Multipolarism

While the economic and military superiority of the United States will not vanish in the 21st century, the rise of a number of other states and non-state actors is creating a more "multi-polar" world with multiple centers of power and influence. Two clusters seem poised to be especially consequential: what Goldman Sachs calls the "BRIC" nations of Brazil, Russia, India and China, who together represent 40 percent of the world's population, and whose combined economies by 2040 are projected to be larger than those of the United States or Europe; and an emerging "Shi'a axis" from the Mediterranean to Central Asia, in which Iran will play a leadership role.

Globalist Perspective > Global DiplomacyPax Americana or Primus Inter Pares?

By Leon T. Hadar | Friday, July 13, 2007

Many countries view the United States either as the bully or policeman of the world. But after Iraq, the government has lost the support of its citizens and its allies. As Leon Hadar explains, in light of recent experiences, even the most ambitious U.S. policymaker should shed any notions of global hegemony — and accept being first among equals in the global community. irror, mirror on the wall, who is the biggest superpower of all?” That is the question being asked by foreign policy pundits in Washington, D.C., these days, as they ponder the impact of the U.S. military quagmire in the Middle East on the global position of the United States.

The cover of a recent issue of The Economist, the British magazine that has always been bullish on U.S. power — it considers the United States to be the successor to the British Empire — is quite simple: “Still No. 1” it reads, next to a drawing of Uncle Sam standing in the boxing arena and ready to punch again despite his (minor) injuries.

Hobbled hegemon

The magazine calls the United States a “hobbled” hegemon and concludes that while the problems in Iraq may have weakened the United States, it is still likely to remain the “dominant There is a huge gap between the pundits' conception of U.S. national interest and the one shared by the general public. superpower.”

Much of the support for the America-Is-Still-Number-One thesis — which not surprisingly is also very popular among members of the foreign policy establishment in Washington is based on numbers. After all, who really wants to be a member of an elite in charge of a declining power? The United States has the largest and most advanced economy — and the largest and most powerful military. Even those who are doing a lot of cheerleading for China these days agree that that country will not become the world’s largest economy before 2050 — and even that proposition is very “iffy.”

No challengers

And no one expects any of the United States' potential global rivals (the European Union, Russia, China and India) to overspend the United States on defense and overtake it in the military sphere any time soon. It just ain’t gonna happen. And notwithstanding the advances that the Chinese, Indians and the Europeans are making in science and technology, the United States' open and dynamic free-market economy — as well as

its impressive elite universities and research institutions — help it to maintain its status as the world’s center of scientific and technological creativity.

U.S.-led wars

It can therefore be accepted as an axiom that there is no great power — or even a combination of powers — that is ready to challenge the United States for global supremacy at this time in Given the Iraq experience, the American people are no longer ready to provide their government with the money and the manpower it needs to secure its hegemonic position. history.

At the same time, one cannot deny that the U.S.-led wars in the "Arc of Instability" — ranging from the Middle East to South Asia, including Iraq and Afghanistan — have overstretched the U.S. armed forces. In fact, it has reached a point at which the United States would find it very costly, if not impossible, to fight and win other military conflicts.

Indeed, one does not have to be a military expert to figure out that the decisions by North Korea and Iran to challenge the United States over the nuclear issue reflected their conclusion that the U.S. Army and Marines are not ready to fight in a ground war and do regime change à la Iraq in other parts of the world.

Global cop

In order to maintain its position as a global cop by responding 24/7 to 911 international calls, oust “rogue regimes,” fight wars in several areas of conflict and deploy hundreds of thousands of troops to conduct counter-insurgency and do “nation building,” the United States would have to recruit many more soldiers.

However, given the Iraq experience, the American people are no longer ready to provide their government with the money and the manpower it needs to secure its hegemonic position.

Domestic discontent

Meanwhile, there are pundits who suggest that “if only” the Bush Administration had done this (deploying more troops) If anything, costly interventions like the war in Iraq are only helping to erode the U.S. public's willingness to support military engagements abroad. or that (doing more planning for the occupation), the United States would have been marching towards victory in Iraq.

What has undeniably emerged on this front is the huge gap between the pundits' conception of U.S. national interest (that the United States has the right and the obligation to use its power to achieve “regime changes” and do “nation building”) — and the one shared by the general public. The latter believes it has the right and the obligation to use its power to respond to a clear and present danger to its security — and preferably through short and relatively cheap wars).

Costly interventions

If anything, costly interventions like the war in Iraq are only helping to erode the U.S. public’s willingness to support military engagements abroad and increase isolationist sentiments at home. At the same time, the failure in Iraq is also making it more difficult for the United States to win support from likely allies — while playing into the hands of potential rivals. Ultimately, it is the application of the law of diminishing returns in the use of military power by a great power.

Few allies

If one moves beyond the point of conducting a war of necessity and becomes engaged in a war of choice, rising It has become more difficult for the United States to win support from likely allies — while playing into the hands of potential rivals. costs in terms of casualties and money weaken the ability of the great power to maintain its dominant status. The emerging consensus on the war in Iraq in Washington assumes that, even under the best-case scenario, the Americans would have no choice but to withdraw most of their troops from Iraq — while perhaps keeping a small number of troops in isolated military bases to provide limited support and training for the Iraqi forces. More likely, the United States will have to redeploy its troops from Iraq and protect its interests in the Persian Gulf through a quick reaction force and over-the-horizon presence of the U.S. military.

Protecting U.S. interests

Moreover, Washington would need to work in tandem with other regional actors, including Iran and Syria, and other global powers to maintain the stability in the Persian Gulf and the entire Middle East. And if the United States wants other global powers to share in the burden of policing the Middle East and other parts of the world, it would need to share the process of decision-making with them.

Giving up the driver's seat

It cannot continue to occupy the driver’s seat and ask the Europeans, Russians or Chinese to help in navigating from points A to point B and to check the tires and to change the The notion of U.S. monopoly in the international system will be replaced with the concept of oligopoly. oil.

These powers are going to demand to have more of a say on where points A and B are — and perhaps even insist on occupying the driver’s seat when it comes to their spheres of influence: China in East Asia, Russia in its “near abroad” — and Europe in the Middle East. In fact, Washington has an interest in encouraging the Europeans to play a more activist diplomatic and military role in the Middle East — so as to discourage them from continuing to do “free riding” on U.S. power in that region.

