Muslim Brotherhood of Jordan & Jama’at i Islam of Pakistan by Neha Sahgal

8/13/2019 Muslim Brotherhood of Jordan & Jamaat i Islam of Pakistan by Neha Sahgal

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Explaining the Effect of State Accommodation on Islamist Movement Strategies:

The Muslim Brotherhood of Jordan and Jamaat-i-Islam of Pakistan.

Neha Sahgal

University of Maryland, College Park

States have followed various strategies to manage the tide of Islamist activism inopposition to their power. Some have chosen to repress, while others have strategicallyused accommodative tactics. This paper explores the effect of government

accommodation on Islamist movement strategies. I argue that states have followed two

kinds of accommodative policies towards Islamist movements Islamization andliberalization. Using a social movement theory lens, I hypothesize that these policies have

different effects on the targeted movements. Counter intuitively, Islamization leads to an

increase in regime opposition while liberalization decreases opposition among Islamist

movements. The argument is found to hold true in the two cases explored: Pakistan underGeneral Zia (1977-1989), where Islamization policies were followed creating greater

opposition from Jamaat-i-Islam and Jordan (1989-1999), where liberalization policies

were followed creating lower levels of regime opposition from the Muslim Brotherhood.

International Studies Association, Annual Convention March 2005

Honolulu, Hawaii


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IntroductionThe study of Islamist activism is new to social movement theory. Social

movement scholarship has ignored Islamist movements because of their unique faith-

based nature. More recently scholars have recognized that the processes of contention

conceptualized by social movement theory can be applied to Islamist activism to seek

theoretical refinements in both areas of study.

In this paper, I examine variations in the strategies followed by Islamist

movements in response to government policies. States have followed various policies in

managing the tide of Islamist opposition to their power. Some states have chosen to use

repressive means (Egypt, Jordan before 1989), while others, at different times in their

history have used accommodative policies (Jordan after 1989, Pakistan, Malaysia). I

examine the effects of government accommodation on Islamist movement strategies.

I argue that accommodation can have varying effects on Islamist movement

strategies depending on the nature of accommodative policies followed. Governments

have employed two different types of accommodative policies in their tenuous

relationship with Islamist opposition Islamization and liberalization. Islamization

attempts to co-opt the movements through greater religiosity in state and society.

Liberalization allows the movements to conduct their activities at both the state and the

societal level without necessarily increasing the religiosity of the state1. Islamization

disempowers Islamists while liberalization empowers them by providing a sphere of

influence. Disempowered movements are likely to increase their oppositional stance,

while empowered Islamist movements work in cooperation with the government to

1A similar distinction has been made by Nasr (1994) who argues that states can either expand their power

through Islamization, as in the case of Malaysia under Mahatir and Pakistan under General Zia or form

tactical alliances with Islamists in order to counter a common enemy as in the case of Turkey where the

state felt threatened by leftist forces.


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preserve their privileged position. I explain my point with two case studies Pakistan,

where Islamization policies were followed under General Zia from 1977 1989 and

Jordan (1989-1999), where liberalization policies were followed.

I explain the effects of these policies by examining the strategies followed by

major Islamist movements that became the direct targets of accommodative policies

Jamaat-i-Islam in Pakistan and the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. While both

movements show remarkable similarities in their philosophical roots and pre

accommodation strategies, their post accommodation strategies diverged. Jamaat-i-

Islam became a pro democracy, political opposition movement, while the Muslim

Brotherhood (MB) became a loyal opposition party to the Jordanian government, never

directly challenging the monarchy, and primarily a social Islamist movement2.

The literature addressing the effects of state policy on social movements has

primarily theorized and tested the effects of varying levels of government repression.

These studies have found that repression leads to increased radicalism and violence

(Lichbach 1987; Koopmans 1993; Khawaja 1994; Krain 2000; Rashid 2002). One scholar

has also disaggregated the concept of repression into discriminate versus indiscriminate

repression and reactive versus preemptive repression, arguing that indiscriminate and

reactive repression lead to increased violence and radicalism (Hafez 2002). The effects of

accommodation however, remain under-theorized. We need to understand

accommodation by similarly disaggregating the concept qualitatively according to the

nature of accommodative policies followed.

2The distinction between social Islamist and political Islamist movements is drawn by Robinson

(1988). She argues that social Islamists are primarily interested in social reform through support from the

state while political Islamists are more concerned with larger political issues such as Western Zionist

links, regime corruption etc. These movements are more likely to be critical of the regime under which they

operate.


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I begin this paper with the argument that there are many benefits of studying

Islamist movements using the social movement lens. I believe that using social

movement theory in understanding Islamist activism takes scholars away from treating

these movements as in some way unique in their faith-based nature to an understanding

of the dynamics of contention that surround their strategies and framing processes

(Wiktorowicz 2004).

I then go on to examine the literature on repression/ accommodation and dissent

and argue that this literature needs to pay particular attention to the varying effects of

accommodation. This discussion is followed by an explanation of the hypothesized

effects of Islamization and liberalization. The case studies of Pakistan and Jordan follow,

showing the differing effects of these policies on Jamaat-i-Islam and the Muslim

Brotherhood.

Islamist Activism and Social Movement Theory

The study of Islamist activism has traditionally been lumped under comparative

fundamentalisms, the idea being that such movements are an expression of radicalized

faith that is exceptional to their particular world view (Lawrence 1989; Marty and

Appleby 1995; Lawrence 1998). Islamic activism is treated as a product of distinctive

cultural mentalities3.

Such orientalist understandings of Islamism miss several key components of

these movements. Focusing on the exceptionalism of Islamist activism as an expression

of fundamentalist thought misses the social and political nature of the grievances

3Ideas presented in this section are adapted from Wiktorowicz 2004, whose insights on collaboration

between the Islamist activism and social movement theory are one of the first. See also, Snow, D. and S.

Marshall (1984). Cultural Imperialism, Social Movements and Islamic Revival. Research in Social

Movement Conflict, and Change. L. Kriesberg. Greenwich, JAI Press.7:131-152.


