedinmid‐1961,allthefoodwasdividedupandallocateddirectlytoindividualhouseholds.Despitethefactthatthelevelofpercapitagrainconsumptionwasstillloweratthistimethanthatin1959,thefamineended.
SeealsoCentralPlanning;GreatCulturalRevolution(1966–1976);People'sCommunes/HouseholdResponsibilitySystem.
Bibliography
Ashton,Basil,KennethHill,AlanPiazza,andRobinZeitz,“FamineinChina,1958–1961,”PopulationandDevelopmentReview10,no.4(December1984):613–645;Chang,Gene,andGuangzhongJamesWen,“CommunalDiningandtheCausationoftheChineseFamineof1958–1961,”EconomicDevelopmentandCulturalChange,October1997,1–34;Yang,DaliL.,CalamityandReforminChina(Stanford,CA:StanfordUniversityPress,1996).
Wright,DavidCurtis."China:TheGreatLeapForward."TheHistoryofChina.SantaBarbara,CA:Greenwood,2001.DailyLifeOnline.ABC‐CLIO.5Oct2009.<http://dailylife.greenwood.com/dle.aspx?k=4&x=GR0940&=p=GR0940‐627&bc=>.
THELULLBEFORETHESTORM
MaowasanunpopularmaninChinaintheearly1960s,andheknewit.In1961aplaycalledHaiRuiDismissedfromOfficebecamequitepopularandwasperformedinBeijingbeforeselloutaudiences.TheplotoftheplaywasanobliquehistoricalcondemnationofMao’sroleintheGreatLeapForwardandacelebrationofPengDehuai’scourageincriticizinghimoverit.ThehistoricalHaiRuiwasaloyalanduprightofficialduringtheMingdynastywhobluntlycriticizedaMingemperor’spoliciesandwas,asaresult,dismissedfromofficeindisgrace.AnyonewhosawtheplayandhadafingeronthepulseofpoliticaldevelopmentsinChinaknewthatthecharacterHaiRuiwasthehistoricalandliterarycounterparttoPengDehuai,whilethestubbornandobtuseMingemperorwhofailedtoheedtheloyalminister’sremonstrationswasnoneotherthanMaohimself.JiangQing,awomanwithliteraryandculturalinterestswhohadbeenMao’swifesinceYan’andays,quicklycaughtontothisandurgedMaoforyearstodosomethingaboutit.
Maomadeonlyonepublicappearancein1962.Duringthisyearhewasangryandhurtaboutthewaypracticalofficialshadmoreorlessshuntedhimasideandregardedhimasa“deadancestor.”HefearedthatbureaucratsandgovernmentalcogswerenowincontrolofChinaandthatthecountrywasslowlywateringdownMarxist‐Leninistdogma.InhisyouthhehadacceptedMarxism‐
Leninismandsawclassstruggleasthedrivingforceofhistory.Now,inthewakeofattemptstorecoverfromtheGreatLeap,therewaslittleevidenceofcontinuingclassstruggle,andthistroubledhim.
OnesegmentofChinesesocietythatwasnotcriticalofMaowasthePeople’sLiberationArmy(orPLA),ledbyLinBiao.LinknewthatthebasisofhispowerandauthoritywashisloyaltytoMao,andduringtheearly1960sheflatteredMaoandwasobsequiousinhisbehaviortohim.WhenotherscriticizedMaofortheGreatLeapcatastrophe,LinpraiseditandglorifiedMaoforattemptingit.LinfosteredapersonalitycultcenteredonMaointhePLA,andheprintedandcirculatedamongPLAtroopsthefamous“LittleRedBook,”orQuotationsfromChairmanMaoZedong,whichheencouragedofficersandmentoreadandmemorizereverentially.Maowaspleasedwithallthisattentivenessandby1965wasencouragingChinatolearnfromthePLA’sideologicalzealandpersonaldedicationtohim.Maoencouragedtheformationofapersonalitycultcenteredaroundhimself,partlyforhisownglorificationbutmainlyforthemassdedicationtohisideologythatitmightproduce.
Bylate1965Maowasonceagainconfidentenoughinhisownleadershiptofireasalvoathiscriticsanddetractors.HefinallyunleashedthefuryofhiswifeJiangQingandherultra‐leftistcroniesagainstthosetheyregardedasimpedingclassstruggleinChina,andinNovembertheyhadnewspapersinBeijingandShanghaipublishatiradeagainsttheHaiRuiplay.BytheendoftheyearMaohadconvenedameetingwithtopChineseofficialsabouttheplayandlashedoutathiscritics,questioningtheirdevotiontotherevolutionarycause.InFebruary1966hetoldLinBiaoandthePLAabouthisvisionofa“greatsocialistculturalrevolution”thatwouldfundamentallychangeChina’sculturebyrootingoutthevestigesofoldorfeudalways.Withthisdone,Maobelieved,hiscriticswouldfinallybesilencedandChinacouldproceedfartherandfasteralongtherevolutionarypathtowardtheultimategoalofpurecommunism.
Wright,DavidCurtis."China:TheLullBeforetheStorm."TheHistoryofChina.SantaBarbara,CA:Greenwood,2001.DailyLifeOnline.ABC‐CLIO.5Oct2009.<http://dailylife.greenwood.com/dle.aspx?k=4&x=GR0940&=p=GR0940‐635&bc=>.
CHINAGOESMAD:THECULTURALREVOLUTION,1966–1976
MaowasintenselydedicatedtothetaskofseeingtherevolutionthroughinChinaduringhislifetime.Ratherthanseehisrevolutionderailed,hethrewChinaintoadecadeofchaosandturmoilthatwould,hehoped,maintainChina’srevolutionaryardorandkeepthenationontracktoachievesocialisminhislifetime.MaoplungedChinaintooneofitsdarkestdecadesofthetwentiethcenturybecausetherevolutionaryidealsandgoalsofhisyouthremainedunrealized.Hewas,ashisphysicianwroteinthe1990s,dedicatedtosocialismforsocialism’ssakeandcaredlittleaboutthepracticalconsequencesorreal‐worldhumansufferingthathisattemptstorealizehistheoreticalidealsentailed(Li1994,377).