Still Number One

All in all, while the United States will probably remain Number One for quite a while, it is becoming clear that domestic resistance and rising global challenges will make it more and more difficult for Washington to secure its military hegemony on its own. As a consequence, the notion of a U.S. monopoly in the international system will be replaced with the concept of oligopoly.

Monopoly to oligopoly

The choice that Washington will face in the aftermath of Iraq is between continuing to strive for strategic dominance in a way that has ignited more opposition at home and resistance abroad — or working together with other powers to contain threats to the international system. In that case, the United States will still be first among equals (or primus inter pares) — which is the next best thing to being Number One.

What China and India Could Do Together

By Wendy Dobson | Wednesday, December 01, 2010

Despite thousands of years of relative peace, the scars from China and India’s 1962 border war still remain. However, political and economic ties are strengthening — despite China's close relationship with India's main rival, Pakistan. Wendy Dobson, author of “Gravity Shift,” discusses the bright spots in the evolving bilateral relationship. hina and India have a shared history, now largely forgotten, of exchange and mutual learning that came to an end when Turkic and Afghan invaders arrived from the northwest around a thousand years ago. In the 20th century, the two countries have been deeply mistrustful of each other, and the bitter border war in 1962 still scars Indians' memories. China's nuclear capabilities and its patronage of Pakistan have been a source of major anxiety for India. The bilateral economic relationship warmed after the Cold War ended, when both governments began to see the potential mutual benefits of growing economic interdependence. These warming ties are also efforts to offset mutual suspicions of each other's strategic intents. China resists India's permanent membership in the UN Security Council and in regional forums, such as the East Asia Summit and trans-Pacific and Europe-Asia forums, that might elevate India to peer or rival status in the region. China's nuclear capabilities and its patronage of Pakistan have been a source of major anxiety for India. They were the catalyst for the latter's decision to embark on its own costly nuclear weapons program in the 1990s — and to seek closer cooperation with Japan and the United States. The United States and China have clashed repeatedly over China's assistance to Pakistan's strategic programs, which some see as the central obstacle to better relations between China and India. Within this strategic context, economic cooperation is gaining momentum — a joint working group already oversees the bureaucratic planning and implementation of closer cooperation. India's IT successes have impressed the Chinese. India's increasingly liberal economic policies and liberal politics provide a potential counterexample to China's liberal economic policies and autocratic politics. Other governments expect that China-India relations will be a significant factor in the Asian region — and that cooperation and competition, but not confrontation, will characterize the bilateral relationship. China resists India's permanent membership in the UN Security Council.

One of the most interesting future economic possibilities is a bilateral free trade agreement — indeed, the two countries have been studying the possibility since 2005. Two-way trade has been growing since then at annual rates of about 46%, reaching $25 billion in 2007 and $38 billion in 2008. If growth continues at that rate, total trade between the two countries could reach $200 billion by 2015, roughly the size of China and Japan's total trade in 2005.

The problem is that the balance of this trade is strongly in China's favor.

Economic ties are also deepening through the activities of the two countries' international firms, which are seeking out investment and other opportunities in each country. Indian software companies such as Wipro, TCS and Infosys are investing in China to serve their global clients there. Others are marketing software solutions to increase the efficiency of Chinese manufacturers and to take advantage of Chinese skills in chip design. Still others are using China as an offshore design center for business in Japan. Meanwhile, Chinese multinationals such as Huawei Technologies are investing in India. In 2007 India's Reliance Communications outsourced to Huawei the expansion of its huge, next-generation mobile phone network deep into rural India. U.S.-based multinationals such as IBM and GE are also locating business units in both countries, where they are developing the complementary talents of Chinese and Indian workers and knitting them closely together. India's increasingly liberal economic policies and liberal politics provide a counterexample to China's liberal economic policies and autocratic politics. Looking to the future, a comprehensive free trade agreement between China and India — one that has a robust period in which to phase in the reduction of barriers and few sectoral exceptions — would set the important example that an Asian free trade agreement can have economic, not just foreign policy, benefits. A full-fledged China-India free trade agreement is possible by 2030. The strategic potential of such an agreement would reach far beyond its obvious bilateral benefits if it allowed other countries in the neighborhood to join. This would solve a conundrum that faces the Asian region.

U.S.-China Relations: Gone Fishin’

By Banning Garrett | Wednesday, November 24, 2010

While the United States might not always agree with China's methods, there is no denying that the two countries will have to work together on a variety of issues in the coming decades. The leaders of both nations need to ask some critical questions about how they will collaborate and what it will mean for each country, writes the Atlantic Council's Banning Garrett. hen I was about eight years old, my father took me fishing in a stream a few miles from our ranch in California. After a long day, we came up dry. Dad saw I was disappointed, so he pulled into a fish farm on the way home. I eagerly dropped my line into a pond roiling with trout. Bingo — in less than 30 seconds, I had hooked a fish! And then another and another. At first I was excited at my instant success. But soon I realized there was little skill involved and it was just too easy. We never went back. I preferred plying the open streams hoping for an occasional bite even though it was much harder and required far more patience.

We may not have much time to fish in the depleting stream of potential cooperation. The United States and China now seem caught in an eddy of deepening suspicion of each other’s intentions. Criticizing China is as easy as landing a rainbow trout at the fish farm. What’s not to dislike? China does so many things that are lamentable, if not outrageous, to Western sensibilities.

The list ranges from human rights violations, threats to Taiwan and repression in Tibet and Xinjiang, to the increasingly assertive actions of its ever-modernizing military and “indigenous innovation” policies that tilt the playing field against foreign competitors. The fact that China is governed by an opaque, one-party regime obscured by secrecy only bolsters sinister Western interpretations of China's intentions and ambitions.

Voicing our concerns about our policy differences is essential as we continue to struggle with China on a wide range of bilateral and international issues. But we also must try to keep the larger strategic picture in the forefront and try to land the elusive “big one” — a more cooperative U.S.-China relationship to deal with the great strategic challenges of the 21st century.

While China and the United States will always be reluctant partners at best, leaders of both countries have acknowledged that we are in the same boat when it comes to critical 21st century challenges.