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expressed in protests, rallies and other forms of contentious activity. In several countries,

severe restrictions on opposition activity make Islamism a natural outlet for dissent. As

Wiktorowicz (2004) explains, Rooted in established social sites of religious practice and

widely accepted values, contention through Islam represents one of the few remaining

effective options for confronting a sense of political exclusion (p.8). Islam therefore

provides an opportunity structure for expressing grievances in opposition to the regime

(Esposito and Voll 1996). Analyzing Islamism as an expression of dissent is therefore

necessary for a better understanding of the grievances expressed and strategies used.

Examining Islamism as simply an expression of fundamentalism also prevents

the literature from exploring the possibility that these actors seek instrumental and/ or

ideational goals through strategic means. Value-laden terms such as fundamentalism

associate Islamism with a sense of irrationality that preempts understanding the

strategic nature of their behavior (Juergensmeyer 1993). More recent literature has found

that Islamists respond rationally to the changing nature of opportunities and constraints

presented by their environment (Mufti 1999; Alexander 2000; Hafez 2002; Rashid 2002;

Hafez 2004).

Islamism is often excluded from social movement theory because religion is seen

as an involuntary and unchanging identity. On the other hand, more secular forms of

social movements such as environmentalism and womens rights are assumed to be based

on voluntary association with a dynamic ideal where discourse within the community

shapes the contentious strategies. However, this understanding of religion as static

because of its by the book nature ignores the fact that religious identity, particularly in

its contentious forms, shows dynamism according to the needs of the environment within

which it operates. As I will show in this paper, Jamaat changed its strategy from a


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reformist social movement to a pro-democracy movement under the Zia regime because

of the limited political opportunities provided by the new Islamic state. Similar

examples can be found when examining Church activism in Poland and Hindu activism

in the United States where the movements have renegotiated their identities and changed

their strategies according to the needs of their environment (Byrnes 2002; Mazumdar

2003).

In order to gain a more complete understanding of Islamist activism it is also

necessary to move away from treating these movements simply as terrorist networks.

While terrorism is an aspect of Islamist activism, most Islamist movements are actually

charity organizations, civic associations and even democracy movements (Esposito and

Voll 1996). Far from being a monolithic phenomenon, Islamism represents the many

ways in which community life can be politically organized and should be understood as

such.

Social movement theory also has much to gain from examining Islamist activism.

Not only does Islamism provide a new testing ground for concepts such as political

opportunity structures and framing, the particular ways in which governments have

responded to Islamist activism can help scholars disaggregate repression and

accommodation. In this paper I argue that government accommodation towards

Islamist movements can be categorized into two forms Islamization and liberalization.

The literature on repression and accommodation has inadequately theorized the varying

effects of these policies because of its lack of rootedness in a particular social context.

Large N studies of the effects of these policies prevent a more nuanced understanding of

the various ways in which social movements can be accommodated. Studying the effects


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of different accommodative or repressive policies on Islamist activism therefore adds

theoretical nuance to social movement theory (see for example Hafez 2003).

The fields of Islamism and social movement theory therefore have much to gain

from each other. The increasingly more complex phenomenon of Islamist activism

requires an understanding of these actors as strategic in their orientation, using political

opportunities and battling against constraints, instead of dismissive notions of terrorist

and fundamentalist organizations. Particular attention needs to be paid to the grievances

expressed by these movements and their dynamic nature. Social movement theory, I have

argued, can make theoretical advances by seeking greater disaggregation in

understanding the effects of government policies of repression and accommodation. I

now follow with a critical review of social movement literature that focuses on the effects

of government policy and social movement mobilization.

The Study of Repression/ Accommodation and Dissent

A growing group of scholars have suggested that much like other forms of

opposition movements, Islamist movement activity follows predictable patterns based on

repression or accommodation by their respective governments (Parsa 1989; Hafez 2002;

Rashid 2002). Such conjectures bring the study of Islamism closer to a well-known sub

field in comparative government and contentious politics- the Repression / Opposition

nexus.

In this section I elucidate some of the major findings of the literature on

repression/ accommodation and social movement activity. I find that while the literature

on repression/ accommodation had made several important theoretical contributions, the

study of accommodation is not given sufficient attention. Accommodation is studied as

the counterpart to repression whereby low levels of repression are considered


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accommodation. However, accommodation can entail more than just less repression.

Regimes use accommodation strategically to prevent crises of governance (Adams 1996;

Nasr 2001; Wiktorowicz 2001). Different types of accommodative policies can have

varying effects on movement strategies. Further, I find that the literature aims to explain

the level of dissent, but not the different strategies used by dissenters.

There are four main theoretical divisions among the scholars examining social

movement mobilization. Some theorists explain mobilization or the lack there of, through

individual participation in protest based on resource mobilization and cost benefit

analysis (Olson 1965; Lichbach 1987; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Khawaja 1994;

Francisco 1995; Lichbach 1998). Others explain mobilization through structural factors

(Skocpol 1979; Parsa 1989) or through psychological theories of deprivation (Gurr 1970;

Davies 1974; Tilly, Tilly et al. 1975; Skocpol 1979) Another group of scholars explore

culturalist perspectives of mobilization (Gurr 1970; Hibbs 1973; Snow, Zurcher et al.

1980; Snow 1986; White 1989; Hoover and Kowalewski 1992; McAdam and Paulsen

1993). These schools of thought are explained further:

Structuralists school of thought

Structuralists explain mobilization through economic, institutional and class-

based factors. In her explanation of contentious politics, Theda Skocpol (1979) argues

that revolutions are accompanied and carried through by class-based revolts. She believes

that a comparative historical analysis of class-based conflict is the key to understanding

revolutions.


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Misgah Parsa (1989) takes a similar approach in his work on the Iranian

revolution. He explains the Iranian revolution as a class-based struggle consolidated

under an overarching Islamic identity. However, he adds an institutional dimension to the

argument. Revolution is a product of opposition consolidation as well as state

intervention. His ideas on the interaction between the two variables can be explained by

the following table:

Levels of State Intervention

Low High

Low Segmented class conflict Segmented class conflict

against the state

Consolidation

High Popular Struggles for

Social Reforms

Popular struggles to seize

state power

State intervention is broadly defined as regulation of the private sphere. For

example, a state that regulates dress codes is considered an interventionist state.