FrustratedthatthemajorityoftheChinesegovernmentwasapparentlyabandoningChina’srevolutionarycharterandfollowingamorerevisionistpathsimilartotheSovietUnion,Maoessentiallythrewatempertantrum;hewentovertheheadsofthegovernmentandappealeddirectlytothepeopleforsupport.MaotappedintoavastreservoirofyouthfuldiscontentinChinaandtoldagenerationofChineseyouththatitwasacceptableforthemtorebelagainstauthorityfiguresinfamilies,schools,workplaces,andlocalandprovincialgovernments;manypersonnelintheseorganizationswere,afterall,revisionistorcounterrevolutionaryanddeservedcontemptandcensure.Thatwasallthatagenerationofangryanddisenchantedurbanyouthneededtohear,andbythesummerof1966Chinawasinthethroesofanationwideupheavalthatwouldlast,toagreaterorlesserextent,untilMao’sdeathinSeptember1976.
May1966wasabigmonthinthedevelopingmomentumfortheCulturalRevolution.Mao’smostprominentcriticsweredismissedinMay,andthissamemonthLinBiaoassertedthatthesecriticswerepartofa“blackline”inthepartythatwasouttorestorebourgeoisinterestsinChinesesociety.OnlyathoroughhousecleaningwithinthepartyandanintensifiedrevolutioninChinesesocietyandculturecouldreversetheseominousdevelopments.Sensingwhichwaythewindwasblowing,Mao’slongtimeassociateZhouEnlainamedthedevelopingmovementtheGreatProletarianCulturalRevolution.AlsoinMay,anultra‐leftistphilosophyprofessoratPekingUniversity(Beida)placed“big‐characterposters”throughoutthecampuscondemningtheuniversitypresident’spoliciesforbiddingstudentprotestmovements.Mao’sdiscoveryandapprovalofthepostershadtworesults:thedismissalorassailingofmanyprofessorsandadministratorsatPekingUniversityandthepopularizationofbig‐characterposters(largeposterswrittenwithboldChinesecharacters)asameansofairingopinionsandattackingideologicalopponents.
InJune1966theanarchyinChinabegan.ManyyoungstudentslefttheirstudiesandjoinedtheexcitingnewmovementtoprotectChairmanMaoandhisThoughtfromrevisionists,thestandardbogeymanlabelforanyonewhodaredvoicedisagreementwithMao.Revisionistsweremembersoftheover‐thirtygeneration;howcouldyoungpeopleeverdareresistthesmilingChairmanMaowhowastellingthemthatitwasacceptabletorebelagainsttheoldergenerations?InAugustMaopubliclyandapprovinglydesignatedhisnewyoungsupportersthe“RedGuards”andheartilyapprovedoftheirslogan“torebelisjustified.”Andrebeltheydid,inthenameofapersonalitycultcenteredonthethought,andtheperson,ofChairmanMao.MaotookhisfamousswimintheYangtzeRiverinJuly1966toannouncetoChinaandtheworldthathehadtherenewedpoliticalandphysicalprowessnecessarytodirecttheturmoilhewasabouttounleashinChina.(Inreality,theswimasafeatofphysicalfitnesswasquiteunremarkable;Maosimplyletthecurrentcarryhimalongashefloatedonhisback,supportedbythebuoyancyofhisconsiderablestomach.)
Mao’ssycophantsandflatterersinthePLAwereproudoftheroletheyhadplayedinstartingthemovement.HappytobeincludedinMao’svisionofculturalrevolutionandideologicalpurificationinChina,thePLA’sLiberationArmyDailypublishedthefollowingpieceinitsAugust1,1966edition:
ChairmanMaowantsustorunourarmyasagreatschool.Workingmainlyasafightingforce,itconcurrentlystudies,engagesinagriculture,runsfactories,anddoesmasswork;itcarriesonandfurtherdevelopsthefinetraditionsofourPartyandourarmy,andtrainsandtempersmillionsofsuccessorstotheproletarianrevolutionarycause,sothatourpeople’sarmyofseveralmillioncanplayastillgreaterroleinthecauseofsocialistrevolutionandsocialistconstruction.Itisagreatschoolforthestudy,implementation,dissemination,andsafeguardingofMaoZedong’sThought.(SchurmannandSchell1967,623)
InthissamepiecetheLiberationArmyDailyingratiateditselfwithMaobylashingoutathiscriticsatLushan:
The…bigstruggletookplaceatthesametimeasourParty’sstruggleagainsttheRightopportunistanti‐Partycliquein1959.Takingadvantageoftheimportantpoststheyhadusurpedinthearmy,theprincipalmembersoftheanti‐Partyclique—whowereexposedattheParty’sLushanConference—madeagreatefforttodoawaywiththeParty’sabsoluteleadershipoverthearmy,toabrogatepoliticalwork,torejectthearmy’stasksofparticipatinginsocialistconstructionanddoingmasswork,andtoabolishthelocalarmedforcesandthemilitia;inthisway,theytriedtocompletelynegateChairmanMao’sthinkingonthepeople’sarmyandthepeople’swar.Theyvainlyhopedtorefashionourarmyaccordingtothebourgeois,revisionistmilitarylinesothatitwouldbecomeaninstrumentfortheirusurpingleadershipofthePartyandthegovernment,andforrealizingtheirpersonalambitions.TheEnlargedSessionoftheMilitaryCommissionheldaftertheParty’sLushanConferencethoroughlysettledaccountswiththeminregardtotheircrimesanddismissedthemfromoffice.ThiswasagreatvictoryforMaoZedong’sThought!(625)
OnAugust5,MaoeggedtheRedGuardsonbypostinghisownbig‐characterpostersaying“Bombtheheadquarters!”atthedooroftheCommunistPartyCentralCommitteeHeadquarters.Unnerved,theCentralCommitteegaveintoMao’stacticsbydismissingmoderatesandrecruitingradicalMaoistsintoitsranks.
OnthedawnofAugust18,1966,MaopropelledhisnewpersonalityculttoafrenzyamongtheRedGuardswhenhespoketoonemillionofthematarallyinBeijing’sTiananmenSquare.Hemingledandchattedwiththecrowdsforseveralhours,andthenextdaynewsoftherallywassplashedalloverChina’snewspapers.ThisproducedacrazeforRedGuardralliesatTiananmenSquareformuchoftherestoftheyear.Thelastrally,heldinNovember1966,wasthelargest,withmorethan2.5millionpeopleattending.