We are compelled to pull together to maintain a growing and stable global economy, mitigate climate change and adapt to its effects, ensure energy security and transition to a global, low-carbon economy, move to more sustainable economic models as resource scarcities loom as billions of people seek to join the global middle class — and combat terrorism, proliferation, piracy, international crime, pandemics, failing states and a host of other non-traditional threats.

This summer's unprecedented heat and forest fires in Russia and the massive, destructive floods in Pakistan may be the most recent warning signs that global warming is already altering our planet’s climate, causing extreme weather and other first-order effects that will have cascading impacts on virtually all countries. In the United States, there is growing anxiety about the pace of shifting power and a range of Chinese behaviors that are perceived as Beijing seeking to challenge a wide range of U.S. interests. The implications for the global economy, societies and governments and the security of nations and peoples are potentially destabilizing and even catastrophic.

The United States and China — the two largest economic powers — will not be immune from the impact of climate change. Nor, as the biggest energy consumers and producers of greenhouse gases, will they escape blame from the rest of the world if they fail to act and to cooperate.

In the United States, there is growing anxiety about the pace of shifting power and a range of Chinese behaviors that are perceived as Beijing seeking to challenge a wide range of U.S. interests.

The Chinese leadership, for its part, and especially elements of the People’s Liberation Army, is flush with a sense of their country’s rapidly rising power, which has been turbo-boosted in the last two years by its superior performance in the global financial crisis.

Beijing seems to be emphasizing narrow national interests and making a new push to gain recognition for an expanding list of “core interests” which now apparently includes China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. The Chinese seem reluctant to place a priority on their “core interests” in ensuring their prosperity and security by cooperating with other nations, especially the United States, on long-term global challenges and threats.

We should ask what the prospects are for human civilization in this century as well as for American and Chinese interests if the United States and China do not cooperate on global challenges — and even more ominously, if they have a highly competitive and antagonistic relationship, much less engage in actual military conflict. China and the United States will always be reluctant partners at best. We may not have much time to fish in the depleting stream of potential cooperation. The United States and China need to change course soon. The two giants now seem caught in an eddy of deepening suspicion of each other’s intentions — despite the stated conviction of the leaders of both countries that they need to work together.

There needs to be a new effort on both sides of the Pacific to craft a long-term relationship that can deliver cooperation amidst continuing differences. Chinese and American leaders need to begin by asking four critical questions:

If we stay on the current course, where will the U.S.-China relationship be in ten years?

Will this relationship be adequate to meet the strategic challenges that both countries and the world will be facing in 2020 and beyond? If not, what kind of relationship do the United States and China need to build to meet their strategic needs?

If we need a more cooperative relationship to meet common strategic challenges, how do we get there from here?

Even if American and Chinese leaders can agree that they need to change the vectors that are currently driving the United States and China down divergent paths and move toward greater collaboration and cooperation to meet long-term challenges, putting this into practice will require wisdom, political will and reigning in those within their respective governments that oppose cooperation behind a more coherent and farsighted strategy.

Can Presidents Hu and Obama go fishing together for the big one? We know it won’t be an easy catch.

China's New Doctrine: Mental Power for Uncertain Times

By Yamei Shen | Monday, November 22, 2010

Hard power? Soft power, Joe Nye-style? Smart power, as preferred by Hillary Clinton and her policy planning chief, Anne-Marie Slaughter? All for naught in the context of U.S.-Chinese relations, argues the China Institute of International Studies’ Yamei Shen.

As the Greek philosopher Aristotle remarked in his work on Politics, a big state enjoys glory and majesty, while a small state enjoys freedom and dignity. Each and every nation — no matter what size — acts on the world stage under the shadow of her mental power.

She can be delighted or discontent, joyful or anxious, subject to a "mood" — depending whether the perceived halo of glory is adored or whether the basic claim to dignity is respected. And the "mood," in reverse, affects how she interprets and responds to situations.

Mental power, in the context of Sino-U.S. relations, refers to the ability of both countries to show restraint on emotional impulses and maintain a relatively stable mind-set in getting along with each other.

The key component of "mental power" is to make the willingness and determination to pursue an established foreign strategy. By definition, it is a branch of "soft power," reflecting the courage and confidence of a country in sticking to its chosen path when confronting obstacles on the road ahead.

Both China and the United States hold characteristic mental attitudes on world affairs, derived from their unique cultural traditions. At this juncture, instead of harnessing "smart power" and sending out mixed signals regarding each other’s strategic intentions, what the two countries need most is to build strategic trust in a relatively stable and predictable manner.

Therefore, the willingness and determination to resolve disputes and to build trust between the two countries, rooted in a strong conviction in peace and cooperation on both sides, rather than any other transient sentiments, is exactly the mental power that is needed.

Some geopolitical analysts, such as professor Stephan Walt, Dominic Tierney and Michael Freedman, proceeding from empirical knowledge of the historical tragedy of Great Power politics, tend to feel the urge to be pessimistic. As a result, they interpret the path of Sino-U.S. relations as one destined for structural or ideological conflict between the two.

In contrast, I would suggest paying more attention to the healing effect of mental power in handling U.S.-Sino relations. If we followed that route, we would witness how the conviction in peace and belief in a strong and mature partnership can grow to be self-sustaining. This, in turn, helps to put things back on track — even after a slip astray.

In retrospect, the year 2010 unfolded in a series of mutual bickering. Tensions went especially high on issues such as U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, the hosting of the Dalai Lama, allegations against China’s cyberspace policy, the value of the renminbi and China’s South China Sea claim.

And yet, as the end of the year approaches, the picture for 2011 seems a bit rosy. Both sides are engaged in preparing a warm atmosphere for the upcoming visit by President Hu Jintao to the United States. The intention is to keep tensions in check and avoid an escalation, which helps to heal the wounds toward each other accumulated so far.

A "pendulum effect," is attributed to such recurring cycles of development in Sino-U.S. relations. However, even though the trajectory of warming up and cooling down in bilateral relations may seem to repeat itself, changes in the underlying theme are sneaking their way up, and the healing effect of mental power needs to be unleashed further.

In appreciating the mental power interaction in U.S.-Sino relations, it is important to look at the relationship through two prisms — the international prism and the soft-power prism.

Sino-U.S. relations are not restricted to a bilateral framework at all. In a broader sense, it represents a new pattern of correlation between the emerging powers (including China, India and Brazil) and the traditional western powers (such as the United States, Britain and Japan).