Consolidation is defined as the level of inter-group organization, or social cohesion

among affected groups.

Under conditions of high inter-group consolidation, as well as high state

intervention, there is an increased likelihood of revolution, or as he puts it, Popular

struggles to seize state power (p.10). Class forms an important part of the argument.

Revolution is seen as a form of inter-class cohesiveness against the state. This

cohesiveness is the result of opposition consolidation and high levels of state

intervention.

When social cohesion is low, and state intervention is high, opposition

movements show factional resistance. That is, while they do struggle against the state, the

classes are not able to put up a united front due to internal class based differences.


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Skocpol (1982) explicitly argues that the Iranian case does not fall within her

model because it shows a possible role of ideas and culture in shaping political action.

Therefore, the explanatory variables behind the Iranian revolution lie in the traditional

centers of urban communal life and in networks of Islamic communication and

leadership (Skocpol 1982). While Parsas (1989) argument addresses these unique

community networks in his treatment of class-based mobilization, he aims to fit the

Iranian case in the larger theoretical framework of revolution.

Parsas recognition that Islamist movement activity in the Iranian revolution can

be explained in the context of revolutions more generally is an important theoretical

advancement. However, Parsas (1989) definition of state intervention seems vague. Each

state intervenes in the private sphere in different levels. Even in the United States there is

state intervention in areas such as marriage and divorce. In fact, states are formed with

the very purpose of regulation. The line between an interventionist state and a non-

interventionist state is hence thin. The link between state intervention in society and

social movement activity is not clear. State intervention is hence not a useful concept in

understanding dissent. It is more useful to examine social movement strategies in relation

to state repression and/or accommodation.

Psychological Theories

These scholars explain dissent as a product of the psychological processes that are

the result of economic factors such as income inequality, poverty and structural

rearrangements (Gurr 1970; Snyder and Tilly 1972; Tilly, Tilly et al. 1975). Social

movement opposition activity is more likely in countries that are poor and have deprived

or strained populations. These macro structural conditions have a deeply psychological

effect that leads to greater dissent.


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Tilly et.al. (1975) argue that large-scale structural rearrangement such as

urbanization and industrialization dissolves existing social control mechanisms subjecting

the populous to uncertainty and strain. Migration to cities further adds to these feeling of

disassociation. The century from 1830 through 1930 in Europe consisted of several

revolutions and instances of collective violence. It is no coincidence that during these

years, Europe experienced a transformation from an agrarian to industrial society. They

argue, [i]f the shift in the locus and character of collective violence occurred as

European countries urbanized and industrialized, the two massive sets of changes must

somehow have depended on each other (p.3).

Scholars have argued that marginal populations in a society are more likely to

engage in violent activities because these people feel disoriented from the core

population. This has been offered as a common explanation for all forms of collective

violence such as riots, rebellion and extremist killing (1965).

In particular, Ted Gurrs (1970) influential theory, relative deprivationexplains

collective violence as the deeply psychological process of the frustrations that arise when

there is a gap between what people think they can achieve and what they actually

achieve. This psychological process is the result of the manner in which structural

conditions are processed.

The theory of relative deprivation has lost adherents because it has been

empirically disproved (McPhail 1971; Muller 1972). The generally accepted version of

the theory currently is that relative deprivation is not the primary cause of dissent,

although it may contribute significantly under some circumstances. Relative deprivation,

or the psychological processes of frustration and alienation are further filtered through the

organizational mechanisms available for voicing the groups demands (Tilly, Tilly et al.


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1975), individual cost-benefit analysis (Lichbach 1998) or the formation of community in

the frustrated dissident group (Opp and Roehl 1990).

Even though relative deprivation theory has been discredited in the literature, no

analysis of Islamist movements can proceed without taking account of the fact that these

movements emerge in countries that are poor and weak. Most of the Islamic world, is

experiencing economic crisis because of high rates of unemployment, inflation and

inability of the domestic economy to keep pace with globalization (Rashid 2002). It is

therefore important to take economic factors into account when explaining mobilization

and state responses.

Rational choice theorists

This theory is a more recent reevaluation of relative deprivation. Its proponents

believe that anti-regime mobilization can be explained through struggles of political

power between rational actors. Groups attempt to apply their resources towards acquiring

collective goods-such as concessions from the government. Groups will only mobilize if

individual benefits of mobilization are high (Snyder and Tilly 1972; Snyder 1978;

Khawaja 1994; Lichbach 1998).

It has been argued that individual interests aggregate differently to group interests

since the attainment of the group goal is a collective good (Olson 1982; Lichbach 1998).

Once the group goal is achieved, the members of the group share its benefits equally.

Therefore, while the individual costs of participation in collective action are high, the

benefits are distributed equally regardless of participation. Therefore, individual

incentives for participation are low. It follows from this argument that dissent is a

relatively rare phenomenon. In fact 95-percent of the people, 95-percent of the time, do


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not participate in collective action. This statistic is commonly referred to as the 5-percent

rule (Lichbach 1998).

While there is much evidence that the 5-percent rule holds, Lichbach (1998)

argues that the current problem facing rational choice theorists is how collective action

can be explained when it does occur. In other words, what explanations can be offered to

explain the activities of the 5-percent who do participate in collective action? Lichbach

(1998) says:

There are, [second], those who do rebel. While this is by far the smaller

category, one cannot ignore the fact that some people at some time in some

places are able to overcome the Rebels Dilemma and rebel. This is referred to

as the paradox or puzzle of CA [collective action] (p.12).

Lichbach (1998) offers four solutions to the rebels dilemma. These are

Contract, Hierarchy, Market, and Community. The market solution to the collective

action problem assumes that individuals do not engage in social planning. Therefore, a

state of nature exists among the rebels. Rebels participate in collective action when the

immediate environmental conditions allow them to do so. These conditions may include,

reduced supply of the collective good, increased probability of winning or lowered costs.

The Contract solution proposes that rebels solve their collective action problems

through the formation of association relationships, whereby there is a contractual

agreement among the members as to the type of institutions they seek. Therefore, the

rebels solve their collective action problem through a formal agreement.