ThesehugeRedGuardrallieswerepossiblebecausestudentsalloverChinasimplyquitschoolandadventurouslytraveledalloverChinato“makerevolution”anddoquixoticbattleagainstthephantomcounterrevolutionariesandreactionaries.TheyweregivenfreepassageonChina’strainandbussystemtojustaboutanywhere,whichenabledtheRedGuardgenerationtoseemoreofChinathananyothergenerationinChinesehistory.TheultimatedestinationformillionsofRedGuardswas,ofcourse,Beijing,especiallyafterthenewsmediareportedthatMaohimselfwasknowntoreviewtheralliesatTiananmenSquare.ThefondestdreamofanyRedGuardwastolayeyesontheChairman,evenifonlyforafewfleetingandfrenziedseconds.LiangHeng,ayoungstudentwhotraveledallthewayfromHunaninsouthernChinatoattendaRedGuardrallyatTiananmenSquare,conveysinhismemoirstheintensityandflavoroftherallies:
Iftherewasanysinglethingthatmeantecstasytoeveryoneinthosedays,itwasseeingChairmanMao.EversinceIhadbeeninPeking[Beijing],thepossibilityhadbeeninthebackofmymind,and,likeeveryotherRedGuard,Iwouldhavelaiddownmylifeforthechance.
ChairmanMao’scarwasfirst,aPeking‐brandarmyjeep.Asinadream,Isawhim.Heseemedverytalltome,magnificent,trulylargerthanlife.Hewavedhishatasthejeepdroveslowlythroughthethrong.Thesoldiersformingthepassagewaystoodatattention,butthetearspoureddowntheirfacesinrivulets.Neverthelesstheymanagedtosniffletheirrefrain,“PleasekeepRevolutionaryorder!PleasekeepRevolutionaryorder!”
Iwasbawlinglikeababy,cryingoutincoherentlyagainandagain,“Youareourhearts’reddest,reddestsun!”Mytearsblockedmyvision,butIcoulddonothingtocontrolmyself.ThenChairmanMao’scarwaspast,andPremierZhou’sfollowed.
Thepeopleinfronthadn’trealizedwhathadhappened,andwerestillchanting.“WewanttoseeChairmanMao!”withtheirbacksturnedtoalltheaction.Astheydiscoveredhimintheirmidst,however,theynearlymobbedthecar,obstructingitspassagecompletely….ItwasonlywhenthecrowdwastoldthattheChairmanwantedtoclimbthegate‐towertoseethefireworksthattheyseparatedandletthecargothrough.
WhenitwasallovereveryonerantothepostofficetotelegraphthegoodnewstotheirfamiliesalloverChina.Iwaitedmorethan
twohourstotraceoutthetremblingwords,“Thiseveningat9:15Ibecamethehappiestpersonintheworld.”Iknewmyfatherwouldneednofurtherexplanation.(LiangandShapiro1983,121,124–25)
ThethrongsofRedGuardscollectedMaomemorabilia,woreredarmbandsemblazonedwiththreecharactersmeaningRedGuard,sangsongsinpraiseofChairmanMao’swisdomandbenevolence,andaboveallreadhisworks,especiallytheLittleRedBookorQuotationsfromChairmanMaoZedong.Mao’sQuotationswerecarriedbyeverygoodRedGuardwhereverheorshewent.TheoriginaleditionoftheQuotations,issuedbythePLAinacheap,redplasticcover,had270pagesoftextandmeasuredabout5×3½×3¾inches.AgenerationofRedGuardsreverentiallyporedovertheQuotationsandknewthemlargelybyheart;manyevencommittedtheentirebooktomemory.(TheQuotationsachievedpopularitywiththe1960shippiegenerationintheUnitedStatesandCanada.)Stridentlyanti‐American,theQuotationscontainedfrequentandshrilldenunciationoftheUnitedStates:
Peopleoftheworld,uniteanddefeattheU.S.aggressorsandalltheirrunningdogs!Peopleoftheworld,becourageous,daretofight,defydifficultiesandadvancewaveuponwave.Thenthewholeworldwillbelongtothepeople.Monstersofallkindsshallbedestroyed.(Mao1976,82)
Maowassupremelyconfidentintheultimatevictoryofthesocialistrevolutionallovertheworld:
Thesocialistsystemwilleventuallyreplacethecapitalistsystem;thisisanobjectivelawindependentofman’swill.Howevermuchthereactionariestrytoholdbackthewheelofhistory,soonerorlaterrevolutionwilltakeplaceandwillinevitablytriumph.(24)
Itismyopinionthattheinternationalsituationhasnowreachedanewturningpoint.Therearetwowindsintheworldtoday,theEastWindandtheWestWind.ThereisaChinesesaying,“EithertheEastWindprevailsovertheWestWindortheWestWindprevailsovertheEastWind.”IbelieveitischaracteristicofthesituationtodaythattheEastWindisprevailingovertheWestWind.Thatistosay,theforcesofsocialismhavebecomeoverwhelminglysuperiortotheforcesofimperialism.(80–81)
Theultimatevictoryofthesocialistandcommunistrevolutionswouldbeaccomplishedthroughbruteforceofarms:
EveryCommunistmustgraspthetruth,“Politicalpowergrowsoutofthebarrelofagun.”(61)
…onlywithgunscanthewholeworldbetransformed.(63)
Weareadvocatesoftheabolitionofwar,wedonotwantwar;butwarcanonlybeabolishedthroughwar,andinordertogetridofthegunitisnecessarytotakeupthegun.(63)
Revolutionwas,infact,abrutalandmessybusiness,andinwhatwasprobablythemostfamousstatementofhislife,Maotoldhisfollowersthattheyshouldnotexpectittobeotherwise:
Arevolutionisnotadinnerparty,orwritinganessay,orpaintingapicture,ordoingembroidery;itcannotbesorefined,
soleisurelyandgentle,sotemperate,kind,courteous,restrainedandmagnanimous.Arevolutionisaninsurrection,anactofviolencebywhichoneclassoverthrowsanother.(11–12)
TheCulturalRevolutionwasanexcitingtimefortheRedGuardsandotherperpetrators,butforitsvictims(variouslycalledcounterrevolutionaries,reactionaries,revisionists,capitalistroaders,andthelike)itwasatimeofenormoussufferingandhardship.Maodetestedintellectualsbecausetheythoughtforthemselvesanddidnotalwaysreverentiallylapupthedogmahepouredouttothem.Ithadbeentheintellectuals,afterall,whohadspokenoutmostvociferouslyagainstMao’spoliciesduringtheHundredFlowerscampaign.Alwaysconsciousofhisownlackofformaladvancededucation,Maowasespeciallysuspiciousofanyintellectualwhohadstudiedabroad.DuringtheCulturalRevolution,thousandsofpatriotic,foreign‐educatedChinesewhohadreturnedtoChinaafterthe1949revolutionwerehunteddownandsenttothecountrysideforbackbreakingreformthroughlaboronfarms.Hundredsofphysicistsandotherscientistswerereducedtodemeaningtaskssuchasshovelingpigmanureandcleaninglatrines.Intellectualsingeneralwerereferredtoasthe“stinkingninthcategory,”ninthbeingthelastofalistofundesirablesinChinesesocietywhichincludedcriminalsand“badelements.”RedGuardstookspecialdelightinburstingintotheirteachers’homesinsearchofanythingthatcouldpossiblyprovethemantagonistictoMaoorpro‐Westernintheirtastes:books,music,paintings,andevenWestern‐styleclothing.PeoplewhoarousedtheslightestsuspicionoftheRedGuardsweretakenoutand“struggled,”orverballyandphysicallyabusedbeforelargecrowdsofaccusersanddetractors.ChinesewriterJungChangrecallshowherfather,anintellectual,wastormentedbutremaineddefiantduringtheCulturalRevolution:
Astandardopeningwastochant:“Tenthousandyears,anothertenthousandyears,andyetanothertenthousandyearstoourGreatTeacher,GreatLeader,GreatCommander,andGreatHelmsmanChairmanMao!”Eachtimethethree“tenthousand”sandfour“great”swereshoutedout,everyoneraisedtheirLittleRedBooksinunison.Myfatherwouldnotdothis.Hesaidthatthe“tenthousandyears”washowemperorsusedtobeaddressed,anditwasunfittingforChairmanMao,aCommunist.