In handling bilateral relations, the two leaderships find no escape from international flashpoints. Regional conflicts are perpetuating. Traditional and non-traditional security threats remain intertwined.

The shadow of the financial crisis lingers on. And the gap between the Global North and the Global South continues to widen. No country can afford to act alone — and the sensible way out is to walk a cooperative path.

The soft-power prism underscores the fundamental difference as to where China is standing now vis-à-vis where the United States stood 200 years ago. In the early days of the 19th century, the United States closed the door of the whole American continent to outsiders under the banner of the “Monroe Doctrine.” The American Century, too, was unveiled with the breakout of the Spanish-American War.

In the world of today, that historical sense of blind obsession with military power can no longer be justified. Pursuing instruments of war as a matter of state policy has for the most part been abandoned ever since the world collected itself from the ashes of two world wars.

Looking ahead, nobody will find easy access to arms when all peace-loving peoples of the world have weaved a web of international laws and institutions for the common good.

Essentially, soft power, including a firm belief in peace and development and the choice of wise diplomacy, far eclipses the strength of any type of coercive power.

The key to healing wounds with a strong sense of mental power and inner discipline is to examine oneself first, put oneself into the other’s shoes, build mutual trust and bear in mind consistently a broader picture of world peace and prosperity.

For over 300 years, ever since the Westphalia system was established, it has been the privilege of several Anglo-Saxon white men — men like Woodrow Wilson and Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt — to rewrite the world map with a quill pen. That has now become a thing of the past.

It is just natural that the United States might feel embarrassed, disappointed or offended when it no longer held the single most important and final say in international affairs. For that same reason it is understandable, too, that the United States would sometimes overreact to China.

Conversely, China, by trusting the United States' ability to face the music and ultimately to pursue a desire for peace, needs to show wisdom and tolerance toward this spoiled boy who has so far hesitated to share its toys with neighbors, and it needs to wait for him to mature a bit.

In the same way, China — as a newcomer in the international system — is still on a learning curve. With its rise on the world stage comes a larger share of international responsibility. China in recent years has made its due contribution to regional security arrangements, the international fight against pirates and international humanitarian assistance, etc.

Out of inexperience with the increasingly heavy weight she is carrying, China may feel that the expectations loaded down on her from the outside — in terms of assuming responsibility — exceed her ability. It may sometimes appear unwilling to be pressured beyond the limit.

What is important is for the United States and others in the west to refrain from any premature judgment suspecting any ill Chinese “strategic intention.” Otherwise, a self-fulfilling prophecy would become the real danger.

In conclusion, I would like to quote an ancient Chinese poem composed by Su Shi in the Song Dynasty, dating back nearly 1,000 years ago. It reads as follows:

If we say nice melody flows from the zither,

Then why it remains silent in the box?

If it is the finger making the music,

Then why we cannot hear the sound from the finger?

In short, applying the poem to global affairs, it takes two to tango.

The major changes the world is undergoing have given new impetus to U.S.-Sino relations. China and the United States both need to reserve some buffer room within, so as to being able to accommodate each other’s occasionally sentimental torrents in a reliable fashion.

If the healing effect of mental power were applied to Sino-U.S. irritants, a smooth process of mutual adaptation and trust-building would be facilitated. In this sense, by steering the Sino-U.S. relations toward a higher degree of maturity, we shall not allow ourselves to be carried away in time of success, and not be broken down in time of crisis.

BORIS MARTYNOV MULTIPOLAR OR MULTI-CIVILIZATIONAL WORLD?

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Today the generally accepted opinion is that the global issues of the present cannot be resolved by a single, even the strongest, country in the world, or by synergetic efforts of a limited number of major countries. The prospect of global cooperation within the framework of a multipolar world is viewed by many as an imperative which can guarantee the survival of mankind on our planet. However, one has to recognize that the multipolar world is not a well-established reality, and the concept of multipolarism has not yet been developed either in the academic, or, a fortiori, practical aspect. It entails a number of quite relevant questions, and is a target of criticism both of those interested in upholding the hegemony of the sole superpower and of those countries and nations which fear to become again (as under “classic multipolarism” before the First World War) passive victims of manipulation from the “five” or “ten” of new “great powers”. The message of the article is not only the need to corroborate that the multipolar world order has no alternative, but also the need to identify common values in the multipolarism doctrine of such culturally different and distant countries as Russia and Latin American nations.

1

The idea of building a multipolar world and maintaining relations in the global system on the basis of actual diversity has been gaining importance in Russian foreign policy approximately since the mid-1990s1. The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of 2000 incorporates the provision that Russia will continue to seek formation of the multipolar system of international relations which actually reflects the multifaceted nature of the contemporary world with the diversity of its interests. It also points out that the guarantee of effectiveness and reliability of this world order is mutual consideration of national interests, and that the world order of the 21st century must be based on the mechanisms of collective decisions on the key issues, on the precedence of law (italics added. – B.M.) and wide democratization of international relations2. Viewing the “emerging multipolarism” as one of the “fundamental tendencies of contemporary development”, the 2008 version of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation stated “the growing role, due to objective factors, of multipolar diplomacy, international institutions and mechanisms in global policy and economy, as a result of growing independence of States and the need to make global development more manageable”. It also reiterated Russia’s ambition “to seek the strengthening of principles of multipolarism in international affairs, development of an architecture of international relations that would be