The Hierarchy solution proposes that the public goods problem is solved through

the existence of formal organizations that have the ability to coerce members into

contributing to collective action. These institutions are created specifically to manage

society and plan social order.

Regarding the community solution, Lichbach (1998) says:


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Dissidents, however, are often members of a shared community. Communal

groups, characterized by strong social institutions, hold common beliefs and

eventually engage in common behavior. In short, communal relationships beget

communal understandings, which beget communal action (p.111).

Communal groups can hence overcome the collective action problem by

establishing a common belief system and a set of common values. Communities are able

to remedy the free rider problem by increasing the perception that other members of the

community will join in the protest. Under these condition, rebels are less likely to act in

self-interest and more likely to act in the interest of the community.

Lichbach (1998) argues that there are four factors that act to increase the

dissidents belief that others will participate in the collective action. These are, Mutually

understood signals, Places and times, Causal mechanisms and Communications. Mutually

understood signals preempt the need for overt leadership in the dissident group. The

dissidents are able to act in unison through the use of community-specific symbols.

The community is able to better communicate to its members regarding the places

and times at which the dissident activity is to take place. The history of collective action

has shown that there is much significance attached to the places where the dissent occurs.

Lichbach (1998) uses several examples to illustrate this point. Student protesters often

meet at a particular significant place on their campus for a demonstration or rioters may

commune at a major intersection that they hold significant. Similarly, the community

may pick certain significant times that are mutually understood and easily communicated,

to engage in their dissident activity.

Members of a community are well aware of the causal mechanisms that link them

to the other members of the group. They understand that their actions will have

consequences for other members and that another members actions will have


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consequences for them. These causal links contribute to solving the collective action

problem by establishing causal interconnectedness among the community members.

Finally, communication among the members of the group helps facilitate

solidarity, clarify expectations of each member and reinforce each members

connectedness in the community. Mutually understood communication therefore helps

in solving the collective action problem.

Skocpol (1982) has argued that Islamic groups operate under the influence of a

unique political culture. This political culture lends itself to the formation of a community

within the dissident groups. Therefore, using the rational choice perspective, Islamist

dissident groups are able to solve their collective action problem through mutually

understood symbols, causal mechanisms, places and times and communication.

Indeed there is much evidence to show that Islamist groups use these factors to

increase the perceptions of a community among the members. The invocation of symbols

such asAllah,Jihad, theShariahand theQuaranare powerful means of reinforcing the

community. Further, the idea ofUmmah, or the Islamic community around the world, is a

powerful socialization practice that facilitates causal mechanisms and communications.

Parsa (1989) argues that mosques were extensively used as meeting grounds for

dissidents and the Islamic lunar calendar was used to establish times for dissident events.

Therefore, Islamic communities around the world are able to make use of mutually

significant times and places, symbols, communication and interconnectedness to increase

the perception that the collective action problem among the dissidents will be solved.

The community solution to the free rider problem implies that Islamist dissident

groups should show high levels of mobilization. However, while Lichbachs solutions to

the CA problem and subsequent mechanisms of contention explain why dissent occurs,


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his theory does not explain variations across social movement activity. How can we

explain variations in the strategies used by social movements? Why do some movements

refrain from directly challenging the regime while others engage in political opposition,

despite comparable levels of community cohesion?

Kitschelts (Kitschelt 1986) research on the anti nuclear movement in four

western democracies (United States, France, Sweden and West Germany) provides a

possible solution to the puzzle. He finds that movements in more open and responsive

political systems such as the United States and Sweden adopted more assimilative

strategies such as lobbying, petitioning and political party activity. On the other hand,

movements in more closed political systems such as France and W. Germany adopted

more confrontational activities like public demonstrations and civil disobedience (della

Porta, Kriesi et al. 1999). Kitschelt (1986) finds that state accommodation leads to social

movements following more institutional strategies of dissent while state repressiveness

leads to extra institutional strategies.

It is clear that Islamist movements use the community solution to the free rider

problem, but state responses of repression or accommodation predispose movements

towards certain strategies as opposed to others. There is a need to understand how

institutional strategies (as Kitschelt finds) can vary across movements based on the

particularities of regime accommodation.

Constructivist school of thought

This group takes the cultural perspective in explaining opposition activity. An

important concept introduced by these authors is that of micromobilization. The term

refers to an escalation in opposition mobilization when the members of the opposition

movement consider the repression illegitimate and are able to participate in informal


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associations that support opposition to the regime (Opp and Roehl 1990). Therefore

individual relationships with the group and the community that are formed as a result of

the repression become important explanatory variables for group mobilization against the

state, even though escalation in resistance may not appear rational from the cost-benefit

stand point (McAdam and Paulsen 1993).

Opp and Roelh (1998) argue that informal kinship based ties form under

conditions of repression. Furthermore, for micromobilization processes to take effect, the

repression must be judged as illegitimate by the community. In other words, the presence

of an illegitimate other is necessary for reinforcement of community ties. While Opp

and Roelh (1998) make a convincing argument with regard to the effects of repression,

the effect of accommodation are not explored. How do micromobization strategies

change when the illegitimate other is seen as accommodating? If repression leads to an

increase in micromobilization, does accommodation necessarily lead to a decrease in

these informal community-based networks? What is the subsequent effect of this

decrease on movement activity?

Exploration of the formation of identity through community ties is an important

part of the constructivist endeavor. Scholars argue that social movements and dissenting

groups frame issues in a particular manner that makes collective action possible (Snow

1986). Snow et.al. (1986) argue that resource mobilization and relative deprivation

theorists have ignored the interpretive and framing function that is an important part of

collective action. They say:

Too much attention is focused on grievances per se, and on their social

psychological manifestations, to the neglect of the fact that grievances or

discontents are subject to differential interpretation, and in fact that variations in

their interpretation across individuals, social movement organizations, and time

can affect whether and how they are acted upon (p.465).


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Snow et. al (1986) define framing as the process by which social movements

establish congruence between individual interests, values, beliefs and the goals and

activities of the social movement. Therefore, the manner in which the exigency is

interpreted by the social movement is of most consequence in explaining collective

action.