Thisbroughtdownatorrentofhystericalyellsandslaps.Atonemeeting,allofthetargetswereorderedtokneelandkowtowtoahugeportraitofMaoatthebackoftheplatform.Whiletheothersdidastheyweretold,myfatherrefused.HesaidthatkneelingandkowtowingwereundignifiedfeudalpracticeswhichtheCommunistswerecommittedtoeliminating.TheRebelsscreamed,kickedhisknees,andstruckhimonthehead,buthestillstruggledtostandupright.“Iwillnotkneel!Iwillnotkowtow!”hesaidfuriously.Theenragedcrowddemanded,“Bowyourheadandadmityourcrimes!”Hereplied,“Ihavecommittednocrime.Iwillnotbowmyhead!”
Severallargeyoungmenjumpedonhimtotrytoforcehimdown,butassoonastheyletgohestoodupstraight,raisedhishead,andstareddefiantlyattheaudience.Hisassailantsyankedhishairandpulledhisneck.Myfatherstruggledfiercely.Asthehystericalcrowdscreamedthathewas“anti‐CulturalRevolution,”heshoutedangrily,“WhatkindofCulturalRevolutionisthis?Thereisnothing‘cultural’aboutit!Thereis
onlybrutality!”(Chang1991,331)
ByNovember1966MaowastakenabackbytheviciousnessoftheattacksagainstteachersandotherauthoritiesandtriedtoremindtheRedGuardsthatnotallpeopleinauthoritywererevisionistsorcapitalistroaders.Hedidnot,however,reininthemovementatthistime,andthingssteadilyworsened.SeveralhighofficialsinChina’sgovernmentwerehauledoutoftheirhomes,struggled,andmoreorlessforcedtoadmittotrumped‐upaccusationsagainstthem.Duringthesummerof1967,mobsbrokeintoPengDehuai’shouseanddraggedhimouttoastrugglesession.AmobbrokeintotheBritishembassyinBeijing,terrorizedBritishdiplomats,andburnedapartoftheBritishembassycompound.AnarchyprevailedinseveralmajorChinesecitiesasrivalgroupsclaimingtobethemostloyalofChairmanMao’sRedGuardsfoughtandmurderedeachother.OneChineseintellectualremembershowuniversityandurbanlifewasviolentlydisruptedasthecityofHefeiinAnhuiprovincedescendedintolawlessness:
Attheuniversity,thesixteen‐year‐olddaughterofColonelLi,stillinjuniorhigh,madeherselffamousbybeingoneofthosedaredevilRedGuardswhopridedthemselvesontheirbloodlineage.Shesportedadaggerwithéclat,becausebothofherparentshadservedintheearlyRedArmy.Oneday,whileroamingthestreetswithabandofteenagersofherfaction,shesawateenageboycomingtowardthem.
“Whoisthat?Friendorenemy?”sheaskedhercompanions.
“Ihavenotseenhimbefore.Enemy,Ibelieve,”oneoftheboyssaid.
“Thenwhatarewewaitingfor?Let’sgethim,”sheurged,walkinguptothesolitaryyouth.
“Stop!Whoareyou,kid?Whichfaction?”
“Youhavenorighttostopmeoraskmequestions.Letmegoby.”
“Here’sforyourimpudence,youdog!”Herdaggerwentstraightintotheyoungster’sheart.Hercompanionsweredumbfounded.“Comeon!”shesaidcheerfully.“I’lltreatyoutoice‐suckerstocelebrateourheroicdeed.”Leavingtheyoungsterdyingonthestreetinapoolofblood,shewalkeduptoamanpeddlingice‐suckersandclenchedthebloodydaggerbetweenherteethwhileshefumbledinherpocketsforchange.“Tenice‐suckersforChairmanMao’strueRedGuards!”shesaidproudly.Thepeddlerwassofrightenedthathedarednottakemoneyfortheice‐suckers.Thedeadboyturnedouttohavebelongedtothesamefactionasthekiller.(Wu1993,206–7)
Thingsbecameevenmoreominousinthesummerof1967whenentireshipmentsofweaponsdisappearedandmobruleprevailedinthesouthernChinesecityofGuangzhou.WhenitappearedthatthePLAitselfmightalsobeslidingintochaos,MaofinallyconcludedthathisCulturalRevolutionhadgonetoofarandtriedtorestrainit.WhenhetouredtheprovincesinSeptember,hewasappalledattheextentofthesocialdisruptionhesaw.MaoalsoreinedinJiangQingandhergroupofwriters,buthekepttheminreservetouseasattackdogsagainsthispoliticalopponentswhenitsuitedhim.OrderinChina
wasnotquicklyrestored,andinJuly1968MaohadtoinstructthePLAtorestoreordertoChina’scitiesthroughallthenecessarymeans,includingmilitaryforce.ThatsamemonthhesummonedstudentandRedGuardleaderstoadiscussionandmoreorlesstoldthemthatthepartywasovernow.OnewaytogettheRedGuardsoutofthecitieswastosendthemouttothecountrysidetolearnfromthepeasants.Thishedidin1969,andmillionsofstudentswenttoworkonfarms.Somewentwillinglyandenthusiastically,butmosthadtobecompelled.InthecountrysidetheylearnednothingbutbitternessforMao,whoseemedtohavenoconcernforthemnowthattheyhadoutlivedtheirusefulness.