based on the recognition by the international community of the principles of security indivisibility in the modern world and would reflect its diversity”. Besides, the establishment of a fair and democratic world order based on collective principles of resolving international issues and on the supremacy of the international law was once again delineated as the strategic guideline of foreign policy3. Can the “emerging multipolarism” be seen as a feature of the current moment of history? Certainly, if one does not try to pass the desirable for reality. What is “multipolarism”, and why is it a fortiori better than what has been already known in history: bipolarity and unipolarity? Many professional politicians who often use this term prefer to remain hostage of mass stereotypes. Nevertheless, the designated task of Russia’s active participation in building a multipolar world demands a more in-depth analysis of the given doctrine which, like any other theory, has its advantages and weaknesses. On top of that, keeping in mind the recognition of cultural and civilization diversity of the contemporary world4, such analysis is needed in order to identify the attitude of the key world civilizations with regard to this doctrine. So far, a comprehensive academic research of the doctrine of multipolarity has not been translated into the practical plane. Moreover, as it was correctly noticed by Tatyana Shakleina, “the advocacy of the concept of a polycentric (multipolar) world without elucidation of details of such system, its advantages and flaws both for the world in general and individual large countries in particular, without reaching consensus among the leading world countries on how the collective management can be materialized, without the recognition by all its participants of the need for concerted interaction and reasonable competition – will disallow success”5. The idea of a multipolar world is not new. In fact, the logic of multipolarity took shape long before the First World War. The decade that immediately preceded the war was characterized by a quite fragile “balance of forces” between the great powers: Britain, Germany, France, USA, Austria-Hungary, Italy and Japan. Alexey Bogaturov points out as follows: “Multipolarity is characterized by an approximate comparability of aggregate concurrent opportunities for several world countries neither of which enjoys a distinct superiority over others. Roughly, this structure of international relations existed in Europe of the 19th century when major European countries were jealously watching each other, prohibiting individual strengthening to the degree when a united coalition of the rest would a fortiori disallow the superiority of a contender trying to pull away”6. Despite a “nearly academic” (according to George F.Kennan) nature of the European balance of forces which owes its origin to Bismark, a single spark, a shot in Saraevo was enough to let out the long-accumulated internal differences among the participants of the system. Today, the inability of multipolarity of the early 20th century to prevent the world to drift to the nightmare of an all-out war becomes almost the key argument for the scientists, primarily American (Zb. Bzhezinsky, Ch. Krauthammer, R. Keohane), who see the guarantee of global security either in the “benevolent hegemonism” of the strongest participant of the system, or in the bipolar “peace responsibility sharing” by the two strongest states (K. Waltz, J. Meersheimer). In 1993 one of the patriarchs of American political science Kenneth Walts wrote that the multipolar world was very stable but at the same time, unfortunately, too prone to war7. This reasoning has one evident flaw. The authors are somehow reluctant to analyze the distinctions of the “classic” multipolarity from the one which is currently emerging, thus limiting themselves to a simple and spectacular, but quite superficial comparison of the two systems. The ‘Bismark system” in Europe had a number of specific features, which, in my opinion, are entirely different from the currently emerging multipolarity. First, it was a closed-off and elitist system as it was restricted to a number of developed countries of Europe, the United States and Japan. Second, it existed in the environment when the war, according to the then effective international law, was still recognized as a legitimate instrument of settling international disputes and conflicts. It is equally important that the “classic system” existed without a powerful deterrent. After the Second World War the role of such deterrent came to be played by nuclear weapons. However, precisely the nuclear arms in many ways prevented the “cold war” from

turning into a “hot war”, and allowed mankind to survive despite an abundance of crises (two Berlin, one Korean, Suez, Caribbean etc.), which by far exceeded the Saraevo crisis in their conflict potential. Finally, the most important aspect. The “Bismark system” incorporated different countries with varying state systems and sometimes completely opposying state interests. However, they all (save Japan) belonged to the same Western Christian civilization and, competing or feuding with each other, as a rule, acted as a united front in their relations with the shapeless, inadequately shaped or obviously weak in the state-legal, economic and military-political aspects “non-Western” civilizations – China, India, African and Latin American countries. Today, when we talk about a “multipolar world”, before all, we imply an emerging inter-civilization communication not so much of individual countries but of the whole regions or, in a broader sense, communication of different races, cultures and models of socio-economic development. This paradigm is entirely different from the multipolarity of the early 20th century. The emerging multipolarity includes both additional opportunities of cooperation and new, still barely known loads and risks, as the notion of “inter-civilization communication” also presupposed the “new generation” crises and conflicts. The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of 2008 stresses that for the first time in the current history the global competition acquires a civilization dimension, which implies competition between different value reference points and development patterns within the framework of universal principles of democracy and market economy8. As to the latter, there are possible value, cultural and other nuances, which were identified by the international practice of the last twenty years. In particular, the global economic crisis demonstrated the futility of discussions on “universal principles of market economy” in the countries which tried to make those principles unconditional for all and everyone on the planet. In this respect one can remember an interesting theory of “pluralist unipolarity” proposed by Alexey Bogaturov in the early 1990s. He spoke of the “change of nature”, “measured pluralism” of the unipolar US leadership in the world, treating the US not as the sole leader, but the one in a “tight circle of countries of G7”9, i.e. in fact, as a leader of a unified Western civilization10.” It allowed the author to presume that the unipolarity of the “moderated type” would be less harsh in its impact on the outer world than a hegemony of one state, the US. Upon September 11, 2001 and in its aftermath the discussions on inter-civilization interaction took on the spirit of gloom prophesy. It seemed that the prognostication of Samuel P.Huntington on the “clash of civilizations” began to come true. More sophisticated public became fully aware of the connection between globalization as an eradication of information and cultural distinctions among different human communities and a protest of “traditional” societies, for example, Muslims or American Indians against the imposed alien behavioral stereotypes11. A legitimate question is whether mankind pins too much hope on the concept of multipolarity with no guarantees that a new multipolarity of the 21st century would not be any worse than all those systems experienced by the humanity in its relatively recent history – “classic” multipolarity, bipolarity, “underdeveloped” (or “pluralist”) unipolarity? Before answering the question, one has to take a closer look at all the aforementioned systems versus each other.

2

In the first decade of the new century one could notice a burst of nostalgia for the times of bipolarity, long ago sunk into oblivion, which was branded “the long peace” by J.L. Gaddis who actually coined the term. The most demanded authors became those who warned the world as early as at the peak of euphoria of the “end of history” against difficult ramifications of the destruction of the global world order established after 1945. For instance, just remember the statement of professor J.Meersheimer made in 1990 that one beautiful day we shall regret the lost order which, thanks to the “cold war”, replaced chaos in international relations12.