Applying the concept of framing to opposition activity, some scholars argue

that rebellion against authorities is contingent on the injustice frame, or an

interpretation that defines the actions of the state as illegitimate, hence legitimizing

opposition (Goffman 1974; Moore 1978; Gamson, Fireman et al. 1982). This direction of

analysis is in congruence with Opp and Roehl (1990) who argue that the community must

judge the repression as illegitimate for micromobilization processes to take effect.

Several constructivist scholars examine the role of identity formation in the

community. Scholars argue that participants in collective action are able to align their

identities with the community through the processes of Identity Amplification, Identity

Consolidation, Identity Extension and Identity Transformation (Snow and McAdam

2000). Identity amplification is defined as, [t]he embellishment and strengthening of an

existing identity that is congruent with a movements collective identity but not

sufficiently salient to ensure participation and activism (p.49). This argument implies

that collective action is made possible by the invocation of an underlying individual

identity and then matching this identity with that of the group. A previously lower-order

identity is made salient enough to facilitate collective action.

Identity consolidation refers to the formation of an association between two or

more prior identities. New identities are not based on the amplification of an existing


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identity or the reemergence of a previous identity, but rather, on a blending process

between two identities (Snow and McAdam 2000).

Identity extension refers to the broadening of identity to allow for congruence

with the group while identity transformation refers to a dramatic change in identity due to

fracturing and obliterating of old identities. The result is a complete change in

perspective towards the group, as well as towards oneself.

This categorization points to the dynamic nature of self and group identity. While

Snow and McAdam (2000) provide an interesting analysis of the changing nature of

identity, they fail to identify the explanatory factors that would account for identity

amplification, transformation or extension.

Scholars such as Opp and Roehl (1990), Gamson et. al. (1982) and Goffman

(1975) have stressed the importance of how the movement participants interact with

authority as an important variable in explaining identity dynamism. It is hence

important to take account of both the external influences that change identity and how

identity changes as a result of these interactions.

Unfortunately, a detailed examination of identity changes in Jamaat and Muslim

Brotherhood are beyond the scope of this paper, as such research would necessarily

require field work. Nonetheless, in this paper, I assess possible identity changes in the

two movements using existing literature. I now explain my theoretical arguments on the

effects of regime accommodation.

Disaggregating the Effects of Accommodation

In the previous section I have argued that examining state responses is an

important variable in explaining the strategies of opposition movements. I have also

argued that the literature on social movement activity and the repression dissent nexus


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has treated accommodation as the counterpart to repression without adequately

examining the varying effects of different types of accommodative strategies.

Furthermore, the literature explains the conditions under which dissent occurs, but is less

prolific in explaining variations in strategies of movements. In this section, I explain the

theorized relationship between regime accommodation and Islamist movement strategies.

The last several decades have seen the emergence of Islamist opposition with

Islamist movements emerging as an important political force, questioning the activities of

the state, demanding greater religiosity in society and state, or seeking greater openness

at the institutional level (Juergensmeyer 1993; Nasr 1993; Esposito 1997; Wiktorowicz

2004). Some states have used repressive tactics to quell the tide of Islamist activism

while others have strategically used accommodation of certain key groups to prevent a

crisis of governance.

In the Muslim world accommodative policies have been employed in two

different ways Islamization, as in the case of Pakistan (under Zia) and Malaysia (under

Mahatir); or liberalization as in the case of Jordan (after 1989) and Turkey (Nasr 2001).

Islamization implies the transformation of the state institutions into a theocracy

whereby the state governs according to the principles of Islam. Shariahlaw may be

implemented and the courts may follow Islamic jurisprudence. Under state-led

Islamization, the government becomes the authority on religious interpretation. In the

case of Pakistan, Islamization policies were followed for the first time under General Zia.

Zia implemented Islamic education, Islamic taxation and Islamic judiciary.

Liberalization implies the opening up of the political system to allow civic and

other groups to function. Restrictions on political freedoms and liberty are repealed.

Liberalization is often accompanied by democratization, although not necessarily. In the


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case of Jordan, liberalization was initiated in 1989 under King Hussein. Parliamentary

elections were held in the same year and by 1993, several political parties had registered

with the government.

Scholars have argued that the nature of liberalization in Jordan is limited at best.

The goal of liberalization in Jordan is not democratization but to preserve state power

(Adams 1996; Robinson 1998; Wiktorowicz 2001). In the 1993 elections, the state

undertook electoral reforms and instituted a one-man-one-vote rule that would prevent

the Islamists from voting as a bloc, thus hurting their chances of electoral success. Even

though the state used precautionary tactics to prevent the Islamists from gaining

unmanageable influence in the state, elections were held and political freedoms were

granted under the newly initiated reforms4.

I argue that Islamization disempowers Islamist movements, making them critical

of government policies. Since the state now has the monopoly over religious

interpretation, the movement loses its major sphere of activity. It must now function

merely as a body of implementation of state Islamic policies. This new position

prevents the movement from establishing an identity separate from that of the state,

which is hurtful to the movements grassroots and other activities (Nasr 2001).

Liberalization on the other hand, empowers Islamist movements. Allowing

movements to have representation at the level of the state and to influence government

policy provides Islamist movements with an identifiable sphere of influence and

cultivates cooperative relations with the government. While it is argued that inclusion in

governmental processes limits that movements grassroots activity (Wiktorowicz 2001),

4It should be noted that under the reign of King Abdullah (1999 onwards) several impediments to

liberalization were initiated to manage Islamic activism, see Wiktorowicz, Q. (2001). The Management

of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood and State Power in Jordan. New York, SUNY Press.


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often through control over key portfolios such as education and health, Islamist

movements are able to better achieve their community-level goals.

State accommodation can therefore have varying effects based on the extent to

which the movement feels empowered by its new position. I argue that while Islamization

disempowers Islamist movements and therefore leads to greater anti regime

oppositional tendencies, liberalization empowers Islamist movements and encourages a

cooperative relationship with the government. Movement strategies are therefore

explained by the type of accommodative policies followed by the state.