Thefallof1968wastheendoftheCulturalRevolutionproper,anditwasofficiallydeclaredoverinthespringof1969.Itslingeringeffects,however,continuedtoreverberateuntilMao’sdeathin1976.After1969movementsreminiscentoftheCulturalRevolutionflaredupoccasionallybutwerenotgiventhefullreintheyhadin1966and1967.MaoknewthathisCulturalRevolutionwas,likehisGreatLeapForwardofthelate1950s,amonumentalfailure,butthistimehemadesurethatnobodylikePengDehuaiwoulddarecomeforthandcriticizehim.Thistimetheoddswerestackedinhisfavor;thehighestlevelsoftheCCPwerepackedwithhisallies,andhealwayshadJiangQingandhergroupofliteraryhatchetmenreadytosliceupanypotentialcritics.
MaocontinuedtobeconcernedaboutthestateoftherevolutioninChina,butbythelate1960sandearly1970shewasbecomingpreoccupiedwithanothermatter,thegrowingSino‐Sovietsplit.Maobecameconvincedduringthistimethatthegreatestthreat
toChineseandinternationalsecuritywasnottheUnitedStatesbuttheSovietUnion,whichhaddistanceditselffromChinainhorrorafterthelunacyoftheGreatLeapForwardandtheCulturalRevolutionandhadbegunmenacingChinaalongtheSino‐Sovietborders.
TheCulturalRevolutionwasacomplexphenomenon,andmakingsenseofitisnotaneasytask.Indeed,severalscholarswhohavedevotedtheircareerstoplumbingitsdepthshavenotbeenabletocometofullgripswithitscausesandthecourseofitsdevelopment.TheCulturalRevolutionwasmoreorlessofficiallylaunchedinmid‐1966,butafterthatitseemstohaveassumedamomentumandmeaningallitsown,quiteapartfromwhatMaooriginallyforesaworintended.ItendedwiththedeathsofmorethanonemillionChineseandmassivedisruptionsinthelivesofalmostallofChina’surbanpopulation.(Disruptionswerelessextensiveinthecountryside.)PerhapsweneverwillfullyunderstandtheCulturalRevolution,butatpresentitappearsthatitwasmoreorlessafailedattemptbyMaoandhisideologicalsupporterstoseetherevolutionthroughtocompletion.Mao’sappealtoChina’sangryyoungpeoplewasanattempttoharnesstheirenergyandrestlessnessfortherevolutionarycause,butinsteadoffurtheringtherevolutiontheyplungedChinaintosocialandeconomicchaos.
Wright,DavidCurtis."China:ChinaGoesMad:TheCulturalRevolution,1966‐1976."TheHistoryofChina.SantaBarbara,CA:Greenwood,2001.DailyLifeOnline.ABC‐CLIO.5Oct2009.<http://dailylife.greenwood.com/dle.aspx?k=4&x=GR0940&=p=GR0940‐640&bc=>.
ChronologyofthePeople'sRepublicofChina
1949
ThePeople'sRepublicofChina(PRC)isfoundedonOctober1inBeijing.TheNationalistgovernmentwithdrawstoTaiwan.MaoZedongdeclaresthe“People'sDemocraticDictatorship.”MaoisappointedchairmanoftheCentralPeople'sGovernment;ZhouEnlaiisnamedpremier;andZhuDebecomesgeneralcommanderofthePeople'sLiberationArmy(PLA).
1950
TheSino‐SovietTreatyofFriendship,Alliance,andMutualAssistanceissignedinMoscowbyMaoZedongandJosephStalin.InJune,MaodenouncesAmericanaggressioninKorea.InOctober,theArmyoftheChinesePeople'sVolunteerspubliclyentersKoreainsupportofNorthKorea.Alsointhisyear,theMarriageLawispromulgatedbythecentralgovernment,togetherwiththeTradeUnionLawandtheAgrarianReformLawofthePRC.
1951
TheKoreanWarprogresses,withChinesetroopstakingSeoul.MaoZedong'sson,MaoAnying,iskilledinKorea.Domestically,theAgreementoftheCentralPeople'sGovernmentandtheLocalGovernmentofTibetonMeasuresfortheLiberationofTibetissignedinBeijing;theagreementrecognizesTibetaspartofChinaandgrantstheregionautonomousstatus.
1952
TheThree‐AntisCampaignislaunchedinJanuary;ittargetscorruption,waste,andbureaucratism.InFebruary,theFive‐AntisCampaignisstarted;ittargetsbusinessoperationsandiscommonlyviewedastheprecursortoaloomingdeprivatizationcampaign.DengXiaopingbecomesdeputypremier.
1953
ThearmisticeendingtheKoreanWarissignedonJuly27.TheFirstFive‐YearPlan(1953–1957)starts.DengXiaopingbecomesfinanceministerforoneyear.
1954
ZhouEnlaiandIndianprimeministerJawaharlalNehrusignajointcommuniquéthatbecomesthefirst
internationaldeclarationtoincludethePRC's“FivePrinciplesofPeacefulCoexistence.”ThefirstNationalPeople'sCongress(NPC)convenes.DengXiaopingbecomesdeputychairmanoftheNationalDefenseCouncil.
1955
ZhouEnlaiattendstheAsian‐AfricanConference(BandungConference)inBandung,Indonesia;theconferenceseekstobuildaunitedfrontofAsianandAfricannationsagainstcolonialismandracism.DengXiaopingiselectedtothePolitburo.TheChineseLanguageReformCommitteereleasesthefirstbatchofsimplifiedChinesecharacters,whicharefirstusedinnewspapersinBeijingandTianjin.