He insisted that the bipolar system had a more peaceful character because its protagonists were only two major nations. Moreover, under the given system, as a rule, the great powers demand loyalty from smaller countries, which, in all probability, leads to the establishment of rigid allied structures. Hence, smaller states are protected not only from the attacks of an opposing country but also from one another. Consequently, a bipolar system has only one dyad (pair) that can generate a war. A multipolar system has a greater flexibility and incorporates a variety of such dyads. Therefore, with other factors being equal, the statistic probability of a war in a multipolar model is higher than in a bipolar system. It is generally accepted that in a multipolar world the armed conflicts involving smaller countries alone, or just one major state are not so devastating as a collision between two major states. However, smaller wars can always grow into major wars13. The specifics of the bipolar confrontation of 1945–1991 were far more diversified than the rigid scheme suggested by J. Meersheimer in an attempt to explain it. For instance, one cannot disregard the fact that by the end of the “cold war” the world has practically turned into a tri-polar model, keeping in mind the global role of China which materialized in the multifaceted interaction within the USSR-USA-PRC triangular and an actual risk of a full-fledged war between the Soviet Union and China. At the same time, the “intra-system” wars (China-Vietnam, Ethiopian-Somali, British-Argentina) were not entirely ruled out. Besides, the “loyalty of smaller countries” was quite relative, bearing in mind that in a number of instances the behavior of East Germany, Cuba and Vietnam towards the USSR, or that of France and Israel towards the United States could be well viewed as “quasi-loyal”. Emphasizing the merits of bipolarity in ensuring the “long peace”, J.L. Gaddis admitted that to a large extent the peace was a result of a mere coincidence. In his summary review of the results of the “cold war” he wrote that it could have been much worse, and everything could have been entirely different. He concluded that the “cold war” ended with the victory of the right side14. The doctrine of the “rightness of the US victory” was immediately used by the part of US ruling elite who viewed “benevolent hegemonism” as the lesser evil as compared to the hegemony of the “club of the chosen” or to a bipolar balance of forces. Both Democrats and Republicans were engaged in the doctrine promotion campaign (Zb. Bzhezinsky, Ch. Krauthammer, R. Kagan, W. Kristol). Their views were comprehensively enough discussed in Russian and foreign literature15, so there is no need to dwell on the issue any longer. Probably, the most representative was the statement of Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State in the Democratic Administration of Bill Clinton, who substantiated the necessity of the US global leadership by a more strategic vision of the situation by the Americans16. Practical results of “benevolent hegemonism” turned out to be so deplorable that even one of the renowned pillars of the neoconservative school of thought, R. Kagan, had to acknowledge in 2008 that today’s world looked more like the 19th century than the end of the 20th. He then added that those who thought it was good news had to remember that the 19th century had ended in a less positive result than the epoch of the “cold war”17. Evidently, the message of the past events is that while claiming the role of the leader of a unipolar world, the US was physically and morally unprepared to bear the burden of such leadership. As a result, the American model of “freedom-democracy” (which initially seemed to be universally acceptable) stumbled into incomprehension and rejection not only in the countries of different civilization systems than the US (Middle East, Latin America, Russia) but also in the countries where the model had been initially “doomed” to success (countries of the so-called “older Europe”).

3

In my opinion, the new emerging multipolarity cannot be anything but civilization multipolarity. One has to emphasize that the inter-civilization communication is already a reality of today’s world where different economic and financial institutions, non-government entities,

religious, business, public associations and, finally, individuals maintain constant multifaceted and multilevel international contacts of all kinds as representatives of their civilization archetypes, both in their own capacity or alongside their respective state authorities. Meanwhile, one has to agree that the development of international communication among civilization poles of the modern world at the macrolevel is supplemented by the polarization of values at the microlevel. It is confirmed by a different attitude of individuals of different civilization archetypes to the in-depth perception of the universal issues on the mankind agenda (terrorism, fight against poverty and social inequality, nuclear arms non-proliferation, ecology etc.). As a rule, there are no differences in the superficial (“statement”) perception of the problem per se. Consequently, the calls made at high international levels (the UN etc.) “to combat terrorism”, “to prevent proliferation of MDW”, “to eradicate social and economic inequality”, “to preserve environment” etc. often hang in midair. Many instruments devised to resolve global issues turn out to be “insipid”, because their authors either deliberately neglect their substance in order to keep up appearances (agreement of opinion) or because of a special approach to those issues. For instance, what is the actual value of such a document as the OAS Anti-Terrorism Convention of 2003 where international terrorism was branded as “evil”? However, it neither pinpointed the cause of “evil” nor identified those who could be classified as “wrongdoers”. For instance, how can one enforce the universal compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty while the power politics pursued by the US suggest to the “threshold” countries that possession of nuclear arms is the only guarantee against outer interference into their internal affairs? Against this backdrop the phenomenon of “targeting” gains special importance (under the principle of facilitation of civilization contact). Obviously, the absence of a distinctly pronounced center in one of the most influential and thriving civilizations of the modern world, i.e. Islamic, complicates the system of inter-civilization interaction, while it does not revoke the necessity to establish one. At the same time, over the recent years one could notice growing interaction along the lines of “kindred” civilizations, in particular, between Christian Orthodox (Russia) and Christian Catholic civilizations. It manifested itself in an original “discovery” of Latin America by Russia in 2005–2008, and to a less degree, in traditionally more constructive relations between Russia and Catholic countries of “older Europe” (France, Italy, Spain, partially Germany) than the relationship with the Anglo-Saxon world, for example. Though Russia’s animation towards Latin America became “in many respects an unexpected breakthrough in Russian foreign policy”18, apart from the geopolitical grounds, it was based on a sufficiently deep moral, legal and civilization foundation. Isn’t it a paradox noticed by the MGIMO researchers, that in 2008-early 2009 the Russian foreign policy displayed a fairly high efficiency “especially where the available resources of influence are relatively modest”, primarily on the Latin American vector and inside the BRIC group (Brazil, Russia, India and China)19? Maybe, one should pose a more general question: probably, our understanding of the “resources of influence” is somewhat outdated, and needs adjustment? Talking about “influence” and international image of our country, people traditionally consider economic, political and, finally, military factors, forgetting that the emotional and psychological similarity of different nations and cultures, their general perceptions of justice, morals and law can yield an equally substantial “image effect”. If there is an advantage of a multipolar world order over unipolar or bipolar systems, it is the prerequisite that it must be based on the law. Brute force does not need the law which is intended to check it with reason. The accuracy of this observation is obvious in the example of the unipolar world which lived up to the rules of the main player of the global system. It is also applicable to bipolarity where each of the two “equally responsible” entities seeks to get a “free hand” in its area of influence disrespecting any international law. As a rule, the latter is used not for the intended application, but to discredit the opponent’s position in the global war with the “zero sum game”. However, the interaction of several equal players of approximately comparable might and influence needs the law in order to ensure a reasonable modus vivendi. It