Case Selection

Two cases of accommodation are examined in this paper Pakistan (1977-1989)

and Jordan (1989-1999). During this period, both countries accommodated Islamist

movements in response to a growing crisis of governance and rising tide of Islamist

activism. Pakistan, under General Zia Islamized the state and society, making Jamaat its

closest allay. Jordan liberalized the polity, allowing movements such as MB to contest

elections.

Crisis of Governance

During the years that preceded accommodation, both Pakistan and Jordan were

facing economic, political and social crises. In Jordan, the regime faced threat from

growing Palestinian activism, particularly the activities of the Palestinian Liberation

Organization (PLO) as well as for Nasserites and Bathists. Also, the country was in

financial turmoil owing to cuts in foreign aid from the United States, falling oil prices and

declining remittances from expatriates. To mitigate the effects of the crisis, austerity

measures were introduced in 1989 that increased the price of certain goods such as


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cigarettes and gasoline. In response, riots broke out throughout the country leading to

further chaos.

Similarly, in Pakistan rising unemployment and inflation had led to severe social

unrest. Ethnic factionalism had emerged with Sindis and Baluchis threatening the Bhutto

regime. An Islamist movement under the banner Nizam-i-Mustapha(consisting of nine

separate movements) threatened to topple the government. In 1977, Pakistan went to the

polls with the main opposition to the Bhutto government coming from Islamists. Despite

their widespread popularity, the Islamists did not do well in the elections leading to

popular beliefs that the election had been rigged. Activists took to the street and social

turmoil ensued. In this state of unrest, General Zia staged a coup in July 1977.

Both countries followed accommodative policies in response to crises of

governance (Adams 1996; Robinson 1998; Nasr 2001; Wiktorowicz 2001). In order to

quell social unrest and consolidate their power, the governments formed tactical alliances

with Islamists that held the greatest political and social influence at the time Jamaat-i-

Islam in Pakistan and Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan.

Jamaat-i-Islam and Muslim Brotherhood

Jamaat and the Muslim Brotherhood became the major targets of regime

accommodation due to their wide support base. The two movements represent the

dynamic nature of Islamist activism. They have functioned as opposition parties, regime

allies and charity organizations as well as social movements.

The Muslim Brotherhood was formed in 1929 by Hassan Al- Banna. Its Jordanian

Branch was set up in 1945. The Brotherhood never espoused the overthrow of the

government or violent rebellion. The main motto of the movement, in its philosophical

roots, has been evolution, not revolution (Wiktorowicz 2001). Even though


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traditionally the MB had never directly threatened the regime, it would be a misnomer to

believe that the MB has no history of regime opposition. In the mid 1980s, MB had

become forthright in its demands for democratization and Islamist reforms. Under the

Hussein regime (before 1989), the MB was active in opposition to the regime on the

Palestinian question, advocating, No to Camp David and no to Reagan, and No

solution to the Palestinian question except through Islam. (Day 1986; Boulby 1999). MB

also attacked the government on human rights issues, activities of the security services,

public sector corruption and the continuance of martial law (Day 1986; Robbins 1986;

Boulby 1999; Wiktorowicz 2001).

State reactions to the MB before 1989 had been a combination of repression and

accommodation. While the MB was never subject to harsh repression, as several other

groups in Jordan were, under Hussein, security services often harassed MB members by

taking away passports of senior members and forcing members to resign from their jobs

at universities and other areas.

Jamaat-i-Islam was formed in 1941 under the leadership of Mawdudi. Mawdudi

saw Islam as the solution for the problems of South Asian Muslims and believed that

change could be achieved through reform. In its philosophical roots, Jamaat had little

interest in politics and was conceptualized primarily as an elitist movement seeking

greater religiosity in the state. Mawdudi explicitly rejected democracy in his writings,

arguing that illiterate people can not be in charge of their own government. Even though

the movement had apolitical roots, Jamaats leadership was a key pillar for the

opposition movement to Bhuttos regime. Jamaat was one of the nine members of the

Nizam-i-Mustapha Movementthat contested elections against Bhutto. Jamaat was also

active in anti-regime protest in response to the 1977 elections.


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Both Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat have reformist philosophical roots that

translated to moderate political action in their respective polities. In the years

immediately prior to regime accommodation, both movements had shown increased anti-

regime activism. However, their post accommodation strategies diverged. Jamaat,

while initially cooperative with the Zia regime, soon transformed into a pro democracy

activist movement, while MB became a loyal opposition to the Jordanian regime, never

directly challenging regime policies. I now present the case studies in detail.

Pakistani Islamization and the Jamaat-i-Islam

The state of Pakistan was formed primarily to protect the interests of the South

Asian Muslim minority once the Indian subcontinent received independence from British

rule. Ironically, Islam had been a limited part of government until Zias regime was

instituted in 1977.

Previous military leaders such as Yaha Khan and Ayub Khan had been ardent

secularists. The Bhutto regime paid lip service to Islamists, by terming Pakistans nuclear

program, the Islamic Bomb, seeking greater cooperation with Gulf states and including

Arabic in the school curriculum. However, Bhuttos appeal to the Islamists was not

credible owing to his reputation as a secularist in the early years of his political career

(Nasr 1993).

The 1970s saw a rise in Islamism around the world. In Pakistan, the 1970s were

the apogee of anti state Islamist activism, particularly after the loss of East Pakistan in a

war with its neighbor India. The loss of territory became a central grievance for the

Islamists, who blamed the loss on the lack of religiosity in state and society (Khan 1985).

Zia came to power amidst social, economic and political turmoil. His immediate

goal was to restore order in the country. The means to achieve this end were the


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Islamization of state and society. While Islamization was part a tactical strategy to co opt

the Islamists and unite the country, Zia had been an ardent admirer of Mawdudis work

and had encouraged soldiers under his command to read his work and practice Islamic

teachings (Khan 1985; Nasr 2001). Therefore, Zia had religious credibility that his

predecessor Bhutto lacked.

Zia made several changes in governance to institute Islamism. Islamic code was

strictly enforced through Shariah law and Islamic jurisprudence. Along with Islamism

came the curtailment of civil liberties. All opposition to the regime wad considered anti

Islamic and elections were postponed on two occasions. Zia declared himself as

having the right to interpret and enforce Islamic law.