1956
InApril,MaoZedongdelivershisinfluentialspeech“OntheTenMajorRelationships.”InSeptember,theEighthPartyCongresselectsMaoPartychairman;LiuShaoqi,ZhouEnlai,ZhuDe,andChenYunareelecteddeputychairmen;andDengXiaopingiselectedassecretary‐generaloftheChineseCommunistParty(CCP).InMay,MaoZedongcallsforgreaterartisticandacademicfreedomwiththeslogan“letahundredflowersbloom,andahundredschoolsofthoughtcontend.”
1957
MaoZedongdelivershisspeech“OntheCorrectHandlingofContradictionsamongthePeople.”InJune,thePeople'sDailystatesthatrightistsaretryingtooverthrowtheCommunistParty,andanAnti‐RightistCampaignislaunched.
1958
InMay,theGreatLeapForwardislaunchedwiththephrase“more,faster,better,andmoreeconomicallysoundly”asitsgeneralguidingprinciple.InAugust,atthePolitburo'sBeidaiheConference,thepeople'scommunesplanisendorsed;theplanresultsintheorganizationof26,000communesinlessthantwomonths.
1959
InMarch,theStateCouncilappointsthePanchenLamatochairthePreparatoryCommitteefortheTibetanAutonomousRegion.Democraticreforms
startinAprilinTibet.InApril,LiuShaoqireplacesMaoZedongaspresidentofthePRC,withSongQinglingandDongBiwuasdeputies.DuringJulyandAugust,anextremelyseriousdroughthitsvastareasofChina,affecting30percentofproductionfromtheland.RebellioneruptsinTibet.LinBiaoreplacesPengDehuaiasdefenseminister.
1960
InJuly,theSovietsnotifyChinaoftheirwithdrawaloftechnologicalsupport.WiththeexceptionofXinjiangandTibet,seriousfamineoccursacrossChina,causingtensofmillionsofdeaths.
1961
WuHan'scontroversialplayHaiRui'sDismissalispublishedinJanuary.TheTwenty‐sixthWorldTableTennisChampionshipstakesplaceinBeijing,withtheChinesewinningboththemen'sandwomen'ssinglestitles.
1962
InOctober,ChinesetroopslaunchmajoroffensivesontheSino‐Indianborder.Acease‐fireisdeclaredinNovember.MaoZedongstepsupemphasisonclassstruggle.
1963
InMay,MaoZedonglaunchesthesocialisteducationmovementinruralareas.
1964
InJanuary,ZhouEnlailaunchesanextensivetourofAfrica.InAugust,theUnitedStatesbombsNorthVietnam.InOctober,Chinacarriesoutitsfirstnucleartest.
1965
InMay,Chinacarriesoutitssecondnucleartest.InJune,theWenhuibaonewspaperdenouncesWuHan'sdramaHaiRui'sDismissalasananti‐Partypoisonousweed,therebysignalingthecomingoftheGreatCulturalRevolution.TheTibetanAutonomousRegionisformallyinauguratedinSeptember.
1966
InMay,thePolitburosetsuptheCulturalRevolution
GroupandcallsforattacksonallrepresentativesofthebourgeoisiewhohaveinfiltratedtheParty,government,army,andculturalworld.InJuly,MaoZedongswimsintheYangziRiveratWuhan,refutingtherumorthatheissick.InAugust,MaoZedong,LinBiao,andZhouEnlaipresideataCulturalRevolutionrallyinTiananmenSquareatwhichRedGuardsmaketheirfirstappearance.TheGuardssubsequentlybegindestroyinghistoricalrelics.ChairmanMao'sQuotationsarefirstpublishedintheformofthe“LittleRedBook.”DengXiaopingisoustedfromhisoffices.
1967
InJune,Chinatestsitsfirsthydrogenbomb.ByDecember25,Chinahasdistributed350millioncopiesofMao'sLittleRedBook.
1968
Thearmytakescontrolofgovernmentoffices,schools,andfactories.Millionsofyoungpeoplearesenttothecountrysidetoreceivere‐educationfrompeasants.
1969
InMarch,ChineseandSovietforcesclashatZhenbaodaoIslandintheUssuriRiver.Moreclashesoccurinthefollowingmonths.InJuly,theUnitedStatesliftsrestrictionsontraveltoChina;theUnitedStatesliftsitspartialtradeembargoofChinainDecember.LiuShaoqidies.
1970
InApril,Chinalaunchesitsfirstsatellite.
1971
InApril,theU.S.Ping‐PongteamvisitsChinaandisfollowedbyU.S.secretaryofstateHenryKissinger,whocomestoBeijinginJuly.InOctober,ChinaisadmittedtotheUnitedNations.
1972
InFebruary,PresidentRichardNixonvisitsChina,wherehesignsthejointShanghaiCommuniquéadmittingthatthereisbutoneChinaandthatTaiwanisapartofChina.InSeptember,ChinapurchasestenBoeing707civilianjetairlinersfromtheUnitedStates.
1973
DengXiaopingbecomesvicepremierinAugust.The
UnitedStatesandChinaannouncetheirintentiontoestablishliaisonofficesineachother'scapital.
1974
InApril,DengXiaopingaddressestheUnitedNationsanddenouncestheworldhegemonyofthetwosuperpowers,theUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnion.
1975
InJanuary,DengXiaopingiselecteddeputychairmanoftheChineseCommunistPartyCentralCommittee(CCPCC).
1976
AhugeearthquakeinTangshan,acitynearBeijing,killsmorethan250,000people.PremierZhouEnlaidiesinJanuary,andMaoZedongdiesinSeptemberatageeighty‐two.Mao'sdeathendstheGreatCulturalRevolution.Theradicalgroupcalledthe“GangofFour,”ledbyMao'swidowJiangQing,isarrestedbyHuaGuofeng,Mao'shandpickedsuccessor.
1977
Universityadmissionsbasedoncollegeentranceexaminationsstart.Enrollmentbasedonrecommendationsends.DengXiaopingispoliticallyrehabilitated.