is even more applicable to such sophisticated system as civilization multipolarity. Its functionality will directly depend on the attitude of the main players of the system to international law. The experience of Russia’s interaction with the Anglo-Saxon nations confirms former and current substantial differences in value perception of such seemingly universal notions as “security”, “partnership”, “sovereignty”, “democracy”, “human rights”, “terrorism”. The same applies to the appreciation of the role of international law as a demiurge of the world politics, which is advocated by the Russian diplomacy both at the theoretical and practical levels in the context of multipolar strategy. After the 2008 events in the Caucasus Russia has become ever more focused on strengthening and perfecting legal fundamentals of international relations. The importance is being attached to streamlining active interaction with the participants of the global system whose attitude to international law can be at least qualified as respectful. Apart from the geopolitical considerations, the Russian discovery of Latin America of the recent years was accounted for by the fact that the stance of Russia and the majority of Latin American states on the most urgent political issues of the world are either close, or coincide. This already trite expression has become commonplace in the political language also because Russia and Latin American states regard international law as a natural pillar of the multipolar world order. The basis of our rapprochement is shared legal understanding of such problems as formation of the multipolar world, consolidation of the UN prestige, establishment and support of the regional security systems, fight against international terrorism, “old” and “new” threats to international cooperation, elaboration of non-discriminatory conditions of international trade and many others. Historically developed special attitude of Latin Americans to international law20 corresponds to the key imperatives of our times. It disallowed the Latin American approval of the US and NATO aggression against Yugoslavia and bomb raids in Kosovo in 1999. The majority of the states refused to recognize the legitimacy of the US and its allies’ invasion in Iraq. The Latin American interpretation of such an urgent problem as international terrorism merits special attention. Two years before the 9/11 attack, the White Book of the National Defense of Chile stated that the “boom of Islamic fundamentalism” can be a ramification of the attempted and forced global cultivation of the consumption and cultural standards of one and only civilization, i.e. Western21. All countries of the region subscribe to the idea of the necessity to build a multipolar world, and are trying to implement the idea in their everyday policy.

* * *

Talking about civilizations as potential parties of the system of inter-civilization interaction, one has to avoid a simplistic approach. Many things look different in practice than in theory. In a more detailed assessment of the stance of the Russian Federation and leading Latin American countries one can trace a certain difference of approach. The political culture of Latin American countries, which continue to think about themselves in the context of the “poor” (and now more and more “rising”) South, is in contrast with the Russian culture which is traditionally used to perceive the world order through the prysm of interaction of the “developed North” triangle (US-EU-Japan). Russia is also actively trying to squeeze itself into this triangular framework (but not always welcome by our Western partners). This is the reason of certain nuances of Latin American position on the issues of UN reforming, G8 enlargement, revision of the WTO entry rules. However, keeping in mind that Russia is seeking to restructure the global and regional systems of political and economic security on the basis of international law provisions, evidently, certain seemingly inviolable stereotypes will have to be revised. In the environment of a global economic (and moral) crisis at stake is the choice of preferential partners in ensuring a long-term strategy of development. One has to answer a question traditionally difficult for Russia: which party it is siding with: the ascending East (where today one can

attribute Latin America through many value, cultural and ethical indicators), or with the West featuring the signs of the “descending” development?

Notes

1 We tend to agree with the opinion of A.D.Bogaturov that the unipolar world existed for about a decade, since signing of the Charter for American-Russian Partnership and Friendship in Washington in June 1992, till the beginning of the war in Iraq in 2003. It coincides with the conclusion of the “Review of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation” of 2007 that the “myth of a unipolar world has finally collapsed in Iraq” (http:// www.mid.ru./brp_4.nsf/sps/690A2BAF968B1FA4). The first practical attempts to pursue the Russian “multipolar” foreign policy could be seen in the 1997 Latin American tour of the then Russian Foreign Minister Ye.M.Primakov when he signed a number of documents on “strategic partnership” with several leading countries of the region. 2 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. Moscow, June 28, 2000. // System History of International Relations of 1918-2003 / Edited by A.D.Bogaturov. Volume 4. Documents. Moscow. 2004. P. 538-539. 3 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of July 12, 2008. (http://kremlin.ru/ text/docs/2008/07204108.shtml). 4 Ibid. 5 Shakleina T. “Order after Georgia” or “Order under Obama”? // International Processes. 2008. No. 3. P. 7. 6 Bogaturov A.D., Kosolapov N.A., Khrustalev M.A. Features of Theory and Application Study of International Relations. Moscow. 2003. P. 284. 7 Waltz, K. The Emerging Structure of International Politics // International Security. Vol. 18. No. 2. 1993. P. 321. 8 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of July 12, 2008. 9 Bogaturov A.D. Features of Theory… P. 168, 291 10 Ibid. 111 In this connection it would be interesting to refer to the White Book of the National Defense of Chile of 1998 (i.e. three years before the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington!). In this document the “boom” of Islamic fundamentalism is directly attributed to the protest of traditional societies against the pressure of Western lifestyle and culture under globalism (Book of the National Defense of Chile. Ministerio de Defensa, 1998. P. 34). 12 Meersheimer J. Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War. // Russia in Global Politics. 2008. No. 6. P. 9. 13 Ibid. P.12. 14 Gaddis J.L. The Cold War. London. 2007. P. ix, 266. 15 See, e.g., Fucuyama F. After the Neocons. America at the Crossroads. London. 2006. 16 Fucuyama F. Op. cit. P. 194. 17 Keigan R. The Paradigm of 9/11. // Russia in Global Politics. 2008. No.6. P. 120. 18 The Potential of International Influence and the Efficiency of Russian Foreign Policy (2008-early 2009). Analytical Report. MGIMO (U) of MFA RF. Moscow. 2009. P. 92. 19 Ibid. P. 94. 20 One has to point out the Latin American lead in working out a large number of instruments, methods and means of the peaceful settlement of international disputes: from negotiations and “good offices” to shuttle diplomacy, mediation and arbitration, their contribution into consolidation of the universal principles of international law – equality, non-interference and territorial integrity. Latin American countries introduced the principle of diplomatic asylum into international practices, worked out a number of important innovations in the maritime law,

pioneered the establishment of the first nuclear-free zone (1967). See further: Problems of Latin America and International Law. Two volumes (Moscow. 1995). 21 Book of the National Defense of Chile. Santiago de Chile. 1998. P. 34.