Jamaat was given special status under Zias regime. Islamization was carried out

under the road map of Mawdudis writings. Many members of Jamaat were included in

Zias inner circle of advisors to provide guidelines on seeking greater Islamization.

Jamaat leaders were also given important portfolios such as petroleum, water and power.

Jamaat and Zia were tactical allies in seeking the suppression of remaining factions of

support for the Bhutto regime (Peoples Party of Pakistan or PPP). Jamaat had opposed

the PPP in 1977 and saw Zia as a partner against a common enemy (Nasr 2001). Further,

Zia used Jamaat to quell more radical anti regime Islamist movements such as Islami

Jamiat-i Taluba, a student organization.

Zia initiated the large scale Islamization of state and society with Jamaat as an

ally. Initially Jamaat cooperated with the regime, as this was the first time any

government had made an effort to co opt the movement and implement its demands.

Jamaat held pro- regime rallies and formed religious police squads to enforce


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Islamization. In the early years of Zias administration, Jamaat followed the strategy of

cooperation with the regime.

Zia postponed elections soon after coming to power on the pretext that if elections

were held and PPP was allowed to contest, the debacle of the 1971 loss of East Pakistan

would be repeated. Jamaat supported Zia in this decision owing to its anti PPP stance

and Mawdudis general sentiment against democracy.

However, the alliance between the regime and Jamaat was short lived. Jamaats

strategies changed drastically when it realized that it had been disempowered through its

association with the regime. Two factors proved to be particularly important Jamaats

grassroots activities had been hampered through its close association with the regime. Zia

had banned both student and labor organizations. Association with such regime tactics

had made several sections of the population critical of Jamaat. Second, Zia had the

monopoly over the interpretation of Islam. Therefore, even though Jamaat members had

been given important positions within the administration, their influence was limited

(Nasr 1993). As Nasr (1993) explains, Islamization, [however], proved to be a bone of

contention. While it created concord between Zia and the Jamaat in principle, in practice

it also promoted conflict between the two over what the content of the Islamization

program should be (p.266).

Amidst the growing tension between Zia and Jamaat, the elections planned for

1979 were suspended. In 1980, Jamaat members issued strong statements to Zia warning

him of the consequences of his policy. They asked Zia to restore civilian rule, cut

censorship and restore rule of law.

Jamaat was becoming increasingly divided among two groups. One group led by

Mian Tufayal worked closely with Zia and felt that Jamaat should not oppose Zia


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because its greatest enemy was the PPP. The other, known as the Karachi group argued

that Jamaat could only ensure its survival by moving away from the regimes ideological

agenda and cultivating support from a new social stratum. The Karachi group started

demanding socioeconomic justice and democracy. As Nasr (1993) explains:

This initiative [Karachi initiative] was a manifestation of disenchantment with the Zia

regime, but more importantly, it was a recognition of the limits the emotive appeal of

Islam had in the face of secular political issues socioeconomic justice and ethnic

concerns and democratic demands. Islamization, in the eyes of the younger and more

politically inclined of at leaders could no longer sustain a successful political

campaign (p.272).

Meanwhile, a pro-democracy movement, Movement for the Restoration of

Democracy (MRD), had emerged with an alliance formed between the students

movement and the PPP. In 1985 elections were held, but Jamaats showing was poor.

These elections confirmed that Jamaat had lost its support base. It was Zia and not

Jamaat that had profited from Islamization in Pakistan.

The results of the election strengthened the Karachi group, under the leadership of

Gafur Ahmad. They advocated that Jamaat form an alliance with the MRD. This was a

significant reorientation for Jamaat. The party started distancing itself from Zia. In 1987,

Jamaat voted Qazi Husain Ahmed as its leader who was from the Karachi group. He had

also been an advocate of Jamaat joining the MRD. He was openly critical of Zia, arguing

that neither Islamization, nor the Afghan Jihad justified the abrogation of democracy in

Pakistan. By 1988 Jamaat had formally cut connections with the Zia regime and formed

an alliance with the MRD.

Although Islamist revivalism is thought to be solely committed to the Islamization

of society, the record of Jamaat shows that often political and organizational interests

can trump commitment to Islamization. In the case of Pakistan, Jamaats political


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interests led it to become critical of Zias regime and favor the democratic process. Such

actions are not usually associated with Islamist movements.

The case of Jamaat shows us the dynamics of continuity and change in Islamist

movements and how Islamization can actually disempower Islamists, making them

critical of the regime and leading to a significant change in strategies.

Jordanian Liberalization and the Muslim Brotherhood

Prior to 1989, Jordan had followed policies of harsh repression towards Islamists.

Most Islamists were detained, questioned and tortured for anti regime activities. Even

though the repressive apparatus of the state prevented Islamists from participating

directly in politics, many groups used associational networks to carry on charity work.

The Muslim Brotherhood was one such group (Wiktorowicz 2001).

In 1984, King Hussein decided to hold elections, mostly as a means to gauge

public opinion. Political parties were not legal at the time and candidates ran as

individuals. Further, the press was severely restricted. The Muslim Brotherhood

participated in these elections, and to the alarm of the regime, commanded a high volume

of the vote. The excellent showing of the MB was a cause for alarm for the regime as it

was an indication of the popularity of the Islamists.

The MB used its electoral showing to increase leverage on the government and

increase its opposition activities (Boulby 1999). The rising Islamist opposition combined

with political and economic crises led King Hussein to initiate a series of liberalization

reforms in 1989.

Parliamentary elections were held in the same year in which the MB won 34 of

the 80 seats contested. Political parties were still illegal during the 1989 elections.

However, since the MB had already been active as an associational network, it was able


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to command a high number of votes. MB had a wide support base among Palestinian and

Transjordanian areas that valued democracy and sought greater liberalization in the

government (Boulby 1999).