1978
The“Dengera”begins.DengXiaopingemergesasakeyleaderandsetsaboutrepairingthedamagecausedduringthelastyearsofMaoZedong'srule.Deng'smarket‐orientedreforms,embodiedinthemaxim“togetrichisglorious,”sparkmorethantwodecadesofphenomenalgrowththatliftshundredsofmillionsofpeopleoutofabjectpoverty.InDecember,theCoca‐ColaCompanyreachesanagreementwithChinatosellitssoftdrinksinthecountryandopenupbottlingplants.Inthesamemonth,theThirdPlenumoftheEleventhChineseCommunistPartyCentralCommittee(CCPCC)shiftstheParty'sfocustomodernization,whichisalsoseenastheonsetoftheeconomicreforms.
1979
InJanuary,DengXiaopingvisitstheUnitedStates
andresumestheSino‐Americandiplomaticrelationship.FromJanuarytoFebruary,ChinesetroopsinvadeVietnameseterritoryanddestroylogisticsfacilities.InJuly,theFifthNationalPeople'sCongress(NPC)announcestheCriminalLawandtheOrganicLawoftheLocalPeople'sCongressesandLocalPeople'sGovernments.Specialeconomiczonesareopened,includingShenzhen,Zhuhai,Shantou,andXiamen.InSeptember,thePartycriticizesMaoZedong'sCulturalRevolutionasilljudgedandcalamitous.InOctober,politicaldissidentWeiJingshengissentencedtofifteenyearsinprison.
1980
InFebruary,theNPCStandingCommitteedeclaresregulationsonissuanceofacademicdegrees.InDecember,thePeople'sDailydeclaresthatMaoZedongmadegreatmistakesduringhislastyearsandthathisGreatCulturalRevolutionwasadisaster.
1981
DengXiaopingiselectedchairmanoftheMilitaryCommission,andHuYaobangreplacesHuaGuofengaschairmanoftheChineseCommunistPartyCentralCommittee(CCPCC).BothZhaoZiyangandHuaGuofengareappointeddeputychairmen.ThetrialoftheGangofFourisheld.
1982
InSeptember,BritishprimeministerMargaretThatcherarrivesinBeijingtostartdiscussionswithregardtothefutureofHongKong.
1983
TheSelectedWorksofDengXiaopingispublishedinJuly.Sino‐BritishtalksoverHongKong'sfuturebegin.
1984
InOctober,theThirdPlenumoftheTwelfthChineseCommunistPartyCentralCommittee(CCPCC)adoptsadecisiononreformoftheeconomicstructure,shiftingthefocustourbanenterprises.MeasuresaretakentostrengthentheTibetaneconomy.FourteencoastalcitiesandtheislandofHainanareopenedtoforeigninvestment.ASino‐BritishdeclarationonHongKong'sreturnissigned.
1985
InMay,theChineseCommunistPartyCentralCommittee(CCPCC)releasesitsDecisionontheReformoftheEducationalSystem.
1986
InSeptember,DengXiaoping,duringa60MinutesinterviewwithMikeWallaceofCBS,endorsesMikhailGorbachev'sreformsintheSovietUnionandindicatesthatChina'seconomicreformsarenotinconflictwithcommunism.InSeptember,theShanghaiStockMarketreopensforthefirsttimesince1949.TheBankruptcyLawisissuedinDecember.InMayandDecember,studentsinlargecitiesstagedemonstrationsdemandingmorerapidreformsandmoredemocracy.
1987
Facedwithrisingdemocraticpressures,theChineseCommunistParty(CCP)reiteratesitsdeterminationtosticktothe“FourCardinalPrinciples.”HuYaobangresignsinJanuary.WriterLiuBingyanisexpelledfromtheParty.ZhaoZiyangisappointedgeneralsecretaryoftheCCP,replacingHuYaobang.Studentunrestoccursintwenty‐twoChinesecities.InNovember,DengXiaopingremainsincontroloftheCentralMilitaryCommission.InDecember,ZhaoZiyangresignsaspremierandisreplacedbyhard‐linerLiPeng.InOctober,2,000TibetanmonksdemonstrateinLhasainfavorofTibetanindependence;thedemonstrationsleadtoclasheswithChineseauthorities.
1988
Chinaslidesintoeconomicchaostriggeredbyrisinginflationthatpeaksatmorethan30percentinthecities.Publicdiscontentsetsthestageforprodemocracydemonstrationsin1989.Hainanisapprovedforprovincialstatus.ThefirstnudepaintingsexpositionisopenedinBeijinginDecember.
1989
OnMay16,DengXiaopingandMikhailGorbachevmeetandannouncethenormalizationofSino‐Sovietrelations.OnJune4,afterweeksofprotestsbystudentsinBeijing'sTiananmenSquare,troopsbackedbytankscrushthedemonstrations,allegedlykillinghundredsofpeople.Theeventonceagain
isolatesChinaontheworldstage.OnJune5,PresidentGeorgeBushsuspendshigh‐levelrelationswithBeijinginprotestagainstthemassacre.OnDecember10,U.S.nationalsecurityadviserBrentScowcroftmeetsDengXiaopinginBeijing.Afterthecrackdown,DengplucksJiangZeminfromrelativeobscurityinShanghaitobethenewCommunistPartychief.JiangreplacesZhaoZiyang.
1990
InJanuary,almost500studentswhoparticipatedinthedemonstrationsofthepreviousyeararereleasedfromdetention.InApril,PresidentYangShangkunpromulgatestheBasicLawoftheHongKongSpecialAdministrativeRegion(SAR)adoptedbytheSeventhNationalPeople'sCongress(NPC).ThelawisscheduledtotakeeffectonJuly1,1997.Campaignsthataimatstrengtheningpatriotismanddisciplinearelaunchedateducationalinstitutions.
1991
ThefirstpartialdirectelectionsareheldinHongKong.
1992
DuringhistourtoHainanandcoastalcities,DengXiaopingreiterateshisdeterminationtocontinueChina'seconomicreforms.BeijingestablishesdiplomaticrelationswithSouthKorea.
Wright,DavidCurtis."China:CivilWarinChina."TheHistoryofChina.SantaBarbara,CA:Greenwood,2001.DailyLifeOnline.ABC‐CLIO.5Oct2009.<http://dailylife.greenwood.com/dle.aspx?k=4&x=GR0940&=p=GR0940‐604&bc=>.
DavidWrightanalysestheuseofpoliticalslogansinChina,thearticlefirstappearedinSACU'sChinaNowmagazine1989.