The Twilight of the Nation State Ernesto Gallo

Researcher in Political Science at the Centre for Studies on Federalism based in Torino, Italy Prem Shankar Jha The Twilight of the Nation State: Globalisation, Chaos and War London, Pluto Press, 2007 An impressive book. Prem Shankar Jha is a well-known Indian journalist and economist, with academic experience in three continents, Asia, America and Europe. In this massive volume (374 pages) he sketches out an ambitious macrohistorical sociology of capitalism and the state, by drawing on authors as diverse as Marx and Braudel, Schumpeter and Polanyi. He also provides a detailed empirical analysis of the world economy of the last three decades. Furthermore, he relies on two giant social scientists, Eric J. Hobsbawm and Giovanni Arrighi, whose main publications have respectively been devoted to 'the short' and 'the long' twentieth century. How to reconcile them? Hobsbawm, an engaged Marxist historian, has expressed a deeply pessimistic opinion about the fate of modern ideologies and the future of the capitalist system. In his view, despite the apparent neoliberal victory, capitalism is undergoing a phase of increasing chaos and demise. A phase whose roots can be traced back to the early 1970s. Arrighi, on the other hand, has proposed a long-term history of 'cycles of accumulation', each of them driven by a new hegemonic power. After the rise and fall of such hegemonic powers as Genoa, the Netherlands and Britain, the 1970s have heralded the early symptoms of the decline of the fourth world leader, the United States, and the onset of a period of 'systemic chaos' which would end with the domination of a fifth hegemonic power, possibly Japan or another East Asian country. Is Arrighi right? To some degree. Certainly his theoretically-informed reconstruction of centuries of economic history is an excellent starting-point. Certainly the early 1970s unveiled the signs of crucial transformations. But it is not just about the demise of a hegemonic power and the surge of the following one. A qualitative turn has occurred: the rise of 'global capitalism'. Jha challenges several interpretations which are common in the mainstream economic literature. The 'end of the golden age' is no by-product of factors such as oil shocks, crises in productivity or transformations in the relations of production. The core element which explains the onset of turbulences and chaos has to be found in the genesis of truly global production processes, which bring about de-localizations, breakdown of the welfare system in the 'developed' world and disruptions in the newly-developing 'peripheries'. Such process has so far entailed painful consequences in terms of continuous marginalization, exclusion and deprivation in both the rich and poor regions of the world. Jha follows a clear-cut theoretical hypothesis and provides a substantial amount of data to support it. So far we have, however, a thorough economic history; but what about politics? What about the states? Global capital requires a military arm. More precisely, a power capable of breaking down boundaries and imposing liberal institutions and the free market, either by consent or by force. Such a role so far has been played by the USA, and in a distinctively imperial fashion. This holds true as far as both Democratic and Republican presidencies are concerned. Though Bush Jr and his fellows have probably gone much beyond any sustainable hegemony, the seeds of the empire can be traced back to Clinton's administration. How to explain otherwise the sequence of tragical military undertakings, especially in Iraq and the Balkans? How to read otherwise several declarations by Democratic officers, such as Madeleine Albright and Anthony Lake, who are still

playing a role in Washington's big game? Furthermore, Jha does not subscribe to Hardt and Negri's understanding of empire. Instead of a blurred overarching constellation of corporations, international organizations, agonizing nation-states and would-be global rulers (America), he prefers referring to the 'empire' as the political and military arm of what he appropriately labels 'globalization'. Despite their different interpretations of what the 'empire' actually is, Hardt, Negri and Jha share the analysis of the crisis of nation-states and of the strains put on them by the dominance of transnational productive forces. In political terms, Jha concludes by calling for 'a commonwealth' to deal with global concerns and provide a minimum framework to address the tragical inequalities which are currently shaking the world order. In his view, such commonwealth is needed urgently, in order to tackle the American bid for world primacy and offer the US itself a channel through which to express its interests. To this goal, the current redistribution of world power towards multipolarism (especially in the light of the rise of the Asian powers) seems to offer a possible framework. The 'global commonwealth' should be based on consent - so, according to such perspective Jha comes close to a federalist interpretation. From a scientific viewpoint, one might object that his combination of different approaches is not always consistent. Cyclical theories are usually rather mechanistic, and the interplay between 'the economic' and 'the political' in 'the long twentieth century' is far from being clear. An interpretation of capitalism based on the modes of production and their inherent social relations could be heuristically more fruitful. The most interesting legacy of Braudel and Arrighi's thought is, however, the idea of a 'container': that is, capitalistic relations are embedded in political institutions which contain them, serve their purposes and change over time according to the changing size of the markets. The most appropriate 'container' of global capitalism must therefore be a 'global polity', like the commonwealth he is referring to in the last chapter. Such an interesting idea could, though, be developed further, to both scientific and political aims. In other words, Jha comes close to a kind of federalist vision, but does not work it out extensively. Why is Jha's thick volume a worthwhile reading? Among many reasons, we can single out this one: it's a challenging book. Challenging because, instead of providing simplistic and fashionable hypotheses (such as the ones by Fukuyama and Huntington, which he briefly discusses), he tries to combine various perspectives, draw on their insights and build a coherent construction. Many passages would deserve deeper investigation, but a kind of overall theory clearly emerges. Global capitalism, the rise of the US Leviathan and the lack of overarching world institutions are the main aspects of the planet we are living in. Furthermore, Jha's book is topical. 2008 is an important year. The USA and Russia choose their new presidents, while the European countries have to ratify the Reform Treaty. Are the incoming younger leaders, from Hillary Clinton to Obama, from Medvedev to Sarkozy himself, really aware of the turbulences which the world might soon face? A final remark. In Jha's account Europe's role is rather overlooked. Western scholarship has long been charged with 'Eurocentrism' - and with very good reasons. However, Europe is not only composed of decaying nation-states or greedy corporations. A transnational polity of decent European citizens is slowly emerging and looking for political solutions other than the states we have been used to live in. Disregarding it would be a mistake and possibly a real shame.