The wide social base of the Brotherhood made it a prime candidate for

government cooptation. In 1990, the government used the Brotherhood to pacify social

unrest in the country by appealing for peace. State directed liberalization therefore

proceeded with a key alliance with a traditionally moderate Islamist group. In 1991,

members of the Muslim Brotherhood gained socially important portfolios such as

education, health, justice and social development. Alcohol was banned from government

and public buildings and the MB became in charge of Islamic programming on television.

Furthermore, MB was allowed to contest municipal elections where it gained significant

ground. The movement was also popular with professional associations. While the

regimes support of the MB was based on its wide social base combined with the

possibility that it may form alliances with anti regime forces such as Palestinians, Arab

Nationalists and East Bankers, the MB was able to use its privileged position to gain an

important sphere of influence in politics.

In 1992, the Brotherhood formed the Islamic Action Front (IAF) which was

necessitated by the provisions of the National Charter that legalized political parties but

prohibited those that had links outside Jordan. The regime announced elections in 1993,

but introduced a one-man-one-vote system that would prevent Islamists from voting as

a bloc and therefore hampered their chances of electoral success. In response, the IAF

threatened to boycott the elections. King Hussein appealed to the IAF to carry out its

historical responsibilities and to proceed, with Gods help, toward genuine Islam


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(Adams 1996). Eventually, the IAF and the Muslim Brotherhood gave up their brief

opposition to the regime and contested elections under the new electoral law.

The IAF did not fare well in the 1993 elections, leading to speculation by some

scholars that the MB had lost its support base. Boulby (1999) explains, The Muslim

Brotherhood did not extend its parliamentary agenda much beyond the vaguely defined

principles of its campaign program Islam is the solution (p.153). Therefore it lost

support from other Islamists as well as from the populace. However other scholars have

argued that given that they were contesting elections in a system that hurt them, the MB

performed well. In particular, the MB received votes in the Palestinian areas where its

support had been high in previous elections (Robinson 1998). Therefore, there is little

evidence that MB had lost its support base.

Robinson (1998) argues that the MB had been able to provide social services to

the population that the regime had not. In addition, because it still had an identity

separate from that of the regime, it had not become associated with the corruption among

government officials. MB was still considered a pious religious party.

Despite its wide support base, the Muslim Brotherhood has not chosen to oppose

the regime, instead working within the political apparatus in seeking reform. There is a

small radical wing operating within the Brotherhood, but even this wing has never

advocated radical opposition to the regime, or seeking its overthrow (Wiktorowicz 2001).

The MB had several opportunities for mobilization against the regime, but it has worked

within the system as a loyal opposition, focusing primarily on social reform (Robinson

1998).

The case of Jordanian liberalization and the Muslim Brotherhood shows that

through empowerment of Islamists by giving them a sphere of influence can cause an


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already moderate opposition group to become even more moderate. While traditionally

reformist, the MB had shown resistance to the Hussein regime. After the 1989 reforms,

the MB worked within the system as a key ally to the Hashemite rule.

Conclusion

Islamist movements have used various strategies in their interaction with domestic

governments. They are not simply faith based organizations that are an expression of

religious fundamentalism, nor are they mere terrorist cells. As I have shown in this paper,

Islamist movements have functioned as charity organizations, social movements and even

pro democracy forces. They are dynamic entities that strategically adapt to the needs of

their environment in expressing their grievances and seeking their goals. Therefore, there

are many benefits of examining Islamist movements using the social movement theory

lens.

How do we understand the varying strategies of Islamist movements? In this

paper, I argue that state responses are a key explanatory variable when examining the

dynamic nature of Islamist movement strategies. I examine the effect of state

accommodation, arguing that the literature on repression/accommodation and dissent has

focused all its energies on varying levels of repression, to the determent of a clear

understanding of the effects of accommodation.

I argue that in the context of Islamist movements, states have used two types of

accommodative strategies Islamization and liberalization. Islamization disempowers

Islamist movements by expanding state power and preventing the movements from

having an identity of their own beyond that of the state. Therefore, Islamization leads to

greater regime opposition among Islamist movements.


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Liberalization empowers Islamist movement by giving them a greater sphere of

influence in politics and society. Islamist movements that are accommodated through

liberalization show greater cooperation with the government and moderation in their

strategies.

I explain my argument by examining the cases of Pakistan (1977-1989) where

Islamization policies were implemented under General Zia and Jordan (1989-1999)

where liberalization policies were implemented under King Hussein. I examine the effect

of these policies on the strategies of the major Islamist movements operating in these

countries that became the targets of accommodative policies Jamaat-i-Islam in

Pakistan and Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. Both had been moderate, reformist

movements before the accommodative policies were followed, but had exhibited an

increase in anti regime activity in the years immediately preceding accommodation.

I found that in the case of Pakistan, while Islamization initially created a

relationship of cooperation between Zia and Jamaat, this partnership proved to be short

lived. Jamaat soon realized that it had lost support from several sections of the

population because of its association with the repressive tactics of the regime. An anti

regime subgroup soon emerged within the Jamaat and by 1988, it had officially ended its

relationship with the regime and formed an alliance with the pro democracy group,

Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD). Jamaat continually pressed the

regime for elections and critiqued Zias policies on rule of law and media censorship.

Jamaat therefore exhibited a change in strategy from a reformist, moderate Islamist

movement, to a pro democracy, anti regime opposition movement.

In the case of Jordan, liberalization provided a greater sphere of influence for the

Muslim Brotherhood. The movement became loyal to the regime and never directly


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challenged its power. Even with the introduction of unfair electoral laws in 1993, and the

IAFs threats to boycott the elections, the movement ultimately gave in to the requests of

the regime and did participated in the elections. MB has also cooperated with the

government in preventing social turmoil in the country. In exchange, MB members were

given important portfolios and many of their demands regarding education and television

programming were met. Overall, a cooperative relationship emerged between King

Husseins regime and MB that we did not see in the case of Pakistan.

This paper points out that governments that Islamize plant the seeds for their own

destruction. When Islamization is accompanied by an increase in state power, as it most

often is, greater opposition emerges in the long run. On the other hand, the case of Jordan

shows that liberalization provides Islamists with a separate sphere of influence and

creates less dissent.


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Documents

Muslim Brotherhood of Jordan & Jama’at i Islam of Pakistan by Neha Sahgal