TheChineseCommunistPartyhasalwaysseenpropagandaasofgreatimportance,andtheslogan(kouhao)isonemethodofachievingtheaimsofthepropagandist.Itisusuallyshort,easytoremember,andneatlyencapsulatesaparticularlyimportantideaorcalltoaction.TheChineselanguagelendsitselfwelltosuchconciseexpressions,aseachcharacterrepresentsawordoridea.Soafour‐charactersloganmaywellrequireatleastsixormoreEnglishwordsinordertoexpressthesameidea.[Seealsoproverbs]TheslogansusedatvariousperiodssinceLiberationin1949showthechangingpoliticalimperativesandpoliciespromotedbythecentralgovernment.
为人民服务 Weirenminfuwu:Servethepeople
Atimelessslogan,firstusedinthe1940s,andoneofthefewwhichmaystillbeseentoday.
百花齐放,百家争鸣Baihuaqifang,baijiazhengming:Ahundredflowersbloom,a
hundredschoolsofthoughtcontend
Thisslogan,usedduringtheHundredFlowersperiodof1956‐57,harkedbacktothedistantpastduringtheWarringStatesperiod(476‐221BC)whenmanydifferentschoolsofphilosophyexistedinChina.Themodem'HundredSchoolsofThought'werethecriticismsoftheCommunistPartywhichMaoinvitedinlate1956,partlyinresponsetotheHungarianuprising.TheferocityandscaleofthediscontentwhichtheHundredFlowerscampaignrevealedseverelyshookthePartyleaders,andin1957manyofthosewhohadofferedtheircriticismswerepunishedaspartoftheAnti‐RightistCampaign,setinmotiontoeradicatethe'poisonousweeds'whichhadsprungupinsuchalarmingnumbers.
敢想敢干Ganxianggangan:Daretothink,daretoact
AsloganoftheGreatLeapForwardof1958‐60whenChairmanMaowasencouragingthepeasantstoformcommunesandtoincreaseproductiontounheard‐oflevels.Communismitselfwasthoughttobeimminent,andinafewyearstheindustrialcountriesoftheWestwouldbeovertaken.
农业学大寨NongyexueDazhai:Inagriculture,learn
fromDazhai
DazhaiisavillageinShanxiProvince,north‐westChina.In1964itwasheldupasamodelofwhatcouldbeachievedbyself‐relianceandcollectiveeffort.Fromthenuntil1979itwasoneofthemostfamousplacesinChina,andbrigadeleaderChenYongguitravelledallovertheworldtalkingaboutthespiritofDazhai.After1979Dazhai'sexamplewasrepudiated,andsince1983Dazhaihasbeenprivatised.
造反有理Zaofanyouli:Torebelisjustified
ARedGuardsloganoftheearlyCulturalRevolutionperiod(1966‐68).ChairmanMaohadencouragedattacksonvirtuallyalloftheexistingpartyapparatus,andthisrebellionextendedtoallformsofauthority:parents.,teachers,doctors,scientists,musicians,artistsandintellectualsofeverykindweretargetsofattack.Manycommittedsuicide,manymoreweresenttoworkonthelandinremoteareas.
批林批孔PiLinpiKong:CriticiseLinBiaoand
Confucius
ThecampaignagainstLinBiaostartedafterhis1971attempttoassassinateMao,andhisowndeathinaplanecrash,weremadepublic.AtfirstLinwasaccusedofbeingultra‐leftist,butlaterhewas(somewhatbizarrely)labelledasultra‐rightandin1974linkedwithConfucius,thesageofancientChina.ThecampaigntocriticiseLinBiaoandConfuciuswasreallyacovertattackonZhouEnlaiandhispolicies,viewedaspro‐modernisationandasless'radical'thanthosepromotedbyMaohimself.
实事求是Shishiqiushi:Seektruthfromfacts
Thiswasthecredoofthereformerswhofrom1977onwardsbegan'tosetthepoliticalagendaforChinaafterthedeathofMao.Itmeantthatfactsratherthanideologyshouldbethecriterionofthe'correctness'ofapolicy;thepolicyhadtoworkinpractice.DengXiaopinghimselfhadsaid,'Itdoesn'tmatterwhetheracatisblackorwhite,aslongasitcatchesthemouse.'Mouse‐catching(expertise)wasnowatamuchhigherpremiumthanpoliticalcolouring.ThisofcoursecontrastedcompletelywithMao'ssuspicionofhard‐headedempiricism.ForMao,theFoolishOldMan(acharacterinanancientChinesefableretoldbyMaotoencouragepeopletocontinuetostruggledespiteenormousdifficulties),hadshownthat'humanwillconquersheaven'andhadrefutedthescepticismoftheso‐calledexperts.
实现四个现代化Shixiansigexiandaihua:
AchievetheFourModernisations
TheFourModernisationsarethemodernisationofscience,industry,agricultureanddefence.ThereformersseemodernisationofChinainallthesefieldsastheprimarytaskfacingChinainthelatetwentiethcentury.Science,ratherthanmassmovementsandideologicalupheaval,isseenasthemeansbywhichChinawillachievesocialism.
只生一个孩子好Zhishengyigehaizihao:Itisgoodtohavejustonechild
SinceMao'sdeath,theproblemofrapidpopulationgrowthhasbeentreatedwith
Cultural Revolution Slogans greatseriousnessbytheChinesegovernment.On14thApril1989Chinamarked1.1billionpopulationdaywithexhortationstostrengthenfamilyplanning.Predictionsofseverehardshipandevenstarvationiftherateofgrowthisnotstemmedhavebeenreinforcedbycampaignstoencouragetheone‐childpolicy.Thishasnotbeencompletelysuccessful,partlybecauseitisdifficulttoimposesanctionsoncouplesinthecountrysidewhohavemorethanonechild.
Eventodayslogansdostillariseandwillcontinuetoappear,asgovernmentsofanypoliticalcolourneedtogetmessagesacrosstothepopulation,andslogansareaconvenientandeffectivewayofpackagingideas.ThehugeroadsideboardsinBeijingandotherbigcitiesusedtobecoveredwithquotationsfromMao,Marx,EngelsandLenin;nowforthemostpartthesehavedisappeared,replacedbycommercialadvertisementsandgovernmentpostersofalesspoliticalkind:promotinghealthcampaignsorbirthcontrol.Yetslogansarestillverymuchpartofpoliticallife.
©CopyrightSocietyforAnglo‐ChineseUnderstanding(SACU)2001reprintedfromSACU'smagazineChinaNow131,Page22.